MASTERS THESIS
Study program/ Specialization:
Spring semester, 2015
Masters degree programme
in Offshore technology/
Industrial Asset Management
(Writers signature)
Thesis title:
Credits (ECTS): 30
Key words:
Pages:
International project
Norwegian operator
South Korean shipyard
Communication and coordination
EPC contract
130
+ enclosure:
Stavanger, 15.06/2015
Date/year
Abstract
The oil and gas exploration and production industry in the North Sea has been challenged extensively over
the last decade with increasing cost profiles. This condition, together with relatively low oil prices, has
begun to squeeze the commercial margins of a large number of industrial assets. Foreign engineering
contracts have become a common trend in this context for those seeking significant cost advantages during
the engineering phase of major offshore facilities. However, this popular strategy has been met with
serious debates due to many critical issues experienced in complex engineering projects.
In last few years, many Norwegian offshore oil and gas field development projects were awarded to Asian
contractors. Despite of the commercial incentive to improve cost-effectiveness of those projects, reports
and analyses have revealed that most of them have failed to deliver on time and budget during their
execution phase. This makes the economics of projects on the Norwegian continental shelf more
vulnerable to the recent oil market downturn. At the same time, it also has raised concerns about the
efficiency of the coordination and communication management process of large-scale projects under EPC
(Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) contracts.
This study investigated the key elements contributing to project coordination and communication
challenges and resulting delays in schedule and cost overruns of EPC projects awarded to shipyards in
South Korea. In order to identify the key elements, principal data were gathered using in-depth, openended, guided interviews with Norwegian operators, sub-contractors, and authorities, involving those who
have long experience with EPC projects awarded to South Korean shipyards. The paper will define and
discuss how the key elements regulate the efficiency of complex engineering projects involving
Norwegian operators and foreign contractors. It will also suggest how to improve the current situation and
enhance overall project performance.
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... I
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................... II
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................. VI
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................. VII
1.
2.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.
Background ................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
2.1.1.
2.1.2.
2.1.3.
2.2.
3.
2.2.1.
2.2.2.
Characteristics ..................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.3.
2.2.4.
2.2.5.
Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.
II
3.1.1.
3.1.2.
3.2.
3.3.
3.3.1.
3.3.2.
3.3.3.
3.4.
4.
4.1.1.
4.1.2.
4.2.
5.
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
4.2.3.
4.2.4.
4.2.5.
Findings ............................................................................................................................................... 35
5.1.
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.1.4.
5.2.
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
6.
5.2.3.
5.2.4.
5.2.5.
5.2.6.
5.2.7.
Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 88
6.1.
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.2.
6.2.2.
6.2.3.
6.3.1.
6.3.2.
6.3.3.
8.
6.2.1.
6.3.
7.
7.1.1.
7.1.2.
7.1.3.
7.2.
7.3.
List of Figures
Figure 2-1 Life cycle of building and construction project (Morris, 1988 cited in Gardiner, 2005) ............. 6
Figure 4-1 Exploration & production project development model (Odland, 2013) .................................... 19
Figure 4-2 Project development (Odland, 2013) ......................................................................................... 20
Figure 4-3 Commitment to cost and technical issues (Gudmestad, Zolotuchin and Jarlsby, 2010) ............ 21
Figure 4-4 Total value of ship delivered (2007-2013) (OECD, 2014) ........................................................ 24
Figure 4-5 Market share by shipbuilding order intake (Sung and Lee, 2015) ............................................. 25
Figure 4-6 Break down of order intake by ship type (Sung and Lee, 2015) ............................................... 25
Figure 4-7 Floating production units market share 2005-2009 (Koshipa, 2011) ........................................ 28
Figure 4-8 New order intake of the Big 3 2012 to 2014 (Han, 2015) ......................................................... 28
Figure 4-9 QUARTERLY FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF HHI (HHI, 2015) ................................... 30
Figure 4-10 QUARTERLY FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SHI (SHI, 2015; Kang, 2015) .............. 30
Figure 4-11 QUARTERLY FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF DSME .................................................. 31
Figure 4-12 Unbilled account receivable of the Big 3 (HHI, 2015; SHI, 2015; DSME, 2015) .................. 31
Figure 4-13 Big 3s New order intake in offshore segment (Cheon, 2015d) .............................................. 33
Figure 4-14 Big 3s new order intake in shipbuilding and offshore segment (Cheon, 2015d) ................... 34
Figure 5-1 Comparison between Norway and South Korea (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005) ...................... 36
Figure 5-2 Communication patterns between organization ......................................................................... 42
Figure 5-3 Labor productivity comparison in Shipbuilding industry (Ecorys, 2009) ................................. 46
Figure 5-4 Head count development of South Korean shipbuilding industry ............................................. 50
Figure 5-5 Headcount development (Offshore segment) ............................................................................ 51
Figure 5-6 Ratio of Sub-contractor (Tech. & crafts.) to Shipyard Engineer ............................................... 52
Figure 5-7 Information flow ........................................................................................................................ 60
Figure 5-8 Communication patterns within South Korean EPC contractor ................................................ 75
Figure 5-9 Contractual relationship in shipbuilding project ........................................................................ 77
Figure 5-10 Contractual relationship in offshore EPC project .................................................................... 78
VI
List of Tables
Table 3-1 Difference between Quantitative and Qualitative research (Bryman, 2012) .............................. 14
Table 3-2 Interview participants.................................................................................................................. 16
Table 4-1 Norwegian project awarded to East Asian shipyard ................................................................... 22
Table 4-2 Norwegian Offshore projects awarded to Big 3 .......................................................................... 29
Table 5-1 Hall's low-context/high-context approach (Ulven, 2004) ........................................................... 37
Table 5-2 Norwegian business practices observed by South Korean (INTSOK, 2014) ............................. 72
Table 6-1 Difference between Norway and South Korea............................................................................ 88
Table 6-2 Classification of differences........................................................................................................ 91
Table 6-3 3D modeling software in use (ETRS, 2015) ............................................................................. 105
VII
1.
Introduction
1.1.
Background
The last decade with its strong oil market resulted in a significant increase in field development costs
worldwide. Oil and gas field development costs almost quadrupled between 2001 and 2012, while
production grew by only 2% (Statoil, 2014).
Norway, the 5th largest oil exporter in the world, has not been immune to the high cost in the oil and gas
industry. The high compensation level in the manufacturing industry of Norway (TCB, 2014) put much
pressure on the economic viability of new field development projects. In an attempt to tackle the high cost
challenges, Norwegian operators have made various efforts to bring development cost down for each and
every phases of offshore oil and gas field development projects. For the execution phase, where intensive
input of labor is required, notoriously high labor cost in Norway provided a strong incentive for
Norwegian operators to eye East Asian contractors rather than Norwegian players. East Asian shipyards
won fabrication contracts from Norwegian operators in the mid to late 1990s. As cost levels in Norway
kept escalating, Asian yards also appeared to be successful in securing more projects with higher budget
and complexity, including multiple EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) projects, in the
late 2000s and early 2010s.
What was delivered for such high profile projects, however, was not something the Norwegians expected.
Many of these projects suffered from huge cost overruns, significant delays in schedule, and low quality.
In its report in 2013, the NPD (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) stated that the Skarv FPSO (Floating
Production Storage Offloading unit), built by South Korean and Singaporean contractors, suffered
significant cost overruns of 32% in total (NPD, 2013). More recently, the Goliat FPSO, delivered from
South Korean yard, reportedly hit a 49% cost increase (Haugstad, 2015).
Bad experiences with East Asian shipyards, together with already expensive field development cost levels
in Norway, deepened Norwegian operators concerns over the high risk potential of cost overruns for new
projects in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Such concerns and the recent oil price drop pose
serious challenges to the Norwegian oil and gas industry and resulted in a series of postponed executions
of fresh field development projects late last year and early this year.
Given that the market consensus is that oil prices will remain volatile for years to come, it is essential to
make industry-wide effort to gain more control over cost development during the project execution phase.
1.2.
Many of projects awarded to East Asian shipyards by Norwegian operators have been adversely impacted
by significant time and cost overruns. It is of critical importance for the whole Norwegian oil and gas
industry to address this challenge, and many researches have been conducted about how to do this. Most
of the researchers working on this issue have adopted a broad view approach to cover the whole project
life cycle or project development phases (see 4.1.1). This approach helps locate the activities that should
be improved to prevent cost overruns from the wide perspective involving multiple of project phases.
Although the researchers were diligent in this respect, their findings have not been sufficient to provide
practical implications to Norwegian companies that were actually involved in the projects at East Asian
shipyards. When it comes to the project execution phase, the previous research findings have limited
practical implications, highlighting only the significance of Norwegian operators responsibility and
emphasizing the importance of the operators obligation to carry all the burdens. Although it is true that
the operators should assume such responsibility, the research could have moved one step beyond this and
touched upon the practical problems that arise at the East Asian shipyards and, thus, trouble Norwegian
players.
1.3.
Research Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the Norwegian oil and gas industry with insights into how to deal
with difficulties arising during the execution phase of Norwegian EPC projects in South Korean shipyards
effectively. For the last few years, the majority of the projects have gone to South Korean contractors in a
form of EPC contracts, and many of these projects are known to suffer from cost and schedule overruns.
To provide these insights, I investigated the practical problems occurring during the projects which were
either recently completed or are currently under construction at the shipyards using a phenomenology
approach to understand and describe such challenges. Primary research data were collected via in-depth,
open-ended, semi-structured interviews, and secondary data were gathered through various resources. In
addition to providing these insights, I also provide suggestions for the Norwegian players to be better
prepared for the challenges that may arise.
1.4.
Research Questions
This thesis aims to answer following research questions developed from the statement of the problem:
What are key factors that contribute to challenges arising from Norwegian EPC project at South
Korean shipyards?
1.5.
Project management is a broad and complex subject where many different approaches can be taken for a
research activity. Thus, some constraints are necessary for practical reasons. For this study, the constraints
include the following:
The research task is restricted to the execution phase of Norwegian EPC project at South Korean
shipyards. Hence, any potential factors contributory to cost overruns that originally emerge from
preceding phases in the course of project development, (i.e., feasibility study, concept selection,
FEED) are not of consideration in this study.
This study investigated Norwegian EPC projects in South Korea where the project deliverables
require high technical complexity, such as topside or offshore units with new concepts. Thus,
projects with relatively low complexity were not taken into consideration.
EPC contract comes in many variants. The effect of such variants on the project is beyond the
scope of this study. In this study EPC contract denotes EPC contract and all its variants.
Compensation schemes of EPC contracts also come in many variants. The effect of such variants
on the projects is also beyond the scope of this study.
Another constraint is the focus of the study on two distinct features of Norwegian EPC project in
South Korea: the management of international project and the use of the EPC contract format. The
features provide primary inputs to the study design, as discussed in Chapter 3.
1.6.
Thesis Structure
This thesis is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides the context for the study, describes the task,
and offers definitions of terms used in the study. Chapter 2 presents a review of existing literature relevant
to the thesis topic and identifies the focus area of the study. Chapter 3 contains the research methods along
with the study limitations. Chapter 4 provides an overview of Norwegian field development projects
awarded to East Asian yards and an introduction to the South Korean shipbuilding industry. Chapter 5
presents the study findings, where the key influential factors are described and how they create challenges
is illustrated. Chapter 6 contains recommendations for Norwegian companies to help them mitigate the
challenges in EPC projects in South Korea. Chapter 7 offers areas of potential future study and discusses
challenges for this study. The thesis reaches conclusion at Chapter 8.
2.
Literature Review
This chapter provides presentation of the two major features of Norwegian EPC project in South Korea,
that is, the management of international projects and the use of the EPC contract format.
2.1.
International Project
Project deliverables are constructed. Thus, most of the resources are used, and control is critical
in this phase. As project progresses, better descriptions of the project end product are obtained.
Changes requested should be properly managed to minimize their impact on critical success
factors of the project.
Closure
The budget is closed and documentation is completed. Any conflicts and disputes among project
stakeholders are settled. Official evaluation of the project as a whole can take place.
Time zone: overlapping working hours between two locations affects communication.
Organizational behavior: Each organizations structure and corporate culture is unique, so new
comers should learn about these elements in order to work efficiently.
Profession: The distinct work habits or mindsets of each person influence the degree of distance
between people.
Power distance
The extent to which power differentials within an organization is accepted by less powerful
people.
Uncertainty avoidance
The extent to which members of a society are tolerant of uncertainty of the future.
2.2.
Under the EPC contract format, the EPC contractor and the operator, who owns the project, have distinct
roles. The EPC contractor serves as a single point of responsibility, communication, and coordination
(Schramm, Meiner and Weidinger, 2010) for major project activities. Hence, almost all risk is shifted
from the operator to the EPC contractor. The operators task as the project owner includes contract
management concerning contractual relationship with the EPC contractor and interface management
across multiple entities (Schramm, Meiner and Weidinger, 2010). Situated at the center of the EPC
contractual relationship, the EPC contractor has to deal with the operator and many sub-contractors. In
particular, the EPC contractor needs to ensure that its sub-contractors comply with all requirements from
the operator while carrying out their own tasks.
2.2.2. Characteristics
According to Schramm, Meiner and Weidinger (2010), the key characteristics of the EPC contract format
includes the following:
The EPC contractor acts as a single point of responsibility for work performance, communication,
and coordination;
A relatively long tendering process and initial engineering phase negatively affect the project
schedule.
Higher efficiency expected because one contractor is responsible for both engineering and
construction.
