ENBANC

[G.R.No.221697,March08,2016]
MARYGRACENATIVIDADS.POELLAMANZARES,PETITIONER,VS.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSAND
ESTRELLAC.ELAMPARO,RESPONDENTS,
[G.R.NOS.221698700]
MARYGRACENATIVIDADS.POELLAMANZARES,PETITIONER,VS.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,
FRANCISCOS.TATAD,ANTONIOP.CONTRERASANDAMADOD.VALDEZ,RESPONDENTS,
DECISION
PEREZ,J.:
BeforetheCourtaretwoconsolidatedpetitionsunderRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulescfCourtwithextremelyurgentapplication
foranexparteissuanceoftemporaryrestrainingorder/statusquoanteorderand/orwritofpreliminaryinjunctionassailingthefollowing:
(1)1December2015ResolutionoftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC)SecondDivision(2)23December2015Resolutionofthe
COMELECEnBanc,inSPANo.15001(DC)(3)11December2015ResolutionoftheCOMELECFirstDivisionand(4)23December2015
ResolutionoftheCOMELECEnBanc,inSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC)andSPANo.15139(DC)forhavingbeenissued
withoutjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.

TheFacts
MaryGraceNatividadS.PoeLlamanzares(petitioner)wasfoundabandonedasanewborninfantintheParishChurchofJaro,Iloilobya
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives,EmilianoMilitar(Emiliano)andhiswife.Threedaysafter,6September1968,Emilianoreportedandregisteredpetitionerasa
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCRIloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitionerwasgiventhename"MaryGraceNatividadContrerasMilitar."[1]
Whenpetitionerwasfive(5)yearsold,celebrityspousesRonaldAllanKelleyPoe(a.k.a.FenandoPoe,Jr.)andJesusaSonoraPoe(a.k.a.
Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCRIloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court
decreedadoption,[2]thepetitioner'sadoptivemotherdiscoveredonlysometimeinthesecondhalfof2005thatthelawyerwhohandled
petitioner'sadoptionfailedtosecurefromtheOCR
IloiloanewCertificateofLiveBirthindicatingpetitioner'snewnameandthenameofheradoptiveparents.[3]Withoutdelay,petitioner's
motherexecutedanaffidavitattestingtothelawyer'somissionwhichshesubmittedtotheOCRIloilo.On4May2006,OCRIloiloissueda
newCertificateofLiveBirthinthenameofMaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoe.[4]
Havingreachedtheageofeighteen(18)yearsin1986,petitionerregisteredasavoterwiththelocalCOMELECOfficeinSanJuanCity.On
13December1986,shereceivedherCOMELECVoter'sIdentificationCardforPrecinctNo.196inGreenhills,SanJuan,MetroManila.[5]
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287[6] by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Subsequently,on5April1993and19May1998,sherenewedherPhilippinepassportandrespectivelysecuredPhilippinePassportNos.
L881511andDD156616.[7]
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to
continueherstudiesabroadandleftfortheUnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.)in1988.Petitionergraduatedin1991fromBostonCollegein
ChestnutsHill,MassachusettswheresheearnedherBachelorofArtsdegreeinPoliticalStudies.[9]
On27July1991,petitionermarriedTeodoroMisaelDanielV.Llamanzares(Llamanzares),acitizenofboththePhilippinesandtheU.S.,at
SanctuariodeSanJoseParishinSanJuanCity.[10]DesirousofbeingwithherhusbandwhowasthenbasedintheU.S.,thecoupleflew
backtotheU.S.twodaysaftertheweddingceremonyoron29July1991.[11]
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.[12] Her two daughters Hanna
MacKenzie(Hanna)andJesusaAnika(Anika)werebothborninthePhilippineson10July1998and5June2004,respectively.[13]
On18October2001,petitionerbecameanaturalizedAmericancitizen.[14]SheobtainedU.S.PassportNo.017037793on19December
2001.[15]
On8April2004,thepetitionercamebacktothePhilippinestogetherwithHannatosupportherfather'scandidacyforPresidentintheMay
2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
daughterson8July2004.[16]

Afterafewmonths,specificallyon13December2004,petitionerrushedbacktothePhilippinesuponlearningofherfather'sdeteriorating
medicalcondition.[17]Herfatherslippedintoacomaandeventuallyexpired.Thepetitionerstayedinthecountryuntil3February2005to
takecareofherfather'sfuneralarrangementsaswellastoassistinthesettlementofhisestate.[18]
Accordingtothepetitioner,theuntimelydemiseofherfatherwasasevereblowtoherentirefamily.Inherearnestdesiretobewithher
grievingmother,thepetitionerandherhusbanddecidedtomoveandresidepermanentlyinthePhilippinessometimeinthefirstquarter
of2005.[19]Thecouplebeganpreparingfortheirresettlementincludingnotificationoftheirchildren'sschoolsthattheywillbetransferring
to Philippine schools for the next semester[20] coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture
andcarsfromtheU.S.tothePhilippines[21]andinquirywithPhilippineauthoritiesastotheproperproceduretobefollowedinbringing
theirpetdogintothecountry.[22]Asearlyas2004,thepetitioneralreadyquitherjobintheU.S.[23]
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005[24] and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the
BureauofInternalRevenue.Herthree(3)childrenimmediatelyfollowed[25]whileherhusbandwasforcedtostayintheU.S.tocomplete
pendingprojectsaswellastoarrangethesaleoftheirfamilyhomethere.[26]
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a
parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.[27] The corresponding Condominium
CertificatesofTitlecoveringtheunitandparkingslotwereissuedbytheRegisterofDeedsofSanJuanCitytopetitionerandherhusband
on20February2006.[28]Meanwhile,herchildrenofschoolagebeganattendingPhilippineprivateschools.
On14February2006,thepetitionermadeaquicktriptotheU.S.tosupervisethedisposalofsomeofthefamily'sremaininghousehold
belongings.[29]ShetravelledbacktothePhilippineson11March2006.[30]
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their
addressintheU.S.[31]Thefamilyhomewaseventuallysoldon27April2006.[32]
Petitioner'shusbandresignedfromhisjobintheU.S.inApril2006,arrivedinthecountryon4May2006andstartedworkingforamajor
PhilippinecompanyinJuly2006.[33]
Inearly2006,petitionerandherhusbandacquireda509squaremeterlotinCorinthianHills,QuezonCitywheretheybuilttheirfamily
home[34] and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.[35] A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said
propertywasissuedinthecouple'snamebytheRegisterofDeedsofQuezonCityon1June2006.
On7July2006,petitionertookherOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinespursuanttoRepublicAct(R.A.)No.9225orthe
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.[36] Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petitiontoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshiptogetherwithpetitionsforderivativecitizenshiponbehalfofherthreeminorchildrenon10July
2006.[37]Ascanbegatheredfromits18July2006Order,theBIactedfavorablyonpetitioner'spetitionsanddeclaredthatsheisdeemed
tohavereacquiredherPhilippinecitizenshipwhileherchildrenareconsideredascitizensofthePhilippines.[38]
Consequently,theBIissuedIdentificationCertificates(ICs)inpetitioner'snameandinthenamesofherthree(3)children.[39]
Again,petitionerregisteredasavoterofBarangaySantaLucia,SanJuanCityon31August2006.[40]ShealsosecuredfromtheDFAa
new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.[41] This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
PassportNo.EC0588861bytheDFA.[42]
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
ClassificationBoard(MTRCB).[43]Beforeassumingherpost,petitionerexecutedan"AffidavitofRenunciationofAllegiancetotheUnited
StatesofAmericaandRenunciationofAmericanCitizenship"beforeanotarypublicinPasigCityon20October2010,[44]insatisfactionof
thelegalrequisitesstatedinSection5ofR.A.No.9225.[45]Thefollowingday,21October2010petitionersubmittedthesaidaffidavitto
theBI[46]andtookheroathofofficeasChairpersonoftheMTRCB.[47]Fromthenon,petitionerstoppedusingherAmericanpassport.
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
NationalityoftheUnitedStates."[49]Onthatday,sheaccomplishedaswornquestionnairebeforetheU.S.ViceConsulwhereinshestated
that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.[50] In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines,
from3September1968to29July1991andfromMay2005topresent.[51]
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21
October2010.[52]
On2October2012,thepetitionerfiledwiththeCOMELECherCertificateofCandidacy(COC)forSenatorforthe2013Electionswherein
sheanswered"6yearsand6months"tothequestion"PeriodofresidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013."[53]Petitionerobtained
thehighestnumberofvotesandwasproclaimedSenatoron16May2013.[54]
On19December2013,petitionerobtainedPhilippineDiplomaticPassportNo.DE0004530.[55]

On15October2015,petitionerfiledherCOCforthePresidencyfortheMay2016Elections.[56]InherCOC,thepetitionerdeclaredthat
sheisanaturalborncitizenandthatherresidenceinthePhilippinesuptothedaybefore9May2016wouldbeten(10)yearsandeleven
(11)monthscountedfrom24May2005.[57]ThepetitionerattachedtoherCOCan"AffidavitAffirmingRenunciationofU.S.A.Citizenship"
subscribedandsworntobeforeanotarypublicinQuezonCityon14October2015.[58]
Petitioner'sfilingofherCOCforPresidentintheupcomingelectionstriggeredthefilingofseveralCOMELECcasesagainstherwhichwere
thesubjectoftheseconsolidatedcases.
OriginofPetitionforCertiorariinG.R.No.221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC
which was docketed as SPA No. 15001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[59] She is convinced that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over her petition.[60] Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she
stated in her COC that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and
eleven(11)monthsuptothedaybeforethe9May2016Elections.[61]
Ontheissueofcitizenship,ElamparoarguedthatpetitionercannotbeconsideredasanaturalbornFilipinoonaccountofthefactthatshe
wasafoundling.[62]Elamparoclaimedthatinternationallawdoesnotconfernatural bornstatusandFilipinocitizenshiponfoundlings.[63]
Followingthislineofreasoning,petitionerisnotqualifiedtoapplyforreacquisitionofFilipinocitizenshipunderR.A.No.9225forsheisnot
anaturalbornFilipinocitizentobeginwith.[64]EvenassumingarguendothatpetitionerwasanaturalbornFilipino,sheisdeemedtohave
lostthatstatuswhenshebecameanaturalizedAmericancitizen.[65]AccordingtoElamparo,naturalborncitizenshipmustbecontinuous
frombirth.[66]
Onthematterofpetitioner'sresidency,Elamparopointedoutthatpetitionerwasboundbythesworndeclarationshemadeinher2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May 2013
Elections.ElamparolikewiseinsistedthatassumingarguendothatpetitionerisqualifiedtoregainhernaturalbornstatusunderR.A.No.
9225,shestillfellshortofthetenyearresidencyrequirementoftheConstitutionasherresidencecouldonlybecountedattheearliest
from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to
reacquirelostPhilippineCitizenship,ElamparoisofthebeliefthatshefailedtoreestablishherdomicileinthePhilippines.[67]
PetitionerseasonablyfiledherAnswerwhereinshecounteredthat:

(1)
(2)
(3)

the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warrantowhichcouldonlybefiledifGracePoewinsinthePresidentialelections,andthattheDepartment
ofJustice(DOJ)hasprimaryjurisdictiontorevoketheBI'sJuly18,2006Order
the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen nor was
thereanyallegationthattherewasawillfulordeliberateintenttomisrepresentonherpart
she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualificationsfor:
a.the1934ConstitutionalConventiondeliberationsshowthatfoundlingswereconsideredcitizens
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they
arefound
c.shereacquiredhernaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshipundertheprovisionsofR.A.No.9225
d.sheexecutedaswornrenunciationofherAmericancitizenshippriortothefilingofherCOCforPresident
in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or
recanted
e.theburdenwasonElamparoinprovingthatshedidnotpossessnaturalbornstatus
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as
May24,2005
g.shecouldreestablishresidenceevenbeforeshereacquirednaturalborncitizenshipunderR.A.No.9225
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not
bindingandshouldgivewaytoevidenceonhertruedateofreacquisitionofdomicile
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a
purelypoliticalquestion,thatis,shouldsheserveasthecountry'snextleader.[68]

AfterthepartiessubmittedtheirrespectiveMemoranda,thepetitionwasdeemedsubmittedforresolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of
running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representationswhicharefalse.ThefallooftheaforesaidResolutionreads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
CandidacyisherebyGRANTED.Accordingly,theCertificateofCandidacyforPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinthe
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llarnanzares is hereby
CANCELLED.[69]

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23
December2015Resolutionbydenyingthesame.[70]

OriginofPetitionforCertiorariinGR.Nos.221698700
Thiscasestemmedfromthree(3)separatepetitionsfiledbyFranciscoS.Tatad(Tatad),AntonioP.Contreras(Contreras)andAmadoD.
Valdez(Valdez)againstpetitionerbeforetheCOMELECwhichwereconsolidatedandraffledtoitsFirstDivision.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,[71] docketed as SPA No. 15002 (DC), Tatad
allegedthatpetitionerlackstherequisiteresidencyandcitizenshiptoqualifyherforthePresidency.[72]
TatadtheorizedthatsincethePhilippinesadherestotheprincipleofjussanguinis,personsofunknownparentage,particularlyfoundlings,
cannotbeconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizenssincebloodrelationshipisdeterminativeofnaturalbornstatus.[73]Tatadinvokedthe
ruleofstatutoryconstructionthatwhatisnotincludedisexcluded.Heaverredthatthefactthatfoundlingswerenotexpresslyincludedin
thecategoriesofcitizensinthe1935Constitutionisindicativeoftheframers'intenttoexcludethem.[74]
Therefore,theburdenliesonpetitionertoprovethatsheisanaturalborncitizen.[75]
Neithercanpetitionerseekrefugeunderinternationalconventionsortreatiestosupportherclaimthatfoundlingshaveanationality.[76]
AccordingtoTatad,internationalconventionsandtreatiesarenotselfexecutoryandthatlocallegislationsarenecessaryinordertogive
effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.[77] He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically
confersnaturalbornstatustofoundlings.[78]
SimilartoElamparo'sargument,TatadclaimedthatpetitionercannotavailoftheoptiontoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderR.A.No.
9225becauseitonlyappliestoformernaturalborncitizensandpetitionerwasnotasshewasafoundling.[79]
Referringtopetitioner'sCOCforSenator,Tatadconcludedthatshedidnotcomplywiththeten(10)yearresidencyrequirement.[80]Tatad
opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was
sometimein2010or2011.[81]
Additionally,Tatadquestionedpetitioner'slackofintentiontoabandonherU.S.domicileasevincedbythefactthatherhusbandstayed
thereatandherfrequenttripstotheU.S.[82]
InsupportofhispetitiontodenyduecourseorcanceltheCOCofpetitioner,docketedasSPANo.15139(DC),Valdezallegedthather
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a naturalborn citizen.[83] He advanced the view that former
naturalborncitizenswhoarerepatriatedunderthesaidActreacquiresonlytheirPhilippinecitizenshipandwillnotreverttotheiroriginal
statusasnaturalborncitizens.[84]
Hefurtherarguedthatpetitioner'sownadmissioninherCOCforSenatorthatshehadonlybeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleast
six(6)yearsandsix(6)monthspriortothe13May2013Electionsoperatesagainsther.Valdezrejectedpetitioner'sclaimthatshecould
havevalidlyreestablishedherdomicileinthePhilippinespriortoherreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.Ineffect,hispositionwasthat
petitionerdidnotmeettheten(10)yearresidencyrequirementforPresident.
UnlikethepreviousCOMELECcasesfiledagainstpetitioner,Contreras'petition,[85]docketedasSPANo.15007(DC),limitedtheattackto
theresidencyissue.Heclaimedthatpetitioner's2015COCforPresidentshouldbecancelledonthegroundthatshedidnotpossessthe
tenyearperiodofresidencyrequiredforsaidcandidacyandthatshemadefalseentry
inherCOCwhenshestatedthatsheisalegalresidentofthePhilippinesforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthsby9May2016.[86]
Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the
datewhenherpetitiontoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipwasapprovedbytheBI.[87]Heassertedthatpetitioner'sphysicalpresenceinthe
countrybefore18July2006couldnot
bevalidevidenceofreacquisitionofherPhilippinedomicilesinceshewasthenlivinghereasanAmericancitizenandassuch,shewas
governedbythePhilippineimmigrationlaws.[88]
Inherdefense,petitionerraisedthefollowingarguments:
First,Tatad'spetitionshouldbedismissedoutrightforfailuretostateacauseofaction.Hispetitiondidnotinvokegroundsproperfora
disqualificationcaseasenumeratedunderSections12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCode.[89]Instead,Tatadcompletelyreliedonthe
alleged lack of residency and naturalborn status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidatetoanelectiveoffice.[90]
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.[91] A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.[92]
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen is on the respondents.[93] Otherwise stated, she has a
presumptioninherfavorthatsheisanaturalborncitizenofthiscountry.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country

wheretheyarefound.[94]Consequently,thepetitionerisconsideredasanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.[95]
Fifth,sheclaimedthatasanaturalborncitizen,shehaseveryrighttoberepatriatedunderR.A.No.9225ortherighttoreacquireher
naturalbornstatus.[96]Moreover,theofficialactsofthePhilippineGovernmentenjoythepresumptionofregularity,towit:theissuance
ofthe18July2006OrderoftheBIdeclaringherasnaturalborncitizen,herappointmentasMTRCBChairandtheissuanceofthedecree
of adoption of San Juan RTC.[97] She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines.[98]
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
constructionoftheirfamilyhomeinCorinthianHills.[99]
Seventh,sheinsistedthatshecouldlegallyreestablishherdomicileofchoiceinthePhilippinesevenbeforesherenouncedherAmerican
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.[100] She reasoned out that there was no
requirementthatrenunciationofforeigncitizenshipisaprerequisitefortheacquisitionofanewdomicileeofchoice.[101]
Eighth,shereiteratedthattheperiodappearingintheresidencyportionofherCOCforSenatorwasamistakemadeingoodfaith.[102]
InaResolution[103]promulgatedon11December2015,theCOMELECFirstDivisionruledthatpetitionerisnotanaturalborncitizen,that
shefailedtocompletetheten(10)yearresidencyrequirement,andthatshecommittedmaterialmisrepresentationinherCOCwhenshe
declaredthereinthatshehasbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodoften(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthsasofthedayofthe
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the
RepublicofthePhilippines.ThedispositiveportionofsaidResolutionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theCommissionRESOLVED,asitherebyRESOLVES,toGRANTthePetitionsandcancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POELLAMANZARES for the elective position of
PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinconnectionwiththe9May2016SynchronizedLocalandNationalElections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELECEnBancissuedaResolutiondenyingpetitioner'smotionforreconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the
issuanceofanexpartetemporaryrestrainingorder/statusquoanteorder and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015,
temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed
COMELECResolutionsuntilfurtherordersfromtheCourt.TheCourtalsoorderedtheconsolidationofthetwopetitionsfiledbypetitioner
initsResolutionof12January2016.Thereafter,oralargumentswereheldinthesecases.
TheCourtGRANTSthepetitionofMaryGraceNatividadS.PoeLlamanzaresandtoANNULandSETASIDEthe:

1.Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner,vs.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares.
2.Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15002 (DC) entitled
FranciscoS.Tatad,petitioner,vs.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondentSPANo.15007(DC)entitledAntonio
P.Contreras,petitioner,vs.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondentandSPANo.15139(DC)entitledAmadoD.
Valdez,petitioner,v.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondent.
3.Resolutiondated23December2015oftheCommissionEnBanc,upholdingtheIDecember2015ResolutionoftheSecondDivision.
4.Resolutiondated23December2015oftheCommissionEnBanc,upholdingthe11December2015ResolutionoftheFirstDivision.

TheprocedureandtheconclusionsfromwhichthequestionedResolutionsemanatedaretaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackofjurisdiction.ThepetitionerisaQUALIFIEDCANDIDATEforPresidentinthe9May2016NationalElections.
TheissuebeforetheCOMELECiswhetherornottheCOCofpetitionershouldbedeniedduecourseorcancelled"ontheexclusiveground"
that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELECandrestrainitfromgoingintotheissueofthequalificationsofthecandidatefortheposition,if,asinthiscase,suchissueisyet
undecidedorundeterminedbytheproperauthority.TheCOMELECcannotitself,inthesamecancellationcase,decidethequalificationor
lackthereofofthecandidate.
Werely,firstofall,ontheConstitutionofourRepublic,particularlyitsprovisionsinArticleIX,C,Section2:

Section2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1)Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,and
recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective

regional,provincial,andcityofficials,andappellatejurisdictionoverallcontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficialsdecidedby
trialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,orinvolvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.
Decisions,finalorders,orrulingsoftheCommissiononelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalandbarangayofficesshall
befinal,executory,andnotappealable.
(3)Decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,allquestionsaffectingelections,includingdeterminationofthenumberand
locationofpollingplaces,appointmentofelectionofficialsandinspectors,andregistrationofvoters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
includingtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,fortheexclusivepurposeofensuringfree,orderly,honest,
peaceful,andcredibleelections.
(5)Register,aftersufficientpublication,politicalparties,organizations,orcoalitionswhich,inadditiontootherrequirements,
mustpresenttheirplatformorprogramofgovernmentandaccreditcitizens'armsoftheCommissiononElections.Religious
denominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered.Thosewhichseektoachievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans,
orrefusetoupholdandadheretothisConstitution,orwhicharesupportedbyanyforeigngovernmentshalllikewiseberefused
registration.
Financialcontributionsfromforeigngovernmentsandtheiragenciestopoliticalparties,organizations,coalitions,orcandidates
related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellationoftheirregistrationwiththeCommission,inadditiontootherpenaltiesthatmaybeprescribedbylaw.
(6)File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionorexclusionofvotersinvestigateand,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses,andmalpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisancecandidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinaryaction,forviolationordisregardof,ordisobediencetoitsdirective,order,ordecision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum,orrecall.

NotanyoneoftheenumeratedpowersapproximatetheexactitudeoftheprovisionsofArticleVI,Section17ofthesamebasiclawstating
that:

TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nineMembers,threeofwhomshallbeJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremaining
sixshallbeMembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenonthebasisof
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system
representedtherein.TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeitsChairman.

orofthelastparagraphofArticleVII,Section4whichprovidesthat:

TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsof
thePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.

ThetribunalswhichhavejurisdictionoverthequestionofthequalificationsofthePresident,theVicePresident,SenatorsandtheMembers
oftheHouseofRepresentativeswasmadeclearbytheConstitution.Thereisnosuchprovisionforcandidatesforthesepositions.
CantheCOMELECbesuchjudge?
TheopinionofJusticeVicenteV.MendozainRomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,[104]whichwasaffirmativelycitedintheEn
BancdecisioninFerminv.COMELEC[105]isourguide.ThecitationinFerminreads:

Apparentlyrealizingthelackofanauthorizedproceedingfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,theCOMELECamendedits
rulesonFebruary15,1993soastoprovideinRule251,thefollowing:
Groundsfordisqualification.Anycandidatewhodoesnotpossessallthequalificationsofacandidateasprovided
forbytheConstitutionorbyexistinglaworwhocommitsanyactdeclaredbylawtobegroundsfordisqualification
maybedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule
makingpowerunderArt.IX,A,6oftheConstitution,cannotdoit.ItisnoteworthythattheConstitutionwithholdsfromthe
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications
basedonage,residenceandcitizenshipofvoters.[Art.IX,C,2(3)]
TheassimilationinRule25oftheCOMELECrulesofgroundsforineligibilityintogroundsfordisqualificationiscontrarytothe
evidentintentionofthelaw.Fornotonlyintheirgroundsbutalsointheirconsequencesareproceedingsfor"disqualification"
differentfromthoseforadeclarationof"ineligibility.""Disqualification"proceedings,asalreadystated,arebasedongrounds
specifiedin12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCodeandin40oftheLocalGovernmentCodeandareforthepurposeof
barringanindividualfrombecomingacandidateorfromcontinuingasacandidateforpublicoffice.Inaword,theirpurposeis
toeliminateacandidatefromtheraceeitherfromthestartorduringitsprogress."Ineligibility,"ontheotherhand,refersto
the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedingsfordeclarationofineligibilityistoremovetheincumbentfromoffice.
Consequently,thatanindividualpossessesthequalificationsforapublicofficedoesnotimplythatheisnotdisqualifiedfrom
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
NaturalizationLaw.(C.A.No.473)Thatanalienhasthequalificationsprescribedin2oftheLawdoesnotimplythathedoes
notsufferfromanyof[the]disqualificationsprovidedin4.

Beforewegetderailedbythedistinctionastogroundsandtheconsequencesoftherespectiveproceedings,theimportanceoftheopinion
is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule".
JusticeMendozalecturedinRomualdezMarcosthat:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualificationsofacandidate.
Firstisthefactthatunlessacandidatewinsandisproclaimedelected,thereisnonecessityfordetermininghiseligibilityfor
theoffice.Incontrast,whetheranindividualshouldbedisqualifiedasacandidateforactsconstitutingelectionoffenses(e.g.,
votebuying,overspending,commissionofprohibitedacts)isaprejudicialquestionwhichshouldbedeterminedlesthewins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be
countedandifforsomereasonhehasbeenvotedforandhehaswon,eitherhewillnotbeproclaimedorhisproclamationwill
besetaside.
Secondisthefactthatthedeterminationofacandidates'eligibility,e.g.,hiscitizenshipor,asinthiscase,hisdomicile,may
take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino s residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings
relatingtocertificatesofcandidacy.Thatiswhythelawmakesthereceiptofcertificatesofcandidacyaministerialdutyofthe
COMELECanditsofficers.Thelawissatisfiedifcandidatesstateintheircertificatesofcandidacythattheyareeligibleforthe
positionwhichtheyseektofill,leavingthedeterminationoftheirqualificationstobemadeaftertheelectionandonlyinthe
event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELECgivenjurisdiction.
Thirdisthepolicyunderlyingtheprohibitionagainstpre proclamationcasesinelectionsforPresident,VicePresident,Senators
andmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives.(R.A.No.7166,15)ThepurposeistopreservetheprerogativesoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesElectoralTribunalandtheotherTribunalsas"solejudges"undertheConstitutionoftheelection,returnsand
qualificationsofmembersofCongressofthePresidentandVicePresident,asthecasemaybe.[106]

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
ResolutionNo.9523,on25September2012ofitsRule25.This,the15February1993versionofRule25,whichstatesthat:

Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitutionorbyexistinglaworwhocommitsanyactdeclaredbylawtobegroundsfordisqualificationmaybedisqualified
fromcontinuingasacandidate.[107]

wasinthe2012rendition,drasticallychangedto:

Grounds.Anycandidatewho,inactionorprotestinwhichheisaparty,isdeclaredbyfinaldecisionofacompetentcourt,
guiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissiontobesufferingfromanydisqualificationprovidedbylawortheConstitution.
APetitiontoDisqualifyaCandidateinvokinggroundsforaPetitiontoDenytoorCancelaCertificateofCandidacyorPetitionto
DeclareaCandidateasaNuisanceCandidate,oracombinationthereof,shallbesummarilydismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
electionthequalificationsofcandidate.Suchthat,aspresentlyrequired,todisqualifyacandidatetheremustbeadeclarationbyafinal
judgmentofacompetentcourtthatthecandidatesoughttobedisqualified"isguiltyoforfoundbytheCommissiontobesufferingfrom

anydisqualificationprovidedbylawortheConstitution."
Insofarasthequalificationofacandidateisconcerned,Rule25andRule23areflipsidesofonetotheother.Bothdonotallow,arenot
authorizations,arenotvestmentofjurisdiction,fortheCOMELECtodeterminethequalificationofacandidate.Thefactsofqualification
must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualificationmaybebystatute,byexecutiveorderorbyajudgmentofacompetentcourtortribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution,"neithercanthecertificateofcandidacybecancelledordeniedduecourseongroundsoffalserepresentationsregardinghis
orherqualifications,withoutapriorauthoritativefindingthatheorsheisnotqualified,suchpriorauthoritybeingthenecessarymeasure
bywhichthefalsityoftherepresentationcanbefound.Theonlyexceptionthatcanbeconcededareselfevidentfactsofunquestionedor
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representationcanbedetermined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representationsregardingthecandidate'scitizenshipandresidence,forcedtheCOMELECtoruleessentiallythatsincefoundlings[108]are
notmentionedintheenumerationofcitizensunderthe1935Constitution,[109] they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in
oralarguments,whenpetitioneradmittedthatsheisafoundling,shesaiditall.Thisbordersonbigotry.Oddly,inaneffortattolerance,
theCOMELEC,aftersayingthatitcannotrulethathereinpetitionerpossessesbloodrelationshipwithaFilipinocitizenwhen"itiscertain
thatsuchrelationshipisindemonstrable,"proceededtosaythat"shenowhastheburdentopresentevidencetoprovehernaturalfiliation
withaFilipinoparent."
Thefactisthatpetitioner'sbloodrelationshipwithaFilipinocitizenisDEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family
CodeofthePhilippineshasawholechapteronPaternityandFiliation.[110]Thatsaid,thereismorethansufficientevidencethatpetitioner
hasFilipinoparentsandisthereforeanaturalbornFilipino.Parenthetically,theburdenofproofwasonprivaterespondentstoshowthat
petitionerisnotaFilipinocitizen.Theprivaterespondentsshouldhaveshownthatbothofpetitioner'sparentswerealiens.Heradmission
thatsheisafoundlingdidnotshifttheburdentoherbecausesuchstatusdidnotexcludethepossibilitythatherparentswereFilipinos,
especiallyasinthiscasewherethereisahighprobability,ifnotcertainty,thatherparentsareFilipinos.
Thefactualissueisnotwhotheparentsofpetitionerare,astheiridentitiesareunknown,butwhethersuchparentsareFilipinos.Under
Section4,Rule128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existenceornoexistence.Evidenceoncollateralmattersshallnotbeallowed,exceptwhenittendsinanyreasonabledegreeto
establishtheprobabilityofimprobabilityofthefactinissue.

TheSolicitorGeneralofferedofficialstatisticsfromthePhilippineStatisticsAuthority(PSA)[111]thatfrom1965to1975,thetotalnumber
of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is naturalborn Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
censusstatisticsforIloiloProvincefor1960and1970,alsofromthePSA.In1960,therewere962,532Filipinosand4,734foreignersin
the province 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%.
Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (1549). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female
foreignersor99.68%.Inthesameyear,therewere210,349Filipinomalesand886malealiens,or99.58%.In1970,therewere270,299
Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male
aliensor99.53%.COMELECdidnotdisputethesefigures.Notably,CommissionerArthurLimadmitted,duringtheoralarguments,thatat
thetimepetitionerwasfoundin1968,themajorityofthepopulationinIloilowasFilipino.[112]
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman
CatholicChurchinIloiloCity.ShealsohastypicalFilipinofeatures:height,flatnasalbridge,straightblackhair,almondshapedeyesand
anovalface.
Thereisadisputablepresumptionthatthingshavehappenedaccordingtotheordinarycourseofnatureandtheordinaryhabitsoflife.
[113]Alloftheforegoingevidence,thatapersonwithtypicalFilipinofeaturesisabandonedinCatholicChurchinamunicipalitywherethe

population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
provincewouldbeaFilipino,wouldindicatemorethanampleprobabilityifnotstatisticalcertainty,thatpetitioner'sparentsareFilipinos.
ThatprobabilityandtheevidenceonwhichitisbasedareadmissibleunderRule128,Section4oftheRevisedRulesonEvidence.
Toassumeotherwiseistoaccepttheabsurd,ifnotthevirtuallyimpossible,asthenorm.InthewordsoftheSolicitorGeneral:

Second.ItiscontrarytocommonsensebecauseforeignersdonotcometothePhilippinessotheycangetpregnantandleave
theirnewbornbabiesbehind.Wedonotfaceasituationwheretheprobabilityissuchthateveryfoundlingwouldhavea50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the
parentsofanyoneborninthePhilippineswouldbeFilipinos?99.9%.
AccordingtothePhilippineStatisticsAuthority,from2010to2014,onayearlyaverage,therewere1,766,046childrenbornin
the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample
period, the ratio of nonFilipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability

thatanychildborninthePhilippineswouldbeanaturalbornFilipinois99.93%.
From1965to1975,thetotalnumberofforeignersborninthePhilippinesis15,986whilethetotalnumberofFilipinosbornin
the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of nonFilipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probabilitythatanychildborninthePhilippinesonthatdecadewouldbeanaturalbornFilipinois99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical
probabilitythatachildborninthePhilippineswouldbeanaturalbornFilipinowillnotbeaffectedbywhetherornottheparents
are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandontheirchildrenoutofpovertyorperhaps,shame.Wedonotimagineforeignersabandoningtheirchildrenhereinthe
Philippinesthinkingthoseinfantswouldhavebettereconomicopportunitiesorbelievingthatthiscountryisatropicalparadise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess
baggagethatisbestleftbehind.
TodenyfullFilipinocitizenshiptoallfoundlingsandrenderthemstatelessjustbecausetheremaybeatheoreticalchancethat
one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory,irrational,andunjust.Itjustdoesn'tmakeanysense.Giventhestatisticalcertainty99.9%thatanychildborn
in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their
birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
politicalrightsofanentireclassofhumanbeings.YourHonor,constitutionalinterpretationandtheuseofcommonsenseare
notseparatedisciplines.

Asamatteroflaw,foundlingsareasaclass,naturalborncitizens.Whilethe1935Constitution'senumerationissilentastofoundlings,
thereisnorestrictivelanguagewhichwoulddefinitelyexcludefoundlingseither.Becauseofsilenceandambiguityintheenumerationwith
respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[114] this
Courtheldthat:

Theascertainmentofthatintentisbutinkeepingwiththefundamentalprincipleofconstitutionalconstructionthattheintentof
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
constructionistoascertainandthereafterassuretherealizationofthepurposeoftheframersandofthepeopleintheadoption
of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanationofferedbytheframers.[115]

AspointedoutbypetitioneraswellastheSolicitorGeneral,thedeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionshowthattheframers
intendedfoundlingstobecoveredbytheenumeration.Thefollowingexchangeisrecorded:

Sr.Rafols:
xxxx
President:
Sr.Rafols:
Sr.Montinola:

Sr.Rafols:
Sr.Montinola:
Sr.Rafols:
Sr.Briones:
Sr.Rafols:
President:
Sr.Rafols:

President:
Sr.Busion:
Sr.Roxas:

Foranamendment.Iproposethataftersubsection2,thefollowingisinserted:"Thenatural
childrenofaforeignfatherandaFilipinomothernotrecognizedbythefather.
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentlemanreferstonaturalchildrenortoanykindofillegitimatechildren?
Toallkindsofillegitimatechildren.Italsoincludesnaturalchildrenofunknownparentage,
naturalorillegitimatechildrenofunknownparents.
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino,thatis,IrefertotheSpanishCodewhereinallchildrenofunknownparentageborn
in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknownparentageisthesonofaSpaniard.ThismaybeappliedinthePhilippinesinthata
childofunknownparentageborninthePhilippinesisdeemedtobeFilipino,andthereisno
need...
Thereisaneed,becausewearerelatingtheconditionsthatare[required]tobeFilipino.
Butthatistheinterpretationofthelaw,therefore,thereisno[more]needforamendment.
Theamendmentshouldreadthus:"NaturalorillegitimateofaforeignfatherandaFilipino
motherrecognizedbyone,orthechildrenofunknownparentage."
Theamendment[should]meanchildrenborninthePhilippinesofunknownparentage.
ThesonofaFilipinatoaForeigner,althoughthis[person]doesnotrecognizethechild,is
notunknown.
Doesthegentlemanaccepttheamendmentornot?
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipinawithaforeignerwhodoesnotrecognizethechild.Theirparentageisnotunknown
and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not
recognize,shouldalsobeconsideredasFilipinos.
ThequestioninorderistheamendmenttotheamendmentfromtheGentlemanfromCebu,
Mr.Briones.
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Mr.President,myhumbleopinionisthatthesecasesarefewandJarinbetween,thatthe
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or
peopleborninacountryofunknownparentsarecitizensinthisnationisrecognized,andit
isnotnecessarytoincludeaprovisiononthesubjectexhaustively.[116]

ThoughtheRafolsamendmentwasnotcarriedout,itwasnotbecausetherewasanyobjectiontothenotionthatpersonsof"unknown

parentage"arenotcitizensbutonlybecausetheirnumberwasnotenoughtomeritspecificmention.Suchwastheaccount,[117]citedby
petitioner,ofdelegateandconstitutionlawauthorJoseAruegowhosaid:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate
childrenwithaforeignfatherofamotherwhowasacitizenofthePhilippines,andalsofoundlingsbutthisamendmentwas
defeatedprimarilybecausetheConventionbelievedthatthecases,beingtoofewtowarranttheinclusionofaprovisioninthe
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitutionoftheproposedamendment.

ThisexplanationwaslikewisethepositionoftheSolicitorGeneralduringthe16February2016OralArguments:

WeallknowthattheRafolsproposalwasrejected.Butnotethatwhatwasdeclinedwastheproposalforatextualandexplicit
recognitionoffoundlingsasFilipinos.Andso,thewaytoexplaintheconstitutionalsilenceisbysayingthatitwastheviewof
MontinolaandRoxaswhichprevailedthatthereisnomoreneedtoexpresslydeclarefoundlingsasFilipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalizerulesbasedonassumptionsthatareimperfectorevenwrong.Theycanevenoverturnexistingrules.Thisis
basic.WhatmattershereisthatMontinolaandRoxaswereabletoconvincetheircolleaguesintheconventionthatthereisno
moreneedtoexpresslydeclarefoundlingsasFilipinosbecausetheyarealreadyimpliedlysorecognized.
Inotherwords,theconstitutionalsilenceisfullyexplainedintermsoflinguisticefficiencyandtheavoidanceofredundancy.The
policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. This
inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrasedbyChiefJusticeFernando:theconstitutionisnotsilentlysilent,itissilentlyvocal.[118]

TheSolicitorGeneralmakesthefurtherpointthattheframers"workedtocreateajustandhumanesociety,"that"theywerereasonable
patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave
implicationsoftheargumentthatfoundlingsarenotnaturalbornFilipinos,theCourtmustsearchtherecordsofthe1935,1973and1987
Constitutions"foranexpressintentiontodenyfoundlingsthestatusofFilipinos.Theburdenisonthosewhowishtousetheconstitution
todiscriminateagainstfoundlingstoshowthattheconstitutionreallyintendedtotakethispathtothedarksideandinflictthisacrossthe
boardmarginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basicrighttoequalprotectionofthelaws.AllexhorttheStatetorendersocialjustice.Ofspecialconsiderationareseveralprovisionsin
the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protectandenhancetherightofallthepeopletohumandignity,reducesocial,economic,andpoliticalinequalitiesxxx"andArticleXV,
Section3whichrequirestheStatetodefendthe"rightofchildrentoassistance,includingpropercareandnutrition,andspecialprotection
fromallformsofneglect,abuse,cruelty,exploitation,andotherconditionsprejudicialtotheirdevelopment."Certainly,theseprovisions
contradictanintenttodiscriminateagainstfoundlingsonaccountoftheirunfortunatestatus.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenshipupontheadoptee.Rather,theadopteemustbeaFilipinointhefirstplacetobeadopted.ThemostbasicofsuchlawsisArticle
15oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthat"[l]awsrelatingtofamilyrights,duties,status,conditions,legalcapacityofpersonsarebindingon
citizensofthePhilippineseventhoughlivingabroad."Adoptiondealswithstatus,andaPhilippineadoptioncourtwillhavejurisdictiononly
iftheadopteeisaFilipino.InEllisandEllisv.Republic,[119]achildleftbyanunidentifiedmotherwassoughttobeadoptedbyaliens.This
Courtsaid:

Inthisconnection,itshouldbenotedthatthisisaproceedingsinrem,whichnocourtmayentertainunlessithasjurisdiction,
notonlyoverthesubjectmatterofthecaseandovertheparties,butalsoovertheres,whichisthepersonalstatusofBaby
Roseaswellasthatofpetitionersherein.OurCivilCode(Art.15)adherestothetheorythatjurisdictionoverthestatusofa
natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby
Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.[120] (Underlining
supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the InterCountry Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "InterCountry Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
AdoptionActof1998)andthisCourt'sA.M.No.02602SCorthe"RuleonAdoption,"allexpresslyreferto"Filipinochildren"andinclude
foundlingsasamongFilipinochildrenwhomaybeadopted.
Ithasbeenarguedthattheprocesstodeterminethatthechildisafoundlingleadingtotheissuanceofafoundlingcertificateunderthese
lawsandtheissuanceofsaidcertificateareactstoacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenshipwhichmakethefoundlinganaturalizedFilipino
atbest.Thisiserroneous.UnderArticleIV,Section2"NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithout
havingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."Inthefirstplace,"havingtoperformanact"meansthatthe
act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the

authorities.[121] Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child.Lastly,theprocessiscertainlynotanalogoustonaturalizationproceedingstoacquirePhilippinecitizenship,ortheelectionofsuch
citizenshipbyonebornofanalienfatherandaFilipinomotherunderthe1935Constitution,whichisanacttoperfectit.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate
issuedinherfavor.[122]TheDecreeofAdoptionissuedon13May1974,whichapprovedpetitioner'sadoptionbyJesusaSonoraPoeand
RonaldAllanKelleyPoe,expresslyreferstoEmilianoandhiswife,RosarioMilitar,asher"foundlingparents,"henceeffectivelyaffirming
petitioner'sstatusasafoundling.[123]
Foundlingsarelikewisecitizensunderinternationallaw.Underthe1987Constitution,aninternationallawcanbecomepartofthesphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
intoadomesticlawthroughaconstitutionalmechanismsuchaslocallegislation.[124]Ontheotherhand,generallyacceptedprinciplesof
internationallaw,byvirtueoftheincorporationclauseoftheConstitution,formpartofthelawsofthelandeveniftheydonotderivefrom
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
acceptedaslaw,andgeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations.[125]Internationalcustomaryrulesareacceptedasbinding
as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States and a
psychologicalelementknownastheopinionjurissivenecessitates(opinionastolawornecessity).Implicitinthelatterelementisabelief
thatthepracticeinquestionisrenderedobligatorybytheexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.[126]"Generalprinciplesoflawrecognized
bycivilizednations"areprinciples"establishedbyaprocessofreasoning"orjudiciallogic,basedonprincipleswhichare"basictolegal
systemsgenerally,"[127]suchas"generalprinciplesofequity,i.e.,thegeneralprinciplesoffairnessandjustice,"andthe"generalprinciple
againstdiscrimination"whichisembodiedinthe"UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social
and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
DiscriminationinEducation,theConvention(No.111)ConcerningDiscriminationinRespectofEmploymentandOccupation."[128]These
arethesamecoreprincipleswhichunderliethePhilippineConstitutionitself,asembodiedinthedueprocessandequalprotectionclauses
oftheBillofRights.[129]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of
internationallawandbindingontheState.[130]Article15thereofstates:

1.Everyonehastherighttoanationality.
2.Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligationsonourcountry:

Article7

1.Thechildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhavetherightfrombirthtoaname,therighttoacquirea
nationalityandasfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.
2.StatesPartiesshallensuretheimplementationoftheserightsinaccordancewiththeirnationallawandtheirobligations
undertherelevantinternationalinstrumentsinthisfield,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.

In1986,thecountryalsoratifiedthe1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR).Article24thereofprovideforthe
rightofeverychild"toacquireanationality:"

Article24

1.Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family,societyandtheState.
2.Everychildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhaveaname.
3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.

ThecommonthreadoftheUDHR,UNCRCandICCPRistoobligatethePhilippinestograntnationalityfrombirthandensurethatnochild
is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen(18)yearsold.
Theprinciplesfoundintwoconventions,whileyetunratifiedbythePhilippines,aregenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallaw.The
firstisArticle14ofthe1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLawsunderwhichafoundlingis
presumedtohavethe"nationalityofthecountryofbirth,"towit:

Article14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established,itsnationalityshallbedeterminedbytherulesapplicableincaseswheretheparentageisknown.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underliningsupplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling ispresumedbornofcitizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
1961UnitedNationsConventionontheReductionofStatelessness:

Article2
AfoundlingfoundintheterritoryofaContractingStateshall,intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,beconsideredtohave
beenbornwithintheterritoryofparentspossessingthenationalityofthatState.

ThatthePhilippinesisnotapartytothe1930HagueConventionnortothe1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessnessdoesnot
mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
UniversalDeclarationonHumanRights,Article15(1)ofwhich[131]effectivelyaffirmsArticle14ofthe1930HagueConvention.Article2of
the1961"UnitedNationsConventionontheReductionofStatelessness"merely"giveseffect"toArticle15(1)oftheUDHR.[132]InRazon
v. Tagitis,[133] this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonethelessbindingasa"generallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw."Razonv.Tagitisislikewisenotablefordeclaringthebanasa
generallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawalthoughtheconventionhadbeenratifiedbyonlysixteenstatesandhadnotevencome
intoforceandwhichneededtheratificationofaminimumoftwentystates.Additionally,aspetitionerpointsout,theCourtwascontent
with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United
States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada,[134] where only four countries had
"either ratified or acceded to"[135] the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European
Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments.Inall,onlythepracticesoffourteencountrieswereconsideredandyet,therewaspronouncementthatrecognitionofforeign
judgmentswaswidespreadpractice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law" are
basednotonlyoninternationalcustom,butalsoon"generalprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations,"asthephraseisunderstood
in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental
principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"[136] support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of
internationallaw"undertheincorporationclause.
Petitioner's evidence[137] shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation
recognizingfoundlingsasitscitizen.Fortytwo(42)ofthosecountriesfollowthejussanguinisregime.Ofthesixty,onlythirtythree(33)
arepartiestothe1961ConventiononStatelessnesstwentysix(26)arenotsignatoriestotheConvention.Also,theChiefJustice,atthe
2February2016OralArgumentspointedoutthatin166outof189countriessurveyed(or87.83%),foundlingsarerecognizedascitizens.
Thesecircumstances,includingthepracticeofjussanguiniscountries,showthatitisagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawto
presumefoundlingsashavingbeenbornofnationalsofthecountryinwhichthefoundlingisfound.
CurrentlegislationrevealstheadherenceofthePhilippinestothisgenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw.Inparticular,R.A.No.
8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipinochildrenwhocouldbeadopted.Likewise,ithasbeenpointedthattheDFAissuespassportstofoundlings.Passportsarebylaw,
issuedonlytocitizens.Thisshowsthateventheexecutivedepartment,actingthroughtheDFA,considersfoundlingsasPhilippinecitizens.
Adoptingtheselegalprinciplesfromthe1930HagueConventionandthe1961ConventiononStatelessnessisrationalandreasonableand
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of naturalborn citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
morethan99%andisavirtualcertainty.
Insum,alloftheinternationallawconventionsandinstrumentsonthematterofnationalityoffoundlingsweredesignedtoaddressthe
plightofadefenselessclasswhichsuffersfromamisfortunenotoftheirownmaking.Wecannotberestrictiveastotheirapplicationifwe
are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening
statementisrelevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted
becausetheworldcommunityisconcernedthatthesituationoffoundlingsrendersthemlegallyinvisible.Itwouldbetragically
ironicifthisHonorableCourtendedupusingtheinternationalinstrumentswhichseektoprotectandupliftfoundlingsatoolto
denythempoliticalstatusortoaccordthemsecondclasscitizenship.[138]

The COMELEC also ruled[139] that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the
reacquisitionofnaturalborncitizenship.TheCOMELECreasonedthatsincetheapplicantmustperformanact,whatisreacquiredisnot
"naturalborn"citizenshipbutonlyplain"Philippinecitizenship."
TheCOMELEC'srulearrogantlydisregardsconsistentjurisprudenceonthematterofrepatriationstatutesingeneralandofR.A.No.9225
inparticular.
IntheseminalcaseofBengsonIIIv.HRET,[140]repatriationwasexplainedasfollows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenshipwillberestoredtohispriorstatusasanaturalizedFilipinocitizen.Ontheotherhand,ifhewasoriginallyanatural
borncitizenbeforehelosthisPhilippinecitizenship,hewillberestoredtohisformerstatusasanaturalbornFilipino.

R.A.No.9225isarepatriationstatuteandhasbeendescribedassuchinseveralcases.TheyincludeSobejanaCondonv.COMELEC[141]
where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreo v.
CommissiononAudit,[142]whichcitedTabasa v. Court of Appeals,[143] where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will
allow him to recover his naturalborn citizenship. Parreo v. Commission on Audit[144] is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
Filipinocitizenship(underR.A.No.9225),hewill...recoverhisnaturalborncitizenship."
TheCOMELECconstruedthephrase"frombirth"inthedefinitionofnaturalcitizensasimplying"thatnaturalborncitizenshipmustbegin
atbirthandremainuninterruptedandcontinuousfrombirth."R.A.No.9225wasobviouslypassedinlinewithCongress'soleprerogative
todeterminehowcitizenshipmaybelostorreacquired.Congresssawitfittodecreethatnaturalborncitizenshipmaybereacquiredeven
ifithadbeenoncelost.ItisnotfortheCOMELECtodisagreewiththeCongress'determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that naturalborn status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET[145]
wherethephrase"frombirth"wasclarifiedtomeanatthetimeofbirth:"Apersonwhoatthetimeofhisbirth,isacitizenofaparticular
country,isanaturalborncitizenthereof."Neitheris"repatriation"anactto"acquireorperfect"one'scitizenship.InBengsonIIIv.HRET,
thisCourtpointedoutthatthereareonlytwotypesofcitizensunderthe1987Constitution:naturalborncitizenandnaturalized,andthat
thereisnothirdcategoryforrepatriatedcitizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are naturalborn and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalizedFilipino,i.e.,didnothavetoundergotheprocessofnaturalizationtoobtainPhilippinecitizenship,necessarilyisa
naturalborn Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippinecitizenship,subsequentlyreacquireit.Thereasonthereforisclear:astosuchpersons,theywouldeitherbenatural
bornornaturalizeddependingonthereasonsforthelossoftheircitizenshipandthemodeprescribedbytheapplicablelawfor
the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
electedasmemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.[146]

TheCOMELECcannotreverseajudicialprecedent.ThatisreservedtothisCourt.Andwhilewemayalwaysrevisitadoctrine,anewrule
reversingstandingdoctrinecannotberetroactivelyapplied.InMoralesv.CourtofAppealsandJejomarErwinS.Binay,Jr.,[147]wherewe
decreedreversedthecondonationdoctrine,wecautionedthatit"shouldbeprospectiveinapplicationforthereasonthatjudicialdecisions
applyingorinterpretingthelawsoftheConstitution,untilreversed,shallformpartofthelegalsystemofthePhilippines."ThisCourtalso
saidthat"whilethefuturemayultimatelyuncoveradoctrine'serror,itshouldbe,asageneralrule,recognizedasgoodlawpriortoits
abandonment.Consequently,thepeople'sreliancethereuponshouldberespected."[148]
Lastly,itwasrepeatedlypointedoutduringtheoralargumentsthatpetitionercommittedafalsehoodwhensheputinthespacesfor"born
to"inherapplicationforrepatriationunderR.A.No.9225thenamesofheradoptiveparents,andthismisledtheBItopresumethatshe
was a natural born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely
unknown.
This position disregards one important fact petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties
between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."[149] Under R.A. No.
8552,petitionerwasalsoentitledtoanamendedbirthcertificate"attestingtothefactthattheadopteeisthechildoftheadopter(s)"and
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."[150] That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and
papersrelatingtotheadoptioncasesinthefilesofthecourt,theDepartment[ofSocialWelfareandDevelopment],oranyotheragency
orinstitutionparticipatingintheadoptionproceedingsshallbekeptstrictlyconfidential."[151]Thelawthereforeallowspetitionertostate
thatheradoptiveparentswereherbirthparentsasthatwaswhatwouldbestatedinherbirthcertificateanyway.Andgiventhepolicyof
strictconfidentialityofadoptionrecords,petitionerwasnotobligatedtodisclosethatshewasanadoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of
discretion.
OnResidence

Thetaintedprocesswasrepeatedindisposingoftheissueofwhetherornotpetitionercommittedfalsematerialrepresentationwhenshe
statedinherCOCthatshehasbeforeanduntil9May2016beenaresidentofthePhilippinesforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)months.
Petitioner'sclaimthatshewillhavebeenaresidentforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthsonthedaybeforethe2016elections, is
true.
TheConstitutionrequirespresidentialcandidatestohaveten(10)years'residenceinthePhilippinesbeforethedayoftheelections.Since
theforthcomingelectionswillbeheldon9May2016,petitionermusthavebeenaresidentofthePhilippinespriorto9May2016forten
(10)years.Inanswertotherequestedinformationof"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesuptothedaybeforeMay09,2016,"sheput
in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she
returnedforgoodfromtheU.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to
acquireanewdomicile:1.Residenceorbodilypresenceinanewlocality2.anintentiontoremainthereand3.anintentiontoabandon
the old domicile.[152] To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicileabonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneanddefiniteactswhichcorrespond
withthepurpose.Inotherwords,theremustbasicallybeanimusmanendicoupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Thepurposetoremainin
oratthedomicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftimethechangeofresidencemustbevoluntaryandtheresidenceatthe
placechosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.[153]
PetitionerpresentedvoluminousevidenceshowingthatsheandherfamilyabandonedtheirU.S.domicileandrelocatedtothePhilippines
forgood.Theseevidenceincludepetitioner'sformerU.S.passportshowingherarrivalon24May2005andherreturntothePhilippines
everytimeshetravelledabroademailcorrespondencesstartinginMarch2005toSeptember2006withafreightcompanytoarrangefor
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines email with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
IndustryinquiringhowtoshiptheirdogtothePhilippinesschoolrecordsofherchildrenshowingenrollmentinPhilippineschoolsstarting
June 2005 and for succeeding years tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005 titles for condominium and parking slot
issuedinFebruary2006andtheircorrespondingtaxdeclarationsissuedinApril2006receiptsdated23February2005fromtheSalvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family March 2006 email to the U.S. Postal Service confirming
requestforchangeofaddressfinalstatementfromtheFirstAmericanTitleInsuranceCompanyshowingsaleoftheirU.S.homeon27
April200612July2011filledupquestionnairesubmittedtotheU.S.EmbassywherepetitionerindicatedthatshehadbeenaPhilippine
resident since May 2005 affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased) and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses
jointlydecidedtorelocatetothePhilippinesin2005andthathestayedbehindintheU.S.onlytofinishsomeworkandtosellthefamily
home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
ContrerasandValdezcases.
However,theCOMELECrefusedtoconsiderthatpetitioner'sdomicilehadbeentimelychangedasof24May2005.Attheoralarguments,
COMELECCommissionerArthurLimconcededthepresenceofthefirsttworequisites,namely,physicalpresenceandanimusmanendi,but
maintainedtherewasnoanimusnonrevertendi.[154]TheCOMELECdisregardedtheimportofalltheevidencepresentedbypetitioneron
thebasisofthepositionthattheearliestdatethatpetitionercouldhavestartedresidenceinthePhilippineswasinJuly2006whenher
application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,[155] Japzon v.
COMELEC[156] and Caballero v. COMELEC.[157] During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.[158]
RespondentscontendthatthesecasesdecreethatthestayofanalienformerFilipinocannotbecounteduntilhe/sheobtainsapermanent
residentvisaorreacquiresPhilippinecitizenship,avisafreeentryunderabalikbayanstampbeinginsufficient.Sincepetitionerwasstillan
American(withoutanyresidentvisa)untilherreacquisitionofcitizenshipunderR.A.No.9225,herstayfrom24May2005to7July2006
cannotbecounted.
Butasthepetitionerpointedout,thefactsinthesefourcasesareverydifferentfromhersituation.InCoquillav.COMELEC,[159]theonly
evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC[160] did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisitionsufficedtoestablishresidence.InCaballerov.COMELEC,[161]thecandidateadmittedthathisplaceofworkwasabroadand
thatheonlyvisitedduringhisfrequentvacations.InReyesv.COMELEC,[162]thecandidatewasfoundtobeanAmericancitizenwhohad
not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a sevenmonth stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with
approvalbythisCourt,saidthat"suchfactaloneisnotsufficienttoproveheroneyearresidency."
Itisobviousthatbecauseofthesparseevidenceonresidenceinthefourcasescitedbytherespondents,theCourthadnochoicebutto
holdthatresidencecouldbecountedonlyfromacquisitionofapermanentresidentvisaorfromreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently
abandonherU.S.residence(sellingthehouse,takingthechildrenfromU.S.schools,gettingquotesfromthefreightcompany,notifying
theU.S.PostOfficeoftheabandonmentoftheiraddressintheU.S.,donatingexcessitemstotheSalvationArmy,herhusbandresigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her
residencehereon24May2005(securingT.I.N,enrollingherchildreninPhilippineschools,buyingpropertyhere,constructingaresidence
here,returningtothePhilippinesafteralltripsabroad,herhusbandgettingemployedhere).Indeed,coupledwithhereventualapplication
toreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipandherfamily'sactualcontinuousstayinthePhilippinesovertheyears,itisclearthatwhenpetitioner
returnedon24May2005itwasforgood.

Inthisconnection,theCOMELECalsotookitagainstpetitionerthatshehadenteredthePhilippinesvisafreeasabalikbayan.Acloserlook
atR.A.No.6768asamended,otherwiseknownasthe"AnActInstitutingaBalikbayanProgram,"showsthatthereisnooverridingintent
totreatbalikbayansastemporaryvisitorswhomustleaveafteroneyear.IncludedinthelawisaformerFilipinowhohasbeennaturalized
abroadand"comesorreturnstothePhilippines."[163]Thelawinstitutesabalikbayanprogram"providingtheopportunitytoavailofthe
necessarytrainingtoenablethebalikbayantobecomeeconomicallyselfreliantmembersofsocietyupontheirreturntothecountry"[164]
inlinewiththegovernment's"reintegrationprogram."[165]Obviously,balikbayansarenotordinarytransients.
Giventhelaw'sexpresspolicytofacilitatethereturnofabalikbayanandhelphimreintegrateintosociety,itwouldbeanundulyharsh
conclusiontosayinabsolutetermsthatthebalikbayanmustleaveafteroneyear.Thatvisafreeperiodisobviouslygrantedhimtoallow
himtoreestablishhislifeandreintegratehimselfintothecommunitybeforeheattendstothenecessaryformalandlegalrequirementsof
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaitingthereturnofherhusbandandthenapplyingforrepatriationshortlythereafter.
Nocasesimilartopetitioner's,wheretheformerFilipino'sevidenceofchangeindomicileisextensiveandoverwhelming,hasasyetbeen
decidedbytheCourt.Petitioner'sevidenceofresidenceisunprecedented.Thereisnojudicialprecedentthatcomesclosetothefactsof
residenceofpetitioner.ThereisnoindicationinCoquillav.COMELEC,[166] and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court
intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided
particularlyonthefactsofthecasebasis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of
residenceoften(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthsby9May2016inher2015COCwasfalsebecausesheputsix(6)yearsandsix(6)
monthsas"periodofresidencebeforeMay13,2013"inher2012COCforSenator.Thus,accordingtotheCOMELEC,shestartedbeinga
PhilippineresidentonlyinNovember2006.Indoingso,theCOMELECautomaticallyassumedastruethestatementinthe2012COCand
the2015COCasfalse.
Asexplainedbypetitionerinherverifiedpleadings,shemisunderstoodthedaterequiredinthe2013COCastheperiodofresidenceasof
thedayshesubmittedthatCOCin2012.ShesaidthatshereckonedresidencyfromAprilMay2006whichwastheperiodwhentheU.S.
housewassoldandherhusbandreturnedtothePhilippines.Inthatregard,shewasadvisedbyherlawyersin2015thatresidencecould
becountedfrom25May2005.
Petitioner'sexplanationthatshemisunderstoodthequeryin2012(periodofresidencebefore13May2013)asinquiringaboutresidence
as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now
"periodofresidenceinthePhilippinesuptothedaybeforeMay09,2016."TheCOMELECwouldnothaverevisedthequeryifitdidnot
acknowledgethatthefirstversionwasvague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is
plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school
recordsofherchildren.
ItwasgraveabuseofdiscretionfortheCOMELECtotreatthe2012
COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive.Thereisprecedentafterallwhereacandidate'smistakeastoperiodofresidencemadeinaCOCwasovercomebyevidence.
In RomualdezMarcos v. COMELEC,[167] the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required
periodwasaminimumofoneyear.Wesaidthat"[i]tisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacywhichoughtto
bedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement."TheCOMELEC
ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
2005.HadtheCOMELECdoneitsduty,itwouldhaveseenthatthe2012COCandthe2015COCbothcorrectlystatedthepertinentperiod
ofresidency.
TheCOMELEC,byitsownadmission,disregardedtheevidencethatpetitioneractuallyandphysicallyreturnedhereon24May2005not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation
underR.A.No.9225inJuly2006.However,itdoesnottakeawaythefactthatinreality,petitionerhadreturnedfromtheU.S.andwas
heretostaypermanently,on24May2005.Whensheclaimedtohavebeenaresidentforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)months,she
coulddosoingoodfaith.
Foranother,itcouldnotbesaidthatpetitionerwasattemptingtohideanything.Asalreadystated,apetitionforquowarrantohadbeen
filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner'srepatriationinJuly2006underR.A.No.9225,wasanestablishedfacttorepeat,forpurposesofhersenatorialcandidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first
broughtupinthemediaon2June2015byRep.TobiasTiangcooftheUnitedNationalistAlliance.Petitionerappearstohaveansweredthe
issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when
Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the
statementwerealreadymattersofpublicrecordandwerenothidden.
Petitionerlikewiseprovedthatthe2012COCwasalsobroughtupintheSETpetitionforquowarranto.HerVerifiedAnswer,whichwas
filedon1September2015,admittedthatshemadeamistakeinthe2012COCwhensheputinsix(6)yearsandsix(6)monthsasshe
misunderstoodthequestionandcouldhavetruthfullyindicatedalongerperiod.HeranswerintheSETcasewasamatterofpublicrecord.
Therefore,whenpetitioneraccomplishedherCOCforPresidenton15October2015,shecouldnotbesaidtohavebeenattemptingtohide
hererroneousstatementinher2012COCforSenatorwhichwasexpresslymentionedinherVerifiedAnswer.

Thefactsnow,ifnotstretchedtodistortion,donotshoworevenhintatanintentiontohidethe2012statementandhaveitcoveredby
the2015representation.Petitioner,moreover,hasonhersidethisCourt'spronouncementthat:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation
which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate'smisrepresentationinhisCOCmustnotonlyrefertoamaterialfact(eligibilityandqualificationsforelectiveoffice),
butshouldevinceadeliberateintenttomislead,misinformorhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.It
mustbemadewithanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastoone'squalificationstorunforpublicoffice.[168]

Insum,theCOMELEC,withthesamepostureofinfallibilism,virtuallyignoredagoodnumberofevidenceddatesallofwhichcanevince
animusmanenditothePhilippinesandanimusnonreverteditotheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Theveracityoftheeventsofcomingand
stayinghomewasasmuchasdismissedasinconsequential,thefocushavingbeenfixedatthepetitioner's"sworndeclarationinherCOC
for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only
commence sometime in November 2006" such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President."Thisconclusion,asalreadyshown,ignoresthestandingjurisprudencethatitisthefactofresidence,notthestatementofthe
personthatdeterminesresidenceforpurposesofcompliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirementofresidencyforelectionasPresident.It
ignorestheeasilyresearchedmatterthatcasesonquestionsofresidencyhavebeendecidedfavorablyforthecandidateonthebasisof
facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.[169] It ignores, above all else, what we
considerasaprimaryreasonwhypetitionercannotbeboundbyherdeclarationinherCOCforSenatorwhichdeclarationwasnoteven
consideredbytheSETasanissueagainsthereligibilityforSenator.WhenpetitionermadethedeclarationinherCOCforSenatorthatshe
has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as
referencetheresidencyrequirementsforelectionasSenatorwhichwassatisfiedbyherdeclaredyearsofresidence.Itwasuncontested
duringtheoralargumentsbeforeusthatatthetimethedeclarationforSenatorwasmade,petitionerdidnothaveasyetanyintentionto
vieforthePresidencyin2016andthatthegeneralpublicwasnevermadeawarebypetitioner,bywordoraction,thatshewouldrunfor
President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a lengthofresidence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of
residenceotherthanthatwhichwasmentionedintheCOCforSenator.Suchotherfactsofresidencehaveneverbeenproventobefalse,
andthese,torepeatinclude:
[Petitioner]returnedtothePhilippineson24May2005.[petitioner's]husbandhoweverstayedintheUSAtofinishpendingprojectsand
arrangethesaleoftheirfamilyhome.
Meanwhile[petitioner]andherchildrenlivedwithhermotherinSanJuanCity.[Petitioner]enrolledBrianinBeaconSchoolinTaguigCity
in2005andHannainAssumptionCollegeinMakatiCityin2005.AnikawasenrolledinLearningConnectioninSanJuanin2007,when
shewasalreadyoldenoughtogotoschool.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.
[Petitioner]andherfamilylivedinUnit7FuntiltheconstructionoftheirfamilyhomeinCorinthianHillswascompleted.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's]
adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's]newnameandstatingthatherparentsare"RonaldAllanK.Poe"and"JesusaL.Sonora."
InFebruary2006,[petitioner]travelledbrieflytotheUSinordertosupervisethedisposalofsomeofthefamily'sremaining
householdbelongings.[Petitioner]returnedtothePhilippineson11March2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their
addressintheUS.
ThefamilyhomeintheUSwassoleon27April2006.
InApril2006,[petitioner's]husbandresignedfromhisworkintheUS.HereturnedtothePhilippineson4May2006andbegan
workingforaPhilippinecompanyinJuly2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family
home.[170]

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation,toconsidernootherdatethanthatmentionedbypetitionerinherCOCforSenator.
Allputtogether,inthematterofthecitizenshipandresidenceofpetitionerforhercandidacyasPresidentoftheRepublic,thequestioned
ResolutionsoftheCOMELECinDivisionandEnBancare,oneandall,deadlydiseasedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionfromroottofruits.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheResolutions,towit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner,vs.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondent,statingthat:
[T]heCertificateofCandidacyforPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesintheMay9,2016NationalandLocalElections
filedbyrespondentMaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzaresisherebyGRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15002 (DC) entitled
Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora PoeLlamanzares, respondent SPA No. 15007 (DC) entitled Antonio P
Contreras,petitioner,vs.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondentandSPANo.15139(DC)entitledAmadoD.Valdez,
petitioner,v.MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzares,respondentstatingthat:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theCommissionRESOLVED,asitherebyRESOLVES,toGRANTthepetitionsandcancelthe
CertificateofCandidacyofMARYGRACENATIVIDADSONORAPOELLAMANZARESfortheelectivepositionofPresidentofthe
RepublicofthePhilippinesinconnectionwiththe9May2016SynchronizedLocalandNationalElections.
3.dated23December2015oftheCOMELECEnBanc,upholdingthe1December2015ResolutionoftheSecondDivisionstatingthat:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for
ReconsiderationofSENATORMARYGRACENATIVIDADSONORAPOELLAMANZARES.TheResolutiondated11December2015
oftheCommissionFirstDivisionisAFFIRMED.
4.dated23December2015oftheCOMELECEnBanc,upholdingthe11December2015ResolutionoftheFirstDivision.
areherebyANNULEDandSETASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POELLAMANZARES is DECLAREDQUALIFIED to
beacandidateforPresidentintheNationalandLocalElectionsof9May2016.
SOORDERED.
Bersamin,andMendoza,JJ.,concur.
Sereno,C.J.,Velasco,Jr.,Jardeleza,andCaguioa,JJ.,seeconcurringopinion.
Carpio,Brion,DelCastillo,andPerlasBernabe,JJ.,seedissentingopinion.
LeonardoDeCastro,J.,pleaseseeseparatedissentingopinion.
Peralta,J.,IjoinJ.Caguioa'sopinion.
Reyes,J.,IconcurwiththedissentingopinionofJ.PerlasBernabe.
Leonen,J.,seeseparateconcurringopinion.

NOTICEOFJUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 8, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
aboveentitledcase,theoriginalofwhichwasreceivedbythisOfficeonMarch11,2016at5:33a.m.
Verytrulyyours,
(SGD)
FELIPAG.BORLONGANANAMA
ClerkofCourt

[1]PetitionforCertiorariinG.R.Nos.221698700,pp.1516COMELECFirstDivisionResolutiondatedIIDecember2015inSPANo.15

002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC)andSPANo.15139(DC),p.2.
[2]PetitionforCertiorari,id.at1617
[3]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranoteIat4.
[4]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at22.
[5]Id.at17Comment(onthePetitionforCertiorariinG.R.No.221697)filedbyrespondentCOMELECdatedIIJanuary2016,p.6.
[6]PetitionforCertiorari,id.id.at7.
[7]Id.at18.
[8]Supranote6.
[9]Id.
[10]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranoteIat3.
[11]PetitionforCertiorari,supranoteIat17.

[12]Id.at18.
[13]Id.
[14]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote10.
[15]Id.
[16]SupranoteIat1718.
[17]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote10.
[18]Id.
[19]Id.
[20]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at20.
[21]Id.
[22]Supranote3.
[23]Supranote20.
[24]Supranote3.

[25]Supranote20.
[26]Supranote3.
[27]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote4.
[28]Id.
[29]Id.at23COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote3.
[30]Id.id.
[31]Id.id.
[32]Id.id.
[33]Id.at2324COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote1at5.
[34]Id.at24id.
[35]Id.
[36]Supranote34.
[37]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at25COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote1at5.
[38]Id.at2526id.
[39]Id.at26id.
[40]Id.id.
[41]Id.id.
[42]Id.at32id.at6.
[43]Supranote39.
[44]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at2627COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote1at5.

[45]Section5,R.A.No.9225states:

SEC.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoyfullcivil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
3.ThoseappointedtoanypublicofficeshallsubscribeandsweartoanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesand
itsdulyconstitutedauthoritiespriortotheirassumptionofoffice:Provided,Thattheyrenouncetheiroathofallegiancetothe
countrywheretheytookthatoath
xxxx
[46]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at27.
[47]Id.at29.
[48]Supranote46supranote1at6.
[49]PetitionforCertiorari,supranoteIat30id.
[50]Id.
[51]Supranote48.
[52]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at31COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote1at6.
[53]Comment,supranote5at9.
[54]PetitionforCertiorari,supranoteIat31.
[55]Id.at32Comment,supranote53at10.
[56]Id.COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranoteIat6.
[57]Id.id.at7.
[58]Id.id.
[59]Comment(onthePetitioninG.R.No.221697)filedbyrespondentElamparo,datedJanuary6,2016,p.7.
[60]COMELECSecondDivisionResolutiondatedDecember1,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),p.7.
[61]Id.at78.
[62]Supranote60.
[63]Id.
[64]Id.at8.
[65]Id.
[66]PetitionforCertiorariinG.R.No.221697,p.7.
[67]Supranote64.
[68]PetitionforCertiorari,supranote65at8COMELECSecondDivisionResolution,supranote60at811.
[69]COMELECSecondDivisionResolution,supranote60at34.
[70]Comment,supranote59at10.
[71]SectionIofRule25oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,asamended,states:

Rule25DisqualificationofCandidates

Section1.Grounds.Anycandidatewho,inanactionorprotestinwhichheisaparty,isdeclaredbyfinaldecisionofacompetentcourt,
guiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissiontobesufferingfromanydisqualificationprovidedbylawortheConstitution.
APetitiontoDisqualifyaCandidateinvokinggroundsforaPetitiontoDenytoorCancelaCertificateofCandidacyorPetitiontoDeclarea
CandidateasaNuisanceCandidate,oracombinationthereof,shallbesummarilydismissed.
[72]PetitiontoDisqualifydated19October2015filedbyTatadinSPANo.15002(DC),p.9.
[73]Id.,at9and14.
[74]Id.at10.
[75]Id.at12.
[76]Id.at11.
[77]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranote1at8.
[78]Id.
[79]PetitiontoDisqualify,supranote72at11.
[80]Id.at21.
[81]Id.
[82]Id.
[83]SupranoteIat8.
[84]Id.
[85]Contreras'petitionisapetitionforcancellationofGracePoe'sCOCunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichstatesthat:

Sec.78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancela
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
requiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthefiling
ofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.
[86]PetitionforCancellationofGracePoe'sCOCdated17October2015filedbyContrerasinSPANo.15007(DC),pp.24.
[87]Id.at3PetitionforCertiorari,supranote1at13.
[88]Id.at34.
[89]Sections12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCodeprovide:

Sec.12.Disqualifications.Anypersonwhohasbeendeclaredbycompetentauthorityinsaneorincompetent,orhasbeensentencedby
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteenmonthsorforacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude,shallbedisqualifiedtobeacandidateandtoholdanyoffice,unlesshehasbeen
givenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty.
Thisdisqualificationstobeacandidatehereinprovidedshallbedeemedremoveduponthedeclarationbycompetentauthoritythatsaid
insanityorincompetencehadbeenremovedoraftertheexpirationofaperiodoffiveyearsfromhisserviceofsentence,unlesswithinthe
sameperiodheagainbecomesdisqualified.
Sec.68.Disqualifications.Anycandidatewho,inanactionorprotestinwhichheisapartyisdeclaredbyfinaldecisionofacompetent
courtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionofhaving(a)givenmoneyorothermaterialconsiderationtoinfluence,induceorcorruptthe
votersorpublicofficialsperformingelectoralfunctions(b)committedactsofterrorismtoenhancehiscandidacy(c)spentinhiselection
campaignanamountinexcessofthatallowedbythisCode(d)solicited,receivedormadeanycontributionprohibitedunderSections89,
95, 96, 97 and 104 or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate,orifhehasbeenelected,fromholdingtheoffice.Anypersonwhoisapermanentresidentof
oranimmigranttoaforeigncountryshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyelectiveofficeunderthisCode,unlesssaidpersonhaswaivedhis
statusaspermanentresidentorimmigrantofaforeigncountryinaccordancewiththeresidencerequirementprovidedforintheelection
laws.
[90]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,supranoteIat12.

[91]Id.at10.
[92]Id.
[93]Id.at9.
[94]Id.
[95]Id.
[96]Id.
[97]Id.
[98]Id.
[99]Id.at910.
[100]Id.at10.
[101]Id.
[102]Id.
[103] The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma.

RowenaAmeliaV.Guanzon.PresidingCommissionerChristianRobertS.LimissuedaSeparateDissentingOpinion.
[104]318Phil.329(1995).
[105]595Phil.449(2008).
[106]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,supranote104at396397.
[107]Id.at397398Ferminv.COMELEC,supranote105at471472.
[108] In A.M. No. 02602SC, Resolution Approving The Proposed Rule on Adoption (Domestic and InterCountry), effective 22 August

2002, "foundling" is defined as "a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown or a child
committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil
Registerasa"foundling."
[109]ArticleIVCitizenship.