Fewer changes
10
Transfer of schedule risk to the EPC contractor (disadvantage for the EPC contractor)
Transfer of risk associated with operator supplied items (disadvantage for the EPC contractor)
Transfer of risk associated with Guarantee for performance (disadvantage for the EPC contractor)
Allows for innovation for value engineering and constructability by the EPC contractor
Disadvantages
Transfer of cost risk to the EPC contractor can lead to substantial risk premium
The EPC contractor is incentivized to apply minimum compliant standard in order to reduce cost
EPC
EPCI
11
EPCI is often referred to as EPCH with a focus on hook-up function of offshore construction project.
EPCIC is normally used for new build projects of mobile offshore drilling units, such as drillship, semisubmersible drilling rig, and jack-up rig (INTSOK, 2014).
Compensation schemes
The impact of the compensation system on the project is not within the scope of the study, so it is
introduced only briefly in this section.
There exist various compensation systems applicable to the EPC contract format. The most frequently
used approaches includes lump sum price, target price, unit price, and cost reimbursable (Gloria,
Siegfriedt and Carstens, 2011; Gardiner, 2005).
Target price
Functional and technical scopes are well defined, but physical scope is not sufficiently defined
for the contractor to offer a fixed price. The contractor is encouraged to save cost. The operator
should be able to make good estimation of target price.
Unit price
The technical scope is established, but the quantity is not certain. The operator can have some
control to determine the quantity of the work units but also takes risks for the total quantity.
Cost reimbursable
The operator compensates the contractor for all work performed. The work scope is not well
defined, and many changes are expected. The operator can also choose this approach to control
the contractors performance. The operator can have influence over the resources assigned by
contractor.
12
For the former, an EPC contractor takes responsibility for major functions including engineering,
procurement, construction, and project control. Because one contractor can rarely perform all the
functions required to be an EPC contractor, it sub-contracts some of the functions to other entities or
forms a consortium or joint venture. Still, responsibility for the performance of sub-contractors lies with
the EPC contractor.
For the latter, an EPC contractor serves as a single point of responsibility for management of interfaces
between functions and among project stakeholders. The EPC contractor addresses interface issues by
recording and tracking interface information and by opening communication channels among the operator,
the EPC contractor itself, and the sub-contractors. To do this the EPC contractor takes a leading role for
communication and coordination activities across boundaries between functions and among subcontractors.
13
3.
Methodology
This chapter describes how the study was conducted including a discussion of the research methods and
data collection and analysis. This discussion is followed by a review of the studys limitations.
3.1.
Research Strategy
Quantitative
Qualitative
Inductive; generation of theory
Epistemological orientation
Interpretivism
Ontological orientation
Objectivism
Constructionism
Table 3-1 Difference between Quantitative and Qualitative research (Bryman, 2012)
In a qualitative research such as the present study, the inductive reasoning sequence provides a principal
method to generate theory, which tends to be the primary focus of the study. Though guided by informed
methods and additional research, these theories arise from the researchers interpretations of the data and
the social phenomenon (Bryman, 2012).
14
3.2.
Research Design
Within the domain of qualitative research, there are a number of approaches researchers may take such as
narrative research, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, case study, life history, and many
more. The research approach determines how to structure study and collect and analyze data; thus, each
approach has its own focused area and a type of problem for which the approach is designed (Creswell,
2007).
In his book, Creswell (2007) provides features of the phenomenology approach. This approach puts
emphasis on drawing from share experiences to describe core elements of a certain phenomenon.
Phenomenology researchers analyze multiple of individual experiences to uncover a larger social
phenomenon. Data in phenomenology approach is collected through interviews, for the most part, and is
supplemented by relevant documents and observations.
The present study is conducted to describe the challenges in Norwegian EPC projects in South Korean
shipyards, what factors create the challenges, and how these factors come into play. To do this, I adopt a
phenomenological design to better understand the essence of the EPC projects (that is, the phenomenon as
an objective of this study), using interviews with various project stakeholders to collect primary data.
These data are combined with a review of the relevant literature and observations of the phenomenon.
3.3.
Data Collection
operators (2), South Korean shipyards (3), Norwegian suppliers (5), and local service sub-contractors (3).
Every interview participant had been previously involved in, or was currently working on, one of the EPC
projects.
The interviewees had different positions in different disciplines within their organizations, from project
director to discipline engineer.
Group
Operator
Shipyard
Supplier
Local sub-contractor
# of personnel
Manager level
26
21
9
4
6
5
3
TABLE 3-2 INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Discipline level
5
5
1
3
Interview questionnaire
The interview questions were developed with a focus on main features of Norwegian EPC projects at
South Korean shipyards: management of international projects and use of the EPC contract format.
Presentation of the two features in Chapter 2 provided inputs for the interview questionnaire.
Key elements of the questionnaire were from the two features. Regarding management of international
projects, two elements were determined: cultural difference and significant communication cost. Turner
(2009) identified the latter as a major challenge for international projects and highlighted the former as a
major contributing factor to the challenge. For use of the EPC contract format, capability of an EPC
contractor to perform major project functions and manage communication and coordination issues was
considered a key element. The most distinctive characteristic of the EPC contract format is that the EPC
contractor is responsible for performance of all project functions (engineering, procurement, construction,
and project controls) and management of interfaces between the functions and among tis sub-contractors.
Pertaining to the interface management role of the EPC contractor, in particular, the contractors
communication and coordination competency are of particular importance to the EPC projects. This
importance is also noted by Schramm, Meiner and Weidinger (2010), who indicate that communication
and coordination issues are major cause of interface problems.
As project owners, Norwegian operators are positioned to have an overview of the project. Thus, the
questionnaire for the operator covered all the foregoing elements. The questionnaire designed for the
operators is presented in Appendix A. The same general questions were used with other project
stakeholders, though these stakeholders were not asked questions about aspects of the project that are not
relevant to their work scope.
16
Interview administration
Interviews were conducted at the participants work place in both Norway and South Korea according to
pre-developed interview protocol (see Appendix A). Interviews were recorded when the interviewee
agreed and when and the situation permitted. Out of the 44 interviews, 18 were recorded. Interviewees
were informed that they would remain anonymous and that they could choose not to answer any questions.
I exercised the flexibility embedded in design of the semi-structured interview to ask additional relevant
questions or skip those not suitable to the participant based on her or his position and experience.
17
Validity
Validity refers to whether the measures deployed to assess a concept accurately assess the specific concept
they are supposed to and, for the purposes of a study, the concepts the study is designed to address
(Bryman, 2012). For this study, the overall validity of the primary data is high because all of the interview
participants are or had been directly involved in the object phenomenon, i.e., Norwegian EPC projects in
South Korea. Still, the fact that some of the interviewees had a relatively short experience in the projects
may weaken the validity. In particular, experience shorter than six months might have not been long
enough for the participant to see the big picture of the project.
In addition to differences in the personal experiences of the interviewees, there were differences in the
actual projects themselves. This variability could also weaken the validity of the study. As noted
previously, interview participants had been or are engaged in one of six different projects. Each project is
unique by definition and involves a different operator, shipyard, supplier, and local sub-contractors.
Furthermore, corporate culture of the South Korean shipyards seemingly demonstrates certain variance
from company to company, and this variance has substantial influence over the project execution.
The positions that study participants held also affect validity. Manager level personnel can have a view
over full scope of project, but their account can conflict with observations from discipline level engineers,
who focus on specific issues addressed in low level of the organization hierarchy.
3.4.
Data Analysis
Make a list of significant statements and arrange them into larger information units,
Describe what the participant experienced and how the experience happened, and
Construct the essence of the phenomenon by combining the description of what and how.
Data analysis in this study followed the procedure presented above in general. Due to time constraint of
the study, however, more focus was on developing significant statements and essence of the phenomenon
while other processes received less attention. The data and its analysis are integrated into the contents
presented in Chapter 5 and 6.
18
4.
4.1.
FIGURE 4-1 EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION PROJECT DEVELOPMENT MODEL (ODLAND, 2013)
19
Figure 4-1 illustrates the entire exploration and production project development model used in Norway,
which comprises comprehensive activities from evaluation of hydrocarbon potential to abandonment of
facilities. In particular, among the seven project phases comprising the model, appraisal and development
planning and project execution are jointly referred to as project development (Gudmestad, Zolotuchin
and Jarlsby, 2010). This is where huge capital input is needed and, thus, robust risk management approach
counts. Each phase of the project development phase comprises three sub-phases as shown Figure 4-2.
20
Figure 4-3 illustrates that most of the project development cost are incurred during detail engineering,
construction, and completion phases of a project, which constitute the project execution phase. This
suggests why project execution phase is prone to cost and schedule overrun and why the successful
management of this stage is critical to robust economy of the whole field development project.
Balder
Norne
Varg
sgard A
sgard B
Kristin
Production
Type
FPSO
FPSO
FPSO
FPSO
Semisub
Semisub
2007 BP Norge
Skarv
FPSO
2007
2010
2010
2011
Gja
Ekofisk
Goliat
Valemon
Semisub
Jacket
FPSO
Jacket
2011 BG Norge
Knarr
FPSO
CAT-D
2011
2012
2013
2013
Heidrun
Martin Linge
CAT-J
CAT-J
Year
1995
1995
1996
1998
1998
2002
2013
2013
2013
2015
Operator
/Owner
Exxonmobil
Statoil
Saga Petroleum
Statoil
Statoil
Statoil
Statoil
Conocophillips
ENI Norge
Statoil
Statoil
Total
Statoil
Statoil
Field/Project
Semisub
MODU
FSU
Jacket
Jack-up MODU
Jack-up MODU
Contract
Shipyard
Conversion
Hull FC
Hull FC
Hull FC
Hull FC
Hull FC
Hull/Topside
FC
Hull FC
LQ FC
EPC
Topside EPC
Hull/Topside
FC
Keppel
Keppel
Keppel
Hitachi
DSME
SHI
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore
Japan
Korea
Korea
SHI
Korea
SHI
SMOE
HHI
SHI
Korea
Singapore
Korea
Korea
SHI
Korea
EPCI
DSME
Korea
DSME
SHI
SHI
Sembcorp
Korea
Korea
Korea
Singapore
Topside EPC
EPCI
EPCI
Topside and
Aasta
Statoil
Spar
substructure
HHI
Hansteen
EPC
Statoil
Gina Krog
Jacket
Topside EPC
DSME
Det Norske
Ivar Aasen
Jacket
Topside FC
SMOE
Statoil
Gina Krog
FSO
Conversion
Sembawang
TABLE 4-1 NORWEGIAN PROJECT AWARDED TO EAST ASIAN SHIPYARD
Korea
Korea
Singapore
Singapore
22
According to NPD (2013), projects with major cost and schedule overrun includes the Skarv with 32%
overrun as compared to cost estimate in PDO (plan for development and operation)/PIO (plan for
installation and operation), Yme with 188%, and Valhall redevelopment with 86%. The Knarr and
Bryunhild projects are also known to have experienced 36% and 58% increase in cost respectively (Torres,
2014). The Goliat FPSO, of which construction is recently completed, reportedly suffered from almost
50% increase (Haugstad, 2015).
There are also growing concerns among the industry players about the possible significant cost overrun for
ongoing projects. The CAT-D project allegedly underwent considerable cost overrun; construction of the
first drilling rig of the project is expected to complete in June 2015 (Maslin, 2015). According to Lvs
(2015), another three Norwegian projects (Gina Krog, Aasta Hansteen, and Martin Linge), which are ongoing as of May 2015, are also reportedly behind schedule.
4.1.2.3. Major causes to cost overrun
Many studies have been conducted to reveal what causes project execution cost overrun in NCS. In its
report in 2013, NPD found four key factors contributing to such cost overrun:
The operators contracting strategy failed to incorporate all the key risk elements. The strategy
does not center on operators direct follow-up activities to EPC contractor and meticulous
prequalification of key equipment suppliers.
Operators follow-up was insufficient to address quality issues due to the oversea contractors
insufficient understanding of NORSOK and Norwegian standard.
Overly commercially driven management decision leads to overly ambitious target and to too
much emphasis on cost reduction without enough consideration of resulting detrimental impact on
quality.
Application of relatively new technology to flagship projects in harsher (farther, colder, and
deeper) offshore environments, where no project has been developed before, creates unexpected
technical challenges.
Contractors/suppliers pursue high profit margin in a bid to take advantage of cost increase trend.
23
4.2.
24
FIGURE 4-5 MARKET SHARE BY SHIPBUILDING ORDER INTAKE (SUNG AND LEE, 2015)
And by number of order intake, South Korea is ranked as the second in the world as of 2014 (Figure 4-5).
FIGURE 4-6 BREAK DOWN OF ORDER INTAKE BY SHIP TYPE (SUNG AND LEE, 2015)
Figure 4-6 indicates that South Korean focuses on new building of high value ships, such as containership
and LNG/LPG carrier, while China relies heavily on relatively low value ships, e.g. bulker carrier and
tankers.
25
Construction capability
South Korean shipyards demonstrate strong competitiveness in engineering, production, and
production management. In particular, solid basic engineering capability and wielding skills helps
accommodate customized design requests from clients.
Economies of scale
Total construction capacity of South Korean shipyard is two to seven times higher than its
competitors as of 2007. South Korean shipbuilders with huge docks are positioned well to keep up
with recent trend of increasing average size of ships.
Productivity
High productivity has been achieved by continuous production process improvement and
development of construction methods. Such innovative methods include product-mix method,
mega/giga/tera bock method, and the introduction of floating/T-type dock.
Product mix
South Korean shipyards have diversified their products with an emphasis on high value ship types
by virtue of huge construction capacity and high productivity. While bulk carrier of relatively low
value takes the major portion of new build order for Chinese and Japanese shipyards,
containership and LNG/LPG tankers account for more than half of South Korean shipbuilders
order backlogs.
Shipbuilding cluster
Most of shipyards, equipment suppliers, engineering firms, and education institutions are located
alongside the southeastern part of South Korea. Close relationship between academia and industry
in the region support reliable supply of high quality equipment and material as well as constant
development of technology.