Sec.I.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution,
(2)ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicoffice
inthePhilippineIslands.(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
Section2.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
[110]Article163to182,TitleVIofExecutiveOrderNo.209,otherwiseknownasTheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,whichtookeffecton4

August1988.
[111] Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible evidence. See Herrera v. COMELEC, 376 Phil. 443 (1999) and

Bagabuyov.COMELEC,593Phil.678(2008).Inthelattercase,theCourteventookjudicialnoticeofthefigures.
[112]TransciptofStenographicNotes,9February2016,p.40.
[113]Section3(y),Rule131.
[114]236Phil.307(1987).
[115]Id.at314315.

[116]EnglishtranslationoftheSpanishoriginalpresentedinthepetitioner'spleadingsbeforetheCOMELECandthisCourt.TheCOMELEC

andprivaterespondentshavenotdisputedtheaccuracyandcorrectnessofthetranslation.
[117]1JoseM.Aruego,TheFramingofthePhilippineConstitution209(1949).
[118]TSN,16February2016,pp.2021.
[119]117Phil.976(1963).
[120]Id.at978979.
[121] See Section 5 of the RA No. 8552: "Location of Unknown Parent(s). It shall be the duty of the Department or the childcaring

agencywhichhascustodyofthechildtoexertalleffortstolocatehis/herunknownbiologicalparent(s).Ifsucheffortsfail,thechildshall
be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned."
(Underliningsupplied)
[122]SeeExhibit"1"inSPANo.15001(DC)andSPANo.1500(DC).
[123]SeeExhibit"2"inSPANo.15001(DC)andSPANo.1500(DC).
[124]Razon,Jr.v.Tagitis,621Phil.536,600(2009)citingPharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssoc.ofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,561Phil.

386,398(2007).
[125]Article38.1,paragraphs(b)and(c)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.
[126]Mijaresv.Raiiada,495Phil.372,395(2005).
[127]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssoc.ofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,561Phil.386,400(2007).
[128]InternationalSchoolAllianceofEducatorsv.Quisumbing,388Phil.661,672673(2000).
[129]CONSTITUTION,Art.III,Sec.I.
[130]Rep.ofthePhilippinesv.Sandiganbayan,454Phil.504,545(2003).
[131]"Everyonehastherighttoanationality."
[132] See Introductory Note to the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness issued by the United Nations High

CommissioneronRefugees.
[133]Supranote124.
[134]Supranote126.
[135]Id.at392SeefootnoteNo.55ofsaidcase.
[136]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssoc.ofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,supranote127.
[137]SeeExhibits38and39series.
[138]OpeningStatementoftheSolicitorGeneral,p.6.
[139]FirstDivisionresolutiondatedIIDecember2015,upheldintotobytheCOMELECEnBanc.
[140]409Phil.633,649(2001).
[141]692Phil.407,420(2012).
[142]551Phil.368,381(2007).
[143]531Phil.407,417(2006).
[144]Supranote142.
[145]Supranote140at646.

[146]Id.at651.
[147]G.R.No.21712627,10November2015.
[148]Id.
[149]ImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRepublicActNo.8552,Art.VI,Sec.33.

[150]RepublicActNo.8552(1998),Sec.14.
[151]RepublicActNo.8552(1998),Sec.15.
[152]Fernandezv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,623Phil.628,660(2009)citingJapzonv.COMELEC,596Phil.354,370

372 (2009) further citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768770 (2002) further further citing Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
TaclobanCity,G.R.No.104960,14September1993,226SCRA408,415.
[153]Dominov.COMELEC,369Phil.798,819(1999).
[154]TSN,16February2016,p.120.
[155]434Phil.861(2002).
[156]
[157]596Phil.354(2009).
[158]G.R.No.209835,22September2015.
[159]G.R.No.207264,25June2013,699SCRA522,Supranote155.
[160]Supranote156.
[161]Supranote157.
[162]Supranote158.
[163]RepublicActNo.6768(1989),asamended,Sec.2(a).
[164]RepublicActNo.6768(1989),asamended,Sec.1.
[165]RepublicActNo.6768(1989),asamended,Sec.6.
[166]Supranote155.
[167]Supranote104at326.(Emphasissupplied)
[168]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.COMELEC,575Phil.253,265266(2008).
[169]InMitrav.COMELEC,etal.,[636 PhiL 753 (2010)], It was ruled that the residence requirement can be complied with through an

incrementalprocessincludingacquisitionofbusinessinterestinthepertinentplaceandleaseoffeedmillbuildingasresidence.
[170]COMELECResolutiondated11December2015inSPANo.15002(DC),pp.45.

SERENO,CJ.:
It is important for every Member of this Court to be and to remain professionally indifferent to the outcome of the 2016 presidential
election. Whether it turns out to be for a candidate who best represents one's personal aspirations for the country or who raises one's
fears, is a future event we must be blind to while we sit as magistrates. We are not the electorate, and at this particular juncture of
history,ouronlyroleistoadjudicateasourunfetteredconsciencedictates.Wehavenomasterbutthelaw,nodrumbeaterbutreason,
andinourheartsmustlieonlythelovefortruthandforjustice.ThisiswhattheConstitutionrequiresofus.
ItisaproposatthispointtorecalltheprinciplesthatJusticeAngelinaSandovalGutierrezevokedinherconcurringopinioninTecsonv.
COMELEC,[1]thelandmarkcaseinvolvingasrespondentapresidentialcandidatefor2014,thelateRonaldAllanKellyPoe:
xxxx

Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is political liberty, which is the right and
opportunitytochoosethosewhowillleadthegovernedwiththeirconsent.Thisrighttochoosecannotbesubtly
interfered with through the elimination of the electoral choice. The present bid to disqualify respondent Poe from the
presidentialraceisaclearattempttoeliminatehimasoneofthechoices.ThisCourtshouldresistsuchattempt.Therightto
choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would impose through force or stealth their
will on the majority of citizens. We should not only welcome electoral competition, we should cherish it. Disqualifying a
candidate,particularlythepopularone,onthebasisofdoubtfulclaimsdoesnotresulttoagenuine,freeandfairelection.It
results to violence. x x x. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we know that when democracy operates as intended, an
arousedpubliccanreplacethosewhogoverninamannerbeyondtheparametersestablishedbypublicconsent.[2]
xxxx
WhenthepeoplevoteonMay10andcasttheirballotsforPresident,theywillbeexercisingasovereignright.Theymayvote
for respondent Poe, or they may not. When they vote, they will consider a myriad of issues, some relevant, others trivial,
including the eligibility of the candidates, their qualities of leadership, their honesty and sincerity, perhaps including their
legitimacy.Thatistheirprerogative.Aftertheelection,andonlyafter,andthatiswhattheConstitutionmandates,theelection
ofwhoeverisproclaimedwinnermaybechallengedinanelectioncontestorapetitionforquowarranto.Wherethechallengeis
becauseofineligibility,hewillbeoustedonlyifthisCourtexertsutmostefforttoresolvetheissueinamannerthatwouldgive
effecttothewillofthemajority,foritismerelysoundpublicpolicytocauseelectiveofficestobefilledbythosewhoarethe
choiceofthemajority.[3]
ThatiswhattheCOMELECrulingsinthesecaseswouldhavepreciselyaccomplishedhadtheybeenaffirmed:theillegitimate
eliminationofanelectoralchoice,achoicewhoappearstobeoneofthefrontrunnersinalltherelevantsurveys.Forthereasonsset
forthbelow,IconcurwithJusticeJosePortugalPerez,andamhereinexpoundingindetailthereasonsforsuchconcurrence.
WiththemajorityoftheMembersoftheCourtdeclaring,byavoteof9asagainst6,thatpetitionerMaryGracePoeLlamanzareshasno
legalimpedimenttorunforthepresidency,itismostunfortunatethatoneoftheDissentingOpinionsopenswithastatementthattriesto
castuncertaintyonanalreadytensesituation.Thedissentgivesexcessiveweighttothefactthatthereare5Justicesintheminoritywho
believethatpetitionerdoesnothavethequalificationsforpresidency,whileignoringtherealitythatthereatleast7Justiceswhobelieve
thatpetitionerpossessesthesequalifications.
Notethatthefalloneededonlytodisposeofthegrantordenialofthepetitionsandnothingmore.Ideally,nofurtherinterpretationofthe
votesshouldhavebeenmade.Unfortunately,thereareattemptstomakesuchaninterpretation.Wethereforeneedtolooktoourinternal
rulesforclarificationonthemattertoavoidexacerbatingmatters.
If we were to apply the rules on voting in the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Court decided on the matter of
petitioner'sintrinsicqualificationsinaccordancewithRule12,Section1oftheserules:
Section1.Votingrequirements.(a)AlldecisionsandactionsinCourtenbanccasesshallbemadeupupontheconcurrence
of the majority of the Members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues involved and
votedonthem.
Out of the 12 Members who voted on the substantive question on citizenship, a clear majority of 7 voted in favor of petitioner. As to
residency,7outof13votedthatpetitionercompliedwiththe10yearresidencyrequirement.Thesevotes,asexplainedintheextended
opinions submitted by the members of the majority, must be respected. Granting therefore that we need to address the question of
substantivequalificationsofpetitioner,sheclearlypossessesthequalificationsforpresidencyonthematterofresidencyandcitizenship.
I.
TheProceedingsBeforetheCourt
On28December2015,petitionerfiledtwoseparatePetitionsforCertioraribeforethisCourtassailingtheResolutionsdated23December
2015oftheCOMELECEnBanc,whichorderedthecancellationofherCertificateofCandidacy(CoC)forthe2016presidentialelections.[4]
BothpetitionsincludedaprayerfortheissuanceofTemporaryRestrainingOrders(TRO)againsttheCOMELEC.
Intheafternoonof28December2015,bymyauthorityasChiefJusticeanduponthewrittenrecommendationoftheMembersinCharge,
theCourtissuedtwoseparateordersenjoiningCOMELECanditsrepresentativesfromimplementingtheassailedResolutions,pursuantto
Section6(g),Rule7oftheSupremeCourtInternalRules.[5]
The issuance of the TROs was confirmed by the Court En Banc, voting 123, in Resolutions dated 12 January 2016. In the same
resolutions,theCourtorderedtheconsolidationofthetwopetitions.
Oral arguments were then held on the following dates:January 19 and 26 February 2, 9 and 16, 2016. During these proceedings, the
partieswereorderedinopencourttosubmittheirMemorandawithinfivedaysfromtheconclusionoftheoralarguments,afterwhichthe
consolidatedpetitionswouldbedeemedsubmittedforresolution.
On29February2016,thedraftreportoftheMemberinChargewascirculatedtotheMembersoftheCourt.TheCourtthendecidedto
schedule the deliberations on the case on 8 March 2016. A reserved date 9 March 2016 was also agreed upon, in the event that a
decisionisnotreachedduringthe8March2016session.
Inkeepingwiththeaboveschedule,theMembersoftheCourtdeliberatedandvotedonthecaseon8March2016.
II
COMELECexceededitsjurisdictionwhenitruledonpetitioner'squalificationsunderSection78oftheOmnibusElection
Code.
ThebriefreasonswhytheCOMELECexceededitsjurisdictionwhenitruledonpetitioner'squalificationsareasfollows.

First, Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 118, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), does not allow the COMELEC to rule on the
qualificationsofcandidates.ItspowertocancelaCertificateofCandidacy(CoC)iscircumscribedwithintheconfinesofSection78ofthe
OEC that provides for a summary proceeding to determine the existence of the exclusive ground that any representation made by the
candidateregardingaSection74matterwasfalse.Section74requires,amongothersastatementbythecandidateonhiseligibilityfor
office.ToauthorizetheCOMELECtogobeyonditsmandateandruleontheintrinsicqualificationofpetitioner,andhenceforth,ofevery
candidate,isanoutcomeclearlyprohibitedbytheConstitutionandbytheOEC.
Second,evenassumingthattheCOMELECmaygobeyondthedeterminationofpatentfalsityoftheCoC,itsdecisiontocancelpetitioner's
CoC must still be reversed. The factual circumstances surrounding petitioner's claims of residency and citizenship show that there was
neitherintenttodeceivenorfalserepresentationonherpart.Worse,theCOMELEC'sunmeriteduseofthisCourt'sdissentingopinionsasif
theywerepronouncementsoftheCourtitself[6]misleadsboththeCourtandthepublic,asitevincesarefusaltoacknowledgeadissent's
proper place not as law, but as the personal views of an individual member of this Court. Most egregiously, the COMELEC blatantly
disregardedalonglineofdecisionsbythisCourttocomeupwithitsconclusions.
ThePoweroftheCOMELECPrior
toSection78oftheOmnibus
ElectionCode
PriortotheOEC,thepoweroftheCOMELECinrelationtothefilingofCoCshadbeendescribedasministerialandadministrative.[7] In
1985,theOECwaspassed,empoweringtheCOMELECtograntordenyduecoursetoapetitiontocancelaCoC.Therighttofileaverified
petition under Section 78 was given to any person on the ground of material representation of the contents of the CoC as provided for
under Section 74. Among the statements a candidate is required to make in the CoC, is that he or she is eligible for the office the
candidateseeks.
The fundamental requirements for electoral office are found in the Constitution. With respect to the petitions at hand, these are the
naturalborn Filipino citizenship and the 10year residency requirements for President found under Section 2, Article VII in relation to
Section1,ArticleIVoftheConstitution.
InthedeliberationsoftheBatasangPambansaonwhatwouldturnouttobeSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodeorBatasPambansa
Bilang(BP)881,thelawmakersemphasizedthatthefearofpartisanshiponthepartoftheCOMELECmakesitimperativethatit
must only be for the strongest of reasons, i.e., material misrepresentation on the face of the CoC, that the COMELEC can
reject any such certificates. Otherwise, to allow greater power than the quasiministerial duty of accepting facially
compliantCoCswouldopenthedoorforCOMELECtoengageinpartisanshiptheCOMELECmaytargetanycandidateatwill.
The fear was so real to the lawmakers that they characterized the power to receive CoCs not only as summary, but initially as,
"ministerial."Allowmetoquote:
HON.ADAZA.WhyshouldwegivetheComelecpowertodenyortogiveduecoursewhentheacceptanceofthecertificateof
candidacyisministerial?
HON.FERNAN.Iyonnangaangsinasabikoeh.
THE CHAIRMAN. Baka iyong residences, this must be summary. He is not a resident of the ano, why will you wait?
Automaticallydisqualifiedsiya.Supposeheisnotanaturalborncitizen.
HON.ADAZA.No,butwecanspecifythegroundshere.Kasi,theycanusethispowertoexpand.
THECHAIRMAN.Yeah,thatisunderthisarticlenga.
HON.ADAZA.Iyonnanga,butlet'smakeparticularreference.Remember,Nonoy,thisisanewprovisionwhichgivesauthority
totheComelec.Thiswasnevertherebefore.Ikanselnanatinyan.
HON.GONZALES.AtsakatheConstitutionsays,diba?"TheCommissiononElectionisthesolejudgeofallthecontest."This
merelyreferstoconteste.Petitionfangtogiveduecoursee.Youwillonlybedeclareddisqualified.
THE CHAIRMAN. No, no, because, clearly, he is a nonresident. Oh, why can we not file a petition? Supposing he is not a
naturalborncitizen?Why?
HON.GONZALES.Thisisaveryveryseriousquestion.Thisshouldbedeclaredonlyinproperelectioncontest,properlylitigated
butneverinasummaryproceedings.
THECHAIRMAN.Wewillnotusetheword,thephrase"duecourse","seekingthecancellationoftheCertificateofCandidacy".
Forexample,siAding,isaresidentofCebuandherunsinDavaoCity.
HON.ADAZA.HeisaresidentofCebubutherunsinLapuLapu?lkaw,youarealreadythreateninghimah.
THECHAIRMAN.ThesearethecasesIamsure,thatare...
HON.ADAZA.Isee.No,no,butletusgetridoftheprovision.Thisisdangerous.
THECHAIRMAN.Nobut,ifyouknowthatyouropponentisnotelectedorsuppose...
HON.ADAZA.Filetheproperpetitionlikebeforewithoutprovidingthis.
THECHAIRMAN.Butinthemeantime,why...
HON.SITOY.Myproposalistodeletethephrase"todenyduecourse",godirectto"seekingthecancellationoftheCertificate
ofCandidacy."
HON.ASOK.EveryCertificateofCandidacyshouldbepresumedaccepted.Itshouldbepresumedaccepted.

THECHAIRMAN.Supposeonthebasisof...
HON.SITOY.That'swhy,myproposalis,"anypersonseekingthecancellationofaCertificateofCandidacy".
HON.FERNAN.Butwherearethegroundshere?
HON.ADAZA.Noy,let'sholdthis.Holdmunaito.Thisisdangerouse.
THECHAIRMAN.Okay,okay.
HON.GONZALES.GinagamitlamangngComelecang"before"ifitisclaimedthatacandidateisanofficialorthathisCertificate
of Candidacy has been filed in bad faith, iyon lang. Pero you cannot go to the intrinsic qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates.
HON.DELOSREYES.Whicharetakenupinanordinaryprotest.
HON.GONZALES.Ditoba,kasamaiyongproceedingssa...?WhatI'msayingis:KagayaiyongnabanggitkayNonoy,natural
courseofmargin,imagine,itwilleventuallyreachtheSupremeCourt.Themomentthatthedisqualificationispending,lalong
lalonakungmaydecisionngComelecandyetpendingpabeforetheSupremeCourt,thatalreadyadverselyaffectacandidate,
mabigat na iyan. So, what I'm saying is, on this disqualification subjudice, alisin ito except if on the ground that he is a
nuisancecandidateorthathisCertificateofCandidacyhasbeenfiledinbadfaith.ButifhisCertificateofCandidacyappearsto
beregularandvalidonthebasisthathiscertificatehasbeenfiledontime,thenitshouldbegivenduecouse.[8]
Thesameconcernswereraisedwhentheprovisionwastakenupagain:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 10, the power of the Commission to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Whatisthespecificano,Tessie?
HON.ADAZA.Page45.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Section71.
HON.ADAZA.KasikayNeptaliitoanditisalsocontainedinourpreviousproposal,"Anypersonseekingtodenyduecourseto
orcancel..."ourproposalhereisthatitshouldnotbemadetoappearthattheCommissiononElectionshastheauthorityto
deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy. I mean their duty should be ministerial, the acceptance, except in
caseswheretheyarenuisancecandidates.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Incaseofnuisance,whowilldetermine,hindibaComeleciyan?
HON.ADAZA.Iyonnanga,exceptinthosecases,eh.Ito,thiscoversaprovisionnotonlyinreferencetonuisancecandidates.
HON.CUENCO.Willyoureadtheprovision?
HON.ADAZA."Anypersonseekingduecoursetoorthecancellation..."becauseourpositionhereisthatthesearematters
that should be contained in an election protest or in a quo warranto proceedings, eh. You know, you can be given a lot of
problemsinthecourseofthecampaign.
HON.ASOK.Butwealreadyhaveaspecificprovisiononthis.
HON.ADAZA.(MPAdazareadingtheprovision.)Youknow,weshouldnothavethisasaprovisionanymorebecausewhatever
matterswillberaisedrespectingthiscertificateofcandidacy,thesearenormalissuesforprotestorquowarranto,eh.
HON.CUENCO.SoyounowwanttoremovethispowerfromtheComelec?
HON.ADAZA.ThispowerfromtheComelec.Thisisthenewprovision,eh.Theyshouldnothavethis.Allofuscanbebothered,
eh.
HON.CUENCO.SointhatcasehowcantheComeleccancelthecertificateofcandidacywhenyousaid...
HON.ADAZA.Onlywithrespecttothenuisancecandidates.Thereisnospecificprovision.
HON.ASOK.Thereisalreadyaspecificprovisionfornuisancecandidates.
HON.ADAZA.Thisonereferstoothercandidateswhoarenotnuisancecandidates,butmostparticularlyreferstomattersthat
areinvolvedinprotestandquowarrantoproceedings.Whyshouldweexpandtheirotherprovisionsbefore.Youknow,youcan
getbothered.
HON.CUENCO.Everybodywillbevulnerable?
HON.ADAZA.Yeah,everybodywillbevulnerable,eh.
HON.CUENCO.Evenifyouareaseriouscandidate?
HON.ADAZA.Evenifyouareaseriouscandidatebecause,forinstance,theywillfileapetitionforquowarranto,theycanfilea
petition to the Comelec to cancel your certificate of candidacy. These are actually grounds for protest or for quo warranto
proceedings.
xxxx
HON.CUENCO.Bymerelyalleging,forexample,thatyouareasubversive.
HON.ADAZA.Oo,iyonnanga,eh.

xxxx
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Supposeyouaredisqualified,youdonothavethenecessaryqualifications,theComeleccanmotu
propiocancelit.
HON.CUENCO.Onwhatground,Mr.Chairman?
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Youaredisqualified.Let'ssay,walakangresidenceorkuwan...
HON.ADAZA.Ah,that'stheproblem.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.That'swhy.
HON.ADAZA.WeshouldnotallowthatthingtocropupwithinthepowersoftheComelecbecauseanyonecancreateproblem
foreverybody.Youknow,that'sapropersubjectforprotestorquowarranto.ButnottoempowertheComelectocancel.That's
averydangerousprovision.Itcanreachallofus.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Hindi,ifyouarearesidentperoiyong,let'ssayanewcomercomestoMisamisOriental,3months
beforeandfilehisCertificateofCandidacy.
HON.ADAZA.Nevermind,filethenecessarypetition.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Thesearethecasestheysay,thatwillbeinvolved.
HON.ADAZA.Ithinkweshouldkuwanthate.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Iyontalagangnonresidentandthenhegoesthereandfilehiscertificate,Youcan,howcananybody
stophim,diba?
HON. ADAZA. No, let me cite to you cases, most people running for instance in the last Batasan, especially in the highly
urbanized city, they were residence in one particular city but actually running in the province. You see, how you can be
bothered if you empower the Comelec with this authority to cancel, there would have been many that would have been
cancelled.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER.Thereweremanywhotriedtobeatthedeadline.
HON.ADAZA.No,therearemanywhodidnotbeatthedeadline,Iknow.
HON.LOOD.ThematterofpointisthewordArticle8,Article8,providesfullresponsibilityfor...
HON.ADAZA.Whichone?That'sright.
HON.LOOD.That'swhyitincludesfull...(Unintelligible).
HON.ADAZA.No,it'sverydangerous.Wewillbeallinserioustrouble.Besides,thatcoveredalreadybyspecificprovisions.So,
canweagree.Anywayitisthisnewprovisionwhichisdangerous.
HONCUENCO.So,youwanttheentireprovision?
HON.LOOD.Unlesswemakeexception.[9]
TheSummaryNatureofProceedings
underSection78OnlyAllowthe
COMELECtoRuleonPatent
MaterialMisrepresentationofFacts
onResidencyandCitizenship,notof
ConclusionsofLaw,andespecially,
notintheAbsenceofEstablished
LegalDoctrinesontheMatter
The original intent of the legislature was clear: to make the denial of due course or cancellation of certificate of candidacy before the
COMELEC a summary proceeding that would not go into the intrinsic validity of the qualifications of the candidate, even to the point of
makingthepowermerelyministerialintheabsenceofpatentdefects.Therewasconcernamongsomeothermembersaboutgivingthe
COMELECthepowertodenyduecoursetoorcanceloutrightthecertificateofcandidacy.Assuch,theproposalwastoremoveSection78
entirely or to lay down specific parameters in order to limit the power of the COMELEC under the provision. Thus, in interpreting the
languageofSection78aspresentlycrafted,thoseintendedlimitationsmustbekeptinmind.Thisincludesretainingthesummarynature
ofSection78proceedings.
Reyesv.CommissiononElections[10]providesaninsightintothesummarynatureofaSection78proceeding:
ThespecialactionbeforetheCOMELECwhichwasaPetitiontoCancelCertificateofCandidacywasaSUMMARYPROCEEDING
orone"heardsummarily."ThenatureoftheproceedingsisbestindicatedbytheCOMELECRuleonSpecialActions,Rule23,
Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the
PhilippineBartohearthecaseandtoreceiveevidence.COMELECRule17furtherprovidesinSection3thatwhen
the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counteraffidavits and other documentary
evidence...andthat"[t]hisprovisionshalllikewiseapplytocaseswherethehearingandreceptionofevidencearedelegated
bytheCommissionortheDivisiontoanyofitsofficials...."
xxxx

In fact, in summary proceedings like the special action of filing a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, oral testimony is dispensed with and, instead, parties are required to submit their position paper
togetherwithaffidavits,counteraffidavitsandotherpiecesofdocumentaryevidence.
The Summary nature of Section 78 proceeding implies the simplicity of subjectmatter[11] as it does away with long drawn and
complicatedtrialtypelitigation.Consideringitsnature,theimplicationtherefore,isthatSection78casescontemplatesimpleissuesonly.
Anyissuethatiscomplexwouldentailtheuseofdiscretion,theexerciseofwhichisreservedtotheappropriateelectiontribunal.With
greaterreasonthen,claimsofcandidateonamatterofopiniononunsettledquestionsoflaw,cannotbe the basis for the
denialofaCoC.
Section78ProceedingsCannotTake
thePlaceofaQuoWarranto
ProceedingoranElectoralProtest
The danger of the COMELEC effectively thwarting the voter's will was clearly articulated by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his separate
opinioninthecaseinvolvingMrs.ImeldaRomualdezMarcos.[12]TheCourtvotedtogranttheRule64PetitionofMrs.Marcostoinvalidate
the COMELEC's Resolution denying her Amended CoC. Justice Mendoza wanted the Court to do so on the prior threshold issue of
jurisdiction,i.e.,thattheCOMELECdidnothaveeventhepowertoassumejurisdictionoverthepetitionofCiriloMontejobecauseitwasin
effect a petition for disqualification. Thus, the COMELEC resolution was utterly void. Justice Mendoza explains Section 78 in relation to
petitionsfordisqualificationundertheConstitutionandrelevantlaws.TheallegationsintheMontejo'spetitionwerecharacterized,thus:
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and
Disqualification,"containednoallegationthatprivaterespondentImelda RomualdezMarcos made material representations in
her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter
Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative,
consideringthatonelectionday,May8,1995,[she]wouldhaveresidedlessthanten(10)monthsinthedistrictwheresheis
seekingtobeelected."Foritspart,theCOMELEC'sSecondDivision,initsresolutionofApril24,1995,cancelledhercertificate
of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding
thatshehadmadefalserepresentationsastomaterialmattersinhercertificateofcandidacy.
Montejo'spetitionbeforetheCOMELECwasthereforenotapetitionforcancellationofcertificateofcandidacyunder78ofthe
OmnibusElectionCode,butessentiallyapetitiontodeclareprivaterespondentineligible.Itisimportanttonotethis,because,
aswill presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate,
whereasquowarrantoproceedingshavefortheirpurposetodisqualifyapersonfromholdingpublicoffice.Jurisdictionoverquo
warrantoproceedingsinvolvingmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesisvestedintheElectoralTribunalofthatbody.[13]
JusticeMendozaopinedthattheCOMELEChasnopowertodisqualifycandidatesonthegroundofineligibility,elaboratingthus:
InmyviewtheissueinthiscaseiswhethertheCommissiononElectionshasthepowertodisqualifycandidatesontheground
thattheylackeligibilityfortheofficetowhichtheyseektobe elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of
candidatesmaybequestionedonlyintheeventtheyareelected,byfilingapetitionforquowarrantooranelectionprotestin
theappropriateforum,notnecessarilyintheCOMELECbut,asinthiscase,intheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.
That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were
unauthorizedandwerenotrenderedvalidbytheiragreementtosubmittheirdisputetothatbody.
Thevariouselectionlawswillbesearchedinvainforauthorizedproceedingsfordeterminingacandidate'squalificationsforan
officebeforehiselection.TherearenoneintheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.Blg.881),intheElectoralReformsLawof1987
(R.A.No.6646),orinthelawprovidingforsynchronizedelections(R.A.No.7166).Thereare,inotherwords,noprovisionsfor
preproclamationcontestsbutonlyelectionprotestsorquowarrantoproceedingsagainstwinningcandidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the
ineligibilityofacandidate.Theseprovisionsareconcernedwiththeincapacity(duetoinsanity,incompetenceorconvictionof
anoffense)ofapersoneithertobeacandidateortocontinueasacandidateforpublicoffice.Thereisalsoaprovisionforthe
denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain
mattersrequiredbylawtobestatedinthecertificates.[14]
He then proceeded to cite the three reasons explaining the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualificationsofacandidate:
Firstisthefactthatunlessacandidatewinsandisproclaimedelected,thereisnonecessityfordetermininghiseligibilityfor
theoffice.Incontrast,whetheranindividualshouldbedisqualifiedasacandidateforactsconstitutingelectionoffenses(e.g.,
votebuying,overspending,commissionofprohibitedacts)isaprejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be
countedandifforsomereasonhehasbeenvotedforandhehaswon,eitherhewillnotbeproclaimedorhisproclamationwill
besetaside.
Secondisthefactthatthedeterminationofacandidate'seligibility,e.g.,hiscitizenshipor,asinthiscase,hisdomicile,may
take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of
proceedingsrelatingtocertificatesofcandidacy.Thatiswhythelawmakesthereceiptofcertificatesofcandidacy
a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of
candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their

qualificationstobemadeaftertheelectionandonlyintheeventtheyareelected.Onlyincasesinvolvingcharges
offalserepresentationsmadeincertificatesofcandidacyistheCOMELECgivenjurisdiction.
ThirdisthepolicyunderlyingtheprohibitionagainstpreproclamationcasesinelectionsforPresident,VicePresident,Senators
andmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives.(R.A.No.7166,15)ThepurposeistopreservetheprerogativesoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesElectoralTribunalandtheotherTribunalsas"solejudges"undertheConstitutionoftheelection,returnsand
qualificationsofmembersofCongressorofthePresidentandVicePresident,asthecasemaybe.[15]
The legal differentiation between Section 78 visavisquowarranto proceedings and electoral protests made by Justice Mendoza in the
RomualdezMarcoscasewascompletelyadopted,andaffirmedbyaunanimousCourtinFerminv.COMELEC.[16]Ferminv.COMELEChas
beenaffirmedinMunderv.CommissiononElections, [17]Agustinv.CommissiononElections[18]Talagav.CommissiononElections, [19]
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, [20] Hayundini v. Commission on Elections, [21] Aratea v. Commission on Elections [22] Gonzalez
v.CommissiononElections [23]Jalosjos,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,[24]DelaCruzv.CommissiononElections, [25]andMaruhomv.
COMELEC,[26],thustheMendozaformulationhasbecomesettleddoctrine.
It is clear that what the minority herein is attempting to accomplish is to authorize the COMELEC to rule on the intrinsic
qualifications of petitioner, and henceforth, of every candidate an outcome clearly prohibited by the Constitution and by
theOmnibus Election Code. That this was also the objective of the minority justices in Tecson v. COMELEC should warn us that the
proposaloftheminorityhereinwillresultinthedirectreversalofthesaidcase.
InTecson,theCOMELECcontendeditdidnothavethejurisdictiontoruleonthequalificationofRonaldAllanKelley Poe. The COMELEC
stated that it could only rule that FPJ did not commit material misrepresentation in claiming that he was a naturalborn Filipino citizen,
therebeingsubstantialbasistosupporthisbeliefthathewasthesonofaFilipino.TheCourtupheldthisconclusionoftheCOMELEC,and
inthedispositiveconclusionsportionoftheDecisionheld:
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines,theevidenceonhandstillwouldpreponderateinhisfavorenoughtoholdthathecannotbeheldguiltyofhaving
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunitygiventothepartiestopresenttheir position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation,which,assoruledinRomualdezMarcosvs.COMELEC,must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
TheCourtmadetwoimportantrulingsonthisparticularpoint.First,thatMr.Fornier,thepetitionerintheCOMELECcasetodenyMr.Poe's
CoC,hadtheburdentoprovethatMr.Poecommittedmaterialmisrepresentation.Second,evenassumingthatthepetitionerthereinwas
able to make out a prima facie case of material misrepresentation, the evidence on Mister Poe's side preponderated in favor of the
conclusion that he did not make any material misrepresentation. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in saying that there was no basis to
grant Fornier's Section 78 petition. Mr. Poe, We said, did not have to conclusively establish his naturalborn citizenship
preponderanceofevidencewassufficienttoprovehisrighttobeacandidateforPresident.
ItisabsolutelyoffensivetoOurconceptofdueprocessfortheCOMELECtoinsistonitsowninterpretationofanareaoftheConstitution
that this Court has yet to squarely rule upon, such as the citizenship of a foundling. It was also most unfair of COMELEC to suddenly
impose a previously nonexisting formal requirement on candidatessuch as a permanent resident visa or citizenship itselfto begin the
tollingoftherequireddurationofresidency.Neitherstatutesnorjurisprudencerequirethosematters.COMELECgrosslyactedbeyondits
jurisdictionbyusurpingthepowersofthelegislatureandthejudiciary.
Section78andMaterialMisrepresentation
It must be emphasized that all the decisions of the COMELEC where the Court upheld its denial of a CoC on the basis of an alleged
misrepresentationpertainingtocitizenshipandresidency,werealldenialsonmattersoffactthatwereeitheruncontroverted,orfactual
mattersthatwereproventobefalse.Noneofthemhadtodowithanyquestionoflaw.
Inthefollowingcases,weupheldtheCOMELEC'SdenialoftheCoCs:Labo,Jr.v.COMELEC[27],(Labo'sstatementthathewasanatural
borncitizenwasdisprovedonthegroundthathefailedtosubmitanyevidenceprovinghisreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship)Abellav
.COMELEC[28] (Abella, a candidate for governor of Leyte, and undisputedly a resident of Ormoc City, an independent component city,
failed to establish a new domicile in Kananga, Leyte ) Domino v. Commission on Elections,[29](the lease contract over a residence in
SaranganiProvincefailedtoproducethekindofpermanencynecessarytoestablishabandonmentofone'soriginaldomicile)Caballerov.
Commission on Elections,[30] (petitioner, who had effectively transferred his domicile of choice in Canada, failed to present competent
evidencetoprovethathewasabletoreestablishhisresidenceinUyugan)Jalosjosv.CommissiononElections,[31](Svetlana Jalosjos,
whosedomicileoforiginwasSanJuan,MetroManila,failedtoacquireadomicileofchoiceinBaliangao,MisamisOccidental,priortothe
May2010elections)Aquinov.CommissiononElections,[32](Aquino,whosedomicileoforiginwasSanJose,Concepcion,Tarlac,failedto
establishedanewdomicileintheSecondDistrictofMakatiCityonthemerebasisofaleaseagreementofacondominiumunit)Reyesv.
CommissiononElections[33](wherepetitioner,whopreviouslyadmittedthatshewasaholderofaU.S.passport,failedtosubmitproof
thatshereacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipunderRA9225orthatshemaintainedherdomicileoforiginin Boac, Marinduque ) Dumpit
Michelenav.Boado[34](candidateDumpitMichelenawasnotaresidentofAgoo,LaUnionvoter'sregistrationatNaguilian,LaUnionand
jointaffidavitofallbarangayofficialsofSanJulianWest,Agootakenasproofthatshewasnotaresidentofthebarangay) Hayudini v.
CommissiononElections[35](candidateHayudiniwasnotaresidentofSouthUbian,TawiTawibasedonafinalRTCDecisionordering
thedeletionofHayudini'snameinBarangayBintawlan's permanent list of voters) Velasco v. Commission on Elections[36] (court ruling
that he was not a registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga) Bautista v. Commission on Elections[37] (admission that he was not a
registered voter of Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas where he was running as punong barangay) Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections[38] (admission that he was at the time of the filing of the CoC still a holder of a then valid green card) and Jalosjos v.
CommissiononElections[39](temporaryandintermittentstayinastranger'shousedoesnotamounttoresidence).

In fact, in the only case of material misrepresentation on citizenship where the Supreme Court agreed to a Section 78 denial by the
COMELEC,wasinthecaseofMr.RamonL.Labo,Jr.ofBaguioCity[40]whohadpreviouslybeendeclaredbytheSupremeCourtitselfas
notaFilipinocitizen.[41]IntheLabocase,therewasapriorbindingconclusionoflawthatjustifiedtheactionoftheCOMELECindenying
the CoC.1wphi1 It is important to emphasize this considering the dangers of an overly broad reading of the COMELEC's power under
Section78.
A candidate commences the process of being voted into office by filing a certificate of candidacy (CoC). A candidate states in his CoC,
amongothers,thatheiseligibletorunforpublicoffice,asprovidedunderSection74oftheOmnibusElectionCode.Thus:
Sec.74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncinghis
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post office address for all election purposes his
profession or occupation that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesthat
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretrue
tothebestofhisknowledge.
AsusedinSection74,theword"eligible"meanshavingtherighttorunforelectivepublicofficethatis,havingallthequalificationsand
noneoftheineligibilities.[42]Theremedytoremovefromtheelectoralballot,thenamesofcandidateswhoarenotactuallyeligible,but
whostillstateunderoathintheirCoCsthattheyareeligibletorunforpublicoffice,isforanypersontofileapetitionunderSection78,
whichprovides:
Sec.78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseorto
cancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,
notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasissupplied)
HowLegallySignificantistheIntent
toDeceiveforaSection78OEC
PetitiontoProsper?
It was proposed by Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC that the intent to deceive was never
contemplated as an essential element to prove a Section 78 petition.[43] The problem with this opinion is that it remains a proposed
reversal of a doctrine that remains firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. In a long line of cases, starting with RomualdezMarcos v.
COMELEC[44]in1995,thisCourthasinvariablyheldthatintenttodeceivetheelectorateisanessentialelementforaSection78petition
toprosper.
InRomualdezMarcos,theCourtruledthatitisthefactofthequalification,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacy,whichoughtto
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's qualification requirements. The statement in the
certificateofcandidacybecomesmaterialonlywhenthereisorappearstobeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafact
whichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.[45]
ThisrulingwasadoptedbytheCourtinalonglineofcases,inwhichitwasruledthatasidefromtherequirementofmateriality,apetition
underSection78mustalsoshowthattherewasmaliciousintenttodeceivetheelectorateastothecandidate'squalifications for public
office.
InSalcedoIIv.COMELEC,[46]theCourtaffirmedthedecisionoftheCOMELECdenyingthepetitiontocanceltheCoCfiledbyErmelita
Cacao Salcedo, a candidate for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Apart from finding that the use of the surname "Salcedo" was not a material
qualificationcoveredbySection78,theCourtalsodeclaredthattherewasnointentiononthepartofthecandidatetomisleadordeceive
the public as to her identity. We concluded that, in fact, there was no showing that the voters of the municipality were deceived by
Salcedo'suseofsuchsurnameconsequently,theCOMELECcorrectlyrefusedtocancelherCoC.
Ontheotherhand,inVelascov.COMELEC,[47]WeupheldthecancellationoftheCoCfiledbyNardoVelascobecausehemadeamaterial
misrepresentationastohisregistrationasavoter.InOurdiscussion,WeemphasizedthatVelascoknewthathisregistrationas a voter
hadalreadybeendeniedbytheRTC,buthestillstatedunderoathinhisCoCthathewasavoterofSasmuan.[48]Thiswasconsidered
sufficientbasisfortheCOMELECtogranttheSection78petition.[49]
InJustimbaste v. Commission on Elections,[50] this Court sustained the COMELEC's dismissal of the petition of cancellation filed against
RusticoB.Balderianbecausetherewasnoshowingthathehadtheintenttodeceivethevotingpublicastohisidentitywhenheusedhis
Filipinoname,insteadofhisChinesename,inhisCoC.
On the other hand, in Maruhom v. COMELEC,[51] We upheld the cancellation of the CoC of Jamela Salic Maruhom because she had
subsisting voter registrations in both the municipalities of Marawi and Marantao in Lanao del Sur. We emphasized that Maruhom
deliberatelyattemptedtoconcealthisfactfromtheelectorateasitwouldhaverenderedherineligibletorunasmayorofMarantao.
The element of intent was again required by this Court in MitravCOMELEC. [52]In that case, We reversed the ruling of the COMELEC,
whichcancelledtheCoCfiledbyAbrahamKahlilB.Mitrabecausethecommission"failedtocriticallyconsiderwhetherMitradeliberately
attemptedtomislead,misinformorhideafactthatwouldotherwiserenderhimineligibleforthepositionofGovernorofPalawan."Upon
anexaminationoftheevidenceinthatcase,WeconcludedthattherewasnobasisfortheCOMELEC'sconclusionthatMitradeliberately
attemptedtomisleadthePalawanelectorate.

ThepresenceofintenttodeceivetheelectoratewasalsoacontrollingfactorinthedecisionoftheCourtinPanlaquiv.COMELEC. [53]We
ruled that the decision of the Regional Trial Court to exclude Nardo Velasco as a voter did not result in the cancellation of his CoC for
mayorofSasmuan,Pampanga.SaidthisCourt:
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter's inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the
presenceofafalserepresentationofamaterialfact.Ithasnojurisdictiontotrytheissuesofwhetherthemisrepresentation
relatestomaterialfactandwhethertherewasanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateintermsofone'squalificationsforpublic
office.ThefindingthatVelascowasnotqualifiedtovoteduetolackofresidencyrequirementdoesnottranslateintoafinding
ofadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderhimineligible.
InGonzalesvCOMELEC, [54]theCourtdistinguishedbetweenapetitionforcancellationunderSection78andapetitionforcancellation
underSection68oftheOEC,inordertodeterminewhetherthepetitionfiledagainstRamonGonzaleswasfiledontime.Wedeclaredthat
a Section 78 petition must pertain to a false representation on a material matter that is made with the deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Upon finding these elements in the petition filed against
FernandoV.Gonzales,WeruledthattheapplicableperiodforfilingthepetitionisthatprescribedunderSection78i.e.withintwentyfive
daysfromthefilingoftheCOC.Sincethepetitionwasfiledbeyondthisperiod,thisCourtdeclaredthattheCOMELECerredingivingdue
coursetothesame.
TherequirementofintentwaslikewisereiteratedinTecsonv.COMELEC, [55]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,[56]Fermin v.
CommissiononElections,[57]Arateav.CommissiononElections[58]andTalagav.CommissiononElections.[59]
Ithasbeenclaimed,however,thatthisCourtinTagolinov.HRET,[60]abandonedthisrequisitewhenitstatedthat"deliberatenessofthe
misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's
declaration of a material qualification in the [certificate of candidacy] be false." In that case, the Court, using Miranda v. Abaya[61] as
basis,statedthat:
Inthisrelation,jurisprudenceholdsthatanexpressfindingthatthepersoncommittedanydeliberatemisrepresentationisof
littleconsequenceinthedeterminationofwhetherone'sCoCshouldbedeemedcancelledornot.Whatremainsmaterialisthat
thepetitionessentiallyseekstodenyduecoursetoand/orcanceltheCoConthebasisofone'sineligibilityandthatthesame
begrantedwithoutanyqualification.[62]
Itisimportanttonotethatthestatementregardingintenttodeceivewasonlyanobiterdictum.TheprimaryissueinbothTagolinoand
Mirandaiswhetheracandidatewhosecertificateofcandidacyhadbeendeniedduecourseorcancelledmaybevalidlysubstitutedinthe
electoralprocess.Inotherwords,thecasesdealtwiththeeffectofthedenialofduecourseorcancellationofacertificateofcandidacy,
andnotonthevalidityorsoundnessofthedenialorcancellationitself.
Furthermore,inMiranda,WeclarifiedtheCOMELEC'suseoftheword"disqualified"whengrantingapetitionthatprays for the denial of
duecourseorcancellationofacertificateofcandidacy.ThisCourtsaid:
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98019, it is sufficiently
clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the
matterwhatsoever.Thedisqualificationwassimplyruledoverandabovethegrantingofthespecificprayerfordenialofdue
courseandcancellationofthecertificateofcandidacy.[63]
Clearly,thephrase"noqualification"inMiranda,whichwasessentiallyechoedinTagolino,referredtotherulingoftheCOMELECtogrant
thepetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelthecertificateofcandidacy.Itdidnotrefertothefalserepresentationmadebythecandidate
inhiscertificateofcandidacy.
Atanyrate,afterTagolino,WereiteratedtherequirementofdeceitforaSection78petitiontoprosperinfourmorecases.[64]Ourmost
recentpronouncementsinJaloverv.Osmena,[65]reiteratedthatapetitionunderSection78cannotprosperinasituationwherethe
intent to deceive or defraud is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. Furthermore, the
misrepresentationcannotbetheresultofamereinnocuousmistake,butmustpertaintoamaterialfact.
SaidJusticeArturoD.Brioninthe2014unanimousJaloverv.Osmenadecision:
Separatefromtherequirementofmateriality,afalserepresentationunderSection78mustconsistofadeliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." (citing
Ugdoracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections)Inotherwords,itmustbemadewiththeintentiontodeceivetheelectorateasto
thewouldbecandidate'squalificationsforpublicoffice.InMitrav.COMELEC,weheldthatthemisrepresentationthatSection
78addressescannotbetheresultofamereinnocuousmistake,andcannotexistinasituationwheretheintenttodeceiveis
patentlyabsent,orwherenodeceptionoftheelectorateresults.Thedeliberatecharacterofthemisrepresentationnecessarily
followsfromaconsiderationoftheconsequencesofanymaterialfalsity:acandidatewhofalsifiesamaterialfactcannotrun.
Thus,apetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacyaccordingtotheprevailingdecisionsofthisCourtstillrequires
thefollowingessentialallegations:(1)thecandidatemadearepresentationinthecertificate(2)therepresentationpertainstoamaterial
matterwhichwouldaffectthesubstantiverightsofthecandidate(therighttorunfortheelection)and(3)thecandidatemadethefalse
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderhimineligible.[66]
RomualdezMarcosv.COMELECisagainworthrecalling.[67]Weruledthereinthatitisthefactofthedisqualification,notastatementina
certificateofcandidacywhichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'squalification
requirements.Thestatementinthecertificateofcandidacybecomesmaterialonlywhenthereisorappearstobeadeliberateattemptto
mislead,misinformorhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.[68]

InMitra v. COMELEC,[69]We gave importance to the character of a representation made by a candidate in the certificate of candidacy.
This Court found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it failed to take into account whether there had been a
deliberatemisrepresentationinMitra'scertificateofcandidacy.[70]TheCOMELECcannotsimplyassumethatanerrorinthecertificateof
candidacywasnecessarilyadeliberatefalsityinamaterialrepresentation.[71]
ItmustbeemphasizedthatunderSection78,itisnotenoughthatapersonlackstherelevantqualificationhemusthavealsomadea
false representation of the lack of qualification in the certificate of candidacy.[72]The denial of due course to, or the cancellation of the
certificateofcandidacy,isnotbasedonthelackofqualificationsbutonafindingthatthecandidatemadeamaterialrepresentationthatis
false,whichrelatestothequalificationsrequiredofthepublicofficethecandidateisrunningfor.[73]
ConsideringthatintenttodeceiveisamaterialelementforasuccessfulpetitionunderSection78,aclaimofgoodfaithisavaliddefense.
Misrepresentationmeanstheactofmakingafalseormisleadingassertionaboutsomething,usuallywiththeintenttodeceive.[74]Itisnot
just written or spoken words, but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion.[75]A material misrepresentation is a false
statement to which a reasonable person would attach importance in deciding how to act in the transaction in question or to which the
makerknowsorhasreasontoknowthattherecipientattachessomeimportance.[76]
In the sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act with the intention to gain an advantage by
deceitfullyclaimingpossessionofallthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationswhenthecontraryistrue.
Amaterialmisrepresentationisincompatiblewithaclaimofgoodfaith.Goodfaithencompasses,amongotherthings,anhonestbelief,the
absenceofmaliceandtheabsenceofadesigntodefraudortoseekanunconscionableadvantage.[77]Itimplieshonestyofintentionand
honestbeliefinthevalidityofone'sright,ignoranceofacontraryclaim,andabsenceofintentiontodeceiveanother.[78]
BurdenofProofinSection78Proceedings
Section1,Rule131oftheRevisedRulesonEvidencedefinesburdenofproofas"thedutyofapartytopresentevidenceonthefactsin
issuenecessarytoestablishhisclaim""bytheamountofevidencerequiredbylaw."WhenitcomestoaSection78proceeding,itisthe
petitionerwhohastheburdenofestablishingmaterialmisrepresentationinaCoC.[79]
SincetheCOMELECisaquasijudicialbody,thepetitionermustestablishhiscaseofmaterialmisrepresentationbysubstantialevidence.
[80]Substantialevidenceisthatamountofrelevantevidencewhichareasonablemindmightacceptasadequatetojustifyaconclusion.

Burdenofproofnevershifts.[81]Itistheburdenofevidencethatshifts.[82]Hence,inaSection78proceeding,ifthepetitionercomesup
withaprimafaciecaseofmaterialmisrepresentation,theburdenofevidenceshiftstotherespondent.
Inthiscase,respondentshadtheburdentoestablishthefollowing:(1)falsityoftherepresentationsmadebypetitionerwithregardtoher
citizenshipandresidenceand(2)intenttodeceiveormisleadtheelectorate.
Onresidence
Aswillbefurtherdiscussedbelow,respondentsmainlyreliedontherepresentationthatpetitionerpreviouslymadeinher2012CoCfor
thepositionofSenatortoestablishtherequirementsoffalsityandintenttodeceive.Petitioner,however,hasshownbyanabundanceof
substantialevidencethatherresidenceinthePhilippinescommencedon24May2005andthatthestatementshemadeinthe2012CoC
wasduetohonestmistake.Butrespondentsfailedtomeetheadonthisevidence.Hence,theyfailedtodischargetheirburdenofproving
materialmisrepresentationwithrespecttoresidency.
Furthermore, the COMELEC unreasonably shifted the burden of proof to petitioner, declaring that she had the burden to show that she
possessedthequalificationstorunforPresident.Aspreviouslydiscussed,respondentshadtheburdentoestablishthekeyelementsfora
Section78petitiontoprosper.
Oncitizenship
Withrespecttotheissueofcitizenship,respondentsleanedheavilyonpetitioner'sadmissionthatshewasafoundling.Nevertheless,this
didnotestablishthefalsityofpetitioner'sclaimthatshewasanaturalborncitizen.Presumptionsoperatedprofoundlyinherfavortothe
effectthatafoundlingisanaturalborncitizen.Further,shehadarighttorelyontheselegalpresumptions,thusnegatingthenotionof
deceptiononherpart.Thus,respondentsfailedtodischargetheirburdenofprovingmaterialmisrepresentationwithrespecttoresidency.
Yet, the COMELEC unfairly placed the burden of proof on petitioner when, for reasons already discussed, the onus properly fell on
respondents.Thispointwillbemorecomprehensivelydiscussedbelow.
III.
TheCOMELECactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitcancelledpetitioner's2016CertificateofCandidacyinthe
absenceofanymaterialmisrepresentationonresidencyorcitizenship.
Inmyview,thefactthattheCOMELECwentbeyondanexaminationofthepatentfalsityoftherepresentationsintheCoCisenoughto
demonstrateitsgraveabuseofdiscretion.ImaintainthataSection78proceedingmustdealsolelywith"patentdefectsinthecertificates"
andnotthequestionofeligibilityorineligibility.ThecommissionclearlyexceededthelimitedauthoritygrantedtoitunderSection78of
theOECwhenitdeterminedpetitioner'sintrinsicqualifications,notonthebasisofanyuncontrovertedfact,butonquestionsoflaw.
With this conclusion, the Court already has sufficient justification to reverse and set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
Consequently,Ibelievethatitisnolongernecessaryforustodecidequestionspertainingtopetitioner'squalifications.
However,giventhefactualmilieuofthiscaseanditssignificancetotheupcomingelectoralexercise,Iamlikewisemindfulofthedutyof
the Court to allay the doubts created by the COMELEC ruling in the minds of the voting public. Furthermore, the dissents have already
gone to the intrinsic qualification of petitioner as to cast doubt on her viability as a candidate. These positions must be squarely
addressedhencethisextendedopinionisinevitable.

GraveAbuseofDiscretion
InMitrav.COMELEC,[83]thisCourtheldthatCOMELEC'suseofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsintheresolutionofanissueconstitutes
graveabuseofdiscretion:
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction"theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasion
ofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethe
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enoughitmustbegrave.Wehaveheld,too,thattheuseofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissue
issufficienttotaintadecisionmaker'sactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petitionisthecondition,underSection5,Rule64oftheRulesofCourt,
thatfindingsoffactoftheCOMELEC,supportedbysubstantialevidence,shallbefinalandnonreviewable.Substantialevidence
isthatdegreeofevidencethatareasonablemindmightaccepttosupportaconclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciationandevaluationofevidence.AnymisstepbytheCOMELECinthisregardgenerallyinvolvesanerrorofjudgment,
notofjurisdiction.(Emphasissupplied)

Forreasonsdiscussedbelow,IfindthattheCOMELECcommittedagrosslyunreasonableappreciationofboththeevidencepresentedby
petitioner to prove her residency, as well the legal standards applicable to her as a foundling. For purposes of clarity, I will discuss
residencyandcitizenshipseparately.
InSabili,[84]wenotedthattheCourtdoesnotordinarilyreviewtheCOMELEC'sappreciationandevaluationofevidence.However,when
theappreciationandevaluationofevidenceissogrosslyunreasonableastoturnintoanerrorofjurisdiction,theCourtisdutyboundto
intervene. In that case, petitioner was able to show that the COMELEC relied on wrong or irrelevant considerations like property
ownershipinanothermunicipalityindecidingtheissueofwhetherpetitionermadeamaterialmisrepresentationregardinghisresidence.
IV.
A.ONRESIDENCY
TheCOMELECmadetwofindingsasfaraspetitioner'scompliancewiththe10yearresidencyrequirementisconcerned.First,petitioner
committedafalsematerialrepresentationregardingherresidencyinher2016CoCforPresident,asshownbyherdeclarationinher2013
CoCforsenator.Second,petitioner'saliencitizenshipatthetimesheallegedlyabandonedherdomicileintheUSwasalegalimpediment
whichpreventedherfromreestablishingherdomicileinthePhilippines,consideringherfailuretoobtainanauthorizationfromtheBureau
ofImmigrationaspermanentresidentinthecountryearlyenoughtostartthecountofthe10yearresidencyrequirement.
These conclusions reveal the failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate and evaluate evidence, so much so that it overstepped the
limitsofitsdiscretiontothepointofbeinggrosslyunreasonable.
Therewasnodeliberateintentonthe
partofpetitionertomakeamaterial
misrepresentationastoherresidency.
IntheassailedResolutions,theCOMELEChadconcludedthatpetitionercommittedafalsematerialrepresentationaboutherresidencyin
her 2016 CoC for president on the basis of her declaration in her 2013 CoC for senator. According to the Commission, this 2012
declarationshowedadeliberateintenttomisleadtheelectorateandthepublicatlarge.
Publicrespondent'sconclusionsareunjustified.Inthefirstplace,theCOMELECmisappliedtheconceptsofadmissionsandhonestmistake
inweighingtheevidencepresentedbypetitioner.Aswillbediscussedbelow,declarationsagainstinterestarenotconclusiveevidenceand
must still be evaluated to determine their probative value. Neither does the declaration in her 2013 CoC foreclose the presentation of
evidence of petitioner's good faith and honest belief that she has complied with the 10year residency requirement for presidential
candidates.
AdmissionsagainstInterest
AdmissionsagainstinterestaregovernedbySection26,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,whichprovides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
againsthim.
Itiswelltoemphasizethatadmissionsagainstinterestfallundertherulesofadmissibility.[85]Admissionsagainstinterestpassthetestof
relevanceandcompetence.They,however,donotguaranteetheirownprobativevalueandconclusiveness.Likeallevidence,theymust
beweighedandcalibratedbythecourtagainstallotherpiecesathand.Also,apartyagainstwhomanadmissionagainstinterestis
offeredmayproperlyrefutesuchdeclarationbyadducingcontraryevidence.[86]
To be admissible, an admission must (1) involve matters of fact, and not of law (2) be categorical and definite (3) be knowingly and
voluntarily made and (4) be adverse to the admitter' s interests,otherwiseitwouldbeselfservingandinadmissible.[87] An admission
against interest must consist of a categorical statement or document pertaining to a matter of fact. If the statement or document
pertainstoaconclusionoflawornecessitatespriorsettlementofquestionsoflaw,itcannotberegardedasanadmission
againstinterest.[88]
Even a judicial admission, which does not require proof, for judicial admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court[89] But
eventhen,contraryevidencemaybeadmittedtoshowthattheadmissionwasmadethroughpalpablemistake.InBitongv.CA,[90]the

Courtruledthatalthoughactsorfactsadmittedinapleadingdonotrequireproofandcannolongerbecontradicted,evidencealiundecan
bepresentedtoshowthattheadmissionwasmadethroughpalpablemistake.SaidtheCourt:
A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent
inconsistency, and it is competent for the party against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were
inadvertentlymadeorweremadeunderamistakeoffact.Inaddition,apartyagainstwhomasingleclauseorparagraphofa
pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph
offeredbytheadversary.
Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit,
modifyordestroyitseffectontheotherside.Thereasonforthisis,wherepartofastatementofapartyisusedagainsthimas
anadmission,thecourtshouldweighanyotherportionconnectedwiththestatement,whichtendstoneutralizeorexplainthe
portionwhichisagainstinterest.
Inotherwords,whiletheadmissionisadmissibleinevidence,itsprobativevalueistobedeterminedfromthewholestatement
andothersintimatelyrelatedorconnectedtherewithasanintegratedunit.[91]
COMELECConclusionsonAdmission
againstInterest
IntheResolutiondated1December2015oftheSecondDivisioninSPANo.15001(Elamparov.Llamanzares),the COMELEC ruled as
follows:
Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial Elections. In her COC for Senator, she answered "6 years and 6
months" in the space provided for the candidate's period of residence in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration,
respondentadmittedunderoaththatshehasbeenaresidentofthecountryonlysinceNovember2006.
Undeniably,thisfallsshortby6monthsoftherequiredMay2006commencementoftheresidenceinthePhilippinesinorder
forrespondenttoqualifyasacandidateforPresidentofthePhilippinesintheMay9,2016elections.Ifwereckonherperiodof
residency from November 2006, as she herself declared, she will be a resident of the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a
periodof9yearsand6months.
Ascorrectlypointedoutbypetitioner,thisswornstatementbyrespondentisanadmissionagainstherinterest.
Section26,Rule130,RulesofCourt(whichisofsuppletoryapplication)expresslystates:
Section26.Admissionofaparty.Theact,declarationoromissionofapartyastoarelevantfactmaybegivenin
evidenceagainsthim.
TherationalefortherulewasexplainedbytheSupremeCourtinManilaElectricCompanyv.HeirsofSpousesDionisioDeloy:
Beinganadmissionagainstinterest,thedocumentsarethebestevidencewhichaffordsthegreatestcertaintyofthe
factsindispute.Therationalefortheruleisbasedonthepresumptionthatnomanwoulddeclareanythingagainst
himselfUNLESSSUCHDECLARATIONWASTRUE.Thus,itisfairtopresumethatthedeclarationcorrespondsto
thetruth,anditishisfaultifitdoesnot.
Respondent'srepresentationinherCOCforSenatorthatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodof6yearsand
6 months by May 2013 is an admission that is binding on her. After all, she should not have declared it under oath if such
declarationwasnottrue.
Respondent'sconvenientdefensethatshecommittedanhonestmistakeonadifficultquestionoflaw,whenshestatedinher
COCforSenatorthatherperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013was6yearsand6months,isatbestself
serving.Itcannotoverturntheweightgiventotheadmissionagainstinterestvoluntarilymadebyrespondent.
Assumingarguendothatasnowbelatedlyclaimedthesamewasduetoanhonestmistake,noevidencehasbeenshownthat
therewasanattempttorectifythesocalledhonestmistake.TheattempttocorrectitinherpresentCOCfiledonlyonOctober
15,2015cannotservetooutweightheprobativeweightthathastobeaccordedtotheadmissionagainstinterestinher2013
COCforSenator.
Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, under oath at that, that she has been a
residentofthePhilippinessinceNovember2006stillstandsintherecordofthisCommissionasanofficialdocument,which
maybegiveninevidenceagainsther,andtheprobativeweightandbindingeffectofwhichisneitherobliteratedbythepassing
of time nor by the belated attempt to correct it in her present COC for President of the Philippines. Respondent cannot now
declareanearlierperiodofresidence.Respondentisalreadystoppedfromdoingso.Ifallowedtorepudiateatthislatestage
her prior sworn declaration, We will be opening the floodgates for candidates to commit material misrepresentations in their
COCsandescaperesponsibilityforthesamethroughthemereexpedientofconvenientlychangingtheirstoryinasubsequent
COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate to run for President when the COC for Senator earlier submitted to the
Commissioncontainsamaterialfactordatabarringherfromrunningforthepositionshenowseekstobeelectedto.Surely,to
ruleotherwisewouldbetotolerateacavalierattitudetotherequirementofputtinginthecorrectdatainaCOC.Infact,the
COCfiler,inthatsameCOC,certifiesunderoaththatthedatagivenareindeed"trueandcorrect".
As shown by the abovecited Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division regarded the declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of
candidacyforsenatorthatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesonlysinceNovember2006asabindingandconclusivestatement
thatshecannolongerrefute.Itappearedtoconfuseadmissionsagainstinterestwithjudicialadmissions.
However,intheResolutiondated23December2015oftheEnBanc,COMELECconcededthatsuchstatementmayindeedbeovercomeby
petitionerthroughthepresentationofcompetentevidenceofgreaterweight.AccordingtotheCOMELECEnBanc:

OntheallegationthattheSecondDivisionchosetorelysolelyonthedeclarationsofrespondentinher2013COC:wearenot
persuaded. Again, the Second Division was not constrained to mention every bit of evidence it considered in arriving at the
assailedResolution.Concededly,however,itdidputampleattentiononRespondent's2013COC,butnotwithoutgoodreason.
Torecall,Respondent,inher2013COCforSenator,indicated,underoath,thatherperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesfrom
May13,2013is"6yearsand6months."Followingthis,shebecamearesidentonNovember2006.Thisisentirelyinconsistent
with her declaration in the present 2016 COC for president that immediately before the May 9, 2016 elections, she will be a
resident of the country for "10 years and 11 months," following which she was a resident since May, 2005. The Second
Divisionstruckrespondent'sargumentsmainlyonthebasisofthiscontradiction.
Respondent cannot fault the Second Division for using her statements in the 2013 COC against her. Indeed, the Second
Divisioncorrectly found that this is an admission against her interest. Being such, it is "the best evidence which affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anythingagainsthimselfunlesssuchdeclarationwastrue.Thus,itisfairtopresumethatthedeclarationcorrespondswiththe
truth,anditishisfaultifitdoesnot."
Moreover, a COC, being a notarial document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict the facts stated
therein, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. In order for a declarant to
impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial
document. After executing an affidavit voluntarily wherein admissions and declarations against the affiant's own interest are
madeunderthesolemnityofanoath,theaffiantcannotjustbeallowedtospurnthemandundowhathehasdone.
Yes,thestatementinthe2013COC,albeitanadmissionagainstinterest,maylaterbeimpugnedbyrespondent.However,she
cannot do this by the mere expedient of filing her 2016 COC and claiming that the declarations in the previous one were
"honestmistakes".Theburdenisuponhertoshow,byclear,convincingandmorethanpreponderantevidence,that,indeed,it
isthelatterCOCthatiscorrectandthatthestatementsmadeinthe2013COCweredonewithoutbadfaith.Unfortunatelyfor
respondent,shefailedtodischargethisheavyburden.
Asshownbytheforegoing,theCOMELECenbanchada proper understanding of an admission against interest that it is one piece of
evidencethatshouldbeevaluatedagainstallotherpiecespresentedbeforeit.
TheCOMELECwaswrong,however,inrulingthatpetitionerattemptedtoovercometheallegedadmissionagainstinterestmerelybyfiling
her2016CoCforpresident.Petitionersubmittedseveredvariousmanyandvariedpiecesofevidencetoproveherdeclarationinher2016
certificateofcandidacyforpresidentthatasofMay2005,shehaddefinitelyabandonedherresidenceintheUSandintended to reside
permanentlyinthePhilippines.Theyarethefollowing:
1.Petitioner'sUSpassportshowingthatshereturnedtothePhilippineson24May2005andfromthenwouldalwaysreturntothe
Philippinesaftereverytriptoaforeigncountry.
2. Email exchanges showing that as early as March 2005, petitioner had begun the process of relocating and reestablishing her
residenceinthePhilippinesandhadallofthefamily'svaluablemovablepropertiespackedandstoredforshippingtothePhilippines.
3.Schoolrecordsofpetitioner'sschoolagedchildrenshowingthattheybeganattendingPhilippineschoolsstartingJune2005.
4.IdentificationcardissuedbytheBIRtopetitioneron22July2005.
5. Condominium Certificate of Title covering a unit with parking slot acquired in the second half of 2005 which petitioner's family
usedasresidencependingthecompletionoftheirintendedpermanentfamilyhome.
6. Receipts dated 23 February 2006 showing that petitioner had supervised the packing and disposal of some of the family's
householdbelongings.
7.ConfirmationofreceiptoftherequestforchangeofaddresssentbytheUSPostalServiceon28March2006
8.FinalsettlementofthesellingofthefamilyhomeintheUSasof27April2006.
9.TransferCertificateofTitledated1June2006showingtheacquisitionofavacantlotwherethefamilybuilttheirfamilyhome.
10.QuestionnaireissuedbytheUSDepartmentofStateBureauofConsularAffairsregardingthepossiblelossofUScitizenship,in
whichpetitioneransweredthatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinessinceMay2005.
11. Affidavits of petitioner's mother and husband attesting to the decision of the family to move to the Philippines in early 2005
shortlyafterthedeathofpetitioner'sfather.
Unfortunately,theCOMELECEnBancfoundthatthesepiecesofevidencefailedtoovercometheprobativeweightoftheallegedadmission
against interest. According to the COMELEC, the discrepancy between petitioner's 2013 and 2016 certificates of candidacy only goes to
showthatshesuitsherdeclarationsregardingherperiodofresidencyinthePhilippineswhenitwouldbetoheradvantage.Hence,her
deliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhidethefactofherineligibilityinsofarasresidencyisconcerned.
The statement that she would be a resident of the Philippines for six years and six months as of May 2013 (reckoned from November
2006) in her 2013 certificate of candidacy was admittedly made under oath. However, while notarized documents fall under the
categoryofpublicdocuments,[92] they are not deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[93] Section 23, Rule
132oftheRulesofCourtstates:
Sec.23.Publicdocumentsasevidence.Documentsconsistingofentriesinpublicrecordsmadeintheperformanceofaduty
byapublicofficerareprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated.Allotherpublicdocumentsareevidence,evenagainsta
thirdperson,ofthefactwhichgaverisetotheirexecutionandofthedateofthelatter.