26
Offshore project
South Korean shipbuilders have had many offshore project experiences, but most of these experiences
were limited to fabrication of relatively simple structures, such as steel jackets and hull of floating units.
After the financial crisis in 2008, the Big 3 have ventured into large scale offshore new build project in
earnest in an attempt to overcome the difficult time. They took aggressive marketing strategy and
managed to sweep offshore new build market.
FIGURE 4-7 FLOATING PRODUCTION UNITS MARKET SHARE 2005-2009 (KOSHIPA, 2011)
Accordingly, offshore projects come to account for an increasing share of the Big 3s total new order
intake. For the last three years offshore projects made up the majority of the new orders of the Big 3.
FIGURE 4-8 NEW ORDER INTAKE OF THE BIG 3 2012 TO 2014 (HAN, 2015)
28
SHI
Operator
/Owner
Contract
Price
Award
(Bil NOK)
Delivery
Kristin
Semi-Sub
Hull FC
0,48
2002
2004
BP Norge
Skarv
FPSO
Hull/Topside
FC
4,50
2007
2010
Statoil
Statoil
Gja
Valemon
Semi-Sub
Jacket
Hull FC
Topside EPC
0,90
2,30
2007
2011
2009
2014
Teekay
(BG Norge)
Knarr
FPSO
Hull/Topside
FC
6,50
2011
2014
Heidrun
Martin
Linge
CAT-J
sgard
FSU
1,50
2011
2015
Total Norge
Statoil
Statoil
Songa
(Statoil)
Songa
(Statoil)
Statoil
ENI Norge
HHI
Type
Statoil
Statoil
DSME
Field
Statoil
Statoil
Jacket
Topside EPC
8,13
2012
2016
2 Jack-up Rig
Semi-Sub
EPCI
Hull FC
8,45
0,55
2013
1998
2017
2000
CAT-D
2 Semi-Sub rig
EPCI
7,35
2011
2015
CAT-D
2 Semi-Sub rig
EPCI
7,15
2012
2015
Jacket
Topside EPC
6,10
2013
2016
FPSO
EPC
6,90
2010
2015
Spar
Deck/LQ EPC
6,50
2013
2016
Spar
4,00
2013
2016
Gina
Krog
Goliat
Aasta
Hansteen
Aasta
Hansteen
29
projects could help the shipbuilders survive the difficult market. Figure 4-9, Figure 4-10, and Figure 4-11
show the financial results of the Big 3 shipyard in South Korea from 2014 and onwards.
FIGURE 4-10 QUARTERLY FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SHI (SHI, 2015; KANG, 2015)
30
FIGURE 4-12 UNBILLED ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE OF THE BIG 3 (HHI, 2015; SHI, 2015; DSME, 2015)
Unbilled account receivable of the Big 3 has been increasing continuously since 2011 (Figure 4-12) and
offshore projects have been known to account for a substantial portion of the amount as many of the
projects has reportedly experienced various disputes and significant delays. Recently much of this unbilled
31
account receivable amount for offshore projects has proven to be uncollectable, which resulted in a
significant increase of allowance for doubtful accounts and recognition of huge losses.
Most of the big scale offshore projects reportedly face significant losses. A notable example of such
projects is a new build project of a new concept platform installation, removal, and pipe-lay vessel
awarded to DSME. The project with a 600 million dollar budget reportedly underwent 500 million cost
overruns (Shin, 2014a).
Norwegian offshore projects also take their tolls on the South Korean shipyards. The Knarr FPSO project
of a 12 billion NOK budget (Norwegian Kroner) is reported to suffer 30% cost overrun up to 16 billion
NOK (Stangeland, 2015). Songa offshore, a Norwegian drilling contractor, also announced that project
cost of their new build project for four semi-submersible drilling rigs in South Korea also increased to 685
million USD per a rig from the initial budget of 565 million as well as 1 year delay (Songa, 2015). In the
meantime, the South Korean counterpart of Songa offshore reportedly has suffered 1 billion USD losses
for the same project alone (Kang, 2015). Many other on-going offshore projects, including Martin Linge
and Aasta Hansteen, are also allegedly known to suffer cost and schedule overruns.
Major causes to the loss
Major causes to the recent considerable loss of the Big 3 were analyzed by the South Korean shipbuilding
industry (Shin, 2014b).
32
varying local contents rules and HSE (Health, Safety, and Environment) regulations leads to a
huge unanticipated additional cost.
Excessive outsourcing
The shipyards have been very dependent on outsourcing to meet the increasing demand of work
force due to the growing number of offshore projects. This raises concerns over quality of the
projects and capability to transfer knowledge and experience within the shipyards organizations.
FIGURE 4-13 BIG 3S NEW ORDER INTAKE IN OFFSHORE SEGMENT (CHEON, 2015D)
33
This poses a serious challenge for the shipbuilders since the offshore projects account for substantial
portion of their total order intake (55% to 75%) during 2011 to 2013. Figure 4-14 presents the new order
intake trend of the Big 3.
FIGURE 4-14 BIG 3S NEW ORDER INTAKE IN SHIPBUILDING AND OFFSHORE SEGMENT (CHEON, 2015D)
Efforts to tackle the challenges
The South Korean shipyards have put a great deal of effort into tackling the new challenges in the difficult
market condition. In light of recent significant loss, industry wide business downsizing to improve
profitability seems unavoidable. Workforce reduction and product portfolio readjustment are required. In a
bid to increase engineering capacity, some of the shipbuilders have been attempting to make an
acquisition of engineering firms. They also set up new engineering offices in metropolitan areas to attract
more engineers. To better manage offshore projects, the shipyards have been developing new project
control systems customized to the projects. They recently have shifted their marketing focus to fabrication
(construction only) contracts from EPC contracts (the shipbuilder as a main EPC contractor) in order to
reduce contractual risks.
34
5.
Findings
This chapter presents the key contributory factors and describes how they play out and create problems
during project execution phase. While the challenges arising during Norwegian EPC project execution at
South Korean shipyards are attributed to many different elements, it is important to review the experiences
of the people involved in the projects and to consider the social phenomenon. Thus, the analysis of data
from the interviews and follow-up literature review conducted helps determine the key contributory
factors that may not otherwise have been apparent.
5.1.
Each of the key contributory factors presented in this chapter does not come into play in isolation. They
are closely interconnected with each other. It is essential to identify the relationship among the factors as
well as to take a holistic view in order to understand how they influence project performance.
35
suggesting that South Koreans feel acutely threatened by ambiguity or unknown situations. The most
significant margin between the two countries, however, can be observed on the last dimension, i.e., long
term orientation. Norwegians take a normative approach, paying respect to tradition while seeking a quick
result. In contrast, South Koreans are extremely pragmatic, focusing on education to be prepared for
change, thus putting more value on steady growth in longer term.
Low-Context
****
****
***
***
***
***
**
*
High-Context
36
France
United Kingdom
Italy / Spain
Russia
Middle East
Africa
South America
East Asia
*
**
***
***
****
****
****
****
37
lower the communication barrier among the people in the relationship and develop personal connections
more easily and quickly compared to other relationships.
Asymmetrical and reciprocally obligatory
Yum (1988) indicates that reciprocity is the core concept of Confucianism. People involved in a
relationship have sense of asymmetrical mutual indebtedness, which assigns different obligations to each
person. This asymmetry does not allow a give-and-take-equally approach to occur and calculations for
such is deemed to be violation of Confucian principal (Yum, 1988). This complementary interpersonal
characteristic helps the relationship last for long time. For example, when people eat out, it is generally
expected that elders or superiors pay the bill for younger folks or subordinates who pay respect to them in
return.
Clear distinction between in-group and out-group
People involved in the reciprocally obligatory relationship become dependent on each other by fulfilling
obligations assigned to each of them, which make long-term relationships possible. Strong bonds among
the group members arise by excluding other groups (Chen and Chung, 1994).
Use of informal intermediary
Clear distinctions between in-group and out-group members make the use of intermediary inevitable, and
such intermediaries are effective for initiating new relationships or resolving disputes between groups.
The intermediary belongs to the multiple of groups in question so that the groups can communicate
through the intermediary.
Overlap of personal (social) and official business (professional) relationships
Pure business transactions based on calculation of each others interests is perceived as potential violation
of Confucian principle of mutual faithfulness. The desire for mutual faithfulness has resulted in
development of strong preference to develop a personal relationship during a pure business transaction
(Chen and Chung, 1994). People prefer small and personal meetings, as opposed to big and formal
meeting, where they feel more comfortable and open so that personal relationship can be developed
relatively easily.
5.1.1.4. Confucian influence on communication
Yum (1988) states that communication patterns in Confucian societies are developed in a way that can
help build and maintain interpersonal relationships. Yum identified four general patterns: process
39
40
Hierarchical structure
The nature of particularistic interpersonal relationships intensifies characteristics of linear relationships
and serves as a basis for the hierarchical structure of organizations. It places great emphasis on differences
in age, sex, length of service between different levels and assigns authority and responsibility based on the
differences. Thus, the distinction between levels in organizations is clearer than in less particularistic
societies. In hierarchical organizations, communication usually takes place in unilateral direction, i.e., topdown.
Explicit rule of communication
Because of the institutionalized differences and social distance between levels (e.g., management versus
workers), there are explicit communication rules in Confucian societies and their organizations (Chen and
Chung, 1994). Learning and practicing formal and specific code of conducts as well as differentiated
linguistic code are important to avoid miscommunication.
Reciprocally obligatory relationship
Because of the complementary relationship in Confucian organizations, the superior takes paternal care of
subordinates and provides knowledge and experience. Subordinates, in return, repay with loyalty and offer
obedience to their superiors. Combined with hierarchical relationships and use of explicit rules of
communication, reciprocally obligatory relationships regulate what subordinates are likely to say to their
superiors.
Frequent contact among member
The overlap of personal and official business relationships leads to frequent contact among organization
members. They seek opportunities to identify mutual interests, share personal information, and build trust
so that they can expand common understanding and reach consensus (Chen and Chung, 1994). To this end,
social activities and gathering after work hours are frequent.
Loyalty to organization
A clear distinction between in-group and out-group members promotes a strong sense of unity among
members and inspires high commitment to the organization. Chen and Chung (1994) indicate that the
strong sense of unity improves management-employee relationships and the organizations control system.
On the other hand, the organization in Confucian society is often found to be difficult for out-group
members to join the group because such loyalty is achieved by excluding others; thus, foreigners are rarely
received as genuine in-group members (Chen and Chung, 1994).
41
42
the shipyard have social gatherings frequently after work where they form consensus. It helps build strong
sense of we, which draws a clear line between their group and others.
How these Confucian influences affect the South Korean shipyard in particular will be further illustrated
in 5.2.2.
5.1.1.8. Confucian influence on attitude towards law and contract
Confucianism has significantly affected the way contracts are understood and interpreted. As discussed in
5.1.1.2, the goal of Confucianism is to achieve stability through implementing order. Confucius stressed
that, in order to build and maintain stability, people should remain in their social position, which is
identified in a relative and comparative manner, and fulfill their obligation assigned in line with the
position. This rigid social hierarchical structure leads to the development of a social relation concept that
puts the group ahead of individual. Such social structure emphasizes harmony to keep the society stable
and creates self-regulating environment to achieve this (Leonhard, 2009).
Negative view on law and contract
Emphasis on harmony and the individuals burden of fulfilling moral obligation discourages legal
proceedings to pursue an individuals interests (Pattison and Herron, 2003). In the event of dispute,
relying on interruption of legal system as stated in the written contract to settle the case is viewed as a
failure to resolve dispute in respectful way based on trust. Such an approach, hence, is considered to
damage the harmony within the group (Tanner, 1996 cited in Leonhard, 2009, p.10). This Confucian
approach leads to negative attitude towards law and contract (Leonhard, 2009).
True intention of a contract
For the high context culture, a correct understanding of the true intent of a contractual counterparty
requires an interpretation of wider range of economic and societal background of the contract. For
example, two parties in a Confucian society may assume that the both can make some profit, or no loss at
least, out of the new business by concluding the contract, and the general business environment will
remain stable enough to achieve the goal. These assumptions can also include fulfilling verbal promises
between the parties which are not reflected in the contract (Leonhard, 2009). Although the assumptions
are not clearly stated in the contract, the contextual background of the contract also counts as one of
important elements representing true intent of the contract.
43
44
45
46
Lean concept
The Lean is a production concept that focuses on eliminating non-value-added inputs and processes
from production operation (Yusuf and Adeleye, 2002). Inputs can be anything from time, to material, or to
effort during the operation (Hassan and Kajiwara, 2013). For example, any activity or movement of
equipment or people that does not create value, such as idle time of equipment or idle material, should be
reduced. Principles of the Lean production includes standardization, one-piece flow, flow smoothing,
focus on eliminating waste, dedicated interim production line, and so forth (Liker and Lamb, 2000). Many
tools to implement Lean principles have been developed, such as Just-In-Time, Total Quality Management,
pull production, and group manufacturing (Yusuf and Adeleye, 2002).
Production process innovation
South Korean shipbuilders applied some of these principles into their production system. Moura and
Botter (2011) indicate that the South Korean shipyards strategies put emphasis on low cost, short build
cycle, and high quality with technical innovations. According to Bae, Lee, and Park (2009), South Korean
shipyards have increased turnover rate of the core assets for shipbuilding industry, such as dry-dock,
berths, and lifting equipment significantly, so as to reduce construction cycle through introduction of
series of innovative production process: product-mix method, floating dock, mega/giga/tera bock method,
T-type dock, and so on. These innovations contribute to reduction of waste, e.g., idle time of the main
production facility and idle material.
Construction- led organization
Yusuf and Adeleye (2002) also indicate that Lean production is process-focused approach. As discussed
above, South Korean shipyards have achieved high productivity through many innovative technical
improvements in production process. Most of these improvements were initiated and led by construction
management department. This department deals with practical production issues at work sites where new
innovative ideas come out and communicates with other functions to put the ideas into practice.
Due to fierce international competition, the profit margin of South Korean shipbuilding industry remains
relatively low even with such a huge scale (Bae, Lee, and Park, 2009). In light of that, for those shipyards
which already possess full basic engineering capability for commercial ships in particular, increase of
productivity is regarded as core competency that directly relates to higher profitability. This desire to
increase productivity has resulted in a management focus on improvement of productivity that requires the
construction management department to have substantial influence over the whole organization. The
construction department investigates production process issues and gives feedback to other functions so as
to develop new/enhanced production processes. For example, the engineering function takes inputs from
47
the construction department for a new design with improved productivity. During this process, the
contraction department plays important role to assess chance of productivity improvement, comes up with
solutions, brings it to other functions to develop the ideas, and ensures that the information is brought into
other functions in a correct manner.
Built in quality
The built in quality, one of Lean production approaches, aims to build something right the first time.
This approach helps reduce cost for inspection and correction during the production process while
maintaining high quality. Thus, the built in quality approach improves reliability of production system
with low defect rate and stable quality control.
In its nature, this approach results in more focus on how to prevent error or change. It makes it challenging
for the Lean production system to manage offshore projects, which entail many changes. Due to their
complexity and customized design, offshore projects inevitably come with many changes. Thus, such
projects require an emphasis on how to efficiently deal with changes as opposed to built in quality
approach of Lean production.
Tightly coupled production system
Lean production eventually leads to less flexibility. This favors productivity of South Korean shipyards
for shipbuilding business, but it does not help offshore business.
Lean production has its emphasis on minimizing waste by smoothing the flow of goods, and this affects
flexibility of a production system. Production systems are organized such that the goods proceed
continuously through the production processes without minimum waiting time. To this end, the production
processes are streamlined and tightly coupled, and this can translate into less flexibility, thus suggesting
that the high productivity comes at the cost of flexibility.
In tightly coupled processes, a change in one process can influence the whole production system as the
impact of the change is difficult to predict. A change in a local level can affect the entire production
process flow and eventually bring serious consequences for the entire shipyard. Again, smoothing flow of
goods in the Lean production concept is another factor that can slow progress of offshore project in the
shipyards.
Master-servant relationship
According to Yusuf and Adeleye (2002), the master-servant supply chain relationship is another
characteristics of Lean production. An entity that adds more value to the product has more control over the
48
supply chain (Yusuf and Adeleye, 2002). Thus, in Lean production, the Lean manufacturer (shipyard) has
a strong grip over a supply chain because it takes the lead of whole value creation processes. The Lean
manufacturer has substantial influence over its supplier by demanding them to comply with its
requirements for technical specifications and delivery conditions as required by its optimized production
system. The dynamics of this relationship tilts the balance of power toward the Lean manufacturer and
leads to the master-servant relationship that arises in the shipbuilding business in South Korea.
In offshore business, however, this is not the case. The equipment produced by suppliers in the offshore
sector is of much higher value than those in shipbuilding sector. Thus, the suppliers can have more control
over contract terms and conditions as reflected in this new relationship between the shipyard and suppliers.
Because South Korean shipyards are used to the master-servant relationship in a Lean production supply
chain, friction between the shipyards and suppliers in offshore business escalates.
5.1.2.3. Heavy reliance on local sub-contractor
Due to the labor-intensive nature of the shipbuilding business, labor costs account for a substantial portion
of production costs in the industry. In South Korea, wages make up 30% of total shipbuilding cost (Ecorys,
2009), and there has been increasing trend in the cost element. In order to retain its cost competitiveness
and increase labor flexibility, South Korean shipyards contract out extensive construction work within the
yard to local sub-contractors.
Dependency on local service provider
According to a report from the Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association (Koshipa, 2014), the number
of technicians/craftsmen from service sub-contractors for construction work within the yard has been
increasing continuously, and this trend turns out to be very significant in offshore projects in particular.
As shown in Figure 5-4, the total number of workers hired-in from sub-contractors for construction work
at South Korean shipyards surged from 19,321 to 114,167 (by 491%) between 1998 and 2013, while total
number of shipyard employees rose from 56,384 to 68,855 (by 22%) only during the same period.
49
Number of
employees
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1996
1998
Admin.
2000
2002
Eng.
2004
Tech.
2006
Yard TTL
2008
2010
2012
2014
Sub-contractor
50
Number of
employees
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2006
2007
Admin.
2008
2009
Eng.
Tech.
2010
2011
Yard TTL
2012
2013
2014
Sub-contractor
51
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
1996
1998
2000
2002
Ship
2004
2006
Offshore
2008
2010
2012
2014
Others
52
As the labor demand in the shipbuilding industry surges, it becomes more difficult to find skilled workers
who are capable of understanding new requirements and performing up to the high standard of offshore
industries. Thus, concerns about the overall quality of construction work at the shipyards increase.
Another impact of the heavy reliance on sub-contractors is related to learning capability of the
organization. Because most of the construction work is carried out by sub-contractors who are highly
mobile, the permanent employees of the shipyard cannot fully capture the lessons learned through the
experience and cannot, therefore, transfer that learning from project to project within shipyard in efficient
manner.
5.1.2.4. Experienced negotiator
Over the course of navigating the tough and volatile shipbuilding market, South Korean shipyards have
developed seasoned negotiation skills. The fluctuating market affects the market sentiments quickly,
resulting in consistent changes of the balance of power between shipbuilders and ship owners. Shipyards
are very sensitive to such changes and respond promptly as the resulting consequences can be immense.
For example, in market down turns, ship owners often try to reject or delay the delivery of ships that are
ready to sail, citing issues that are actually minor and not enough for no-delivery. Challenges of this
kind come all at the same time, leading to long and difficult negotiations and legal proceedings. Thus, the
market conditions require the shipbuilder also be a skilled negotiator who knows when to be tough or nice.
The ship owner and shipbuilder continuously change their positions according to market developments. At
the same time, tough experiences make shipbuilding companies put a high value on long-term
relationships with reliable ship owners.
However, after the 2008 financial crises, when the dry bulk market index (BDI) plummeted by 94% in a
matter of 6 months, South Korean shipyards learned that even very well-established ship owners can go
out of business and that they may default on payment or refuse delivery. A number of lawsuits and
arbitration have made the shipbuilding companies cautious of their customers, even well-known ship
owners.
As the shipping market downturn hit South Korean shipyards, the shipyards came to take more costoriented approaches for new shipbuilding projects. This made them more sensitive to change order
requests, which can influence the cost level of projects and which deepened their already negative
attitudes (see 5.1.2.2).
The financial crisis accelerated the shipyards transition into a relatively new business area, i.e., offshore
oil and gas projects, and as they transitioned, they brought with them their skeptical views of project
53
owners and a heightened tight cost-oriented approach. These sentiments, combined with Confucian
perspectives on law and contract, affected Norwegian offshore project adversely.
Power distance
High power distances between levels resulting from hierarchical organization structure do not
help effective discussions between senior and junior engineers. In this organizational set-up,
senior engineers should be able to guide juniors properly, but this is not the case for offshore
projects because both the senior and junior do not have much experience. Even if a young
engineer completes training courses for the project recently and thus have more knowledge, it is
not easy for the junior to speak up her or his own opinion before seniors.
manual is prepared for construction only. This results in quality issues not properly handled in
early phase of a project, i.e., the engineering phase. Hence, the issues are resolved in later stages
of a project, i.e., the construction and commissioning phases, and this costs more and causes
delays.
of the facility has resulted in a need for engineers who can take a systems approach and a holistic view on
the overall processing process and control. In order to develop such capabilities, engineers must
understand a wide range of engineering disciplines, i.e., multi-disciplinary engineering capability, rather
than exclusive knowledge in a certain discipline only. Rapid technological development in recent years
calls for even more emphasis on such multi-disciplinary engineering capability. Engineers are asked to use
newly developed technology to improve the process, while making the most out of existing proven
technology. On such occasions, multi-disciplinary engineers are expected to ensure that operations of the
system are not adversely affected by implementation of new technologies (REE, 1981).
Multi-disciplinary engineering also helps develop creative solutions for complex technical problems. King
(1995) indicates that fragmentation of disciplines can limit creativity of engineers because the high
specialism can narrow their perspectives, whereas multi-disciplinary engineering can broaden perspectives
and encourage cross-disciplines discussion, thereby promoting creativity and proving itself vital for design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of complex processing facilities.
Multi-disciplinary engineer
Special knowledge and experience in each of the single disciplines still plays a substantial role in dealing
with ever-increasing complexity of equipment and process used during processing. Specialists need to be
guided and advised properly of when and how to address such issues so that their job would not hinder the
processes of other components and the performance of the whole system would not be affected. Multidisciplinary engineers are to take such roles. They identify issues in the system and engage engineers from
various disciplines to deal with them. The engineers coordinate communication among different
disciplines to ensure the issues are resolved while maintaining the integrity of the system.
The roles of multi-disciplinary engineer are elaborated by REE (1981):
through the process. This process helps detect any clashes between disciplines including mechanical
penetrations. The reviewed information should be effectively communicated with construction and
procurement functions as well as sub-contractors to be implemented in construction phase.
3D modeling
The high complexity of processing systems demands the effective use of 3D modeling as well as multi
discipline engineers and inter-disciplinary check process. In a project of large scale, a number of discipline
engineers work concurrently (Biffl, Moser and Winkler, 2011) and can make local changes in a discipline
level unwittingly. Such changes invalidate connections between other disciples but are difficult to be
located promptly before they cause the problem. 3D modeling programs collect technical inputs and
present the data in an integrated 3D model that can be used to check potential problems or any type of
interface issues among different disciplines. Biffl, Moser, and Winkler (2011) point out that 3D modeling
programs provide significant benefits including increased product quality, less effort spent for defect
detection, and less rework cost.
No multi-disciplinary engineering culture in the shipyards
South Korean shipyards do not have a tradition of developing multi-disciplinary engineering functions. In
fact, there are rarely if ever positions for multi-disciplinary engineers in the shipyards project
management team (PMT) or engineering departments.
Upon acknowledgement of technical problem, a project engineer who serves as a multi-disciplinary
engineer in the PMT can readily refer the issue to relevant discipline engineers or call for a meeting for
cross discipline cooperation. Multi-disciplinary engineers also play an important role in the engineering
department. They are able to have a holistic view on the engineering aspect of the project and prioritize
the engineering tasks. Such engineers coordinate tasks between disciplines and get involved in the event
of discipline clash so as to facilitate the procedure and enhance quality of engineering work.
However, both the employee composition and organization structure of South Korean shipyards make
such fluid communication less likely. Communication barriers arise from the hierarchical and functional
organization structure of shipyards and may hinder discussion within a discipline and across different
disciplines. The high power distance between different levels dissuades low-level engineers from raising
their voices to note problems or offer solutions. Rigid boundaries between engineering disciplines also
obstruct efficient collaboration. In this organizational set-up, it is also difficult to expect an engineering
manager to have effective inter-discipline check process.
REE (1981) states that the development of multi-disciplinary skills and knowledge requires the following:
57
Most of the training provided by the shipyards focus on the development of specialism and do not focus
sufficiently on enhancing multi-disciplinary engineering.
Failure to use 3D modeling in proactive manner
South Korean shipyards in general do not actively use 3D modeling programs and fail to take full
advantage of it. A lot of changes in offshore project pose considerable technical challenges to EPC
contractors. The challenges of high technical complexity often require creative approaches and thorough
risk analysis, and for these things, using 3D modeling programs in proactive manner is key. 3D modeling,
if fully utilized, also plays an important role in assisting familiarization with installation condition and
allowing optimized material handling. Most South Korean shipyards miss out on these 3D modeling
benefits; thus, on many occasions, they spend a lot more time and resources reworking things or looking
for defects than they needed to.
5.1.3.3. Change and quality management issues
Technical changes matter
Changes during project execution comprise commercial/contractual changes, engineering changes, and
changes initiated by construction department while the department implements engineering work.
Although South Korean shipyards seem to handle commercial/contractual changes relatively well, their
capability to deal with engineering and construction changes is not satisfactory to Norwegian operators.
Change control system
South Korean shipyards have developed PCSs (Project Control Systems) for shipbuilding which
incorporates a system for change control. In its nature, a shipbuilding project is not so much dependent on
efficiency of change control system comparatively as it involves far fewer changes than an offshore
project. This enables the shipbuilders to predict to a certain degree where and when changes usually occur
in a shipbuilding project. This also leads to slim change control system with relatively low information
handling capacity.
58
Based on the PCS designed for shipbuilding project, the shipbuilders have been developing a PCM for
offshore projects, but this new system does not seem to have enough capacity to handle many changes
occurring during an offshore project. The great number of changes brings on immense amount of
information to process and eventually overflows the change control system imbedded in PCS. The change
management process from change initiation to closeout is not properly registered or well-documented via
the system. This inevitably causes loss of information and results in poor traceability of change
information, and amounts to quality problems.
Because the change management process is not fully supported by the system, it is often handled manually
(use of email, smartphone messenger application, and phone call). This leaves the operator unassured of
the quality.
Insufficient engineering competency
Weak risk analysis capability of the shipyard hinders the ability to see changes early enough to better
manage them. Risk analysis should assess consequences of a change against cost, schedule, HSE
performance, economy performance, operability and maintainability, and provide technical solution for
the changes. However, it takes too much time for the shipyards engineering function to do so. Thus it
cannot produce such information and solutions in timely manner and often cause delay.