Clearly, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date stated therein.[94] They
requirenofurtherprooftobeadmissible,becausethecertificateofacknowledgementservesastheprimafacieevidenceofitsexecution.
[95]

Thuswhilepetitioner's2013certificateofcandidacymaybepresentedasproofofitsregularityanddueexecution,itisnotprimafacie
evidenceofthefactsstatedtherein,i.e.thedeclarationthatsheessentiallybecamearesidentofthePhilippinesonlyinNovember2006.
Furthermore,whileanotarizeddocumentcarriestheevidentiaryweightconferreduponitwithrespecttoitsdueexecutionandregularity,
evensuchpresumptionisnotabsoluteasitmayberebuttedbyclearandconvincingevidencetothecontrary.[96]
Thus,wherethedocumentoritscontentsareinquestion,thepersonwhoexecutedthesamemaysubmitcontraryevidencetoestablish
the truth of the matter. In this case, petitioner submitted the abovecited pieces of evidence to prove that her 2016 certificate of
candidacydeclaredthetruthaboutherresidenceinthePhilippines,andthatherdeclarationinher2013certificateofcandidacywasthe
resultofanhonestmistake.
HonestMistake
TheCOMELECgavescantconsiderationtopetitioner'sassertionthatshemadeanhonestmistakeinher2013certificateofcandidacyfor
senator.TheCommissionhypothesizedthatifpetitionertrulybelievedthattheperiodofresidencywouldbecountedbackwardsfromthe
dayoffilingtheCoCforSenatorinOctober2012,sheshouldalwaysreckonherresidencyfromApril2006.TheCOMELECobservedthat
theperiodofresidencyindicatedinthe2015CoCforPresidentwasreckonedfromMay2005.TheCOMELECtooktheallegedunexplained
inconsistencyasabadgeofintenttodeceivetheelectorate.
To a malicious mind, the assertions of petitioner are nothing but sinister. Considering the contradicting and inconsistent dates alleged
beforetheCOMELEC,anindiscriminateobservermaybetemptedtothinktheworstanddisbelieveaclaimtothecommonexperienceof
humanmistake.
UnitedStatesv.AhChong, [97]hastaughtgenerationsoflawyersthatthequestionastowhetheronehonestly,ingoodfaith,and
withoutfaultornegligencefellintothemistake,istobedeterminedbythecircumstancesastheyappearedtohimatthe
time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
haveonhismind,informingtheintentuponwhichheacted.
Inthepetitionsbeforeus,petitionerexplainedhermistakeinthefollowingmanner:
5.268. [Petitioner] committed an honest mistake when she stated in her COC for Senator that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
BEFOREMAY13,2013"is"6"yearsand"6"months.
5.268.1. Only a twoyear period of residence in the Philippines is required to qualify as a member of the Senate of the
RepublicofthePhilippines.[Petitioner]sincerelyhadnodoubtthatshehadsatisfiedthisresidencerequirement.Sheeven
accomplishedherCOCforSenatorwithouttheassistanceofalawyer.xxx
5.268.2.Itisnowonderthat[petitioner]didnotknowthattheuseofthephrase"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippines
beforeMay13,2013"inherCOCforSenator,actuallyreferredtotheperiodimmediatelypreceding13May2013,orto
her period of residence on the day right before the 13 May 2013 elections. [Petitioner] therefore interpreted this
phrase to mean her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of COCs in October 2012
(whichistechnicallyalsoaperiod"beforeMay13,2013").
5.268.3. In terms of abandoning her domicile in the U.S.A. and permanently relocating to the Philippines, nothing
significant happened in "November 2006." Moreover, private respondent was not able to present any evidence which
wouldshowthat[petitioner]returnedtothePhilippineswiththeintentiontoresideherepermanentlyonly in November
2006.Thus,therewouldhavebeennologicalreasonfor[petitioner]toreckonthestartofherresidenceinthePhilippines
from this month. Even the COMELEC considered a date other than November 2006 as the reckoning point of
[petitioner's] residence (i.e., August 2006). This date is, of course, not the day [petitioner] established her
domicilein the Philippines. Nonetheless, that even the COMELEC had another date in mind bolsters the fact
that[petitioner]'srepresentationinherCOCforSenatorregardingherperiodofresidencewasbasedonher
honestmisunderstandingofwhatwasaskedofherinItemNo.7ofherCOCforSenator,andthatsheindeed
countedbackwardfromOctober2012(insteadoffrom13May2013).
xxxx
When [petitioner] accomplished her COC for Senator, she reckoned her residence in the Philippines from MarchApril
2006,whichiswhen(toherrecollectionatthetimeshesignedthisCOC)sheandherfamilyhadsubstantiallywoundup
their affairs in the U.S.A. in connection with their relocation to the Philippines. Specifically, March 2006 was when
[petitioner] arrived in the Philippines after her last lengthy stay in the U.S.A., and April 2006 was when she and her
husbandwerefinallyabletoselltheirhouseintheU.S.A.ThemonthofApril2006isalsowhen[petitioner's]husbandhad
resigned from his job in the U.S.A. The period between MarchApril 2006 to September 2012 is around six (6)
yearsandsix(6)months.Therefore,thisistheperiod[petitioner]indicated(albeit,mistakenly)inherCOC
forSenatorasher"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013."
5.268.7. This erroneous understanding of the commencement of her residence in the Philippines, together
with the confusing question in Item No. 7 of her COC for Senator, explains why [petitioner] mistakenly
indicated in that COC that her "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" would be "6"
yearsand"6"months.
5.268.8. [Petitioner] was later advised (only last year, 2015) by legal counsel that the concept of "residence," for
purposesofelectionlaw,takesintoaccounttheperiodwhenshewasphysicallypresentinthePhilippinesstartingfrom24
May 2005, (after having already abandoned her residence in the U.S.A., coupled with the intent to reside in the
Philippines)andnotjusttheperiodafterherU.S.A.residencewassoldandwhenherfamilywasalreadycompleteinthe

country,afterherhusband'sreturn.[Petitioner]'speriodofresidenceinherCOCforSenatorshould,therefore,havebeen
counted.from 24 May 2005, and extended all the way "up to the day before" the 13 May 2013 elections. [Petitioner]
realized only last year, 2015, that she should have stated "7" years and "11" months (instead of "6" years and "6"
months)asherperiodofresidenceinherCOCforSenator.[98](Emphasessupplied)
Toanopenmind,theforegoingexplanationprofferedbypetitionerdoesnotappeartobeconcocted,implausible,ortheproductofmere
afterthought. The circumstances as they appeared to her at the time she accomplished her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator,
withouttheassistanceofcounsel,mayindeedreasonablycausehertofilluptheresidencyitemwiththeanswer"6yearsand6months."
Itdoesnotnecessarilymean,however,thatshehadnotbeenresidinginthePhilippinesonapermanentbasisforaperiodlongerthan
that.
Thefactthatitwasthefirsttimethatpetitionerranforpublicofficethatonlyatwoyearperiodofresidenceinthecountryisrequiredfor
thoserunningassenatorandthattheiteminthecertificateofcandidacyproviding"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,
2013"couldbeopentoaninterpretationdifferentfromthatrequired,shouldhavebeentakenintoconsiderationinappreciatingwhether
petitionermadethesubjectentryhonestly,ingoodfaith,andwithoutfaultornegligence.
Thesurroundingcircumstancesinthiscasedonotexcludethepossibilitythatpetitionermadeanhonestmistake,bothinreckoning her
periodofresidenceinthePhilippinesaswellasdeterminingtheproperendperiodofsuchresidenceatthetime.Thatpetitionerisrunning
forthehighestpublicofficeinthecountryshouldnotbetheonlystandardbywhichweweighheractionsandultimatelyhermistakes.Not
allmistakesaremadewithevilmotives,inmuchthesamewaythatnotallgooddeedsaredonewithpureintentions.Goodfaithisalways
presumed,andinthefaceoftangibleevidencepresentedtoprovethetruthofthematter,whichisindependentofthecircumstancesthat
causedpetitionertomakethatfatefulstatementof"6yearsand6months,"itwouldbedifficulttodismisshercontentionthatsuchisthe
resultofanhonestmistake.
To reiterate, the COMELEC incorrectly applied the rule on admissions in order to conclude that petitioner deliberately
misrepresented her qualificationsnotwithstanding a reasonable explanation as to her honest mistake, and despite the
numerouspiecesofevidencesubmittedtoproveherclaims.
IfpetitionerhonestlybelievedthatshecanreckonherresidencyinthePhilippinesfromMay2005becauseshehadalreadyrelocatedto
the country with the intent to reside here permanently,then her statement in her 2016 certificate of candidacy for president cannot be
deemedtohavebeenmadewithintenttodeceivethevotingpublic.TheCOMELEChasclearlyfailedtoprovetheelementofdeliberate
intenttodeceive,whichisnecessarytocancelcertificatesofcandidacyunderSection78.
In any case, the single declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator cannot be deemed to overthrow the
entiretyofevidenceshowingthatherresidenceinthePhilippinescommencedinMay2005.
Petitionerwasabletoprovethefactof
thereestablishmentofherdomicilein
thePhilippinessinceMay2005.
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution requires that a candidate for president be "a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term residence, as it is used in the 1987 Constitution and previous Constitutions, has been
understoodtobesynonymouswithdomicile.[99]Domicilemeansnotonlytheintentiontoresideinoneplace,butalsopersonalpresence
therein coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[100] It is the permanent home and the place to which one intends to return
wheneverabsentforbusinessorpleasureasshownbyfactsandcircumstancesthatdisclosesuchintent.[101]
Domicile is classified into three: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired at birth by every person and (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person
independentlyofhisresidenceofintention.[102]
Domicile by operation of law applies to infants, incompetents, and other persons under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a
domicileofchoice.[103]Italsoaccruesbyvirtueofmarriagewhenthehusbandandwifefixthefamilydomicile.[104]
A person's domicile of origin is the domicile of his parents.[105] It is not easily lost and continues even if one has lived and maintained
residences in different places.[106] Absence from the domicile to pursue a profession or business, to study or to do other things of a
temporaryorsemipermanentnature,andeventravelsabroad,[107]doesnotconstitutelossofresidence.[108]
Incontrast,immigrationtoaforeigncountrywiththeintentiontolivetherepermanentlyconstitutesanabandonmentofdomicileinthe
Philippines.[109]InordertoqualifytorunforpublicofficeinthePhilippines,animmigranttoaforeigncountrymustwaivesuchstatusas
manifestedbysomeactoractsindependentofanddonepriortothefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy.[110]
Apersoncanhavebutonedomicileatatime.[111] Once established, the domicile remains until a new one is acquired.[112]In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new place, (b) an intention to remain there (animus
manendi),and(c)anintentiontoabandontheformerdomicile(animusnonrevertendi).[113]
Withoutclearandpositiveproofoftheconcurrenceoftheserequirements,thedomicileoforigincontinues.[114]InGallegov.Verra,[115]
weemphasizedwhatmustbeshownbythepersonallegingachangeofdomicile:
Thepurposetoremaininoratthedomicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftime.Theactsofthepersonmustconformwith
hispurpose.Thechangeofresidencemustbevoluntarytheresidenceattheplacechosenforthedomicilemustbeactualandtothefact
ofresidencetheremustbeaddedtheanimusmanendi.[116]
The question of whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the durational
residencyrequirementof10yearsgoesintotheCOMELEC'sappreciationofevidence.InSabiliv.COMELEC,[117]weheldthat:

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC'sappreciation and evaluation of evidence become so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutionaldutytointerveneandcorrecttheCOMELEC'serror.[118]
Sabiliwasaninstanceofgrosslyunreasonableappreciationinevaluationofevidence,verymuchlikethelopsidedevaluationofevidence
oftheCOMELECinthepresentcase.
Further, in Mitra v. COMELEC,[119] we held that COMELEC's use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in the resolution of an issue
constitutesgraveabuseofdiscretion:
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction"theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasion
ofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethe
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enoughitmustbegrave.Wehaveheld,too,thattheuseofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissue
issufficienttotaintadecisionmaker'sactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petitionisthecondition,underSection5,Rule64oftheRulesofCourt,
thatfindingsoffactoftheCOMELEC,supportedbysubstantialevidence,shallbefinalandnonreviewable.Substantialevidence
isthatdegreeofevidencethatareasonablemindmightaccepttosupportaconclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciationandevaluationofevidence.AnymisstepbytheCOMELECinthisregardgenerallyinvolvesanerrorofjudgment,
notofjurisdiction.(Emphasissupplied)
However, before going into a discussion of the evidence submitted by petitioner, a threshold issue must first be resolved: whether
petitioner'sstatusasavisafreebalikbayanaffectedherabilitytoestablishherresidenceinthecountry.Ibelievethatitdidnot.
ThePhilippines'BalikbayanProgram
On31July1973,PresidentMarcosissuedLetterofInstructionsNo.(LOI)105[120]designatingtheperiodfrom1September1973to28
February1974asa"HomecomingSeason"forFilipinosand/ortheirfamiliesanddescendantswhoarenowresidentsorcitizensofother
countries (referred to as overseas Filipinos). Due to its overwhelming success,[121] the Balikbayan Program was extended. This was
furtherenhancedin1974underLOI163.[122]
In 1975, professionals and scientists were targeted in the program by encouraging their return under LOI 210, and then by PD 819.
OverseasFilipinoscientistsandtechnicianswerebeingencouragedtocomehomeandapplytheirknowledgetothedevelopmentprograms
ofthecountry,andtotakeadvantageoftheBalikbayanProgram.ItwasalsodecreedthatanyoverseasFilipinoarrivinginthePhilippines
under the BalikbayanProgramshall be authorized to remain in the country for a period of one year from the date of arrival within the
extendedperiod.
PursuanttothestatedpurposeofLOI210,P.D.819[123]wasissuedon24October1975inrecognitionofthe"needofattractingforeign
based scientists, professionals, or persons with special skill or expertise who are of 'Filipino descent or origin."[124]It was decreed that
these persons, who are licensed to practice their profession, special skill or expertise in their host, adopted or native countries, may
practicetheirprofession,specialskillorexpertisewhilestayinginthePhilippineseitheronatemporaryorpermanentbasis,togetherwith
theirfamiliesuponapprovalbytheSecretaryofHealth.TheyareonlyrequiredtoregisterwiththeProfessionalRegulationCommission,
regardlessofwhetherornottheirspecialskillorexpertisefallswithinanyoftheregulatedprofessionsandvocationsin the Philippines,
and pay the required license fee. They are entitled to all incentives, benefits and privileges granted to or being enjoyed by overseas
Filipinos(balikbayans).
Asameansofattractingmore"returnees,"[125]LOI1044providedforadditionalincentivessuchasattendanceininternational scientific
conferences,seminars,meetingsalongthefieldofexpertisewiththetravelofthereturneesfundedbytheprogramatleastonce
peryear.Also,theyshallhaveprioritytoobtainhousingloansfromGSIS,SSSandDevelopmentBankofthePhilippinestoassure
theircontinuedstayinthecountry.
By virtue of LOI 272A[126], the Balikbayan Program was extended to another period beginning 1 March 1976 to 28 February 1977
featuringthesameincentivesandbenefitsprovidedbyLOI210.Itwasagainextendedto28February1978,[127]to28February1979,
[128]to29February1980,[129]andto28February1981.[130]

On28February1981,PresidentMarcosissuedExecutiveOrderNo.(EO)657extendingtheBalikbayanProgramforoverseasFilipinosfora
periodoffiveyearsbeginning1March1981to28February1986.
ExecutiveOrderNo.(E.O.)130[131]issuedon25October1993byPresidentRamosinstitutionalizedtheBalikScientistProgramunderthe
DepartmentofScienceandTechnology(DOST)butwithdifferentfeatures.ItdefinedaBalikScientistasascienceortechnologyexpert
whoisaFilipinocitizenoraforeignerofFilipinodescent,residingabroadandcontractedbythenationalgovernmenttoreturnandworkin
thePhilippinesalonghis/herfieldofexpertiseforashorttermwithadurationofatleastonemonth(ShortTermProgram)orlongterm
withadurationofatleasttwoyears(LongTermProgram).
ABalikScientistundertheShortTermProgrammaybeentitledtofreeroundtripeconomyairfareoriginatingfromaforeigncountryto
the Philippines by direct route, and grantsinaid for research and development projects approved by the Secretary of Science and
Technology.
A Balik Scientist under the LongTerm Program and returning new graduates from DOSTrecognized science and technology foreign
institutionsmaybeentitledtothefollowingincentives:

1. Free oneway economy airfare from a foreign country to the Philippines, including airfare for the spouse and two minor
dependentsandfreereturntripeconomyairfareaftercompletionoftwoyearsinthecaseofBalikScientists,andthreeyearsinthe
caseofnewgraduates
2. Dutyfree importation of professional instruments and implements, tools of trade, occupation or employment, wearing apparel,
domesticanimals,andpersonalandhouseholdeffectsinquantitiesandoftheclasssuitabletotheprofession,rankorpositionofthe
personsimportingthem,fortheirownuseandnotforbarterorsale,inaccordancewithSection105oftheTariffandCustomsCode
3.Nodollarimportationofmotorvehicles
4.ExemptionfrompaymentoftraveltaxforFilipinopermanentresidentsabroad
5.Reimbursementoffreightexpensesfortheshipmentofacarandpersonaleffects
6.Reimbursementofthefreightexpensesfor21/2tonsvolumeweightforsurfaceshipmentofacarandpersonaleffects,aswellas
excessbaggagenotexceeding20kilogramsperadultand10kilogramsperminordependentwhentravellingbyair
7.Housing,whichmaybearrangedthroughpredeterminedinstitutions
8. Assistance in securing a certificate of registration without examination or an exemption from the licensure requirement of the
ProfessionalRegulationCommissiontopracticeprofession,expertiseorskillinthePhilippines
9.GrantsinaidforresearchanddevelopmentprojectsapprovedbytheSecretaryofScienceandTechnologyand
10.Grantofspecialnonimmigrantvisas[132]underSection47(a)(2)ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamended,after
compliancewiththerequirementstherefor.
R.A.6768,[133]enactedon3November1989,institutedaBalikbayanProgramundertheadministrationoftheDepartmentofTourismto
attractandencourageoverseasFilipinostocomeandvisittheirmotherland.UnderR.A.6768,thetermbalikbayancoversFilipinocitizens
whohavebeencontinuouslyoutofthePhilippinesforaperiodofatleastoneyearFilipinooverseasworkersandformerFilipinocitizens
andtheirfamilywhohadbeennaturalizedinaforeigncountryandcomesorreturnstothePhilippines.
Thelawprovidedvariousprivilegestothebalikbayan:
1.TaxfreemaximumpurchaseintheamountofUS$1,000oritsequivalentinotheracceptableforeigncurrenciesatPhilippineduty
freeshops
2.Accesstoaspecialpromotional/incentiveprogramprovidedbythenationalflagaircarrier
3.VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofoneyearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexceptionofrestrictednationals
4.Traveltaxexemption[134]and
5.Accesstoespeciallydesignatedreceptionareasattheauthorizedportsofentryfortheexpeditiousprocessingofdocuments.
It is emphasized in the law that the privileges granted thereunder shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayanunder
existinglaws,rulesandregulations.
R.A.9174[135]dated7November2002amendedR.A.6768byextendingfurthertheprivilegesofabalikbayantoinclude:
1.KabuhayanshoppingprivilegethroughanadditionaltaxexemptpurchaseinthemaximumamountofUS$2,000oritsequivalent
inPhilippinepesoandotheracceptableforeigncurrencies,exclusivelyforthepurchaseoflivelihoodtoolsatallgovernmentowned
andcontrolled/operateddutyfreeshops
2.Accesstonecessaryentrepreneurialtrainingandlivelihoodskillsprogramsandmarketingassistance,includingthe
balikbayan'simmediatefamilymembers,underthegovernment'sreintegrationprogramand
3.Accesstoaccreditedtransportationfacilitiesthatwillensuretheirsafeandconvenienttrips+uponarrival.
It was again emphasized that the privileges granted shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayanunder existing laws,
rulesandregulations.
BalikbayansarenotMereVisitors
Asshownbytheforegoingdiscussion,theBalikbayanProgram,asconceptualizedfromtheverybeginning,envisionedasystemnotjustof
welcoming overseas Filipinos (Filipinos and/or their families and descendants who have become permanent residents or naturalized
citizensofothercountries)asshorttermvisitorsofthecountry,butmoreimportantly,onethatwillencouragethemtocomehomeand
onceagainbecomepermanentresidentsofthePhilippines.
Notably, the program has no regard at all for the citizenship of these overseas Filipinos. To qualify for the benefits, particularly the
exemptionsfromthepaymentofcustomsdutiesandtaxesonpersonaleffectsbroughthomeandtaxexemptionsforlocalpurchases,all
theyhavetodoisprovetheirdesiretobecomepermanentresidentsofthePhilippines.Thisisdonethroughthesimpleexpedientofthe
presentationoftheofficialapprovalofchangeofresidencebytheauthoritiesconcernedintheirrespectiveforeignhostcountries.
Asoriginallyintendedinthecaseofthebalikscientists,theyarealsowelcometopracticetheirprofession,specialskillorexpertisewhile
stayinginthePhilippineseitherontemporaryorpermanent bases. Again, there was no regard for their citizenship considering that the
program is open to both foreignbased Filipinos and those of Filipino origin or descent, as long as they were licensed to practice their
profession,specialskillorexpertiseintheirhost,adoptedornativecountries.

Therefore,asfarasourimmigrationlawsareconcernedwithregardtobalikbayans,theyandtheirfamiliesmayresideinthePhilippines
either on temporary or permanent bases even though they remain nationals of their host, adopted or native countries. The special
treatmentaccordedtobalikbayansfindsitsrootsinrecognitionoftheirstatusasformerFilipinosandnotasmerealiens.
Further militating against the notion of balikbayans as mere visitors of the country are the privileges accorded to them
underR.A.9174,thecurrentbalikbayanlaw.ItspecificallyprovidesforaKabuhayanshoppingprivilegeforthepurchaseof
livelihood tools as well as access to the necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing
assistanceinaccordancewiththeexistingrulesonthegovernment'sreintegrationprogram.
Livelihoodtoolshavebeendefinedas"instrumentsusedbyhandorbymachinenecessarytoapersoninthepracticeofhisorhertrade,
vocation or profession, such as hand tools, power tools, precision tools, farm tools, tools for dressmaking, shoe repair, beauty parlor,
barbershopandthelike,"[136]aswellasacomputerunitanditsaccessories.
Accesstothereintegrationprogramisoneofthesocialservicesandfamilywelfareassistancebenefits(asidefrominsuranceandhealth
care benefits, loan guarantee fund, education and training benefits and workers assistance and onsite services) that are available, to
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) members.[137] It incorporates community organizing, capabilitybuilding, livelihood
loansandothersocialpreparationssubjecttothepoliciesformulatedbytheOWWABoard.[138]
The reintegration program aims to prepare the OFW in his/her return to Philippine society.[139] It has two aspects. The first is
reintegration preparedness (OnSite) which includes interventions on value formation, financial literacy, entrepreneurial development
training (EDT), technological skills and capacity building.[140] The second is reintegration proper (InCountry) which consists of job
referrals for local and overseas employment, business counselling, community organizing, financial literacy seminar, networking with
supportinstitutionsandsocialpreparationprograms.[141]
As the Philippine government's reintegration manager,[142] the Department of Labor and Employment National Reintegration Center for
OFWs(NRCO)providesthefollowingservices:
1. Develop and support programs and projects for livelihood, entrepreneurship, savings, investments and financial literacy for
returning Filipino migrant workers and their families in coordination with relevant stakeholders, service providers and international
organizations
2. Coordinate with appropriate stakeholders, service providers and relevant international organizations for the promotion,
developmentandthefullutilizationofoverseasFilipinoworkerreturneesandtheirpotentials
3.Institute,incooperationwithothergovernmentagencies concerned, a computerbased information system on returning Filipino
migrantworkerswhichshallbeaccessibletoalllocalrecruitmentagenciesandemployers,bothpublicandprivate
4.ProvideaperiodicstudyandassessmentofjobopportunitiesforreturningFilipinomigrantworkers
5.DevelopandimplementotherappropriateprogramstopromotethewelfareofreturningFilipinomigrantworkers
6.Maintainaninternetbasedcommunicationsystemforonlineregistrationandinteractionwithclients,andmaintainandupgrade
computerbasedservicecapabilitiesoftheNRCO
7. Develop capacitybuilding programs for returning overseas Filipino workers and their families, implementers, service providers,
andstakeholdersand
8.Conductresearchforpolicyrecommendationsandprogramdevelopment.[143]
WhilethereintegrationprogramcoversonlyOFWs,[144]nonOFWbalikbayanscanalsoavailofpossiblelivelihoodtrainingincoordination
withtheDepartmentofTourism,theTechnologyandLivelihoodResourceCenterandothertraininginstitutions.[145]
R.A. 9174 is the government's latest thrust in its consistent efforts in attracting balikbayans to come home to the
Philippines and build a new life here. Notwithstanding our immigration laws, balikbayans may continue to stay in the
Philippinesforthelongtermevenunderavisafreeentry,whichisextendibleuponrequest.[146]
ItmustbeemphasizedthatnoneoftheCourt'spreviousdecisionshaseverlookedattheveryextensiveprivilegesgrantedtoBalikbayan
entrants.
Coquilla,Japzon,Caballero,Jalosjos
andtheBalikbayanProgram
InrulingthatpetitionercanonlybesaidtohavevalidlyreestablishedherresidencyinthePhilippineswhenshereacquiredherPhilippine
citizenship,theCOMELECinvokedtherulinginCoquillav.COMELEC.[147]
InCoquilla,petitionerwasaformernaturalborncitizenandwhoreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshiponNovember10,2000.Hewasnotable
to show by any evidence that he had been a oneyear resident of Oras, Eastern Samar prior to the May 14, 2001 local elections. His
argumentwasthathehadbeenaresidentofthesaidtownfortwoyears,butwasnotabletoshowactualresidenceoneyearfrombefore
thesaidelection.EvidenceshowsonthecontrarythathislasttriptotheUnitedStates,ofwhichhewasaformercitizenwasfromJuly6
to August 5, 2000. The only evidence he was able to show was a residence certificate and his bare assertion to his townmates that he
intended to have himself repatriated. He did not make much of a claim, except to advert to the fulfillment of the required residenceby
cumulatinghisvisitsandactualresidence.WeCourtsaid:
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to
prepareforthemayoraltyelectionsofOrasbysecuringaCommunityTaxCertificateinthatyearandbyconstantlydeclaringto
his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an

alien and a nonresident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an
immigrantvisaunder13ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1948andanImmigrantCertificateofResidence(ICR)andthus
waive his status as a nonresident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No.
473,asamended,or,ifheisaformerPhilippinenational,hemayreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipbyrepatriationorbyanactof
Congress,inwhichcasehewaivesnotonlyhisstatusasanalienbutalsohisstatusasanonresidentalien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20,
1998,October16,1999,andJune23,2000isthestatementPhilippineImmigrationBalikbayaninhis19982008U.S.passport.
AsforhisentryonAugust5,2000,thestampboretheaddedinscriptiongoodforoneyearstay.Under2ofR.A.No.6768(An
Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a
foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visafree entry to the
Philippinesforaperiodofone(1)year(3(c)).Itwouldappearthenthatwhenpetitionerenteredthecountryonthedatesin
question,hedidsoasavisafreebalikbayanvisitorwhosestayassuchwasvalidforoneyearonly.Hence,petitionercanonly
be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a nonresident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern,Samar.
Notethattherecordisbareofanyassertion,unlikeinthecasebeforeUs,thatCoquillahadboughtaresidence,relocatedallhiseffects,
establishedallthenecessitiesofdailylivingtooperationalizetheconceptofactualresidencetoshowresidencefortheminimumperiodof
oneyear.EvenifinfacttheperiodofreckoningforCoquillaweretostartfromhisentryintothecountryon5August2000,itwouldstill
beonlyninemonthsthustherewasnotevenanynecessitytodiscusstheeffectofhishavingbeenclassifiedasaBalikbayanwhenhe
enteredthecountryin1998,1999and2000.
TheCOMELECtriestoassertthatitsinterpretationoftherulinginCoquillawascarriedoverinJapzonv.COMELEC[148]andCaballerov.
COMELEC[149]astobarpetitioner'sclaimsonresidency.TheCOMELECisdeadwrong.
InJapzon,privaterespondentTywasanaturalbornFilipinowholefttoworkintheUSandeventuallybecameanAmericancitizen.On2
October2005,TyreacquiredhisFilipinocitizenshipbytakinghisOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesinaccordancewith
theprovisionsofRepublicActNo.(R.A.)9225.[150]ImmediatelyafterreacquiringhisPhilippinecitizenship,heperformedacts(i.e.applied
for a Philippine passport, paid community tax and secured Community Tax Certificates (CTC) and registered as a voter) wherein he
declared that his residence was at General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. On 19 March 2007, Ty renounced his American citizenship
beforeanotarypublic.Priortothis,however,TyhadbeenbodilypresentinGeneralMacarthur,EasternSamarforamore
thanayearbeforetheMay2007elections.Assuch,theCourtbrushedasidethecontentionthatTywasineligibletorunfor
mayor on the ground that he did not meet the oneyear residency requirement. If anything, Japzon reinforces petitioner's
position.
InCaballero,petitionerwasanaturalbornFilipinowhowasnaturalizedasaCanadiancitizen.On13September2012,petitionertookhis
OathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofRepublicActNo.9225.On 1 October 2012, he
renouncedhisCanadiancitizenship.HefiledhiscertificateofcandidacyformayorofUyugan,Bataneson3October2012.
We ruled that it was incumbent upon petitioner toprove that he made Uyugan, Batanes his domicile of choice upon reacquisitionofhis
Philippine citizenship. Aside from his failure to discharge this burden, the period reckoned from 13 September 2012 to the May 2013
elections is only nine months clearly short of the required oneyear residency requirement for mayoralty candidates. Caballero is thus
clearlynotapplicable.Indeed,itistobenotedthatitisonlyJusticeBrioninhisSeparateConcurringOpinionwhoopinesthatapermanent
residentvisaisrequiredforreestablishmentofdomiciletotakeplace,aviewnotsharedbythemajority.
JusticeBrionneededtostateinhisSeparateConcurringOpinionthatapermanentresidencyvisaisnecessaryforthestartofresidencyfor
electionpurposesispreciselybecausesuchviewisnotfoundinthePonencia,hence,contrariestobelegallyinapplicable.
TherearecategoricalrulingsinU.S.statecourtsthataresquarelyasallfourswiththepetitionbeforeus.InElkinsv.Moreno,[151]aliens
withanonimmigrantvisawereconsideredashavingthelegalcapacitytochangetheirdomiciles.Inreachingthisconclusion,
theUSSupremeCourttookintoaccounttheintentionofCongresswhenitenactedthetermsandrestrictionsforspecificclassesofnon
immigrantsenteringtheUnitedStates:
Although nonimmigrant aliens can generally be viewed as temporary visitors to the United States, the nonimmigrant
classificationisbynomeanshomogeneouswithrespecttothetermsonwhichanonimmigrantenterstheUnitedStates.For
example,Congressexpresslyconditionedadmissionforsomepurposesonanintentnottoabandonaforeignresidenceor,by
implication,onanintentnottoseekdomicileintheUnitedStates.Thus,the1952ActdefinesavisitortotheUnitedStatesas
"analien...havingaresidenceinaforeigncountrywhichhehasnointentionofabandoning"andwhoiscomingtotheUnited
States for business or pleasure. Similarly, a nonimmigrant student is defined as "an alien having a residence in a foreign
countrywhichhehasnointentionofabandoning...andwhoseekstoentertheUnitedStatestemporarilyandsolelyforthe
purposeofpursuing...acourseofstudy...."Seealso(aliensin"immediateandcontinuoustransit")(vesselcrewman"who
intends to land temporarily") (temporary worker having residence in foreign country "which he has no intention of
abandoning").
By including restrictions on intent in the definition of some nonimmigrant classes, Congress must have meant aliens to be
barredfromtheseclassesiftheirrealpurposeincomingtotheUnitedStateswastoimmigratepermanently.xxx.
ButCongressdidnotrestricteverynonimmigrantclass.Inparticular,norestrictionsonanonimmigrant'sintentwereplacedon
aliens admitted under 101(a)(15)(G)(iv). Since the 1952 Act was intended to be a comprehensive and complete code, the
conclusionisthereforeinescapablethat,whereaswiththeG4classCongressdidnotimposerestrictionsonintent,thiswas
deliberate.Congress' silence is therefore pregnant, and we read it to mean that Congress, while anticipating that permanent
immigrationwouldnormallyoccurthroughimmigrantchannels,waswillingtoallownonrestrictednonimmigrantalienstoadopt
theUnitedStatesastheirdomicile.

Underpresentlaw,therefore,wereaG4alientodevelopasubjectiveintenttostayindefinitelyintheUnitedStateshewould
beabletodosowithoutviolatingeitherthe1952Act,theService'sregulations,orthetermsofhisvisa.Ofcourse,shouldaG
4alienterminatehisemploymentwithaninternationaltreatyorganization,bothheandhisfamilywouldlosetheirG4status.
Nonetheless,suchanalienwouldnotnecessarilybesubjecttodeportationnorwouldhehavetoleaveandreenterthecountry
inordertobecomeanimmigrant.[152](Citationsomitted)(Emphasissupplied)
In Toll v. Moreno, [153] the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the ruling in Elkins and held that the ordinary legal standard for the
establishmentofdomicilemaybeusedevenfornonimmigrants:
Ifunderfederallawaparticularindividualmustleavethiscountryatacertaindate,orcannotremainhereindefinitely,thenhe
couldnotbecomedomiciledinMaryland.Anypurportedintenttolivehereindefinitelywouldbeinconsistentwithlaw.Itwould
atmostbeanunrealisticsubjectiveintent,whichisinsufficientunderMarylandlawtoestablishdomicile.
xxxx
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law, itis obvious that nothing inherent in the nature of a G4
visawouldrendertheholderofsuchvisaabsolutelyincapableofestablishingaMarylanddomicile.Assumingthe
correctnessofthedefendant'sassertionthatmostG4visaholderswillleavethiscountry,ifinaparticularcase
one of these individuals is in a minority and, as shown by objective factors, intends for Maryland to be his fixed
place of abode and intends to remain here indefinitely, he will have satisfied the Maryland standard for
establishingdomicileinthisState.
The fact that an alien holds a nonimmigrant visa is thus not controlling. What is crucial in determining whether an alien may lawfully
adoptadomicileinthecountryistherestrictionplacedbyCongressonaspecifictypeofnonimmigrantvisa.Solongastheintended
stay of a nonimmigrant does not violate any of the legal restriction, sufficient animus manendi may be appreciated and
domicilemaybeestablished.
Inthecaseofbalikbayans,thetrueintentofCongresstotreattheseoverseasFilipinosnotasmerevisitorsbutasprospectivepermanent
residentsisevidentfromtheletterofthelaw.Whiletheyareauthorizedtoremaininthecountryforaperiodofonlyoneyearfromtheir
dateofarrival,thelaws,rulesandregulationsundertheBalikbayanProgramdonotforeclosetheiroptionsshouldtheydecidetoactually
settledowninthecountry.Infact,theBalikbayanProgramenvisionsasituationwhereformerFilipinoswouldhavebeenlegallystayingin
the Philippines visafree for more than 36 months.[154] In the case of petitioner Poe, she entered the Philippines visafree under the
Balikbayan program, left for a short while and legally reentered under the same program. This is not a case where she abused any
Balikbayanprivilegebecauseshortlyafterreenteringthecountryon11March2006,[155]sheappliedfordualcitizenshipunderR.A.9225.
Basedontheforegoing,itwasmostunfairforCOMELECtodeclarethatpetitionercouldnothaveacquireddomicileinthe Philippines in
2005 merely because of her status as a balikbayan. Her visa (or lack thereof) should not be the sole determinant of her intention to
reacquireherdomicileinthePhilippines.
CongressitselfwelcomesthereturnofoverseasFilipinoswithoutrequiringanytypeofvisa.Althoughvisafreeentryisforalimitedtime,
the period is extendible and is not conditioned upon the acquisition of a permanent resident visa. Considering that the law allows a
balikbayantostayinthePhilippinesforacertainperiodevenwithoutavisaandtosettlein.thecountryduringthatperiod,thereisno
reason to reject petitioner's intent to reestablish a residence from the date she entered the country. In fact, petitioner's permanent
resettlement,asonemillionsofFilipinowhohadgoneabroad,isanendgoaloftheBalikbayanProgram.
If we were to apply the standard for determining the effect of a visa on the ability of petitioner to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines,theU.S.casesofElkinsv.MorenoandTollv.Moreno,begthequestion:DoesherentryasaBalikbayanrestrictherfromre
establishingherdomicileinthePhilippines?Theanswerwould be a resounding NO, for precisely the legislative policy of the Balikbayan
ProgramistoassistinthereintegrationofformerFilipinocitizenbackintothecountry.TheCourtmustalsonotethatthevisafreeentryis
goodforoneyearandrenewable,eventotheextentofauthorizingtheBalikbayantostaymuchlonger.TheBalikbayanprogramisfully
compatibleandsupportiveofthereestablishmentbyaBalikbayanofherresidenceinhernativeland,herdomicileoforigin.
And this is not a case when petitioner abused the privileges of visafree entry considering that, a year after her relocation, she
immediatelytookstepstoreacquireherPhilippinecitizenship
Petitionerwasabletoprovethatshe
reacquiredherdomicileinthePhilippines
beginningMay2005.
Asdiscussed,thereareonlythreerequisitesforapersontoacquireanewdomicilebychoice:(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenew
domicile (2) an intention to remain there and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[156] In my view, the pieces of evidence
submittedbypetitionersufficientlyprovethatshereestablishedherdomicileinthePhilippinesasearlyasMay2005.
I shall discuss the fulfillment of the requirements in the following order: (1) intention to remain in the new domicile (2) intention to
abandontheolddomicileand(3)bodilyresidenceinthenewdomicile.
IntenttoEstablishaNewDomicile
ToproveherintenttoestablishanewdomicileinthePhilippineson24May2005,petitionerpresentedthefollowingevidence:(1)school
recordsindicatingthatherchildrenattendedPhilippineschoolsstartingJune2005[157](2)Taxpayer'sIdentificationNumber(TIN)Card,
[158]showingthatsheregisteredwithandsecuredtheTINfromtheBIRon22July2005(3)Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs)
[159] and Tax Declarations covering Unit 7F and a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium, 194 Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro

Manila,purchasedinearly2005andservedasthefamily'stemporaryresidence(4)TransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)[160]inthenameof
petitionerandherhusbandissuedon1June2006,coveringaresidentiallotinCorinthianHills,QuezonCityin2006and(5)registration
asavoteron31August2006.

EnrollmentofChildreninLocalSchools
Whetherchildrenareenrolledinlocalschoolsisafactorconsideredbycourtswhenitcomestoestablishinganewdomicile.InFernandez
v.HRET,[161]weusedthisindicium:
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and
abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and
operatedbusinessesinSta.Rosasince2003.TheirchildrenhaveattendedschoolsinSta.Rosaatleastsince2005.xxx
(Emphasissupplied)
InBlount v. Boston,[162]the Supreme Court of Maryland identified location of the school attended by a person's children as one of the
factorsindeterminingachangeofdomicile.Thediscourseisreproducedhere:
Whereactualresidenceand/orplaceofvotingarenotsoclearortherearespecialcircumstancesexplainingparticularplaceof
abodeorplaceofvoting,courtwilllooktomyriadofotherfactorsindecidingperson'sdomicile,suchaspayingoftaxesand
statementsontaxreturns,ownershipofproperty,whereperson'schildrenattendschool,addressatwhichpersonreceives
mail,statementsastoresidencyincontracts,statementsonlicensesorgovernmentaldocuments,wherepersonalbelongings
are kept, which jurisdiction's banks are utilized, and any other facts revealing contact with one or the other jurisdiction.[163]
(Emphasissupplied)
Thefactthatpetitioner'schildrenbegantheirschoolinginthePhilippinesshortlyaftertheirarrivalinthecountryinMay2005isnolonger
indispute.InitsComment,theCOMELECnotedthisasoneofthefacts"dulyproven"bypetitioner.[164]By"dulyproven,"theCOMELEC
explainedduringtheoralargumentsthatthetermmeantthatdocumentaryproofsubstantiatedthepertinentallegation:
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Allright.Letmeturnyourattentiontopage56oftheCOMELECComment.Itsays,"theCOMELECnotedthefollowingfactsas
duly proven by the petitioner. Petitioner's children arrived in the Philippines during the latter half of 2005. Shortly after their
arrival, petitioner's children began their schooling in the country. Petitioner purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City
during the second half of 2005. Petitioner and husband started the construction of their house in 2006. Petitioner and her
husband informed the U.S. Postal Service in 2006 of their abandonment of their U. S. Address." What does the commission
meanwhenitsaysthatthesefactsaredulyproven?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Your Honor please, the proceeding before the commission was summary. There was a preliminary conference, submission of
exhibits, stipulations, comparison between the originals and the photocopies, and offer of evidence. We considered these
facts as noncontroverted in the sense that they are covered by documentary proof, Your Honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
AcquisitionofaNewResidence
TheCOMELEC,initsComment,foundthefollowingfactstobedulyproven:thatpetitionerpurchasedacondominiumunitinSanJuanCity
duringthesecondhalfof2005,andthatpetitionerandherhusbandstartedtheconstructionoftheirhouseinCorinthianHillsin2006.[165]
ThatpetitionerpurchasedtheresidentiallotinCorinthianHillsisnotupfordebate.Takentogether,thesefactsestablishanotherindicium
ofpetitioner'sestablishmentofanewdomicileinthePhilippines.
Ourveryownjurisdictiontreatsacquisitionofresidentialpropertyasafactorindicatingestablishmentofanewdomicile.Takethe2012
caseofJalosjosv.COMELEC,[166]inwhichweheldthatRommelJalosjosacquiredanewdomicileinZamboangaSibugay:
Jalosjos presented the affidavits of nextdoor neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These
adjoining neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence than his
otherneighbors,whoseaffidavitsErasmopresented,whojustsporadicallypassedbythesubjectresidence.Further,itisnot
disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro,
Naga,ZamboangaSibugay.Heshowedcorrespondenceswithpoliticalleaders,includinglocalandnationalpartymates,from
where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
Sibugay.(Emphasissupplied)
IthasbeenarguedthattheacquisitionofatemporarydwellinginGreenhills,thepurchaseofaresidentiallotinCorinthianHills,andthe
eventualconstructionofahouseinthelatterplacedonotindicateanintentonthepartofpetitionertostayinthecountryforgood.The
2013caseofJalosjosv.COMELEC[167]hasbeencitedtosupportthisconclusion,aswepurportedlyheldinthatcasethatownershipofa
house"doesnotestablishdomicile."
ThisreadingofJalosjosisnotaccurate.BynomeansdidJalosjosruleout ownership of a house or some other property as a factor for
establishinganewdomicile.Toappreciatethestatementinitspropercontext,therelevantdiscussioninJalosjosisquotedbelow:
Assumingthattheclaimofpropertyownershipofpetitioneristrue,Fernandezv.COMELEChasestablishedthattheownership
of a house or some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has
failedtoestablishherbodilypresenceinthelocalityandherintenttostaythereatleastayearbeforetheelections,towit:
Touseownershipofpropertyinthedistrictasthedeterminativeindiciumofpermanenceofdomicileorresidenceimpliesthat
the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirementtotherighttoholdpublicoffice,whichpropertyrequirementwouldbeunconstitutional.(Emphasissupplied)
Ascanbeseenfromthequoteddiscourse,thecasedidnotthrowoutownershipofahouseasafactorfordeterminingestablishmentofa
newdomicile.Rather,itdiscardedownershipofahouseasacontrollingfactorfordeterminingestablishmentofanewdomicile.

Even US courts consider acquisition of property as a badge of fixing a new domicile.[168] In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC,
[169]theSupremeCourtofMississippiusedacquisitionofanewresidenceasafactorfordeterminingtransferofdomicile.Inthatcase,

William Stone sought the Democratic Party nomination for Senate District 10, a district covering parts of Marshall County, including
Stone's home in Holly Springs. Hale argued that Stone was not eligible to run for that office because he did not meet the twoyear
residencyrequirement.Specifically,HalearguedthatStonecouldnotbearesidentofMarshallCountybecauseStone.hadnotabandoned
hisdomicileinBentonCounty.HehadmovedtoHollySpringsinOctober2013.
TheMississippiSupremeCourtruledthatStonehadproventhatheestablishedhisdomicileinMarshallCounty.Itrelied,amongothers,on
acquisitionofahomeinthenewdomicileasafactor:
ToprovehispositionthathehadchangedhisdomicilefromBentonCountytoMarshallCounty,Stoneprovidedanabundance
ofevidence.InOctober2013,Stonerentedahouseat305PeelLaneinHollySprings,thecountyseatofMarshallCounty,and
he obtained utility service for the home. In July 2014, he bought a home at 200 Johnson Park in Holly Springs.
Furthermore, he notified the Senate comptroller about his change of address, and the comptroller sent an email to every
memberoftheSenateinformingthemofthechange.
xxxx
We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations, the acts of purchasing a home and
longcontinued residency are circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin and to
establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these factors, the circuit court did not err in determining that
Stone'sdomicilehasexistedinMarshallCountysinceOctoberof2013.(Emphasessuppliedandcitationsomitted)
SecuringaTaxpayer'sIdentification
Number(TIN)Card
InhisCommentOppositiontothePetitionforCertiorari in G.R. No. 221698700, private respondent Valdez positedthatsecuringaTIN
doesnotconclusivelyestablishpetitioner'sanimusmanendiinthePhilippines.[170]Hereasonsthatanyperson,evenanonresident,can
secureaTIN.Onthismatter,Imustagreewithhim.
Indeed,the1997TaxCodemandatesallpersonsrequiredunderourtaxlawstorenderorfileareturntosecureaTIN.[171] This would
includeanonresidentsolongasheorsheismandatedbyourtaxlawstofileareturn,statementorsomeotherdocument.[172]Itisthus
correcttosaythataTINCarddoesnotconclusivelyevincethenotionthatpetitionerisaresidentofthePhilippines.
Nevertheless, the significance of the TIN Card lies in the fact that it lists down the address of petitioner as No. 23 Lincoln St. West
Greenhills, the very same address of her mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, as reflected in the latter's affidavit.[173]Therefore, the TIN Card,
whichwasissuedon22July2005,corroboratestheassertionthatpetitioner,uponherarrivalin2005,wasthenstayingathermother's
home.
RegistrationasVoter
Petitionerregisteredasavoteron31August2006.Thisspeaksloudlyoftheintenttoestablishadomicileinthecountry.InHalev.State
of Mississippi Democratic EC,[174]the Supreme Court of Mississippi considered registering to vote as a factor indicative of the intent to
acquire a new domicile. More importantly, Oglesby v. Williams treats voter registration as one of the two most significant indicia of
acquisitionofanewdomicile.TheOglesbydiscussionisinformative:
ThisCourt'slongstandingviewondeterminingaperson'sdomicilewasstatedinRoberts,wheretheCourtwrote:
Thewordsresideorresidentmeandomicileunlessacontraryintentisshown.Apersonmayhaveseveralplacesofabodeor
dwelling,buthecanhaveonlyonedomicileatatime.Domicilehasbeendefinedastheplacewithwhichanindividualhasa
settled connection for legal purposes and the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and
principal establishment, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he has, whenever he is
absent, the intention of returning. The controlling factor in determining a person's domicile is his intent. One's domicile,
generally,isthatplacewhereheintendstobe.Thedeterminationofhisintent,however,isnotdependentuponwhathesays
ataparticulartime,sincehisintentmaybemoresatisfactorilyshownbywhatisdonethanbywhatissaid.Onceadomicileis
determinedorestablishedapersonretainshisdomicileatsuchplaceunlesstheevidenceaffirmativelyshowsanabandonment
ofthatdomicile.Indecidingwhetherapersonhasabandonedapreviouslyestablisheddomicileandacquiredanewone,courts
will examine and weigh the factors relating to each place. This Court has never deemed any single circumstance conclusive.
However, it has viewed certain factors as more important than others, the two most important being where a
personactuallylivesandwherehevotes.Whereapersonlivesandvotesatthesameplacesuchplaceprobably
willbedeterminedtoconstitutehisdomicile.Wherethesefactorsare not so clear, however, or where there are special
circumstances explaining a particular place of abode or place of voting, the Court will look to and weigh a number of other
factorsindecidingaperson'sdomicile.
Furthermore, this Court has stated that the place of voting is the "highest evidence of domicile." ("the two most
importantelementsindeterminingdomicilearewhereapersonactuallylivesandwherehevotes")("Evidencethataperson
registered or voted is ordinarily persuasive when the question of domicile is at issue," quoting Comptroller v. Lenderking).
Furthermore,actualresidence,coupledwithvoterregistration,"clearlycreate[s]apresumptionthat[theperson]
wasdomiciled" there. ("[w]here the evidence relating to voting and the evidence concerning where a person actuallylives
bothclearlypointtothesamejurisdiction,itislikelythatsuchplacewillbedeemedtoconstitutetheindividual'sdomicile").In
other words, the law presumes that where a person actually lives and votes is that person's domicile, unless special
circumstancesexplainandrebutthepresumption.(Citationsomitted)(Emphasessupplied)
This Court, too, shares this reverence for the place of voting as an evidence of domicile. In Templeton v. Babcock, [175] we held as
follows:

ThefindingofthetrialcourttotheeffectthatthedeceasedhadacquiredadomicileintheStateofCaliforniaisinouropinion
baseduponfactswhichsufficientlysupportsaidfinding.Inparticular,weareoftheopinionthatthetrialcourtcommittedno
errorinattachingimportancetothecircumstancethatthedeceasedhadvotedinCaliforniaelections.
Though not of course conclusive of acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an important circumstance and, where the
evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship,
and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he lives more than in the act of
voting.(Emphasissupplied)
Insum,theevidenceofpetitionersubstantiatesherclaimoftheintenttoestablishanewdomicileinthecountry.Theenrollmentofher
children in local schools since 2005, the family's temporary stay in her mother's home followed by the purchase of the Greenhills
condominiumunitandthesubsequentestablishmentoftheCorinthianHillsfamilyhome,theregistrationofpetitionerasavoterandthe
issuance1ofaTINCardinherfavor,collectivelydemonstratetheconclusionthatshehasestablishedanincrementaltransferofdomicile
inthecountry.
Respondent Valdez, however, points out that petitioner currently maintains two residential properties in the US, one purchased in 1992
andtheotherin2008.[176]Accordingtohim,thisisinconsistentwithanimusmanendi.
Thisargumentdisregardsoverwhelmingevidenceshowingthatpetitionerintendedtoestablishanewdomicileinthecountry. Petitioner
has uprooted her family from Virginia, US to Manila, enrolled her children soon after her arrival in the Philippines, acquired residential
propertiesinthenewdomicileoneofwhichnowservesasthecurrentfamilyhomeandregisteredasavoter.Thesefactorsallpointto
onedirection:petitionerisinthecountryandisheretostay.Wecannotdisregardthesefactors,allofwhichestablishanexustothenew
domicile,becauseofasolitaryfact:theretentionoftworesidentialhousesintheUS.Tobesure,itisdifficulttojustifyaconclusionwhich
considers only one contact in the old domicile and ignores many significant contacts established by the removing person in the new
domicile.
Moreover,petitioneronlyadmitted[177]thatsheownsthetwohouses.Sheneveradmittedthatsheresidesinanyofthem.Atbest,what
canonlybeestablishedisthatpetitionerownspropertiesclassifiedasresidentialproperties.Undoubtedly,wecannotmakeaconclusion
thatpetitionerfailedtomeettheanimusmanendirequirementintheabsenceofproofthatpetitionerusesoneofthepropertiesasaplace
of abode. In fact, all the evidence points to the fact that she leaves the Philippines only for brief periods of time obviously with no
intentiontoresideelsewhere.
Itisimportanttoalwaysrememberthatdomicileisinthemainaquestionofintent.[178]Itrequiresfactintensiveanalysis.Notasingle
factorisconclusive.Itisthetotalityoftheevidencethatmustbeconsidered.
Even the US Supreme Court admitted that domicile is a difficult question of fact that its resolution commands a pragmatic and careful
approach.InTheDistrictofColumbiav.Murphy,[179]theUSHighCourtremarked:
[T]hequestionofdomicileisadifficultoneoffacttobesettledonlybyarealistic and conscientious review ofthe many
relevant(andfrequentlyconflicting)indiciaofwhereaman'shomeisandaccordingtotheestablishedmodesofproof.[180]
ItisinterestingtonotethattheUSSupremeCourtappendedafootnoteonthetermhomeintheabovequotedstatement.Footnote10
states:
Ofcourse,thistermdoesnothavethemagicqualitiesofadiviningrodinlocatingdomicile.Infact,thesearchforthdomicile
ofanypersoncapableofacquiringadomicileofchoiceisllutasearchforhis"home."SeeBeale,SocialJusticeandBusiness
Costs,49Harv.L.Rev.593,5961Beale,ConflictofLaws,19.1.[181]
Now, if we are to adopt the view that petitioner failed to meet the animus manendi requirementon the ground that she maintains two
housesintheUS,Iposethisquestion:inoursearchforpeti'tioner'shome,arewemakingarealisticandconscientiousreviewofallthe
facts?
Additionally,itisnotrequiredforpurposesofestablishing a new domicile that a person must sever all contacts with ,the old domicile."
[182]Ithereforefindnothingwrongwithpetitionermaintainingresidentialpropertiesintheolddomicile.

Ithasbeenfurthersuggestedthatpetitioner'sinvocationofacquisitionofresidentialpropertyasafactorshowinganimusmanendidoes
not benefit her considering that she purchased in 2008 a residential property in the US, which was subsequent to her purchase of the
condominiumunitandtheresidentiallotinthePhilippines,andthatshemaintainedtheonesheacquiredin1992.Butwhatisconsidered
foranimusmanendipurposesasafactorisacquisitionofahouseinthenewdomicile.Acquisitionofahouseintheolddomicileisnota
factorfordetermininganimusmanendi.
ThatpetitionerstillmaintainstwohousesintheUSdoesnotnegateherabandonmentofherUSdomicile.First,ithas,notbeenshown
thatpetitioneractuallylivedintheresidentialhouseacquiredin1992.WhatisclearisthattherewasonlyonefamilyhomeinVirginia,US,
andpetitionerhadalreadyreestablishedherresidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeitwasevensold.
Second,theresidentialhouseacquiredin2008hasnobearinginthecasesbeforeuswithregardtodeterminingthevalidityofpetitioner's
abandonment of her US domicile, particularly because it was purchased after she had already reacquired her Filipino citizenship. Inthis
regard, even respondent Valdez claims that "it is only upon her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship on 18 July 2006, that she can be
considered to have established her domicile in the Philippines."[183] This concession already leaves no question as to petitioner's
abandonmentofherUSdomicileandintenttoresidepermanentlyinthePhilippinesatthetimethattheresidentialhouseintheUSwas
purchasedin2008.
1.IntenttoAbandontheOldDomicile
Toproveherintenttoabandonherolddomicileinthe US, petitioner presented the following evidence: ( 1) email exchange1sbetween
petitionerorherhusbandandthepropertymoversregardingrelocationoftheirhouseholdgoods,furnitureandvehiclesfromtheUSto

theBhilippines(2)invoicedocumentshowingdeliveryfromtheUSandtothePhilippinesofthepersonalpropertiesofpetitionerandher
family(3)acknowledgmentofchangeofaddressbytheUSPostalService(4)salelofthefamilyhomeon27April2006.
PlanstoRelocate
InOglesbyv.Williams, [184]theCourtofAppealsofMarylandnotedthatplansforremovalshowintenttoabandontheolddomicile.The
Courtsaid:
[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon retirement and may make quite elaborate
plans toward fulfilling that intent by building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by
themselves,donotprovetheabandonmentofanexistingdomicile,althoughitisevidenceoftheintentiontodo
so.Weresuchplanningtobesufficient,theintentrequirementwouldswallowtherequirementofanactualremovaltoanother
habitationwiththeintenttoresidethereindefinitely.(Emphasissupplied)
In this case, petitioner submitted email exchanges showing that the family began planning to move back to the Philippines as early as
March2005.Exhibit"6series"includesanemailletterdated17March2005andsenttopetitionerbyKarlaMurphyon18March2005.
Basedontheemail,KarlaworkedatVictoryVan,acompanyengagedinmovingpersonalbelongings.Apparently,petitionerhadaskedfor
anestimateofmovingpersonalpropertiesfromtheUStothePhilippines.Theemailreplyreads:
From:KarlaMurphyMURPHY@VictoryVan.com
To:gllamanzaresgllamanzares@aol.com
Subject:RelocationtoManilaEstimate
Date:Fri,18Mar2005
3.17.05
HiGrace:
Sorryforthedelayingettingthistoyou.Iknowyouareeagertogetsomeratesforbudgetarypurposes.
I estimate that you have approximately 28,000 lbs of household goods plus your two vehicles. This will necessitate
usingTHREE 40' containers. You not only have a lot of furniture but many of your pieces plus the toys are very
voluminous.WewillloadthecontainersfrombottomtotopnottowasteanyspacebutIsincerelybelieveyouwillneedtwo
containersjustforyourhouseholdgoods.
Toprovideyouwithdoortodoorservicewhichwouldincludepacking,exportwrapping,customcratingforchandeliers,marble
top and glass tops, loading of containers at your residence, US customs export inspection for the vehicles, transportation to
Baltimore, ocean freight and documentation to arrival Manila, customs clearance, delivery, with collection of vehicles from
agent in Manila unwrapping and placement of furniture, assisted unpacking, normal assembly (beds, tables, two piece
dressers and china closets), container return to port and same day debris removal based on three 40' containers, with
28,000lbsofHHGandtwoautoswillbeUSD19,295.
Grace,Ipredictyouwillhavesomequestions.IwillbeoutoftheofficetomorrowandwillbeintheofficealldayonMonday.If
yourquestionscan'twaitpleasecallmeonmycellnumberat7032972788.
I'lltalktoyousoon.
Kindregardsandagain,thanksforyourpatience.
Karla(EmphasesSupplied)
Theemailindicatesthatpetitionerwasplanningtomoveanestimated28,000poundsofhouseholdgoodsplustwovehiclesfromVirginia,
UStoManila.Theemailfurthershowsthatthreefortyfootcontainerswereestimatedtobeusedinthemovementoftheseitems.
Twentyeight thousand pounds of personal properties, including two vehicles, is not difficult to visualize. The exchanges during the oral
argumentsheldbythisCourtforthiscaseshowsthatthreefortyfootcontainersisaboutthesizeofathreestoreyhouse.Theexchange
isquotedbelow:
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Okay.Alright.Nowwhenyoucome,youseeyouhavethrownoutthefactofrelocation,continuousschooling,youhavethrown
thatout.MayInowaskyouwhatyoudidinlookingattheemailthattheysubmitteddated18March2005.Haveyou[looked]
closelyatthatemail?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Okay.Canyoutelluswhatthatemailsaid?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
These correspondences, email correspondences evinced a strong desire to bring your belongings here to seemingly on the
surface,YourHonor,totransferresidencehereandtoinquireaboutthecostofmovingtothePhilippines,YourHonor...
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Didyoulookatthe,howmuchtheywereplanningtomovebacktothePhilippines?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Welltheysaidtheysoldtheirhousetherealready,YourHonor...

CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Twentyeightthousandpounds.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Andtheestimateoftheforwardingcompanyisthattheyneedthreefortyfootcontainers,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Noquestionasto,noquestionastothat,YourHonor.
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Okay.Alright.Includingcanyoulookatwhatafortyfootcontainerlookslike.This.(imageflashedonthescreen)Pleaselook
atthisCommissionerLim.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
I'mquitefamiliarhavingbeenamaritimelawyerinthepast...
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
Alright.Thankyouverymuch.Youseeonefortyfootcontaineralreadycontainsanoffice,andanentireresidence.Andthenif
youputthreeontopoftheother,okay,...(imageflashedonthescreen)
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
CHIEFJUSTICESERENO:
That'salreadythecontentofanentirehouse.Andthey'retalkingaboutglasstops,marbletops,chandeliers,inadditiontothat
twocarsandpets.Ofcourse,it'snotintheemail.
Inotherwords,eventhisthereisnointention,CommissionerLim?[185]
Definitely,theemailshowsthatasearlyas18March2005,petitioneralreadyhadplanstorelocatetoManila.Itmustbestressedthatnot
onlyhouseholdgoodswouldbemovedtoManila,buttwovehiclesaswell.Petitionerwascertainlynotplanningforashorttrip.Theletter,
therefore,showstheintentofpetitionertoabandonherolddomicileintheUSasearlyasMarchof2005.
ChangeofPostalAddress
PetitioneralsoadducedasevidencetheemailoftheUSPostalServiceacknowledgingthenoticeofchangeofaddressmadebypetitioner's
husband. It has been argued that the online acknowledgment merely establishes that petitioner's husband only requested a change of
addressanddidnotnotifytheUSPostalserviceoftheabandonmentoftheoldUSaddress.Thisreasoningfailstoappreciatethatanotice
ofchangeofaddressisalreadyconsideredanindiciumsufficienttoestablishtheintenttoabandonadomicile.
The already discussed Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC[186] utilized change of postal address as a factor for determining the
intenttoabandonadomicile.InthecaseofFarnsworthv.Jones, [187]theCourtofAppealsofNorthCarolinanoted,amongothers,the
failureofthecandidatetochangehisaddress.Itruledoutthepossibilitythatdefendanthadactuallyabandonedhispreviousresidence.
To the contrary, defendant maintained the condominium at Cramer Mountain, ate dinner weekly at the Country Club there,
exercised there, and spent approximately 50% of his time there. Headditionally did not change his address to Ashley
Arms for postal purposes, or for any other purposes. He executed a monthtomonth lease for a furnished
apartment because he wanted to "see what would happen" in the election. Although defendant acquired a new
residence at the Ashley Arms address and expressed his intention to remain there permanently, there is little
evidenceintherecordtoindicatethathewasactuallyresidingthere.xxx.(Emphasissupplied)
IdoagreewiththeobservationthattheonlineacknowledgementnevershowedthatthechangeofaddresswasfromtheoldUSaddress
to the new Philippine address. To my mind, however, the deficiency is not crucial considering that there are other factors (discussed
elsewhere in this opinion) showing that petitioner's intent was to relocate to the Philippines. What matters as far as the online
acknowledgementisconcernedisthatitindicatesanintenttoabandontheolddomicileofpetitioner.
SaleofOldResidence
Anotherfactorpresentinthiscaseisthesaleofpetitioner'sfamilyhomeintheUS.
In Imbraguglio v. Bernadas[188] decided by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, Bernard Bernadas filed a "Notice of
Candidacy"fortheofficeofSheriffofSt.BernardParish.PetrinaImbragugliofiledapetitionobjectingtothecandidacyofBernadasonthe
groundoffailuretoestablishresidenceintheparish.ItwasfoundthatBernardassoldhishomeonEtienneDriveon23February2006.
Since 31 August 2006, Bernadas has lived with his family at a home he purchased at 7011 General Haig Street in New Orleans. The
Louisiana appellate court ruled that Bernardas had abandoned his domicile in the parish by selling his home therein and had not
reestablishedthesame.TheLouisianaappellatecourtheldthat:
We also find no error in the trial court's finding that the defendant established a new domicile for purposes of La. R.S. 1
$:451.3(whichtookeffectonJune8,2006)byvoluntarilysellinghishome,theonlypropertyownedinSt.BernardParish,
andmovingtoNewOrleanswithoutresidinganywhereinSt.BernardParishfortwoyearsprecedingthedatehefiledhisnotice
ofcandidacytorunforsheriff.(Emphasissupplied)
Locationofpersonalbelongings

Another vital piece of evidence is the invoice issued by Victory Van to petitioner indicating the actual delivery of personal property to
ManilainSeptember2006andthecostofshippingofthehouseholdgoods.PertinentportionsoftheInvoicedated13September2006are
quotedbelow:
Hello!AsyoumayhaveheardfromyouragentinthePhilippines,therewasanoverflow.Everyeffortwasmadetomakeitfitin
thetwo40'sandallwentexceptforabout1900lbs,whichwillbesentinliftvans.Aninvoiceisattached.Thankyou.
xxxx

CUSTOMER:
GraceLlamanzares DATE:
9/13/2006
ORIGIN:
Sterling,VA
REFERENCE#: EXP06020
DESTINATION: Manila,Philippines
WEIGHT:
VOLUME:
VOLUME

25,241lbs
240'SSC
2LiftVans
OverflowLCI,
Shipment(293Cu
Ft.)

Theinvoiceprovesthat25,241poundsofpersonalpropertyownedbypetitionerandherfamilyweremovedfromSterling,Virginia,USto
Manila,Philippines.Thisprovesanotherfactor:theconsummationofthepreviouslydiscussedplantorelocatetoManila.Thelocation of
themajorityofthepersonalbelongingsmattersinthedeterminationofachangeindomicile.Thisfactorwasusedinthealreadydiscussed
OglesbyandinBellv.Bell.[189]
ItmustbenotedthatBellheldthatunimportantbelongingsarenotconsideredinthatdetermination.Inthatcase,thewifesoughtbefore
aPennsylvaniacourttheissuanceofaninjunctionrestrainingthehusbandfromobtainingadivorceinNevada.Shefiledthesuitonthe
groundthatthehusbandfailedtoestablishadomicileinNevada'asheoncelivedinPennsylvania.Also,hewasawayfromNevadamost
ofthetimesinceheworkedinNigeria.
ThePennsylvaniaSuperiorCourt,inholdingthatthehusbandsucceededinestablishingadomicileinNevada,disregardedthefactthatthe
husbandleftbehindacrateofhisclothingatthehomeinPennsylvania.
AsfortherelevancyoftheclothingleftbehindatthePennsylvanialocationbyMr.Bellafterhisdeparture,we,asdidthetrial
court,findthiselementtobe"oflittlemoment.That[Mr.Bell]hasdonewithoutthemforsolongshowsthattheyarenotof
particularimportancetohim."(Emphasissupplied)
Itisworthytonotethatthecasedidnotrejectmovement/nonmovementofpersonalbelongingsasafactorfordetermining domicile.
Rather,whatitrejectedwasunimportantpersonalproperties.Thus,thiscase,combinedwiththeOglesbycase,providesthatmovement
ofpropertiesthatarevaluable/importantindicatesintenttoabandonthepreviousdomicile.Anothertakeawayfromthiscaseisthatwhen
onlyunimportantbelongingsremainintheolddomicile,theintenttoabandontheolddomicileisnotdiminished.
Whatismore,itmustbeemphasizedthatpetitionerdonatedtotheSalvationArmy,asshownbyExhibit"15"andExhibit"15A,"which
arereceiptsshowingdonationstotheSalvationArmyofclothes,booksandmiscellaneousitems.Thereceiptsaredated23February2006.
Thevalueofthepersonaleffectsdonatedwasplacedbypetitioner'shusbandatUSD300.00andUSD575.00,[190]certainlylittlepersonal
itemsthatwereeventhen,fullydisposed.
What can be gleaned from the above facts is that petitioner intended to bring along with her in the Philippines only those items she
deemedimportanttoher,andthatthosethatwereleftbehindwereunimportant.Itshouldbestressedthattheitemsdonatedtocharity
included books and clothes, which presumably are not valuable to petitioner hence, the donations to the Salvation Army. Accordingly,
petitionerwasabletoestablishanotherfactorindicatingtheintentofpetitionertoabandonherolddomicileandestablishanewdomicile
inthePhilippines.
Insum,thereismorethansufficientevidenceindicatingpetitioner'sintenttoabandonherdomicileintheUS.Severalfactorshavebeen
established: plans to transfer to the Philippines, sale of the residence in the old domicile, change of postal address, and relocation of
valuablepersonalbelongingstothenewdomicile.
2.Actualremovalfromold
domicileandrelocationto
newdomicile
Thethirdrequirementforestablishmentofanewdomicileisbodilypresenceinortheactualremovaltothenewdomicile.
InOglesbyv.Williams, [191]the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the issue of whether Beau H. Oglesby met the twoyear residency
requirementtorunforState'sAttorneyforWorcesterCountyintheNovember2002generalelection.Oglesbyadmittedthathehadbeen
domiciledinWicomicoCountyforaperiodoftimebeginninginDecember1995.Heargued,however,thathispurchaseofrealpropertyin
Worcester County on 5 September 2000, more than two years before the election, coupled with his intention to be domiciled there,
effectivelyestablishedthathehadchangedhisdomiciletoWorcesterCounty.
We do not question, to be sure, that the appellant intended to make Worcester County his residence, his fixed, permanent
homeandhabitationand,thus,toabandonhisWicomicoCountyresidence.Wesimplydonotbelievethattheintentwas
perfectedbeforetheappellantmovedintotheWorcesterCountyhometheappellant'sintentwas not actualized
untilthen.
[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon retirement and may make quite elaborate
plans toward fulfilling that intent by building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by
themselves,donotprovetheabandonmentofanexistingdomicile,althoughitisevidenceoftheintentiontodoso.Weresuch

planningtobesufficient,theintentrequirementwouldswallowtherequirementofanactualremovaltoanotherhabitationwith
theintenttoresidethereindefinitely.
xxxx
TheevidenceshowsthattheappellantestablishedadomicileinWicomicoCountyinDecember,1995andremaineddomiciledin
thatcountyuntil,attheearliest,December,2000.HevotedintheNovember7,2000electioninWicomicoCountyandhedid
notmoveintoaresidenceinWorcesterCountyuntilDecember,2000.Weholdthattheappellantdidnotbecomea
domiciliaryofWorcesterCountyuntil,attheearliest,heactuallymovedintohisnewhomeonDecember20,2000.
Oglesbymakesthedateofactualtransferasthereckoningpointforthechangeofdomicile.Hadtheactualremovalhappenedpriortothe
twoyearperiod,Oglesbywouldhavesatisfiedtheresidencyrequirementinthatcase.
Applyingtheruletothiscase,itappearsthattheintentwasactualizedin24May2005,thedatewhenpetitionerarrivedinthePhilippines,
as revealed by her US passport bearing a stampshowing her entry in the Philippines. The fact that she arrived here for the purpose of
movingbacktothePhilippineswasnotdeniedbyCOMELECduringtheoralarguments,althoughitdidnotrecognizethelegalimplications
ofsuchfact.
We must not lose sight of the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in this country on 31 August 2006. Thus, the implication of
petitionerhavingregisteredon31August2006isthatshehadalreadybeenaresidentinthecountryforatleastoneyearasofthedayof
her registration. The reason is that the Voter's Registration Act of 1996[192] requires among other things that the citizen must have
residedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyear.
Thatbeingsaid,theregistrationofpetitionerasvoterbolsterspetitioner'sclaimthatsheconcretizedherintenttoestablishadomicilein
the country on 24 May 2005. Take note that if we use 24 May 2005 as the reckoning date for her establishment of domicile in the
Philippines,shewouldhaveindeedbeenaresidentforroughlyoneyearandthreemonthsasof31August2006,thedatesheregistered
asavoterinthePhilippines.
Besides,whenweconsidertheotherfactorspreviouslymentionedinthisdiscussiontheenrolmentofpetitioner'schildrenshortlyafter
their arrival in the Philippines, the purchase of the condominium unit during the second half of 2005, the construction of their house in
Corinthian Hills in 2006, the notification of the US Postal Service of petitioner's change of address there can only be one conclusion:
petitionerwasheretostayinthePhilippinesforgoodwhenshearrivedinMay2005.
Letmehighlightthefactofenrolmentofpetitioner's children in 2005. This happened shortly after their arrival inthePhilippines,which
wasinMay2005.TakingtogetherthetwofactsthearrivalofthefamilyinMayandthesubsequentattendanceofthechildreninlocal
schoolsthefollowingmonththelogicalconclusionthatwecanderivefromthemisthatpetitionerarrivedearlyinMaysoastoprepare
herchildren'sschoolinginthePhilippines.Now,giventhatinMay,shealreadyhadinmindtheattendanceofherchildreninlocalschools,
thisindicatesthatpetitioner,atthetimeofherarrivalalreadyhadtheintenttobeinthecountryforthelonghaul.
Lastly, we must not overlook the proximity of her date of arrival in the Philippines in 24 May 2005 to the death of her father in 14
December2004.Theclosenessofthedatesconfirmstheclaimofpetitionerthattheuntimelydeathofherfatherandtheneedtogiveher
mother moral support and comfort. The return to the country, it must be emphasized, happened within one year of the death of
petitioner'sfather.Itreflectsthemotiveofpetitionerforherreturnto the Philippines: the only child had to return to the Philippines as
soonaspossiblesothatshecould,bewithhergrievingmother.Moreimportant,thisverysamemotivejustifiestheactsofrelocationshe
executed,severalofwhichoccurredwithinayearofthedeathofherfather.
As a result, petitioner's arrival in the Philippines on 24 May 2005 was definitely coupled with both animus manendi and animus non
revertendi.
True,petitioner'stransferinthiscasewasincremental.ButthisCourthasalreadyrecognizedthevalidityofincrementaltransfers.InMitra
v.COMELEC,[193]Westated:
Mitra'sfeedmilldwellingcannotbeconsideredinisolationandseparatelyfromthecircumstancesofhistransferofresidence,
specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a
provincialpositionhispreparatorymovesstartinginearly2008hisinitialtransferthroughaleaseddwellingthepurchaseof
alotforhispermanenthomeandtheconstructionofahouseinthislotthat,parenthetically,isadjacenttothepremiseshe
leasedpendingthecompletionofhishouse.Theseincrementalmovesdonotoffendreasonatall,inthewaythatthe
COMELEC'shighlysubjectivenonlegalstandardsdo.(Emphasissupplied)
EventheSuperiorCourtofPennsylvaniainBellv.Bell[194]recognizedthenotionofincrementaltransfersinachangeofdomicile:
Intent, being purely subjective, must to a large extent be determined by the acts which are manifestations of that intent.
However,itdoesnotfollowfromthatthattheactsmustalloccursimultaneouslywiththeformationoftheintent.
Suchaconclusionwouldbecontrarytohumannature.Onedoesnotmovetoanewdomicileandimmediatelychangechurch
membership, bank account, operator's license, and club memberships. Nor does he immediately select a neighborhood,
purchaseahomeandbuyfurniture.Allofthoseactsrequirevaryingdegreesofconsiderationandasaconsequence
cannotbedonehastilynorsimultaneously.(Emphasessupplied)
Theforegoingconsidered,theCOMELECusedawrongconsiderationinreachingtheconclusionthatpetitionerfailedtomeetthedurational
residencyrequirementof10years.Thereisnofalsitytospeakofintherepresentationmadebypetitionerwithregardtoherresidencein
the country. For using wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue, COMELEC tainted its cancellation of petitioner's 2016
certificateofcandidacyforpresidentwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
LongResidenceinthePhilippines
WemustrememberthatpetitionerandherchildrenwouldhavestayedinthePhilippinesfor10yearsand11monthsby9May2016.For
nearly11years,herchildrenhavestudiedandspentasubstantialpartoftheirformativeyearshere.Onthis,thecaseofHaleis again

instructive:
We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations, the acts of purchasing a home and
longcontinued residency are circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin and to
establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these factors, the circuit court did not err in determining that
Stone'sdomicilehasexistedinMarshallCountysinceOctoberof2013.(Emphasissuppliedandcitationsomitted)
Petitioner'sintentiontoabandonUS
domicilewasnotnegated
TheCOMELECFirstDivisionandtheCOMELECEnBancinSPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC)and15139(DC)ruledthatthefactthat
petitioner's husband remained and retained his employment in the US in May 2005 negated her intent to reside permanently in the
Philippines. Furthermore, petitioner travelled frequently to the US using her US passport even after she reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.AccordingtotheCOMELEC,theseshowthatshehasnotabandonedherdomicileintheUS.RespondentValdezalsopointsto
two houses in the US that petitioner maintains up to the present, and alleges that this fact also negates her alleged intent to reside
permanentlyinthePhilippines.
The fact that petitioner's husband was left in the US and retained his employment there should be viewed based on the totality of the
circumstancesandthereasonforsuchseparation.ThereisnoquestionthattheimpetusforpetitionertomovebacktothePhilippineswas
thedeathofherfatherinDecember2004andthedesiretobebackinthePhilippinesandcomforthergrievingmother.Thereisalsono
questionthatbyMay2005,petitionerandherchildrenwerealreadylivinginthePhilippinesandthechildrenalreadyenrolledinPhilippine
schools.
Petitioner and her family could not have been expected to uproot their lives completely from the US and finish all arrangements in the
spanofsixmonths.OneofthespouseshadtoremainintheUStowindupalllogisticalaffairs.Thereisalsonoshowingthatpetitioneris
abletoreadilyfindajobinthePhilippinesupontheirreturn.Again,oneofthespouseshastocontinueearningalivingforthefamily's
upkeep and to finance the heavy cost of relocation. The conjugal decision became clear when it was the husband who kept his
employmentintheusandcametojoinhisfamilyinthePhilippinesonlyafterthesaleofthehouseintheUS.
Tomymind,thatpetitioner'shusbandremainedintheUSuntilApril2006onlyshowedthatthefamilyenduredaperiodofseparationin
ordertorebuildtheirfamilylifetogetherinthePhilippines.Thefactthatthehusbandstayedbehindshouldnothavebeenconsideredin
isolationbutcontemplatedinlightoftherealitiesofthesituation.
The COMELEC also faults petitioner for travelling to the US "frequently" using her US passport. A closer examination of the factual
circumstancesatthetime,however,revealsthatpetitionerhadajustifiablereasonfordoingso.
WhenpetitionercamebacktothePhilippinesinMay2005,shewasadmittedlystillaUScitizen.ShereacquiredherPhilippinecitizenship
on7July2006undertheauspicesofRepublicActNo.9225andbecameadualcitizenofthePhilippinesandtheUS.Itwasonlyon20
October2010thatpetitionerrenouncedherUScitizenshipandbecameapureFilipinocitizen.Thus,petitionerwasaUScitizenfromMay
2005to20October2010.
Section215(b)oftheUSImmigrationandNationalityActprovidesthat"itshallbeunlawfulforanycitizenoftheUnitedStatestodepart
from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport." This provision is
echoedinSection53.1oftheUSCodeofFederalRegulations,unlesstheUScitizenfallsunderanyoftheexceptionsprovidedtherein.[195]
Petitioner, as a US citizen, was required by law to use her US passport when travelling to and from the US. Notwithstanding her dual
citizenship and the abandonment of her US domicile, she could not have entered or departed from the US if she did not use her US
passport.
In Maquiling v. COMELEC, [196] which I penned for the Court, while we ruled that the use of a foreign passport negates the earlier
renunciationofsuchforeigncitizenship,didnotsay,however,thattheuseofaforeignpassportafterreacquisitionofPhilippine
citizenshipandbeforetherenunciationoftheforeigncitizenshipadverselyaffectstheresidencyofacandidateforpurposes
of running in the elections. This case cannot, therefore, be used as basis to negate petitioner's residency. This Maquiling
decisioninvolvedRommelArnadowhowaselectedMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteinthe2010elections.Heranalsoforthe2013
electionsforthesamepostandwonagain.TheCourtaffirmedtheMaquilingdoctrineinthecaseofArnadov.COMELEC.[197]Thedoctrine
wasnotexpandedinanymannerastoaffectpetitioner'scitizenshipclaim.TheMaquilingdoctrinesolelyhastodowiththeeffectofthe
continueduseofaUSpassportaftertherenunciationofUScitizenship.Inthecaseofpetitioner,thereisabsolutelynoevidence,which
evenCOMELECadmits,thatsheusedaUSpassportaftersherenouncedherUScitizenshipon20October2010.Clearly,Maquilingand
Arnado are not relevant to the petitioner's case until new proof can be adduced contradicting the present state of the
evidenceonrecordthatpetitionerneverusedherUSpassportaftersherenouncedherUScitizenship.
Taking into account all these pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that petitioner made a false material representation in her 2016
certificateofcandidacyforpresidentasfarasherresidencyisconcerned.Thetotalityofthesecircumstancesshowsthatindeed,shehad
reestablished her residence in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months until the day before the elections in May 2016, which is
sufficient to qualify her to run for president in the country. At the very least, it negates a finding of deliberate intention on her part to
misleadtheelectoratewithregardtoherresidency.Evidently,asinglestatementinher2013certificateofcandidacyforsenatorcannot
be deemed to overthrow the entirety of the evidence on record, which shows that her residence in the Philippines commenced in May
2005.
IV.
B.ONCITIZENSHIP
IntheassailedResolutions,theCOMELECalsodeclaredthatpetitionermadeafalsematerialrepresentationwhenshedeclared that she
wasanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.Accordingtothecommission,petitioner'sinabilitytoproveherbloodrelationshiptoaFilipino
parentprecludedherfromeverclaimingnaturalbornstatusunderthe1935Constitution.COMELECargues,therefore,thatherdeclaration
astohercitizenshipmustnecessarilybeconsideredfalse.

Ifindnosupportwhatsoeverfortheselegalconclusions.
Petitionerdidnotmakeafalsematerial
representationregardinghercitizenshipin
her2016CertificateofCandidacyfor
president.
Consideringthattherehasbeennodefinitiverulingonthecitizenshipoffoundlings,itwouldbeunreasonableandunfairfortheCOMELEC
to declare that petitioner deliberately misrepresented her status as a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. In fact, the evidence she
submittedinsupportofherclaimofcitizenshipgivesuseveryreasontoacceptherassertionofgoodfaith.
Inanyevent,Ibelievethatthereissufficientlegalbasistosustainapresumptionofcitizenshipinfavorofpetitionernotwithstandingthe
absence of any physical proof of her filiation. Her naturalborn status can be founded from solid interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution.
Therewasnodeliberateattemptto
mislead,misinform,orhideafact
thatwouldotherwiserenderher
ineligible.
ContrarytoclaimsthatpetitionercommitteddeliberatemisrepresentationwhenshedeclaredthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,the
followingdocumentssupportafindingofgoodfaithonherpart:
1.AdoptionDecree
The adoption decree issued in favor of petitioner in 1974 allows her to legally claim to be the daughter of Ronald Allan Poe andJesusa
SonoraPoe.Thispropositionfindssupportinstatutesandjurisprudence.
InRepublic v. Court of Appeals, We held that upon entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted
childrenweredeclared"bornof'theiradoptiveparents.[198]
Congress confirmed this interpretation when it enacted R.A. 8552, which provides that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided 1 by law to
legitimatesons/daughterborntothemwithoutdiscriminationofanykind."[199]
Apartfromobtainingthestatusoflegitimatechildren,adopteesarelikewiseentitledtomaintainthestrictconfidentialityoftheiradoption
proceedings.TheprovisionsofP.D.603,[200]R.A.85152[201]andtheRuleonAdoption[202]stipulatethatallrecords,books,andpapers
relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, or any other agency or
institutionparticipatinginthe
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. The records are permanently sealed and may be opened only upon the court's
determinationthatthedisclosureofinformationtothirdpartiesif"necessary"and"forthebestinterestoftheadoptee."[203]Thisgrantof
confidentialitywouldmeanverylittleifanadopteeisrequiredtogobeyondthisdecreetoproveherparentage.
2.CertificateofLiveBirth
Upon the issuance of an adoption decree, an amended certificate of birth is issued by the civil registrar attesting to the fact that the
adopteeisthechildoftheadoptersbybeingregisteredwiththeirsurname.[204]Likeallpersons,petitionerhastherighttorelyonthis
birthcertificateforinformationaboutheridentity,statusandfiliation.
Article 410 of the Civil Code states that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto are considered public
documentsandshallbeprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereincontained.[205]Asapublicdocument,aregisteredcertificateoflivebirth
enjoysthepresumptionofvalidity.[206]
Petitioner'sbirthcertificatealsohastheimprimaturofnolessthantheMunicipalCourtofSanJuan,RizalProvince.[207]Intheabsenceof
a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the birth certificate and the facts stated
thereinaredeemed1egitimate,genuineandrea1.[208]
Petitionerthuscannotbefaultedforrelyingonthecontentsofapublicdocumentwhichenjoysstrongpresumptionsofvalidityunderthe
law. She is actually obliged to do so because the law does not provide her with any other reference for information regarding her
parentage. It must be noted that records evidencing her former foundling status 'have been sealed after the issuance of the decree of
adoption.InBaldosv.CourtofAppealsandPillazar, [209]Weheldthatitisnotforapersontoprovethefactsstatedinhiscertificateof
livebirth,butforthosewhoareassailingthecertificatetoproveitsallegedfalsity.
Theissuanceofanamendedcertificatewithoutanynotationthatitisneworamendedorissuedpursuanttoanadoptiondecree,should
notbetakenagainstpetitioner,becauseitmerelycomplieswiththeconfidentialityprovisionsfoundinadoptionlaws.[210]UnderSection
16oftheRuleonAdoption(A.M.No.02602SC,31July2002),itshallbetheresponsibilityofthecivilregistrarwherethefoundlingwas
registered to annotate the adoption decree on the foundling certificate, and to prepare and a new birth certificate without any notation
thatitisaneworamendedcertificate.
3.Voter'sID
TheVoter'sIDissuedtopetitionerlikewiseprovethatsheactedingoodfaithwhensheassertedthatshewasanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippines.Preciselybecauseoftheentriesinthesedocuments,Poecouldnotbeexpectedtoclaimanycitizenshipotherthanthatofthe
Philippines.Hence,shecouldnothavecommittedamaterialmisrepresentationinmakingthisdeclaration.
4.PhilippinePassport

In1996,R.A.8239(PhilippinePassportActof1996)waspassed.Thelawimposesuponthegovernmentthedutytoissuepassportorany
travel document to any citizen of the Philippines or individal who complies with the requirements of the Act.[211] "Passport" has been
definedasadocumentissuedbythePhilippinegovernmenttoitscitizensandrequestingothergovernmentstoallowitscitizenstopass
safelyandfreely,andincaseofneedtogivehim/heralllawfulaidandprotection.[212]
Section5ofR.A.8239statesthatnopassportshallbeissuedtoanapplicantunlesstheSecretaryorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativeis
satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the requirements. Conversely, a Philippine passport holder like
petitionerispresumedtobeaFilipinocitizen,consideringthepresumptionofregularityaccordedtoactsofpublicofficialsinthecourseof
theirduties.WhentheclaimtoPhilippinecitizenshipisdoubtful,onlya"traveldocument"isissued.[213]Atraveldocument,inlieuofa
passport, is issued to stateless persons who are likewise permanent residents, or refugees granted such status or asylum in the
Philippines.[214]IftheStateconsidersfoundlingstobeanythingelsebutitscitizens(statelesspersons,forexample),itwouldnothave
giventhempassports.However,sincethe1950s,theDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA)hasbeenissuingpassportstofoundlings.[215]A
quick look at the official website[216] of the DFA would show an enumeration of supporting documents required of foundlings for the
issuance of a Philippine passport to wit, certificate of foundling authenticated by the Philippine Statistics Authority, clearance from the
Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD), passport of the person who found the applicant, and letter of authority or
endorsement from DSWD for the issuance of passport. The only conclusion that can be made is that foundlings are considered by the
State,oratleastbytheexecutive,tobePhilippinecitizens.
Rule 130, Section 44[217] of the Rules of Court has been cited by the Court to support the finding that entries in the passport are
presumedtrue.[218]Onitsface,thePhilippinepassportissuedtoPoeon16March2014indicateshercitizenshiptobe"Filipino."Hence,
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in not even considering this as evidence in determining whether Poe intended to
deceivetheelectoratewhensheindicatedthatshewasanaturalbornFilipino.
5.BureauofImmigrationOrder
WhilefindingsmadebyBureauofImmigration(BI)onthecitizenshipofpetitionerisnotconclusiveontheCOMELEC,[219]suchnegateany
notionofbadfaithormaliceonthepartofpetitionerwhenshemadetherepresentationinherCoCthatshewasanaturalborncitizen.At
the time, the presumption created by the Order was in operation. In effect, petitioner had color of authority to state that she was a
naturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.
It has been argued that petitioner had obtained theBI order only because she misrepresented herself to have been "born ... toRonald
Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe."[220] However, as previously discussed, the potent policy interests[221] embedded in the
confidentialityofadoptionrecordsfullyjustifiesherdecisiontowritethenamesofheradoptiveparentsasindicatedinherbirthcertificate.
6.TheDecisionoftheSenateElectoralTribunalinSETCaseNo.00105
TheSETDecisionisaprimafaciefindingofnaturalborncitizenshipthatpetitionercanrelyon.ThefactthattheSETDecisionwasissued
laterthanthefilingbypetitionerofherCoCforpresidentdoesnottakeawayfromitsvalidityasanothertangiblebasis of petitioner to
validly claim that she was a naturalborn Filipino. It should be borne in mind that the SET Decision is a determination of petitioner's
naturalbornstatusasofthetimeshewaselectedandassumedherdutiesassenatorofthePhilippines.WhiletheDecisionwaslaterin
issuance,theapplicationofthisrulingbytheSETsignificantlypredatesthefilingofher2016certificateofcandidacyforpresident.
Takentogether,theenumerateddocumentsprovidepetitionerwithsufficientbasisforherclaimofcitizenship.Shecannotbefaultedfor
relying upon these pieces of evidence, particularly considering that at the time she made her declaration that she was a naturalborn
citizen,thepresumptioncreatedbythesedocumentshasnotbeenoverturned.
Atanyrate,itwouldbeabsurdforpetitionertoanswer"foundling"ineverydocumentwhereherfiliationandcitizenshipisrequiredwhen
herbirthcertificateandotherofficialdocumentsprovideotherwise.Notonlywouldthisdefeatthepurposeofthedegreeofconfidentiality
prescribedbythelaw,shewouldevenruntheriskofcausingoffensetoherparentswhomshewoulddepriveofactualrecognition.
Petitioner'shonestbeliefthatshewasanaturalborncitizenisfurthershownbyherconstantassertionofherstatusandiscorroborated
byofficialdocumentsandactsofgovernmentissuedinherfavor.Ibelievethatthesedocuments,attheveryleast,negateanydeliberate
intentonherparttomisleadtheelectorateastohercitizenshipqualification.
LegalSignificanceofConfirmationofRenunciation
It had been posited that petitioner's repatriation as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. 9225 had been rendered doubtful by her
subsequentactsin2011,inparticularherexecutionofanOath/AffirmationofRenunciationofNationalityofUnitedStatesbeforeaVice
ConsuloftheU.S.EmbassyinthePhilippines[222]hercompletionofaQuestionnaireonInformationforDeterminingPossibleLossofU.S.
Citizenship[223]andtheissuanceofaConfirmationofLossofNationalityoftheUnitedStates.[224]
SufficeittostatethatthesedocumentswereexecutedbypetitioneronlyforthepurposeofcomplyingwiththerequirementsofU.S.law.
It had no relevance to petitioner's reacquisition of citizenship under Philippine law. The fact remains that she had already properly
renounced her U.S. citizenship by executing the Affidavit of Renunciation required in Section 5 of R.A. 9225. Any act done thereafter
servedonlytoconfirmthisearlierrenunciationofforeigncitizenship.
Respondentvalidlypresumedthat
sheisacitizenofthePhilippines.
The failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate evidence showing good faith on the part of petitioner is compounded by its narrow
minded approach to the question of citizenship. There is sufficient basis to support the presumption that foundlings are citizens of the
Philippines.
Although the citizenship of foundlings is not expressly addressed by the language of Article IV of the Constitution, Philippine statutes,
administrativeregulationsandjurisprudencesupportthisconclusion,eveninlightoftheabsenceofphysicalprooftoestablishfoundlings

filiation.
Moreover,apresumptionoffoundlingstheirnaturalbornstatuscanbeestablishedbythedeliberationsofthe1935Constitutionandthe
historyofitsprovisions.Theselegalauthoritiesandmaterialsserveassufficientjustificationforanyfoundlingsgoodfaithbeliefthatsheis
anaturalborncitizen.
ThestandardproposedbytheCOMELECphysicalproofofbloodrelationtoaparentwhoisacitizenofthePhilippinesisanimpossible,
oppressiveanddiscriminatorycondition.Toallowtheimpositionofthisunjustandunreasonablerequirementistosanctionaviolationof
theConstitutionandourobligationsunderexistinginternationallaw.
InPhilippinelaw,afoundlingreferstoadesertedorabandonedinfantorachildwhoseparents,guardian,orrelativesareunknownora
childcommittedtoanorphanageorcharitableorsimilarinstitutionwithunknownfactsofbirthandparentage,andregisteredassuchin
theCivilRegister.[225]
TherulingoftheCOMELECispremisedsolelyontheadmittedfactthatpetitionerisafoundling.AsexplainedintheassailedResolutions,
petitionerwasfoundabandonedintheparishchurchofJaro,Iloilo,on3September1968byacertainEdgardoMilitar.Shewaslateron
legallyadoptedbyRonaldAllanPoeandJesusaSonoraPoe.Todate,however,herbiologicalparentsareunknown.
AccordingtotheCOMELEC,thesecircumstancesrenderthe citizenship of petitioner questionable. It claims that I since she is unable to
establishtheidentitiesofherparents,sheislikewiseincapableofprovingthatsheisrelatedbybloodtoaFilipinoparent.Accordingly,she
cannotbeconsideredanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Theseargumentsareunmeritorious.
Filiationasamatteroflegalfiction
Under Philippine law, the parentage of a child is a matter of legal fiction. Its determination relies not on physical proof, but on legal
presumptionsandcircumstantialevidence.Forinstance,achildisdisputablyorconclusivelypresumedlegitimate,i.e.bornoftwomarried
individuals depending on the period that elapsed between the birth of that child and the ce1ebration[226] or termination[227] of the
spouses'marriage.Thepresumptionofthefactoflegitimacyisoneofthestrongestknowntothelaw,andcannotbeoverthrownexcept
bystrongerevidence.[228]AstheCourtexplainedinRodolfoA.Aguilarv.EdnaG.Siasat:[229]
"Thereisperhapsnopresumptionofthelawmorefirmlyestablishedandfoundedonsoundermoralityandmore
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomesconclusiveintheabsenceofproofthatthereisphysicalimpossibilityofaccessbetweenthespousesduringthefirst
120daysofthe300dayswhichimmediatelyprecedesthebirthofthechilddueto(a)thephysicalincapacityofthehusbandto
have sexual intercourse with his wife (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
FamilyCode(whichtookeffecton03August1988),theactiontoimpugnthelegitimacyofachildwouldnolonger
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. (Emphases
supplied)
TheFamilyCodealsoallowspaternityandfiliationtobeestablishedthroughanyofthefollowingmethods:(1)recordofbirth(2)written
admissionoffiliation(3)openandcontinuouspossdssionofthestatusofalegitimateoranillegitimatechild(4)orothermeansallowed
bytheRulesorspeciallaws.[230]Notably,noneofthesemethodsrequiresphysicalproofofparentage:
(a)Theentriesinarecordofbirthdependonlyonthestatementsofcertainpersonsidentifiedbylaw:ingeneral,administratorof
the hospital, or in absence thereof, either of the following: the physician/nurse/midwife/hilot who attended the birth. In default of
both, either or both parents shall cause the registration of the birth and if the birth occurs in a vessel/vehicle/airplane while in
transit,registrationshallbethejointresponsibilityofthedriver/captain/pilotandtheparents.[231]
(b)Filiationmayalsobeprovedbyanadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentand
signed by the parent concerned. In Aguilar, the Court declared that such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummatedactofacknowledgmentofthechildandrequiresnofurthercourtaction.[232]
(c) With respect to open and continuous possession of the status of children and other means allowed by the Rules of Court, the
relevantsectionsofRule130provide:
SEC.39.Actordeclarationaboutpedigree.Theactordeclarationofapersondeceased,orunabletotestify,inrespect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.Theword"pedigree"includesrelationship,familygenealogy,birth,marriage,death,thedateswhenandthe
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connectedwithpedigree.
SEC.40.Familyreputationortraditionregardingpedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to
the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
familybooksorcharts,engravingonrings,familyportraitsandthelike,maybereceivedasevidenceofpedigree.
Evidently,thereisnolegalbasisforthestandardproposedbytheCOMELECandprivaterespondents.Physicalorscientific
proof of a blood relationship to a putative parent is not required by law to establish filiation or any status arising
therefromsuchascitizenship.Infact,thisCourthasrepeatedlyemphasizedthatDNAevidenceisnotabsolutelyessential
solongaspaternityorfiliationmaybeestablishedbyotherproof.233Thereis,therefore,noreasontoimposethisundue
burden on petitioner, particularly in light of her situation as a foundling. Instead of requiring foundlings to produce
evidence of their filiation a nearly impossible condition administrative agencies, the courts and even Congress have
insteadproceededontheassumptionthatthesechildrenarecitizensofthePhilippines.

Contemporaneousandsubsequent
constructionbythelegislature,executive
andjudicialbranchesofgovernment
Although the details of their births cannot be established, foundlings are provided legal protection by the state through statutes, rules,
issuancesandjudicialdecisionsallowingtheiradoption.Asearlyas1901,theCodeofCivilProcedure[234]recognizedthatchildrenwhose
parents are unknown have a right to be adopted. Failure to identify the parents of the child was not made an obstacle to adoption
instead,therulesallowedalegalguardian,orthetrustees/directorsofanorphanasylum,tograntt,erequiredconsentonbehalfofthe
unknownparents.SimilarprovisionswereincludedinthesubsequentrevisionsoftheRulesofCourtin1940[235]and1964.[236]
Earlystatutesalsospecificallyallowedtheadoptionoffoundlings.ActNo.1670wasenactedpreciselytoprovidefortheadoptionofpoor
children who were in the custody of asylums and other institutions. These children included orphans or "any other child so maintained
thereinwhoseparentsareunknown":[237]
SECTION548.Adoptionofchildfrominstitutionforpoorchildren.Upontheapplicationofanypersontothecompetent
authoritiesofanyasylumorinstitutionwherethepoorchildrenaremaintainedatpublicexpensetoadoptanychildso
maintainedtherein,itshallbethedutyofsuchauthorities,withtheapprovaloftheSecretaryoftheInterior,toreportthe
fact to the provincial fiscal, or in the City of Manila to the fiscal of the city, and such official shall thereupon prepare the
necessaryadoptionpapersandpresentthemattertothepropercourt.Thecostsofsuchproceeding,incourtshallbedeoficio.
TheprovisionsofActNo.1670weresubstantiallyincludedintheAdministrativeCodeof1916[238]andintheRevisedAdministrativeCode
of1911.[239]
In1995,CongressenactedRepublicActNo.8043toestablishtherulesgoverningthe"IntercountryAdoptionofFilipinoChildren." The
adoptionofafoundlingwassimilarlyrecognizedunderSection8ofthestatute,whichallowedthesubmissionofafoundlingcertificateto
facilitatetheintercountryadoptionofachild.[240]Afewyearslaterorin1998,thelawon"DomesticAdoptionofFilipinoChildren" was
amendedthroughR.A.8552.Thistime,aspecificprovisionwasincludedtogoverntheregistrationoffoundlingsforpurposesofadoption:
SECTION5.LocationofUnknownParent(s).ItshallbethedutyoftheDepartmentorthechildplacingorchildcaringagency
whichhascustodyofthechildtoexertalleffortstolocatehis/herunknownbiologicalparent(s).Ifsucheffortsfail,thechild
shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declaredabandoned.
In2009,CongresspassedR.A.9523,[241]which allowed the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to declare a child
"legallyavailableforadoption"asaprerequisiteforadoptionproceedings.Underthisstatute,foundlingswereincludedinthedefinitionof
abandonedchildren[242]andexpresslyallowedtobeadopted,providedtheywerefirstdeclaredbytheDSWDasavailableforadoption.
[243]AdministrativeOrderNo.01109wasadoptedbythatdepartmentin2009toimplementthestatute.[244]

Theseenactmentsandissuancesonadoptionaresignificant,becausetheyeffectivelyrecognizefoundlingsascitizensofthePhilippines.It
mustbeemphasizedthatjurisdictionoveradoptioncasesisdeterminedbythecitizenshipoftheadopterandtheadoptee.Asexplainedby
this Court in Spouses Ellis v.Republic,[245]the Philippine Civil Code adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural
personisdeterminedbythelatter'snationality.This1ulingcitesArticle15oftheCivilCode:
ARTICLE15.Lawsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindingupon
citizensofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad.
Thecitizenshipofapersonisa"status"governedbythisprovisionisclear,pursuanttoourrulinginBoardofImmigrationCommissioners
v.Callano.[246]Inthatcase,WeappliedthenationalityruleinArticle15todeterminewhethersomeindividualshadlosttheirPhilippine
citizenship:
"Thequestion,whetherpetitionerswhoareadmittedlyFilipinocitizensatbirthsubsequentlyacquiredChinesecitizenshipunder
theChineseLawofNationalitybyreasonofrecognitionoraprolongedstayinChina,isafitsubjectfortheChineselawandthe
Chinesecourttodetermine,whichcannotberesolvedbyaPhilippinecourtwithoutencroachingonthelegalsystemofChina.
For,thesettledruleofinternationallaw,affirmedbytheHagueConventiononConflictofNationalityLawsofApril12,1930and
by the International Court of Justice, is that." Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular
stateshouldbedeterminedinaccordancewiththelawsofthatstate."(quotedinSalonga,PrivateInternationalLaw,1957Ed.,
p.l12)Therewasnonecessityofdecidingthatquestionbecausesofarasconcernthepetitioners'status,theonlyquestionin
thisproceedingis:Did the petitioners lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certainactsorthe
happeningofcertaineventsinChina?Indecidingthisquestionnoforeignlawcanbeapplied.Thepetitionersare
admittedlyFilipinocitizensatbirth,andtheirstatusmustbegovernedbyPhilippinelawwherevertheymaybe,in
conformitywithArticle15(formerlyArticle9)oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesasfollows:"Lawsrelatingtofamily
rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines,eventhoughlivingabroad."UnderArticleIV,Section2,ofthePhilippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship.
may be lost or reacquired m the manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his
PhilippinecitizenshipshallbedeterminedbynootherthanthePhilippinelaw.(Emphasissupplied)
Ellis also discredits the assertion that this Court has no power to determine the citizenship of a foundling based only on
presumptions. In that case, an infant named Baby Rose was abandoned at the Heart of Mary Villa, an institution for unwed mothers.
WhenanAmericancouple,theSpousesEllis,latersoughttoadoptBabyRose,theSupremeCourtpresumedthecitizenshipoftheinfant
forpurposesofadoption:
"Inthisconnection,itshouldbenotedthatthisisaproceedingsinrem,whichnocourtmayentertainunlessithasjurisdiction,
notonlyoverthesubjectmatterofthecasean4overtheparties,butalsoovertheres,whichisthepersonalstatusofBaby
Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory,wehavejurisdiction

overthestatusofBabyRose,shebeingacitizenofthePhilippines,butnotoverthestatusofthepetitioners,who
areforeigners.Underourpoliticallaw,whichispatternedaftertheAngloAmericanlegalsystem,wehave,likewise,adopted
the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/ or subject to the jurisdiction of the
domiciliarylaw(Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86 The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp.
713714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by nonresident aliens, and we have
consistentlyrefusedtorecognizethevalidityofforeigndecreesofdivorceregardlessofthegroundsuponwhichthesameare
based involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized
absolutedivorceinthePhilippines.(citationsomittedandemphasissupplied)
Inthe1976caseDuncanv.CFIofRizal,[247]theCourtagainpresumedthePhilippinecitizenshipofafoundlingforpurposesofadoption.
Notwithstandingtherefusalofthedefactoguardianorevealtheidentityofthechild'smother,theadoptionoftheabandonedchildwas
allowedinordertopreventa"cruelsanctiononaninnocentchild":
Havingdeclaredthatthechildwasanabandonedonebyanunknownparent,thereappearstobenomrelegalneedtorequire
thewrittenconsentofsuchparentothechildtotheadoption.xxx.
ThetrialcourtinitsdecisionhadsoughtrefuseintheancientRomanlegalmaxim"Duralexsedlex"tocleanseitshandsofthe
hardandharshdecisionitrendered.Whilethisoldadagegenerallyfindsaptapplicationinmanyotherlegalcases,inadoption
of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding,foradoptionismoreorthebenefitofunfortunatechildren,particularlythosebornoutofwedlock,thanforthose
bornwithasilverspoonintheirmouths.Alleffortsoractsdesignedtoprovidehomes,love,careandeducationforunfortunate
children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems,shouldbegiventhewidestlatitudeofsympathy,encouragementandassistance.Thelawisnot,andshouldnot
bemade,aninstrumenttoimpedetheachievementofasalutaryhumanepolicyAsoftenasislegallyandlawfully
possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist
withamodicumpromisefausefulandconstructiveexistence.
...Ifwearenowtosustainthedecisionofthe court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all
concernedparticularlytosaidspouses,andworse,itwillbeimposingacruelsanctiononthisinnocentchildand
on all other children who might be similarly situated. We consider it to be justifiable and more humane to
formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and the
minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel
interpretation of he law that was done by the private respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in
consonancewiththeruespiritandpurposeofthelaw,andwiththepolicyoftheState,touphold,encourageand
givelifeandmeaningtotheexistenceoffamilyrelations.
Although the citizenship of the child in Duncanwasnot elaborated upon, the Court proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the adoption
proceedings. From this act, it may be inferred that the Court presumed that the child was a Philippine citizen whose status m y be
determinedbyaPhilippinecourtpursuanttoArticle15oftheCivilCode.
The foregoing enactments and decisions prove the contemporaneous and subsequent interpretation of the Constitution b the three
branchesofgovernment.ItisevidentthatCongress,certainadministrativeagenciesandeventhecourtshavealwaysproceededonthe
assumptionthatthesechildrenareFilipinocitizensintheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary.
Theassertionthatcitizenshipcannotbemadetorestuponapresumptioniscontradictedbythepreviouspronouncements
ofthisCourt.InBoardofCommissionerset.alv.DelaRosa, [248]theCourtutilizedapresumptionofcitizenshipinfavorof
respondentWilliamGatchalianonthebasisofanOrderoftheBureauofImmigrationadmittinghimasaFilipinocitizen.
OnMarch15,1973,thenActingCommissionerNitudaissuedanOrder(Annex"6",counterpetitionwhichaffirmedtheBoardof
SpecialInquiryNo.1decisiondatedJuly6,1961admittingrespondentGatchalianandothersasFilipinocitizensrecalledthe
July6,1962warrantofarrestanrevalidatedtheirIdentificationCertificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which
respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the
presumptionofcitizenshipliesinfavorofrespondentWilliamGatchalian.
In2004,apresumptionwaslikewisemadeythisCourttoresolveissuesinvolvingthecitizenshipofpresidentialcandidate
FernandoPoe,Jr.inTecsonv.COMELEC.[249]Inparticular,thepresumptionthatPoe'sgrandfatherhadbeenaresidentofSanCarlos,
Pangasinan, from 1898 to 1902, entitled him to benefit from the en masse Filipinization effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. We
explained:
ThedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouwouldindicatethathediedon11September1954,attheageof84years,inSanCarlos,
Pangasinan.ItcouldthusbeassumedthatLorenzoPouwasbornsometimeintheyear1870whenthePhilippineswasstilla
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippine during the crucial period of from 1898 to
1902consideringthattherewasnoexistingrecordaboutsuchfactintheRecordsManagementanArchivesOffice.Petitioner,
however,likewisefailedtoshowthatLorenzoPouwasatanyotherplaceduringthesameperiod.Inhisdeathcertificate,the
residenceofLorenzoPouwasstatedtobeSanCarlos,Pangasinan.Intheabsenceofanyevidencetothecontrary,itshouldbe
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Of ice would have had
completerecordsofallresidentsofthePhilippinesfrom1898to1902.
xxxx
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessarytotakeonthematterofwhetherornotprivaterespondentFPJisanaturalborncitizen,which,inturn,dependedon
whetherornotthefatherofprivaterespondent,AllanF.Poe,wouldhavehimselfbeenaFilipinocitizenand,intheaffirmative,

whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of private respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putativefather.AnyconclusionontheFilipinocitizenshipofLorenzoPoucouldonlybedrawnfromthepresumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been ho n sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou wouldhavebenefitedfromtheen masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Thatcitizenship(ofLorenzoPou),ifacquired,wouldtherebyextendtohisson,AllanF.Poe,fatherofprivaterespondentFPJ.
The1935Constitution,duringwhichregimeprivaterespondentFPJhasseenfirstlight,conferscitizenshiptoallpersonswhose
fatherseFilipinocitizensregardlessofwhethersuchchildrenarelegitimateorillegitimate.(Emphasissupplied)
It is reasonable to presume that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, considering that she was found abandoned in Iloilo at a time when the
numberofchildrenborntoforeignersinthecountryasbutasmallfractionofthetotalnumberofbirthsinthePhilippines.[250]without
evidencetothecontrary,thispresumptionmuststandinaccordancewiththerulesonevidence.
ThePlaceofProbabilityintheRuleofLaw
Obedience to the rule of law is the bedrock of the Philippine justice system.[251]In order to expound and define the true meaning and
operation of these laws, they must first be ascertained by judicial determination, and in order "to produce uniformity in these
determinations,theyoughttobesubmitted,inthelastresort,toonesupremetribunalxxxauthorizedtosettleanddeclare
inthelastresortauniformrulefciviljustice."[252]
Therulesofevidence,authorizedbytheConstitution,isameansbywhichuniformityisinstitutedinthejudicialsystemwhetherincourts
oflaworadministrativeagenciesgrantedquasiadjudicatorypower.Theserulesgovernthemeansofascertainingthetruthrespectinga
matteroffact.[253]
Itmustbeemphasizedthatascertainingevidencedoesnotentailabsolutecertainty.UnderRule128oftheRulesofCourt,evidencemust
onlyinducebeliefintheexistenceofafactinissue,thus:
Section4.Relevancycollateralmatters.Evidencemusthavesucharelationtothefactinissueastoinducebeliefin
its existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonabledegreetoestablishtheprobabilityorimprobabilityofthefactinissue.(Emphasissupplied)
Hence,judgesarenotprecludedfromdrawingconclusionsfrominferencesbasedonestablishedfacts.InthecaseofJoaquinv.Navarro,
[254]theCourtproceededtodiscussthisprocess:[255]

In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain
enoughtojustifyafindingoffact."
xxxx
"Juriesmustoftenreason,"saysoneauthor,"accordingtoprobabilities,drawinganinferencethatthemainfact
in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital
questioninsuchcasesisthecogencyoftheproofaffordedbythesecondaryfacts.Howlikely,accordingtoexperience,isthe
existenceoftheprimaryfactifcertainsecondaryfactsexist?"Thesameauthortellsusofacasewhere"ajurywasjustifiedin
drawingtheinferencethatthepersonwhowascaughtfiringashotatananimaltrespassingonhislandwasthepersonwho
firedashotaboutanhourbeforeatthesameanimalalsotrespassing."ThatInfact,thecircumstancesintheillustrationleave
greaterroomforanotherpossibilitythandothefactsofthecaseathand.[256](Emphasissuppliedandcitationsomitted)
This is enshrined in established legal doctrines, including that of probable cause for preliminary investigation,[257] probable cause for
issuanceofawarrantofarrest,[258]substantialevidence,[259]preponderanceofevidence,[260]andcharacterevidence.[261]
Jurisprudence is replete with cases decided on the basis of probability. For example, the Court affirmed an award of workrelated
compensationtoanemployeewhocontractedrectalcancerbasedonaprobability,statingthus:
Thedegreeofproofrequiredtoestablishworkconnectionbetweenthedisablingailmentandtheworkingconditionsismerely
substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion"
Probabilitynotcertaintyisthetouchstoneintestingevidenceofworkconnection. [262](Emphasisintheoriginalandcitations
omitted).
In criminal cases, it has also been ruled that "extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical with
eachotherintheiressentialdetailsandarecorroboratedbyotherevidenceonrecord,areadmissibleascircumstantial evidence against
thepersonimplicatedtoshowtheprobabilityofthelatter'sactualparticipationinthecommissionofthecrime."[263]
Note that the two cases cited pertain to different quantum of evidence (substantial for administrative and beyond reasonable doubt for
criminal),butbothhaverelieduponprobabilitiestoruleuponnissue.Inthatsense,itcanbeconcludedthatprobabilitiesareconsidereds
essentialelementsofthejudicialdeterminationofrelevantevidence.
Whileitistruethatadministrativeorquasijudicialbodiesarenotboundbythetechnicalrulesofprocedureintheadjudicationofcases,
this procedural rule should not be construed as a lice se to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.[264] In the instant case
COMELECrefusedtoconsiderevidencethattendsto"establishtheprobabilityofafactinissue,"whichinthiscasepertainstopetitioner's
citizenship, claiming that it "did not and could not show bloodline to a Filipino pare t as required under jus sanguinis."[265] This, to my
mind,constitutesgrossmisappreciationofthefacts.
First and foremost, it is admitted that petitioner has typical Filipino features, with her brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair, oval
shaped face and height. This by itself, does not evince belief that as to her definite citizenship, but coupled with other circumstantial

evidencethat she was abandoned as an infant, that the population of Iloilo in 1968 was Filipino[266] and there were not international
airportsinIloiloathattimeestablishestheprobabilitytheshewasbornofFilipinoparents.
SuchprobabilityisfurtherenhancedbythestatisticsobtainedfromthePhilippineStatisticsAuthority,showingthat 10,558,278 children
(99.03%) were born to Filipino parents while 15,98 (0.07%) were born to foreigners in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975.[267]
Consideringthatthee1ectioncasesrequireamerepreponderanceofevidence,[268]then it can be reasonably concluded that petitioner
has fulfilled the requirements of citizenship under the law. In the words of Justice Tuazon in Joaquin,this conclusion is not airtight but
rationalnevercertainbutplainenoughtojustifyafact.
The rationale for implementing this policy is simple to require abandoned children to prove their parentage or status before they are
grantedprotectionwouldcompoundtheiralreadydirepredicament.Thatrequirementwouldrendertheseunfortunatechildrenevenmore
vulnerable, in contravention of the declared policy of the State to "defend the right of children to assistance, including proper care an
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."[269]
Respondentmayheconsideredanaturalborn
citizenunderthe1935Constitution.
Having established that foundlings may be presumed citizens of the Philippines, the question now turns to whether they may be
considered naturalborn. I believe that this issue may be resolved by utilizing both an originalist and a functionalist approach to the
interpretationoftheConstitution.
Originalistv.FunctionalistInterpretation
InitsMemorandum,theCOMELECassertedthatfoundlingscannotbeconsiderednaturalborncitizensinlightoftheprincipleofinclusion
unius est exclusion alterius.[270] This line of reasoning stems from an originalist reading of the Constitution, which is anchored on the
principlethatconstitutionalissuesaretoberesolvedbylookingonlyatthetextoftheConstitutionandattheclearintentoftheframers.
[271] Intentionalism is a species of originalism. Another species is textualism, which has been described as "that [which] looks to the

Constitution'soriginalpublicmeaning,"[272]or"read[s]thelanguageoftheConstitutionasthemanonthestreetwouldunderstandit."
[273]

Itisafallacy,however,toassertthatthereisonlyoneoriginalist/textualistapproachtointerprettheConstitution.Thereare
many approaches to constitutional interpretation, subclassified into a) originalism v. nonoriginalism, and b) formalism v.
functionalism,amongothers.InhiscommentaryonthePhilippineConstitution,Bernasenumeratedanddescribedatleastfive
modes of constitutional interpretation, i.e. historical approach,[274] structural approach,[275] doctrinal approach,[276] ethical
approach,[277]andprudentialapproach.[278]
In legal scholarship, the functionalist approach appears to be defined most clearly by what it is not it is not formalism.[279] William
Eskridge, a member of the Yale Law School faculty wrote a paper entitled "Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in
SeparationofPowersCases"inwhichhedistinguishedformalismfromfunctionalism:
There are no fewer than three different ways that constitutional formalism and functionalism can be contrasted. One is their
apparently different approach to legal rules and standards. Formalism might be associated with brightline rules that seek to
placedeterminate,readilyenforceablelimitsonpublicactors.Functionalism,atleastasanantipode,mightbeassociatedwith
standardsorbalancingteststhatseektoprovidepublicactorswithgreaterflexibility.
Another way of contrasting formalism and functionalism focuses on the reasoning process by which we reach rules or
standards.Formalismmightbeunderstoodasdeductionfromauthoritativeconstitutionaltext,structure,originalintent,orall
three working together. Functionalism might be understood as inductionfrom constitutional policy and practice, with practice
typically being examined over time. Formalist reasoning promises stability and continuity of analysis over time functionalist
reasoningpromisesadaptabilityandevolution.
Finallyandrelatedly,formalismandfunctionalismcouldbecontrastedasemphasizingdifferentgoalsforlaw.Formalismmight
beunderstoodasgivingprioritytoruleoflawvaluessuchastransparency,predictability,andcontinuityinlaw.Functionalism,
inturn,mightbeunderstoodasemphasizingpragmaticvalueslikeadaptability,efficacy,andjusticeinlaw.[280]
IemphasizethatthisCourthasutilizeddifferentapproachestointerpretingtheConstitution.Itisnotmandatedtofakeonlyanoriginalist
viewofthefundamentallaw.Onthecontrary:theCourt,throughJusticeJoseP.Laurel,consideredthe1935Constitutiontobea"living
constitution.[281]ThisconceptissaidtohaveoriginatedfromMissouriv.Holland[282]pennedbyJusticeOliverWendellHolmes:
Whenwearedealingwithwordsthatalsoareaconstituentact,liketheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,wemustrealizethat
theyhavecalledintolifeabeingthedevelopmentofwhichcouldnothavebeenforeseencompletelybythemostgiftedofits
begetters.Itwasenoughforthemtorealizeortohopethattheyhadcreatedanorganismithastakenacenturyandhascost
theirsuccessorsmuchsweatandbloodtoprovethattheycreatedanation.(Emphasissupplied)
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in his Notion of Living Constitution, [283] ventured to say that the framers purposely couched the
UnitedStatesConstitutioningeneralterms:
TheframersoftheConstitutionwiselyspokeingenerallanguageandlefttosucceedinggenerationsthetaskofapplyingthat
languagetotheunceasinglychangingenvironmentinwhichtheywouldlive.Thosewhoframed,adopted,andratifiedtheCivil
WaramendmentstotheConstitutionlikewiseusedwhathavebeenaptlydescribedas"majesticgeneralities"incomposingthe
fourteenth amendment. Merely because a particular activity may not have existed when the Constitution was adopted, or
becausetheframerscouldnothaveconceivedofaparticularmethodoftransactingaffairs,cannotmeanthatgenerallanguage
intheConstitutionmaynotbeappliedtosuchacourseofconduct.WheretheframersoftheConstitutionhaveusedgeneral

language,theyhavegivenlatitudetothosewhowouldlaterinterprettheinstrumenttomakethatlanguageapplicabletocases
thattheframersmightnothaveforeseen.(EmphasisSupplied)
TheoristsutilizingthefunctionalistapproachhavelikenedConstitutionstoanimatebeingsthatcanevolvetotheextentthattheybecome
hardlyrecognizablebytheirframers.Inotherwords,theybelievethattheConstitutionmaybeinterpretedinamannerthatgoesbeyond
theoriginalintentofthepersonswhocraftedthetext.
Inthiscase,theuseofboththeoriginalistandthefunctionalistapproachesleadstothesameresultthatpetitionerpadsufficientreason
tobelievethatsheisanaturalborncitizendespitetheadmittedfactthatshewasafoundling.
TheOriginalistApproach:
Interpretationinaccordancewiththe
intentoftheframers
RespondentsurgetheCourttoresolvethecitizenshipissueinthiscasebyusingtheoriginalistapproach,i.e.tomakeaninterpretation
basedprimarilyonanexaminationofthetextandtheoriginalintentoftheframersofthe1935Constitution.Theypositthattherewasno
intentonthepartofthedelegatestothe1934ConstitutionalConventiontoconsiderfoundlingsasnaturalborncitizens,"forhaditbeen
so, the text of the provision would have explicitly stated it."[284] In thy opinion, this is a simplistic reading of the Constitution that
disregardstheintentoftheframers.
WherethetermsoftheConstitutionitselfdonotrevealtheintentoftheframersandtherestofthepeople,extrinsicaidsmayberesorted
to,evenwhenusinganoriginalistapproach.TheanswermaybeprovidedbythedebatesorproceedingsintheConstitutionalConvention,
thecontemporaneouslegislativeorexecutiveconstruction,history,andtheeffectsresultingfromtheconstructioncontemplated[285]Here,
therecordsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionprovethattheframersintendedtoaccordnaturalborncitizenshiptofoundlings.
Ithasbeenarguedthatthenoninclusionofaprovisionon"naturalchildrenofaforeignfatherandaFilipinomothernotrecognizedbythe
father" negates the intent to consider foundlings naturalborn citizens (or even merely citizens). However, the Court cannot infer the
absenceofintenttoincludefoundlingsbasedonthatfactalone.Indeed,thetranscriptofthedeliberationsduringthe1934Constitutional
ConventionshowswhyitwasdecidedthatfoundlingswerenottobeexpresslymentionedinSection1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution:
Sr.Rafols:Foranamendment,IproposethatafterIsubsection2,thefollowingisinserted:'Thenaturalchildrenofaforeign
fatherandaFilipinomothernotrecognizedbythefather.'
ElPresidente:Wewouldliketorequestaclarificationfromtheproponentoftheamendment.Thegentlemanreferstonatural
childrenortoanykindofillegitimatechildren?
Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate
childrenofunknownparents.
Sr.Montinola:Forclarification.Thegentlemansaid'ofunknownparents.'CurrentcodesconsiderthemFilipino,thatis,Irefer
totheSpanishCodewhereinallchildrenofunknownparentageborninSpanishterritoryareconsideredSpaniards,becausethe
presumptionisthat~childofunknownparentageisthesonofaSpaniard.ThismaybeappliedinthePhilippinesinthatachild
ofunknownparentageborninthePhilippinesisdeemedtobeFilipino,andthereisnoneed...
Sr.Rafols:Thereisaneed,becausewearerelatingtheconditionsthatare[required]tobeFilipino.
Sr.Montinola:Butthatistheinterpretationofthelaw,therefore,thereisnoneedfortheamendment.
Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: 'Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by
one,orthechildrenofunknownparentage.'
Sr.Briones:Theamendment[should]meanchildrenborninthePhilippinesofunknownparentage.
Sr.Rafols:ThesonofaFilipinatoaforeigner,althoughthis[person]doesnotrecognizethechild,isnotunknown.
ElPresidente:Doesthegentlemanaccepttheamendmentornot?
Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner
whodoesnotrecognizethechild.TheirparentageisnotunknownandIthink those children of overseas Filipino mother and
father[whomthelatter]doesnotrecognize,shouldalsobeconsideredasFilipinos.
ElPresidente:ThequestioninorderistheamendmenttotheamendmentfromthegentlemanfromCebu,Mr.Briones.:
Mr.Bulson:Mr.President,don'tyouthinkitwouldbebettertoleavethismatterinthehandsoftheLegislature?:
Sr.Roxas:Mr.President,myhumbleopinionisthatthesecasesarefewandfarbetween,thattheconstitutionneed[not]refer
to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this
nationisrecognized,anditisnotnecessarytoincludeaprovisiononthesubjectexhaustively.
Thedelegatesappearedtohavebeenconvince4thattherewasnoneedtoincludeabindingprovisiononthesubjectforthe1following
reasons:theSpanishCivilCodealreadyrecognizesfoundlingswerebornofSpanishcitizens,andwerethusSpanish(Sr.Montinola)that
the citizenship of foundlings could be determined by Congress (Sr. Buslon) that the cases were so few and far between that the
Constitution did not need to refer to them (Sr. Roxas) or international law already recognized children or people born in a country of
unknownparentsascitizensofthatcountry(Sr.Roxas).
Forthesereasons,theybelievedthatitwasnolong1ernecessarytoincludefoundlingsamongthosetobeexpresslyenumerated in the
1935Constitution.TherecordisbereftofanyproposalbyanydelegatetodenyfoundlingsFilipinocitizenship.Itwouldeven
appearthatthosedelegateswhospokecouldnotimagineanyotherinterpretationthanthatfoundlingsaretobeconsidered
Filipinos.

ThetextualsilenceonfoundlingsinArticleIV,Section1isconsistentwiththeprinciplethatagoodConstitutionisbrief,comprehensive,
anddefinite.[286]Themajority[287]ofthedelegates,beinglawyers,musthavesubscribedtotheacceptedprinciplethattheConstitutionis
unavoidablyrequiredtobecouchedingenerallanguage:
It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its
powersortodeclarethemeansbywhichthosepowersshouldbecarriedintoexecution.Itwasforeseenthatthiswouldbeaperilous
anddifficult,ifnotanimpracticable,task.Theinstrumentwasnotintendedtoprovidemerelyfortheexigenciesofafewyears,but
wastoendurethroughalonglapseofages,theeventsofwhichwerelockedupintheinsrutablepurposesofProvidence.Itcould
not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the
charter, and restrictions and specifications which at the present might seem salutary might in the end prove the overthrow of the
systemitself.Henceitspowersareexpressedingeneralterms,leavingtothelegislaturefromtimetotimetoadoptitsownmeans
toeffectuatelegitimateobjectsandtomouldandmodeltheexerciseofitspowersasitsownwisdomandthepublicinterests,should
require.[288]
TheunderstandingthattheConstitutionmustbebriefevenasitisbroadisevidentinSr.Roxas'statementduringthedeliberationsthat
casesofchildrenbornofunknownparentagewereso"fewkindfarinbetween,thattheconstitutionneednotrefertothem."Notably,no
oneraised a comment or an objection in response to Delegate Roxas' remark. The framers might have also accepted, regardless of its
veracity,thatinternationallawregardsfoundlingsascitizensofthecountrywheretheywerefound.Theymayhavebelieved,asamatter
offact,thatcurrentcodesalreadyconsideredchildrenofunknownparentsasFilipinos.
Whatisclearfromthedeliberationsisthattheframerscouldnothaveintendedtoplacefoundlingsinlimbo,asthesocialjusticeprinciple
embodiedinSection5,ArticleIIofthe1935Constitutionindiscriminatelycovered"allofthepeople."Socialjusticehasbeendefinedas
"thehumanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated."[289]Itmeansthepromotionofthewelfareofallthepeople.[290]Itisfoundedonthe
recognitionofthenecessityofinterdependenceamongdiverseunitsofasocietyandoftheprotectionthatshouldbeequallyandevenly
extendedtoallgroupsasacombinedforceinoursocialandeconomiclife.Thisrecognitionisconsistentwiththestate'sfundamentaland
paramount objective of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and bringing about the greatest good to the greatest
number.[291]
TheFunctionalistApproach:
Interpretationconsistentwithnatural
justice
Theissueofcitizenshipmayalsoberesolvedusingthefunctionalapproachtoconstitutionalinterpretation.Underthismethod,theCourt
shouldadoptaninterpretationthatwouldallowtheConstitutiontofulfillitspurpose.
Takinghistoricalconsiderationsintoaccount,itisbeyond cavil that the Constitution would not function as envisioned if we give judicial
imprimatur to the COMELEC's argument. It claims that the 1935 Constitution, as well as the 1973 and 1987 constitutions, excluded
foundlings from being citizens merely on the ground that they could not establish a blood relationship with a Filipino father. This
interpretationwouldlikewisegoagainstthefundamentalprincipleofnaturaljustice.
Mixtureofjussoliandjussanguinis
ThehistoryofcitizenshiplawsinthePhilippinesshowsthatwehaveneveradoptedapurelyjus sanguinis regime. Ours is a mixture of
elementsofjussoliandjussanguinis,whichweinheritedfromtheAmericansandtheSpaniards,respectively.Infact,aswillbeelaborated
inthesucceedingsection,theconceptof"naturalborncitizenship"originatedfromajussolijurisdiction.
TheCOMELEChowever,opinesthatonlythosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippinesareconsiderednaturalborncitizensunderthe
1935Constitution.[292]CitingVallesv.Comelec, [293]itarguesthatnaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshipisacquiredatthemomentofbirth
on the basis of blood relationship.[294] This is a gross misreading of the case. The Court in Valles did say that the principle of jus
sanguinis,whichconfers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
however, the Court never stated that jus sanguinis had ever been the exclusive regime in this jurisdiction. On the contrary, Rosalind
Lopez'sfather,fromwhomshederivedherPhilippinecitizenship,wasconsideredbytheCourtasaPhilippinecitizenbasedonhisbirthin
Daet,CamarinesNorte,in1879,ajussoliapplication:ofcitizenshiprules.
Far from adhering to an exclusively jus sanguinis regime, at least four modes of acquiring citizenship have operated in the: Philippine
jurisdictionsincetheturnofthecentury:jussoli,jussanguinis,resjudicataandnaturalization.Jussoliusedtopredominatebutuponthe
effectivityofthe1935Constitution,jussanguinisbecamethepredominatingregime.[295]
Citizenshippriortothe1935Constitution
The first Civil Code adopted in the Philippines was the Spanish Civil Code,[296] which became effective on 18 December 1889. It
enumeratedwhowereSpaniards:
Article17.ThefollowingareSpaniards:
(a)PersonsborninSpanishterritory,
(b)ChildrenofaSpanishfatherormother,eveniftheywerebornoutsideofSpain,
(c)Foreignerswhohaveobtainednaturalizationpapers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. (Emphasis
supplied)
On21January1899,theMalolosConstitution,whichwasframedbythenationalassemblyofthefirstPhilippineRepublic,was
promulgated.AllpersonsborninthePhilippineterritorywereconsideredasFilipinos:

Article6.ThefollowingareFilipinos:
1.AllpersonsborninthePhilippineterritory.AvesselofPhilippineregistryisconsidered,forthispurpose,aspartof
Philippineterritory.
2.ChildrenofaFilipinofatherormother,althoughbornoutsideofthePhilippines.
3.Foreignerswhohaveobtainedcertificationofnaturalization.
4.Thosewho,withoutsuchcertificate,haveacquiredadomicileinanytownwithinPhilippineterritory.
ItisunderstoodthatdomicileisacquiredbyuninterruptedresidencefortwoyearsinanylocalitywithinPhilippineterritory,with
anopenabodeandknownoccupation,andcontributingtoallthetaxesimposedbytheNation.
TheconditionofbeingaFilipinoislostinaccordancewithlaw.(Emphasissupplied)
TheMalolosConstitutionwasshortlivedandwasinforceonlyintheplaceswerethefirstPhilippineRepublichadcontrolOn11April1899,
the Treaty of Paris between Spain and America took effect. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in Tecson v. Comelec[297] implied that between 10
December1898whenthepartiesenteredintothetreatyand11April1899,whenittookeffect,Spanishcivillawremainedintact.[298]
Theterm"citizensofthePhilippineIslands"wasintroducedafewyearslaterthroughSection4ofthePhilippineBillof1902:
Section4.ThatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandscontinuingtoresidethereinwhowereSpanishsubjectsontheeleventh
clayofApril,eighteenhundredandninetynine,andthenresidedinsaidPhilippineIslands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequent
thereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsandassuchentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnited
States,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
thetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpainsignedatParisDecembertenth,eighteenhundredandninetyeight.
UnderthePhilippineBill,acitizenofthePhilippineswasonewhowasaninhabitantofthePhilippinesandaSpanishsubjecton11April
1899.Theterminhabitantwastakentoinclude1)anativeborninhabitant2)aninhabitantwhowasanativeofPeninsularSpainor3)
aninhabitantwhoobtainedSpanishpapersonorbefore11April1899.[299]
ControversyaroseonthestatusofchildrenborninthePhilippinesfrom11April1899to1July1902,duringwhichperiodnocitizenship
law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time that the common law
principleofjussoligovernedthoseborninthePhilippineArchipelagowithinthatperiod.[300]Jussoliwas also known as the principle of
territoriality,whichwasoperativeintheUnitedStatesandEngland.
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law, restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill: of 1902 as
amendedbytheActofCongressin1912:[301]
Section 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundredandninetynine,andthenresidedinsaidIslands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentlythereto,shallbedeemedand
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
SpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParisDecember
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninetyeight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithintheforegoingprovisions,thenativesoftheinsular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States,orwhocouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStatesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."
Underthe.JonesLaw,nativeborninhabitantsofthePhilippinesweredeemedtobecitizensofthePhilippinesasof11April1899ifthey
were (1) subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899 (2) residing in the Philippines on that date and (3) since that date, not citizens of some
othercountry.[302]
Citizenshipunderthe1935,1973and1987
Constitutions
ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitutionprovides:
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
1.ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
2.ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublic
officeinthePhilippineIslands.
3.ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
4.ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
5.Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
Items1and4oftheforegoingsectionshowthatthe1935Constitutionwasnotbasedpurelyonthejussanguinisprinciple.Taking into
accountthehistoryofourcitizenshipprovisions,thephrase"thosewhowerecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoption
ofthisConstitution"clearlyincludedthosewhodidnothaveasingledropofFilipinobloodinthem.Moreover,"thoseborninthePhilippine
Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office" were also automatically
consideredcitizensdespitethefactthattheywereofforeignblood.

Significantly,theprovisionsofSection1(1)ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitutionwerecarriedovertothe1973and1987Constitutions.
[303]TheonlydifferencewasthereferencetothecountryasPhilippines"insteadof"PhilippineIslands."

Consideringthemixtureofcitizenshipregimescurrentlyinforce,itisnotcorrecttosaythatthereisanexclusivejussanguinisprinciplein
place,andbecauseofthatprinciple,thatpetitioneristherebyrequired,regardlessofthefactthatsheisafoundling,tosubmitproofof
herbloodrelationshiptoaFilipinofather.Toruleotherwisewouldbetoimplementapurelyjussanguinisregimecontrarytothehistoryof
theConstitution.
Functionalityinaccordwithnaturaljustice
Aspreviouslyexplained,theConstitutionismeanttoadvancethefundamentalvaluesoftheFilipinopeople,inparticular,thosearticulated
inthePreamble:thepromotionofgeneralwelfare[304]thecreationofajustandhumanesociety[305]andtheprotectionoftheblessings
ofindependenceanddemocracyunderaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,equality,andpeaceinaccordancewiththeruleoflaw.
[306]TheConstitutionmustbeinterpretedtoallowittofunctioninaccordancewiththeseideals.Thus,theCourtshouldnotconstruethe

citizenshipprovisionsofthe1935Constitutioninamannerthatwouldunjustlydeprivefoundlingsofcitizenshipandrenderthemstateless.
To emphasize, from the time that the Supreme Court was vested with the power to interpret the law, We have exercised this power in
accordancewithwhatisrightandjust.Citizenshipcasesarenoexception.Inpreviouscases,theCourthasinfactinterpretedthelawon
citizenshipinaccordancewithnaturaljustice.
InRoa v. Collector,[307] We have assumed that the principle of jus soli was applicable. This assumption was affirmed in Torres v. Tan
Chim[308]andGallofinv.Ordonez,[309]inwhichthisCourtheldthattheprincipleofjussoliwasfollowedwithreferencetoindividualswho
werebornofChinesefathersandFilipinomothers.[310]
InTalarocv.Uy, [311]WeheldthatinmakingjussanguinisthepredominatingprincipleinthedeterminationofPhilippinecitizenship,the
Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. We
ruled that if, on the strength of Roa, a person was considered al fullfledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the
Constitution when jus soli was the prevailing doctrine, that person cannot be divested of Filipino citizenship.[312] The Court also stated
that "it would be neither fair nor good policy to hold Uy an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship in the face of legal
principlesthathavetheforceoflaw."[313]
Theprinciplesofnaturaljusticewerealsoutilizedinothercasestoavoidanunfairoutcome.InSaledePorkanv.Yatco,[314]Weupheld
the validity of a contract over a parcel of land in favor of a "nonChristian inhabitant of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu." The
contractwasconsideredvaliddespitethelackofapprovalbytheprovincialgovernoroftheprovincewherethecontractwasexecutedas
mandatedbytheAdministrativeCodeofMindanaoandSulu.TheCourtheld:
But if the contract, Exhibit B, is avoided, the result would be just the contrary, for the nonChristian plaintiffappellant here
wouldbedivestedofownershipoverthehouseswhichwerecededtohimbyCdeSandwhichhenowpossesses.Thiswould
defeatthelegislativeaimandpurpose,destroysubstantialequities,andthwartthepostulatesofnaturaljustice.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, [315] We also prevented injustice by freeing a Filipino woman from her marital obligations after she had been
divorcedbyherforeignerhusband:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondentandstillsubjecttoawife'sobligationsunderArticle109,et.seq.oftheCivilCodecannotbejust.Petitionershould
notbeobligedtolivetogetherwith,observerespectandfidelity,andrendersupporttoprivaterespondent.Thelattershould
notcontinuetobeoneofherheirswithpossiblerightstoconjugalproperty.Sheshouldnotbediscriminatedagainstinherown
countryiftheendsofjusticearetobeserved.
Conceptof"naturalborn"citizenship
Therequirementofnaturalborncitizenshipshouldserveonlytodenycertainprivilegestothosewhohavegonethroughtheprocessof
naturalizationinordertoacquireandperfecttheircitizenship.Theconcept,originallymeanttodistinguishthosewhoare"naturalborn"
fromthosewhoare"foreignborn"injussolijurisdictions,cannot:beusedtojustifythedenialofcitizenshipstatustofoundlingsbecause
oftheirinabilitytoproveacertainbloodrelationship.
"Naturalborn"citizenshipandjussoli
An examination of the origin of the term "naturalborn" reveals that it was lifted by the Philippines from the United States (U.S.)
Constitution,whichstates:
NoPersonexceptanaturalbornCitizen,oraCitizenoftheUnitedStates,atthetimeoftheAdoptionofthisConstitution,shall
beeligibletotheOfficeofthePresidentneithershallanypersonbeeligibletothatOfficewhoshallnothaveattainedtothe
AgeofthirtyfiveYears,andbeenfourteenYearsaResidentwithintheUnitedStates.[316](Capitalizationintheoriginal)
TheU.S.Constitutionitselfdoesnotdefinetheterm.However,numerousholdingsandreferencesinfederalandstatecaseshaveclearly
indicated that those born in the United States andsubjecttoitsjurisdiction(i.e.,notborntoforeigndiplomatsortooccupying military
forces),eveniftheywereborntoalienparents,arecitizens"atbirth"or"bybirth,"andare"naturalborn,"asopposedto"naturalized,"
U.S.citizens.[317]
Asamatterofinclusion,ithasbeenheldthatitisbeyonddisputethatanyonebornonAmericansoilwithanAmericanparentisa"natural
borncitizen."[318]Asamatterofexclusion,anyonewhosecitizenshipisacquiredafterbirthasaresultof"naturalization"isnota"natural
born citizen."[319] The meaning of the naturalborn citizen clause became politically salient in the U.S. when John McCain became the
RepublicannomineeforPresidentinSeptemberof2008.HewasborninthePanamaCanalZonetoparentswhowereAmericancitizens.
[320]

Thephrase"naturalborncitizen"founditswaytoAmericafromEngland.Whiletherehadbeennoextensiveusageofthephraseduring
thefoundingeraoftheUS(17741797),itseemsclearthatitwasderivedfrom"naturalbornsubject,"whichhadatechnicalmeaningin
Englishlawandconstitutionaltheory.[321]TheframersoftheUSConstitutionwouldhavebeenfamiliarwithBlackstone'sCommentaries
whichJamesMadison(hailedasthe"FatheroftheConstitution")describedas"abookwhichisineveryman'shand"andwouldhave
understoodthatthefundamentalpremiseofnaturalborncitizenshipwasaconceptofallegiancetothesovereignatbirth.[322]
Indeed,theEnglishlexicographerSamuelJohnsondefined"natural"as"native,"whichmaymeaneitheran"inhabitant"oran"offspring."
[323]TheconceptionofnaturalbornsubjectsunderBritishlawistiedtothatofnaturalallegiancetoasovereign.Thisconceptionisbased

primarily on being born within the territory subject to the sovereign's rule, but with the addition of others (such as the children of
ambassadorsorofthesovereignsthemselves)whohavea"naturalallegiance"tothesovereign.
Blackstonewrites:
Thefirstandmostobviousdivisionofthepeopleisintoaliensandnaturalbornsubjects.Naturalbornsubjectsaresuchasare
bornwithinthedominionsofthecrownofEngland,thatis,withintheligeance,orasitisgenerallycalled,theallegianceofthe
kingandaliens,suchasarebornoutofit.Allegianceisthetie,orligamen,whichbindsthesubjecttotheking,inreturnfor
thatprotectionwhichthekingaffordsthesubject.Thethingitself,orsubstantialpartofit,isfoundedinreasonandthenature
ofgovernmentthenameandtheformarederivedtousfromourGothicancestors.
xxxx
Allegiance,bothexpressandimplied,ishoweverdistinguishedbythelawintotwosortsorspecies,theonenatural,theother
localtheformerbeingalsoperpetual,thelattertemporary.Naturalallegianceissuchasisduefromallmenbornwithinthe
king'sdominionsimmediatelyupontheirbirth.For,immediatelyupontheirbirth,theyareundertheking'sprotectionatatime
too,when(duringtheirinfancy)theyareincapableofprotectingthemselves.
xxxx
WhenIsay,thatanalienisonewhoisbornoutoftheking'sdominions,orallegiance,thisalsomustbeunderstoodwithsome
restrictions.Thecommonlawindeedstoodabsolutelysowithonlyaveryfewexceptions:sothataparticularactofparliament
became necessary after the restoration, for the naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign
countriesduringthelatetroubles.Andthismaximofthelawproceededuponageneralprinciple,thateverymanowesnatural
allegiancewhereheisborn,andcannotowetwosuchallegiances,orservetwomasters,atonce.Yetthechildrenoftheking's
ambassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not
even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of
postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by his father, the ambassador.[324] (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the original opposite of the term "naturalborn" is not "naturalized," but
"foreignborn."The term was meant to distinguish between those born within a certain territory and those born outside it.
Bloodordescentwasirrelevant.However,becauseofthemixtureofcommonlawandcivillawinourjurisdiction,theoriginal
conceptofnaturalborncitizenshipseemstohavebeendiluted.
CitizensbyBirthv.Citizensby
Naturalization
Irrespectiveoftheoriginoftheconcept,theterm"naturalborn"wasusedbytheframersofthe1935,1973and1987Constitutionsto
delineatetheprivilegesofthosewhoarecitizensatbirth,fromthoseenjoyedbycitizenswhoarenaturalized.
The word "naturalborn" appeared thrice in the 1935 Constitution as a qualification for the presidency and vicepresidency, as well as
membershipintheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives.[325]Theframersofthe1935Constitution,however,didnotdefinetheterm.
Intheircommentaryonthe1935Constitution,TaadaandFernandoopinedthattherequirementthatapersonbeanaturalborncitizen
may be interpreted to mean that at the time of birth, the candidate was a Filipino citizen naturalized citizens are excluded.[326]
Proceedingfromthislogic,citizenswhodidnotacquiretheirPhilippinecitizenshipthroughnaturalizationhavethecitizenship
qualificationtorunforthepresidency.
The statements in these commentaries are supported by the deliberations of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. During the 1934
ConstitutionalConvention,DelegateAlejandrinoproposedtolimiteligibilityforthepresidencyandvicepresidencyonlytoFilipinocitizens
borninthePhilippinesofparentswhowerenotnaturalized.[327]Thisproposalwasshotdown.Itmustbenoted,though,thathereferred
to parents who were "not naturalized," instead of those who were "naturalborn." It may be inferred that the framers of the 1935
Constitution only intended to exclude those citizens who had been naturalized from occupying certain positions. Another section of the
deliberationsproceededinthismanner:
DelegateArtadi.Iamgoingtoaskareconsiderationwithrespecttothematterappearingonpage22Awhichtreatsofthe
interpretation of the words, 'naturalborn,' because I would like to inform the Assembly that I have had a conversation with
somemembersofthecommittee...andtheyexplainedtomethatthewords,'naturalborn,'donotnecessarilymean'bornin
thePhilippines'thatistosay,translatedintoSpanish,theymeanthatonewhopossessesallthequalificationstobePresident
oftherepublic,asitiswritten,isnotnecessarilyborninthePhilippines.Sothatforpurposesoftherecord,Iwouldlikeoneof
the members of the committee to explain the true interpretation of the words, 'naturalborn,' for the information of the
Assembly.
ThePresident.ThedelegatefromCapiz,Mr.Roxas,maypleasetellwhatistheexactequivalentofthosewords.
Delegate Roxas. Mr. President, the phrase, 'naturalborn citizen' appears in the Constitution of the United States but the
authorssaythatthisphrasehasneverbeenauthoritativelyinterpretedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinviewof

the fact that there has never been raised the question of whether or not an elected President fulfilled this condition. The
authors are uniform in the fact that the words, 'naturalborn' citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a person who is a
citizenbyreasonofhisbirth,andnotbynaturalizationorbyafurtherdeclarationrequiredbylawforcitizenship.
InthePhilippines,forexample,undertheprovisionsofthearticleoncitizenshipwhichwehaveapproved,allthosebornofa
fatherwhoisaFilipinocitizen,betheypersonsborninthePhilippinesoroutside,wouldbecitizensbybirthor'naturalborn.
And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the article which we approved about citizenship
requiresthat,uponreachingtheageofmajority,thischildneedstoindicatethecitizenshipwhichheprefers,andifheelects
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, then he shall be considered a Filipino citizen. According to this
interpretation, the child of a Filipino mother with a foreign father would not be a citizen by birth, because the law or the
Constitutionrequiresthathemakeafurtherdeclarationafterhisbirth.Consequently,thephrase,'naturalborncitizen,'as
it is used in the English text means a Filipino citizen by birth, regardless of where he was born.[328] (Emphasis
supplied)
The requirement of "naturalborn" citizenship was carried over to the 1973 Constitution[329] and then to the present Constitution.[330]
Confirmingtheoriginalvisionoftheframersofthe1935Constitution,the1973Constitutiondefinedthetermas"onewhoisacitizenof
thePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship."[331]The1973definitionwas
adoptedinthepresentConstitution,withtheaddedprovisothatthosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithparagraph(3),
[332]Section1ofArticleIV,shallbedeemednaturalborncitizens:

Art.IV,Section2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformany
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section1hereofshallbedeemednaturalborncitizens.
Sincethetermwasdefinedinthenegative,itisevidentthattheterm"naturalborncitizens"referstothosewhodonothavetoperform
anyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.Thedefinitionexcludesonlythosewhoarenaturalized.Fromthisinterpretation,it
maybeinferredthataFilipinocitizenwhodidnotundergothenaturalizationprocessisnaturalborn.AsWeexplainedinBengsonIIIv.
HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal:[333]
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarilyisanaturalbornFilipino.Noteworthyistheabsenceinsaidenumerationofaseparatecategoryforpersonswho,afterlosing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be naturalborn or
naturalizeddependingonthereasonsforthelossoftheircitizenshipandthemodeprescribedbytheapplicablelawforthereacquisition
thereof.
In Bengson, We also ruled that private respondent regained his status as a naturalborn citizen the moment he reacquired his Filipino
citizenshipthroughrepatriation.ThatpartoftheDecisionwillbediscussedinfurtherdetailinthesucceedingsections.
NotPurityofBlood
Naturalizedcitizensareformeraliensorforeignerswhohadtoundergoarigidprocedure,inwhichtheyhadtoadducesufficientevidence
toprovethattheypossessedallthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationstobecomeFilipinocitizensasprovidedbylaw.[334]In
contrast,asstatedintheearlycaseRoav.CollectorofCustoms,[335]anaturalborncitizenisaonewhohasbecomesuchatthemoment
ofbirth.
ItmaybeobservedfromtheexchangesduringthedeliberationsonthequalificationsofmembersoftheSupremeCourtthattheconcern
aboutthenaturalbornrequirementwasnotallaboutthequestionableallegianceofthosewithoutFilipinoblood,butofthosebornabroad
of Filipino parents. Delegate Lim expressed his understanding that the requirement was for the President to be "nativeborn," and his
reservationsaboutinstallingasmagistratesthosewhoarenotfamiliarwiththe"idiosyncrasiesofthepeople:"
How can we figure out that naturalized citizens could really interpret the purposes of this Constitution including the
idiosyncrasies of the people? We have as a matter of policy adopted the principle that the President of the Commonwealth
should be a native born. Our Supreme Court in some instances has the power much bigger than that of the President by
declaring our laws passed by the National Assembly as unconstitutional. That power makes the Supreme Court the supreme
interpreterofourlawsoftheland,andwhoelsebutnativebornpersons,individualswhohavebeenborninthecountry,can
interpret,asIsaid,thecustomsandhabitsofourpeople?[336]
Itmustbeemphasizedthatnaturalbornstatuswasneverintendedtobeameasureofthepurityofblood.ThisCourt,onreconsideration
inTanChong,[337]explainedwhybirthalonemaynotbesufficientbasisfortheacquisitionofcitizenship.Someoftheimportantelements
thatwouldmakeapersonlivinginacountryitscitizen:youthspentinthecountryintimateandendearingassociationwiththecitizens
amongwhomtheyliveknowledgeandprideofthecountry'spastbeliefinthegreatnessandsecurityofitsinstitutions,intheloftinessof
itsideas, and in the ability of the country's government to protect them, their children and their earthy possessions against perils from
withinandfromwithoutandtheirreadinesstodefendthecountryagainstthoseperils.[338]
In the same manner, blood relationship alone is not controlling.[339] The following groups of people, who technically have no "Filipino
blood,"wereeffectivelyconsideredcitizensbyvirtueofCommonwealthActNo.473orthe"RevisedNaturalizationLaw":
Section15.EffectoftheNaturalizationonWifeandChildren.Anywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizen
ofthePhilippines,andwhomightherselfbelawfullynaturalizedshallbedeemedacitizenofthePhilippines.
MinorchildrenofpersonsnaturalizedunderthislawwhohavebeenborninthePhilippinesshallbeconsideredcitizensthereof.
A foreignborn minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically
becomeaPhilippinecitizen,andaforeignbornminorchild,whoisnotinthePhilippinesatthetimetheparentisnaturalized,

shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when
stillaminor,inwhichcase,hewillcontinuetobeaPhilippinecitizenevenafterbecomingofage.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless
withinoneyearafterreachingtheageofmajority,hefailstoregisterhimselfasaPhilippinecitizenattheAmericanConsulate
ofthecountrywhereheresides,andtotakethenecessaryoathofallegiance.(Emphasissupplied)
A necessary implication of the above provision is that children born within the Philippines after the naturalization of their parent are
unqualifiedlycitizensofthecountry.Thisimplicationholdstrueevenifthenaturalizedparentispurelyofforeignblood.Moreover,because
theydonotneedtoperformanyacttoacquirePhilippinecitizenship,theymustbeconsiderednaturalborncitizensbydefinition.
Like foundlings, these groups are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. However, by implication of law, they are considered
naturalborncitizensdespitetheabsenceofasingledropofFilipinobloodinthem.Fromthisfact,onecandrawnootherconclusion:that
thenaturalbornclassificationhasnothingtodowithbloodlineorbirthright.
Foundlingnot"naturalizedinaccordance
withlaw"
Ithasbeenarguedthatafoundlingmayobtainonlynaturalizedcitizenship,becauseanactissupposedlyrequiredtoacquirethisstatus,
i.e., the registration of the child as a foundling after an administrative proceeding. In other words, it is contended that the process of
registrationeffectivelyamountstonaturalizationinaccordancewithlaw.Thiscontentionisunacceptableforthreereasons.
First, the phrase "naturalized in accordance with law" must be understood with reference to the naturalization process provided under
naturalization statutes. In several decisions, this Court has construed the meaning of the expression "in accordance with law" as an
allusiontoenablinglegislation.[340]Hence,naturalizationinArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitution,doesnotrefertojustanyact,
but to the specific procedure for naturalization prescribed by the legislature. The Court does not have the right to engage in judicial
legislationonnaturalizationwhentheConstitutionexclusivelyvestssaidpowerinCongress.
Second,registrationisnotanactthatcanbeattributedtoafoundling.PursuanttoSection5ofActNo.3752,[341]thepersonwhofinds
an abandoned child shall report the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances to the local civil registrar for
purposes of registration. This prescribed act is in sharp contrast to the naturalization process provided under the Revised Naturalization
Law,[342]whichrequirestheapplicantstothemselvespersonallyandvoluntarilyperformcertainactstoavailofnaturalizedcitizenship.In
particular,applicantsarerequiredto(a)fileadeclarationunderoaththeirbonafideintentiontobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines[343]
(b)fileapetitionforcitizenshipwithacompetentcourt[344](c)participateinahearingbeforeacompetentcourt[345]and(d)takean
oath of allegiance to the Philippines.[346] Needless to state, foundlings do not perform acts equivalent to any of these when they are
registered.Moreoftenthannot,theyarenotawareoftheircircumstanceswhentheyarebeingregisteredasfoundlings.
Third, it is possible to register a foundling by reporting the circumstances of the discovery to the local civil registrar without any
administrativeproceeding,iftheregistrationisdonepriortothesurrenderofthecustodyofthechildtotheDSWDoraninstitution.[347]It
is only when the child is turned over to the DSWD without having been registered with the local civil registrar that an administrative
proceedingisrequiredpriortotheissuanceofaFoundlingCertificate.[348]Ifachildisalreadyregisteredbythefinder,theadministrative
proceedingundertheRulesoftheDSWD[349]isfollowednotforthepurposeofallowingthatregistration,butonlytodeterminewhether
thechildmaybedeclaredlegallyavailableforadoption.
Petitionerdidnotlosehernaturalborn
statuswhenshereacquiredPhilippine
citizenshipunderR.A.9225.
Respondents also question the reacquisition by petitioner of her citizenship under R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re
acquisitionActof2003.Theyclaimthatonlynaturalborncitizensareallowedtoreacquirecitizenshipunderthelaw. Since petitioner is
allegedlynotacitizenofthePhilippines,sheisnotentitledtothisprivilege.
Thepremiseofpetitioner'sargumenthasalreadybeenextensivelyaddressedabove.Forreasonspreviouslyexplained,petitionermaybe
considered a naturalborn citizen hence, she may validly reacquire her citizenship under R.A. 9225. The other arguments raised by
respondentsareaddressedbelow.
AdoptionDecreeandAmendedBirth
Certificate
Inmyview,petitionerwasentitledtorelyupontheadoptiondecreeissuedinherfavorandtheamendedbirthcertificateissuedpursuant
thereto. These documents named Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces, and no other, as her parents for all intents and purposes. Her
relianceonthesedocumentsjustifiesherbeliefthatsheisanaturalborncitizenentitledtoavailherselfoftheprovisionsofR.A.9225.
It must be emphasized that adoption severs all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee and vests those rights in the
adopter.[350] Section 17 of R.A. 8552, in particular, provides that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopterforallintentsandpurposesandassuchisentitledtoalltherightsandobligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughter
borntothemwithout discrimination of any kind." Hence, upon the entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which
adoptedchildrenaredeemed"bornof"theiradoptiveparents:
...Theactofadoptionfixesastatus,viz.,thatofparentandchild.Moretechnically,itisanactbywhichrelations
of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has
beendefinedasthetakingintoone'sfamilyofthechildofanotherassonordaughterandheirandconferringon
it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationshipbetweenthechildanditsadoptiveparents,thechangeofnamewhichfrequentlyaccompaniesadoptionbeingmore

anincidentthantheobjectoftheproceeding.Thewelfareofthechildistheprimaryconsiderationinthedeterminationofan
applicationforadoption.Onthispart,thereisunanimousagreement.
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the
child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and allotherlegalconsequencesandincidentsofthenatural
relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject,
however,tosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasmaybebystatuteimposed.[351](Emphasissupplied)
As proof of this new relationship, an adoptee's original birth certificate is cancelled and sealed in the records of the Civil Registry.
Thereafter,anamendedbirthcertificateisissuedinitsplace"attestingtothefactthattheadopteeisthechildoftheadopter(s)"[352]This
amendedcertificateisissuedwithoutanynotationthatitisneworamended.[353]Onceissued,thisdocumenthasthesamelegaleffectas
anyotherbirthcertificate,andisentitledtoapresumptionofvalidityasapublicdocument.[354]
Evidently,torequireadopteestogobeyondtheparentageestablishedintheirbirthcertificateswoulddefeatthepurposeofR.A.8552in
requiring courts and other institutions to seal adoption records, including the child's original birth certificate, and to maintain the
confidentialityofthosepapers.[355]
Bytheseprovisions,thelegislatureclearlyintendedtoprotecttheprivacyofthepartiestotheadoption,therebyallowingthemtoavoid
the stigma resulting from the proceedings. The rationale behind these confidentiality provisions was elucidated by the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, in Alma Society Incorporated v. Mellon. [356] In that decision, which was later affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court,[357]theU.S.CourtofAppealsexplained:
Judged by these standards, the New York sealed record statutes do not want constitutional validity. The statutes, we think,
serve important interests. New York Domestic Relations Law s 114 and its related statutes represent a considered legislative
judgmentthattheconfidentialitystatutespromotethesocialpolicyunderlyingadoptionlaws.SeeInreAnonymous,89Misc.2d
132, 133, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Surr.Ct.1976). Originally, sealing adoption records was discretionary with the court, 1924
N.Y.Laws,ch.323,s113,butin1938confidentialityofadoptionrecordsbecamemandatory.1938N.Y.Laws,ch.606s114.
Aslateas1968,thelegislatureenactedvariousamendmentstoincreasetheassuranceofconfidentiality.1968N.Y.Laws,ch.
1038.Moreover,thepurposeofarelatedstatute,Section4138ofthePublicHealthLaws,wastoerasethestigma
ofillegitimacyfromtheadoptedchild'slifebysealinghisoriginalbirthcertificateandissuinganewoneunderhis
new surname. And the major purpose of adoption legislation is to encourage natural parents to use the process
when they are unwilling or unable to care for their offspring. New York has established a careful legislative
scheme governing when adoption may occur and providing for judicial review, to encourage and facilitate the
socialpolicyofplacingchildreninpermanentlovinghomeswhenanaturalfamilybreaksup.Asthecourtofappeals
statedinScarpettav.SpenceChapinAdoptionService,28N.Y.2d185,195,321N.Y.S.2d65,73,Cert.denied,404U.S.805,
321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), "(i)t cannot be doubted that the public policy of our State is contrary to the
disclosure of the names and identities of the natural parents and prospective adoptive parents to each other." (Footnote
omitted.) Fortytwo other states, according to the State of New York, require that birth and adoption records be kept
confidential, indicating the importance of the matter of confidentiality. See also Uniform Adoption Act (U.L.A.) s 16(2) (rev.
1969)(adoptionrecords"aresubjecttoinspectiononlyuponconsentoftheCourtandallinterestedpersonsorinexceptional
cases, only upon an order of the Court for good cause shown"). These significant legislative goals clearly justify the State's
decision to keep the natural parents' names secret from adopted persons but not from nonadopted persons. (Emphasis
supplied)
ApplicabilityofBengsonvHRET
As to whether petitioner also reacquired her naturalborn status, the Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET,[358] which
allowed the applicant to reacquire not only his citizenship, but also his original naturalborn status. In that case, the Court noted that
thosewhoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipmustbeconsiderednaturalbornornaturalizedcitizens,sincetheConstitutiondoesnotprovide
a separate category for them. Between the two categories, the Court found it more appropriate to consider them naturalborn citizens,
sincetheywerenotrequiredtogothroughthetediousnaturalizationprocedureprovidedunderthelaw:
ThepresentConstitution,however,nowconsidersthosebornofFilipinomothersbeforetheeffectivityofthe1973Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as naturalborn. After defining who are naturalborn
citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural
borncitizens.ItisapparentfromtheenumerationofwhoarecitizensunderthepresentConstitutionthatthereareonlytwo
classesofcitizens:(1)thosewhoarenaturalbornand(2)thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.Acitizenwhois
notanaturalizedFilipino,i.e.,didnothavetoundergotheprocessofnaturalizationtoobtainPhilippinecitizenship,necessarily
isanaturalbornFilipino.Noteworthyistheabsenceinsaidenumerationofaseparatecategoryforpersonswho,afterlosing
Philippinecitizenship,subsequentlyreacquireit.Thereasonthereforisclear:astosuchpersons,theywouldeitherbenatural
bornornaturalizeddependingonthereasonsforthelossoftheircitizenshipandthemodeprescribedbytheapplicablelawfor
thereacquisitionthereof.AsprivaterespondentCruzwasnotrequiredbylawtogothroughnaturalizationproceedingsinorder
toreacquirehiscitizenship,heisperforceanaturalbornFilipino.Assuch,hepossessedallthenecessaryqualificationstobe
electedasmemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.
Although Bengson referred to R.A. 2630 or the repatriation of persons who served in the U.S. Armed Forces,[359] a similar process is
undergonebythosewhoreacquirecitizenshipunderR.A.9225.Inpreviouscases,thisCourthasalsoconsistentlycharacterizedR.A.9225
asa"repatriation"statute[360]thatallowsformerFilipinocitizenstorecovertheirnaturalbornstatus.[361]
Accordingly,thelogicusedbythisCourtinBengsonalsoappliestothiscasetheprocedureprovidedbyR.A.9225doesnotamountto
naturalizationconsequently,acitizenwhoreacquirescitizenshipunderthisstatutecannotbedeemednaturalized.
Determinationofnaturalbornstatusatbirth