Tightly coupled production system
Low flexibility of closely interconnected production system does not allow interruption in the production
process because doing so could cause an adverse impact on operation of the whole system of a shipyard,
which may be managing 50 to 60 projects in parallel. Thus, the production system cannot afford any
delays in production, including the one resulting inevitably from a change that will usually need some
time to obtain a solution from the engineering function. Due to this uncertainty, the shipyard keeps
proceeding with the production process although it is aware of the change. As one of the interviewees
stated, the big train cannot be stopped. Still, this production pattern eventually puts more burden on the
offshore project as it requires additional cost and time for a rework to implement th solution for the
change afterwards.
Overloaded shipyard
High oil prices for last decade brought South Korean shipyards a number of offshore projects all at once.
All the Big 3 shipyards are overcrowded with 50 to 70 projects including several mega offshore projects,
each of which absorbs a significant portion of the shipyards resources. Although the shipyards have
increased their production capacity continuously, it is still not enough to accommodate all the big projects
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at the same time without trouble. There is a shortage of skilled workers, and employees of the shipyards
and local sub-contractors are overburdened with multiple tasks for multiple projects. The shipbuilders and
their local sub-contractors are overloaded, and PCSs of the shipyards are overflowed. It is unlikely that the
change control system will work in efficient manner practically.
Communication barriers
Engineering information flows through many stakeholders, i.e., long chain of different companies
comprising engineering sub-contractor, EPC contractor, oversea vendors, local engineering subcontractors, and local construction sub-contractors. Figure 5-7 illustrates the flow of the information.
Different line types denote efficiency of communication: solid lines mean very efficient communication,
dash lines mediocre, and dotted lines inefficient.
Traceability of change data then becomes problematic. The communication barriers affect overall TQ
(technical query) and NCR (Non-Conformance Report) processes in general. These constitute serious
quality issues.
Effective implementation of solution by construction department
Once the solution for a change is provided, the construction department can resolve the issue in a very
efficient and effective manner. The shipyards emphasis on construction functions helps prompt and
accurate implementation of change.
5.1.3.4. NORSOK standard
The NORSOK standard is a functional regulation that contrasts with prescriptive regulation. Functional,
goal-oriented regulations describe what to be achieved, while prescriptive, descriptive ones provide how
to achieve the goal.
Prescriptive regulation
Before NORSOK was introduced in the 1990s, Norway used prescriptive regulations, which were a rather
stiff system offering specific details to be followed by the industry. The rules appeared to inefficient at
bringing technological development into practice while addressing risk associated with rapidly increasing
complexity (Kringen, 2014). The limitation of the prescriptive rules led to the introduction of more
flexible and systematic regulation.
Functional regulation
The functional standard emphasizes the ultimate objective to be accomplished. With adoption of these
standards, the industry is given more flexibility to use its experience and knowledge and to exercise its
discretion to determine how to reach the goal. The standard encourages creativity, enabling companies to
establish industry practice, develop new technologies, and cultivate continuous learning capabilities
(Skotnes and Engen, 2015). Still, the introduction of the goal-oriented approach also brought up issues
with interpretation.
Increasing complexity of HSE regime
HSE is the area which underlines the feature of NORSOK standard as a functional rule. A coordinated
effort made by the whole Norwegian petroleum industry to effectively address health, safety, and
environmental (HSE) issues contributed to establishment of the goal-oriented concept. According to a
report by Engen, Hagen, and Kringen (2013), the functional approach of the HSE movement also led to an
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increasing complexity that should be dealt with by all parties involved. The functional standards require
considerable knowledge and technical skill. It is difficult for small or new players in the industry to fully
utilize the flexibility given by the approach in order to identify and apply more advanced solutions.
Skotnes and Engen (2015, p.12) also point out that functional standards pose application and interpretation
challenges because they demand comprehensive and systematic review on how the various provisions are
to be understood and how the appropriate standards should be used to meet the requirements.
Implication for Norwegian EPC projects in South Korea
In the shipbuilding industry, prescriptive standards prevail, not functional ones, and South Korean
shipyards are no different. They have been developing their systems and knowledge based on approach of
command and control. Unlike functional standards, the prescriptive regulations do not require holistic
approaches. The rules are clearly stated, so they are easily read and comfortably followed.
As the shipbuilders came into the offshore business and landed Norwegian projects, including topside
construction projects, NORSOK standards became one of the difficult issues for them. The Koreans were
asked to take a systems approach that should be based on two critical elements.
First, in order to correctly interpret and apply the standard, shipyards need to understand how Norwegian
companies see the problem and deal with it. Knowledge and experience in Norwegian offshore industry
are very important in this regard. This view is evident in the case of HSE, the most critical domain in
offshore industry. The development of HSE regulations in NORSOK is based on inputs from offshore
operation experience. It has been difficult for shipbuilders to interpret the rules in consideration of such
particulars. Many of interviewees pinpointed working environment and technical safety as the most
challenging areas for Korean shipyards. These comments suggest how important it is for the industry to
understand Norwegian offshore industry practice in order to efficiently and effectively use NORSOK
standards.
The second element is a tool to analyze the problem and provide solutions. The NORSOK standards allow
users to exercise discretion to come up with new solutions with creativity for many challenges from
offshore project. Still, to fully utilize the flexibility provided by NORSOK, a tool to investigate issues
from different perspectives is essential. Multi-disciplinary engineering is one of such tools, but it is not
fully developed by the shipyards.
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and insufficient functional capability comes into play and adversely affects communication between the
two parties (see 5.2.6).
Operator involvement issue
Because of the insufficient competences, many issues arise and become known to operator. Then the
operator feels incentivized to increase its influence and take more control in effect over the project with a
view to keeping the project risk in check. Baram (2005) indicates that even when an EPC contractor is
given freedom and flexibility to manage project, it is still bounded by operators requirements. The
researcher lists various ways operator can affect the freedom and flexibility of EPC contractor (Baram,
2005):
Operators requirements,
Variations vs changes,
Design approvals,
Schedule approvals,
These items are often disputed to varying degrees between operators and contractors in EPC settings and
should, thus, be closely and carefully watched. As the operators involvement increases, the EPC
contractor becomes more reactive and responsive rather than proactive and preventive. At some point, the
EPC contractor comes to think that, as operator exerts more influence, the risk allocation structure of EPC
contract should also be re-organized. This approach seems to give grounds for EPC contractor to claim
that operator should share some of the project risk with the main contractor.
5.1.4.2. Norsk Total Kontrakt (NTK) 07
Norwegian standard contract for offshore construction project
Norwegian operators extensively use Norwegian standard contract conditions with relevant amendments
for the construction of offshore installations in NCS. A recent version of the standard contract documents
include NF 07 (for fabrication contract), NTK 07 (for EPC contract), NTK 07 MOD (for modification
contract), and NSC 05 (for subsea operation contract). These are results of long discussions between
Norwegian operators and contractors operating in NCS and the federation of Norwegian industries. Thus,
Norwegian standard contracts reflect comprehensive knowledge and experience of the Norwegian
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offshore oil and gas industry. One of main features of the standard contracts is the stringent formal rules,
which are exemplified by variation order (VO) regime.
Variation order regime
By their nature, a project goes through many changes and, in the case of EPC contracts, because of their
broad scope, the number of changes become even much larger. The VO regime in NTK 07 is designed to
deal with changes in an effective way and constitutes an essential part of the contract. The VO regime
operates as a mechanism regulating relationships between changes in the contractors obligations and the
resulting impact on project schedule and cost (Kaasen, 2009).
Variation is an alteration to the scope of work to be carried out by contractor as agreed to in the contract
and, thus, demands adjustments on the project schedule or cost. Sources of variation include design
change, variation from other contractors, new work scope, change in requirement, and so on.
Operators should issue a VO when they want to change an obligation of the contractor. The contractor
then becomes obligated to perform the work as stated in the VO without undue delay (NTK art. 15.1)
and informs the operator of an estimate of the work to be carried out for the variation. The obligation
imposed on contractor side to carry out such work is dubbed as Hoppeplikt in Norwegian.
If the contractor considers that the operator requested variation without issuing a VO, the contractor shall
issue variation order request (VOR) without undue delay (NTK 07 art. 16.1). If the contractor fails to
meet the time constraints, it loses the right to adjust the project cost and schedule.
Upon receipt of VOR, the operator can issue VO if it agrees on contractors opinion. If the operator does
not agree, it can issue a disputed variation order (DVO). The DVO has the same effect as a VO, and the
contractor shall perform the work according to DVO.
The disagreement on whether the work instructed by operator requires VO or how much impact the VO
has on project cost or schedule can be settled via expert decision, arbitration, or court proceeding. Still, if
the contractor does not commence such dispute resolution actions against the operator within a specific
time limit as stated in NTK 07, it will lose the right to the claim.
Formalism
The formal rules of procedure to handle VO described above represents strong formalism in Norwegian
standard contracts. Preclusive time limits offer a good example: the contractor loses its claim if it fails to
issue VOR within the time limit.
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Kaasen (2009) notes the practical benefits of the stringent preclusive rules. The rules facilitate clarification
of both parties position so that the impact of any dispute between them over project will be lessened. The
mechanism also helps the parties involved to renew the power balance between them if it is damaged in
the course of project. However, this formalism also often invites criticism. Critics question the fairness of
the preclusive rule mechanism in the contract format (Kaasen, 2009). For example, as described above, the
VO regime requires the contractor to perform the work instructed in the form of VO or DVO by the
operator even though the dispute between them is yet to be settled. This Hoppeplikt rule begs the
question of impartiality because it compels the contractor to relinquish its bargaining power. Another
criticism concerns the preclusive rules that deteriorate the spirit of cooperation among parties involved:
the stiff procedural rules make some parties of the agreement perceive the practice of such mechanism
antagonistic and contentious (Kaasen, 2009).
Implication for Norwegian EPC projects in South Korea
The criticism of formalism gives interesting implications for Norwegian EPC projects at South Korean
yards and cultural difference play important roles in this context. Negative attitudes towards contracts in
Confucianism (see 5.1.1.8) have considerable influence over contract management activities. Emphasis on
harmony lead South Koreans to perceive unfairness in the preclusive rules as violation of the Confucian
principle. The negative view of contracts in Confucian cultures hampers invoking the formal contractual
mechanism actively. The adverse impact resulting from the practice of the stringent formal procedure can,
coupled with this Confucian characteristic, make the contractual relationships even more vulnerable.
Kaasen (2009) contends that the potential risks of the formalism presented above do not pose much
challenge in consideration of practical situations where the Norwegian standard contracts are used. Such
situations assume that both parties are exceptionally experienced and have good understandings of the
mechanisms to use them efficiently (Kaasen, 2009). The assumption is valid for contracts involving
Norwegian companies only but may not so for international contract with players new to the standard
contracts. Kaasen (2009) observes that it also takes time for Norwegian companies to get accustomed to
the formalism of Norwegian standard contracts. As Norwegians become more familiar with the
characteristic of Norwegian stander contract, the sentiment against the formality gradually abates. This
means that the formal preclusive rules require some time even for Norwegians to get used to, and, in this
respect, it seems natural that it will take even more time for new player to well understand and practice the
formalistic mechanism.
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5.2.
The four key contributory factors come into play as a project progresses. How those factors play out in
combination and challenges arise are illustrated here.
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This reciprocal indebtedness also promotes long-term relationships. In Norway, however, relationships are
symmetrically obligatory and contractually reciprocal. People follow a general give-and-take interaction
principle. In these sorts of relationships, each party expects a pay-off reward that will be equivalent or
proportionate to what they offer the other party and that will be realized in a relatively short period of time
(Yum, 1988).
Unlike Norwegians, South Koreans tend to mix social and professional relationships. They interact
continuously and frequently to build a common understanding and have consensus within and outside of
the work place. Norwegians, in contrast, have a rather clear distinction between personal and official
business relationships. Overlap between the two does not typically happen.
The distinction between in-group and out-group members is clear in South Korea while it is rather unclear
in Norway.
Different way of building trust
The discussion above suggests that the way people establish and develop interpersonal relationships in the
two countries is different. The difference accordingly causes much confusion. In particular, the emphasis
on social relationships in South Korea is such that in order to establish and develop build trust for official
business one must first consider, and perhaps build, an interpersonal relationship. According to Yum
(1988), the Confucian focus on social relationships puts the development of human relationships even
ahead of official business activities, and this, in turn, results in a strong appetite among people to build
personal relationships during purely business transactions. Thus, for South Koreans, establishing and
developing social relationships are critical for building trust, and failure to establish the relationship in
proper way can lead to the disruption of professional business.
By establishing a relative relationship, South Koreans apply the Confucian asymmetric and reciprocally
obligatory rules of interaction to the relationship, which impose different types of burdens on each party.
Because the rules regulate the relationship and have some binding effect over the people involved, South
Koreans regard establishment of this relationship as an assurance of a certain level of trust. Thus, the
relationship is deemed to have a certain level of trust from its beginning, even without a process of gradual,
progressive development of the trust, which takes time. This suggests one of the most distinct
characteristics of how South Koreans build trust, which is very different from the Norwegian way. Based
on this mutual understanding, people can enhance the relationship and deepen the trust further.
It is difficult for Norwegians to appreciate the importance of establishing proper interpersonal relationship
in the manner typical of South Koreans because Norway has very different approach. In Norway, people
clearly separate social and professional matters; thus, personal relationships do not have much impact on
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trust in official business contexts. Norwegians establish relationships on equal terms and take general
symmetric give-and-take approach with each other. This means that delivering what one promises to
deliver is essential to build the trust in this relationship.