WhenR.A.9225providesfortheloss,reacquisitionandretentionofcitizenship,itrefersonlytothefactofcitizenship,not naturalborn
status:
Section2.DeclarationofPolicy.ItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheStatethatallPhilippinecitizenswhobecomecitizensof
anothercountryshallbedeemednottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipundertheconditionsofthisAct.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of
thePhilippineswhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryare
herebydeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthefollowingoathofallegiancetotheRepublic:
"I_______________________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I
herebydeclarethatIrecognizeandacceptthesupremeauthorityofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiance
theretoandthatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarilywithoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion."
NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivityofthisAct,becomecitizensofaforeigncountryshallretain
theirPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.(Emphasissupplied)
These provisions are consistent with Article IV,[362] Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution, which indicates that what may be lost or
reacquiredisPhilippinecitizenshipandnotnaturalbornstatus.Thesetermswerecarriedoverintothe1973and1987Constitutions.
Theprecisecharacterofthecitizenshipreacquiredunderthelawwasnolongermadeanissueintheseprovisions,becausenaturalborn
statusisdeterminedatthetimeofbirth.[363]Thischaracteristiccannotbechanged,unlessanindividualundergoesnaturalizationinany
oftheinstancesprovidedbylaw.[364]Aswillbeexplainedbelow,theprocedureforthereacquisitionofcitizenshipunderR.A.9225does
notamountto
naturalization.
Reacquisitionisnotnaturalization
It has been argued that the taking of an oath under R.A. 9225, as petitioner has done, should be considered as an "act to acquire or
perfectcitizenship"underSection2,ArticleIVofthepresentConstitution.Aspreviouslydiscussed,however,thereareonlytwoclassesof
citizensundertheConstitutionthosewhoarenaturalbornandthosewhoarenaturalized.The"act"advertedtointheConstitutionmust
thereforebeunderstoodaspertainingonlytotheactofnaturalization.
The1935,1973,and1987ConstitutionsconferredonCongressthepowertodeterminewhoarenaturalizedcitizens:
1935CONSTITUTION
ARTICLEIV
Citizenship
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.(Emphasissupplied)
1973CONSTITUTION
ARTICLEIII
Citizenship
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.(Emphasissupplied)
1987CONSTITUTION
ARTICLEIV
Citizenship
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.(Emphasissupplied)
In compliance with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the required enabling statute in 1939 when it passed Commonwealth
ActNo.473ortheRevisedNaturalizationLaw.Thispieceoflegislationidentifiesthosewhoaretobeconsiderednaturalizedcitizensofthe
country,anditisnottheprovinceoftheCourttoencroachuponthislegislativeprerogative.Accordingly,wecannotunilaterally declare
those who have availed themselves of the benefits of R.A. 9225 and similar laws as naturalized citizens. To do so would violate the
principleofseparationofpowers.
ItmustbeemphasizedthatR.A.9225merelydiscussestheretentionandreacquisitionofcitizenship,notnaturalization.Asearlyas1936,
Congressalreadytreatednaturalizationasadifferentspeciesapartfromrepatriationandothermodesthatmaylaterbeintroducedbythe
nationalassembly:
Section.2.Howcitizenshipmaybereacquired.Citizenshipmaybereacquired:

(1)Bynaturalization:Provided,Thattheapplicantpossessnoneofthedisqualification'sprescribedinsectiontwoofActNumbered
Twentyninehundredandtwentyseven,
2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her
marriagetoanalienmayberepatriatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisActaftertheterminationofthemaritalstatusand
(3)BydirectactoftheNationalAssembly.[365]
ThereacquisitionandretentionofcitizenshipunderR.A.9225orR.A.2630[366]andrepatriationunderR.A.8171[367]aredifferentfrom
naturalizationunderC.A.473.Reacquisition,retention,andrepatriationareeffectedbymerelytakingthenecessaryoathofallegianceand
registeringinthepropercivilregistry(andintheBureauofImmigrationinaccordancewithR.A.8171).Ontheotherhand,naturalization
is a tedious process that begins with the filing of a declaration of intention one year prior to filing a petition for admission to Philippine
citizenshipandendswiththeissuanceofacertificateofnaturalization.
Here, petitioner did not have to undergo the process of naturalization in order to reacquire her Philippine citizenship. She only had to
followtheprocedurespecifiedinR.A.9225.Inthislight,todeclareheranaturalizedcitizenwouldthusbecontrarytolaw.
Torefusetorecognizefoundlingsas
citizensofthePhilippinesisto
contraveneourobligationsunder
existinginternationallaw.
ThePhilippinesisobligatedbyexistingcustomaryandconventionalinternationallawtorecognizethecitizenshipoffoundlings.
CustomaryInternationalLaw
Petitionerassertsthatinternationallawinthe1930sgrantedafoundlingtherighttoacquireanationality"frombirth."Inmyopinion,she
has not presented sufficient evidence to prove that in 1935, the Philippines was bound by customary international law to recognize
foundlingsasPhilippinecitizens.
It must be remembered that norms of customary international law become binding on the Philippines as part of the law of the land by
virtueoftheIncorporationClauseintheConstitution.[368]Forincorporationtooccur,however,twoelements[369]mustbeestablished:(a)
widespreadandconsistentpracticeonthepartofstatesand(b)apsychologicalelementknownastheopinioJurissivenecessitatisora
belief on the part of states that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[370] For
evident reasons, a statement made by one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the Hague Convention cannot, by themselves,
prove widespread state practice or opinio Juris. Without more, We cannot declare the existence of a binding norm of customary
internationallawgrantingcitizenshiptofoundlingsin1935.
I believe, however, that this customary norm exists in international law at present. Although matters of citizenship were
traditionally considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, contemporary developments indicate that their
powers in this area are now "circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights."[371] In
particular,therightofchildrentoacquireanationalityisenshrinedinanumberofinternational[372] and regional[373]conventions. The
presumption of citizenship accorded to foundlings in a state's territory is specifically mentioned in three conventions: the 1930 Hague
Convention,[374] the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness[375] and the European Convention on Nationality.[376] These
treaties, concurred in by various state parties,[377] show that on the part of the members of the international community, there is
widespreadrecognitionoftherighttonationalityofchildreningeneralandfoundlingsinparticular.
Asimportantastheseinternationalinstrumentsaretheactionsofstatesintheirowndomesticspheres.TheInternationalCourtofJustice
itselfhasconsiderednationallegislationassufficientevidenceofstatepractice.[378] Inthiscase,asurveyofthecitizenshiplawsof189
countriesallovertheworldrevealsthat165ofthesenationsconsiderfoundlingsascitizensbyoperationoflaw.Twentythreeofthese
states[379]grantcitizenshiptofoundlingsinobservanceofthejussoliprinciple,orthegeneralgrantofcitizenshiptoallindividualsborn
withintheirterritory.Meanwhile,onehundredfortytwocountries[380]haveenactedfoundlingstatutestograntcitizenshiptoachildfound
in their territories if the parents are unknown, unless there is proof to the contrary. Depending on the rule followed by the state, the
foundlingispresumedeithertohavebeenbornintheterritory[381]ortohavebeenborntocitizensofthestate.[382]
Thatstateshaveagreedtobeboundbytheseobligationsundervariousconventionsandhaveevenenacteddomesticlegislationtofulfill
theirresponsibilitiesunderthelawofnationsindicatestheirrecognitionofthebindingcharacterofthisnorm.Theseactsdemonstratethe
opinioJurisofthosestates,i.e.,theirrecognitionthatthegrantofnationalitytofoundlingsisobligatoryunderinternationallaw.[383]
In view of the concurrence of these two elements, it is evident that a rule requiring states to accord citizenship to foundlings has
crystallizedintoacustomarynorm.ThePhilippinesisthereforeboundatpresenttoactincompliancewiththeseobligations.
TheICCPRandtheCRC
As a state party to the ICCPR[384] and the CRC,[385] the Philippines is also obligated to respect the right of every child to acquire a
nationality.Whilethesetreatiesostensiblypertainonlytoa"righttoacquire"anationality,thisrighthasbeeninterpretedasthedutyofa
state to "grant nationality," particularly where there is a link only with the state on whose territory the child was born. As the United
Nations(UN)HumanRightsCommitteeexplained:
64.Regardlessofthegeneralruleswhichgovernacquisitionofnationality,Statesshouldensurethatsafeguardsareinplaceto
ensurethatnationalityisnotdeniedtopersonswithrelevantlinks to that State who would otherwise be stateless. This is of
particular relevance in two situations, at birth and upon State succession. As regards the right to acquire a nationality under
article24, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee stated that
"Statesarerequiredtoadopteveryappropriatemeasure...toensurethateverychildhasanationalitywhenheisborn".In
thiscontext,birthontheterritoryofaStateandbirthtoanationalarethemostimportantcriteriausedtoestablishthelegal

bondofnationality.WherethereisonlyalinkwiththeStateonwhoseterritorythechildwasborn,thisStatemust
grant nationality as the person can rely on no other State to ensure his orherrighttoacquireanationalityand
would otherwise be stateless. Indeed, if nationality is not granted in such circumstances then article 24,
paragraph3,oftheInternationalCovenantaswellasarticle7oftheConventionontheRightsoftheChildwould
otherwisebemeaningless.Inconcreteterms,thecircumstancereferredtoabovemayarise,forexample,whereachildis
born on the territory of a State to stateless parents or with respect to foundlings. Given the consequences to the children
concerned,denialofnationalityinsuchinstancesmustbedeemedarbitrary.[386](Emphasissupplied)
InitsConcludingObservationsonFiji'scompliancewiththeCRC,theUNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChildlikewisedirectedstatesto
takeallmeasurestoavoidstatelessnessincompliancewiththeirobligationsunderArticle7oftheCRC:
TheCommitteetakesnoteofarticle7oftheCitizensDecree,whichstipulatesthatanyinfantfoundabandonedinFijiisdeemed
to have been born in Fiji unless there is evidence to the contrary. However, the Committee is concerned that this stipulation
might carry a risk of statelessness for children of whom it can be proven that they have not been born in Fiji, but whose
nationalitycanneverthelessnotbeestablished.[...]TheCommitteerecommendsthattheStatepartytakeallthenecessary
measurestoavoidachildfoundabandonedinFijibeingstateless.[387]
Consideringtheseinternationalnorms,itistheobligationofthePhilippinesnotonlytograntnationalitytofoundlings,butalsotoensure
thatnoneofthemarearbitrarilydeprivedoftheirnationality.Needlesstostate,theCourtcannotinterprettheConstitutioninamanner
contrarytotheseobligations.Wecannotsanctionaviolationofinternationallaw.
Adeclarationthatfoundlingsarestateless
personswouldhaveunconscionable
consequences.
ThedutyoftheCourttointerprettheConstitutionisimpressedwiththeequallyvitalobligationtoensurethatthefundamentallawserves
theendsofjusticeandpromotesthecommongood.Afterall,theConstitutionismeanttobethelegalembodimentofthesevalues,andto
bethepeople'sinstrumentfortheprotectionofexistingnaturalrightsandbasichumanliberties.AsChiefJusticeReynatoPunoexplained
inhisSeparateOpinioninRepublicv.Sandiganbayan:
Butwhiletheconstitutionguaranteesandprotectsthefundamentalrightsofthepeople,itshouldbestressedthatitdoesnot
createthem.AsheldbymanyoftheAmericanRevolutionpatriots,"libertiesdonotresultfromcharterschartersratherarein
thenatureofdeclarationsofpreexistingrights."JohnAdams,oneofthepatriots,claimedthatnaturalrightsarefounded"in
theframeofhumannature,rootedintheconstitutionoftheintellectandmoralworld."Thus,itissaidofnaturalrightsvisa
vistheconstitution:
. . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions enumerate such rights and provide
against their deprivation or infringement, but do not create them. Itis supposed that all power, all rights, and all
authority are vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. By such an instrument, they create a
government,anddefineandlimitthepowerswhich the constitution is to secure and the government respect. But
they do not thereby invest the citizens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not before
possess.(Italicssupplied)
Aconstitutionisdescribedasfollows:
AConstitutionisnotthebeginningofacommunity,northeoriginofprivaterightsitisnotthefountainoflaw,nor
theincipientstateofgovernmentitisnotthecause,butconsequence,ofpersonalandpoliticalfreedomitgrants
norightstothepeople,butis the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their
protectionintheenjoymentoftherightsandpowerswhichtheypossessedbeforetheConstitutionwasmade,itis
buttheframeworkofthepoliticalgovernment,andnecessarilybaseduponthepreexistingconditionoflaws,rights,
habitsandmodesofthought.Thereisnothingprimitiveinititisallderivedfromaknownsource.Itpresupposes
anorganizedsociety,law,order,propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of
cultivatedintelligencetoknowhowtoguardagainsttheencroachmentsoftyranny.[388](Citationsomitted
andemphasissupplied)
IbelievethatdisputesinvolvingtheConstitutionmust be resolved with these precepts in mind. As the Constitution is no ordinarylegal
document, this Court should strive to give meaning to its provisions not only with reference to its text or the original intention of its
framers.BehindthetextaretheidealsandaspirationsoftheFilipinopeopletheirintentto"promotethegeneralwelfare"[389]to"build
ajustandhumanesociety"[390]andto"securetheblessingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace."[391] Any construction that would derogate from these fundamental values cannot be
countenanced.
Inthiscase,adeclarationthatfoundlingsarenaturalborncitizensareunconscionable.First,suchadeclarationwould effectively render
allchildrenofunknownparentagestatelessandwouldplacetheminaconditionofextremevulnerability.[392] As citizenship is "nothing
less than the right to have rights,"[393] its deprivation would leave foundlings without any right or measure of protection. During the
proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Nationality, the Senior Legal Adviser of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugeesexplainedthenatureoftherighttocitizenship:
TheRighttoaGivenNationalityintheAvoidanceofStatelessness
Citizenship,ornationality,hasbeendescribedasman'sbasicright,as,infact,therighttohaverights.Nationalityisnotonlya
rightofitself,itisanecessaryprecursortotheexerciseofotherrights.Nationalityprovidesthelegalconnectionbetweenan
individual and a State, which serves as a basis for certain rights for both the individual and the State, including the State's
entitlementtograntdiplomaticprotection.[394]

In the Philippines, a stateless individual is deprived of countless rights and opportunities under the Constitution, statutes and
administrativeregulations.Theseincludetherightstosuffrage[395]educationandtraining[396]candidacyandoccupationofpublicoffice
andotherpositionsingovernment[397]useandenjoymentofnaturalresources[398]investment[399] ownership and control of certain
typesofbusinesses[400]practiceofrofessons[401] engagement in certain occupations[402] and even participation in legal proceedings
involvingstatus,conditionandlegalcapacity.[403]
Second,adeclarationthatpetitionerisacitizenbutisnotnaturalbornisnolessodioustofoundlingsconsideringtheprivilegesthatwould
be deemed unavailable to them. These include certain state scholarships[404] and a number of government positions requiring natural
born citizenship as a qualification, i. e. a range of nationa1[405] and loca1[406] offices, various posts in government commissions,[407]
corporations,[408]banks,[409]educationalinstitutions,[410]professionalregulatoryboards[411]andthemilitary.[412]
Therepercussionsofsucharulingforfoundlingscurrently holding the enumerated positions are too compelling to ignore. Adeclaration
thatindividualsofunknownparentagearenotFilipinos,oratbestnaturalizedcitizens,mayleadtotheirremovalfromgovernmentposts
ademandtoreturnallemolumentsandbenefitsgrantedinconnectionwiththeirofficesandeventheendofpensionbenefitspresently
beingenjoyedbyaffectedretirees.TheproposalforCongresstoremedytheunjustsituationthatwouldresultfromanaffirmancebythis
CourtofunjustCOMELECrulingsistooodiousasolutiontoevenconsider.ItisnotthefunctionofCongresstocorrectanyinjusticethat
wouldresultfromthisCourt'sproposedunhappyrulingonfoundlings.Rather,itisthisCourt'sfirstandforemostdutytorenderjusticeto
them,astheConstitutionsrequires
WHEREFORE,IvotetoGRANTtheconsolidatedpetitions.

[1]468Phil.421(2004).
[2]Id.at490.
[3]Id.at494.
[4]ThepetitiondocketedasG.R.No.221697assailedtheCOMELECEnBancResolutiondated23December2015inSPANo.15001(DC)

denyingpetitioner'smotionforreconsiderationoftheCOMELECSecondDivisionResolutiondated1December2015.Ontheotherhand,
thepetitiondocketedasG.R.No.221698700assailstheCOMELECEnBancResolutiondated23December2015intheconsolidatedcases
docketedasSPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC)and15139(DC).TheCOMELECEnBancdeniedpetitioner'smotionforreconsideration
oftheCOMELECFirstDivisionResolutiondated11December2015.
[5] This provision states: "When the Court in recess and the urgency of the case requires immediate action, the Clerk of Court or the

DivisionClerkofCourtshallpersonallytransmittherollototheChiefJusticeortheDivisionChairpersonforhisorheraction."
[6]Forinstance,seetheCOMELEC'suseofadissentinTecsonv.COMELEC,OmnibusResolutiondated11December2015,pp.24,46.
[7]Sanchezv.Rosario,111Phil.733(1961),citingAbeedev.Imperial103Phil.136145(1958).
[8]DeliberationsoftheCommittee:AdHoc,RevisionofLaws,20May1985,pp.6568.
[9]DeliberationsoftheCommittee:RevisionofLaws,30May1985.
[10]G.R.No.207264,22October2013.
[11]Black'sLawDictionarydefines"summaryproceeding"as"anonjuryproceedingthatsettlesacontroversyordisposesofacaseina

relativelypromptandsimplemanner."(Black'sLawDictionary1242[8thed.2004]).
[12]318Phil.329(1995).
[13]Id.at460461.
[14]Id.at457458.JusticeMendozathenquoteSection12,68and78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,Sections6and7oftheElectoral

ReformsLaw.R.A.6646,andSection40oftheLocalGovernmentCode,R.A.7160).
[15]Id.at462463.
[16]Ferminv.COMELEC,595Phil.449(2008).
[17]G.R.No.194076,G.R.No.194160,[October18,2011])
[18]G.R.No,207105,[November10,2015])
[19]G.R.No.196804,197015,[October9,2012],696PHIL786918)

[20]G.R.No.191938,[July2,2010],636PHIL753815)
[21]G.R.No.207900,[April22,2014])
[22]G.R.No.195229,[October9,2012],696PHIL700785)
[23]G.R.No.192856,[March8,2011])
[24]G.R.No,193237,193536,[October9,2012],696PHIL601700)
[25]G.R.No.192221,[November13,2012])
[26]G.R.No.179430,[July27,2009],611PHIL501517)
[27]G.R.No.105111,105384,July3,1992.
[28]G.R.No.100710,100739,September3,1991,278PHIL275302.
[29]G.R.No.134015,July19,1999,369PHIL793829.
[30]G.R.No.209835,September22,2015.
[31]G.R.No.193314,February26,2013.
[32]G.R.No.I20265,September18,1995,318PHIL467539.
[33]G.R.No.207264,25June2013.
[34]511Phil.720(2005).
[35]G.R.No.207900,22April2014.
[36]595Phil.1172(2008).
[37]460Phil.459(2003).
[38]575Phil.253(2008).
[39]G.R.No.193314(Resolution),25June2013.
[40]Labo,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.105111,105384,3July1992.
[41]Labo,Jr.v.CommissiononElections.257Phil.123(1989).
[42]Arateav.COMELEC,G.R.No.195229,9October2012.
[43]SeeDissentingOpinionofJusticeDanteO.TingainTecsonv.COMELEC,468Phil.421755(2004).
[44]G.R.No.119976,18September1995.
[45]Id.
[46]371Phil.377393(1999).
[47]G.R.No.180051,24December2008.
[48]Id.
[49]Id.
[50]593Phil.383397(2008).
[51]G.R.No.179430,27July2009.
[52]636Phil.753815(2010).

[53]G.R.No.188671,24February2010.
[54]G.R.No.192856,8March2011
[55]468Phil.421755(2004).
[56]575Phil.253266(2008).
[57]595Phil.449479(2008).
[58]696Phil.700785(2012).
[59]696Phil.786918(2012).
[60]G.R.No.202202,19March2013.
[61]G.R.No.136351,28JulyI999.
[62]Tagolinov.HRET,G.R.No.202202,19March2013.
[63]Mirandav.Abaya,G.R.No.136351,28July1999.
[64]Villafuertev.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.206698,25February2014Hayudiniv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.207900,

22April2014Agustinv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.207105,10November2015.
[65]G.R.No.209286,23September2014.
[66]Ferminv.COMELEC,G.R.No.179695&182369,18December2008.
[67]G.R.No.119976,18September1995.
[68]Id.
[69]G.R.No.191938,2July2010.
[70]Id.
[71]Id.
[72]Tagolinov.HRET,supra.
[73]Ferminv.COMELEC,supra.
[74]Almagrov.SpousesAmaya,Sr.,G.R.No.179685,19June2013.
[75]Id.
[76]Id.
[77]HeirsofLimensev.Vda.deRamos,G.R.No.152319,28October2009.
[78]Id.
[79]SeeTecsonv.COMELEC,G.R.No.161434,161634,161824,March3,2004,468PHIL421755andSalcedoIIv.COMELEC,371Phil

(1999).
[80]RulesofCourt,Rule133,Sectio
[81]SeeJisonv.CourtofAppeals,GRNo.124853,24February1998..
[82]Id.
[83]G.R.No.191938,2July2010.
[84]686Phil.649(2012).
[85]Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.

[86]RufinaPatisFactoryv.Alusitain,supra.
[87]Lacbayanv.Samoy,Jr.,supra.
[88]Id.
[89]Sec.4.Judicialadmissions.Anadmission,verbalorwritten,madebyapartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthesamecase,does

not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admissionwasmade.
[90]G.R.No.123553,13July1998.
[91]Id.
[92]RulesofCourt,Rule132,Section19provides:

Sec.19.ClassesofDocuments.Forthepurposeoftheirpresentationinevidence,documentsareeitherpublicorprivate.
Publicdocumentsare:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whetherofthePhilippines,orofaforeigncountry
(b)Documentsacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicexceptlastwillsandtestamentsand
(c)Publicrecords,keptinthePhilippines,ofprivatedocumentsrequiredbylawtobeenteredtherein.
Allotherwritingsareprivate.(Emphasissupplied)
[93]PhilippineTrustCo.v.CA,G.R.No.150318,22November2010.
[94]Id.
[95]Chuav.CA,G.R.No.88383,19February1992.
[96]ChinaBankingCorp.,Inc.v.CA,G.R.No.155299,24July2007.
[97]G.R.No.5272,19March1910.
[98]Memorandumofpetitioner,pp.284287.
[99]Cav.HRET,G.R.Nos.9219192&9220203,30July1991.
[100]Nuvalv.Ouray,G.R.No.30241,29December1928.
[101]Carrev.Carre,G.R.No.L10128,13November1956.
[102]Ugdaracian,Jr.v.COMELEC,G.R.No.179851,18April2008.
[103]25AmJur2d,Domicil13,citedintheConcurringandDissentingOpinionofJ.Puno,Macalintalv.COMELEC,G.R.No.157013,10

July2003.
[104]Limbonav.COMELEC,G.R.No.181097,25June2008.
[105]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.119976,18September1995.
[106]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.119976,18September1995.
[107]Japzonv.COMELEC,G.R.No.180088,19January2009Gayov.Verceles,G.R.No.150477,28February2005.
[108] Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012 Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, 16 April 2002 Romualdez

Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995 Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 9219192 & 9220203, 30 July 1991 Faypon v.
Quirino,G.R.No.L7068,22December1954.
[109]Caasiv.CA,G.R.Nos.88831&84508,8November1990.
[110]Caasiv.CA,G.R.Nos.88831&84508,8November1990.
[111]Jalosjosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.191970,24April2012.

[112]Jalosjosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.191970,24April2012.
[113]Gallegov.Verra,G.R.No.48641,24November1941.
[114]DumpitMichelenav.Boado,G.R.Nos.16361920,17November2005.
[115]Gallegov.Verra,G.R.No.48641,24November1941.
[116]Gallegov.Verra,G.R.No.48641,24November1941,p.456.
[117]Id.
[118]Id.at668.
[119]G.R.No.191938,2July2010.
[120]Designating1September1973to28February1974asaHomecomingSeasonforOverseasFilipinos.Pursuanttotheprogram,the

executivedepartmentsweremobilizedtowelcomeandextendprivilegestooverseasFilipinoswhoarecominghometothePhilippines.It
calledforthepreparationofahospitalityprogramforoverseasFilipinos,aswellastheofferingofpromotionalroundtripairlinefaresfor
foreign and domestic flights. A temporary "tax holiday" was also declared for the Homecoming Season in which all tax clearance
requirementsinvolvedinthetravelofoverseasFilipinostoandfromthePhilippinesshallbesuspendedandwaived.Aprogramofrewards
was initiated for local governments which are able to invite the most number of overseas Filipinos. The presidential issuance also
constitutedaNationalHospitalityCommitteeforOverseasFilipinos,whichshallorganizeandsupervisetheoperationsoflocalhospitality
committees,especiallyinregardtosharingwithoverseasFilipinosatraditionalFilipinoChristmas.
[121]TheintroductorystatementofLOINo.163dated7February1974provides:

WhileprojectedarrivalsbyFebruary28was30,000,the35,000thBalikbayanparticipanthasalreadyactuallyarrivedasofthisdate.
NumerousrequestsandpetitionsfortheextensionoftheBalikbayanprogramhavebeenreceivedbytheOfficeofthePresidentandthe
Department of Tourism from individual Overseas Filipinos, from associations thereof, and from officials of the Philippine foreign service.
They cite as reasons the noncoincidence of the original Homecoming season (1 September 1973 to 28 February 1974) with the school
vacation period overseas, and the lack of time of Overseas Filipinos to arrange for their vacations and leave of absences from their
occupationsduetothesuddennessofthelaunchingoftheBalikbayanprogram.
Acommonreason,moreover,isthat,withthestoriesaboutthenewPhilippinesrelatedbyBalikbayanparticipantswhohavereturnedto
their overseas residences, our countrymen who were unable to participate in Balikbayanare now more eager than ever to observe for
themselvestheNewSocietyinactionandtosharetheprideofthenewFilipinoinhimselfandinhisrebornnation.
[122]SixmonthExtensionoftheBalikbayanProgram.
[123]DeclaringABalikScientistProgram,AllowinganyForeignBasedScientists,Professional,Technician,oranyPersonwithSpecialSkill

orExpertisewhoisofFilipinoOriginorDescenttoPracticeHis/HerProfessionorExpertiseinthePhilippinesandAligningIncentivesfor
Him/HerandforOtherPurposes.
[124]5th"Whereas"clauseofP.D.819.
[125]"Now,therefore"clauseofLOI1044.
[126]Extensionofthe"BALIKBAYAN"Programdated9February1976.
[127]LOI493entitledExtensionofEffectivityoftheBalikbayanProgramdated30December1976.
[128]LOI652entitledExtensionoftheBalikbayanProgramdated6January1978.
[129]LOI811entitledExtensionofPeriodforOperationoftheBalikbayanProgramdated14February1979.
[130]LOI985entitledExtensionoftheBalikbayanProgramdated21January1980.
[131]InstitutingtheBalikScientistProgramundertheDepartmentofScienceandTechnology.
[132] Special nonimmigrant visas are issued in accordance with Section 47 of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. It

states:
Section47.NotwithstandingtheprovisionsofthisAct,thePresidentisauthorized
(a)Whenthepublicinterestsowarrants

(l)Towaivethedocumentaryrequirementsforanyclassofnonimmigrants,undersuchconditionsashemayimpose
(2) To admit, as nonimmigrants, aliens not otherwise provided for by this Act, who are coming for temporary period only, under such
conditionsashemayprescribe
(3)Towaivethepassportrequirementsforimmigrants,undersuchconditionsashemayprescribe
(4)Toreduceortoabolishthepassportvisafeesinthecaseofanyclassofnonimmigrantswhoarenationalsofcountrieswhichgrant
similarconcessionstoPhilippinecitizensofasimilarclassvisitingsuchcountries
(5) To suspend the entry of aliens into the Philippines from any country in which cholera or other infectious or contagious disease is
prevalent
(b) For humanitarian reasons, and when not opposed to the public interest, to admit aliens who are refugees for religious, political, or
racialreasons,insuchclassesofcasesandundersuchconditionsashemayprescribe.
[133]AnActInstitutingaBalikbayanProgram.
[134]PresidentialDecreeNo.1183(AmendingandConsolidatingtheProvisionsonTravelTaxofRepublicActNo.1478asAmendedand

Republic Act No. 6141, Prescribing the Manner of Collection Thereof, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes,
dated 21 August 1977) and Executive Order No. 283 (Restructuring the Travel Tax Exemptions and Restoring the Reduced Rates on
CertainIndividuals,AmendingforthisPurpose,PresidentialDecreeNo.1183,asAmended,datedJuly25,1987)exemptedonlyFilipino
overseascontractworkersfromthepaymentofthetraveltax.
[135]AnActAmendingRepublicActNumbered6768,Entitled,"AnActInstitutingA"BalikbayanProgram,"byProvidingAdditionalBenefits

andPrivilegestoBalikbayanandforOtherPurposes.
[136]RepublicActNo.6768,asemendedbyRepublicActNo.9174,Section2(c).
[137]OWWABoardResolutionNo.03803dated19September2003entitledGuidelinesonOWWAMembership,ArticleVIII,Section2(4)

(b).
[138]Id.atSection6(b).
[139],(lastvisited9March2016).
[140]Id.
[141]Id.
[142],(lastvisited9March2016)
[143]RepublicActNo.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995),asamendedbyRepublicActNo.10022dated8March

2010,Section17.
[144]AnOFWisapersonwhoistobeengaged,isengagedorhasbeenengagedinaremuneratedactivityinastateofwhichheorsheis

notacitizenoronboardavesselnavigatingtheforeignseasotherthanagovernmentshipusedformilitaryornoncommercialpurposes
oronaninstallationlocatedoffshoreoronthehighseas[RepublicActNo.8042,Section3(a)]
[145]RepublicActNo.6768,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.9174,Section6,par.2.
[146]ThewebsiteoftheBureauofImmigrationstates:

ThosewhoareadmittedasBalikbayansaregivenaninitialstayofone(1)year.Theymayextendtheirstayforanotherone(1),two(2)
orsix(6)monthsprovidedthattheypresenttheirvalidpassportandfilledoutthevisaextensionformandsubmitittotheVisaExtension
Section in the BI Main Office or any BI Offices nationwide. An additional requirement will be ask (sic) for (sic) Balikbayans who have
stayedinthePhilippinesafterthirtysix(36)months.
[147]G.R.No.151914,31July2002.
[148]G.R.No.180088,19January2009.
[149]G.R.No.209835,22September2015.
[150]CitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003.
[151]435U.S.647(1978).
[152]Id.

[153]284Md.425(1979).
[154]ThewebsiteoftheBureauofImmigrationstates:

ThosewhoareadmittedasBalikbayansaregivenaninitialstayofone(l)year.Theymayextendtheirstayforanotherone
(I),two(2)orsix(6)monthsprovidedthattheypresenttheirvalidpassportandfilledoutthevisaextensionformandsubmit
ittotheVisaExtensionSectioninthe81MainOfficeorany81Officesnationwide.Anadditionalrequirementwillbeask(sic)
for(sic)BalikbayanswhohavestayedinthePhilippinesafterthirtysix(36months).
Thisisavailableathttp://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visainquiry/balikbayanprivilege,(lastvisited8March2016).

[155]PetitiontoDenyDueCourse,dated21Oct.2015(Elamparo),AnnexE.
[156]Jalosjosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.193314,26February2013Mitrav.COMELEC,G.R.No.191938,2July2010Gayov.Verceles,G.R.

No.150477,28February2005.
[157]PetitionersubmittedasevidenceExhibit"7,"whichisBrian'sofficialtranscriptofrecordsfromtheBeaconSchoolinTaguigCity.It

statesthatBrianwasenrolledinGrade8attheBeaconSchoolfortheacademicyear20052006.Exhibit7A,aCertificationfromSandra
BernadetteFirmalino,RegistraroftheDeLaSalleHighSchoolDepartment,indicatesthatin2006,BriantransferredtoLaSalleGreenhills,
andthathestudiedthereuntilhegraduatedfromhighschoolin2009.Exhibits"7B"and"7C"areHanna'spermanentrecordsatthe
AssumptionCollegeasanelementaryandsecondarystudent,respectively.TheyshowthatHannawasenrolledinGrade2atAssumption
CollegeinMakatiCityforacademicyear20052006.
AsforAnika,petitionerallegedthatAnikawasjustunderayearoldwhentheformerandherfamilyrelocatedtothePhilippinesinMay
2005andthereforeAnikawasnotenrolledinanyschoolin2005.PetitionerpresentedExhibit"7D,"whichisaCertificateofAttendance
dated 8 April 2015 issued by the Directress of the Learning Connection, Ms. Julie Pascual Penaloza. It states that Anika attended pre
schoolattheLearningConnectioninSanJuanCityfromJanuarytoMarch2007.PetitionerlikewiseofferedasevidenceExhibit"7E,"a
Certificationdated14April2015issuedbytheDirectressoftheGreenmeadowsLearningCenter,Ms.AnnaVillali.maReyes,Anikastudied
at the Greenmeadows Learning Center in Quezon City for academic year 20072008. Exhibit "7F" is the Elementary Pupil's Permanent
RecordshowingthatAnikaspentherkindergartenandgradeschoolyearsattheAssumptionCollege.Therecordcoverstheyears2007to
2013.ThesameExhibit"7F"indicatesthatAnikawasbornon5June2004.
[158]MarkedasExhibit"8."
[159]MarkedasExhibits"11"and"12."
[160]TCTNo.290260,issuedbytheRegisterofDeedsofQuezonCity.
[161]G.R.No.187478(2009).
[162]718A.2d1111(1984).
[163]Id.
[164]COMELECCommentdated7January2016,p.56.
[165]COMELECComment,page56.
[166]G.R.No.191970,24April2012.
[167]Jalosjosv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.193314.26February2013.
[168] Oglesby State Election Bd. v. Bayh 521 N.E. 2d 1313 (1988) Farnsworth v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182 (1994) Hale v. State of

MississippiDemocraticExecutiveCommittee(168So.3d946(2015).
[169]No.2015EC00965SCT(2015).
[170]Seep.47,par.157.
[171]Section236(J)oftheTaxReformActof1997,R.A.No.8424,11December1997provides:

(J) Supplying of Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). Any person required under the authority of this Code to make, render or file a
return,statementorotherdocumentshallbesuppliedwithorassignedaTaxpayerIdentificationNumber(TIN)whichheshallindicatein
suchreturn,statementordocumentfiledwiththeBureauofInternalRevenueforhisproperidentificationfortaxpurposes,andwhichhe
shallindicateincertaindocuments,suchas,butnotlimitedtothefollowing:
[172]Id.

[173]Affidavit,p.1.
[174]No.2015EC00965SCT(2015).
[175]G.R.No.28328,2October1928,52PHIL130138)
[176]CommentOppositiontothePetitionforCertiorari(G.R.No.221698700)dated8January2015,p.51,par.174.
[177]Petitioner'sMemorandump.279.
[178]372Md.360(2002).
[179]314U.S.441(1941).
[180]314u.s.456
[181]Id.
[182] Superior Court of North Carolina. Wake County. Business Court. Steve W Fowler and Elizabeth P. Fowler v. North Carolina

Department of Revenue. No. 13 CVS 10989. 6 August 2014, citing Hall v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52
(1972).SeealsoRobinCatesv.OlgaMescherskayaandProgressiveCasualtyInsuranceCompany.CivilActionNo.1400729./Signed1
July 2014. United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana, citing Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC v. Sasol North Am., Inc., No. 11
856,2012WL262613,at*5(W.D.La.Jan.30,2012).
[183]MemorandumforrespondentAmadoD.Valdez,p.25.
[184]372Md.360(2002).
[185]TranscriptofStenographicNotestakenduringtheOralArgumentson16February2016,pp.8586.
[186]No.2015EC00965SCT(2015).
[187]114N.C.App.182(1994).
[188]968So.2d745(2007).
[189]Pa.SuperiorCt.237(1984)473A.2d1069.
[190]ReceiptNos.827172and8220421,dated23February2006.
[191]372Md.360(2002).
[192]RepublicActNo.8189,11June1996.
[193]G.R.No.191938,19October2010.
[194]473A.2d1069(1984).
[195]53.2Exceptions.

(a)U.S.citizens,asdefinedin41.0ofthischapter,arenotrequiredtobearU.S.passportswhentravelingdirectlybetweenpartsofthe
UnitedStatesasdefinedin51.1ofthischapter.
(b)AU.S.citizenisnotrequiredtobearavalidU.S.passporttoenterordeparttheUnitedStates:
(1)WhentravelingasamemberoftheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStatesonactivedutyandwhenheorsheisintheuniformof,orbears
documents identifying him or her as a member of, such Armed Forces, when under official orders or permit of such Armed Forces, and
whencarryingamilitaryidentificationcardor
(2)WhentravelingentirelywithintheWesternHemisphereonacruise!ship,andwhentheU.S.citizenboardsthecruiseshipataportor
place within the United States and returns on the return voyage of the same cruise ship to the same United States port or place from
where he[ or she originally departed. That U.S. citizen may present a governmentissued photo identification document in combination
with either an original or a copy of his or her birth certificate, a Consular Report: of Birth Abroad issued by the Department, or a
Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services before entering the United States if the U.S. citizen is
undertheageof16,heorshemaypresenteitheranoriginaloracopyofhisorherbirthcertificate,aConsularReport:ofBirthAbroad
issuedbytheDepartment,oraCertificateofNaturalizationissuedbyU.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServicesor
(3) When traveling as a U.S. citizen seaman, carrying an unexpired Merchant Marine Document (MMD) in conjunction with maritime

business. The MMD is not sufficient to establish citizenship for purposes of issuance of a United States passport under part 51 of this
chapteror
(4)Trustedtravelerprograms(i)NEXUSProgram.WhentravelingasaparticipantintheNEXUSprogram,heorshemaypresentavalid
NEXUSprogramcardwhenusingaNEXUSAirkioskorwhenenteringtheUnitedStatesfromcontiguousterritoryoradjacentislandsata
landorseaportofentry.AU.S.citizenwhoenterstheUnitedStatesbypleasurevesselfromCanadaundertheremoteinspectionsystem
mayalsopresentaNEXUSprogramcard
(ii)FASTprogram.AU.S.citizenwhoistravelingasaparticipantintheFASTprogrammaypresentavalidFASTcardwhenenteringthe
UnitedStatesfromcontiguousterritoryoradjacentislandsatalandorseaportofentry
(iii) SENTRI program. A U.S. citizen who is traveling as a participant in the SENTRI program may present a valid SENTRI card when
entering the United States from contiguous territory or adjacent islands at a land or sea portofentry The NEXUS, FAST, and SENTRI
cardsarenotsufficienttoestablishcitizenshipforpurposesofissuanceofaU.S.passportunderpart51ofthischapteror
(5)Whenarrivingatlandportsofentryandseaportsofentryfromcontiguousterritoryoradjacentislands,NativeAmericanholdersof
AmericanIndianCards(FormI872)issuedbyU.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices(USCIS)maypresentthosecardsor
(6) When arriving at land or sea ports of entry from contiguous territory or adjacent islands, U.S. citizen holders of a tribal document
issued by a United States qualifying tribal entity or group of United States qualifYing tribal entities as provided in 8 CFR 235.l(e) may
present that document. Tribal documents are not sufficient to establish citizenship for purposes of issuance of a United States passport
underpart51ofthischapteror
(7)WhenbearingdocumentsorcombinationsofdocumentstheSecretaryofHomelandSecurityhasdeterminedunderSection7209(b)of
Public Law 108458 (8 U.S.C. 115 note) are sufficient to denote identity and citizenship. Such documents are not sufficient to establish
citizenshipforpurposesofissuanceofaU.S.passportunderpart51ofthischapteror
(8) When the U.S. citizen is employed directly or indirectly on the construction, operation, or maintenance of work undertaken in
accordance with the treaty concloded on February 3, 1944, between the United States and Mexico regarding the functions of the
InternationalBoundaryandWaterCommission(IBWC),TS994,9Bevans1166,59Stat.1219,orotherrelatedagreements,providedthat
theU.S.citizenbearsanofficialidentificationcardissuedbytheIBWCandistravelinginconnectionwithsuchemploymentor
(9)WhentheDepartmentofStatewaives,pursuanttoEO13323ofDecember30,2003,Section2,therequirementwithrespecttothe
U.S.citizenbecausethereisanunforeseenemergencyor
(10)WhentheDepartmentofStatewaives,pursuanttoEO13323ofDecember30,2003,Sec2,therequirementwithrespecttotheU.S.
citizenforhumanitarianornationalinterestreasonsor
(11)WhentheU.S.citizenisachildundertheageof19arrivingfromcontiguousterritoryinthefollowingcircumstances:
(i)Childrenunderage16.AUnitedStatescitizenwhoisundertheqgeof16ispermittedtopresenteitheranoriginaloracopyofhisor
her birth certificate, a Consular Report of Birth Abroad, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
ServiceswhenenteringtheUnitedStatesfromcontiguousterritoryatlandorseaportsofentryor
(ii) Groups of children under age 19. A U.S. citizen who is under age 19 and who is traveling with a public or private school group,
religiousgroup,socialorculturalorganization,orteamassociatedwithayouthsportorganizationmaypresenteitheranoriginaloracopy
of his or her birth certificate, a Consular Report of Birth Abroad, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services when arriving in the United States from contiguous territory at all land or sea ports of entry, when the group,
organizationorteamisunderthesupervisionofanadultaffiliatedwiththeorganizationandwhenthechildhasparentalorlegalguardian
consenttotravel.Forpurposesofthisparagraph,anadultisconsideredtobeapersonwhoisage19orolder.Thefollowingrequirements
willapply:
(A)Thegroup,organization,orteammustprovidetoCBPuponcrossingtheborderonorganizationalletterhead:
(1)Thenameofthegroup,organizationorteam,andthenameofithesupervisingadult
(2)Alistofthechildrenonthetripand
(3)Foreachchild,theprimaryaddress,primaryphonenumber,:dateofbirth,placeofbirth,andthenameofatleastoneparentorlegal
guardian.
(B) The adult leading the group, organization, or team must demonstrate parental or legal guardian consent by certifYing in the writing
submitredinparagraph(b)(ll)(ii)(A)ofthissectionthatheorshehasobtainedforeachchildtheconsentofatleastoneparentorlegal
guardian.
(C) The procedure described in this paragraph is limited to memb rs of the group, organization, or team who are urider age 19. Other
membersofthegroup,organization,orteammustcomplywithotherapplicabledocumentand/orinspectionrequirementsfoundin8CFR
parts211,212,or235.
[196]G.R.No.195649,16April2013.
[197]
[198]Republicv.CourtofAppealsG.R.No.97906,21May1992.

[199]Section17.
[200]ChildandYouthWelfareCode(1974),Article38.
[201]DomesticAdoptionActof1998,Sec.15.
[202]A.M.No.02602SC,Sec.18.
[203]ItmustbenotedthatintheUS,adoptionstatutesprohibitadoptionfilesfrombeinginspectedbybirthparents,thegeneralpublic,

andeventheadultadopteesthemselves,withP,oststatesprovidingthatsealedadoptedrecordscouldbeopenedonlybycourtorder.203
InthecaseofInRe:RogerB418N.E.2d751(III.1981),theCourteventuallyheldthattheadopteehasnofundamentalrighttoviewhis
adoption records since the status of an adoptee does not result at birth. It is derived from legal proceedings the purpose of which is to
protectthebestinterestsofthechild.
[204]RepublicActNo.8552entitled"DomesticAdoptionActof1998,"Section14.
[205]CIVILCODE,Art.410.
[206]Baldosv.CourtofAppealsandPillazar,638Phil.601(2010).
[207]MarkedasExhibit"2."
[208]Reyesv.Sotero,517Phil.708(2006).
[209]Id.
[210]Theoriginalcertificateofbirthshallbestamped"cancelled,"annotatedwiththeissuanceofanamendedbirthcertificateinitsplace,

andshallbesealedinthecivilregistryrecords.Withdueregardtotheconfidentialnatureoftheproceedingsandrecordsofadoption,the
civil registrar where the foundling was registered is charged with the duty to seal the foundling certificate in the civil registry records,
whichcanbeopenedonlyuponorderoftheeourtwhichissuedthedecreeofadoptiort(Section16(B)(3)(c),A.M.No.02602SC,31July
2002).
[211]Section2,StatementofPolicy.
[212]Section3(d).
[213]Section3(e).
[214]Section13(e)
[215]In1950,anapplicationforaPhilippinepassportwasfiledforaboy,whohadbeenfoundbySps.Haleinanairraidshelter.Theboy

wasonlythreeyearsoldwhenhewasfound.Hisparents,sisterandgrandmotherwereamongthedead.TheDFAaskedforaDOJopinion
withtheregardtothestatusoffoundlings.In1951,theSecretaryofJusticereleasedDOJOpinionNo.189,seriesof1951whichstated
that,followinginternationalconventions,afoundlingispresumedtohaveassumedthecitizenshipoftheplacewhereheorsheisfound.
Sincethen,theOFAhasbeenissuingpassportstofoundlings.
[216]<http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/consularservices/passportinformdtion>(lastaccessed8March2016).
[217] Section 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the

Philippines,orbyapersonintheperformanceoffdutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated.(38)
[218]Lejanov.People,652Phil.512(2010).
[219]InGo,Sr.v.Ramos,G.R.Nos.167569,167570,171946,4Septembr2009,614PHIL451484,theCourtexplainedthatresjudicata

applies only when the following concur: (a) a person's citizenship is raised as a material issue in a controversy where that person is a
party (b) the Solicitor General or an authorized representative took active part in the resolution of the issue ana (c) the finding of
citizenshipisaffirmedbythisCourt.Theseconditionsdonotobtaininthiscase.
[220]PetitionforCertiorari(G.R.No.221697)dated28December2015,AnnexIseries,Exhibit20.
[221]InInRe:RogerB,theSupremeCourtofIllinoisexplainedthep?tentpolicyinterestswhicharepromotedbythesealingofadoption

records.Includedinthoseinterestsarethefacilitationoftheadoptionprocessbymaintainingtheanonymityandtherighttoprivacyof
thenaturalparents,andtheintegrityofthenewadoptivefamily:

Confidentialityisneededtoprotecttherighttoprivacyofthenatralparent.Thenaturalparents,havingdetermineditisinthe
best interest of themselves and the child, have placed the child for adoption. This process is not done merely rwith the
expectationofanonymity,butalsowiththestatutoryassurancethathisorheridentitywillbeshieldedfrompublicdisclosure.
Quiteconceivably,thenaturalparentshaveestablishedanewfamilyunitwiththeexpectationofconfidentialityconcerningthe

adoptionthatoccurredseveralyearsearlier.
xxxx
Confidentialityalsomustbepromotedtoprotecttherightoftheadoptingparents.Theadoptingparentshavetakenintotheir
homeachildwhomtheywillregardastheirownandwhomtheywilllove,support,andraiseasanintegralpartofthefamily
unit.Theyshouldbegiventheopportunitytocreateastablefamilyrelationshipfreefromunnecessaryintrusion.TheSection
createsasituationinwhichtheemotionalattachmentsaredirectedtowardtherelationshipwiththenewparents.Theadoptive
parentsneedanddeservethechild'sloyaltyastheygrowolder,andparticularlyintheirlateryears.
xxxx
The State's concern of promoting confidentiality to prot ct the integrity of the adoption process is well expressed by the
followingexcerptfromKlibanoff,GenealogicalInformationinAdoption:TheAdopteesQuestandtheLaw:

"The primary interest of the public is to preserve the integrity of the adoptive process. That is, the continued
existence of adoption as a humane solution to the serious social problem of children who are or may become
unwanted,abusedorneglected.Inordertomaintainit,thepublichasaninterestinassuringthatchangesinilaw,
policyorpracticewillnotbemadewhichnegativelyaffectthesupplyofcapableadoptiveparentsorthewillingness
ofbiologicalparentstomakedecisionswhicharebestforthemandtheirchildren.Weshouldnotincreasetheriskof
neglecttoanychild,norshouldweforceparentstoresorttotheblackmarketinordertosurrenderchildrenithey
can'tcarefor.
xxxx
Noonehasyetshownthatdecadesofpolicyprotectingtheanonymityofthebiologicalparentsandthesecurityfrom
intrusionoftheparentchildrelationshipafteradoptionhavebeenmisguided.Quitethecontrary.Theoverwhelming
successofadoptionaaninstitutionwhichhasprovidedmillionsofchildrenwithfamilies,andviceversa,cannotbe
easilyattacked.
Thepublichasastronginterest,too,inpreservingtheconfidentialnonpublicnatureoftheprocess.Publicattitudes
toward illegitimacy and parents who neglect or abuse children have not changed sufficiently to warrant careless
disclosureofthecircumstancesleadingtoadoption.
But the public also has an interest in the mental health of children who have been adoptedin order that they not
becomeburdenstosociety.Someprovisionfortherelativelysmallgroupofadopteeswhosepsychologicalneedsare
compellingwouldappear:necessary."
xxxx
TheStatecertainlymustprotecttheinterestoftheadoptee,laswellastherightsofthenaturalandadoptingparents.When
the adoptee is a minor, there is no dispute that the sealedrecord provisions serve this end. The child, in his nevJ family
environment, is insulated from intrusion from the natural parents. The child is protected from any stigma resulting from
illegitimacy,neglect,orabuse.Thepreclusion:ofoutsideinterferenceallowstheadoptedchildtodeveloparelationshipoflove
andcohesivenesswiththenewfamilyunit.Priortoadulthood,theadoptee'sinterestisconistentwiththatoftheadoptingand
naturalparents.
Upon reaching majority, the adoptee often develops a counterVailing interest that is in direct conflict with the other parties,
particularlythenaturalparents.Theadopteewishestodeterminehisnaturalidentity,whiletheprivacyinterestofthe,natural
parentsremain,perhapsstrongerthanever.TheSectionrecognizesthattherightofprivacyisnotabsolute.Itallowsthecourt
toevaluatetheneedsoftheadopteeIaswellasthenatureoftherelationshipsandchoicesmadebyallpartiesconcerned.The
tatute,byprovidingforreleaseofadoptionrecordsonlyuponissuanceofacourtorder,doesnomorethanallowthecourtto
balance the interests of all the parties and make a det rmination based on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case.221(Citationsomitted)

[222]Exhibit30,AnnexIseriesinG.R.No.229697Exhibit30(Tatad),Sxhibit2022(Contreras/Valdez),AnnexMseriesofPetitionfor

CertiorariinG.R.Nos.229688700.
[223]Exhibit30A,AnnexIseriesinG.R.No.229697Exhibit30A(Tatad,Exhibit23(Contreras/Valdez),AnnexMseriesofPetitionfor

CertiorariinG.R.Nos.229688700.
[224] Exhibit 31, Annex Iseries in G.R. No. 229697 Exhibit 31 (Tatad)J Exhibit 34 (Contreras/Valdez), Annex Mseries of Petition for

CertiorariinG.R.Nos.229688700.
[225] Section 3(h), Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoptin Act of 1998, IRRR.A. 8552 (1998) Also see Rule 26,

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act Nof 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration, NSO Administrative Order No. 193 (1992)
Section3(e),RuleonAdoption,A.M.No.02602SC(2002).
[226]Articles255and258oftheCivilCodestate:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundreddaysfollowingitsdissolutionortheseparationofthespousesshallbepresumedtobelegitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted otlier than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
accesstohisWifewithinthefirstonehundredandtwentydaysofthethreehundredwhichpecededthebirthofthechild.
Article258.Achildbornwithinonehundredeightyqaysfollowingthecelebrationofthemarriageisprimafaciepresumedto
bellegitimate.Suchachildisconclusivelypresumedtobelegitimateinanyofthesrcases:
(1)Ifthehusband,beforethemarriage,knewofthepregnancyofthewife
(2)Ifheconsented,beingpresent,totheputtingofhissurnameontherecordofbirthofthechild
(3)Ifheexpresslyortacitlyrecognizedthechildashisown.

AsimilarprovisionisfoundintheFamilyCode:

Article 168. If the marriage is terminated and the motheri contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such
terminationoftheformermarriage,theserulesshallgovernintheabsenceofprooftotecontrary:
(1)Achildbornbeforeonehundredeightydaysafterthes!olemnizationofthesubsequentmarriageisconsideredtohavebeen
corceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage
(2)Achildbornafteronehundredeightydaysfollowingtecelebrationofthesubsequentmarriageisconsideredtohavebeen
con eived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hu dred days after the termination of the former
marriage.

[227]Rule131,Section3oftheRulesofCourt,states:

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcomebyothereividence.
xxxx
(dd)Thatifthemarriageisterminatedandthemothercontractedianothermarriagewithinthreehundreddaysaftersuchterminationof
theformermarriageJtheseridesshallgovernintheabsenceofprooftothecontrary:
(1)Achildbornbeforeonehundredeightydaysafterthesolemntzationofthesubsequentmarriageisconsideredtohavebeenconceived
duringtheformer[marriage,provideditbebornwithinthreehundreddaysaftertheterminationoftheformermarriage
(2)Achildbornafteronehundredeightydaysfollowingthecelebrationofthesubseq
546+45
56uentmarriageisconsideredtohavebeenconceivedduringsuchmarriage,eventhoughitbebornwithinthethreehundreddaysafter
theterminationofteformermarriage.
[228]AlejandroE.Sebastian,ThePhilippineLawonLegitimacy,11PHIL.L.J.35(1931),p.42.
[229]G.R.No.200169,28January2015.
[230]CIVILCODE,Art.172.
[231]Section5,ActNo.3753states:

SECTION5.RegistrationandCertificationofBirths.Thedeclarationofthephysicianormidwifeinattendanceatthebirthor,in
defaultthereof,thedeclarationofeitherparentofthenewbornchild,shallbesufficientfortheregistrationofabirthinthecivil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax land shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
laterthanthirtydaysafterthebirth,bythphysician,ormidwifeinattendanceatthebirthorbyeitherparentofthenewlyborn
child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to fhe following facts: (a) date and hour of birth (b) sex and
nationalityofinfant(c)names,citizenship,andreligionofparentsor,incasethefatherisnotknown,ofthemothralone(d)
civil status of parents (e) place where the infant was born (f) and such other data may be required in the regulation to be
issued.
Incaseofanillegitimatechild,thebirthcertificateshallbesignedndsworntojointlybytheparentsoftheinfantoronlythe
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name othe
fatherwhorefusestoacknowledgethechild,ortogivethereinanyinformationbywhichsuchfathercouldbeidentified.

[232]Supranote229.
[233]InLucasv.Lucas(G.R.No.190710,665Phil.795815[2011]),theCourtexplained:

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance iof a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court.
Thecourtmay,forexample,considerwhetherthereisabsolutenecessityfortheDNAtesting.Ifthereisalreadypreponderance
ofevidencetoestablishpaternityandtheDNAtestresultwouldonlybecorroborative,thecourtmay,initsdiscretion,disallow
aDNAtesting.

ThispronouncementwasreiteratedinTecsonv.COMELEC(G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, 161824, 468 Phil. 42175 [2004]), in which the
Courtstated:Incaseproofoffiliationorpaternitywouldbeunlikelytosatisfactorilyestablishorwouldbedifficulttoobtain,DNAtesting,
whichexaminesgeneticcodesobtainedfrombodycellsoftheillegitimatechildandanyphysicalresiduofthelongdeadparentcouldbe
resortedto."
[234]Section765ofAct190states:

SECTION 765. How a Child May be Adopted. An inhabftant of the Philippine Islands, not married, or a husband and wife jointly,
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province in which they reside for leave to adopt a minor child: but a written
consentmustbegivenforsuchadoptionbythechild,ifoftheageoffourteenyears,andbyeachofhisorherlivingparentswhoisnot
hopelesslyinsaneorintemperate,orhasnotabandonedsuchchild,oriftherearenosuchparents,oriftheparentsareunknown,
or have abandoned such child, or if they are hopelessly insane or intemperate, then by the legal guardian, or if there is no such
guardian, then by a discreet and suitable person appointed by the court to act in the proceedings as the next friend of such child but
when such child is an inmate of lan orphan asylum or children's home, organized under the laws of the Philippine slands,
and has been previously abandoned by its parents or guardians, or voluntarily surrendered by its parents or guardians to the
trustees or directors of an asylum or cllildren's home, then the written consent of the president of the board of trustees or directors of
suchasylummustbegiven:Provided,nevertheless,Thatnothinghereincontainedshallauthorizeaguardiantoadopthiswardbeforethe
terminationoftheguardianshipandthefinalsettlementandapprovalofhisaccountsasguardianbythecourt.(mphasessupplied)
[235]Sections3and7,Rule100(AdoptionandCustodyofMinors)ofthe1940RulesofCourt,state:

SECTION 3. Consent to Adoption. There shall be filed with! the petition a writtenconsent to the adoption signed by the
child,ifoverfourteen!yearsofageandnotincompetent,andbyeachofitsknownlivingparentswhoisntinsaneorhopelessly
intemperateorhasnotabandonedsuchchild,oriftherearenosuchparentsbythegeneralguardianorguardianad
litemofthechild,orifthecildisinthecustodyofanorphanasylum,children'shome,orbenevolentsocietyorperson,by
the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persbn but if the child is illegitimate and has not
beenrecognized,theconsentofitsfathertptheadoptionshallnotberequired.
SECTION7.ProceedingsastoVagrantorAbusedChild.Whentheparentsofanyminorchildaredead,orbyreasonof
long absence or legal ior physical disability have abandonedit, or cannot support it through vagrancy, neglig nee, or
misconduct, or neglect or refuse to support it, or unlawfully beat or otherwise h bitually maltreat it, or cause or allow it to
engageincommonbegging,ortocommitofensesagainstthelaw,theproperCourtofFirstInstance,uponpetitionfiledby
somerputableresidentoftheprovincesettingforththefacts,mayissueanorderrequiringuchparentstoshowcause,
or,iftheparentsaredeadorcannotbefound,requiringthefiscaloftheprovincetoshowcause,atatimeandplace
fixed in the order, why the child should not be taken from its parents, if living and if upon hearing it appear that the
allegationsofthepetitionaretrue,andthatitisforthebestinterestofthechild,thecourtmaymakeanordertakingit
fromitsparents,ifliving,andcommittingittoanysuitableorphanasylum,children'shome,orbenevolentsociety
or person, to be ultimately placed, by adoption or otherwise, in a home found for it by uch asylum, children's home,
society,orperson.

[236]Sections3and7,Rule99ofthe1964RulesofCourt,provide:

SECTION3.ConsenttoAdoption.Thereshallbefiledwitlithepetitionawrittenconsenttotheadoptionsignedbythechild,iffourteen
yearsdfageoroverandnotincompetent,andbythechild'sspouse,ifany,andbyeachofitknownlivingparentswhoisnotinsaneor
hopelesslyintemperateorhasnotabandoneJsuchchild,orifthereareno such parentsbythegeneralguardianorguardianad
litemofthechild,orifthechildisinthecustodyofanorphanasylum,children'shome,orbenevolentsocietyorperson,bytheproper
officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consentofitsfathertotheadoptionshallnotberequired.
Ifthepersontobeadoptedisofage,onlyhisorherconsentandthhtofthespouse,ifany,shallberequired.
SECTION 7. Proceedings as to Vagrant or Abused Child.When the parents of any minor child are dead, or by reason of long
absence or legal or physical disability have abandoned it, or cannot support it through vagrancy, negligence, or misconduct, or
neglectorrefusetosupportit,ortreatitwithexcessiveharshnesorgiveitcorruptingorders,counsels,orexamples,orcauseorallowit
to engage in egging, or to commit offenses against the law, the proper Court of First Instance, upon petition filed by some reputable
residentoftheprovincesettingforththefacts,mayisfueanorderrequiringsuchparentstoshowcause,or,iftheparentsaredeador

canngt be found, requiring the fiscal of the province to show cause, at a time and place filx.ed in the order, why the child
shouldnotbetakenfromitsparents,iflivingandifupnthehearingitappearsthattheallegationsofthepetitionaretrue,andthatitis
fortheestinterestofthechild,thecourtmaymakeanordertakingitfromitsparents,iflivingndcommittingittoanysuitableorphan
asylum,children'shome,orbenevolentsocietyopersontobeultimatelyplaced,byadoptionorotherwise,inahomefoundforitbysuch
sylum,children'shome,societyorperson.
[237]Sections1and5ofActNo.1670provide:

SECTION1.Theboardoftrusteesordirectorsofanyasylumorinstitutioninwhichpoorchildrenarecaredforand
maintained at public expense are hereby authorized, with the consent of the Director of Health, to place any orpran or
otherchildsomaintainedthereinwhoseparentsareunknown,orbeingknownareunableorunwillingtosupportsuch
child,inchargeofanysuitablepersonwhomaydesiretotakesuchchildandshallfurnishsatisfactoryevidenceofhisability
suitablytomaintain,carefor,andeducatesuchchild.
SECTION5.Upontheapplicationofanypersontothetruseesordirectorsofanyasylumorinstitutionwherepoorchildren
are maintained at public expense to adopt any child so maintained therein, it shall be the duty of such trustes or
directors,withtheapprovaloftheDirectorofHealth,toreportthefacttotheprovicialfiscal,orinthecityofManilatothe
city attorney, and such official shall hereupon prepare the necessary adoption papers and present the matter to the
propercourt.Thecostsofsuchproceedingsincourtshallbedeoficio.

[238]AdministrativeCode,ActNo.2657,31December1916.
[239]Sections545and548ofActNo.2711provide:

SECTION545.Transferofchildfrominstitutionforpoorchilden.Thecompetentauthoritiesofanyasylumorinstitution
inwhichpoorchildenarecaredforandmaintainedatpublicexpenseareauthorized,subjecttoregultionsapprovedby
theSecretaryoftheInterior,toplaceanyorphanorotherchildsomaintainedthereinwhoseparentsareunknown,or
beingknownareunableorunwillingtosupportsuchchild,inchargeofanysuitableperson who may desire to ta e such
childandshallfurnishsatisfactoryevidenceofhisabilitysuitablytomaintain,carefor,andeducatesuchchild.

Theintrustingofachildtoanypersonashereinprovidedshal!lnotconstitutealegaladoptionandshallnotaffectthecivilstatusofsuch
childorprjudicetherightofanypersonentitledtoitslegalcustodyorguardianship.

SECTION548.Adoptionofchildfrominstitutionforpoorhildren.Upontheapplicationofanypersontothecompetent
authorities of anasylum or institution where the poor children are maintained at public expense tadopt any child so
maintainedtherein,itshallbethedutyofsuchauthorities,w'ththeapprovaloftheSecretaryoftheInterior,toreportthe
fact to the provincial fiscal, br in the City of Manila to the fiscal of the city, and such official shall thereupon prepare! the
necessaryadoptionpapersandpresentthemattertothepropercourt.Thecostsofschproceedingincourtshallbedeoficio.

[240]Thelawprovides:

SECTION8.WhoMayBeAdopted.Onlyalegallyfreechildmaybethesubjectofintercountryadoption.Inorderthatsuch
childmaybeconsideredforplacement,thefollowingdocumentsmustbesubmittedtotheBoard:
a)Childstudy
b)Birthcertificate/foundlingcertificate
c)Deedofvoluntarycommitment/decreeofabandonmnt/deathcertificateofparents
d)Medicalevaluation/history
e)Psychologicalevaluation,asnecessaryand
f)Recentphotoofthechild

[241]AnActRequiringtheCertificationoftheDepartmentofSocialWelfaeandDevelopment(DSWD)toDeclarea"ChildLegallyAvailable

forAdoption"asaPrerequisiteforAddptionProceedings(2009).
[242]PursuanttoSection2(3)ofR.A.9523,an"AbandonedChild"referftoachildwhohasnoproperparentalcareorguardianship,or

whoseparent(s)havedesertedhim/herforaperiodofatleastthree(3)continuousmonths,andthetermincludesafounding.
[243]Sections4and5ofR.A.9523state:

Section4.ProcedurefortheFilingofthePetition.ThepetitipnshallbefiledinthecegionalofficeoftheDSWDwherethechild
wasfoundorabandred.

The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form and substance and shall
authorizethepostipgofthenoticeofthepetitionconspicuousplaceforfive(5)consecutivedaysinthelocalitywherethechild
wasfound.
TheRegionalDirectorshallactonthesameandshallrenderardcommendationnotlaterthanfive(5)workingdaysafterthe
completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary
withinfortyeight(48)hoursfromthedateoftherecommendation.
Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. Upon finding merit in the petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification
declaringthechildlegallavailableforadoptionwithinseven(7)workingdaysfromreceiptoftherecommendation.
Saidcertification,byitselfshallbethesolebasisfortheimmediteissuancebythelocalcivilregistrarofafoundlingcertificate.
Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the founding certificate to the National Sta,tistic Office
(NSO).

[244] Guidelines on the Issuance of DSWD Certification Declaring a ChildiLegally Available for Adoption, DSWD Administrative Order No.

01211(2011).
[245]G.R.No.L16922,30April1963.
[246]134Phil.901912(1968).
[247]G.R.No.L30576,I0February1976.
[248]274Phil.11571249(1991).
[249]G.R.Nos.161434,161634,161824,468Phil.42175(2004).
[251]Peoplev.Veneracion,319Phil:364(1995).
[252]AlexanderHamilton,FederalistPaperNo.22emphasissupplied.
[253]RULESOFCOURT,Rule128,Sec.1.
[254]93Phil.257(1953).
[255]Id.ThepassagecitedInreBohenko'sEstate,4N.Y.S.2nd.427,whichalsocitedTortoravs.StateofNewYork,269N.Y.199N.E.

44Hartvs.HudsonRiverBridgeCo.,8N.Y.622.
[256]Id.ThepassagecitedlMooreonFacts,Sec.596.
[257]RULESOFCOURT,Rule112

Section1.PreliminaryInvestigationDefinedWhenRequired Prelim nary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether

thereissufficientgroundtoengederawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeencommittedandtherespondentisprobablyguiltythereof,
andshouldbeheldfortrial.
[258]Section6.Whenwarrantofarrestmayissue.(a)BytheRegionalTrialCourt.Withinten(10)daysfromthefilingofthecomplaintor

information,thejudgeshallpersonallyevaluatetheresolutionoftheprosecutoranditssupportingevidence.Hemayimmediatelydismiss
thecaseiftheevidenceonrecordclearlyfailstoestablishprobablecause.Ifhefindsprobablecause,heshallissueawarrantofarrest,or
acommitmentorderiftheaccusedhasalreadybeenarrestedpursuanttoawarrantissuedbythejudgewhoconductedthepreliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probablecause,thejudgemayordertheprosecutortopresentadditionalevidencewithinfive(5)daysfromnoticeandtheissuemustbe
resolvedbythecourtwithinthirty(30)daysfromthefilingofthecomplaintofinformation.
[259]RULESOFCOURT,Rule133

Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrati e or quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evide ce, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justifY
conclusion.
[260]RULESOFCOURT,Rule133

Section1.Preponderanceofevidence,howdetermined.Incivilcases,thepartyhavingtheburdenofproofmustestablishhiscasebya
preponderanceofevidence.Indeterminingwherethepreponderanceorsuperiorweightofevidenceontheissuesinvolved,lies,thecourt
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunityofknowingthefactstowhichtheyaretestlfying,thenatureofthefactstowhichtheytestify,theprobabilityorimprobability

oftheirtestimony,theirinterestorwantofinterest,andalsotheirpersonalcredibilitysofarasthesamemaylegitimateappearuponthe
trial.Thecourtmayalsoconsiderthenumberofwitnesses,thoughthepreponderanceisnotnecessarilywiththegreaternumber.
[261]RULESOFCOURT,Rule130

Section51.Characterevidencenotgenerallyadmissibleexceptions(a)InCriminalCases:
(1)Theaccusedmayprovehisgoodmoralcharacterwhichispertinenttothemoraltraitinvolvedintheoffensecharged.
(2)Unlessinrebuttal,theprosecutionmaynotprovehisbadmoralcharacterwhichispertinenttothemoraltraitinvolvedintheoffense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probabilityorimprobabilityoftheoffensecharged.
[262]Mercado,Jr.v.Employees'CompensationCommission,223Phil.483t493(1985).
[263]Peoplevs.Condemena,L22426,May29,1968,23SCRA910,919.
[264]LepantoConsolidatedMiningCompanyv.Dumapis,G.R.No.163i10,13August2008,562SCRA103,113114.
[265]MemorandumforpublicrespondentCOMELEC,p.21
[266]PetitionforCertiorari(G.R.221697),p.107.
[267]OralArguments,TSN,16August2016.
[268]Tecsonv.COMELEC,468Phil.421(2004).
[269]1987Constitution,ArticleXV,Section3(2).
[270]Seep.55
[271]ErwinChemerinsky,ConstitutionalLaw:PrinciplesandPolicies1719(3rded.2006).
[272]WilliamMichaelTreanor,AgainstTextualism,103Nw.U.L.Rev.9831006(2009).:

http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub,LastAccessed:8March2016.
[273]JoaquinBernas,SJ,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhiippinesACommentary,p.997(2009).
[274]Inthisapproach,thejusticeanalyzestheintentionoftheframesoftheConstitutionandthecircumstancesofitsratification.
[275]Thejusticedrawsinferencesfromthe"threecorneredpowerrelationhips"foundintheConstitution.

Hegivesasexample'separationofpowers."Inotherwords,ajusticrelies,notonthetextoftheConstitution,butonstructure.
[276] This relies on established precedents. For Bernas, the Supreme Court Decisions are, to a certain extent, a "second set of

constitutionaltexts."
[277]Thisformofinterpretation"seekstointerprettheFilipinomoralcommitmentsthatareembeddedintheconstitutionaldocument.The

Constitution,aerall,asthePreamblesays,ismeanttobeanembodimentof'ouridealsandaspirations.'Amongthesemaybeourinnate
religiosity,respectforhumandignity,andthecelebrationofcultualandethnicdiversity."
[278]Thejusticeweighsandcomparesthecoststobenefitsthatmightbefoundinconflictingrules.
[279] Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutional nd Architectural Interpretation, Jonathan Turley, The George

WashingtonLawReview,Vol.83:308.
[280] Eskridge, William N. Jr., "Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of P owers Cases" (1998). Faculty

ScholarshipSeris.Availab1eonlineathttp://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3807.LastAccessedon:8March2016.
[281]Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139(1936).
[282]252u.s.416(1920).
[283]HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy,Vol.29,pp.401415.
[284]Petition,p.12.

[285]TaadaandFernando,ConstitutionofthePhilippines,VoLI,4thEd.,pp.2324(1952).
[286]TaadaandFernando,ConstitutionofthePhilippines,Vol.I,4thEd.p.13.(1952).
[287]Amajorityofthedelegateselected142outof202werelawyers.Oftheselawyers,10werelawprofessors.Likewisetherewere6

other educators who were elected as delegates, 2 of them political scientists. There were also a respectable number of farmers and
businessmen.Fiftyfiveofthemcanbeclassifiedunderthiscategory.Almostamajorityofthetotalnumberofdelegateshadpreviously
servedaspublicofficialsmostlyinanelectivecapacity.Thusthereweremanyformersenators,andrepresentativesandassemblymenin
theranksofthedelegates(Id.at6).
[288]Martinv.Hunter'sLessee,14U.S.304(1816).
[289]Calalangv.Williams,70Phil.726(1940).
[290]Id.
[291]Id.
[292]MemorandumforpublicrespondentCOMELEC,p.56.
[293]392Phil.327(2000).
[294]COMELECComment,p.28.
[295]ThefollowingexcerptsshowthattheCourtcharacterizedjussanguiniasthepredominatingregimeofcitizenship:

a)Roav.InsularCollectorofCustoms(1912)
"Areadingofarticle17oftheCivilCode,abovecopied,isufficienttoshowthatthefirstparagraphaffirmsandrecognizestheprincipleof
nationality by place ofJ birth, jus soli. The second, that of jus sanguinis and the last two that of free selection, with the first
predominating."
b)Torresv.TanChim(1940)
"In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of
Philippinecitizenship,theConstitution:didnotintendtoexcludethosewhowerecitizensofthePhilippinesbyjudicialdeclarationatthe
timeofitsadoption.IfonthestrengthoftheRoadecisionapersonwasconsideredafullpledgedPhilippinecitizen(Art.IV,sec.1,No.1)
on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the pr vailing doctrine, he cannot be divested ofhis Filipino
citizenship."
c)Villahermosav.CommissionerofImmigration(1948)
"After the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese' father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine
citizenship, and jus sanguinis instead dfjus soli is the predominating factoron questions of citizenship, thereby rendering obsolete the
decisioninRoavs.CollectorofCustoms,23Phil.,andU.S.vs.LimBin,36Phil.,andsimilarcasesonwhichpetitioer'scounselrelies."
d)Talarocv.Uy(1952)
"In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of
Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the
timeofitsadoption.IfonthestrengthoftheRoadecisionapersonwasconsideredafullpledgedPhilippinecitizen(Art.IV,sec.1,No.1)
on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino
citizenship."I
[296] ranslated by Licenciados Cliffor S. Walton and Nestor Ponce de Leon. Published under authority of MaJorGeneral Willam Ludlow

MilitaryGovernorofHavana.EditedbyMajorCliffordS.Walton.Availableonlineathttps://archive.org/stream/spanishcivilcode00spairich
_djvu.txt.(lastvisitedat9March2016).
[297]Supranote1.
[298]JusticeVitugwrote:"Theyear1898wasanotherturningpointinPhilippinehistory.Alreadyinthestateofdeclineasasuperpower,

Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony ip the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of
internationallawdictatedthatachangeinsovereignty,whileresultinginanabrogationofallpoliticallawstheninforce,wouldhaveno
effectoncivillaws,whichwouldremainvirtuallyintact."
[299]Tecsonv.Comelec citing Leon T. Garcia, The Problems of Citizenship in the Philippines, Rex Bookstore, 1949, at pp. 3132, supra

note1.

[300]Idat.2326,citedinTecsonv.Comelec,supranote1.
[301]Teesonv.Comelec,supranote1.
[302]Tecsonv.Comelec,supranote___.
[303]ArticleIII,Section1ofthe1973Constitutionstates:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
1.ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
xxxx
ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1987Constitution,states:
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:1
1.ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimetheadoptionofthisConstitution
xxxx
[304]1987Constitution,Preamble.
[305]Id.
[306]Id.
[307]23Phil315(1912).
[308]69Phil.518(1940).
[309]70Phil.287(1940).
[310]TaadaandFernando,ConstitutionofthePhilippines,Vol.II,4thEd.(1952),p.649.
[311]Talarocv.Uy,92Phil.52(1952).

Facts:ThisisanactiontocontesttheelectionofUytotheofficeofMunicipalMayoronthegroundthatheisChinese,therefore,ineligible.
HewasborninthePhilippinesin1912ofaFilipinomotherandaChinesefather.Hisparentsdidnotgetmarrieduntil1914.Hisfatherdied
in1917,whilehismotherdiedin1949.Uyhadvotedinpreviouselectionsandheldvariouspositionsinthegovernment.Heneverwentto
China.
Held:OnthestrengthoftheRoadoctrine,UycanbeconsideredaFilipinocitizenonthedateoftheadoptionoftheConstitutionwhenjus
solihasbeentheprevailingdoctrine.ThestatusofthosepersonswhowereconsideredFilipinocitizensundertheprevailingdoctrineofjus
soliwouldnotbeaffectedbythechangeofdoctrineupontheeffectivityofthePhilippineConstitution.
[312]Id.
[313]92Phil.61(1952).
[314]70Phil.161166(1940).
[315]223Phil.357363(1985).
[316]U.S.Constitution,Art.II,Sec.I.
[317]JackMaskell,"QualificationsforPresidentandthe'NaturalBorn'CitizenshipEligibilityRequirement",CongressionalResearchService,

14November2011(lastvisited8March2016).
[318] Lawrence B. Solum, Commentary, "Original ism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause," 107 Mich. L. Rev First Impressions 22, 22

(2010).
[319]Id.
[320]Id.
[321]Id.at26
[322]SeeidF.E.Edwards,NaturalBornBritishSubjectsatCommonLaw,14JournaloftheSocietyofComparativeLegislation314,315(

1914)(lastvisited8March2016).

[323] A Dictionary Of The English Language: In Which The Words are Deduced from Their Originals, And Illustrated in Their Different

SignificationsByExamplesfromtheBestWriters,ToWhichArePrefixed,AHistoryoftheLanguage,AndAnEnglishGrammar(2nded.
1756).
[324] The Founders' Constitution, Volume 2, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 (Citizenship), Document I, The University of Chicago Press

http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_4_citizenships1.html(lastvisited8March2016).
[325]Sections4and7,ArticleVIofthe1935Constitutionstate:

Section4.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlesshebeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesand,atthetimeofhiselection,
isatleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,aqualifiedelector,andaresidentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyearsimmediately
priortohiselection.
Section7.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlesshebeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,
and,atthetimeofhiselection,isatleasttwenty fiveyearsofage,aqualifiedelector,andaresidentoftheprovinceinwhich
heischosenfornotlessthanoneyearimmediatelypriortohiselection.

Section3,Art.VIIofthe1935Constitution,states:

Section 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or VicePresident, unless he be a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediatelyprecedingtheelection.

[326]TaadaandFernando,ConstitutionofthePhilippines,Vol.II,4thEd.(1952),pp.974975.
[327]TaadaandFernando,ConstitutionofthePhilippines,Vol.II,4thEd.(1952),p.975.
[328]Id.at404405.
[329]Sections4and2,Art.VIIofthe1973Constitution,state:

Section4.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,ableto
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.(asamendedintheJanuary27,1984Plebiscite)
Section2.ThereshallbeaVicePresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandtermofofficeasthePresidentandmay
beremovedfromofficeinthesamemannerasthePresidentasprovidedinArticleXIII,Section2ofthisConstitution.

[330]Sections2and3,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitution,read:

Section2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadand
write,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelypreceding
suchelection.
Section3.ThereshallbeaVicePresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandtermofofficeandbeelectedwithandinthesame
mannerasthePresident.HemayberemovedfromofficeinthesamemannerasthePresident.
[331]Section4,ArticleIII.
[332]Thissectionstates:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuaryI7,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajorityand
xxxx
[333]409Phil.633(2001).
[334]ChiefJustice(thenAssociateJustice)Panganiban'sConcurringOpinioninBengsonIII,id.

[335]23Phil315,338(1912).
[336]Laurel,ProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,VoLV,p.1032.
[337]79Phil.249,256(1947).
[338]Id.
[339]TaadaandFernando,supra.
[340]See:AngBagongBayaniOFWv.CommissiononElections,412Phil.308374(2001).
[341]Theprovisionstates:

SECTION5.RegistrationandCertificationofBirths.xxxx
Inthecaseofanexposedchild,thepersonwhofoundthesameshallreporttothelocalcivilregistrartheplace,dateandhouroffinding
andotherattendantcircumstances.
[342]CommonwealthActNo.473(1939).
[343]Section5ofC.A.473states:

SECTION 5. Declaration of Intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the
applicantforPhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththeBureauofJusticeadeclarationunderoaththatitisbonafidehisintention
tobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines.Suchdeclarationshallsetforththename,age,occupation,personaldescription,placeof
birth,lastforeignresidenceandallegiance,thedateofarrival,thenameofthevesseloraircraft,ifany,inwhichhecameto
thePhilippines,andtheplaceofresidenceinthePhilippinesatthetimeofmakingthedeclaration.Nodeclarationshallbevalid
until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his
arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schoolsorprivateschoolsrecognizedbytheOfficeofPrivateEducationofthePhilippines,wherePhilippinehistory,government,
andcivicsaretaughtorprescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidenceinthePhilippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two
photographsofhimself.

[344]Section7ofC.A.473states:

SECTION7.PetitionforCitizenship.AnypersondesiringtoacquirePhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththecompetentcourt,a
petitionintriplicate,accompaniedbytwophotographsofthepetitioner,settingforthhisnameandsurnamehispresentand
former places of residence his occupation the place and date of his birth whether single or married and if the father of
children,thename,age,birthplaceandresidenceofthewifeandofthechildrentheapproximatedateofhisorherarrivalin
the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came a
declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for
naturalizationundertheprovisionsofthisActthathehascompliedwiththerequirementsofsectionfiveofthisActandthat
he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippinecitizenship.Thepetitionmustbesignedbytheapplicantinhisownhandwritingandbesupportedbytheaffidavitof
atleasttwocrediblepersons,statingthattheyarecitizensofthePhilippinesandpersonallyknowthepetitionertobearesident
ofthePhilippinesfortheperiodoftimerequiredbythisActandapersonofgoodreputeandmorallyirreproachable,andthat
saidpetitionerhasintheiropinionallthequalificationsnecessarytobecomeacitizenofthePhilippinesandisnotinanyway
disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and postoffice addresses of such
witnessesasthepetitionermaydesiretointroduceatthehearingofthecase.Thecertificateofarrival,andthedeclarationof
intentionmustbemadepartofthepetition.

[345]Section10ofC.A.473provides:

SECTION10.HearingofthePetition.Nopetitionshallbeheardwithinthethirtydaysprecedinganyelection.Thehearingshall
be public, and the SolicitorGeneral, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on
behalf of the Commonwealth of the Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court
believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in, this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall order the proper
naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization certificate in the proper civil registry as
requiredinsectiontenofActNumberedThreethousandsevenhundredandfiftythree.

[346]PursuanttoSection12ofC.A.473,thepetitionershall,inopencourt,takethefollowingoathbeforethenaturalizationcertificateis

issued:

"I,_________________,solemnlyswearthatIrenounceabsolutelyandforeverallallegianceandfidelitytoanyforeignprince,
potentate, state of sovereignty, and particularly to the_________of which at this time I am a subject or citizen that I will
supportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandthatIwillobeythelaws,legalordersanddecreespromulgatedby
thedulyconstitutedauthoritiesoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippinesandIherebydeclarethatIrecognizeandacceptthe
supreme authority of the United States of America in the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto and
thatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarilywithoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
"SohelpmeGod."

[347]Rule28oftheImplementingRulesandRegulationsofActNo.3753andOtherLawsonCivilRegistration(NSOAdministrativeOrder

No.l93[1992])provides:

Immediatelyafterfindingafoundling,thefindershallreportthecasetothebarangaycaptainoftheplacewherethefoundling
wasfound,ortothepoliceheadquarters,whicheverisnearerorconvenienttothefinder.Whenthereportisdulynotedeither
by the barangay captain or by the police authority, the finder shall commit the child to the care of the Department of Social
WelfareandDevelopmentortoadulylicensedorphanageorcharitableorsimilarinstitution.Uponcommitment,thefinder
shallgivetothecharitableinstitutionhiscopyoftheCertificateofFoundling,ifhehadregisteredthefoundling.
(emphasissupplied)

[348] Pursuant to R.A. 9523 (2009), the DSWD may declare a child legally available for adoption in accordance with the following

procedure:

SECTION4.ProcedurefortheFilingofthePetition.ThepetitionshallbefiledintheregionalofficeoftheDSWDwherethechild
wasfoundorabandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form and substance and shall
authorizethepostingofthenoticeofthepetitioninconspicuousplacesforfive(5)consecutivedaysinthelocalitywherethe
childwasfound.
TheRegionalDirectorshallactonthesameandshallrenderarecommendationnotlaterthanfive(5)workingdaysafterthe
completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office ofthe Secretary
withinfortyeight(48)hoursfromthedateoftherecommendation.
SECTION5.DeclarationofAvailabilityforAdoption.Uponfindingmeritinthepetition,theSecretaryshallissueacertification
declaringthechildlegallyavailableforadoptionwithinseven(7)workingdaysfromreceiptoftherecommendation.
Said certification, by itself, shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local civil registrar of a foundling
certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the foundling certificate to the National
StatisticsOffice(NSO).

[349]RulesandRegulationstoImplementtheDomesticAdoptionActof1998,IRRR.A.8552,Section5(1998).
[350]Section16,R.A.8552.
[351]Republicv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.97906,21May1992.
[352]Section14,R.A.8552.
[353]Id.
[354]SeeBaldosv.CourtofAppealsandPillazar,638Phil.601(2010)HeirsofCabaisv.CourtofAppeals,374Phil.681691(1999).
[355]Sections14and15ofR.A.8552state:

Section14.CivilRegistryRecord.AnamendedcertificateofbirthshallbeissuedbytheCivilRegistry,asrequiredbythe
RulesofCourt,attestingtothefactthattheadopteeisthechildoftheadopter(s)bybeingregisteredwithhis/hersurname.
Theoriginalcertificateofbirthshallbestamped"cancelled"withtheannotationoftheissuanceofanamendedbirthcertificate
initsplaceandshallbesealedinthecivilregistryrecords.Thenewbirthcertificatetobeissuedtotheadopteeshallnotbear
anynotationthatitisanamendedissue.
Section 15. Confidential Natltre of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and

shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department,oranyotheragencyorinstitutionparticipatingintheadoptionproceedingsshallbekeptstrictlyconfidential.
Ifthecourtfindsthatthedisclosureoftheinformationtoathirdpersonisnecessaryforpurposesconnectedwithorarisingout
oftheadoptionandwillbeforthebestinterestoftheadoptee,thecourtmaymeritthenecessaryinformationtobereleased,
restrictingthepurposesforwhichitmaybeused.

[356]601F.2d1225,1235(2dCir.1979).
[357]444U.S.995,100S.Ct.531,62L.Ed.2d426(1979).
[358]409Phil.633672(2001).
[359]ReacquisitionofPhilippineCitizenshipbyPersonsWhoServedinUSArmedForces(1960).
[360]SeeSobejanaCondonv.COMELEC,G.R.No.198742,692Phil.407431(2012).
[361]SeeParrefiov.COA,G.R.No.162224,551Phil.368381(2007).
[362]ArticleIV,Section2,states:

Section2.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
[363] In Bengson v. HRET (409 PHIL 633672 [2001]), the Court declared: "A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a

particularcountry,isanaturalborncitizenthereof."(Emphasissupplied)
[364]Sections2and3ofCommonwealthAct63provides:

SECTION2.Howcitizenshipmaybereacquired.Citizenshipmaybereacquired:
(l) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualifications prescribed in section two of Act
NumberedTwentyninehundredandtwentyseven
(2)ByrepatriationofdesertersoftheArmy,NavyorAirCorpsProvided,Thatawomanwholosthercitizenshipbyreasonof
hermarriagetoanalienmayberepatriatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisActaftertheterminationofthemarital
statusand(3)BydirectactoftheNationalAssembly.
SECTION3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The procedure prescribed for naturalization under
ActNumberedTwentyninehundredandtwentyseven,asamendedshallapplytothereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipby
naturalizationprovidedforinthenextprecedingsection:Provided,Thatthequaliticationsandspecialqualificationsprescribed
insectionthreeandfourofsaidActshallnotberequired:Andprovided.further,
(1)ThattheapplicantbeatleasttwentyoneyearsofageandshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesatleastsixmonthsbefore
heappliesfornaturalization
(2)Thatheshallhaveconductedhimselfinaproperandirreproachablemannerduringtheentireperiodofhisresidenceinthe
Philippines,inhisrelationswiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityinwhichheislivingand
(3)Thathesubscribestoanoathdeclaringhisintentiontorenounceabsolutelyandperpetuallyallfaithandallegiancetothe
foreignauthority,stateorsovereigntyofwhichhewasacitizenorsubject.

[365]CommonwealthActNo.63,WaysinWhichPhilippineCitizenshipMaybeLostorReacquired(1936).
[366] An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or

AcceptingCommissionIn,theArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates(1960).
[367]RepatriationofFilipinoWomenandofNaturalBornFilipinosWhoLostTheirPhilippineCitizenship(1995).
[368]ArticleII,Section2ofthe1987Constitution,provides:

ThePhilippinesxxxadoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthelawofthelandandadheresto
thepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.
[369]Article38(1)(b)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticestates:

1.TheCourt,whosefunctionistodecideinaccordancewithinternationallawsuchdisputesasaresubmittedtoit,shallapply:
xxx
a.internationalcustom,aseviJenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw

[370]Razon,Jr.v.Tagitis,621Phil.536635(2009)
[371] InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica.

AdvisoryOpinionOC4/84ofJanuary19,1984.SeriesANo.4,para.35.
[372]InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,Article24UnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article7.
[373]Seethe1997EuropeanConventiononNationality,Article61969AmericanConventiononHumanRights(PactofSanJose,Costa

Rica), Article 20 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 6 2008 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights,
Article29.
[374]Article14oftheConventionstates:

Achildwhoseparentsarebothunknownshallhavethenationalityofthecountryofbirth.Ifthechild'sparentageisestablished,
itsnationalityshallbedeterminedbytherulesapplicableincaseswheretheparentageisknown.
Afoundlingis,untilthecontraryisproved,presumedtohavebeenbornontheterritoryoftheStateinwhichitwasfound.

[375]Article2oftheConventionprovides:

Article2
AfoundlingfoundintheterritoryofaContractingStateshall,intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,beconsideredtohave
beenbornwithinthatterritoryofparentspossessingthenationalityofthatState.

[376]Article6(1)(b)oftheConventionstates:

Article6Acquisitionofnationality
l.EachStatePartyshallprovideinitsinternallawforitsnationalitytobeacquiredexlegebythefollowingpersons:
xxx
(b)foundlingsfoundinitsterritorywhowouldotherwisebestateless.

[377] Based on the databases of the United Nations Treaty Collection (https://treaties.un.org), the number of state parties in the

conventionsmentionedareasfollows:InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights168ConventionontheRightsoftheChild196
HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws13ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness
65EuropeanConventiononNationality20.
[378]SeeJurisdictionalImmunitiesoftheState(Germanyv.Italy),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2012,p.99ArrestWarrantof11April2000

(DemocraticRepublicofCongov.Belgium),I.C.J.Reports2002,p.3.
[379] Argentina (See Database of European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship) Bolivia (Article 141, New Constitution of

Bolivia) Brazil (Article 12[1], Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil) Chile (Article 10, Constitution) Cuba (Article 29, The
Constitution of the Republic of Cuba as amended) Dominica (Article 98, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 1978)
Dominican Republic (Article 18, Constitution), Ecuador (Article 7, Ecuador Constitution) El Salvador (Article 90, Constitution of the
RepublicofElSalvadorasamended),EquatorialGuinea(Article10,FundamentalLawofEquatorialGuinea,1982)Grenada(Item96,97,
Grenada Constitution, 7 February 1974) Guatemala (Article 144, Guatemalan Constitution), Jamaica (Item 3B, Jamaican Constitution
August 1962) Kiribati (Kiribati Independence Order dated July 12,1979) Niger (Directory of Citizenship Laws compiled by the United
StatesOfficeofPersonnelManagementInvestigationsService)Pakistan(Sections4and5,PakistanCitizenshipAct1951,asamended)
Palau (The Citizenship Act, 13 PNCA, 1 January 1995) Panama (Article 9, Constitution of Panama) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
(Items 9091, Constitution of 1979) Tanzania (Sections 5 and 6, Tanzania Citizenship Act No. 6 of 1995, 10 October 1995) Thailand
(Section7,NationalityActB.E.2508)Venezuela(Article32,ConstitutionoftheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuela)andZimbabwe(Section
5,ConstitutionofZimbabwe).
[380]Afghanistan(Article3,LawofCitizenshipinAfghanistan,6November1936)Albania(Article8[1],LawonAlbanianCitizenship,Law

No.8389,6September1998)Algeria(Article7,OrdonnanceNo.7086du15decembre1970portantcodedeIanationalitealgerienne,

18December1970)Andorra(NationalityAct,5October1997)Angola(Article9,ConstituicaodaRepublicadeAngolaaos,21Janeirode
2010)AntiguaandBarbuda(Article3[1],ConstitutionofAntiguaandBarbuda)Armenia(Article12,LawoftheRepublicofArmeniaon
the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia as amended, 27 November 2005) Australia (Section 14, Australian Citizenship Act 2007)
Austria (Article 8(1), Federal Law Concerning the Austrian Nationality [Nationality Act of 1985]) Azerbaijan (Article 13, Law of the
AzerbaijanRepubliconCitizenshipoftheAzerbaijanRepublic,15March1994)Bahrain(ItemNo.5[B],BahrainiCitizenshipActfor1963,
16September1963)Barbados(Cap.186,Section4[1],BarbadosCitizenshipAct)Belgium(CodeofBelgianNationality,28June1984),
Belize (Part III, 7, Belizean Nationality Act, Cap. 161) Benin (Article 10, Code de Ia nationalitedahomeenn, Loi No. 6517, 23 June 1
965) Bosnia and Herzegovina (Section 7, Bosnia and Herzegovina Nationality Law, 7 October 1992) Bulgaria (Article 11, Law on
BulgarianCitizenship,November1998)BurkinaFasp(ZatuNo.AnVIA0013/FP/PRESdu16Novembre1989)Burundi(Article3,LoiNo
1/013 du 18 juillet 2000 portantreforme du code de la nationalite, 18 July 2000), Cambodia (Article 4 [2] [b], Law on Nationality, 9
October 1996) Cameroon (Section 9, Law No. 1968LF3 of the 11th June 1968 to set up the Cameroon Nationality Code) Canada
(Section 4[1], Canadian Citizenship Act) Cape Verde (Nationality law, Law No. 80/III/90, from 29th of June) Central African Republic
(Article I 0, RepubliqueCentrafricaine: Loi No. 1961.212 du 1961 portant code de Ia nationalitecentrafricaine, 21 April 1961) Chad
(Ordonnance33/PG.INT.du14aoftt1962codedeIanationalitetchadienneascitedintheDirectoryofCitizenshipLawscompiledbythe
UnitedStatesOfficeofPersonnelManagementInvestigationsService)China(Article6,NationalityLawofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,
10 September 1980) Comoros (Article 13, Code ofNationality, Law No. 7912) Costa Rica (Article 13[4), Political Constitution of the
Republic of Costa Rica), Croatia (Law of Croatian Citizenship, June 1991) Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti (Article 6, Code de Ia
NationaliteDjiboutienne[Djibouti],Loin79/AN/04/5emeL,24October2004)DemocraticRepublicofCongo(Article2[3],LOINo.87.010
DulerAOUT1987,PortantCodedeIaFamille)Egypt(Article2[4],LawNo.26of1975ConcerningEgyptianNationality,OfficialJournal
No.22,29MayI975),Eritrea(Item2[3],EritreanNationalityProclamationNo.2III992,6April1992)Estonia(Section5[2],Citizenship
Act of Estonia) Ethiopia (Article 3[2], Proclamation No. 378/2003, A Proclamation on Ethiopian Nationality, 23 December 2003) Fiji
(Section7,CitizenshipofFijiDecree2009)Finland(SectionI2,FinnishNationalityAct359/2003asamended)France(Article19,Title1,
FrenchCivilCode),G.Bissau,Gabon(ArticleI1[2],CodedeIaNationaliteLoiNo.371998)Georgia(Article15,OrganicLawofGeorgia
on Georgian Citizenship) Germany (Section 4[2], Nationality Act of 22 July 1913 as amended) Ghana (Citizenship Act, Act 591, 5
January 2001) Greece (Article 1[2][b], Greek Citizenship Code) Guinea (Directory of Citizenship Laws compiled by the United States
OfficeofPersonnelManagementInvestigationsService)GuineaBissau(Article5[2],LeidaCidadaniaLein.o2/92De6deAbril)Guyana
(Item8[2],GuyanaCitizenshipAct,Cap.14:0I)Haiti(Article4,HaitiCitizenshipAct)Honduras(Article23,ConstitutionoftheRepublic
of Honduras) Hungary (Section 3[3][b], Act LV of 1993 as amended) Iceland (Article 1[1], Icelandic Nationality Act No. 100/1952, I
January1953)Indonesia(Article4[9],4[10],4[11],LawoftheRepublicofIndonesiaNo.12onCitizenshipoftheRepublicofIndonesia,
1 August 2006) Iran (Article 976[3], Iran Nationality Law) Iraq (Article 4[6], Law No. 46 of 1963) Ireland (Item 10, Irish Nationality
and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended), Israel (Article 4[A], Nationality Law 57121952, 14 July 1953) Italy (Article 1[2], Law no.
91/1992)Jamaica,Japan(Article2[3],NationalityLawLawNo.147of1950,asamended)Jordan(Article3[4],JordanianNationality
Law1954,LawNo.6of1954onNationality,1January1954)Kazakhstan(Article13,LawonCitizenshipoftheRepublicofKazakhstan,1
March1992)Kenya(Article9,KenyaCitizenshipandImmigrationActNo.12of2011,30August20Il)Korea(Article2[1][3],2[2]Law
No.I6of1948,NationalityActasamended,20December1948)Kosovo(Article7,LawNr.03/L034onCitizenshipofKosovo)Kuwait
(Article3,NationalityLawof1959)KyrgyzRepublic(Article2[5],TheLawoftheKyrgyzRepubliconcitizenshipoftheKyrgyzRepublicas
amended,21March2007)LaoPDR(LawonLaoNationality,29November1990)Latvia(Section2(1)(3)and2(1)(5),LawofCitizenship
1994 [as amended]) Lebanon (Article I [3], Decree No.15 on Lebanese Nationality including Amendments, 19 January 1925) Lesotho
(Item 38, Lesotho Constitution of 1993, 2 April 1993) Liberia (Constitution of the Republic of Liberia) Libya (Section 3, Item 3, Law
Number(24)for2010/1378OnLibyanNationality,24May2010)Liechtenstein(Section4[a],Actof4January1934ontheAcquisition
and Loss of Citizenship) Lithuania (Article 16, Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship No. XI1196, 2 December 2010) Luxembourg
(Article1[2],LuxembourgNationalityLawof23October2008)Macedonia(Article6,LawonCitizenshipoftheRepublicofMacedonia)
Madagascar(DirectoryofCitizenshipLawscompiledbytheUnitedStatesOfficeofPersonnelManagementInvestigationsService)Malawi
(Item2[5),MalawiCitizenshipAct1966)Malaysia(SecondSchedule[Article39],Part1:CitizenshipbyOperationofLawofPersonsBorn
beforeMalaysiaDay[Article14[l][a]Section1,FederalConstitutionofMalaysia,31August1957)Mali(Article11,LoiNo.6218ANRM
du 3 fevrier 1962 portant Code de Ia nationalitemalienne) Malta (Item 17[3], Maltese Citizenship Act) Marshall Islands (Directory of
Citizenship Laws compiled by the United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service) Mauritania (Article 11, Loi N
1961112, Loiportant code de la nationalitemauritanienne) Mexico (Article 7, Law of Nationality as cited in the database of European
UnionDemocracyObservatoryonCitizenship)Moldova(Article11[2],LawonCitizenshipoftheRepublicofMoldova)Mongolia(Article
7[4],LawofMongoliaonCitizenship,5June1995)Montenegro(Article7,MontenegrinCitizenshipAct)Morocco(ArticlelI,CodedeIa
nationalitemarocaine (2011), Dahir n. 158250 du 21 safar 1378, 6 September 1958) Mozambique (Article lO[b], Nationality Act, 25
June1975)Nepal(Item3[3],NepalCitizenshipAct2063,2006),Netherlands(Article3(2),NetherlandsNationalityActasinforceon8
February 2015) New Zealand (Section 6, Citizenship Act 1977 061) Nicaragua (Article 16[4), Constitution of Nicaragua) Norway
(Section 4, Act on Norwegian Nationality) Oman (Article 1 [3], Royal Decree No. 3/83 Law on the Organization of the Omani
Nationality) Papua New Guinea (Section 77, Constitution) Paraguay (Article 146[1], Constitution of Paraguay) Peru (Article 2[2],
Constitution)Poland(Article15,Lawof2April2009onPolishCitizenship)Portugal(A1ticle1[2]PortugueseNationalityAct,Law37/81
of3Octoberasamended)Qatar(Article1[3],LawNo.38of2005ontheAcquisitionofQatarinationality38I2005)Romania(Article
3(1), Law No. 21 of 1 March 1991), Russia (Article 12[2], Federal Law on the Citizenship of the Russian Federation, 15 May 2002)
Rwanda (Article 9, Organic Law N 30/2008 of25/07/2008 relating to Rwandan Nationality 25 July 2008) Saint Kitts and Nevis (Items
95[5][c],I983Constitution)SaintLucia(Article7[2]oftheLawofNationality,ConstitutionofI978ascitedinthedatabaseofEuropean
Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship) Samoa (Part II, Item 6(3),Citizenship Act of 2004) San Marino (See Council of Europe
bulletin: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/nationality/Bulletin_en_files/San%20Marino%20E.pdf) Sao Tome & Principe (Article
5(1) (e) and 5(2), Law of Nationality dated September I 3, 1990) Saudi Arabia (Item No. 7[2], Saudi Arabian Citizenship System
(Regulation),Decisionno.4of25/1/1374Hijra,23September1954)Serbia(Article13,LawonCitizenshipoftheRepublicofSerbia)
Singapore(Article140[13],ThirdSchedule,ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSingapore,9August1965)Slovakia(Section5(2)(b),ActNo.
40/1993Coli.OnnationalityoftheSlovakRepublicof19January1993)Slovenia(Article9,CitizenshipoftheRepublicofSloveniaAct)
Somalia(Article15,LawNo.28of22December1962SomaliCitizenshipasamended)SouthAfrica(Article44,SouthAfricanCitizenship
ActNo.88of1995)SouthSudan(Item8[4],NationalityActof2011,7July2011)Spain(SpanishCivilCode,BookOneTitleI,Article
17[1][d])SriLanka(ItemNo.7,CitizenshipActofSriLanka)Sudan(Section5,SudaneseNationalityAct1994)Suriname(Article4,
State Ordinance of24 November 1975 for the Regulation of the Surinamese Nationality and Residence in Suriname), Swaziland (Section
17,SwazilandCitizenshipAct,1992,Act14/1992,1December1992)Sweden(Section2,SwedishCitizenshipAct)Switzerland(Article
6,FederalActontheAcquisitionandLossofSwissCitizenshipasamended)Taiwan(Article2[3],NationalityActasamended,5February
1929), Tajikistan (Article 19, 13 Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Nationality of the Republic of Tajikistan, 8 August

2015) TimorLeste (Section 3[2][b], Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste) Togo (Article 2, Nationality Act) Tunisia
(Articles9and10,CodeofTunisianNationalityLawNo.636)Turkey(Article8,TurkishCitizenshipLawof2009)Turkmenistan(ArticleII
[1][8], Law of2013 on Citizenship, 22 June 2013) Uganda (Item II, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda) Ukraine (Article 7, Law on
Ukrainian Citizenship) United Arab Emirates (Article 2(5], Federal Law No. 17 for 1972 Concerning Nationality, Passports and
AmendmentsThereof,18November1972)UnitedKingdom(PartI,Item1(2),BritishNationalityActof1984)UnitedStatesofAmerica
(Immigration and Nationality Act 301(a), 302, 306, 307) Uruguay (Article 74, Constitution of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay)
Uzbekistan (Article 16, Law on Citizenship in the Republic of Uzbekistan, 28 July 1992) Vietnam (Article 18, Law on Vietnamese
Nationality,ResolutionNo:24/2008/QH12,13November2008)andYemen(LawNo.6of1990onYemeniNationality,26August1990).
[381]SeeforinstancetheLawofNationalityofMexico,LawNo.636.
[382]SeethePortugueseNationalityAct,Law37/81,of3OctoberasamendedSpanishCivilCode,BookOne:TitleIICameroonLawNo.

1968LF3ofthe11thJune1968Loin1961.212du1961portantcodedeIanationalitecentrafricaineoftheCentralAfricanRepublic
Code of Nationality, Law No. 7912 of Comoros Loi No. 6218 ANRM du 3 fevrier 1962 portant Code de la nationalitemalienne of Mali
Code de Ia nationalitemarocaine (2011), Dahir n. 158250 du 21 safar 1378,6 September 1958 of Morocco Law of Nationality dated
September 13, 1990 of Sao Tome and Principe Law No. 28 of 22 December 1962 Somali Citizenship as amended Code of Tunisian
NationalityLawNo.63.
[383] See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports

1984,p.299.
[384]Article24oftheICCPRstates:

1.Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the
State.
2.Everychildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhaveaname.
3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.

[385]Article7oftheCRCstates:

1.Thechildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhavetherightfi:ombirthtoaname,therighttoacquireanationality
and.asfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.
2.StatesPartiesshallensuretheimplementationoftheserightsinaccordancewiththeirnationallawandtheirobligationsunderthe
relevantinternationalinstrumentsinthisfield,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.

[386]AnnualReportoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRightsandReportsoftheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerand

theSecretaryGeneral.Arbitrarydeprivationofnationality:reportoftheSecretaryGeneral,A/HRC/10/34,26January2009
[387] Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined 24th Periodic Reports of Fiji, adopted by the

committeeatitssixtyseventhsession(119September2014),CRC/C/FIJ/C0/24
[388]454Phil.504642(2003).
[389]ThePreambleofthe1935Constitutionstates:

TheFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofDivineProvidence,inordertoestablishagovernmentthatshallembodytheirideals,
conserveanddevelopthepatrimonyofthenation,promotethegeneralwelfare,andsecuretothemselvesandtheirposterity
theblessingsofindependenceunderaregimeofjustice,liberty,anddemocracy,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.

[390]ThePreambleofthe1987Constitutionprovides:

We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustandhumanesociety,andestablish
aGovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,
andsecuretoourselvesandourposterity,theblessingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeof
truth,justice,freedom,love,equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.

[391]Id.
[392] InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica.

AdvisoryOpinionOC4/84ofJanuary19,1984.SeriesANo.4,para.35.
[393]SeeDissentingOpinionofChiefJusticeWarrenin2356U.S.44,6465,78S.Ct.568,57980,2L.Ed.2d603(1958).
[394]Batchelor,CarolA.DevelopmentsinInternationalLaw:theAvoidanceofStatelessnessthroughPositiveApplicationoftheRighttoa

Nationality.1stEuropeanConventiononNationality.(Strasbourg,18and19October1999).
[395]1987Constitution,ArticleV,Section1.
[396]Id.,ArticleXIV,Section1(righttoqualityeducationatalllevels)ArticleXIV,Section2(5)(righttobeprovidedtrainingincivics,

vocationalefficiencyandotherskills
[397]Id.,Section18,ArticleXI.
[398]ThefollowingeconomicrightsarerestrictedtoPhilippinecitizensundertheConstitution:righttotheexclusiveuseandenjoymentof

thenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,andexclusiveeconomiczoml(ArticleXII,Section2)righttoengage
insmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresources(ArticleXII,Section2)righttoleasenotmorethanfivehundredhectares,oracquirenot
morethantwelvehectaresofpublicalienableland,bypurchase,homestead,orgrant(ArticleXII,Section3)righttobeatransfereeof
publicland(ArticleXII,Section7)
[399] These include the right to participate in certain areas of investments (Article XII, Section 10) right to be granted a franchise

certificate,oranyotherformofauthorizationfortheoperationofapublicutility(ArticleXII,Section11)
[400] The Constitution allows only citizens to exercise the following rights: the right to be the executive and managing officers of a

corporation or association engaged in any public utility enterprise (Article XII, Section 11 ) Right to practice a profession (Article XII,
Section14)righttoown,controlandadministereducationalinstitutions(ArticleXIV,Section[2])Righttoownandmanagemassmedia
(ArticleXVI,Section11[1])Righttobecomeanexecutiveandmanagingofficerofanentityengagedintheadvertisingindustry(Article
XVI,Section11[2])Righttoengageintheadvertisingindustry(ArticleXVI,Section11[2]).
TheownershipofthefollowingbusinessesarealsoreservedforPhilippinecitizens:Retailtradeenterpriseswithpaidupcapitaloflessthan
US$2,500,000(Section5,R.A.8762)cooperatives(ChapterIII,Article26,R.A.6938)privatesecurityagencies(Section4,R.A.5487)
smallscalemining(Section3[C],R.A.7076)ownership,operationandmanagementofcockpits(Section5[a],PD449)Manufactureof
firecrackersandotherpyrotechnicdevices(Section5,R.A.7183).
[401]ArticleXll,Section14Thefollowingprofessionsarealsorestrictedbystatute:Aeronauticalengineering(Section14[b],R.A.1570)

Agriculturalengineering(Section13[a],R.A.8559)Chemicalengineering(Section2,R.A.9297)Civilengineering(Section12[b],R.A.
544)Electricalengineering(Section16[a],R.A.7920)Electronicsandcommunicationengineering(Section14[a],R.A.9292)Geodetic
engineering(Section12[a],R.A.8560)Mechanicalengineering(Section14[a],R.A.8495)Metallurgicalengineering(Section17[a],R.A.
1 0688) Mining engineering (Section 19[a], R.A. 4274) Naval architecture and marine engineering (Section ll[b], R.A. 4565) Sanitary
engineering(Section17[b],R.A.1364)Medicine(Section9[1],R.A.2382asamended)Medicaltechnology(Section8[1],R.A.5527as
amended) Dentistry (Section 14[a], R.A. 9484) Midwifery (Section 13, R.A. 7392) Nursing (Section 13[a], R.A. 9173) Nutrition and
dietetics (Section 18[aJ, P.D. 1286) Optometry (Section 19[a], R.A. 8050) Pharmacy (Section l&[a], R.A. 5921) Physical and
occupational therapy (Section 15[a], R.A. 5680) Radiologic and xray technology (Section 19[a], R.A. 7431) Veterinary medicine
(Section15[a],R.A.9268)Accountancy(Section14[a],R.A.9298)Architecture(Section13[a],R.A.9266)Criminology(Section12[a],
R.A.6506)Chemistry(Sectionl3[a],R.A.754)Customsbrokerage(Section16[a],R.A.9280)Environmentalplanning(Section13[b],
P.D.1308)Forestry(Section14[b],R.A.6239)Geology(Section15,R.A.4209)Interiordesign(Section13(a],R.A.8534)Law(Art.
VIII,Section5[5],1987ConstitutionRule138[2],RulesofCourt)Librarianship(Section15[a],R.A.9246)Marinedeckofficers(Section
14[a], R.A. 8544) Marine engine officers (Section 14[a], R.A. 8544) Master plumbing (Section 12[b], R.A. 1378) Sugar technology
(Section 14[a], R.A. 5197) Social work (Section 12[a], R.A. 4373) Teaching (Section 15[a], R.A. 7836) Agriculture (R.A. 8435)
Fisheries (Section 2[b], R.A. 8550) Guidance counseling (Section 13[a], R.A. 9258) Real estate service (Section 14[a], R.A. 9646)
Respiratorytherapy(R.A.10024)andPsychology(Section12[a],R.A.10029).
[402]Righttomanufacture,repair,stockpileand/ordistributebiological,chemicalandradiologicalweaponsandantipersonnelminesand

the right to manufacture, repair, stockpile and/or distribute nuclear weapons (10th Foreign Negative Investment List, Executive Order
184,29 May 2015, citing Article II, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution and Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory)andrighttobecomemembersoflocalpoliceagencies(Section9[1]R.A.4864).
[403]SeeCivilCode,Article15.Thenextsectionincludesamoredetaileddiscussionofadoptionandfoundlings.
[404] See Section 2, R.A. 4090: Providing for State Scholarships for Poor But Deserving Students (1964) Part V(A)(1)(1.3), Amended

ImplementingRulesandRegulationsforRepublicActNo.7687,DOSTDepEDJointCircular(2005)Section5(a)(i),AdministrativeOrder
No.57,EducationalReformAssistancePackageforMindanaoanMuslims(1999).
[405] The following positions in the Executive branch must be occupied by naturalborn Philippine citizens: President (Article VII,

Section2,1987Constitution)VicePresident(ArticleVII,Section3,1987Constitution)DirectororAssistantDirectoroftheBureau
ofMinesandGeoSciences(Section2,PD1281asamendedbyPD1654[1979)UndersecretaryofDefenseforMunitions(Section2,R.A.
1884, Establishment of a Government Arsenal [1957]) Assistant Director of the Forest Research Institute (Section 7[a], PD 607,
CreatingtheForestResearchInstituteintheDepartmentofNaturalResources[1974])OfficersofthePhilippineCoastGuard(Section
12,R.A.9993,PhilippineCoastGuardLawof2009[2010])CommissionerorDeputyCommissionersofImmigration(Section4[b],
C.A. 613, The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 [1940]) Secretary and Undersecretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform

(Section50,R.A.3844asamendedbyR.A.6389[1971])Directors,AssistantDirectorsofBureausintheDepartmentofAgrarian
Reform(Section50G,R.A.3844asamendedbyR.A.6389,AgriculturalLandReformCode[1971])ChairmanandCommissionersof
theTariffCommission(Section502,PD1464asamended,HarmonizedCommodityDescriptionandCodingSystem2002Tariffand
CustomsCodeofthePhilippines[2002])DirectororAssistantDirectorsoftheBureauofForestDevelopment(Section6,PD705,
RevisedForestryCodeofthePhilippines[1975])CityFiscalandAssistantCityFiscalsofManila(Section38,R.A.409asamendedby
R.A.4631,RevisedCharterofCityofManila[1965])andProsecutorsintheNationalProsecutionService(Section603,DOJDepartment
CircularNo.05010,[2010]).
Inthelegislativebranch,theoccupantsofthefollowingpostsarerequiredtobenaturalborncitizens:Senator(ArticleVI,Section6,
1987 Constitution) Members of the House of Representatives (Article VI, Section 3, 1987 Constitution) nominees for partylist
representatives(Section9,PartyListSystemAct,R.A.7941[1995]).
The following members of the judicial branch are required to be naturalborn citizens: Members of the Supreme Court and lower
collegiatecourts(ArticleVIII,Section7,1987Constitution)RegionalTrialCourtJudges(Section15,BP129asamendedbyR.A.8369,
theFamilyCourtsActof1997[1997])JudgesofaMetropolitanTrialCourt,MunicipalTrialCourt,orMunicipalCircuitTrialCourt(Section
26,BP129asamended)PresidingJudgeandAssociateJusticesoftheSandiganbayan(Section1,PD1486asamendedbyPD1606,
CreatingtheSandiganbayan[1978])JudgesoftheShari'aCircuitCourt(Art.152,PD1083,CodeofMuslimPersonalLawsofthe
Philippines[1977]).
Otherconstitutionalofficesarereservedtonaturalborncitizens:OmbudsmanandhisDeputies(ArticleXI,Section8,1987Constitution)
BSP Board of Governors (Article XII, Section 20, 1987 Constitution) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
(Article IX [B], Section I, 1987 Constitution Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 10 Executive Order No. 292,
AdministrativeCodeof1987ArticleV,Section8(b)PD807,CivilServiceDecreeofthePhilippinesorCivilServiceLawof1975[1975))
ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCommissiononElections(ArticleIX[C],SectionI,1987ConstitutionBookV,TitleII,SubtitleC,
Chapter2,Section4,EO292,AdministrativeCodeof1987[1987])ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCommissiononAudit(ArticleIX
[D], Section 1, 1987 Constitution) Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights (Article XIII, Section 17[2], 1987
ConstitutionBookV,TitleII,SubtitleA,SectionI,EO292,AdministrativeCodeof1987[1987]).
[406]Thefollowingpositionsinthelocalgovernmentareincluded:RegionalGovernorandViceGovernoroftheARMM(ArticleVII,Section

3,R.A.9054,StrengtheningandExpandingtheARMMOrganicAct[2001])MembersoftheRegionalAssemblyoftheARMM(ArticleVI,
Section 6 [I], R.A. 9054, Strengthening and Expanding the ARMM Organic Act [2001]) Regional Secretary, Regional Undersecretaries,
AssistantRegionalSecretary,AssistantSecretaryforMadaris,BureauDirectors,andAssistantBureauDirectorsoftheARMMDepartment
of Education (Article II, Section 22, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 27910, ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010 [2010] Regional
Governor and Vice Governor of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (Article V, Sections 2 and 3, R.A. 8438, Organic Act of Cordillera
AutonomousRegion[1997]).
[407] Members of these government commissions, boards, administrations are required to be naturalborn citizens: Chairman and

Members of the Energy Regulatory Commission (Section 38, R.A. 9136, Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 [2001])
Commissioners of the Commission on the Filipino Language (Section 6, R.A. 7104, Commission on the Filipino Language Act [1991])
Board of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (Section 9 [a], R.A. 10086, Strengthening Peoples' Nationalism Through
Philippine History Act [2010]) Executive Director and Deputy Executive Directors of the NHCP (Section 17, R.A. 10086, Strengthening
Peoples'NationalismThroughPhilippineHistoryAct[2010])CommissionersofNationalCommissiononIndigenousPeoples(Section3[a]
RulesandRegulationsImplementingTheIndigenousPeoples'RightsActof1997,NCIPAdministrativeOrderNo.0198,[1998])Members
ofProvincial,RegionalandNationalConsultativeBodiesoftheNCIP(Sections22[a]NCIPAdministrativeOrderNo.103,Guidelinesfor
theConstitutionandOperationalizationoftheConsultativeBody[2003])ChairmanandMembersoftheBoardofAgriculture(ArticleTil,
Section6(a]PRCBoardofAgricultureResolutionNo.0202,RulesandRegulationsimplementingPRCResolutionNo.2000663[2002])
MembersoftheBoardoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoard(Section2,PD1986,CreatingtheMovieandTelevision
ReviewandClassificationBoard[1985])ChairmanandMembersoftheBoardofFisheries(ArticleIII,Section7[a]PRCBoardofFisheries
Resolution no. 0102, Rules and Regulations Implementing PRC Resolution No. 2000664) Representative of Consumers at the Price
ControlCouncil(Section2,R.A.6124,FixingoftheMaximumSellingPriceofEssentialArticlesorCommodities[1970])Membersofthe
AntiDummyBoard(Section1,R.A.1130asamendedbyR.A.6082[1969])Chairman,MembersoftheBoardandGeneralManagerof
the Public Estates Authority/Philippine Reclamation Authority, (Section 6, PO 1084, Charter of the Public Estates Authority [1977])
ChairmanandMembersoftheLandTenureAdministration(Section4,R.A.1400,LandReformActof1955[1955])BoardofDirectorsof
the Panay Development Authority (Section 17, R.A. 3856, Creation of Panay Development Authority [1964] Administrator of the
Agricultural Credit Administration (Section 101, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, Agricultural Land Reform Code [1971]) Director
General,DeputyDirectorGeneral,andExecutiveDirectorsoftheNationalManpowerYouthCouncil[absorbedbyTESDApursuanttoPO
850] (Article 53, PO 442 as amended by PO 850 Amendments to P.O. No. 442, Labor Code of the Philippines [1975]) Governor and
DeputyGovernorsoftheLandAuthority(Section50,R.A.3844,AgriculturalLandReformCode,[1963]).
[408]ProjectDirectoroftheMindoroOfficeoftheMindoroIntegratedRuralDevelopmentOffice(Section6[a],PO805,Implementingthe

Mindoro Integrated Rural Development Program and Providing Funds therefore [1975]) Project Director of the Cagayan Integrated
Agricultural Development Project (Section 6 [a], PO 1189, Implementing the Cagayan Integrated Agricultural Development Project
[1977])ProjectDirectoroftheSamarOfficeoftheSamarIntegratedRuralDevelopmentProject(Section4[a],PO1048,Implementation
oftheSamarIntegratedRuralDevelopmentProject[1976])MembersoftheCentralLuzonCagayanValleyAuthority(Section2[e],R.A.
3054,CreationofCentralLuzonCagayanValleyAuthority[1961])ProjectDirectoroftheRuralInfrastructureProjectOfficeintheDOTC
(Section3,PO1298,ImplementingtheRuralInfrastructureProject[1978])MembersoftheCooperativeDevelopmentAuthority(Section
5[a],R.A.6939,CooperativeDevelopmentAuthorityLaw[1990])BoardofDirectorsoftheBasesConversionandDevelopmentAuthority
(Section9[b],BasesConversionandDevelopmentActof1992,R.A.7227[1992])ProgramDirectorattheCotabatoAgusanRiverBasin
ProgramOffice(Section3,PO1556,CreationoftheCotabatoAgusanRiverBasinProgramOffice[1978])ExecutiveDirectoroftheRiver
BasinCouncil(Section5,EO412,CreationofBicolRiverBasinCouncil[1973])BoardofDirectorsofthePhilippineNationalOilCompany
(Section 6, Presidential Decree 334 as amended by PO 405, Creating the Philippine National Oil Company) Board of Governors ofthe
Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan (Section 3, PO 141 I, Dissolving the GSIS Hospital, Inc. [1978]) Board of Directors ofthe Philippine Export
CreditInsuranceandGuaranteeCorporation(Section8,R.A.6424,PhilippineExportCreditInsuranceandGuaranteeCorporationAct[I

972])PresidentofthePhilippineExportandForeignLoanGuaranteeCorporation[laterTradeandInvestmentDevelopmentCorporation,
nowPhil.ExportImportCreditAgency(Section14,PO1080asamendedbyR.A.8494).
[409]MembersoftheBoardofDirectorsofthefollowingbanksarerequiredtobenaturalborncitizens:PhilippineNationalBank(Section

10,EO80,The1986RevisedCharterofthePhilippineNationalBank[1986])LandBankofthePhilippines(Section86,RepublicActNo.
3844asamendedbyR.A.7907,CodeofAgrarianReforminthePhil.[1995])DevelopmentBankofthePhilippines(Section8,R.A.8523,
StrengtheningtheDevelopmentBankofthePhilippines[1998]).
[410] Presidents of State Universities imd Colleges (Section 5.1, CHED Memorandum Order 16 [2009]) and the College President of the

CompostelaValleyStateCollege(ImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRepublicActNo.10598[2014]).
[411]Theseinclude:MembersoftheBoardofExaminersofCriminologists(Section3[1],R.A.6506,CreationofBoardofExaminersfor

Criminologists [1972]) Chairman and Members of the Professional Regulatory Board of Geology (Section 8 [a], R.A. 10166, Geology
ProfessionActof2012[2012])ChairpersonandMembersoftheProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofPsychology(Section5[a],R.A.10029,
Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 [2010]) Chairperson and Members ofthe Board of Respiratory Therapy (Section 5 [a], R.A. 10024,
PhilippineRespiratoryTherapyActof2009[2010])ChairmanandMembersoftheProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofDentistry(Section7
[a], R.A. 9484, The Philippine Dental Act of2007 [2007]) Chairperson and Members of the Professional Regulatory Board for Librarians
(Section7[a],R.A.9246,ThePhilippineLibrarianshipActof2003[2004])MembersoftheProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofAccounting
(Section 6 [a], R.A. 9298, Philippine Accountancy Act of 2004 [2004]) Chairman and Members of the Board of Chemical Engineering
(Section7[a],R.A.9297,ChemicalEngineeringLawof2004[2004])MembersofthePhilippineLandscapeArchitectureBoard(Section4
[a], R.A. 9053, Philippine Landscape Architecture Act of2000 [2001]) Chairperson and Members of the Board of the Professional
RegulatoryBoardofNursingSection4,R.A.9I73,PhilippineNursingActof2002[2002])MemberoftheProfessionalRegulatoryBoard
ofAccountancy(Section6[a],R.A.9298,PhilippineAccountancyActof2004[2004])MembersoftheBoardofAgriculturalEngineering
(Section5[a],R.A.8559,PhilippineAgriculturalEngineeringActof1998[1998])MembersoftheBoardofGeodeticEngineering(Section
4[a],R.A.8560,PhilippineGeodeticEngineeringActof1998[1998])ChairpersonandmembersoftheProfessionalRegulatoryBoardfor
Foresters(Section7[a],R.A.10690,TheForestryProfessionAct[2015])MembersoftheBoardofExaminersforForester(Section6[a],
R.A. 6239, The Forestry Profession Law [1971] Members ofthe Board of Pharmacy Section 7 [a], R.A. 5921, Pharmacy Law [1969])
Members of the Board of Medical Examiners (Section 14, R.A. 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224, The Medical Act of 1959 as amended
[1965]) Members of the Board of Mechanical Engineering (Section 5 [a] R.A. 8495, Philippine Mechanical Engineering Act of 1998
[1998])MembersoftheBoardofOptometry,(Section8[a],R.A.8050,RevisedOptometryLawof1995[1995])MembersoftheBoard
ofElectricalEngineering(Section5[a],R.A.7920,NewElectricalEngineeringLaw[1995]).
[412]Inparticular,allofficersoftheRegularForceoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(Section4[b],R.A.291,ArmedForcesOfficer

PersonnelActof1948[1948])OfficersoftheWomen'sAuxiliaryCorps(Section2,R.A.3835,AnActtoEstablishtheWomen'sAuxiliary
Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to provide the Procurement of its Officers and Enlisted personnel, and for Other Purposes
[1963]).

DISSENTINGOPINION

CARPIO,J.:
Idissentfromthemajorityopinion.
Withtherulingofthemajoritytoday,apresidentialcandidatewhoisdeemedanaturalbornFilipinocitizenbylessthanamajorityofthis
Court,deemednotanaturalbornFilipinocitizenbyfiveJustices,andwithnoopinionfromthreeJustices,cannowrunforPresidentofthe
Philippines even after having been unanimously found by the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC) to be not a naturalborn
Filipinocitizen.WhatisclearandundeniableisthatthereisnomajorityofthisCourtthatholdsthatpetitionerMaryGraceNatividadS.
PoeLlamanzares(petitioner)isanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Thisrulingofthemajoritywillleadtoabsurdresults,makingamockeryof
our national elections by allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected to the Office of the
President,anofficeexpresslyreservedbytheConstitutionexclusivelyfornaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
This means that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner
winstheelections,despitepetitionerhavingalreadypresentedbeforetheCOMELECalltheevidenceshewantedtopresenttoproveher
citizenshipstatus.ThiswillmakeamockeryofourelectionprocessifpetitionerwinstheelectionsbutislaterdisqualifiedbythisCourtfor
notpossessingabasicqualificationfortheOfficeofthePresidentthatofbeinganaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
Thosewhovotedforpetitionerwouldhaveutterlywastedtheirvotes.Thisisnothowthenaturalborncitizenshipqualificationforelective
officemandatedbytheConstitutionshouldbeappliedbythehighestcourtoftheland.
ThereisnodisputethatpetitionerisaFilipinocitizen,asshepubliclyclaimstobe.However,shehasfailedtoprovethatsheisanatural
bornFilipinocitizenandaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingthe9May2016elections.Petitioneris
noteligibletorunforPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesforlackoftheessentialrequirementsofcitizenshipandresidencyunder
Section2,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution.[1]Petitioner'scertificateofcandidacy(COC),whereinshestatedthatsheisqualifiedforthe
position of President, contains false material representations, and thus, must be cancelled. Petitioner, not being a naturalborn Filipino
citizen,isalsoanuisancecandidatewhoseCOCcanmotupropriobecancelledbytheCOMELECunderSection69oftheOmnibusElection
Code.

TheCase

Theseconsolidatedcertioraripetitions[2]seektonullifytheResolutions[3]oftheCOMELECforallegedlybeingissuedwithgraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.IntheassailedResolutions,theCOMELECcancelledpetitioner'sCOCfortheposition
ofPresidentforthe9May2016electionsonthegroundof"falsematerialrepresentations"whenshestatedthereinthatsheisa"natural
bornFilipinocitizen"andthather"periodofresidenceinthePhilippinesuptothedaybeforeMay09,2016"is"10yearsand11months,"
whichiscontrarytothefactsasfoundbytheCOMELEC.
TheIssues

The core issues in this case are (1) whether petitioner, being a foundling, is a naturalborn Filipino citizen, and (2) whether she is a
resident of the Philippines for ten years immediately preceding the 9 May 2016 national elections. The resolution of these issues will in
turn determine whether petitioner committed false material representations in her COC warranting the cancellation of her COC. If
petitioner is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, the issue arises as a necessary consequence whether she is a nuisance candidate whose
COCcanmotupropriobecancelledbytheCOMELEC.
COMELECJurisdiction

Section2(1),ArticleIXCoftheConstitutionvestsintheCOMELECthepower,amongothers,to"[e]nforceandadministeralllawsand
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, x x x."[4] Screening initially the qualifications of all candidates lies within this specific
power. In my dissent in Tecson v. COMELEC,[5] involving the issue of Fernando Poe, Jr.'s citizenship, I discussed the COMELEC's
jurisdiction,towit:
xxx.UnderSection2(1),ArticleIXCoftheConstitution,theComelechasthepowerandfunctionto"[E]nforceandadministeralllaws
andregulationsrelativetutheconductofanelection."Theinitialdeterminationofwhoarequalifiedtofilecertificatesofcandidacieswith
the Comelec clearly falls within this allencompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily
includestheinitialdeterminationofwhoarequalifiedunderexistinglawstorunforpublicofficeinanelection.Otherwise,theComelec's
certifiedlistofcandidateswillbeclutteredwithunqualifiedcandidatesmakingtheconductofelectionsunmanageable.Forthisreason,the
ComelecweedsouteverypresidentialelectiondozensofcandidatesforpresidentwhoaredeemednuisancecandidatesbytheComelec.
Section 2(3), Article IXC of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections x x x. " The power to decide "all questions affecting elections" necessarily includes the power to decide
whetheracandidatepossessesthequalificationsrequiredbylawforelectiontopublicoffice.Thisbroadconstitutionalpowerandfunction
vestedintheComelecisdesignedpreciselytoavoidanysituationwhereadisputeaffectingelectionsisleftwithoutanylegalremedy.If
onewhoisobviouslynotanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen,likeArnoldSchwarzenneger,runsforPresident,theComelecis
certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
electionsbeforesuchcandidatemaybedisqualified.[6](Italicizationintheoriginalboldfacingsupplied)
Clearly, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially determine the qualifications of all candidates and disqualify
those found lacking any of such qualifications before the conduct of the elections. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio
cancelCOCsofnuisancecandidates.[7]InTimbolv.COMELEC,[8]theCourtstatedthus:

Respondent'spowertomotuproprio
denyduecoursetoacertificateof
candidacyissubjecttothecandidate's
opportunitytobeheard.
UnderArticleII,Section26oftheConstitution,"[t]heStateshallguaranteeequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice[.]"
This,however,doesnotguarantee"aconstitutionalrighttorunfororholdpublicoffice[.]"Torunforpublicofficeisamere
"privilegesubjecttolimitationsimposedbylaw."Amongtheselimitationsistheprohibitiononnuisancecandidates.
Nuisancecandidatesarepersonswhofiletheircertificatesofcandidacy"toputtheelectionprocessinmockeryor
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstancesoractswhichclearlydemonstratethatthecandidatehasnobonafideintentiontorunfortheofficeforwhichthe
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate." x x x.
(Emphasissupplied)

It cannot be disputed that a person, not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for President, "put[s] the
electionprocessinmockery"andisthereforeanuisancecandidate.Suchperson'scertificateofcandidacycanmotuproprio be cancelled
bytheCOMELECunderSection69oftheOmnibusElectionCode,whichempowerstheCOMELECtocancelmotupropriotheCOCifit"has
beenfiledtoputtheelectionprocessinmockery."
InPamatongv.COMELEC,[9]citedinTimbol,[10]theCourtexplainedthereasonwhynuisancecandidatesaredisqualifiedtorunforpublic
office:

Therationalebehindtheprohibitionagainstnuisancecandidatesandthedisqualificationofcandidateswhohavenotevinceda
bonafideintentiontorunforofficeiseasytodivine.TheStatehasacompellinginteresttoensurethatitselectoralexercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections.Inevitably,thegreaterthenumberofcandidates,thegreatertheopportunitiesforlogisticalconfusion,nottomention
the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course,
never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be
availabletoalleviatetheselogisticalhardships,whenevernecessaryandproper.Ultimately,adisorderlyelectionisnotmerelya
textbookexampleofinefficiency,butarotthaterodesfaithinourdemocraticinstitutions.xxx.
xxxx
x x x. The organization of an election with bonafide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mentionthecandidacieswhicharepalpablyridiculoussoastoconstituteaonenotejoke.Thepollbodywouldbeboggedby
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates.ItwouldbeasenselesssacrificeonthepartoftheState.

Toallowaperson,whoisfoundbytheCOMELECnottobeanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,torunforPresidentofthePhilippinesconstitutes
a mockery of the election process. Any person, who is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, running for President is obviously a nuisance
candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Allowing a nuisance candidate to run for President renders meaningless the
COMELEC's constitutional power to "[e]nforce and administer all laws x x x relative to the conduct of an election, x x x." The election
processbecomesacompletemockerysincetheelectorateismercilesslyofferedchoiceswhichincludepatentlyineligiblecandidates.The
electorateisalsoneedlesslymisledtocasttheirvotes,andthuswastetheirvotes,foranineligiblecandidate.TheCOMELECcannotbea
partytosuchmockeryoftheelectionprocessotherwise,theCOMELECwillbecommittingagraveabuseofdiscretion.
CitizensofthePhilippines

Itisthesovereignpowerandinherentrightofeveryindependentstatetodeterminewhoareitsnationals.ThePhilippines,andnoother
state,shalldeterminewhoareitscitizensinaccordancewithitsConstitutionandlaws.
Inthiscase,the1935PhilippineConstitutionshallbeappliedtodeterminewhetherpetitionerisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines
sinceshewasbornin1968whenthe1935Constitutionwasineffect.
Section1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitutionidentifieswhoare
Filipinocitizens,thus:

ArticleIV.Citizenship
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

1.ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
2.ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedto
publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
3.ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
4.ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
5.Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Fromthisconstitutionalprovision,wefindthat,exceptforthosewhowerealreadyconsideredcitizensatthetimeoftheadoptionofthe
Constitution,therewere,astherearestillnow,onlytwomethodsofacquiringPhilippinecitizenship:(1)bybloodrelationtothefather(or
themotherunderthe1987Constitution)whomustbeaFilipinocitizenand(2)bynaturalizationaccordingtolaw.[11]
The Philippines adheres to the jussanguinis principle or the "law of the blood" to determine citizenship at birth. An individual acquires
Filipino citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological descent from a Filipino father or mother. The framers of the 1935 Constitution
clearlyintendedtomaketheacquisitionofcitizenshipavailableonthebasisofthejussanguinisprinciple.Thisviewismadeevidentby
thesuppressionfromtheConstitutionofthejussoliprinciple,andfurther,bythefactthattheConstitutionhasmadedefiniteprovisions
for cases not covered by the jus sanguinis principle, such as those found in paragraph 1, Section 1 of Article IV, i.e., those who are
citizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheConstitution,andinparagraph2,Section1ofthesameArticle,i.e.,thoseborn
inthePhilippinesofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionoftheConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicofficeinthePhilippines.[12]
Intermsofjurisprudence,therewasaperiodwhentheCourtwasuncertainregardingtheapplicationofjussolior"lawofthesoil"asa
principle of acquisition of Philippine citizenship at birth.[13] In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor,[14] decided in 1947, the Court finally
abandonedthejussoliprinciple,andjussanguinishasbeenexclusivelyadheredtointhePhilippinessincethen.[15]
BasedonSection1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution,petitioner'scitizenshipmaybedeterminedonlyunderparagraphs(3),(4)and(5).
Paragraph(1)ofSection1isnotapplicablesincepetitionerisnotaFilipinocitizenatthetimeoftheadoptionofthe1935Constitutionas

petitionerwasbornaftertheadoptionofthe1935Constitution.Paragraph(2)ofSection1islikewiseinapplicablesincepetitionerwasnot
borninthePhilippinesofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionoftheConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicofficeinthePhilippines.
OftheFilipinocitizensfallingunderparagraphs(3),(4)and(5),onlythoseinparagraph(3)ofSection1,whosefathersarecitizensofthe
Philippines,canbeconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizenssincetheyareFilipinocitizensfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyactto
acquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.[16]Inshort,theyareFilipinocitizensbythemerefactofbirth.
Underparagraph(4)ofSection1,thoseFilipinocitizenswhosemothersareFilipinosandwhosefathersarealienscannotbeconsidered
naturalborn Filipino citizens since they are still required to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority they are not
Filipinocitizensbythemerefactofbirth.
However,underparagraph(2),Section1ofArticleIVofthe1987Constitution,thosewhosefathersareFilipinocitizensandthosewhose
mothersareFilipinocitizensaretreatedequally.TheyareconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.[17]Moreover,underSection2,Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to paragraph (3), Section 1 of the same Article, those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino
mothersandwhoelectedPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajorityarealsodeemednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
InCo v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[18] the Court held that the constitutional provision treating as naturalborn
Filipino citizens those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect. The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted "to correct the
anomaloussituationwhereonebornofaFilipinofatherandanalienmotherwasautomaticallygrantedthestatusofanaturalborncitizen
whileonebornofaFilipinomotherandanalienfatherwouldstillhavetoelectPhilippinecitizenship.Ifonesoelected,hewasnot,under
earlierlaws,conferredthestatusofanaturalborn."[19]TheCourtexplained:

TheprovisioninParagraph3wasintendedtocorrectanunfairpositionwhichdiscriminatesagainstFilipinowomen.Thereisno
ambiguityinthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,viz:

Mr.Azcuna:Withrespecttotheprovisionofsection4,wouldthisreferonlytothosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenship
aftertheeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionorwoulditalsocoverthosewhoelecteditunderthe1973Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution whether the election was done before or qfter January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission,Vol.1,p.228Emphasissupplied.)
xxxxxxxxx
Mr.Trenas:TheCommitteeonCitizenship,BillofRights,PoliticalRightsandObligationsandHumanRightshasmore
or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a naturalborn citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
naturalborn?AmIrightMr.PresidingOfficer?
Fr.Bernas:Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the
decisionwasdesignedmerelytoaccommodateformerdelegateErnestoAngandthatthedefinitiononnaturalborn
hasnoretroactiveeffect.NowitseemsthattheReverendFatherBernasisgoingagainstthisintentionbysupporting
theamendment?
Fr.Bernas:AstheCommissionercansee,therehasbeenanevolutioninmythinking.(RecordsoftheConstitutional
Commission,Vol.1,p.189)
xxxxxxxxx
Mr.Rodrigo:ButthisprovisionbecomesveryimportantbecausehiselectionofPhilippinecitizenshipmakeshimnot
onlyaFilipinocitizenbutanaturalbornFilipinocitizenentitlinghimtorunforCongress...
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that
provisionofsection4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen
whowasbornadaybeforeJanuary17,1973cannotbeaFilipinocitizenoranaturalborncitizen.(Recordsofthe
ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,p.231)
xxxxxxxxx
Mr.Rodrigo:Thepurposeofthatprovisionistoremedyaninequitablesituation.Between1935and1973whenwe
were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were naturalborn Filipinos.
However,thosebornofFilipinomothersbutalienfatherswouldhavetoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingthe
age of majority and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not naturalborn Filipino citizens. (Records
oftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,p.356)

Theforegoingsignificantlyrevealstheintentoftheframers.TomaketheprovisionprospectivefromFebruary3,1987istogive
anarrowinterpretationresultinginaninequitablesituation.Itmustalsoberetroactive.[20]

Therefore,thefollowingaredeemednaturalbornFilipinocitizens:(1)thosewhosefathersormothersareFilipinocitizens,and(2)those
whosemothersareFilipinocitizensandwerebornbefore17January1973andwhoelectedPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageof
majority.Stateddifferently,thosewhosefathersormothersareneitherFilipinocitizensarenotnaturalbornFilipinocitizens.Iftheyare
not naturalborn Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine citizenship only under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
ConstitutionwhichreferstoFilipinocitizenswhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
IntentoftheFramersofthe1935Constitution

Petitioner concedes that she does not fall under paragraphs (I) and (2) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. However,
petitioner claims that the mere fact that she is a foundling does not exclude her from paragraphs (3) and (4) of the same provision.
PetitionerarguesinherPetitionthat"thepertinentdeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConvention,onwhateventuallybecameArticle
IVofthe1935Constitution,showthattheintentoftheframerswasnottoexcludefoundlings from the term "citizens" of the
Philippines."[21]
Likewise, the Solicitor General asserts in his Comment[22] that "[t]he deliberations ofthe 1934 Constitutional Convention indicate the
intentiontocategorizefoundlingsasaclassofpersonsconsideredasPhilippinecitizens.xxx.The1935Constitution'ssilencecannot
simply be interpreted as indicative of an intent to entrench a disadvantaged class in their tragedy. Not only is there no evidence of
such intent, but also the silence can be explained in a compassionate light, one that is geared towards addressing a fundamental
questionofjustice."[23]
PetitionerandtheSolicitorGeneralaregravelymistaken.Theframersofthe1935Constitutionvotedtocategoricallyrejecttheproposal
toincludefoundlingsascitizensofthePhilippines.Petitioner'sPetition,andtheSolicitorGeneral'sComment,glaringlyomittedthatthe
1934 Constitutional Convention actually voted upon, and rejected, the proposal to include foundlings as citizens of the
Philippines.ThefollowingexchangeduringthedeliberationsoftheConventionshowsthisunequivocally.

SPANISH

ENGLISH

SR.RAFOLS:
Para una enmienda. Propongo que despues del inciso 2 se
inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos naturales de un padre
extranjeroydeunamadrefilipinanoreconocidosporaquel.
xxxx

MR.RAFOLS:
For an amendment, I propose that after subsection 2, the
followingisinserted:''Thenaturalchildrenofaforeignfather
andaFilipinomothernotrecognizedbythefather.
xxxx

ELPRESIDENTE:
PRESIDENT: [We] would like to request a clarification from
La Mesa desea pedir una aclaracion del proponente de la the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
enmienda. Se refiere Su Seiioria a hijos naturales o a toda naturalchildrenortoanykindofillegitimatechildren?
clasedehijosilegitimos?
SR.RAFOLS:
MR. RAFOLS: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. Tambien se incluye a los includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
hijosnaturalesdepadresdesconocidos,loshijosnaturaleso illegitimatechildrenofunknownparents.
ilegitimos,depadresdesconocidos.
SR.MONTINOLA:
Para una aclaracion. Alli se dice "de padres desconocidos."
LosCodigosactualesconsiderancomofilipino,esdecir,ime
refieroalcodigoespaiiolquienIconsideracomoespafiolesa
todos los hijos de padres desconocidos nacidos en territorio
espafiol, porque la presuncion es que el hijo de padres
desconocidos es hijo de un espafiol, y de esa manera se
podra aplicar en Filipinas de que un hijo desconocido aqui y
nacidoenFilipinasseconsideraraqueeshijofilipinoynohay
necesidad...

MR.MONTINOLA:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents."
Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the
Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage
born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because
thepresumptionisthatachildofunknownparentageisthe
son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in
that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is
deemedtobeFilipino,andthereisnoneed...

SR.RAFOLS:
MR.RAFOLS:
Haynecesidad,porqueestamosrelatandolascondicionesde Thereisaneed,becausewearerelatingtheconditionsthat
losquevanaserfilipinos.
are[required]tobeFilipino.
SR.MONTINOLA:
MR.MONTINOLA:
PeroesaesIainterpretaciondelaley,ahora,demaneraque But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is
nohaynecesidaddelaenmienda.
no[more]needfortheamendment.
SR.RAFOLS:
La enmienda debe leerse de esta manera: "Los hijos
naturalesoilegitimosdeunpadreextranjeroydeunamadre
filipina reconocidos por aquel o los hijos de padres
desconocidos.

MR.RAFOLS:
The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate
childrenofaforeignfatherandaFilipinomotherrecognized
bytheformer,orthechildrenofunknownparentage."

SR.BRIONES:
MR.BRIONES:Theamendment[should]meanchildrenborn
Para una enmienda con elfin de significar The amendment inthePhilippinesofunknownparentage.
[should] mean children los hijos nacidos en Filipinas de
padresborninthePhilippinesofunknowndesconocidos

SR.RAFOLS:
MR.RAFOLS:
Esqueelhijodeunafilipinaconunextranjero,aunqueeste ThesonofaFilipinatoaforeigner,althoughthelatterdoes
noreconozcaalhijo,noesdesconocido.
notrecognizethechild,isnotofunknownparentage.
ELPRESIDENTE:
AceptaSuSefioriaonolaenmienda?

PRESIDENT:
Doesthegentlemanaccepttheamendmentornot?

SR.RAFOLS:
No acepto la enmienda, porque la lenmienda excluiria a los
hijosdeunafilipinaconunextranjeroqueestenoreconoce.
No son desconocidos y yo creo que esos hijos de madre
filipina con extranjero y el padre no reconoce, deben ser
tambienconsideradoscomofilipinos.

MR.RAFOLS:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment
wouldexcludethechildrenofaFilipinawithaforeignerwho
doesnotrecognizethechild.Theirparentageisnotunknown
and I believe that these children of a Filipino mother by a
foreigner who does not recognize them should also be
consideredFilipinos.

ELPRESIDENTE:
PRESIDENT:
La cuestion en orden es la enmienda a la enmienda del The question to be settled is the amendment to the
DelegadoporCebu,Sr.Briones.
amendmentofthedelegatefromCebu,Mr.Briones.
Mr.BULSON:
MR.BUSLON:
Mr.President,don'tyouthinkitwouldbebettertoleavethe Mr.President,don'tyouthinkitwouldbebettertoleavethe
matterinthehandsoftheLegislature?
matterinthehandsoftheLegislature?
SR.ROXAS:
SenorPresidente,miopinionhumildeesqueestossoncasos
muy pequeos y contados, para que la constitucion necesite
referirse a ellos. Por !eyes internacionales se rec onoce el
principia de que los hijo las per o as nacidas en un pais de
padres desconocidos son ciudadanos de esa nacion, y no es
necesarioincluirunadisposiciontaxativasobreelparticular.

MR.ROXAS:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are
veryinsignificantandveryfewthattheconstitutionneednot
make reference to them. International law recognizes the
principlethatthechildrenorpersonsinacountryofunknown
parentsarecitizensofthatnationanditisnotnecessaryto
includearestrictiveprovisiononthissubject.

LAENMIENDABRIONESESRETIRADA

THEBRIONESAMENDMENTISWITHDRAWN

ELPRESIDENTE:
InsisteelCaballeroporCebu,Sr.Briones,ensuenmienda?

PRESIDENT:
Does the gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones, insist in his
amendment?

SR.BRIONES:
SR.BRIONES:
Notengoespecialinteres,seorPresidente,enesaenmienda I have no special interest, Mr. President, in the amendment
ylaretiro.
andIwithdraw.
ELPRESIDENTE:
Porretirada.

PRESIDENT:Withdrawn.

LAENMIENDARAFOLSESRECHAZADA

THERAFOLSAMENDMENTISREJECTED

ELPRESIDENTE:
InsisteelCaballeroporCebu,Sr.Rafols,ensuenmienda?

PRESIDENT:
Does the gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Rafols, insist in his
amendment?

SR.RAFOLS:
Si.

SR.RAFOLS:
Yes.

EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a votacion dicha

enmienda.LosqueestenconformesconIamisma,quedigan
si. (Una minoria: SI.) Los que no lo esten, que digan no.
(Unamayoria:NO.)Quedarechazadalaenmienda.[24]

PRESIDENT:
Let us submit to a vote the amendment. Those who agree
with it, say yes. (a minority: YES.) Those who are not, say
no. (a majority: NO.) The amendment is rejected.
(Emphasissupplied)

During the 26 November 1934 deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Rafols proposed an amendment to declare as
FilipinocitizensthosenaturalorillegitimatechildrenofFilipinomothersandalienfatherswhodonotacknowledgethem.Suchproposed
amendment,accordingtoDelegateRafols,included"childrenofunknownparentage."
ThreedelegatesvoicedtheirobjectionstoRafols'samendment,namelyDelegatesBuslon,Montinola,andRoxas.
DelegateTeofiloBuslonsuggestedthatthesubjectmatterbeleftinthehandsofthelegislature,whichmeantthatCongresswoulddecide
whethertocategorizeasFilipinos(1)naturalorillegitimatechildrenofFilipinomothersandalienfatherswhodonotrecognizethemand
(2)childrenofunknownparentage.Ifthatwerethecase,foundlingswerenotandcouldnotvalidlybeconsideredasnaturalbornFilipino
citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens.
FoundlingswouldbenaturalizedcitizenssincetheyacquireFilipinocitizenship"inaccordancewithlaw"underparagraph(5),Section1of
ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution.Significantly,petitionerandtheSolicitorGeneral,whoagreeswithpetitioner'sposition,conveniently
leftoutDelegateBuslon'sopinion.
Petitioner quotes the opinions of Delegates Ruperto Montinola and Manuel Roxas to support her theory. Petitioner argues that "the
pertinentdeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionshowthattheintentoftheframerswasnottoexcludefoundlingsfromthe
term'citizensofthePhilippines,'butsimplytoavoidredundancyoccasionedbyexplicatingwhattothemwasalreadyaclearprincipleof
existingdomesticandinternationallaw."[25]
Petitionerisagaingravelymistaken.
There was no domestic law as well as international law existing during the proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention explicitly
governingcitizenshipoffoundlings,andthus,therecouldnothavebeenaredundancyofanylawtospeakof.

Delegate Montinola applied the Spanish Civil Code provision, stating that children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory were
consideredSpaniards,andopinedthatthesameconceptcouldbeappliedinthePhilippinesandthuschildrenofunknownparentageborn
inthePhilippinesshouldbeconsideredFilipinocitizens.
However,thiswasanerroneousapplicationsincetheprovisionsoftheSpanishCivilCode(whichDelegateMontinolawasrelyingon)were
nolongerineffectasoftheendofSpanishruleinthePhilippines.TheprovisionsoftheSpanishCivilCodecitedbyDelegateMontinola
ceasedtohaveeffectuponthecessionbySpainofthePhilippinestotheUnitedStates.Asearlyas1912,inRoav.CollectorofCustoms,
[26]theCourtstated:

Articles17to27,inclusive,oftheCivilCodedealentirelywiththesubjectofSpanishcitizenship.Whentheseprovisionswere
enacted, Spain was and is now the sole and exclusive judge as to who shall and who shall not be subjects of her kingdom,
including her territories. Consequently, the said articles, being political laws (laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the former sovereign), must be held to have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
UnitedStates.

"By wellsettled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, * * * those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
governmentimmediatelyceaseuponthetransferofsovereignty."(Opinion,Atty.Gen.,July10,1889.)

Thus,DelegateMontinola'sopinionwasbasedonanerroneouspremisesincetheprovisionsoftheSpanishCivilCodehecitedhadalready
longbeenrepealedandcouldnolongerbeappliedinthePhilippines.
ThesamecanbesaidofDelegateManuelRoxas'sopinionregardingthesupposedinternationallawprinciplewhichrecognizesafoundling
to be a citizen of the country where the foundling is found. At that time, there was nothing in international law which automatically
grantedcitizenshiptofoundlingsatbirth.Infact,DelegateRoxasdidnotciteanyinternationallawprincipletothateffect.
Onlythe1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws,whicharticulatedthepresumptionon
theplaceofbirthoffoundlings,wasinexistenceduringthedeliberationsonthe1935Constitution.Aswillbediscussedfurther,the1930
HagueConventiondoesnotguaranteeanationalitytoafoundlingatbirth.Therefore,therewasnoprevailingcustomaryinternationallaw
atthattime,asthereisstillnonetoday,conferringautomaticallyanationalitytofoundlingsatbirth.
Moreover, none of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term "naturalborn" in relation to the citizenship of foundlings.
Again,underthe1935Constitution,onlythosewhosefatherswereFilipinocitizenswereconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.Those
whowerebornofFilipinomothersandalienfatherswerestillrequiredtoelectPhilippinecitizenship,preventingthemfrombeingnatural
born Filipino citizens. If, as petitioner would like us to believe, the framers intended that foundlings be considered naturalborn Filipino
citizens,thiswouldhavecreatedanabsurdsituationwhereachildwithunknownparentagewouldbeplacedinabetterpositionthana
childwhosemotherisactuallyknowntobeaFilipinocitizen.Theframersofthe1935Constitutioncouldnothaveintendedtocreatesuch
anabsurdity.
In any event, Delegate Rafols's amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the majority of the delegates to the 1934
Constitutional Convention. To reiterate, Delegate Rafols's proposal was defeated in the voting. The rejection of the Rafols
amendment not only meant the non inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage are
Filipinocitizens,butalsosignifiedtherejectionbythedelegatesoftheideaorpropositionthatfoundlingsareFilipinocitizensatbirthjust
like naturalhom citizens. While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate Rafols's amendment, they not only
rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of
Filipinofathers.Stateddifferently,theframersintendedtoexcludefoundlingsfromthedefinitionofnaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
Clearly,thereisno"silenceoftheConstitution"onfoundlingsbecausethemajorityofthedelegatestothe1934ConstitutionalConvention
expresslyrejectedtheproposedamendmentofDelegateRafolstoclassifychildrenofunknownparentageasFilipinocitizens.Therewould
havebeen"silenceoftheConstitution"iftheConventionneverdiscussedthecitizenshipoffoundlings.Therecanneverbe"silenceof
the Constitution" if the Convention discussed a proposal and rejected it, and because of such rejection the subject of the
proposalisnotfoundintheConstitution.TheabsenceofanymentionintheConstitutionofsuchrejectedproposalisnot"silenceof
theConstitution"but"expressrejectionintheConstitution"ofsuchproposal.
Further, to include foundlings among those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers based solely on Montinola's and Roxas's opinions
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention is a strained construction of the Constitution which clearly runs counter to the
expressprovisionsoftheConstitutionandcontravenesthejussanguinisprincipleunderlyingthecitizenshipprovisionsoftheConstitution.
Besides,thereisnothinginthedeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionindicatingthatamajorityofthedelegatesagreedwith
the opinion of either Delegate Montinola or Delegate Roxas. The opinions of Delegates Montinola and Roxas remained their personal
opinions, just like the countless opinions of other delegates who aired their opinions during the deliberations of the Convention without
such opinions being put to a vote. Delegate Buslon proposed that the citizenship of foundlings be addressed through legislation by
Congress,aproposalthatcarriedmoreweightsinceitfallssquarelyunderparagraph5,Section1ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitution
authorizingCongresstoenactnaturalizationlaws.
DefinitionoftheTerm"'NaturalBornCitizens"

Theterm"naturalborncitizen"wasfirstdiscussedbytheframersofthe1935ConstitutioninrelationtothequalificationsofthePresident

andVicePresident.Inparticular,DelegateRoxaselaboratedonthisterm,explainingthatanaturalborncitizenisa"citizenbybirth"a
personwhoisacitizenbyreasonofhisorherbirthandnotbyoperationoflaw.DelegateRoxasexplained:

Delegate Roxas. Mr. President, the phrase, 'naturalborn citizen,' appears in the Constitution of the United States but the
authorssaythatthisphrasehasneverbeenauthoritativelyinterpretedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinviewof
the fact that there has never been raised the question of whether or not an elected President fulfilled this condition. The
authors are uniform in the fact that the words, 'naturalborn citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a person who is a citizen by
reasonofhisbirth,andnotbynaturalizationorbyafurtherdeclarationrequiredbylawforhiscitizenship.InthePhilippines,
for example, under the provisions of the article on citizenship which we have approved, all those born of a father who is a
Filipinocitizen,betheypersonsborninthePhilippinesoroutside,wouldbecitizensbybirthor'naturalborn.'
And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the article which we approved about citizenship
requiresthat,uponreachingtheageofmajority,thischildneedstoindicatethecitizenshipwhichheprefers,andifheelects
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, then he shall be considered a Filipino citizen. According to this
interpretation, the child of a Filipino mother with a foreign father would not be a citizen by birth, because the law or the
Constitutionrequiresthathemakeafurtherdeclarationafterhisbirth.Consequently,thephrase,'naturalborncitizen,'asitis
usedintheEnglishtextmeansaFilipinocitizenbybirth,regardlessofwherehewasborn.[27](Emphasissupplied)

Clearly,itwastheintentoftheframersofthe1935ConstitutiontorefertonaturalborncitizensasonlythosewhowereFilipinocitizens
by the mere fact of being born to fathers who were Filipino citizens nothing more and nothing less. To repeat, under the 1935
Constitution, only children whose fathers were Filipino citizens were naturalborn Filipino citizens. Those who were born of alien fathers
andFilipinomotherswerenotconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens,despitethefactthattheyhadabloodrelationtoaFilipinoparent.
SinceanaturalborncitizenisacitizenbybirthwhoneednotperformanyacttoacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenship,thenthoseborn
ofFilipinomothersandalienfathersandwhohadtoelectcitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority,anovertacttoperfectcitizenship,
were not considered naturalborn Filipino citizens. As a matter of course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both
unknown,suchasinthecaseoffoundlings,cannotbeconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
FoundlingsandInternationalLaw
A.EachStateDeterminesitsCitizens
Fundamentalistheprinciplethateveryindependentstatehastherightandprerogativetodeterminewhoareitscitizens.InUnitedStates
v.WongKimArk,[28]decidedin1898,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtenunciatedthisprinciple:

Itistheinherentrightofeveryindependentnationtodetermineforitself,andaccordingtoitsownconstitutionandlaws,what
classesofpersonsshallbeentitledtoitscitizenship.

Inourjurisdiction,theCourtsimilarlyechoedinthe1912caseofRoav.CollectorofCustoms[29]thisincontrovertiblerightofeachstate
todeterminewhoareitscitizens.Hence,everyindependentstatecannotbedeniedthisinherentrighttodeterminewhoareitscitizens
accordingtoitsownconstitutionandlaws.
Article1,ChapterIofthe1930HagueConventiononCertain
QuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLawsexplicitlyprovides:

Itisforeachstatetodetermineunderitsownlawwhoareitsnationals.ThislawshallberecognizedbyotherStatesinsofar
as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles oflaw generally recognized with
regardtonationality.

Thismeansthatmunicipallaw,bothconstitutionalandstatutory,determinesandregulatestheconditionsonwhichcitizenshipisacquired.
[30]Thereisnosuchthingasinternationalcitizenshiporinternationallawbywhichcitizenshipmaybeacquired.[31]Whetheranindividual

possessesthecitizenshipofaparticularstateshallbedeterminedinaccordancewiththeconstitutionandstatutorylawsofthatstate.
B.ConventionalInternationalLaw,CustomaryInternationalLaw,andGenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesofInternationalLaw

Petitioner invokes conventional international law, customary international law and generally accepted principles of international law to
supportherclaimthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Areviewoftheseconceptsisthusinevitable.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out the following sources of international law: (1) international
conventions,whethergeneralorparticular,establishingrulesexpresslyrecognizedbythecontestingstates(2)internationalcustom,as
evidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw(3)generalprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednationsand(4)judicialdecisionsand
theteachingsofthemosthighlyqualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnationsassubsidiarymeansforthedeterminationofrulesoflaw.[32]
Essentially,conventionalinternationallawisthebodyofinternationallegalprinciplescontainedintreatiesorconventionsasopposedto

customaryinternationallaworothersourcesofintemationallaw.[33]
Customaryinternationallawisdefinedasageneralandconsistentpracticeofstatesfollowedbythemfromasenseoflegalobligation.[34]
IhadoccasiontoexplaintheconceptofcustomaryinternationallawasusedinourConstitutioninthiswise:

Generally accepted principles of international law, as referred to in the Constitution, include customary international law.
Customary international law is one of the primary sources of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the
InternationalCourtofJustice.Customaryinternationallawconsistsofactswhich,byrepetitionofStatesofsimilarinternational
acts for a number of years, occur out of a sense of obligation, and taken by a significant number of States. It is based on
custom,whichisaclearandcontinuoushabitofdoingcertainactions,whichhasgrownundertheaegisoftheconvictionthat
these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or right. Thus, customary international law requires the
concurrence of two elements: [1] the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of the States and [2] a
psychologicalelementknownasopiniojurissivenecessitatis(opinionastolawornecessity).Implicitinthelatterelementisa
beliefthatthepracticeinquestionisrenderedobligatorybytheexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.[35]

IntheNorthSeaContinentalShelfCases,[36]theInternationalCourtofJusticeheldthat"[n]otonlymusttheactsconcernedamounttoa
settledpractice,buttheymustalsobesuch,orbecarriedoutinsuchaway,astobeevidenceofabeliefthatthispracticeisrendered
obligatorybyexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.Theneedforsuchabelief,i.e.,theexistenceofasubjectiveelementisimplicitinthe
verynotionoftheopiniojurissivenecessitatis."
Moreover,tobeconsideredascustomaryinternationallaw,arulemustapplytoall,ormajorityofall,states.Onepossibleexceptionto
the universal applicability of customary international law is local or special custom. A local or special customary international rule binds
onlyagroupofstates,regionalorotherwise.[37]"Regionalcustomaryinternationallawreferstocustomaryinternationallawthatarises
from state practice and opinio juris of a discrete and limited number of states as it departs from generally applicable customary
internationallaw,itisonlybindinguponandopposableagainstthosestatesparticipatinginitsformation."[38]
Generally accepted principles of international law are those legal principles which are so basic and fundamental that they are found
universallyinthelegalsystemsoftheworld.Theseprinciplesapplyallovertheworld,notonlytoaspecificcountry,regionorgroupof
states. Legal principles such as laches, estoppel, good faith, equity and res judicata are examples of generally accepted principles of
internationallaw.[39] In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,[40] the Court further explained the
conceptofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesoflaw,towit:

Somelegalscholarsandjudgeslookuponcertain"generalprinciplesoflaw"asaprimarysourceofinternationallawbecause
theyhavethe"characterofjusrationale"andare"validthroughallkindsofhumansocieties."(JudgeTanakainhisdissenting
opinioninthe1966SouthWestAfricaCase,1966I.C.J.296).O'Connellholdsthatcertainprinciplesarepartofinternational
lawbecausetheyare"basictolegalsystemsgenerally"andhencepartofthejusgentium.Theseprinciples,hebelieves,are
established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or
disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and
acceptablesolution.xxx.

C.ThereisNoCustomaryInternationalLaw
PresumingaFoundlingasaCitizen
oftheCountryWheretheFoundlingisFound

Petitioner claims that under customary international law and generally accepted principles of international law, she (1) has a right to a
nationalityfrombirth(2)hasarighttobeprotectedagainststatelessnessand(3)ispresumedtobeacitizenofthePhilippineswhere
shewasfound.
Petitioneranchorsherclaimsonthe(1)1989ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC),(2)1966InternationalCovenantonCiviland
Political Rights (ICCPR), (3) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), (4) 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
RelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws(1930HagueConvention),and(5)the1961
ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness(CRS),amongothers.
1.The1989ConventionontheRightsoftheChild

Article7
1.Thechildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhavetherightfrombirthtoaname,therighttoacquirea
nationalityandasfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations
undertherelevantinternationalinstrumentsinthisfield,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.(Emphasis
supplied)

The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The
Conventiondefinesachildtomeaneveryhumanbeingbelowtheageofeighteenyearsunless,underthelawapplicabletothechild,the
ageofmajorityisattainedearlier.
Since petitioner was born in 1968 or more than 20 years before the Convention came into existence, the Convention could not have
appliedtothestatusofhercitizenshipatthetimeofherbirthin1968.Petitioner'scitizenshipatbirthcouldnotbeaffectedinanywayby
theConvention.
TheConventionguaranteesachildtherighttoacquireanationality,andrequiresthecontractingstatestoensuretheimplementationof
thisright,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.Thus,asfarasnationalityisconcerned,theConventionguarantees
the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that the child will not be stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a
nationalityatbirth,muchlessanaturalborncitizenshipatbirthasunderstoodunderthePhilippineConstitution,butmerely
therighttoacquireanationalityinaccordancewithmunicipallaw.
2.The1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights

Article24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
propertyorbirth,therighttosuchmeasuresofprotectionasarerequiredbyhisstatusasaminor,onthepartofhisfamily,
societyandtheState.
xxxx
3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.(Emphasissupplied)

Adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
recognizes"theidealoffreehumanbeingsenjoyingcivilandpoliticalfreedomandfreedomfromfearandwantwhichcanonlybeachieved
ifconditionsarecreatedwherebyeveryonemayenjoyhiscivilandpoliticalrights,aswellashiseconomic,socialandculturalrights."[41]
ThePhilippinesisasignatorytothisinternationaltreaty.SimilartothetextoftheConventionontheRightsoftheChild,theICCPRdoes
notobligatestatestoautomaticallygrantanationalitytochildrenatbirth.The Covenant merely recognizes the right of a child to
acquireanationality.Inshort,theCovenantdoesnotguaranteeafoundlinganationalityatbirth,muchlessnaturalborn
citizenshipatbirthasunderstoodunderthePhilippineConstitution.
3.The1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights

Article15.
(1)Everyonehastherighttoanationality.
(2)Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.(Emphasissupplied)

TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswasadoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon10December1948whereby"Member
States(includingthePhilippines)havepledgedthemselvestoachieve,incooperationwiththeUnitedNations,thepromotionofuniversal
respectforandobservanceofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms."[42]Itsetsout,forthefirsttime,fundamentalhumanrightstobe
universallyprotected.[43]
Article 15(1) of the UDHR simply affirms the right of every human being to a nationality. Being a mere declaration, such
rightguaranteedbytheUDHRdoesnotobligatestatestoautomaticallyconfernationalitytoafoundlingatbirth,muchless
naturalborncitizenshipatbirthasunderstoodunderthePhilippineConstitution.
4.The1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws

Article14.
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established,itsnationalityshallbedeterminedbytherulesapplicableincaseswheretheparentageisknown.
Afoundlingis,untilthecontraryisproved,presumedtohavebeenbornontheterritoryoftheStateinwhichitwasfound.
Article15.
WherethenationalityofaStateisnotacquiredautomaticallybyreasonofbirthonitsterritory,achildbornontheterritoryof
thatStateofparentshavingnonationality,orofunknownnationality,mayobtainthenationalityofthesaidState.Thelawof

that State shall determine the conditions governing the acquisition of its nationality in such cases. (Emphasis
supplied)

ThePhilippinesisnotasignatorytothisConvention,andtherefore,itisnotboundbytheConvention.Petitioner,however,claimsthatthis
Conventionisevidenceof"generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallaw,"whichallegedlycreatedthepresumptionthatafoundlingisa
citizenatbirthofthestateinwhichthefoundlingisfound.
Article14merelystatesthatafoundling"shallhavethenationalityofthecountryofbirth."Itdoesnotsaythatafoundlingshallhave
thenationalityatbirth of the country where the foundling is found. Nowhere in Article 14 is nationality guaranteed to a foundling at
birth,muchlessnaturalborncitizenshipatbirthasunderstoodunderthePhilippineConstitution.Likewise,Article14merely
lays down the presumption that a foundling is born in the territory of the state in which the foundling is found. This is the only
presumptionthatArticle14establishes.
Article 15 acknowledges the fact that acquisition of nationality by reason of birth in a state's territory is not automatic. Article 15
expressly states that municipal law shall "determine the conditions governing the acquisition of its nationality" by a
foundling.Thus,toimplementtheConventionthecontractingpartieshavetoenactstatutorylegislationprescribingtheconditionsforthe
acquisitionofcitizenshipbyafoundling.Thisrulesoutanyautomaticacquisitionofcitizenshipatbirthbyafoundling.
5.The1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness

Article1
1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Such
nationalityshallbegranted:
(a)atbirth,byoperationoflaw,or
(b)uponanapplicationbeinglodgedwiththeappropriateauthority,byoronbehalfofthepersonconcerned,in
the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, no such application
mayberejected.
AContractingStatewhichprovidesforthegrantofitsnationalityinaccordancewithsubparagraph(b)ofthisparagraphmay
alsoprovideforthegrantofitsnationalitybyoperationoflawatsuchageandsubjecttosuchconditionsasmaybeprescribed
bythenationallaw.
xxxx
Article2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. (Emphasis
supplied)

A1961UnitedNationsmultilateraltreaty,theprimaryaimoftheConventionisthepreventionofstatelessnessbyrequiringstatestogrant
citizenship to children born in their territory, or born to their nationals abroad, who would otherwise be stateless. To prevent
statelessnessinsuchcases,stateshavetheoptiontograntnationality(1)atbirthbyoperationoflaw,or(2)subsequently
by application. In short, a contracting state to the Convention must enact an implementing law choosing one of the two
optionsbeforetheConventioncanbeimplementedinthatstate.
ThePhilippinesisnotasignatorytothisConvention,andthus,thePhilippinesisanoncontractingstate.TheConventiondoesnotbind
thePhilippines.Moreover,thisConventiondoesnotprovideautomaticallythatafoundlingisacitizenatbirthofthecountryinwhichthe
foundlingisfound.
Article 2 of the Convention provides, "A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary,beconsideredtohavebeenbornofparentspossessingthenationalityofthatstate."Dr.LauravanWaasexplainsthemeaning
ofArticle2oftheConvention,asfollows:

Oncemore,thewordingofthisprovisiOnisevidenceofthecompromisereachedbetweenjussoliandjussanguiniscountries.
Ratherthandeterminingthatachildfoundabandonedontheterritoryofthestatewillautomaticallyacquirethe
nationalityofthatstate,itdeclaresthatthechildwillbeassumedtohaveboththenecessaryjussoliandjussanguinislinks
withthestate:bornontheterritorytoparentspossessingthenationalityofthestate.Thismeansthatthechildwillthen
simplyacquirenationalityexlegeunderthenormaloperationofthestate'snationalityregulationstheeffectbeing
the same in both jussoli and jus sanguinis regimes. No attempt is made to further define the type of evidence that may be
acceptedas"prooftothecontrary",thisbeinglefttothediscretionofthecontractingstates.[44](Emphasissupplied)

First,Article2appliesonlytoa"foundlingfoundintheterritoryofaContractingState."ThePhilippinesisnotacontractingstateto
theConventionandthusArticle2,andtheentireConvention,doesnotapplytothePhilippines.

Second, there must be "absence of proof' that the parents of the foundling do not possess the nationality of another state. This means
theremustbeanadministrativeorjudicialproceedingtodeterminethisfactualissue,anactnecessarytoacquirethecitizenshipofthe
statewherethefoundlingisfound.ThisalsomeansthatthegrantofcitizenshipunderArticle2isnotautomatic,asDr.LauravanWaas
explains. This factual determination prevents the foundling from acquiring naturalborn citizenship at birth as understood under our
Constitution,assumingArticle2appliestothePhilippines.
Third,thegrantofcitizenshipunderArticle2isexlegewhichmeansbyoperationoflawreferringtomunicipalstatutorylaw.Assuming
Article2appliestothePhilippines,anditdoesnot,thisgrantofcitizenshipreferstonaturalizationbyoperationoflaw,thecategoryof
citizensunderparagraph(5),Section1ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitution(nowSection1(4),ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution),or"
[t]hosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw."
Nationality at birth may result because the law applicable is either jus soli orjussanguinis. A child born in the United States to foreign
parentsisacitizenoftheUnitedStatesatbirthbecausetheUnitedStatesadoptsthejussoliprinciple.Underthejus soli principle, the
place of birth determines citizenship at birth, not blood relation to the parents. In contrast, a child born in the Philippines to foreign
parents is not a Philippine citizen at birth but a foreigner because the Philippines follows the jus sanguinis principle. Under the jus
sanguinisprinciple,citizenshipatbirthisdeterminedbybloodrelationtotheparents.
Nationality at birth does not necessarily mean naturalborn citizenship as prescribed under the Philippine Constitution. The Constitution
recognizesnaturalborncitizensatbirthonlyundertheprincipleofjussanguinistheremustbeabloodrelationbythechildtoaFilipino
father or mother. Even assuming, and there is none, that there is an international law granting a foundling citizenship, at birth, of the
country where the foundling is found, it does not necessarily follow that the foundling qualifies as a naturalborn citizen under the
PhilippineConstitution.InthePhilippines,anycitizenshipgrantedatbirthtoachildwithnoknownbloodrelationtoaFilipinoparentcan
only be allowed by way of naturalization as mandated by the Constitution, under paragraph 5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution,[45] paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article III of the 1973 Constitution,[46] and paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution.[47]SuchachildisanaturalizedFilipinocitizen,notanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
In sum, there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a contracting party, which provides expressly or impliedly that a
foundling is deemed anaturalborn citizen of the country in which the foundling is found.[48] There is also obviously no international
treaty, to which the Philippines is not a party, obligating the Philippines to confer automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth.
SincethePhilippinesisnotasignatorytothevariousinternationalconventionsregulatingnationality,[49]weshallscrutinizewhetherthe
relevant provisions on foundlings contained in the international conventions cited by petitioner have become part of customary
internationallaworgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawonnationality.
Weshallfirstlaydownthebasicpremiseforaninternationalruletobeconsideredcustomaryinternationallaw.Sucharulemustcomply
withthetwinelementsofwidespreadandconsistentstatepractice,theobjectiveelementandopiniojurissivenecessitatis,thesubjective
element.Statepracticereferstothecontinuousrepetitionofthesameorsimilarkindofactsornormsbystates.Itisdemonstratedupon
theexistenceofthefollowingelements:(1)generalityorwidespreadpractice(2)uniformityandconsistencyand(3)duration.Onthe
otherhand,opiniojuris,thepsychologicalelement,requiresthatthestatepracticeornormbecarriedoutinthebeliefthatthispracticeor
normisobligatoryasamatteroflaw.[50]
The pertinent provisions on foundlings are found in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention and Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness state,
respectively: (1) "A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found"and(2)"AfoundlingfoundintheterritoryofaContractingStateshall,intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,beconsideredto
havebeenbornwithinthatterritoryofparentspossessingthenationalityofthatState."
WeshalllimitourdiscussiontoArticle2oftheConventionontheReductionofStatelessnesssincethepresumptioninArticle14ofthe
1930HagueConventionconcernsmerelytheplaceofbirthoffoundlings.Inthiscase,thepartiesadmitthatpetitionerwasborninJaro,
IloilointhePhilippines,whichisthesameplacewhereshewasfound.Therefore,itisnolongerpresumedthatpetitionerwasborninthe
territoryofthePhilippinessinceitisalreadyanadmittedfactthatshewasborninthePhilippines.
Thereareonly64StateswhichhaveratifiedtheConventionontheReductionofStatelessnessasofFebruary2016. [51]Outofthe193
MemberStatesoftheUnitedNations,[52]farlessthanamajoritysignifiedtheiragreementtotheConvention.
Oneoftheessentialelementsofcustomaryinternationallawisthewidespreadandconsistentpracticebystatesofaspecificinternational
principle, in this case, that foundlings are presumed to be born to parents who are citizens of the state where the foundling is found.
Petitionerfailedtoprovethisobjectiveelement.Prof.MalcolmN.Shaw,inhiswidelyusedtextbookInternationalLaw,explainsthe
meaningofwidespreadandconsistentpracticeinthisway:

OneparticularanalogythathasbeenusedtoillustratethegeneralnatureofcustomarylawasconsideredbydeVisscher.He
likenedthegrowthofcustomtothegradualformationofaroadacrossvacantland.Afteraninitialuncertaintyastodirection,
the majority of users begin to follow the same line which becomes a single path. Not long elapses before that path is
transformedintoaroadacceptedastheonlyregularway,eventhoughitisnotpossibletostateatwhichprecisemomentthis
latterchangeoccurs.Andsoitiswiththeformationofacustom.DeVisscherdevelopsthisideabyreflectingthatjustassome
make heavier footprints than others due to their greater weight, the more influential states of the world mark the way with
morevigourandtendtobecometheguarantorsanddefendersofthewayforward.[53](Emphasissupplied)

Prof. Shaw concludes, "Accordingly, custom should to some extent mirror the perceptions of the majority of states, since it is based
uponusageswhicharepracticedbynationsastheyexpresstheirpowerandtheirhopesandfears."[54]
PetitionermanifestlyfailedtoshowthatArticle2oftheConventionontheReductionofStatelessnessisan"established,widespreadand
consistentpractice"ofamajorityofsovereignstates.ThereisnoshowingthatthisConventionwasinfactenforcedorpracticedbyat
least a majority of the members of the United Nations. Petitioner claims that "ratification by a majority of states is not essential for a
principle contained in an international treaty or convention to be 'customary international law."'[55] On the other hand, it is generally
acceptedbyinternationallawwritersthattheConventionontheReductionofStatelessnessdoesnotconstitutecustomaryinternational
lawpreciselybecauseofthesmallnumberofstatesthathaveratifiedtheConvention.Dr.LauravanWaassummarizesthestateofthe
lawonthisissue:

Inordertocontendthataruleofcustomaryinternationallawhastherebybeenestablished,wemustalsoprovethatstatesare
legislating in this way due to the conviction that they are legally compelled to do so the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The
codification of the obligation to grant nationality to foundlings in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
StatelessnessConventioncannotbetakenassufficientevidencedue,mainly,tothelownumberofstatepartiesto
bothinstruments.[56](Emphasissupplied)

It is hornbook law that there is no general international law, whether customary international law or generally accepted principle of
internationallaw,obligatingthePhilippines,oranystateforthatmatter,toautomaticallyconfercitizenshiptofoundlingsatbirth.AsProf.
SerenaForlatiwrites:"Itisthusnotpossibletoconcludethateverychildwhowouldotherwisebestatelessisautomaticallyentitledtothe
nationalityofherorhiscountryofbirthundertheICCPR,theCRCorgeneralinternationallaw."[57]
Out of the 64 parties to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, only 13 states provide for the automatic and
unconditionalacquisitionofnationalitybyfoundlings.[58]ThismeansthatthemajorityofthecontractingstatestotheConvention
donotautomaticallyconfernationalitytofoundlingsatbirth.Infact,themajorityofthecontractingstatesimposevariousconditionsfor
the acquisition of nationality to prevent statelessness, such as proof of unknown parentage, the specific place where the foundling is
found, and whether the foundling is a newborn infant or a child of a certain age, among others. These conditions must necessarily be
establishedintheappropriateproceedingbeforethefoundlingcanacquirecitizenship.Theseconditionsfortheacquisitionofcitizenship
effectively prevent a foundling from being automatically considered a citizen at birth. In the Philippines, such conditions will prevent a
foundlingfrombeingconsideredanaturalborncitizenasdefinedunderthePhilippineConstitution.
Sincethefirstessentialelementforaninternationalruletobeconsideredacustomaryinternationallawismissinginthiscase,thesecond
essentialelementofopiniojurisislogicallylackingaswell.Infact,petitionerfailedtodemonstratethatanycompliancebymemberstates
withtheConventionontheReductionofStatelessnesswasobligatoryinnature.InBayanMunav.Romulo,[59]theCourtheld:

Absent the widespread/consistentpracticeofstates factor, the second or the psychological element must be deemed non
existent,foraninquiryonwhystatesbehavethewaytheydopresupposes,inthefirstplace,thattheyareactuallybehaving,
asamatterofsettledandconsistentpractice,inacertainmanner.Thisimplicitlyrequiresbeliefthatthepracticeinquestionis
renderedobligatorybytheexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.Likethefirstelement,thesecondelementhaslikewisenot
beenshowntobepresent.

Moreover,asidefromthefactthatthePhilippinesisnotacontractingpartytotheConventionontheReductionofStatelessness,Article2
of the Convention is inapplicable to this case because the Convention, which took effect after the birth of petitioner, does not have
retroactiveeffect.Paragraph3,Article12oftheConventionexplicitlystates:

3.TheprovisionsofArticle2ofthisConventionshallapplyonlytofoundlingsfoundintheterritoryofaContractingStateafter
theentryintoforceoftheConventionforthatState.(Emphasissupplied)

In short, even if the Philippines were to ratify the Convention today, the Convention would still not benefit petitioner who was born in
1968.
D.ApplicableCustomaryInternationalLawon
CitizenshipofFoundlings

Whilethereisnocustomaryinternationallawconferringnationalitytofoundlingsatbirth,thereisnodisputethatpetitionerhastheright
toanationalityandthecorollaryrighttobeprotectedagainststatelessness.
The Philippines is not a signatory to the 1930 Hague Convention or to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. However, the
PhilippinesisasignatorytotheConventionontheRightsoftheChildandtotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.The
PhilippinesalsoadherestotheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.
ThesalientprovisionsoftheCRC,theICCPRandtheUDHRonnationalityestablishprinciplesthatareconsideredcustomaryinternational

law because of the widespread and consistent practice of states and their obligatory nature among states. Generally, most states
recognizethefollowingcorenationalityprovisions:(1)everyhumanbeinghasarighttoanationality(2)stateshavetheobligationto
avoid statelessness and (3) states have the obligation to facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons, including foundlings living
withinsuchstates.
RighttoaNationality
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "everyone has the right to a nationality." With these words, the
internationalcommunityrecognizesthateveryindividual,everywhereintheworld,shouldholdalegalbondofnationalitywithastate.[60]
The right to a nationality is a fundamental human right[61] from which springs the realization of other cardinal human rights.
Possession of a nationality carries with it the diplomatic protection of the country of nationality and is also often a legal or practical
requirementfortheexerciseofpoliticalandcivilrights.Consequently,therighttoanationalityhasbeendescribedasthe"righttohave
rights."[62]
ObligationtoAvoidStatelessness
Closely linked to the right of the individual to a nationality is every state's obligation to avoid statelessness since the nonfulfillment of
suchrightresultsinstatelessness.[63]Indeterminingwhoareitsnationals,everystatehasanobligationtoavoidcasesofstatelessness.
ObligationtoFacilitatetheNaturalizationofStatelessPersons,IncludingFoundlings
The right to confer nationality, being an inherent right of every independent state, carries with it the obligation to grant nationality to
individualswhowouldotherwisebestateless.Todothis,statesmustfacilitatethenaturalizationofstatelesspersons,includingfoundlings.
Therefore,statesmustinstitutetheappropriateprocessesandmechanisms,throughthepassageofappropriatestatutesorguidelines,to
complywiththisobligation.
Moststatesrecognizeascustomaryinternationallawtherightofeveryhumanbeingtoanationalitywhichintum,requiresthosestatesto
avoid statelessness, and to facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons, including foundlings. However, there is no customary
internationallawconferringautomaticallycitizenshipatbirthtofoundlings,muchlessnaturalborncitizenshipatbirthasunderstoodunder
thePhilippineConstitution.
E.GeneralPrincipleofInternationalLawApplicabletoFoundlings
Consideringthatthereisnoconventionalorcustomaryinternationallawautomaticallyconferringnationalitytofoundlingsatbirth,there
are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings. First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country
where the foundling is found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated
otherwise,afoundlingreceivesatbirthadomicileoforiginwhichisthecountryinwhichthefoundlingisfound.[64]
Second,intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,afoundlingisdeemedborninthecountrywherethefoundlingisfound.[65] These two
generalprinciplesofinternationallawhavenothingtodowithconfermentofnationality.
F.StatusofInternationalLawPrinciplesinthePhilippines

UnderSection3,ArticleIIofthe1935Constitution,[66]Section3,ArticleIIofthe1973Constitution,[67]andSection2,ArticleIIofthe
1987 Constitution,[68] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
Internationallawcanbecomepartofdomesticlaweitherbytransformationorincorporation.[69]Thetransformationmethodrequiresthat
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as domestic legislation.[70] The
incorporationmethodapplieswhen,bymereconstitutionaldeclaration,internationallawisdeemedtohavetheforceofdomesticlaw.[71]
ThePhilippineConstitutionadherestotheincorporationmethod.
Anytreaty,customaryinternationallaw,orgenerallyacceptedinternationallawprinciplehasthestatusofmunicipalstatutorylaw.As
such, it must conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. If a treaty, customary international law or generally
acceptedinternationallawprincipledoesnotcontravenetheConstitutionandstatutorylaws,thenitbecomespartofthelawoftheland.If
a treaty, customary international law or generally accepted international law principle conforms to the Constitution but conflicts with
statutory law, what prevails is the later law in point of time as international law has the same standing as municipal statutory law.[72]
However,ifatreaty,customaryinternationallaworgenerallyacceptedinternationallawprincipleconflictswiththeConstitution,itisthe
Constitution that prevails. The Constitution remains supreme and prevails over any international legal instrument or principle in case of
conflict.InexplainingSection2,ArticleIIofthe1987Constitution,theconstitutionalistFatherJoaquinBernas,S.J.narrated:

When Commissioner Guingona asked whether "generally accepted principles of international law" were adopted by this
provisionaspartofstatutorylaworofconstitutionallaw,Nolledo'sanswerwasunclear.Heseemedtosuggestthatatleastthe
provisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharterwouldformpartofbothconstitutionalandstatutorylaw.Nobodyadvertedtothefact
that Nolledo's interpretation was a departure from what had hitherto been the accepted meaning of the provision. Later,
however, during the period of amendment, Commissioner Azcuna clarified this by saying that generally accepted
principles of international law were made part only of statutory law and not of constitutionallaw.[73] (Emphasis
supplied)

Treaties,customaryinternationallawandthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawconcerningcitizenshipcannotprevailover
the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship in case of conflict with the latter.[74] Treaties, customary international law or generally
accepted international law principles on acquisition of citizenship that contravene the language and intent of the Constitution cannot be
giveneffectinthePhilippinesforbeingunconstitutional.
Assumingarguendothattherewasin1935andthereafteracustomaryinternationallawconferringnationalitytofoundlingsatbirth,still
foundlings could not be considered as naturalborn Filipino citizens since to treat them as such would conflict with the concept of jus
sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution. As stated, in case of conflict between customary international law and the Constitution, it is the
Constitutionthatprevails.The1935Constitutionclearlyrequiredbloodrelationtothefathertoestablishthenaturalborncitizenshipofa
child.The1935ConstitutiondidnotcontainanyprovisionexpresslyorimpliedlygrantingFilipinocitizenshiptofoundlingsonthebasisof
birthinthePhilippines(jussoliorlawofthesoil),[75]withthepresumptionofFilipinoparentagesoastomakethemnaturalborncitizens.
Evenassumingtherewasin1935andthereafteracustomaryinternationallawgrantingtofoundlingscitizenshipatbirth,suchcitizenship
atbirthisnotidenticaltothecitizenshipofachildwhoisbiologicallyborntoFilipinoparents.Thecitizenshipofafoundlingcanbegranted
atbirthbyoperationoflaw,butthefoundlingisconsidered"naturalizedinaccordancewithlaw"andnotanaturalborncitizen.Sincea
foundling's nationality is merely granted by operation of statutory law, specifically customary international law (which has the status of
statutorylaw)assumingsuchexists,afoundlingcanonlybedeemedaFilipinocitizenunderparagraph5,Section1ofArticleIVofthe
1935 Constitution which refers to naturalized Filipino citizens. To add another category of naturalborn Filipino citizens, particularly
foundlingsborninthePhilippineswhoseparentsareunknown,conflictswiththeexpresslanguageandintentofthe1935Constitutionto
limitnaturalbornFilipinocitizenstothosewhosefathersareFilipinocitizens.
Inshort,thereisadifferencebetweencitizenshipatbirthbecauseofjussoli,andcitizenshipatbirthbecauseofjussanguinis.Theformer
maybegrantedtofoundlingsunderPhilippinestatutorylawpursuanttoparagraph(5),Section1ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitutionbut
the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a naturalborn citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth
becauseofjussanguinis,whichrequiresbloodrelationtoaparent,arenaturalbornFilipinocitizensunderthe1935,1973and1987
Constitutions.
FoundlingsasNaturalizedFilipinoCitizens

Ifachild'sparentsareneitherFilipinocitizens,theonlywaythatthechildmaybeconsideredaFilipinocitizenisthroughtheprocessof
naturalizationinaccordancewithstatutorylawunderparagraph(5),Section1ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitution.Ifachild'sparents
areunknown,asinthecaseofafoundling,thereisnobasistoconsiderthechildasanatural bornFilipinocitizensincethereisnoproof
thateitherthechild'sfatherormotherisaFilipinocitizen.Thus,theonlywaythatafoundlingcanbeconsideredaFilipinocitizenunder
the1935Constitution,aswellasunderthe1973and1987Constitutions,isforthefoundlingtobenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
InthePhilippines,therearelawswhichprovideforthenaturalizationofforeigners.TheseareCommonwealthActNo.473,[76]asamended
byRepublicActNo.530,knownastheRevisedNaturalizationLaw,whichreferstojudicialnaturalization,andRepublicActNo.9139,[77]
whichpertainstoadministrativenaturalization.
Significantly,thereisnoPhilippinestatutewhichprovidesforthegrantofFilipinocitizenshipspecificallytofoundlingswhoarefoundinthe
Philippines.Theabsenceofadomesticlawonthenaturalizationoffoundlingscanbesufficientlyaddressedbycustomaryinternationallaw,
which recognizes the right of every human being to a nationality and obligates states to grant nationality to avoid statelessness.
Customaryinternationallawcanfillthegapinourmunicipalstatutorylawonnaturalizationoffoundlingsinordertopreventfoundlings
frombeingstateless.Otherwise,afoundlingfoundinthePhilippineswithnoknownparentswillbestatelessonthesolegroundthatthere
is no domestic law providing for the grant of nationality. This not only violates the right of every human being to a nationality but also
derogatesfromthePhilippines'obligationtograntnationalitytopersonstoavoidstatelessness.
Customary international law has the same status as a statute enacted by Congress. Thus, it must not run afoul with the Constitution.
CustomaryinternationallawcannotvalidlyamendtheConstitutionbyaddinganothercategoryofnaturalbornFilipinocitizens,specifically
by considering foundlings with no known parents as naturalborn citizens. Again, under paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article
IVofthe1935Constitution,inrelationtoSections1and2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution,onlythosebornofFilipinofathersorFilipino
mothersareconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
Applyingcustomaryinternationallawtothepresentcase,specificallytherightofeveryhumanbeingtoanationalityandthePhilippines'
obligation to grant citizenship to persons who would otherwise be stateless, a foundling may be naturalized as a Filipino citizen upon
properapplicationforcitizenship.Thisapplicationshouldnotbeinterpretedinthestrictestsenseoftheword.Onthecontrary,theterm
"application" for purposes of acquiring citizenship must be construed liberally in order to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings. The
applicationforcitizenshipmaybeanyovertactwhichinvolvesrecognitionbythePhilippinesthatthefoundlingisindeeditscitizen.Thus,
the application for citizenship may be as simple as applying for a Philippine passport, which serves as evidence of citizenship.[78] An
application for a passport is an application for recognition that the holder is a citizen of the state issuing such passport. In the case of
petitioner,sheappliedfor,andwasissuedaPhilippinepassportonthefollowingdates:(1)4April1988[79](2)5April1993[80](3)19
May1998[81](4)13October2009[82](5)19December2013[83]and(6)18March2014.[84]
Inanyevent,forafoundlingtobegrantedcitizenship,itisnecessarythatthechild'sstatusasafoundlingbefirstestablished.Itmustbe
proven that the child has no known parentage before the state can grant citizenship on account of the child being a foundling. In the
Philippines,achildisdeterminedtobeafoundlingafteranadministrativeinvestigationverifyingthatthechildisofunknownparentage.
TheImplementingRulesandRegulations(IRR)ofActNo.3753[85]andOtherLawsonCivilRegistrationprovidethatthebarangaycaptain
or police authority shall certify that no one has claimed the child or no one has reported a missing child with the description of the

foundling.[86]Rule29ofthesaidIRRprovides:

RULE29.RequirementsforRegistrationofFoundling.Nofoundlingshallberecordedinthecivilregistrarunlessthefollowing
requirementsarecompliedwith:
a)CertificateofFoundling(OCRGFormNo.101,RevisedJanuary1993)accomplishedcorrectlyandcompletely
b)Affidavitofthefinderstatingthefactsandcircumstancessurroundingthefindingofthechild,andthefactthatthefoundling
hasbeenreportedtothebarangaycaptainortothepoliceauthority,asthecasemaybeand
c)Certificationofthebarangaycaptainorpoliceauthorityregardingthereportmadebythefinder,statingamong
otherthings,thatnoonehasclaimedthechildornoonehasreportedamissingchildwhosedescriptionmaybe
thesameasthefoundlingasofthedateofthecertification.(Emphasissupplied)

BeforeafoundlingisconferredPhilippinecitizenship,theremustfirstbeafactualdeterminationofthechild'sstatusasafoundlingafter
anadministrativeinvestigation.Oncefactuallydeterminedthatachildisafoundling,thatchildthroughitsguardianmaythereafterinitiate
proceedingstoapplyforPhilippinecitizenship,e.g.,applyforaPhilippinepassport.
This need for a factual determination prevents the foundling from automatically acquiring Philippine citizenship at birth. The fact of
unknownparentagemustfirstbeproveninanadministrativeproceedingbeforeafoundlingisgrantedcitizenshiponaccountofthechild's
foundling status. Such factual determination is a necessary act to acquire Philippine citizenship, preventing the foundling from being a
naturalborn Filipino citizen. In contrast, for naturalborn Filipino citizens, no factual determination in an administrative proceeding is
requiredtograntcitizenshipsincethecertificateoflivebirthspeaksforitselfitestablishesnaturalborncitizenship.
ErroneousInterpretationofStatistics

DuringtheOralArguments,theSolicitorGeneralinsistedthatpetitionerisanaturalbornFilipinocitizenbasedonthe99.93%statistical
probabilitythatanychildborninthePhilippinesfrom2010to2014wouldbeanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.From1965to1975,thereisa
99.83% statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino citizen. To buttress his position, the
SolicitorGeneralpresentedacertificationfromthePhilippineStatisticsAuthorityshowingthe"numberofforeignandFilipinochildren
borninthePhilippines:19651975and20102014."
Thisisgraveerror.
There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the Solicitor General's contention that naturalborn citizenship can be conferred on a
foundling based alone on statistical probability. Absent any legal foundation for such argument, the Solicitor General cannot validly
concludethata99.93%(or99.83%)statisticalprobabilitythatafoundlingborninthePhilippinesisanaturalbornFilipinocitizenlegally
confers on such foundling naturalborn citizenship. There is no constitutional provision or statute that confers naturalborn citizenship
basedonstatisticalprobability.
TheSolicitorGeneral'sdataspeakofforeignandFilipinobirthsinthePhilippines.Thedatacollectedshowthenumberofforeignand
FilipinochildrenborninthePhilippinesduringtheperiodscovered.Thismeansthatthefiguresreflectthetotalnumberofchildrenbornin
thePhilippineswithknownparents,eitherFilipinoorforeigner.Thedatadonotshowthenumberoffoundlings(thosewithunknown
parentage)borninthePhilippinesfrom1965to1975andfrom2010to2014.Thedataalsodonotshowthenumberoffoundlingswho
were later determined to have Filipino parentage. This is precisely because foundlings have unknown parents. A foundling's unknown
parentagerendersitquitedifficult,ifnotimpossible,tocollectdataon"thenumberofforeignandFilipinofoundlings."
For the Solicitor General's proposition to be correct, he should have presented statistics specifically based on the number of foundlings
born in the Philippines, and not on the number of children born in the Philippines with known foreign or Filipino parents. Children with
known parents constitute a class entirely different from foundlings with unknown parents. Gathering data from the number of children
borninthePhilippineswithknownparentstodeterminethenumberoffoundlingsborninthePhilippinestoconfernaturalborncitizenship
onfoundlingsresemblescomparingappleswithorangesandavocados.Sincethefigureswerecollectedfromtheuniverseofchildrenwith
known parents, either Filipinos or foreigners, and not from the universe of foundlings, the Solicitor General's proposition is fallacious in
concludingthatfoundlingsinthePhilippinesarenaturalbornFilipinocitizens.
Further, if there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%) probability that a child born in the Philippines is a naturalborn Filipino citizen, it does not
automatically follow that there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%) probability that a foundling born in the Philippines is a naturalborn Filipino
citizen. The data, if any, on the universe of foundlings may show a different statistical probability. There is evidently no such statistical
data. Therefore, the Solicitor General's argument that the probability that a foundling born in the Philippines would be a naturalborn
Filipinois99.93%(or99.83%)basedonthenumberofchildrenborninthePhilippineswithknownparentsisglaringlynonsequitur.
ThefollowingexchangebetweenJusticeCarpioandtheSolicitorGeneralillustratesthefallacyofthesocalled99.93%(99.83%)statistical
probabilityadvancedbytheSolicitorGeneral.Suchstatisticalprobabilitywouldresultinpatentabsurdities.

JUSTICECARPIO:
Now,howdoestheConstitutiondefinenaturalborncitizen?
xxxx

SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheircitizenship.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay.Letusassumethataninfantisfound,athreedayinfantisfoundtodayinfrontoftheManilaCathedral.The
infant has blue eyes, blonde hair, milky white skin. The parish priest looks around and doesn't find any one
claimingthechild.So,theparishpriestgoestotheDSWD,turnsoverthechildtotheDSWD.TheDSWDconducts
an investigation, a formal investigation, to find out if the biological parents are around if they can be found.
Nobody comes out, so the DSWD issues a foundling certificate, okay. What is the nationality of the child? Is the
childanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
IwouldconsiderthechildanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesbecause99.9percentofthetime,thatchildwill
beanaturalborncitizen.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Soevenifthechildhasblueeyes,blondehair,Caucasianskin...
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
It'spossibleforFilipinostohaveblueeyes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:Blondehair?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
It'spossibleYourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Howmanypercent?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Again,YourHonor,ifwearelookingatpercentage....
JUSTICECARPIO:
HowmanypercentofFilipinos,naturalborn,haveblueeyes,blondehair,whiteskin,99.9percent?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Idon'tknowaboutthespecificnumbers.....
xxxx
JUSTICECARPIO:
Youdon'thavethestatistics.
xxxx
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Idon't,YourHonor,Idon't.
xxxx
JUSTICECARPIO:
So,youwouldsaythateverychildborninthePhilippineswhohasblueeyes,blondehair,whiteskin,whoseparentscannotbe
found, and there is a certificate by the DSWD that's a foundling, they are all natural born citizens of the Philippines. If
Filipino....
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
YourHonor,Iamnotthreatenedbypeoplewithblueeyesand,youknow,blonde...
JUSTICECARPIO:
Yes,butmyquestionis,whatisthenationalityofthosechildren,ofthoseinfants?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
NaturalbornFilipinosstill,YourHonor.
xxxx
JUSTICECARPIO:
Supposingnow,thereisaDNAtakenfromthechild[ren],yousaytheyarenaturalborncitizens.TheDNAshows
that they have Caucasian genes, no Asian genes at all, would you say they are naturalborn citizens of the
Philippines?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Well,it'spossibleforCaucasianstobeFilipinos,YourHonor,andnaturalbornFilipinos.

JUSTICECARPIO:
IftheirparentsareFilipinos.
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Yes,exactly,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Butifyoudon'tknowwhotheirparents....
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
ThenI,again,wouldgobackto99.9percent,whichisarathercomfortablenumberforme.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Yes,buthowmanypercentofFilipinoshaveblueeyes,blondehairandwhiteskin?
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Thatisanirrelevantfactforme,YourHonor.I'mnotlookingattheclassofcitizens....
xxxx
JUSTICECARPIO:
Youhavetolookatthestatisticsalso.
SOLICITORGENERALHILBAY:
Yes,YourHonor,ofcourse.[87](Emphasissupplied)

FortheSolicitorGeneraltoassertthatafoundlingwithblondhair,blueeyes,andmilkywhiteCaucasianskin,withnoAsiangeneinthe
foundling'sDNA,isanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,istheheightofabsurdity.TheSolicitorGeneral'spositionamendstheConstitutionand
makes jus soli the governing principle for foundlings, contrary to the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.
PhilippineLawsandJurisprudenceonAdoption
NotDeterminativeofNaturalBornCitizenship

DuringtheOralArguments,theChiefJusticecitedRepublicActNo.8552(RA8552)ortheDomesticAdoptionActof1998andRepublic
ActNo.8043(RA8043)ortheInterCountryAdoptionActof1995inarguingthattherearedomesticlawswhichgovernthecitizenshipof
foundlings.
Thisisanobviousmistake.
Theterm"naturalbornFilipinocitizen"doesnotappearinthesestatutesdescribingqualifiedadoptees.Infact,whiletheterm"Filipino"is
mentioned, it is found only in the title of RA 8552 and RA 8043. The texts of these adoption laws do not contain the term "Filipino."
Specifically,theprovisionsonthequalifiedadopteesread:

RA8552,Section8
Section8.WhoMayBeAdopted.Thefollowingmaybeadopted:
(a)Anypersonbeloweighteen(18)yearsofagewhohasbeenadministrativelyorjudiciallydeclaredavailableforadoption
(b)Thelegitimateson/daughterofonespousebytheotherspouse
(c)Anillegitimateson/daughterbyaqualifiedadoptertoimprovehis/herstatustothatoflegitimacy
(d)Apersonoflegalageif,priortotheadoption,saidpersonhasbeenconsistentlyconsideredandtreatedbytheadopter(s)
ashis/herownchildsinceminority
(e)Achildwhoseadoptionhasbeenpreviouslyrescindedor
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
monthsfromthetimeofdeathofsaidparent(s).
RA8053,Section8
Sec.8.WhoMaybeAdopted.Onlyalegallyfreechildmaybethesubjectofintercountryadoption.xxx.

Clearly, there is no specific provision in these adoption laws requiring that adoptees must be Filipinos, much less naturalborn Filipinos.

TheseadoptionlawsdonotdistinguishbetweenaFilipinochildandanalienchildfoundinthePhilippines,andthustheseadoptionlaws
applytobothFilipinoandalienchildrenfoundinthePhilippines.Inotherwords,eitherFilipinooralienchildrenfoundinthePhilippines,
overwhichthePhilippinegovernmentexercisesjurisdictionastheyarepresumeddomiciledinthePhilippines,maybesubjecttoadoption
underRA8552orRA8043.
However,theImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRA8552,issuedbytheDepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment,providethat
theyshall"applytotheadoptioninthePhilippinesofaFilipinochildbyaFilipinooralienqualifiedtoadoptunderArticleIII,Section7of
RA 8552."[88] The IRR, in effect, restricted the scope of RA 8552 when the IRR expressly limited its applicability to the adoption of a
Filipinochildwhenthelawitself,RA8552,doesnotdistinguishbetweenaFilipinoandanalienchild.Insuchacase,theIRRmustyieldto
thecleartermsofRA8552.Basicistherulethattheletterofthelawiscontrollingandcannotbeamendedbyanadministrativerule.In
Perezv.Phil.TelegraphandTelephoneCo.,[89]theCourtdeclared:

At the outset, we reaffirm the timehonored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative
regulationsimplementingit.Theauthoritytopromulgateimplementingrulesproceedsfromthelawitself.Tobevalid,arule
orregulationmustconformtoandbeconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheenablingstatute.Assuch,itcannotamendthelaw
eitherbyabridgingorexpandingitsscope.(Emphasissupplied)

InHijoPlantation,Inc.v.CentralBankofthePhilippines,[90]theCourtruled:

x x x [I]n case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Rules that subvert the
statutecannotbesanctioned.

InCebuOxygen&AcetyleneCo.,Inc.v.Drilon,[91]theCourtstated:

x x x [I]t is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is
designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
increasesforpurposesofcompliancewithRepublicActNo.6640.Theimplementingrulescannotprovideforsuchaprohibition
notcontemplatedbythelaw.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
withtheprovisionsofthelaw,andshouldbeforthesolepurposeofcarryingintoeffectitsgeneralprovisions.The
law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
(Emphasissupplied)

The following exchange during the Oral Arguments highlights the Chief Justice's glaringly erroneous interpretation of RA 8552 and RA
8043,thus:

JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay,Let'sgotoxxxadoptionlaws.xxx[W]ehaveanadoptionlaw,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
xxxRepublicAct...8552?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Itsayswhocanbeadopted,correct?Whomaybeadopted?Section8,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
DoesitsaytherethattheadopteemustbeacitizenofthePhilippines?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
xxxCanyoureadSection8.

COMMISSIONERLIM:
Istandcorrected,YourHonor,itdoesnotrequirecitizenship.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Thereisnorequirement.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
BecausethelawcoverscitizensofthePhilippinesandchildrennotcitizensofPhilippinesbutfoundhere.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
IfafoundlingcannotbeshowntobeacitizenofthePhilippines,canweexercisejurisdictionandhavethatchildadopted?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Dowehavethepower,theStatehasthepower?Yes,becauseafoundlingisdeemedtobedomiciledwhere?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Intheplaceofhisbirth.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Ifhisplace[of]birthisunknown,whereishepresumedtobedomiciled?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
HeispresumedtobedomiciledintheterritoryoftheStatewherethefoundlingisfound.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Yes,becausethedomicileofafoundlingispresumedtobewhereheisfound.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
That'swhytheStatehasjurisdictionoverhimforadoptionpurposes.AndifnootherStatewillclaimhimwithmorereason,we
willhavejurisdictionoverafoundling,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay. So, the law does not distinguish whether Philippine citizen or nonPhilippine citizen, whether natural bornFilipinos or
naturalized,none.There'snodistinction?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
That'scorrect,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay.Let'sgototheSupremeCourtxxxruleonadoption.Weadoptedthisin2002.Whatdoesitsay?Whomaybeadopted?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Anypersonbelow18yearsofage...
JUSTICECARPIO:
DoesitsaythatonlycitizensofthePhilippines?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
No,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
There'sno...
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:

...nothingtherewhichsaysonlycitizensofthePhilippinescanbeadopted.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Preciselybecausewedon'tknowthecitizenshipofafoundling.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
That'sright,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
That'swhyit'snotrequiredthathewouldbeaFilipino,correct?
COMMISSIOl'JERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay. Let's go to the implementing rule and regulation of R.A. 8552. x x x. It says here, this is an implementing rule and
regulationtoimplementRepublicAct8552.Sothiswaspromulgatedbytheadministrativeagency,byDSWD,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Correct,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay.Itsayshereapplicability,Section2,theRuleshallapplytotheadoptioninthePhilippinesofaFilipinochildbyaFilipino
oralienqualifiedtoadopt.SoitlimitsadoptiontoPhilippinescitizens,toaFilipinochild?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay,Thisissupposedtoimplementthelaw.Cantheimplementingrulesrestrictthelaw?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Watercannotrisehigherthanitssource,YourHonor...
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
TheIRR....
JUSTICECARPIO:
Doyouhaveadecision,jurisprudenceforthat,thatanImplementingRulecannotexpandandcannotdeductfromwhatthelaw
provides?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Icannotciteonenow,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Okay.CebuOxygenv.Drilon,xxx.ItsayshereitisafundamentalrulethatImplementingRulescannotaddordetractfrom
the provisions of law it is designed to implement. x x x. But this implementing rule says only Filipinos can be adopted. That
cannotbedone,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICECARPIO:
Fundamentalrule,iftheCourtsaysfundamentalrule,allpracticinglawyersmustknowthat,correct?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.[92]

Moreover,contrarytotheopinionoftheChiefJusticeduringtheOralArguments,thecasesofEllisv.RepublicofthePhilippines[93]and
Duncanv.CFIRizal[94]donotapplyinthiscasesincetheEllisandDuncancasesdonotinvolvefoundlingsortheircitizenship.Thesetwo
casesareaboutadoption,notaboutcitizenshiporfoundlings.
InEllis,theonlyissuebeforetheCourtwaswhetherpetitioners,notbeingpermanentresidentsinthePhilippines,werequalifiedtoadopt
BabyRose.ThecitizenshipoftheabandonedBabyRosewasnotputinissue.BabyRose'smotherwasknownsinceshedeliveredBaby
RoseattheCaloocanMaternityHospitalbutleftBabyRosefourdayslatertotheHeartofMaryVilla,aninstitutionforunwedmothersand

theirbabies.TheCourtinEllisstated:

BabyRosewasbornonSeptember26,1959,attheCaloocanMaternityHospital.Fourorfivedayslater,themotherofRose
leftherwiththeHeartofMaryVillaaninstitutionforunwedmothersandtheirbabiesstatingthatshe(themother)could
nottakeofRosewithoutbringingdisgraceuponher(themother'sfamily.).[95]

Inshort,BabyRosewasnotafoundlingbecausehermotherwasknown.TheCourtmerelymentionedinthedecisionthatBabyRosewas
a"citizenofthePhilippines,"thus,thelocalcourtshavejurisdictionoverherstatus.Theterm"naturalbornFilipinocitizen"isnotfoundin
thedecision.
Ontheotherhand,thecaseofDuncaninvolvedsolelytheissueofwhetherornotthepersonwhogavetheconsentforadoption,Atty.
CorazondeLeonVelasquez,wastheproperpersonrequiredbylawtogivesuchconsent.TheunwedmotherentrustedthebabytoAtty.
Velasquezwhoknewthemother.TheCourtinDuncanstated:

Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was
turnedoverbyitsmothertowitnessAtty.CorazondeLeonVelasquez.Thenaturalandunweddedmother,fromthatdateonto
thetimeoftheadoptionproceedingsincourtwhichstartedinmidyearofsaid1967,anduptothepresent,hasnotbothered
toinquireintotheconditionofthechild,muchlesstocontributetothelivelihood,maintenanceandcareofthesame.xxx.We
areconvincedthatinfactsaidmotherhadcompletelyandabsolutelyabandonedherchild.[96]

Inshort,thebabywasnotafoundlingbecausethemotherwasknown.Again,theCourtdidnotmentiontheterm"naturalbornFilipino
citizen."NeitherdidtheCourtclassifytheabandonedinfantasaFilipinocitizen.
BurdenofProof

Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his or her Philippine citizenship.[97] Any person who
claims to be qualified to run for the position of President of the Philippines because he or she is, among others, a naturalborn Filipino
citizen,hastheburdenofprovingheorsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.AnydoubtwhetherornotheorsheisnaturalbornFilipino
citizenisresolvedagainsthimorher.Theconstitutionalrequirementofanaturalborncitizen,beinganexpressqualificationforelection
asPresident,mustbecompliedwithstrictly.AstheCourtruledinPaav.Chan:[98]

Itisincumbentupontherespondent,whoclaimsPhilippinecitizenship,toprovetothesatisfactionofthecourtthatheisreally
aFilipino.NopresumptioncanbeindulgedinfavoroftheclaimantofPhilippinecitizenship,andanydoubtregarding
citizenshipmustberesolvedinfavoroftheState.[99](Emphasissupplied)

This statement in Paa was reiterated in the 2009 case of Go,Sr.v.Ramos.[100]Paa and Go lay down three doctrines: First, a person
claimingPhilippinecitizenshiphastheburdenofprovinghisclaim.Second,therecanbenopresumptioninfavorofPhilippinecitizenship.
Thisnegatespetitioner'sclaimtoanypresumptionthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinoCitizen.Third, any doubt on citizenship is resolved
againstthepersonclaimingPhilippinecitizenship.Therefore,apersonclaimingtobeaFilipinocitizen,whethernaturalbornornaturalized,
cannotinvokeanypresumptionofcitizenshipbutmustestablishsuchcitizenshipasamatteroffactandnotbypresumptions,withany
doubtresolvedagainsthimorher.
While it is the burden of the private respondents to first prove the fact of disqualification before the petitioner is called upon to defend
herselfwithcountervailingevidence,[101]inthiscase,thereisnodisputethatpetitionerisafoundlingwithunknownbiologicalparents.
Sincepetitioner'sparentageisunknownasshowninherCertificateofLiveBirth,suchbirthcertificatedoesnotshowonitsfacethatsheis
anaturalbornFilipinocitizen.ThisshiftedtheburdenofevidencetopetitionertoprovethatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizeneligibleto
runasPresidentofthePhilippines.
SincetheConstitutionrequiresthatthePresidentofthePhilippinesshallbeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,itisimperativethat
petitionerprovethatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,despitethefactthatsheisafoundling.Theburdenofevidenceshiftedtoher
whensheadmittedherstatusasafoundlingwithnoknownbiologicalparents.Atthatmoment,itbecameherdutytoprovethatsheisa
naturalbornFilipinocitizen.[102]
DNAEvidence

As the burden of evidence has shifted to petitioner, it is her duty to present evidence to support her claim that she is a naturalborn
Filipino citizen, and thus eligible to run for President. The issue of parentage may be resolved by conventional methods or by using
available modem and scientific means.[103] One of the evidence that she could have presented is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
evidence[104] which could conclusively show that she is biologically (maternally or paternally) related to a Filipino citizen, which in tum
woulddeterminewhethersheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
The probative value of such DNA evidence, however, would still have to be examined by the Court. In assessing the probative value of

DNA evidence, the Court would consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled,thepossibilityofcontaminationofthesamples,theprocedurefollowedinanalyzingthesamples,whethertheproperstandards
andprocedureswerefollowedinconductingthetests,andthequalificationoftheanalystwhoconductedthetests.[105]Morespecifically,
theymustbeevaluatedinaccordancewithA.M.No.06115SCortheRuleonDNAEvidence:[106]

Sec.9.EvaluationofDNATestingResults.InevaluatingtheresultsofDNAtesting,thecourtshallconsiderthefollowing:
(a)TheevaluationoftheweightofmatchingDl'JAevidenceortherelevanceofmismatchingDNAevidence
(b)TheresultsoftheDNAtestinginthelightofthetotalityoftheother
evidencepresentedinthecaseandthat
(c)DNAresultsthatexcludetheputativeparentfrompaternityshallbeconclusiveproofofnonpaternity.Ifthevalueofthe
ProbabilityofPaternity[107]islessthan99.9%theresultsoftheDNAtestingshallbeconsideredascorroborativeevidence.If
thevalueoftheProbabilityofPaternityis99.9%orhigher,thereshallbeadisputablepresumptionofpaternity.

PetitionerisNotaNaturalBornFilipinoCitizen

The1987PhilippineConstitutionisclear:"NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,x
x x, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." Is petitioner, being a foundling, a
naturalbornFilipinocitizen?
Theanswerisclearlyno.First,thereisnoPhilippinelawautomaticallyconferringPhilippinecitizenshiptoafoundlingatbirth.Evenifthere
were,suchalawwouldonlyresultinthefoundlingbeinganaturalizedFilipinocitizen,notanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether naturalborn or naturalized. Citizenship must be
establishedasamatteroffactandanydoubtisresolvedagainstthepersonclaimingPhilippinecitizenship.
Third,theletterandintentofthe1935ConstitutionclearlyexcludedfoundlingsfrombeingconsiderednaturalbornFilipinocitizens.The
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies naturalborn Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are
Filipinocitizens.PetitionerfailedtoprovethateitherherfatherormotherisaFilipinocitizen.
Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international law granting automatically Philippine
citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best, there exists a
presumptionthatafoundlingisdomiciled,andborn,inthecountrywherethefoundlingisfound.
Fifth,evenassumingthatthereisacustomaryinternationallawpresumingthatafoundlingisacitizenofthecountrywherethefoundling
is found, or is born to parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution since
customaryinternationallawhasthestatusmerelyofmunicipalstatutorylaw.Thismeansthatcustomaryinternationallawisinferiortothe
Constitution,andmustyieldtotheConstitutionincaseofconflict.SincetheConstitutionadoptsthejussanguinisprinciple,andidentifies
naturalbornFilipinocitizensasonlythosewhosefathersormothersareFilipinocitizens,thenpetitionermustprovethateitherherfather
or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a naturalborn Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes the jus
sanguinisprincipleintheConstitutionmustofcourseberejected.
Sixth,petitionerfailedtodischargeherburdentoprovethatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Beingafoundling,sheadmittedthatshe
does not know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without credible and
convincingevidencethatpetitioner'sbiologicalfatherormotherisaFilipinocitizen,petitionercannotbeconsideredanaturalbornFilipino
citizen.
Seventh,afoundlinghastoperformanact,thatis,provehisorherstatusasafoundling,toacquirePhilippinecitizenship.Thisbeingso,
afoundlingcanonlybedeemedanaturalizedFilipinocitizenbecausethefoundlinghastoperformanacttoacquirePhilippinecitizenship.
Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary
international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the State's obligations to avoid statelessness and to
facilitatethenaturalizationoffoundlings.
During the Oral Arguments, the purportedly sad and depressing plight of foundlings if found not to be naturalborn Filipino citizens,
particularlytheirdisqualificationfrombeingelectedtohighpublicofficeandappointedtohighgovernmentpositions,hadbeenpointedout
onceagain.AsIhavestated,thisappealsplainlytohumanemotions.[108]Thisemotionalplea,however,convenientlyforgetstheexpress
languageoftheConstitutionreservingthosehighpositions,particularlythePresidency,exclusivelytonaturalbornFilipinocitizens.Even
naturalized Filipino citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for President. The naturalborn
citizenship requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise
amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution. It is basic in Constitutional Law that the qualification requirements prescribed by the
Constitution must be complied with by all presidential candidates, regardless of popularity or circumstances. Being sworn to uphold and
defendtheConstitution,theMembersofthisCourthavenootherchoicebuttoapplytheclearletterandintentoftheConstitution.
However,adecisiondenyingnaturalborncitizenshiptoafoundlingonthegroundofabsenceofproofofbloodrelationtoaFilipinoparent
neverbecomesfinal.[109]Resjudicatadoesnotapplytoquestionsofcitizenship.InMoyYaLimYaov.CommissionerofImmigration,[110]

citedinLeev.CommissionerofImmigration,[111]thisCourtdeclaredthat:

[e]very time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata,henceithastobethreshedoutagainandagainastheoccasionmaydemand.xxx.

Likewise,inGo,Sr.v.Ramos,[112]whichinvolvedthecitizenshipofJimmyT.Go,aswellashisfatherCarlos,whowasallegedtobean
illegalandundesirablealieninourcountryandthuswassubjectedtodeportationproceedings,theCourtstatedthatcitizenshipcasesare
suigenerisandresjudicatadoesnotapplyinsuchcases:

x x x Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it
necessarilyhastobethreshedoutanddecidedupon.InthecaseofFrivaldov.CommissiononElections,wesaidthatdecisions
declaringtheacquisitionordenialofcitizenshipcannotgovernaperson'sfuturestatuswithfinality.Thisisbecauseaperson
maysubsequentlyreacquire,orforthatmatter,losehiscitizenshipunderanyofthemodesrecognizedbylawforthepurpose.
Indeed,iftheissueofone'scitizenship,afterithasbeenpasseduponbythecourts,leavesitstillopentofutureadjudication,
thenthereismorereasonwhythegovernmentshouldnotbeprecludedfromquestioningone'sclaimtoPhilippinecitizenship,
especiallysowhenthesamehasneverbeenthreshedoutbyanytribunal.
xxxx
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, resjudicata does not obtain as a
matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensableinajudicialoradministrativecase,whateverthecorrespondingcourtoradministrativeauthoritydecidestherein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasionmaydemand.Resjudicatamaybeappliedincasesofcitizenshiponlyifthefollowingconcur:
1.aperson'scitizenshipmustberaisedasamaterialissueinacontroversywheresaidpersonisaparty
2.theSolicitorGeneralorhisauthorizedrepresentativetookactivepartintheresolutionthereofand
3.thefindingorcitizenshipisaffirmedbythisCourt.

Consequently,ifinthefuture,petitionercanfindaDNAmatchtoaFilipinoparent,oranyothercredibleandconvincingevidenceshowing
herFilipinoparentage,thenpetitionercanstillbedeclaredanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
NotbeinganaturalbornFilipinocitizen,petitionerisanuisancecandidatewhosecertificateofcandidacyforPresidentcanmotupropriobe
cancelledbytheCOMELEC.Infact,theCOMELECisdutyboundtocancelpetitioner'sCOCbecausetoallowapersonwho,asfoundbythe
COMELEC is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, to run for President makes a mockery of the election process. Since petitioner is not a
naturalborn Filipino citizen, I deem it irrelevant to discuss the issue of whether petitioner complied with the tenyear residency
requirementtorunforPresident.Atanyrate,assumingpetitionerisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,whichsheisnot,IconcurwithJustice
MarianoC.DelCastillo'sDissentingOpinionontheresidencyissue.
Afinalword.TheConstitutiondefinesnaturalborncitizensas"thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingto
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." "From birth" means that the possession of naturalborn
citizenshipstartsatbirthandcontinuestothepresentwithoutinterruption.Thephrase"withouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship" means that a person is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen if he or she has to take an oath of
allegiancebeforeapublicofficialtoacquireorreacquirePhilippinecitizenship.Thisprecludesthereacquisitionofnaturalborncitizenship
that has been lost through renunciation of Philippine citizenship. The fact that the reacquisition of citizenship is made possible only
through legislation by Congress Republic Act No. 9225[113] means that Philippine citizenship is acquired pursuant to paragraph (4),
Section1ofArticleIVofthe1987Constitution,referringto"[t]hosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw."
Inshort,naturalbornFilipinocitizenswhohaverenouncedPhilippinecitizenshipandpledgedallegiancetoaforeigncountryhavebecome
aliens, and can reacquire Philippine citizenship, just like other aliens, only if "naturalized in accordance with law." Otherwise, a
naturalbornFilipinocitizenwhohasabsolutelyrenouncedandabjuredallegiancetothePhilippinesandpledgedsoleallegianceto
theUnitedStates,undertakingtobeararmsagainstanyforeigncountry,includingthePhilippines,whenrequiredbyU.S.law,[114]could
stillbecometheCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesbyperformingasimpleacttakinganoathofallegiancebefore
a Philippine public official to reacquire naturalborn Philippine citizenship. The framers of the Constitution, and the Filipino people who
ratified the Constitution, could not have intended such an anomalous situation. For this reason, this Court should one day revisit the
doctrinelaiddowninBengsonIIIv.HRET.[115]
ACCORDINGLY,therebeingnograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCommissiononElectionsEnBanc, I vote to DISMISSthe
petitions.

[1]Thisprovisionreads:

SECTION2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoread

andwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediately
precedingsuchelection.(Emphasissupplied)
[2]UnderRule65,inrelationtoRule64,oftheRulesofCivilProcedure.
[3] In G.R. Nos. 221698700, petitioner assails the COMELEC Resolutions dated II December 2015 (issued by the COMELEC's First

Division)and23December2015(issuedbytheCOMELECEnBanc).
InG.R.No.221697,petitionerassailstheCOMELECResolutionsdatedIDecember2015(issuedbytheCOMELEC'sSecondDivision)and
23December2015(issuedbytheCOMELECEnBanc).
[4]Thisprovisionpertinentlyreads:

SECTION2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1)Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,andrecall
[5]468Phil.421,624642(2004).
[6]Id.at625626.
[7]Section69oftheOmnibusElectionCodeprovides:

Sec.69.Nuisancecandidates.TheCommissionmaymotupropriooruponaverifiedpetitionofaninterestedparty,refusetogivedue
coursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacyifitisshownthatsaidcertificatehasbeenfiledtoputtheelectionprocessinmockery
ordisreputeortocauseconfusionamongthevotersbythesimilarityofthenamesoftheregisteredcandidatesorbyothercircumstances
oractswhichclearlydemonstratethatthecandidatehasnobonafideintentiontorunfortheofficeforwhichthecertificateofcandidacy
hasbeenfiledandthuspreventafaithfuldeterminationofthetruewilloftheelectorate.(Emphasissupplied)
[8]G.R.No.206004,24February2015.
[9]G.R.No.161872,13April2004,427SCRA96,104,105.
[10]Supranote8.
[11]EduardoAbaya,ACriticalStudyontheEffectofAdoptiononCitizenshipStatusinthePhilippines,PhilippineLawJournal,Vol.XXIII,

No.
l,
February
1948,
p.
444
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201%2004
%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20
%20A%20Critical%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016).
[12]EduardoAbaya,ACriticalStudyontheEffectofAdoptiononCitizenshipStatusinthePhilippines,PhilippineLawJournal,Vol.XXIII,

No.
I,
February
1948,
p.
448,
http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201%2004
%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20
%20A%20Critical%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016).
[13]Someofthecasesapplyingthejussoliprinciple:

Roav.CollectorofCustoms,23Phil.315(1912)
Vaov.CollectorofCustoms,23Phil.480(1912)
USv.Ang,36Phil.858(1917)
USv.LimBin,36Phil.924(1917)
GoJulianv.GovernmentofthePhilippines,45Phil.289(1923)
[14]79Phil.249(1947).
[15]SeeIreneR.CortesandRaphaelPerpetuoM.Lotilla,NationalityandInternationalLawfromthePhilippinePerspective,PhilippineLaw

Journal,
Vol.
60,
No.
1,
Supplemental
Issue,
1985,
p.
18
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Volume%2060%20supplemental%20issue%20
01%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo%20M.%20Lotilla%20%20Nationality%20and%201nternational%20Law.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016).
[16]Section2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutionreads:

SECTION2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireor
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be
deemednaturalborncitizens.