It is common knowledge that keeping commitment is critical to gain trust in any relationship, but what the
commitment means can vary across cultures and countries. The difference between individualism and
social relationship (collectivism) matters in this respect. Norwegians stress individualistic values, such as
autonomy of an individual, which requires an individual who pursues his or her own interests to carry his
or her own responsibility solely. It assumes that an individual is well aware of his or her capability and
authority so that he or she should promise what he or she can actually do. This supports that building trust
in Norway is result-oriented. South Koreans, on the other hand, recognize an individual as one of the
members constituting a group and put an emphasis on a role of the individual to keep harmony of a group.
To have a good understanding of capability and authority of an individual, it is necessary to draw a clear
line between the individual and the group, and this is difficult in social relationship (collectivism) culture.
It is also difficult to describe, to a large extent, how a group decides the capability and authority given to
an individual within organizations in South Korea. In this respect, South Koreans put focus on the
intention of his or her counterpart for a trust issue of a relationship. For example, even though a person
failed to deliver what she or he had promised, the failure would not necessarily have an adverse impact on
the trust level of the relationship between South Koreans. If delivery of the promise appears to harm the
harmony of the group and the intention of the person was to deliver what she or he said at the outset, a
South Korean expects her or his counterpart to accept these situations as reasonable grounds of not
keeping the promise.
5.2.1.4. Confucian influence on communication (see 5.1.1.4)
As discussed in 5.1.1.4, Confucianism has a significant impact on communication between people from
the two countries. Emphasis on indirect communication and the role of listeners, in particular, pose
challenges for Norwegians to understand what South Koreans try to convey.
South Koreans will use an indirect communication pattern to sidestep the danger of hurting a counterparts
feelings and reputation by addressing the difficult or sensitive issues in indirect ways. This, however, is in
stark contrast with Norwegians communication pattern, which tends to be more straightforward and
direct. Thus, South Koreans effort to save the reputation, or face, of her or his counterpart by slowly
approaching to heart of problem is not be appreciated by Norwegian. Norwegians may be confused by
indirect communications because such communication can be considered ruder or inconsiderate because it
is time-consuming and intentionally unclear. Thus, they may misinterpret the gesture. Similarly, South
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Koreans can misinterpret a Norwegians bluntness as lacking compassion for their face, though the
Norwegian was trying to get to the main idea in order for the other people to continue on.
Another thing that can cause miscommunication is silence. Recall that in Confucian communication styles,
the burden is on listeners to correctly understand what is said. This keeps South Koreans from asking
questions or speaking against what was said by a Norwegian client. In such cases, the Norwegian
presumes the South Korean understood or agreed with content, but this may not be true. The South Korean
may come back later with many questions about the same topic already discussed.
Yes in Confucian society may not be the yes in Western society
Among many examples where Norwegians struggle with the Confucian communication patterns is
interpretation of yes. For a Norwegian, a yes most likely means I agree with you or I agree to what
you want or recommend. However, in South Korea, yes can be interpreted in various way given the
high context nature of the culture. Yes can be an attempt to avoid saying no or being engaged in a
situations where disagreeing or rejecting an idea would threaten the other persons face. This is related to
the Confucian emphasis of indirect communication noted previously. Another interpretation of yes
relates to the previously discussed emphasis on listeners responsibility to maintain the conversation. In
this context, the South Koreans, who are typically listening, says yes to convey that they are sincerely
listening to what is being said by the speakers even though they are not actually following the contents of
the message. Language barriers, in addition to the cultural ones, also explain why this occurs here.
Because of the possible varying meanings of a South Koreans yes, Norwegians may believe that a
conversation ended differently than it actually did. People may not have actually come to agreement, and
this can lead to unexpected responses from South Koreans after official meetings. Namely, the South
Korean may later oppose or question what Norwegians think are already understood fully or agreed to.
5.2.1.5. Business practice
Business practices in both countries also have huge influence over the communication. Some of the
Norwegian business practices which South Korean recognizes distinct are presented in (INTSOK, 2014).
Positive note
Technically advanced
Sincere and honest
Practical
HSE focused
Standardization
Equality
Do not abuse of unequal
bargaining power
Negative note
TABLE 5-2 NORWEGIAN BUSINESS PRACTICES OBSERVED BY SOUTH KOREAN (INTSOK, 2014)
These practices, particularly the items on the negative side, have practical implications for daily
communication at work. For example, South Koreans should plan ahead to obtain all the information they
need to work from their Norwegian counterpart before the Norwegian takes a long vacation.
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contact often entails the sacrifice of ones personal life. Social gatherings after work hours take place
much more frequently in South Korea relative to Norway.
In-group/out-group distinction
A clear distinction between shipyard and other groups helps strengthen ties among shipyard employees
and encourages loyalty to the shipyard. This promotes sense of unity. However, the loyalty comes at cost
of excluding others. This creates a huddle for the shipyard employees to build a cooperative relationship
with other companies where open discussion is necessary, e.g., joint ventures or consortiums.
5.2.3.2. Shipbuilding industry features
Functional structure (see 5.1.2.1)
The shipyard benefits from strong support from big groups of functional expertise. The deep professional
pool is a prerequisite for high productivity via innovating production processes. However, the rigid
boundaries between functional units hamper lateral communication. Each functional unit focuses on its
own tasks designated by the production system of the shipyard. Communication among functional units is
not well organized or supported by the system.
Lean production (see 5.1.2.2)
By implementing a Lean production concept throughout its production process, the shipyard achieved
high productivity and earned price competitive edge in international shipbuilding markets. Such
productivity comes at cost of flexibility. Production processes are tightly interconnected; thus, it is
difficult to estimate the impact of local changes on the whole system. The production system is not
designed to be resilient to changes.
Emphasis on high productivity has resulted in strong construction departments, which lead production
processes improvement initiatives. The strong power given to construction departments enables the
functional units to push the initiative through the organization. This results in an imbalance of power
between construction and other functions. Other departments are more receptive and reactive as compared
to construction departments.
Heavy reliance on local sub-contractor (see 5.1.2.3)
South Korean shipyards have been able to gain cost competitiveness by hiring in more sub-contractors.
However, such an approach increases concerns over the control of labor and quality of performance as the
number of sub-contractors supervised by shipyard employees has more than doubled since 2011.
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With its limited power, a South Korean shipyards project management organization cannot have control
over the construction and engineering departments which are more powerful and much larger than itself.
In particular, the construction department, which is the most influential unit of South Korean shipyard
organization, does what is the most beneficial for the entire shipyard, not for a specific project. Thus, a
PMT for any particular project does not have enough power to influence the decisions of the construction
department effectively. In fact, the role of a PMT is often limited, and each PMT competes with other
PMTs to attract more attention from the base organization of the EPC contractor so as to secure more
resources and support from functional units.
Haphazard project control
In situations such as the above, it is difficult for a PMT of South Korean shipyard to manage internal
communication efficiently within the organization. Due to insufficient resources, a PMT often struggles to
facilitate communication between functional units. For example, when discord or dispute arises between
construction and engineering department, a PMT should be able to mediate the issue. However, this seems
unlikely in South Korean shipyard because of the difficulty the PMT faces in keeping up with the schedule
and the technical communication that it needs to mediate between the two units. As a result, the project
scheduling and control of offshore projects are often haphazard in this functional organization because the
barrier among functional units hinders prompt exchange of information (Gardiner, 2005).
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In accordance with Confucian reciprocally obligatory relationship, shipyards (SY) pay respect to ship
owners (SO) while ask submission from local vendors (LV) and service sub-contractors (LS).
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usually it is too late to implement corrective actions in the most efficient and effective way (INTSOK,
2014).
Usually E and V are equipped with extensive experience and knowledge in offshore industry while C still
has long way to go. Hence, it is practically impossible for C to provide guidance or advice as a superior to
its sub-contractors except local sub-contractors (L), which are in small number. L in general does not
possess much offshore experiences either. For FPSO, only 20% of total equipment and material are
provided by local players (Koshipa, 2011). In addition to these difficulties, the in-group/out-group
distinction is less clear in these projects than in shipbuilding ones, leading to more difficulties for C. For
instance, the ethnic diversity makes it difficult to draw a clear line between in-groups and out-groups.
Nonetheless, C has a tendency to regard the hierarchical structure of contractual relationship as a group
under Confucian thinking since it seems to them that the Confucian setup still binds all relevant parties
together.
All the above issues creates a gray zone in cultural the context between O and C (, see Figure 5-10), O
and E (), and O and V (), where communication among parties gets difficult. Combined with
insufficient functional and interface management capability (see 5.1.4.1), this cultural gray zone often
results in undesirable outcomes: C demands E/V take responsibility towards O; direct communication
between O and E take place excluding C.
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Formalization issue
The frequent use of informal communication lines brings up an issue of formalizing discussion between O
and C. Because informal communication often takes place in private settings, it is difficult to record all the
details of the communication and to get it confirmed by both parties officially. This can be problematic if
the agreement made though an informal discussion is a sensitive commercial/contractual issue. Depending
on its nature and importance, some of the communication should be formalized and processed officially in
case of any potential dispute; however, this is difficult to do during communicating informally.
No response
Even with use of informal communication, O still has difficulties in dealing with some cases where Cs
personnel do not respond to conclusion made between O and C in the expected manner, in particular when
Cs personnel respond slowly or dont respond at all. There are many possible causes for this: the lack of
authority of the person who delivered the message or was involved in the negotiations, low priority
assigned to the issue or the project, general communication issues including language and cultural barrier
(see 5.2.1).
5.2.4.6. Tough contract management
In general, O and Cs attitude towards contract is very different, which is supported and strengthened by
their own experiences.
Because of Confucianism, the general attitude towards contracts is negative in South Korea (see 5.1.1.8),
and this is very different from Norways attitude. On top of this, the shipyards have grown skeptical
towards project owners and resistant to changes in general after financial crises (see 5.1.2.4). As discussed
in 5.1.4.2, stringent formality is one of major features of the NTK 07 format, which encourages involved
parties to actively utilize relevant clauses provided in the contract. Still, in the event of a dispute, the legal
proceeding usually comes at considerable cost and often does not justify such actions. And C, based on its
experiences that their requests for compensation for any changes are common and well accepted in
shipbuilding project, takes the same approach towards O, expecting that it is also effective for the
Norwegian EPC projects. This creates much tension between the two parties.
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Engineering department is to assist procurement personnel but that is not good enough to achieve smooth
communication between C and V.
Interviewees also revealed that that often POs issued by C often miss out detailed technical specifications
with relevant reference to NORSOK standards, which are essential for V to produce their equipment. Such
POs lead to follow-up inquiries from V, which are followed by a great deal of correspondence between the
two parties to supplement the insufficient technical input in the PO.
supervisors and complicate the relative relationship between C and L. If the Ls employee had
comparatively long work experience at C, it can be difficult for their supervisors from C to have effective
influence over the L. C, then, may call for the Os help to control their sub-contractors.
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6.
Recommendations
6.1.
The findings in Chapter 5 suggest that there is a significant difference between Norway (Offshore industry)
and South Korea (Shipbuilding industry). The first thing to do in order to mitigate the challenges arising
from Norwegian EPC projects in South Korea is to acknowledge and agree that there is such difference.
Both parties should then adjust their expectations of each other in light of the difference. Based on that,
what should be done and how it should be done can be determined to deal with the project challenges.
National culture
Organization
structure
Industry
Norway
South Korea
(Offshore/Process industry)
(Shipbuilding industry)
Scandinavian culture
Individualism
Active towards law
Confucian culture
Harmony
Negative towards law
Flat
Lateral communication
Project-oriented
PM with substantial authority
Multi-disciplinary engineering
tradition
Functional requirement
Agile production (flexibility)
Focus on how to manage change
effectively
Focus on quality
(broad quality scope)
NTK 07 (Hoppeplikt)
Small size offshore yard
(2-3 offshore project in parallel)
Hierarchical
Top-down communication
Functional
PM as project coordinator
Although Table 6-1 provides useful guidance for Norwegian operators to identify the differences between
the countries (industries), there is more to take into consideration to determine the differences for an actual
business case, such as different corporate specific cultures, different work processes, and so on.
individualistic notion of rights (Leonhard, 2009). The individualism in the Western world gives a person
or an entity freedom to engage in an agreement with others for his, her, or its own interest. In contrast, in a
Confucian society, the emphasis is on social relationships, thus restricting individuals freedoms while
putting more value on a harmony in the society. As discussed in 5.1.1.8, this provides ground for frequent
changes to contracts in Confucian countries, while contracts hold an absolute reverence in the Western
world.
Of course the Confucian approach can be hardly approved if any dispute is brought to the court in Norway
as NTK 07 format states. Still this does not sustain the expectation that South Korean shipyards will take
the same logical sequences in interpreting the contract as Norwegian counterparts do. McConnaughay
(2000) observes a significant gap between commercial law and commercial behavior across Asian
countries with traditional expectations often still strong regarding the subordination of law and contracts
to evolving circumstances and relational values.
6.1.1.3. Adjust expectation
The differences noted in Table 6-1 suggest that there can be an inevitable gap between Norwegian
operators and South Korean shipyards expectations. Basically, with the award of NCS project to South
Korean shipyards, Norwegian operators expect South Koreans to comply with Norwegian requirements
and contract terms through the multi-disciplinary and agile concept approach, which require flat and
project oriented organization. Norwegians may also want to have full support from the whole organization
of the contractor similar to what Norwegian offshore yards do. On the other hand, however, South Korean
counterparts anticipate delivering project with their already established systems designed for lean
production and utilization of deep expertise in a discipline, suitable for their hierarchical and functional
structure. Because a Norwegian project usually accounts for 2% to 3% of a business portfolio of South
Korean shipyards, it is natural that the shipyards view the project as one of its ordinary projects, and there
is a fierce competition to draw more attention from the shipyard between many projects going in parallel.
Based on the agreement of the difference, both companies can align their expectations of each other with
reality. For Norwegian operators, this requires a thorough review of the procurement strategy and their
own capability to handle the gap created by the difference. It is also important for the two companies to
have open discussions and a better understanding of the capability of their counterpart so that they can
have more realistic expectations. This is an essential process to improve effectiveness of the measures to
be taken in order to fill the gap.
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What to maintain
National
culture
Organization
structure
Industry
Scandinavian
culture
Individualism
Active towards
law
Confucian
Culture
Social
relationship
Negative
towards law
Flat
Lateral
communication
Project-oriented
PM with
substantial
authority
Hierarchical
Top-down
communication
Functional
PM as project
coordinator
Focus on
quality
What
Multi-disciplinary
engineering
Functional
requirement
Agile production
Focus on how to
manage change
effectively
NTK 07
Deep expertise in
a discipline
Prescriptive
requirement
Lean production
Focus on how to
minimize changes
Shipbuilding
contract
Where
How
91
How the differences are categorized is self-explanatory. National culture and organization structure cannot
be changed thus the difference should be acknowledged. On the other hand, the quality cannot be
compromised.
The three categories point to practical implications for Norwegian operators on how to approach
challenges in Norwegian EPC project at South Korean shipyards.
The What category refers to what to be achieved by the project and maintained by
Norwegian operators. The operators should clearly communicate the items falling into this
category to South Korean shipyards so that the shipyards fully appreciate the criticality of
such items.
The Where category refers to areas where operators should focus their efforts to narrow
the gap between the two parties. Operators supporting activities to reinforce shipyards
capability aim items in this category.
For practical application of this approach, depending on the project execution strategy, the operator may
conduct further analysis to determine more differences and add them into this categorization process. In
doing so, the process can yield more items for each category.
Norwegian is well positioned to adapt to new environment
Given its significant influence on human thinking and behavior, culture deserves more attention, and
Norwegian operators should reflect upon it before implementing the approach by accepting South Korean
culture. The difference between Norway and South Korea in how they communicate and establish
relationships is significant (see 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.1.4). In principle, both Norwegian operators and South
Korean shipyards should work together to overcome problems caused by differences in communication
and interpersonal relationship patterns so as to effectively address practical challenges arising from a
Norwegian EPC project in South Korea.
Still, the low-context nature of Scandinavian culture gives more of an edge to Norway to adapt itself to a
new environment relative to the high-context Confucian culture of South Korea. Because Norwegians do
not have the highly developed complicated rules for communications and relationships that South Koreans
live by, Norwegians can be more flexible when dealing with a completely different culture. The way
Norwegians communicate and build relationships is more universal, contrary to the particularistic South
92
Korean way. This makes Norwegians more tolerant of others and, at the same time, acceptable by others.
Thus, Norwegian operators who play active roles to fill the gap between themselves and South Korean
shipyards are more likely to succeed in creating a successful partnership and completing their projects.
Common understanding is essential
In order to effectively address the project challenges, the two companies should establish a common
understanding about the determination of what, where and how. In doing so, Norwegian operator
can focus on the target areas identified in where category and the communication method determined in
how category so as to put its effort more efficiently to support shipyard activities and fill the gap
effectively. South Korean shipyard can facilitate this activity by lowering its communication barrier and
actively involved in the activities. A one-sided approach by the operator without the common
understanding may have some effect but to a limited extent at best. It is more likely that such an approach
would only increase the risk of misunderstanding between the two parties and further hurt the relationship.
6.2.
How to Communicate
The How category identified above implies that, in order to have effective communication and thereby
facilitate the activities to fill the gap between Norwegian operator and South Korean contractor, operators
need to adapt themselves to the different environments.
a relaxed atmosphere where people can open their minds and help reduce risk of miscommunication. This
is a good starting point for effective communication.
Be specific and clear
It is important to be specific and clear to lower general communication barrier. Using simple and accurate
words in a transparent way and taking pedagogical approach are advisable as there is always a risk of
misunderstanding due to different experience and professional terms used.
To steer clear of pitfalls of different communication patterns, including misinterpretation of Yes, it is
good to rephrase the questions and ascertain that all the relevant parties have the same understanding
clearly.
6.2.1.2. Know your position
The cultural gray zone
In the Confucian framework, the operator is positioned at the top of the hierarchy where contractors pay
respect to the operator and the operator is given authority over the contractors to certain extent. This helps
the operator have influence over the shipyards activities which can be utilized to help them fulfill its
responsibilities as an EPC contractor.
Notwithstanding such influence, the operator is still regarded as not in the same in-group but as a
foreigner. Employees of the operator are not required to follow Confucian rules while receiving respects
from the shipyard according to Confucian framework. This cultural gray zone effect provides the operator
with more flexibility regarding how to deliver its message to the shipyard. In general, following Confucian
rules, including being humble and respectful to counterpart, makes the communication easier. Still it is
worth noting that the operator can exercise some flexibility to go beyond the cultural boundary and take
different communication approaches where appropriate. For example, when the shipyard counterparts do
not respond to the operators request, operators personnel can use some strong words, such as you
should~ rather than can you~, to empower them to get what they need.
Being humble and respectful makes difference
Situated at the top of Confucian hierarchy, the operator can try to take full advantage of its position and
not show as much respect to the shipyard as the shipyard would do. Conversely, if the operator shows a
humble attitude towards South Korean shipyard, the shipyard greatly appreciates such demeanor, as it is
well aware of its position lower than the operator in Confucian hierarchy. The operators personnel could
make comments to shipyard without giving them an impression of being demanding. This can help
94
operator make differences in various aspects in much easier way in the course of the project. It is also
advisable for the operators personnel to be polite to managers of shipyard. In doing so, the operator can
demonstrate its respect not only to its counterpart and his or her manager but also to the shipyard as a
whole.
6.2.1.3. How to establish relationship
According to the particularistic approach of Confucianism, South Koreans establish relative relationships
based on differences in status. The most influential factor that decides status assigned to people title. Age
comes next as the second most influential factor.
Take advantage of cultural gray zone
If a Confucian relative relationship involves a Norwegian as a customer, the relevant Confucian rules are
not strictly applied because the relationship falls within a cultural gray zone. This allows some flexibility.
Norwegians can choose either a Confucian way of establishing relative relationship or their own way of
building relationship on equal terms.
Confucian relative relationship
In establishing a relative relationship with South Korean shipyard personnel, employees of Norwegian
operators will be given status either higher than or equal to her or his South Korean counterpart. The
reason for this is that, under the Confucian framework, the Norwegian operator is positioned higher than
South Korean contractor because of the companies relationship to one another. According to interviewees,
the fact that there is usually not a significant difference in title between the two counterparts also increases
the likelihood that the Norwegian personnel will be assumed to have higher status than the South Korean
personnel.
South Korean shipyard employees have strong tastes to build a personal relationship through official
business (See 5.1.1.3). This suggests that a good personal relationship can be translated into a high level of
trust in an official business transaction. Hence, if well-cultivated, the relative relationship in the personal
level comes with many advantages in the organizational level that can help solve practical problems
effectively and swiftly. According to interviewees, a well-developed relationship can make a huge
difference and help improve the Norwegian project progress very successfully. Basically it lowers
communication barrier caused by lack of English competency and difference in status within Confucian
framework (too much respect to the operator). It can also help to secure high commitment to the project
from the shipyard management, obtain full support from the South Korean counterparts, ensure immediate
follow-up of requests for the operator, and so on. These are invaluable advantages for the Norwegian
95
operator to better manage the projects in South Korean shipyards, where many projects owners compete
fiercely to draw more attention from the shipyard and secure resource for their project.
Professional relationship on equal terms
Relationships that are built on equal terms mean that Norwegians and South Koreans will define their
connections as just professional and official business relationships. This is an approach that Norwegians
are already familiar with. With this type of relationship, Norwegians do not have to worry about
seemingly complicated interpersonal relationship patterns of Confucianism. However, Norwegians are
less likely to experience the advantages that can be obtained by following a Confucian approach. On the
other hand, this approach can help Norwegians avoid the stress of managing new interpersonal skills and
rules. This sort of relationship is also becoming more acceptable in South Korea because South Korean
society is changing rapidly. Thus a relatively younger generation who grows concerned with
individualism is more susceptible to the professional relationship as Norwegians may expect.
6.2.1.4. Develop relationship and Build trust
How to develop relationship and build trust differs depending on how people establish the relationship. A
Norwegian operator can choose how to establish a relationship between a Confucian particularistic
approach (Relative relationship) and Norwegian universal approach (Relationship on equal terms). In
Confucian approach, a certain level of trust is deemed to exist among the people involved from the
beginning of the relationship (See 5.1.1.3). On the other hand, Norwegian builds trust from nothing at the
outset of a relationship. This section presents how the Norwegian employees can develop the Confucian
relative relationship and build trust with South Korean shipyard personnel.
Development of personal relationship is a key
As discussed 6.2.1.3, since a good personal relationship can lead to high trust level of official business
relationship, developing the relative relationship is a key to build trust between the two companies both in
personal and organizational level.
Although the Confucian asymmetric and reciprocally obligatory rules place a certain level of trust on the
relative relationship from its beginning, the rules do not insure the high trust relationship throughout the
project. The trust among the operator and shipyard becomes more dependent on how the relationship is
developed. South Korean shipyard employees develop a relationship through continuous and frequent
interactions due to overlap of social and professional relationship pattern in the Confucian society (See
5.1.1.5). They also have strong taste to build personal relationship through business transactions (See
5.1.1.3). These are useful tips for the operators employees to develop the relationship in particular when
96
the relationship with their South Korean counterparts just started but also requires them sacrifice their
private life after work hours to some extent. Interviews suggest that spending time at social events with
the shipyard personnel and sharing personal matters is very important to lower communication barrier and
make the relationship more reliable. These kinds of social events serve as good opportunities to
understand what is going on in the shipyard and what their priority is for the time.
Being communicative, predictable, and reliable
Solely relying on development of a personal relationship to build trust is not enough to ensure high level
of trust in long term perspective. The fact that personal relationship can influence official business
transaction in Confucian society is also valid in reverse. Thus an effort to keeping a commitment as a
professional should come along with the activities for personal relationship development.
That is, as the project progresses, more general rules to develop trust in official business transaction apply:
be communicative, predictable, and reliable. Understanding how the shipyard personnel communicate and
willingness to adapt to new environment is a starting point to become communicative. The operators
personnel should inform their role and responsibility clearly to their counterparts. These are essential to
establish a solid foundation of trust and avoid potential misunderstanding resulting from different
expectations. When implementing certain requirements in the form of procedures or regulations in a daily
work, it is important to help the shipyard personnel understand why the requirement should be followed as
well as how it should be implemented. Once the rule or plan is set out, efforts should be made to adhere to
it, thereby enhancing predictability. The significance of making good on promises cannot be overstated.
Most importantly, each of operator personnel should be competent and reliable in handling tasks within
their specialty. High complexity of offshore projects brings up many challenging situations where the
operators experience and knowledge count. It helps not only solve a problems of the project but also
develop the relative relationship since the operator is expected to have better knowledge and experience
than the shipyard so as to provide proper guidance and effective solutions according to the Confucian rule.
Having professionals with the right competences is the most basic element to build and maintain trust.
issues, the formal communication lines should be used to formalize and document relevant discussion
properly as these subjects, compared to others, entails higher potential of a legal dispute.
6.2.2.2. Informal communication line
Informal communication lines can be used for subjects that concern daily operation and require practical
approaches with an immediate effect as well as have less risk of developing into a legal dispute. Most of
practical issues which Norwegian operators face during a project execution phase is discussed and
addressed through informal communication. Growing importance of an informal communication lines
turns attention of Norwegian operators on how to develop interpersonal relationship with South Korean
shipyard personnel, which directly affect the effectiveness of the communication line.
6.2.2.3. How to locate a right person?
To make either formal or informal communication lines effective, it is important to identify a right person
and involve the person in the communication. Still it is a very challenging task for Norwegian operators
(see 5.2.4.5). The right persons include a manager who has the authority to handle the issues and
discipline level employees who actually works on the issues. If there are middle managers in-between,
they can also be included.
Establishing a good relationship with the shipyards PMT who can help identify the right person is a good
starting point. PMT can provide an organization chart of the shipyard. The chart often does not indicate
actual report/communication lines of the organization. It is advisable to find out the actual lines and draw
up another chart reflecting the findings. The operator should also continuously keep the chart updated with
a help from PMT as there are frequent changes of personnel within the shipyard organization.
In general it is convenient to start the search for a right person from a higher level of the hierarchical
structure of the shipyard. Meeting with manager level personnel of a functional unit handling the task in
question can help narrow down the search area as the operator goes down the hierarchical ladder.
6.2.2.4. Intermediary
Use of intermediary in line with Confucian relationship management practice (see 5.1.1.3) can help
establish the communication channels in an efficient way. An intermediary should have good
understanding of culture, organizational structure, and work process of both the operator and shipyard so
as to provide practical guidance to deal with cultural and organizational issues on how to communicate
and establish relationship.
98
In the hierarchical organization of South Korean shipyards where authority is concentrated on the highest
position, a leadership change can lead to a massive scale organization and personnel reshuffle. Then the
operator needs to identify details of the changes to re-establish communication lines accordingly. The
process can take considerable time and effort for the operator to complete. The intermediate can assist in
re-establishing relationships with new management and important personnel of the shipyard quickly. This
also helps the operators employees manage relationship with personnel in lower levels.
Intermediary can also help solve practical issues with the shipyard by directly engaging in communication
between the two parties. Often it is the case that certain departments or units of the shipyards want to
communicate directly with the operators to solve problems but fail to do so due to the rigid boundaries
between functional units within the organizations. Intermediary can identify such needs of the departments
or units and help them set up appropriate direct communication channel with the operators. Still, care
should be exercised for this approach. In particular, use of intermediary to settle issues concerning
contractual or commercial subjects should be avoided. Those issues in general address sensitive topics and
can affect or question loyalty of the intermediary. In such case, use of intermediary can be
counterproductive and only damage relationship with the shipyard.
99
boss. If this is not the case and there are conflicts among shipyard participants, let them settle the issue so
that they can come out with one unified voice. Caution should be exercised when making comments on
such issues being disputed between the shipyard personnel, in particular when such comments can be
construed to be against opinion from high level personnel.
Deliver the same message clearly
The message should be delivered clearly through communication lines between the peers of the both
parties. All operator personnel should convey the same message to their counterpart. For each issue to be
discussed, the person who is designated as a main contact point needs to take a leading role in discussion
on behalf of the operator. Other colleagues remain supportive of the contact persons opinion. In doing so,
the operator clearly shows the participants from the shipyard who they have to contact in relation to the
specific issue. It helps simplify communication channels between the operator and shipyard and avoid
confusion arising from different organizational structure of the two companies.
Minute a meeting outcome
Throughout a meeting, either one of the parties should take notes of discussions. At the end of a meeting,
both parties agree on outcomes of the discussions they had. More specifically the outcomes include what
actions are to be taken by which party by when. The next meeting schedule can be also agreed. Based on
the agreed outcomes, the meeting minutes are produced shortly after the meeting and shared between the
two parties.
6.2.4.3. Follow-up meeting
Ensure a common understanding
The outcome of the meeting should be closely followed up by the main contact person in the operators
organization before the next meeting is held. The primary role of the contact person is to support her or his
counterparts in the shipyard to carry out the actions as agreed during the meeting. If there are any action
items which are not closed, the cases should be included in the agenda of the next meeting.
Make a report
The operator and shipyard can make a simple and short report in order to present what are the agreed
outcomes of the previous meeting and among them what are actually done. The report can help decide
agenda of the next meeting. Introduction of KPI (Key Performance Indicator) is recommendable to
measure the progress made after the meeting and keep the report simple.
101
No response
The operator needs to find out the reason why the shipyard counterpart does not respond. Having a
discussion with the shipyard person in private setting is a good way to uncover more fundamental reasons
of the problem. If the shipyard personnel do not have enough authority to handle the case, the operators
personnel can support their counterpart to bring up the issue to higher level. It can be the case that the
shipyard person does not clearly understand what was told by the operator during a meeting for various
reasons including language barrier: the operators employee should ensure their counterparts understand
what the operator needs and why it needs that. The shipyard personnel may not feel that they need to work
on operators request immediately as they do not see the operators counterpart have power. In such case,
finding balance between using power distance within the shipyard organization and developing personal
relationship becomes critical as opting the former can adversely affect the latter. The operator personnel
can ask their boss to contact a manager of the shipyard person who does not respond and put some
pressure on the person in question.
6.3.
What to Support
managers positioned between the low level engineer and the high level manager who can make decision.
In doing so, the operator ensures that everyone in the decision making process chain has the same
understanding of the problem and, thus, facilitates discussions within the shipyard organization.
Sales and other functions
At the very early stage of project execution (or even before project award), the operator needs to ensure
that all the discussions it has had with sales department of the shipyard are shared with other functional
units of the organization which actually work on the project. It is often the case that the sales function
does not communicate some of the key elements negotiated and agreed upon with other functions, such as
construction and engineering. Thus, it is recommendable for the operator to verify if the communication
among the shipyard functions is effective enough to establish same understanding among all the functions
regarding what has been agreed with the operator. The operator may request the involvement of
construction and engineering department personnel in the negotiation process. One of the interviewees
noted that, on some occasions, some of sales department personnel, who get directly involved in the
negotiation and conclude the contract with operator, are engaged in the project execution phase at the
shipyard construction site. This helps facilitate communication between the operator and the shipyard and
reduce the risk of dispute resulting from miscommunication between the shipyard functions.
103
Engineering sub-contractor
It is often the case that operator has already establish communication channel with the international
engineering sub-contractors, leading the sub-contractor to contact the operator directly when it has a
conflict with the EPC contractor. This does not help solve the problem. It will only make the shipyard feel
marginalized and take a more skeptical view of the relationship between the operator and engineering subcontractor. It is, thus, important to make the communication line transparent by involving the EPC
contractor in the discussion between the operator and the sub-contractor.
Oversea vendor
The operator can support procurement activities of the shipyard by backing its engineering capability.
Having engineers to support the shipyards procurement function helps produce technical inputs for the
purchase orders to be issued to overseas vendors. Such aid from operator also assists the shipyard function
in handling technical queries from overseas vendors efficiently.
104
Having more senior engineers in the project organization is also helpful. They can get involved in
communication with the engineering department of the shipyard directly to enhance the multi-disciplinary
engineering capability within the department.
Help the shipyards active use of 3D modeling
It appears that most of the Big 3 South Korean shipyards and their engineering sub-contractors use the
same 3D modeling software provided by a European company. For the operator it is also a good option to
bolster engineering capability of the shipyards by using the customer education program already run by
the 3D modeling software provider through its South Korean branch. In cooperation with the software
company, the operator can provide the shipyard with an education program customized to help the
shipyards actively use 3D modeling programs and apply it in practice for the offshore project.
Company
HHI
DSME
SHI
3D modeling software
Shipbuilding
Offshore
Shipbuilding
Offshore
Offshore
Aveva Marine
105
7.
7.1.
Overview of Results
engineering tradition. It does not have positions for multi-disciplinary engineers and does not actively use
3D modeling although it has the modeling software. Interpretation of NORSOK standard is a difficult task
for the shipbuilders, who are used to prescriptive regulations. The functional regulation demands users
have experience and knowledge to take advantage of the approach fully. For those who do not possess
such virtues, the complexity of the standard will present serous interpretation and implement challenges.
EPC contract
As an EPC contractor, South Korean shipyards provide a single point of responsibility. Lack of full
functional capability required for EPC project and application of different communication and
coordination approaches make it difficult for the shipbuilder to fulfill its obligations as EPC contractor.
For those who do not have experience with Norwegian standard contracts, the stringent formality feature
of the NTK 07 format appears to be difficult to adapt to and to actively utilize. Combined with negative
attitudes towards contract in Confucianism, this can have adverse impact on contract management
between Norwegian operators and South Korean shipyards.
107
Confucian framework
South Koreans apply the Confucian framework for interpretation of contractual relationships. Under the
framework, the shipyard as EPC contractor situated lower than Norwegian operator and higher than its
sub-contractors. Because the EPC contractor cannot fulfill its obligation against operator and its subcontractor according to Confucian reciprocally obligatory relationship, cultural gray zones are created.
Communication with Norwegian operator
According to the Confucian rule, EPC contractors pay respect to the operators, and this sometimes hinders
effective communication. Different organization structures lead both the operator and the EPC contractor
to have formal communication in effective way. As formal communication channel does not work well,
but communication in informal manner takes place extensively.
Communication with sub-contractors
Interviewees revealed that the EPC contractors are demanding of their sub-contractors in general in
Confucian framework, and this is generally strongly opposed by overseas sub-contractors. It is also noted
by interviewees that international engineering contractors have communication issues with EPC
contractors. The friction created between high-context cultures seem to contribute to the issue. The
engineering firm often already has direct communication line with the Norwegian operator, and this can
lead to worsened communication problems with the EPC contractor. Because of the challenges the EPC
contractor has in relation to interpretation of NORSOK, its procurement department fails to provide full
engineering input for the PO. The Norwegian vendors find it time-consuming to obtain all the technical
information they need for their products.
7.1.3. Recommendation
Based on the findings, this thesis makes recommendations for Norwegian operators on how to approach
and address the challenges arising during project execution phase of Norwegian EPC project in South
Korea.
Alignment of expectation
To address challenges, it is critical for the both parties to agree on how different they are and on how they
are going to resolve issues. Without such common understanding, it is difficult to expect efforts by either
of the two be successful.
108
7.2.
This thesis targets Norwegian oil and gas industry players. Thus, it assumes that readers are familiar with
Norwegian culture, business practice, and Norwegian oil and gas industry and focuses on introducing
South Korean culture and shipbuilding industry practice. Future research can put its focus on Norwegian
109
culture and oil and gas industry so that more precise comparisons between the two countries and industries
can be made.
Customers of South Korean shipyard include almost all of the big oil and gas companies in the world
including major NOCs (National Oil Company) and IOC (International Oil Companies). Many of them
also awarded EPC projects to the shipbuilders. One statement that came from South Korean shipbuilders
is that Norway has some of the toughest clients who can be hard to deal with as compared with other
clients. Comparisons between EPC projects from Norway and other countries can reveal what makes
Norwegian operators distinct from others.
South Korean shipyards also recognized that there are serious challenges for Norwegian EPC project. In
an attempt to address the challenges, they are making various efforts including increasing engineering
capacity by acquiring engineering companies and enhancing understanding of NORSOK standards by
initiation of dedicated task force team activities. Additional research on such efforts can touch on how
effective and successful such efforts are in terms of closing the gap between the Norwegian operator and
South Korean shipyard.
7.3.
Challenges
Data collection through interviews is very time consuming in this research. Interviews were conducted in
five different cities in Norway and South Korea. With a view to including various perspectives of different
project stake holders, the researcher contacted approximately 25 companies and obtain consent for
interviews from 13 of them. This is followed by considerable amount of correspondence between the
researcher and the companies to arrange meetings for interviews. As most of the interviews were
conducted outside the town, the researcher made frequent trips to other regions. Thus, considerable time
and effort was spent on administrational activities. To comply with the time constraint put on this study,
the researcher chose to facilitate the study activity by simplifying data analysis process and spending less
time for idea development.
Some of the companies, which were asked to have interviews, rejected interviews on the ground that they
do not have any issues with Norwegian EPC projects at South Korean shipyards. However, in the
researchers view, they seem very concerned about any unexpected consequences which may result from
this study even offered anonymity. For some of the companies, which were sub-contractors, their
experiences concerning Confucian hierarchical framework, where sub-contractors are subject to the EPC
contractors demanding attitude, may affect their responses. For others, which were operators, they
110
seemed to reject interviews as they were known to have serious issues with their on-going projects at
South Korean shipyard.
111
8.
Conclusion
This thesis concludes that there are four key contributory factors to challenges arising from EPC project
awarded by Norwegian operators to South Korean shipyards. Each of the factors is closely connected with
each other and gives a rise to the projects challenges together. In particular, this thesis reveals that the
differences in national culture and industry practice have a significant influence over communication and
coordination pattern in the project. Such differences, in combination with other two factors, relate to
almost every element constituting the challenges.
Identification of the key factors and how they play out has practical implications for management of EPC
project involving Norwegian operators, South Korean shipyards, and international sub-contractors. Based
on the analysis of its findings, this thesis provides practical advice for Norwegian players on how to
approach and tackle the challenges occurring during execution of their projects. In particular, it argues that
it is of critical importance to have common understanding of how different Norwegian operators and
South Korean shipyards are.
In all, this thesis concludes that the four key contributory factors provides an insight for Norwegian
companies to address the challenges arising from project execution phase of Norwegian EPC project in
South Korean shipyard.
112
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Appendix A
Interview protocol
1. Introduction
a. Welcoming
Nice to meet you and thank you so much for participating in my study.
b. Propose of interview
The purpose of this interview is to ask you to reflect on your work experiences with South
Korean EPC contractor. I want to hear your opinions about challenges arising during project
execution phase of Norwegian EPC project.
c.
Who I am
I am in a master course of offshore technology at University of Stavanger. I want to develop this
study as my master thesis.
d. Letter of consent
The interview will be treated completely as confidential.
You may choose to not answer any of the questions.
May I have your permission to record this interview?
e.
Structure of interview
Questions are about your experience and belief with respect to challenges arising in the course
of EPC project at South Korean shipyards
There is no right / wrong answer
Your subjective opinion on the study subject counts
Questions may not be directly related to the area of your specialty.
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How long have you stayed in South Korea? Have you visited South Korea before this project?
What is your age range?
Have you worked at other shipyards in East Asia?
Please briefly describe your role in the project.
3. Culture
a.
Cultural difference
1) What is your opinion on cultural difference between Norway and South Korea? How different
are they?
b. Contractors organization
1) In your mind, how high is the power distance between levels within Contractors organization?
2) How challenges arise within Contractors organization at different levels?
3) In your opinion, how rigid is the boundaries between disciplines or functions within
Contractors organization?
4) Do you think Contractors PMT is given enough authority by the Contractor? Is there any gap
between what you expected from the Contractors PMT and how it actually is?
c.
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1) In your opinion, what are the important communication lines in Contractors organization
during execution phase? Are they formal or informal? Are they effective?
2) Do you find the formal meeting with Contractor effective? What do you do to make the
meeting more productive?
3) How do you deal with Contractors personnel who do not respond? In your opinion, what
makes them not to respond in proper manner?
4) When is it appropriate to use formal and informal communication respectively?
5) To what extent do you agree that personal relationship can affect official business transaction?
6) What do you think about whether intermediary can help address the communication challenges
with Contractor?
e.
4. Contractor capability
a.
b. Functional capability
1) What are your thoughts of engineering capability of Contractor?
2) What are your thoughts of procurement capability of Contractor?
3) What are your thoughts of construction capability of Contractor?
c.
Change management
1) What are your thoughts of change management capability of Contractor?
2) In your opinion, Contractor has a correct understanding of VO regime (NTK 07)?
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a.
c.
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