[17]Sectionsland2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutionprovide:SECTION1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajorityand
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
SECTION2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireor
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section l hereof shall be
deemednaturalborncitizens.
[18]276Phil.758(1991).
[19]Id.at784.
[20]Id.at782783.
[21]Petitioner'sPetition,p.112.Underscoringintheoriginalandboldfacingsupplied.
[22] Manifestation dated 4 January 2016, adopting the Solicitor General's Comment in G.R. No. 221538, Rizalito Y. David v. Senate

ElectoralTribunal.Emphasissupplied.
[23]CommentinG.R.No.221538,pp.6,9,10.
[24]ProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,Vol.IV,26November1934,pp.186188.
[25]Petitioner'sMemorandum,pp.103104.
[26]23Phil.315,330331(1912).
[27]ThisistheEnglishtranslationoftheexplanationgivenbyDelegateRoxasduringthedeliberations.JoseM.Aruego,THEFRAMINGoF

THEPHILIPPINECoNSTITUTION,1949,Vol.1,pp.404405.
Theportionsoftherecordsread:
SR.ROXAS.SeorPresidente,IafrasenaturalborncitizenapareceenlaConstituciondelosEstadosUnidosperolosautoresdicenque
esta frase nunca ha sido interpretada autoritativamente por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, en vista de que nunca se habia
suscitadolacuestiondesiunPresidenteelegido,reuniaonoestacondicion.Losautoresestanuniformesenquelaspalabrasnaturalborn
citizen,quieredecirunciudadanopornacimiento,unapersonaqueesciudadanoporrazondesunacimientoynopornaturalizacionopor
cualquieradeclaracionulteriorexigidaporlaleyparasuciudadania.EnFilipinas,porejemplo,bajolasdisposicionesdelosarticulossabre
ciudadaniaquehemosaprobado,seriaciudadanopornacimiento,oseanaturalborntodosaquellosnacidosdeunpadrequeesciudadano
filipino,yaseaunapersonanacidaenFilipinasofueradeelias.
Yconrespetodeunonacidodemadrefilipina,perodepadreextranjero,elarticuloqueaprobamossobreciudadania,requieredequeal
llegar a la mayoria de edad, este hijo necesita escoger la ciudadania por la cual opta, y si opta por la ciudadania filipina al llegar a la
mayoriadeedad,entoncesseraconsideradociudadanofilipino.Bajoestainterpretacionelhijodeunamadrefilipinaconpadreextranjero,
no seria un ciudadano por nacimiento, por aquello de que la ley o la Constitucion requiere que haga una declaracion ulterior a su
nacimiento. Porlo tanto, la frase a natural born citizen, tal como se emplea en el texto ingles, quiere decir un ciudadano filipino por
nacimiento,sintenerencuentadondehanacido.(ProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,Vol.V,18December1934,pp.
307308).
[28]169u.s.649(1898).
[29]Supranote26.
[30]EduardoAbaya,ACriticalStudyontheEffectofAdoptiononCitizenshipStatusinthePhilippines,PhilippineLawJournal,Vol.XXIII,

No.
1,
February
1948,
p.
443
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number
ll/o
201%2004%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20
%20A%20Critical%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20ot%20adoption%20on%20citizenship%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016).
[31]EduardoAbaya,ACriticalStudyontheEffectofAdoptiononCitizenshipStatusinthePhilippines,PhilippineLawJournal,Vol.XXIII,

No.
1,
February
1948,
p.
443
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201%2004
%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20
%20A%20Critical%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016).

[32]http://www.icjcij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2lastaccessedon2March2016.
[33]https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/conventional_international_lawlastaccessedon2March2016.
[34]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,561Phil.386(2007).
[35]DissentingOpinion,BayanMunav.Romulo,656Phil.246,326(2011).
[36]Judgmentof20February1969,at77(http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/5l/556l.pdflastaccessedonIMarch2016).
[37]FormationandEvidenceofCustomaryInternationalLaw,InternationalLawCommission,UFRGSModelUnitedNationsJournal,p.192

(http://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2013/wpcontent/uploads/2013110/FormationandEvidenceofCustomaryIntemationaiLaw.pdf
accessedon1March2016).
[38]

John
H.
Currie,
PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
Second
(https://www.irwinlaw.com/cold/regional_customary_international_lawlastaccessedon1March2016).

Edition,

last

2008

[39]SeeMalcolmN.Shaw,INTERNATIONALLAW,SeventhEdition,2014,pp.6977.
[40]Supranote34,at400,citingLouisHenkin,RichardC.Pugh,OscarSchachter,HansSmith,International Law, Cases and Materials,

2ndEd.,p.96.Emphasisomitted.
[41]http://www.ohchr.org/en/professional/interestlpages/ccpr.aspxlastaccessedon2March2016.
[42]http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/lastaccessedon2March2016.
[43]http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspxlastaccessedon2March2016.
[44]LauravanWaas,NationalityMatters:StatelessnessunderInternationalLaw,pp.6970,Volume29,SchoolofHumanRightsResearch

Series, Intersentia, 2008 (http://www.stichtingros.nl/site/kennis/files/Onderzoek%20statenloosheid%20Laura%20van%20Waas.pdf last

accessedon2March2016).
[45]Section1,Articlervofthe1935Constitutionreadsinpart:Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

xxxx
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
[46]SectionI,ArticleIIIofthe1973Constitutionreadsinpart:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
[47]Section1,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutionreadsinpart:

SectionI.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
xxxx
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
[48] See Jaime S. Bautista, No customary international law automatically confers nationality to foundlings, The Manila Times Online

(http://www.manilatimes.netlnocustomaryintemationallawautomaticallyconfersnationalitytofoundlings/221126 last accessed on 2

March2016).
[49]SeeIreneR.CortesandRaphaelPerpetuoM.Lotilla,NationalityandInternationalLawfromthePhilippinePerspective,PhilippineLaw

Journal,
Vol.
60,
No.
I,
Supplemental
Issue,
1985,
p.
16
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
contentluploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Volume%2060%20supplemental%20issue%20
01%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo%20M.%20Lotilla%20
%20Nationality%20and%20International%20Law.pdflastaccessedon2March2016).
[50]BayanMunav.Romulo,656Phil.246,303(2011).
[51]SeeDeanRalphA.Sanniento,TheRighttoNationalityofFoundlingsinInternationalLaw,

(http://attyralph.com/2015/12/03/foundlingsnationality/lastaccessedon1March2016).

[52]http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml,lastaccessedon7March2016.
[53]MalcolmN.Shaw,INTERNATIONALLAw,SeventhEdition,2014,p.56,citingDeVisscher,TheoryandReality,p.149.SeealsoHersch

Lauterpacht, THE DEVELOPMENT oF INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 368 Pitt Cobbett, LEADING CASES oN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4thEdition,
London,1922,p.5,andMichaelAkehurst,CustomasaSourceofInternationalLaw,BritishYearbookofInternationalLaw,1975,Vol.47,
pp.223.
[54]Id.
[55]Petitioner'sMemorandum,p.174,citingMijaresv.Raada(495Phil.372[2005])andRazonv.Tagitis(621Phil.536[2009]).
[56]LauravanWaas,NationalityMatters:StatelessnessunderInternationalLaw,pp.7071,Volume29,SchoolofHumanRightsResearch

Series, Intersentia, 2008 (http://www.stichtingros.nl/site/kennis/files/Onderzoek%20statenloosheid%20Laura%20van%20Waas.pdf last

accessedon2March2016).
[57] Prof. Serena Forlati, Nationality as a Human Right, pp. 2223, The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law, edited by

AlessandraAnnoniandSerenaForlati,RoutledgeResearchInternationalLaw,2015KindleEditionemphasissupplied.
[58]

http://eudocitizenship.eu/databases/protectionagainststatelessness?
p=dataEUCIT&application=modesProtectionStatelessness&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=S02lastaccessedon2March2016.
Thesecountriesare:
1.Belgium
2.Bulgaria
3.Croatia
4.Finland
5.France
6.Germany
7.Hungary
8.Lithuania
9.Montenegro
10.Netherlands
11.Romania
12.Serbia
13.Sweden
[59]656Phil.246,306(2011).
[60]

https://www.unhcr.it/sites/53a16111Ob80eeaac7000002/assets/53a164ab0b80eeaac70001fe/preventing_and_reducing_statelessness.pdf
lastaccessedon2March2016.
[61]http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/Nationality.aspxlastaccessedon2March2016.
[62]Seehttp://www.ijrcenter.org/thematicresearchguides/nationalitycitizenship/lastaccessedon2March2016.
[63]

http://eudo
citizenship.eu/Internationa1DB/docs/Explanatory%20report%20Convention%20avoidance%20statelessness%20in%20relation%20to%20State%20succes
lastaccessedon1March2016.
[64] See The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law, The Law of Domicile, p. 4

(http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/321217989/6557/repl07.pdflastaccessedon3March2016).SeealsoM.W.Jacobs,ATreatiseon
the
Law
of
Domicil,
1887,
p.
167
(http://famguardian.org/Publications/TreatOnLawOfDomicile/A_Treatise_on_the_Law_of_Domicil_Nation.pdf, citing Savigny, System, etc.
359 (Guthrie's trans. p. 132), citing Linde, Lehrbuch, 89 Felix, Droit Int. Priv. no. 28 Calvo, Manuel, 198 Id. Dict. verb. Dom.
Westlake,Priv.Int.L.1sted.no.35,rule2Id.2ded.236Dicey,Dom.p.69,rule6Foote,Priv.Int.Jur.p.9Wharton,Confl.ofL.
39,citingHeffter,pp.108,109,lastaccessedon3March2016).
[65] John Bassett Moore, A DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. III, 1906, p. 281 (http://www.unz.org/Pub/MooreJohn1906v03:289

lastaccessedon3March2016).
[66]Section3,ArticleIIofthe1935Constitutionprovides:

ThePhilippinesrenounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,andadoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawasa
partofthelawoftheNation.
[67]Section3,ArticleIIofthe1973Constitutionprovides:

ThePhilippinesrenounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,adoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartof

thelawoftheland,andadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.
[68]Section2,ArticleIIofthe1987Constitutionprovides:

ThePhilippinesrenounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,adoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartof
thelawofthelandandadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.
[69] Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra note 34, citing Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,

CONSTITUTIONALSTRUCTUREANDPOWERSoFGOVERNMENT(NOTESANDCASES),PartI(2005).
[70]Id.
[71]Id.
[72]SecretaryofJusticev.Lantion,379Phil.165(2000).
[73]JoaquinBernas,S.J.,THEINTENTorTHE1986CoNSTITUTIONWRITERS,1995,pp.7576.
[74]SeeIreneR.CortesandRaphaelPerpetuoM.Lotilla,NationalityandInternationalLawfromthePhilippinePerspective,PhilippineLaw

Journal,
Vol.
60,
No.
1,
Supplemental
Issue,
1985,
p.
1.
(http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Vol
ume%2060%20supplemental%20issue%2001%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo%20M.%20Lotilla%20
%20Nationality%20and%20Intemational%20Law.pdflastaccessedon2March2016).
[75] See Jaime S. Bautista, No customary international law automatically confers nationality to foundlings, The Manila Times, 28

September 2015 (http://www.manilatimes.net/nocustomaryintemationalIawautomaticallyconfersnationalitytofoundlings/221126/,

lastaccessedon2March2016).SeealsoJoelRuizButuyan,LegalandemotionalentanglementsinPoeissue,6October2015,Philippine
DailyInquirer(http://opinion.inquirer.net/89141/legalandemotionalentanglementsinpoeissue,lastaccessedon2March2016).
[76]AnActtoProvidefortheAcquisitionofPhilippineCitizenshipbyNaturalization,andtoRepealActsNumberedTwentyNineHundred

andTwentySevenandThirtyFourHundredandFortyEight.
[77]AnActProvidingfortheAcquisitionofPhilippineCitizenshipforCertainAliensbyAdministrativeNaturalizationandforOtherPurposes.
[78]SeeFrancisWharton,LL.D.,ADIGESTOFTHEINTERNATIONALLAwoFTHEUNITEDSTATES,Vol.II,1886,p.465,192(Mr.Fish,

SecretaryofState,toMr.Davis,January14,1875,MSS.lnst.,Germ.XVI6).SeealsoPaulWeis,NATIONALITYANDSTATELESSNESSIN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
Second
Edition,
1979,
p.
228
(https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=hSLGDXqXeegC&printsec=frontcover&dq=paul+weis+nationality&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=paul%20weis%20nationality&f=false
lastaccessedon2March2016).
[79]PhilippinePassportNo.F927287.
[80]PhilippinePassportNo.L881511.
[81]PhilippinePassportNo.DO156616.
[82]PhilippinePassportNo.XX4731999.
[83]PhilippinePassportNo.DE0004530.
[84]PhilippinePassportNo.EC0588861.
[85]CivilRegistryLaw,27February1931.
[86]SeeRules2630,IRRofActNo.3753andOtherLawsonCivilRegistration,18December1992.
[87]TSN,16February2016,pp.152157.
[88]Section2oftheImplementingRulesandRegulationspertinentlyreads:

SECTION2.Applicability.TheseRulesshallapplytotheadoptioninthePhilippinesofaFilipinochildbyaFilipinooralienqualifiedtoadopt
underArticleIII,Section7ofRA8552.
xxxx
[89]602Phil.522,537(2009).
[90]247Phil.154,162(1988).Citationsomitted.

[91]257Phil.23,29(1989).
[92]TSN,2February2016,pp.135141.
[93]117Phil.976(1963).
[94]161Phil.397(1976).
[95]Supranote93,at978.
[96]Supranote94,at407.
[97]Carpio,J.,DissentingOpinion,Tecsonv.Comelec,468Phil.421,634(2004).
[98]128Phil.815(1967).
[99]Id.at825.
[100]G.R.No.167569,4September2009,598SCRA266.
[101]Fernandezv.HRET,623Phil.628(2009).
[102]SeeReyesv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.207264,25June2013,699SCRA522.
[103]Tijingv.CourtofAppeals,406Phil.449(2001).
[104] In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 449 (2001), the Court held that to establish parentage, the DNA from the mother, alleged

fatherandchildareanalyzedsincetheDNAofachild,whichhastwocopies,willhaveonecopyfromthemotherandanothercopyfrom
thefather.
[105]SeePeoplev.Vallejo,431Phil.798(2002).
[106]Dated2October2007.
[107]Section3(f)oftheRuleonDNAEvidencedefines"ProbabilityofParentage"asthenumericalestimateforthelikelihoodofparentage

ofaputativeparentcomparedwiththeprobabilityofarandommatchoftwounrelatedindividualsinagivenpopulation.
[108] See Joel Ruiz Butuyan, Legal and emotional entanglements in Poe issue, 6 October 2015, Philippine Daily Inquirer

(http://opinion.inquirer.net/89141/legalandemotionalentanglementsinpoeissuelastaccessedon2March2016).
[109] See Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, .553 Phil. 331, 343344 (2007), where the Court stated in the dispositive portion of the

Decisionthat"respondentGregoryS.OngxxxisherebyENJOINEDfromacceptinganappointmenttothepositionofAssociateJusticeof
the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all
necessarysteps,throughtheappropriateadversarialproceedingsincourt,toshowthatheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizenandcorrectthe
recordsofhisbirthandcitizenship."
[110]148BPhil.773,85.5(1971).
[111]149Phil.661,665(1971).
[112]Supranote100,at288,290291.
[113]CitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003.
[114]TheoathofallegiancetotheUnitedStatesthatnaturalizedAmricanstakestates:

Iherebydeclare,onoath,thatIabsolutelyandentirelyrenounceandabjureallallegianceandfidelitytoanyforeign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizenthatIwill
supportanddefendtheConstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaagainstallenemies,foreignanddomesticthat
IwillbeartruefaithandallegiancetothesamethatIwillbeararmsonbehalfoftheUnitedStateswhenrequiredby
thelaw that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law that
Iwill perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the Jaw and that I take this obligation
freely,withoutanymentalreservationorpurposeofevasionsohelpmeGod.

(https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/naturalizationtest/naturalizationoathallegianceunitedstatesamerica last accessed on 7 March

2016).Emphasissupplied.

[115]409Phil.633(2001).

CONCURRINGOPINION

VELASCO,JR.,J.:
Iconcurwiththeponenciaandwilladdthefollowingonlyforemphasis.
OnResidency

Itisestablishedthattoacquireanewdomicileonemustdemonstratethreethings:(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality
(2)anintentiontoremainthere(animusmanendi)and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile(animusnonrevertendi).
ThereisnoissueastoSen.Poe'sactualbodilypresenceinthePhilippinessinceMay24,2005,whenceshe,perher2015Certificateof
Candidacy, reckons her residency in the country. What has been questioned is theanimus to stay in the Philippins and to abandon the
domicileintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(US)sincethen.Astheponenciaexplained,thefactsrecited,andtheevidencepresentedbySen.
PoesufficientlyportraysherintenttostayinthePhilippinesandtoabandontheUSsinceMay2005,towit:

35.Asaresultoftheuntimelydemiseofherfather,andherdesiretobewithandtocomforthergrievingmother,Petitioner
and her husband, sometime in the first quarter of 2005, decided to return to the Philippines for good. They consulted their
children,wholikewiseexpressedtheirwishtorelocatepermanentlytothePhilippines.Thechildrenalsowantedtosupporttheir
grandmotherandPetitioner.
36.In2004,petitionerhadalreadyresignedfromherworkintheU.S.A.andsheneveragainsoughtemploymentthere.In
early 2005 Brian (Poe's son) and Hanna's (Poe's eldest daughter) schools in Virginia, U.S.A., were likewise notified that they
wouldbetransferringtoPhilippineschoolsforthenextsemester.
37. As early as March 2005, Petitioner and her husband began obtaining quotations and estimates from property movers
regardingthetotalcostofrelocatingtoManilaalloftheirhouseholdgoods,furniture,andcarstheninVirginia,U.S.A.Oneof
these property movers was Victory Van International, a private freight forwarding company, with whom Petitioner and her
husbandhadaseriesofemailcorrespondencefrom2005to2006.Thespousesalsointendedtobringalongtheirpetdogand
theyinquiredwithPhilippineauthoritiesontheproceduretoaccomplishthisinAugust2005.
38.On24May2005,orshortlybeforethestartoftheacademicyearinthePhilippines,Petitionerreturnedtothecountry.Her
three (3) children also arrived in the country in the first half of 2005. Petitioner's husband, on the other hand, stayed in the
U.S.A.tofinishpendingprojects,andtoarrangeforthesaleofthefamilyhomethere.
39.AftertheirarrivalinthePhilippinesfromtheU.S.A.,PetitionerandherchildreninitiallylivedwithPetitioner'smotherinxx
xSanJuanCity.TheexistinglivingarrangementsatthehouseofPetitioner'smotherevenhadtobemodifiedtoaccommodate
Petitionerandherchildren,Petitioner'smotheralsoassignedtoPetitionerherfather'slongtimedriver,becausePetitionerand
her family would henceforth be based in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Petitioner and her children prepared for the start of the
schoolyear,withBrianandHannaattendingPhilippineschoolsstartingJune2005.xxx
40.ShortlyafterarrivinginthePhilippines,Petitionerimmediatelysubmittedherslftothelocaltaxjurisdictionbyregistering
andsecuringaTINfromtheBIR.
xxxx
42. In the meantime, in the second half of 2005, Petitioner and her husband had acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium (and its corresponding parking slot), located at x x x San Juan, Metro Manila, to be used as the family's
temporaryresidence.

42.1On20February2006,theRegisterofDeedsforSanJuanCityissuedtoPetitionerandherhusbandCCTNo.xx
xcoveringUnit7FofOneWilsonPlace,andCCTNo.xxxcoveringtheparkingslotforUnit7F.
42.2On25April2006,Unit7FofOneWilsonPlaceanditscorrespondingparkingslotweredeclared,forrealestate
taxpurposes,inPetitioner'sandherhusband'snames.
42.3PetitionerandherfamilylivedatOneWilsonPlaceuntilthecompletionoftheirfamilyhomeatCorinthianHills,
QuezonCity.xxx

43.On14February2006,PetitionerbrieflytravelledtotheU.S.A.forthepurposeofsupervisingthedisposalofsomeofthe

family's remaining household belongings. Around this time, Petitioner's and her family's furniture and other household goods
werestillintheprocessofbeingpackedforcollection,storageandeventualtransporttothePhilippines.Petitionerdonatedto
the Salvation Army some of the family's personal properties which could no longer be shipped to the Philippines. Petitioner
returnedtothePhilippinesshortlyafter,oron11March2006.
44. In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the United States Postal Service of the family's change, and
abandonment,oftheirformeraddressintheU.S.A.ThefamilyhomeintheU.S.A.waseventuallysoldon27April2006.
45. In April 2006, Petitioner's husband resigned from his work in the U.S.A., and on 4 May 2006, he returned to the
Philippines.BeginningJuly2006,heworkedinthePhilippinesforamajorPhilippinecompany.
46. Meanwhile, in early 2006, Petitioner and her husband acquired a vacant 509square meter lot at x x x Corinthian Hills,
BagongUgongNorte,QuezonCity(the"CorinthianHillsLot")whereherfamilycouldfinallyestablishtheirnewfamilyhome.
46.1On1June2006,theRegisterofDeedsforQuezonCityissuedtoPetitionerandherhusbandTransferCertificateofTitle
("TCT")No.290260coveringtheCorinthianHillsLot.
46.2 Petitioner and her husband eventually built a house on the Corinthian Hills Lot. To this day, this house is their family
home.
47. After Petitioner and her family settled themselves, she turned her attention to regaining her naturalborn Filipino
citizenship. She was advised that she could legally reacquire her naturalborn Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,pursuanttotheprovisionofR.A.No.9225,otherwiseknownasthe"Citizenship
RetentionandReAcquisitionActof2003."
48.OnJuly7,2006,PetitionertookherOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,asrequiredunderSection3of
R.A.No.9225,towit:xxx
49.On10July2006,petitionerfiledwiththeB.I.aswornpetitiontoreacquirehernaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshippursuant
toR.A.No.9225anditsimplementingrulesandregulations.Uponadvice,andsimultaneouswithherownpetition,petitioner
filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that
time.xxx
50.On18July2006,theB.I.issuedanOrdergrantingPetitioner'sapplicationsxxx.
51. On 31 July 2006, the B.L issued Identification Certificates ("I.C.") in Petitioner's name and in the name of her three
childrenxxx.
52.On31August2006,theCOMELECregisteredPetitionerasavoteratBarangaySantaLucia,SanJuanCity.
53.On13October2009,orovertwo(2)yearsbeforeherU.S.A.Passportwassettoexpire(on18December2011),Petitioner
securedfromtheDFAhernewPhilippinePassportwithNo.xxx(whichwasvaliduntil12October2014).
54. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Petitioner as Chairperson of the MTRCB, a post which
requires naturalborn Philippine citizenship. Petitioner did not accept the appointment immediately, because she was advised
thatbeforeassuminganyappointivepublicoffice,Section5(3),R.A.No.9225requiredherto:(a)takeanOathofAllegianceto
theRepublicofthePhilippinesand(b)renounceherU.S.A.citizenship.Shecompliedwiththerequirementsbeforeassuming
herpostsasMTRCBChairpersonon26October2010.
55.On20October2010,PetitionerexecutedbeforeanotarypublicinPasigCityan"AffidavitofRenunciationofAllegianceto
theUnitedStatesofAmericaandRenunciationofAmericanCitizenship"ofevendate.xxx
56.On21October2010,inaccordancewithPresidentialDecreeNo.1986andSection5(3)ofR.A.No.9225,Petitionertook
heroathofofficeasChairpersonoftheMTRCB,beforePresidentBenignoS.AquinoIII.xxx
57. To ensure that even under the laws of the U.S.A., she would no longer be considered its citizen, Petitioner likewise
renounced her U.S.A. citizenship in accordance with the laws of that country. However, Petitioner was not legally required
under Philippine law to make another renunciation, as her earlier renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship on October 20, 2010 was
sufficienttoqualifyherforpublicoffice.
57.1 On 12 July 2011, Petitioner executed before the Vice Consul at the U.S.A. Embassy in Manila, an Oath/Affirmation of
RenunciationofNationalityoftheUnitedStates.
57.2.Onthesameday,Petitioneraccomplishedasworn"Questionnaire"beforetheU.S.ViceConsul,whereinshestatedthat
shehadtakenheroathasMTRCBChairpersonon21October2010,withtheintent,amongothers,ofrelinquishingherU.S.A.
citizenship.
57.3InthesameQuestionnaire,Petitionerstatedthatshehadresided"OutsideoftheUnitedStates,"i.e.,inthe"Philippines,"
from3September1968to29July1991andfrom"052005"to"Present.":Onpage4oftheQuestionnaire,Petitionerstated:

IbecamearesidentofthePhilippineonceagainsince2005.MymotherstillresidesinthePhilippines.Myhusband
andIarebothemployedandownropertiesinthePhilippines.Asadualcitizen(FilipinoAmerican)since2006,I've

voted in two Philippine national elections. My three children study and reside in the Philippines at the time I
performedtheactasdescribedinPartIitem6.

58.On9December2011,theU.S.A.ViceConsulissuedtopetitionera"CertificateofLossofNationalityoftheUnitedStates."
SaidCertificateatteststhatunderU.S.A.laws,PetitionerlostherU.S.A.citizenshipeffective21October2010,whichiswhen
shetookheroathofofficeasMTRCBChairperson.ThisfactislikewisereflectedonthelastpageofPetitoner:sformerU.S.A.
Passport.
59. On 27 September 2012, Petitioner accomplished her COC for Senator, which she filed with the COMELEC on 2 October
2012.Section12oftheCOCwas,agam,anaffirmationoftheOathof
AllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippineswhichPetitionerhadtakenon7July2006(andwhichshehadreaffirmedon2.1
October2010whenshetookheroathofofficeasMTRCBChairperson).xxx
60.Duringthe13May2013NationalElections,petitionerranforandwasoverwhelminglyelectedasSenator.Shegarnered
over 20 million votes, the highest among her fellow Senatorial candidates, and a record in Philippine election history. On 16
May2013,PetitionerwasproclaimedSenatoroftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
61.On19December2013,theDFAissuedtoSen.PoeDiplomaticPassportNo.xxx(validuntilDecember2018),andon18
March2014,theDFAissuedinherfavorPhilippinePassportNo.xxx.LikeherearlierPhilippinepassports,thesetwo(2)most
recentpassportsuniformlystatethatSen.Poeisa"citizenofthePhilippines."
62.On15October2015,Sen.PoefiledwithCOMELECherCOCasPresident("COCforPresident")inthe9May2016national
andlocalelections.InherCOC,shestatedthatsheisa"NATURALBORNFILIPINOCITIZEN"andthather"RESIDENCEINTHE
PHILIPPINESUPTOTHEDAYBEFOREMAY09,2016"wouldbe"10"yearsand"11"months(countedfrom24May2005).

As"intent"isbasicallya"stateofmind"thatexistsonlyinidea[1]itsexistencecanonlybedeterminedbytheovertactsthattranslateit
tofact.Therealizationofsuchintentneednotbemadeinonefellswoopbytheexecutionofasingleformalact.Rather,thefulfillmentof
the intent to change domicile can be made via a series of steps through what the Court adverts in Mitra v. COMELEC[2] and Sabili v.
COMELEC[3]asan"incrementalprocess"ortheexecutionof"incrementaltransfermoves."
ThefactsofthecasesuggestthatSen.Poe'schangeofdomicileandrepatriationfromtheUStothePhilippineswas,toborrowfromMitra,
"accomplished, not in a single key move but, through an incremental process"[4] that started in early 2005. Specifically, Sen Poe took
definitealbeitincrementalmovestoreacquireherdomicileoforiginasshownbytherepatriationofherchildrenandtheirpet,ifImay
add, from the US to the Philippines the enrollment of her children in Philippine schools the sale of their family home in the US the
repatriation of her husband and his employment in the Philippines the transfer of their household goods, furniture, cars and personal
belongingsfromtheUStothePhilippinesthepurchaseofaresidentialcondominiuminthePhilippinesthepurchaseofaresidentiallot
theconstructionofherfamilyhomeinthecountryheroathofallegianceunderRA9225herchildren'sacquisitionofderivativePhilippine
citizenshiptherenunciationofherUScitizenshipherserviceaschairpersonoftheMTRCBandhercandidacyandserviceasasenatorof
the Philippines. All these acts are indicative of the intent to stay and serve in the country permanently, and not simply to make a
"temporary"sojourn.
Indeed,theforeknowledgeofSen.Poe'srepatriationandherdesireforit,i.e.,herintenttogobacktoandreestablishherdomicilethe
Philippines,isreadilydiscerniblefromheractsexecutedevenbeforeherreturntothecountryinMay2005.
TheforegoingindiciaofSen.Poe'sintenttoreestablishherdomicileinthecountrycannotbefrivolouslydismissedasinsufficientonthe
pretext that "this case involves relocation of national domicile from the US to the Philippines by an alien, which requires much stronger
proof,bothastofactandintent."[5]
ThesuggestionthatSen.Poe'sanimusmanendionlyexistedatthetimeshetookheroathofallegianceunderRA9225inJuly2006and
thatheranimusnonrevertendiexistedonlyinOctober2010whensherenouncedherUScitizenissimplyillogical.Thefactthatwhatis
involved is a change of national domicile from one country to another, separated as it were by oceans, and not merely from one
neighboringmunicipalitytoanotherlikeinMitraandSabili,itiswithmorereasonthattheteachingsinMitraandSabiliareapplicable.
It should be of judicial cognizance that even a temporary travel from one country to another is no easy feat. It takes weeks or even
monthstoplanandexecute.Bynomeansisthepermanenttransferofresidenceinonecountrytoanotheraneasierundertaking.Likein
petitioner'scase,itwouldbealongprocessthatwilltakemonths,ifnotyears,toaccomplishfromtheinitialinquirywiththemoversand
the concerned government agencies in both countries, to the actual packing and transportation of one's belongings, the travel of the
children and the pet,. their enrollment in schools, the acquisition of a new family home, and the reintegration to Philippine society. The
intent to reestablish national domicile cannot be plausibly determined by one isolated formal act or event but by a series of acts that
revealtheprecedingdesireandintenttoreturntoone'scountryoforigin.
Sen.Poeisnotanordinary"alien"tryingtoestablishherdomicileina"foreigncountry."ShewasbornandraisedinthePhilippines,who
wentthroughthetediousmotionsof,andsucceededin,reestablishingherhomeinthecountry.Sheis,bynomeans,foreigntothe
Philippines nor its people. She maintained close ties to the country and has frequently visited it even during the time she was still
recognizedasaUScitizen.Herparentslivedinthecountry,herfriendsshegrewupwithstayedhere.Inamannerofspeaking,herpast,
herrootswereinthePhilippinessothatitshouldnotberenderedmoreburdensomeforhertoestablishherfutureinthecountry.
Afterall,theresidencerequirementwasincontextintendedtopreventastrangerfromholdingofficeontheassumptionthatshewouldbe

insufficientlyacquaintedwiththeconditionsandneedsofherprospectiveconstituents.[6]Havinghelpedherfatherduringhispresidential
campaignandhavingservedasasenatorandbeforethatanMTRCBchairperson,itcannotbecontestedthatshehasmorethanenough
knowledge of the country, its people, and the many issues and problems that beset them. The mischief that the residency requirement
wasdesignedtopreventisclearlynotpresentinthiscase.
TheCourt'spronouncementsinCoquillav.CommissiononElections,[7]Caballerov.CommissiononElections[8]andJapzonv.Commission
and Elections and Jaime S. Ty[9] did not establish an absolute rule that a Filipino who became naturalized under the laws of a foreign
countrycanonlyreestablishhisorherdomicileinthePhilippinesfromthemomentheorsheswearsallegiancetothecountryunderRA
9225.Instead,theCourtconsideredtheacquisitionofdualcitizenshipunderRA9225ortheapplicationforaresidencypermitasoneof
manypossible,nottheonly,evidenceofanimusmanendi.TheCourtdidnotstatethatanyevidenceofresidencebeforetheacquisitionof
aresidencevisaorthereacquisitionofcitizenshipmustbeignored.
Unfortunately, in these three cases, the concerned candidates had presented negligible or no evidence of reestablishment of domicile in
thePhilippinesbeforetheirrepatriation.AsSen.Poepointedout,theonlypiecesofevidenceinCoquillashowingthathemighthadhad
theintenttoresideinthePhilippineswere:(a)hisCommunityTaxCertificateand(b)hisverbaldeclarationsthatheintendedtorunfor
office.InJapzon,therewasabsolutelynoevidenceofthecandidate'sresidencebeforehereacquiredhiscitizenshipandalltheevidence
pertainedtoeventsafterhisrepatriation.Finally,inCaballero,thecandidatefailedtoshowthathisresidencehadbeenformorethana
yearpriortotheMay2013elections.Onthecontrary,headmittedthathehadonly9months"actualstay"inUyugan,Batanes.
Thus,theCourthadnochoicebuttoreckontheresidencyoftheconcernedcandidatesinCoquilla,Jopzon,andCaballeroeitherfromthe
timetheyreacquiredtheircitizenshiporthetimetheyprocuredaresidentvisabecausetherewassimplyinsufficientproofofferedbythe
candidatesbeforesuchevent.ThesamecannotbesaidofSen.Poeintheinstantcase.
Aspreviouslydiscussed,Sen.PoepresentedoverwhelmingevidenceofherpermanentrelocationtothePhilippines,heractualresidence,
andintenttostayinthePhilippinessinceMay2005,i.e.,evenbeforeshetookheroathofallegianceunderRA9225inJuly2006.Hence,
Jalosjosv.CommissiononElections[10]isthebetterprecedent.InJalosjos,theCourtreckonedthecandidate'sdomicileinthePhilippines
even before he reacquired his citizenship under RA 9225, without mentioning the need for a residence visa, because he was able to
satisfactorilyprovethathehadlivedwithhisbrotherpriortotakinghisoathofallegiance.TheCourtheld,thus:

ButitisclearfromthefactsthatQuezonCitywasJalosjos'domicileoforigin,theplaceofhisbirth.Itmaybetakenforgranted
that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
Australiancitizenship,andlivedinthatcountryfor26years.Australiabecamehisdomicilebyoperationoflawandbychoice.
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay,itisevidentthatJalosjosdidsowithintenttochangehisdomicileforgood.HeleftAustralia,gaveuphis
Australiancitizenship,andrenouncedhisallegiancetothatcountry.Inaddition,hereacquiredhisoldcitizenshipbytakingan
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
CitizenshipbytheBureauofImmigration.Byhisacts,JalosjosforfeitedhislegalrighttoliveinAustralia,clearlyprovingthat
hegaveuphisdomicilethere.AndhehassincelivednowhereelseexceptinIpil,ZamboangaSibugay.
ToholdthatJa!osjoshasnotestablishanewdomicileinZamboangaSibugaydespitethelossofhisdomicileoforigin(Quezon
City)andhisdomicileofchoiceandbyoperationoflaw(Australia)wouldviolatethesettledmaximthatamanmusthavea
domicileorresidencesomewhere.[11]

Yet,ithasalsobeenadvancedthatSen.PoehasnotpositivelyshownanintenttoabandontheUS,oranimusnonrevertendi,priortoher
formal renunciation of her American citizenship in October 2010. To this is added that she even acquired a house in the US in 2008 as
proofofherallegedintentnottoabandonthatcountry.ProponentsofthisargumentciteReyesv.CommissiononElections.[12]However,
Reyeswasonastarklydifferent
factual milieu. Unlike Sen. Poe, the petitioner therein had not reacquired her Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 or renounced her
Americancitizenship.[13]Infact,theonlyproofsheofferedofherresidencywasherserviceasaprovincialofficerforseven(7)months.
TheallegedfactthatSen.PoeacquiredahouseintheUSin2008,cannotbetakenasanargumentagainstheranimusnonrevertendivis
avis the evidence of her manifest intent to stay, and actual stay, in the Philippines. Certainly, the element of intent to abandon an old
domiciledoesnotrequireacompleteandabsoluteseveranceofallphysicallinkstothatcountry,oranyothercountryforthatmatter.Itis
simplytooarchaictostate,atatimewhereairtravelisthenorm,thatownershipofasecondaryabodeforatemporaryvisitorholiday
negatesanintenttoabandonaforeigncountryasalegaldomicile.
OnCitizenship

ThereisnoquestionthatSen.PoehasnoknownbiologicalparentsandwasfoundonSeptember3,1968inJaro,Iloilowhenshewasbut
anewborn.ShewasthenadoptedbyspousesRonaldAllanKellyandJesusaSonoraPoeinMay1974.Thenaggingquestionis:IsSen.Poe
anaturalbornFilipinocitizen?
ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitutionmerelyprovides:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

1.ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
2.ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedto
publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
3.ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
4.ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
5.Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Theterm"naturalborn"Filipinodoesnotevenappearintheabovequotedprovision.ThisCourt,however,hasconstruedthetermtorefer
tothosefallingunderitemsonetofourofthesection,asopposedtothosewhounderwentnaturalizationunderitemnumber5.ButSen.
Poe was not born before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the first item is inapplicable. That being said, her status as a
foundlingdoesnotforeclosethelikelihoodthateitherorbothofherbiologicalparentswereFilipinosrenderingheranaturalbornFilipino
underitems3and/or4ofSection1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution.
Indeed, while it is not denied that Sen. Poe was abandoned by her biological parents, her abandonment on the date and specific place
aboveindicateddoesnotobliteratethefactthatshehadbiologicalparentsandtheprivaterespondentshadnotshownanyproofthatthey
werenotFilipinocitizens.
Section1,Rule131oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthattheburdenofproofisthedutyofapartytoprovethetruthofhisclaimordefense,
oranyfactinissuebytheamountofevidencerequiredbylaw.Theprivaterespondentshadnotpresentedevenaniotaofprooftoshow
thatSen.PoewasnotborntoFilipinoparents.Thus,itwasgraveabuseofdiscretionfortheCOMELECtoconcludethatSen.Poewasnot
anaturalbornFilipinoandhaddeliberatelymisrepresentedsuchfact.
To shift the burden of proof to foundlings like, Sen. Poe, to prove the citizenship of their parents who had abandoned them is as
preposterous as rubbing salt on an open bleeding wound it adds insult to injury. The State cannot allow such unconscionable
interpretation of our laws. Instead, the judiciary, as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parenspatriae, must ensure that the
abandonedchildren,thefoundlings,thosewhowereforcedintoanunfavorablepositionaredulyprotected.
As pointed out by petitioner, the same view was shared by the framers of the 1935 Constitution. A delegate to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, Sr. Nicolas Rafols, proposed to explicitly include "children of unknown parentage" in the enumeration of jus sanguinis
PhilippineCitizensinSection1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution.Thesuggestion,however,wasnotacceptedbutnotonthegroundthat
these children are not Philippine citizens. Rather, that the cases of foundlings are "few and far in between," as pointed out by delegate
ManuelRoxas,andthatcitingasimilarSpanishLaw,theyarealreadypresumedtohavebeenborntoFilipinos.[14]
Analternativeconstructionofthe1935,nottosaythepresentConstitution,presentsdireconsequences.Insuchascenario,abandoned
children with no known parents will be considered stateless. This violates the rights of a child to immediate registration and nationality
after birth, as recognized in the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of a Child. Thus, I cannot subscribe to the proposal that
foundlings,likeSen.Poe,arenotnaturalbornFilipinocitizens.

[1]Black'sLawDictionary,9thEd.,fortheiPhone/iPad/iPodtouch.Version2.1.2(B13195),p.883citingJohnSalmond,Jurisprudence378

(GlanvilleL.Williamsed.,10thed.1947).
[2]G.R.No.191938,July2,2010andOctober19,2010.
[3]G.R.No.193261,April24,2012.
[4]Mitra,supra.
[5]JusticeDelCastillo'sOpinion.
[6]Gallegov.Vera,73Phil.453,459(1941)citedinFernandezv.HRET,G.R.No.187478,December21,2009.
[7]G.R.No.151914,July31,2002.385SCRA607.
[8]G.R.No.209835,September22,2015.
[9]G.R.No.180088,January19,2009,596SCRA354.
[10]G.R.No.191970,April24,2012.
[11]Emphasissupplied.
[12]G.R.No.207264,June25,2013,699SCRA522.
[13]Regina0.ReyesadmittedinhersubmissionsunderoathbeforetheCOMELECinSPA13053thatRA9225doesnotapplytoheras

she claims to be a dual citizen of the United States of America and the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a US citizen. Belatedly,
ReyesattemptedtoshowthatsheavailedofRA9225,inavolteface,beforetheCourtinG.R.No.207264,entitledReyesv.COMELEC,by
presentingaquestionableIdentificationCertificateallegedlyissuedbytheBureauofImmigration.

[14]PertheinterpellationofDelegateRupertoMontinola.

SEPARATEDISSENTINGOPINION

LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:
I begin this Dissenting Opinion by outrightly e){pressing my view that the opinion of Honorable Justice Jose P. Perez on the issue of
naturalborncitizenshipwhichwasjoinedbysix(6)otherJusticesincludingtheHonorableChiefJusticeMa.LourdesP.A.Sereno,ifnot
overturned,willwreakhavoconourconstitutional'systemofgovernment.
By their opinion, the seven (7) Justices would amend the 1935 Constitution which was in effect when petitioner was born, to add
"foundlingsfoundinthePhilippineswhoseparentsareunknown"intheenumerationofnaturalborncitizen,asfollows:

ARTICLEIV
CITIZENSHIP
(1935Constitution)
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines [and foundlings found in the Philippines whose parents are
unknown].
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesanduponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewiththelaw.(Emphasessupplied.)

ThisamendmentoftheConstitutionbythejudicialopinionputforthbytheseven(7)Justicesisbasedmainlyonextralegalgroundsanda
misreadingofexistinglaws,whichwillhaveunimaginablegraveandfarreachingdireconsequencesinourconstitutionalandlegalsystem
andnationalinterestwhichthisDissentingOpinionwillexplainbelow.
Fortheabovereasonandotherreasons,IdissenttothePonenciaofMr.JusticeJoseP.Perezthatthefourconsolidatedpetitionsseeking
the annulment and setting aside of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) December 1, 2015 and December 23, 2015 Resolutions in
SPANos.15001(DC)and,theDecember11,2015andDecember23,2015Resolutionsin15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)
shouldbegranted.
It is my humble submission that petitioner Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares (Poe for brevity) failed to show that the
COMELECEnbancgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninaffirmingitsSecondDivision'sDecember1,2015anditsFirstDivision'sDecember11,
2015 Resolutions, both denying due course to and/or cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of President of the
RepublicofthePhilippines,particularlywithrespecttothefindingthatshemadethereinmaterialrepresentationsthatwerefalserelating
tohernaturalborncitizenshipandtenyearperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesthatwarrantthecancellationofherCOC.
Ingist,thebasesformydissentinthedispositionofthecases,whichwillbediscussedinseriatim,areasfollowscontrarytothefindings
inthePonencia:
OntheProcedural/TechnicalIssues

I.ThereviewpowerofthisCourtrelativetothepresentpetitionsfiledunderRule64visavisRule65bothoftheRules
ofCourt,asamended,islimitedtothejurisdictionalissueofwhetherornottheCOMELECactedwithoutorinexcessof
itsjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction
II.Petitioner Poe failed to satisfactorily show that the COMELEC was so grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and
evaluationofthepiecesofevidencesubmittedbythepartiesastotransgressthelimitsofitsjurisdiction
III.Allthefourpetitionsfiled,inclusiveoftheTatadPetition,subjectoftheassailedresolutionsoftheCOMELEC,adduced
ultimatefactsestablishingthecauseofactionforapetitionbasedonSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC)
IV.TheCOMELECcorrectlyconsideredtheallegationscontainedintheTatadPetitionasonefiledunderSection78ofthe
OEC

V.The COMELEC did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal when it took cognizance of
thepetitionstodenyduecoursetoorcanceltheCOCofpetitionerPoethedistinctionbetweenjurisdictionsofthetwo
tribunals has already been settled in Tecson v. COMELEC, the jurisdiction of the PET can only be invoked after the
electionandproclamationofaPresidentorVicePresidentandthequestionofqualificationsofcandidatesforPresident
orVicePresidentproperlybelongstotheCOMELEC
VI.Section8,Rule23oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureisavalidexerciseoftherulemakingpowersoftheCOMELEC,
which is not inconsistent and can be harmonized with its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules of procedure to
expeditethedispositionsofelectioncases
VII.The COMELEC has the power to determine petitioner Poe's citizenship notwithstanding the decision of the Senate
ElectoralTribunalwhichisstillpendingappealandwhichdealswithdifferentissuesand

OntheSubstantive/FocalIssues

I.Sections1and2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutionclearlyandcategoricallydefinewhoarenaturalborncitizens:they
arecitizensfrombirthwithbloodrelationshiptoaFilipinofatherormother,followingthe"jussanguinis"principle
II.SalientRulesofInterpretationand/orConstructionoftheConstitutiondictatethattheclearandunambiguousletterof
theConstitutionmustbeobeyed
III.Statutes,TreatiesandInternationalCovenantsorInstrumentsmustconformtotheprovisionsoftheConstitution
IV.PursuanttotheConstitution,naturalborncitizenshipisanindispensablerequirementforeligibilitytoconstitutionally
identifiedelectivepositionslikethePresidency
V.RepublicActNo.9225,otherwiseknownasthe"CitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003,"makesnatural
borncitizenshipanindispensablerequirementfortheretentionand/orreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipinother
words, the right to avail of dual citizenship is only available to naturalborn citizens who have earlier lost their
Philippinecitizenshipbyreasonofacquisitionofforeigncitizenship
VI.PetitionerPoeobtaineddualcitizenshipunderRepublicActNo.9225bymisrepresentingtCJtheBureauofImmigration
that she is the biological child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the Bureau was misled into believing
that"[petitionerPoe]wasaformercitizenoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbeingborntoFilipinoparents,"whichisa
falsefactualavermentnotanerroneouslegalconclusionand(it)thesaidorderwasnotsignedbytheCommissioner
oftheBIasrequiredbyDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)Regulation
VII.As a consequence of petitioner Poe's abovestated misrepresentations, the July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of
ImmigrationgrantingpetitionerPoe'sapplicationfordualcitizenshiporthereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipwas
clearlyinvalidandhertakingofanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicdidnotresultinherreacquisitionofPhilippine
citizenshipand
VIII.Nothavingvalidlyreacquirednaturalborncitizenship,sheisnoteligibletorunforthePresidencypursuanttoSection
2,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionandevenassumingarguendothatshehasreacquirednaturalborncitizenship
underRepublicActNo.9225,petitionerPoehasfailedtoestablishherchangeofdomicilefromtheUnitedStates,her
domicileofchoicetothePhilippinesthroughclearandunmistakableevidence.

TheProceduralIssues

Petitioner Poe seeks the annulment of the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and December 23, 2015
ResolutionoftheCOMELECEnbanc,inSPANos.15001(DC)andtheDecember11,2015ResolutionoftheCOMELECFirstDivisionand
December 23,2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En banc, in SPA Nos. 15002 (DC), 15007 (DC) and 15139 (DC) via the instant
consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[1] This mode of review is based on the
limitedgroundofwhethertheCOMELECactedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorexcessofjurisdiction.TheCourtheldinJaloverv.Osmea[2]that:

"Grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalenttolackofjurisdiction"theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough it
mustbegrave.Wehaveheld,too,thattheuseofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissueissufficienttotainta
decisionwmaker'sactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Closelyrelatedwiththelimitedfocusofthepresentpetitionisthecondition,underSection5,Rule64oftheRulesofCourt,
thatfindingsoffactoftheCOMELEC,supportedbysubstantialevidence,shallbefinalandnonreviewable.Substantialevidence
is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. In light of our limited authority to

reviewfindingsoffact,wedonotordinarilyreviewinacertioraricasetheCOMELEC'sappreciationandevaluationofevidence.
AnymisstepbytheCOMELECinthisregardgenerallyinvolvesanerrorofjudgment,notofjurisdiction.
Inexceptionalcases,however,whentheCOMELEC'sactionontheappreciationandevaluationofevidenceoverstepsthelimits
of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgmenttooneofjurisdiction.(Citationsomitted.)

TheCOMELEC'sappreciationandevaluationoftheevidenceadducedbypetitionerPoeissaidtobetaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
PetitionerPoefailedtohurdlethebarsetbythisCourtinMitrav.CommissiononElections[3] and Sabili v. Commission on Elections,[4]
whichistoprovethattheCOMELECwassogrosslyunreasonableinitsappreciationandevaluationofevidenceastoamounttoanerrorof
jurisdiction.Petitioner
Poe's insistence that the COMELEC utterly disregarded her "overwhelming and unrefuted evidence" is baseless. As stated in Mitra,
substantialevidenceisnotasimplequestionofnumber.Theemphasismustbeonwhatthepiecesofevidenceareabletosubstantiate
andwhattheycannot.IfindthattheCOMELEC'sassessmentoftheevidenceislogicalandwellfounded.Theconclusionsitreachedare
adequatelysupportedbyevidenceandarewellinaccordwiththeapplicablelawsandsettledjurisprudenceonthematter.
The petitions filed by respondents Elamparo, Contreras, and Valdez sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts constituting the cause(s) of
action for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, that petitioner Poe falsely represented in her COC that she is a naturalborn Filipino
citizenandthatshecompliedwiththetenyearresidencyrequirement.Also,theyaverredthatsuchfalserepresentationsweremadewith
intenttodeceivetheelectorate.
With respect to the petition of private respondent Tatad, the COMELEC properly relied on the allegation of said petition instead of its
captionasapetitionfordisqualificationunderRule25oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure.Clearly,privaterespondentTatadsquarelyput
inissuethetruthfulnessofthedeclarationsofpetitionerPoeinherCOC.Specifically,heallegedthatpetitionerPoelackednaturalborn
citizenshipandfailedtomeetthetenyearresidencyrequirement,whicharegroundsforthecancellationofherCOCunderSection78.
AstothejurisdictionoftheCOMELECvisavisthatofthePresidentialElectoralTribunal's(PET),Istronglydisagreeintheconclusionthat
the COMELEC, in ruling on the four Section 78petitions, usurped the jurisdiction of the PET. Petitioner Poe espouses that due to the
absenceofafalsematerialmisrepresentationinherCOC,theCOMELECshouldhavedismissedthepetitionsoutrightforbeingpremature
astheyareinthenatureofpetitionsforquowarranto,whichiswithinthesoleandexclusivejurisdictionofthePET.Thisisplainerror.The
jurisdiction of the PET over election contests attaches only after the President or the VicePresident concerned had been elected and
proclaimed.Tecsonv.CommissiononElections[5]clearlylaidoutthat:

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an
electionprotestoraquowarrantowhich,althoughtwodistinctremedies,wouldhaveoneobjectiveinview,i.e.,todislodgethe
winningcandidatefromoffice.xxx.
xxxx
The rules [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice President," of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates"forPresidentorVicePresident.Aquowarrantoproceedingisgenerallydefinedasbeinganactionagainsta
personwhousurps,intrudesinto,orunlawfullyholdsorexercisesapublicoffice.Insuchcontext,theelectioncontestcanonly
contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or
thirdhighestnumberofvotescouldfileanelectionprotest.Thisruleagainpresupposesapostelectionscenario.
ItisfairtoconcludethatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,definedbySection4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice
presidencybeforetheelectionsareheld.(Emphasessupplied,citationomitted.)

Section4,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionsustainsthisabovequotedruling.ThegrantofjurisdictiontothePETfollowstheprovisions
onthepreparationsofthereturnsandcertificatesofcanvassforeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentandtheproclamationof
thepersonwhoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotes.

SECTION4.ThePresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermofsixyearswhichshall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six
years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has
servedassuchformorethanfouryearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime.
No VicePresident shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionfor
PresidentandVicePresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.

ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovinceorcity,
shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,the
PresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayoftheelection,openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof
theSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticity
anddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvassthevotes.
Thepersonhavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequaland
highestnumberofvotes,oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofalltheMembersofbothHousesof
theCongress,votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting enbanc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis,
supplied.)

InhisseparateopinioninTecson,retiredChiefJusticeReynatoS.PunowasuncompromisingaboutthejurisdictionofthePET,towit:

The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed.[6]
(Emphasissupplied.)

Andlikewiseinaseparateopinioninthesamecase,retiredJusticeAliciaAustriaMartinezemphasizedthat

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by
the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the
President and VicePresident, Senators, and, Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that
these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 ofthe Rules ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for
President or VicePresident, election protest or quowarranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.[7] (Emphasis
supplied,citationsomitted.)

Section 2(2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which expressly vests upon the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction and appellate
jurisdictionoverelection"contests"involvinglocalofficialsisconsistentwiththisdoctrine.Election"contests"hasadefinitemeaningunder
theConstitution,whichinvolvethequalificationofproclaimedwinningcandidatesinanelection.
Ontheotherhand,Section2,ArticleIX(C)ofthe1987ConstitutionprovidingthattheCOMELECshallhavethepowerto:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum,andrecall.(Emphasissupplied.)

issufficientbasistoentrusttotheCOMELECallissuesrelativetothequalificationsofall"candidates"toruninNationalorLocalElections.
ImplementingtheaforementionedprovisionisBatasPambansaBilang881,orthe"OmnibusElectionCodeofthePhilippines"(OEC),which
providesforthecancellationofacandidate'sCertificateofCandidacyongroundsstatedinSection78thereof.Acontraryconstructionof
theConstitutionwillresultinemasculatingtheConstitutionalmandateoftheCOMELECtoensurefair,honestandcredibleelections.The
overbroad interpretation of the power of the PET under the Constitution will prohibit the COMELEC from even disqualifying nuisance
candidatesforPresident.
Hence,itisbeyondcavilthatitistheCOMELEC,notthePET,whichhasjurisdictionoverthepetitionsforthecancellationoftheCOCof
petitionerPoewhoisstillacandidateatthistime.
With the foregoing, I cannot but register my strong dissent to the opinion in the Ponencia that "[t]he exclusivity of the ground (that
petitionerPoemadeinthecertificateafalsematerialrepresentation)shouldhedgeinthediscretionoftheCOMELECandrestrainitfrom
goingintotheissuesofthequalificationsofthecandidatefortheposition,if,asinthiscase,suchissueisyetundecidedorundetermined
by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification of lack thereof of the
candidate."ThisopinioniscontrarytotherulingpennedbyJusticePerezhimselfinReyesv.COMELEC.[8]
AccordingtothePonencia,theCOMELECcannot,inaSection78petition,lookintothequalificationofthecandidate(forRepresentative,
Senator,VicePresidentandPresident)simplybecauseperitsperusalofthe1987Constitution,thelatterfailedtocategoricallystatethat
the COMELEC was granted the power to look into the qualifications of candidates for President, VicePresident, Senator and
Representatives. It is insisted that the specific provisions of the same giving the PET, SET and HRET jurisdiction over the "election,

returns,andqualifications"ofthePresident,VicePresident,SenatorandRepresentativesaresurefireevidencethattheCOMELECdoesnot
have the authority to look into the qualification of said candidates prior to a determination in a prior proceeding by an authority with
properjurisdictiontolookintothesame.Simplyput,thePonenciawouldhavethefactofaPresidential,VicePresidential,Senatorialor
Congressional candidate's qualification established in a prior proceeding that may be by statute, executive order, or judgment by a
competentcourtortribunal,beforeher/hisCOCcanbecancelledordeniedduecourseongroundsoffalsematerialrepresentationsasto
her/hisqualifications.
ThePonencia's analysis is utterly incorrect. As shown above, such analysis disregards existing jurisprudence stating that these electoral
tribunalsexercisejurisdictionoverelectioncontestsonlyafteracandidatehasalreadybeenproclaimedwinnerinanelection.
If the Ponencia's analysis is allowed to become the leading jurisprudence on the matter, the Court is as good as amending the OEC by
deletingtheSection78thereoftherecannolongerbeapetitionfordenialofduecoursetoorcancellationofCOCbecausetheCOMELEC
hasnowbeendisallowedtolookintothewhetherornotacandidatehasmadeafalseclaimastoher/hismaterialqualificationsforthe
electiveofficethatshe/heaspiresfor.ThataSection78petitionwouldnaturallylookintothecandidate'squalificationisexpectedofthe
natureofsuchpetition.AselucidatedinFerminv.COMELEC,[9]towit:

Afterstudyingthesaidpetitionindetail,theCourtfindsthatthesameisinthenatureofapetitiontodenyduecoursetoor
cancelaCoCunderSection78oftheOEC.Thepetitioncontainstheessentialallegationsofa"Section78"petition,namely:(1)
thecandidatemadearepresentationinhiscertificate(2)therepresentationpertainstoamaterialmatterwhichwouldaffect
thesubstantiverightsofthecandidate(therighttorunfortheelectionforwhichhefiledhiscertificate)and(3)thecandidate
madethefalserepresentationwiththeintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastohisqualificationforpublicofficeordeliberately
attemptedtomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderhimineligible.Itlikewiseappropriatelyraises
a question on a candidate's eliaibilitv for public office, in this case, his possession of the oneyear residency
requirementunderthelaw.
Lestitbemisunderstood,thedenialofduecoursetoorthecancellationoftheCoCisnotbasedonthelackofqualificationsbut
onafindingthatthecandidatemadeamaterialrepresentationthatisfalse,whichmayrelatetothequalificationsrequiredof
thepublicofficehe/sheisrunningfor.Itisnotedthatthecandidatestatesinhis/herCoCthathe/sheiseligibleforthe
officehe/sheseeks.Section78oftheOEC,therefore,istobereadinrelationtotheconstitutionalandstatutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
withthedistinctionmainly.inthefactthata"Section78"petitionisfiledbeforeproclamation,whileapetitionfor
quowarrantoisfiledafterproclamationofthewinningcandidate.
Atthispoint,wemuststressthata"Section78"petitionoughtnottobeinterchangedorconfusedwitha"Section68"petition.
They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent's insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07372 is in the nature of a
disqualificationcaseunderSection68,asitisinfactcaptioneda"PetitionforDisqualification,"doesnotpersuadetheCourt.

ButthePonenciamisconstruestheaboveclearimportofFermin.Itusesthelattercaseasitsauthoritytopushitserroneousviewthatthe
COMELEChasnojurisdictionorpowertolookintotheeligibilityofcandidatesintheabsenceofaspecificlawtothateffect.
Further, with all due respect to the Ponente, I submit that his position that it is only the PET/SETIHRET that has jurisdiction over the
qualifications of candidates for President, VicePresident, Senator, or Representative runs counter to this Court's pronouncement in its
ResolutioninG.R.No.20724,Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan[10],of which he was also the Ponente,
that

Contrarytopetitioner'sclaim,however,theCOMELECretainsjurisdictionforthefollowingreasons:
First,theHRETdoesnotacquirejurisdictionovertheissueofpetitioner'squalifications,aswellasovertheassailedCOMELEC
Resolutions,unlessapetitionisdulyfiledwithsaidtribunaLPetitionerhasnotaverredthatshehasfiledsuchaction.
Second,thejurisdictionoftheHRETbeginsonlyafterthecandidateisconsideredaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,as
statedinSection17,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
solejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectiveMembersxxx.

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives,towit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner'squalificationsaftertheMay8,1995elections,sufficeittosaythatHRET'sjurisdictionasthesolejudge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a

candidatehasbecomeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Petitionernotbeingamemberofthe
HouseofRepresentatives,itisobviousthattheHRETatthispointhasnojurisdictionoverthequestion.
(Emphasissupplied.)

And,interestingly,itwasheldthat

AstotheissueofwhetherpetitionerfailedtoproveherFilipinocitizenship,aswellasheroneyearresidencyin
Marinduque,sufficeittosaythattheCOMELECcommittednograveabuseofdiscretioninfindingherineligiblefor
thepositionofMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.

Withtheindulgenceofmycolleagues,toemphasizetheincongruityofthepositiontakenbythemajorityinthiscaseledbythePonente,
allowmetoquoteverbatimtherelevantfactsandfindingsoftheCourtinReyesaswrittenbythePonenteofthiscase,towit:

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted
records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan."Atthispoint,theburdenofproofshiftedtopetitioner,imposinguponherthedutytoprovethatsheisanatural
bornFilipinocitizenandhasnotlostthesame,orthatshehasreacquiredsuchstatusinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofR.A.
No.9225.Asidefromthebareallegationthatsheisanaturalborncitizen,however,petitionersubmittednoprooftosupport
suchcontention.NeitherdidshesubmitanyproofastotheinapplicabilityofR.A.No.9225toher.
xxxx
Thesecircumstances,takentogether,showthatadoubtwasclearlycastonpetitioner'scitizenship.Petitioner,however,failed
toclearsuchdoubt.
xxxx
Allinall,consideringthatthepetitionfordenialandcancellationoftheCOCissummaryinnature,theCOMELECis
given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of
determiningofwhetherornottheCOCshouldbecancelledxxx.
Here,thisCourtfindsthatpetitionerfailedtoadequatelyandsubstantiallyshowthatgraveabuseofdiscretionexists.

Withtheabove,IamatalosshowtheCourt,throughthemajority,couldrulethewayitdidinthiscasewhennotsolongagoittookthe
oppositepositionanddismissedthepetitionofReyes.
Section8,Rule23oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,asamended,whichreads:

SEC.8.EffectifPetitionUnresolved.IfaPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCancelaCertificateofCandidacyisunresolvedby
finaljudgmentonthedayofelections,thepetitionermayfileamotionwiththeDivisionorCommissionEnBanc,asmaybe
applicable,tosuspendtheproclamationofthecandidateconcerned,providedthattheevidenceforthegroundsfordenialtoor
cancel certificate of candidacy is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the
CommissionshallpreparealistofpendingcasesandfurnishallCommissionerscopiesofthesaidlist.
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed
withinthereglementaryperiod,orincasesofrulingsoftheCommissionEnBanc,norestrainingorderisissuedbytheSupreme
Courtwithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofthedecisionorresolution.(Emphasissupplied.)

doesnotviolateSection7,ArticleIXAofthe1987Constitution,whichstatesthat

SEC.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixty
daysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolution
uponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.
UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughtto
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Section8,Rule23oftheCOMELECRulesisavalidexerciseoftherule makingpowersoftheCOMELECnotwithstandingSection7,Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution. The condition "[u]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law" that is mentioned in the latter
provisiongivestheCOMELECtheflexibilitytofixashorterperiodforthefinalityofitsdecisionanditsimmediateexecutioninconsonance
with the necessity to speedily dispose of election cases, but without prejudice to the continuation of the review proceedings before this
Court. Certainly, this is not inconsistent with Commission's constitutional mandate to promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite

thedispositionsofelectioncases,viz.:

ARTICLEIX
CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION
C.THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS
SEC.3.TheCommissiononElectionsmaysitenbancorintwodivisions,andshallpromulgateitsrulesofprocedureinorderto
expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decidedindivision,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

TheSubstantiveIssues

TheissueiswhetherornottheCOMELECEnbancactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionwhenit
cancelledtheCOCforPresidencyofPetitionerPoeonthesubstantivegroundsoflackofcitizenshipandresidencyqualifications.
Iholdthatitdidnot.
GroundforPetitionfor
CancellationofCOCunder
Section78oftheOEC
Section78oftheOECprovidesthat

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny .due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
notlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenotice
andhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasissupplied.)

Inrelationthereto,Section74alsooftheOECrequires:

SECTION74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncing
hiscandidacyfortheofficestatedthereinandthatheiseligibleforsaidofficeifforMemberoftheBatasangPambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post office address for all election purposes his
profession or occupation that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesthat
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretrue
tothebestofhisknowledge.
Unlessacandidatehasofficiallychangedhisnamethroughacourtapprovedproceeding,acertificateshalluseinacertificate
of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name
registeredintheofficeofthelocalcivilregistraroranyothernameallowedundertheprovisionsofexistinglawor,inthecase
ofaMuslim,hisHadjinameafterperformingtheprescribedreligiouspilgrimage:Provided,Thatwhentherearetwoormore
candidatesforanofficewiththesamenameandsurname,eachcandidate,uponbeingmadeawareofsuchfact,shallstatehis
paternalandmaternalsurname,excepttheincumbentwhomaycontinuetousethenameandsurnamestatedinhiscertificate
of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly
knowninthelocality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size a statement in duplicate
containinghisbiodataandprogramofgovernmentnotexceedingonehundredwords,ifhesodesires.

Inher2016COCforPresident,muchlikeinher2013COCfor
Senator,petitionerPoemadethefollowingverifiedrepresentations,viz.:

7.PERIODOFRESIDENCEINTHEPHILIPPINESUPTOTHEDAYBEFOREMAY09,2016:
10No.ofYears11No.ofMonths
8.IAMANATURALBORNFILIPINOCITIZEN.

xxxx
9.IAMELIGIBLEFORTHEOFFICEISEEKTOBEELECTEDTO.[11]

MaterialityoftheRepresentation

Withrespecttotheissueofmaterialityoftherepresentation,asabovediscussed,Mitrahassettledthat"criticalmaterialfactsarethose
that refer to a candidate's qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence" thus, the materiality of the
representationsoncitizenship,residenceand/oreligibilityisnolongerinissue.
FalsityoftheRepresentation

Butthetruthfulnessofthematerialrepresentationremainsanissuetoberesolved.
CitizenshipRequirement

Inthepresentcase,IsubmitthatpetitionerPoe'srepresentationthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,hence,eligibletorunforand
holdthepositionofPresident,isfalse.Mypositionisanchoredonthefollowingreasons:
UndertheConstitution,natural
bornFilipinocitizenshipisbased
onbloodrelationshiptoaFilipino
fatherormotherfollowingthe
"jussanguinis"principle
PetitionerPoebeingafoundling,doesnotcomewithinthepurviewofthisconstitutionallyordainedprinciple.
DuringtheeffectivityoftheSpanishCivilCodeinthePhilippinesonDecember8,1889,thedoctrinesofjussoli and jussanguinis were
adoptedastheprinciplesofattributionofnationalityatbirth.[12]
Upon approval of the TydingsMcDuffie Act (Public Act No. 127), a Constitutional Convention was organized in 1934. The Constitution
proposedforadoptionbythesaidConventionwasratifiedbythePhilippineelectoratein1935afteritsapprovalbythePresidentofthe
UnitedStates.[13]
It was in the 1935 Constitution that the Philippines adopted the doctrine of jus sanguinis, literally translated to right by blood, or the
acquisitionofcitizenshipbybirthtoparentswhoarecitizensofthePhilippines.Thedoctrineofjussanguinisconsidersbloodrelationship
toone'sparentsasasounderguaranteeofloyaltytothecountrythanthedoctrineofjussoli,ortheattainmentofacitizenshipbythe
placeofone'sbirth.[14]ThecaseofTecsonv.CommissiononElectionstracedthehistory,significance,andevolutionofthedoctrineofjus
sanguinisinourjurisdictionasfollows:

Whiletherewas,atonebrieftime,divergentviewsonwhetherornotjussoliwasamodeofacquiringcitizenship,the1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationshipasbeingthebasisofFilipinocitizenship

"Section1,ArticleIII,1935Constitution.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution
(2)ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeen
electedtopublicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)Thosewhosefathers[ormothers]arecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw."

Subsection(4),ArticleIII,ofthe1935Constitution,takentogetherwithexistingcivillawprovisionsatthetime,whichprovided
that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatorysituationsthateffectivelyincapacitatedthewomenfromtransmittingtheirFilipinocitizenshiptotheirlegitimate
childrenandrequiredillegitimatechildrenofFilipinomotherstostillelectFilipinocitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority.
Seekingtocorrectthisanomaly,aswellasfullycognizantofthenewlyfoundstatusofFilipinowomenasequalstomen,the

framersofthe1973ConstitutioncraftedtheprovisionsofthenewConstitutiononcitizenshiptoreflectsuchconcerns

"Section1,ArticleIII,1973ConstitutionThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirtyfive.
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedmaccordancewithlaw."

Forgoodmeasure,Section2ofthesamearticlealsofurtherprovidedthat

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omissionsheisdeemed,underthelawtohaverenouncedhercitizenship."

The1987ConstitutiongenerallyadoptedtheprovlSlonsofthe1973Constitution,exceptforsubsection(3)thereofthataimed
tocorrecttheirregularsituationgeneratedbythequestionableprovisointhe1935Constitution.

"Section1,ArticleIV,1987Constitutionnowprovides:
ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageof
majorityand
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedmaccordancewithlaw."

TheCaseOfFPJ
Section2,ArticleVII,ofthe1987Constitutionexpresses:

NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,ableto
readandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleastten
yearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.

The term "naturalborn citizens," is defined to include 'those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
performanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.'
Thedate,monthandyearofbirthofFPJappearedtobe20August1939duringtheregimeofthe1935Constitution.Through
itshistory,fourmodesofacquiringcitizenshipnaturalization,jussoli,resjudicataandjussanguinishadbeeninvogue.Only
two,i.e.,jussoliandjussanguinis,couldqualifyapersontobeinga"naturalborn"citizenofthePhilippines.Jussoli,perRoa
vs.CollectorofCustoms(1912),didnotlastlong.Withtheadoptionofthe1935ConstitutionandthereversalofRoain Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenshipbybirth.[15](Emphasissupplied.)

The changes in the provisions on citizenship was done to harmonize the Article on Citizenship with the State policy of ensuring the
fundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomenandmenunderSection14,ArticleIIofthe1987Constitution.
Thus, contrary to the insistence of petitioner Poe that there is nothing in our Constitutions that enjoin our adherence to the principle of
"jussanguinis"or"byrightofblood,"saidprincipleis,inreality,well entrenchedinourconstitutionalsystem.Oneneedsonlytoreadthe
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and the jurisprudence detailing the history of the well deliberated adoption of the jus sanguinis
principleasthebasisfornaturalbornFilipinocitizenship,tounderstandthatitssignificancecannotbelightlyignored,misconstrued,and
trivialized.

NaturalbornCitizenshipbyLegal
FictionorPresumptionofLawis
ContrarytotheConstitutionunder
SalientRulesofInterpretationof
theConstitution
In this case, petitioner Poe's original birth certificate stated that she was a foundling, or a child of unknown father or mother, found in
Jaro,Iloilo,onSeptember3,1968.TheConstitutionineffectthenwasthe1935Constitution.Toreiterate,itenumeratedthe"citizensof
thePhilippines"inSection1,ArticleIV,whichincludedthefollowing:

(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

Petitioner Poe would want this Court to look beyond the abovequoted enumeration and apply the disputable or rebuttable presumption
broughtaboutbytheprinciplesofinternationallawand/orcustomaryinternationallaw.However,theabovequotedparagraphs(3)and
(4)ofArticleIVareclear,unequivocalandleavenoroomforanyexception.
RuleofVerbaLegis
Basicinstatutoryconstructionistheprinciplethatwhenwordsandphrasesofastatuteareclearandunequivocal,theirmeaningmustbe
determinedfromthelanguageemployedandthestatutemustbetakentomeanexactlywhatitsays.Thisplainmeaningorverba legis
rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba legis non est recedendum," dictates that "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."[16]
Undeniably,petitionerPoedoesnotcomewithinthescopeofFilipinocitizenscoveredbyparagraphs(3)and(4).Fromaliteralmeaningof
thesaidprovisions,shecannotbeconsideredanaturalborncitizen.Paragraphs3and4,Section1,ArticleIVofthe1935Constitution,
the organic law in effect during the birth of petitioner Poe, were clear and unambiguous, it did not provide for any exception to the
applicationoftheprincipleof"jussanguinis"orbloodrelationshipbetweenparentsandchild,suchthatnaturalborncitizenshipcannotbe
presumedbylawnorevenbelegislatedbyCongresswherenobloodtiesexist.
FunctionofExtrinsicAidSuchas
theDeliberationsofthe1934
ConstitutionalConvention
Petitioner Poe claims that "foundlings" were intended by the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional Commission to be considered natural
born citizens. Specifically, she maintains that during the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols proposed an amendment to include
foundlings as among those who are to be considered naturalborn citizens that the only reason that there was no specific reference to
foundlings in the 1935 Philippine Constitution was because a delegate mentioned that foundlings were too few to warrant inclusion in a
provisionoftheConstitutionandtheircitizenshipisdealtwithbyinternationallaw.
Theaboveinferenceorconclusiondrawnfromthedebatesadvertedtoisnotaccurate.
Firstly,thedeliberationsdidnotevincethecollectiveintentofthemembersofthe1934ConstitutionalConventiontoinclude"foundlings"
inthelistofFilipinocitizensintheArticleonCitizenship.Moreover,therewasnomentionatallofgrantingthemnaturalborncitizenship.
Areviewofthetranscriptofthedeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionactuallyprovedprejudicialtopetitionerPoe'scause.
The suggestion of Delegate Rafols to include in the list of Filipino citizens children of unknown parentage was voted down by the
delegateswhentheamendmentand/orsuggestionwasputtoavote.Inotherwords,themajoritythereofvotednottoapproveDelegate
Rafol'samendment.
Secondly. Petitioner Poe's use of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention to expand or amend the provision of the
Constitutionisunwarranted.
The Constitution is the basis of government. It is established by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own
happiness,andpermanentlytosecuretheirrights,property,independence,andcommonwelfare.Whenthepeopleassociate,andenter
intoacompact,forthepurposeofestablishinggovernment,thatcompact,whatevermaybeitsprovisions,orinwhateverlanguageitmay
be written, is the Constitution of the state, revocable only by people, or in the manner they prescribe. It is by this instrument that
governmentisinstituted,itsdepartmentscreated,andthepowerstobeexercisedbyitconferred.[17]
Thus,intheconstructionoftheConstitution,theCourtisguidedbytheprinciplethatit(constitution)isthefundamentalandparamount
lawofthenation,anditissupreme,imperious,absolute,andunalterableexceptbytheauthorityfromwhichitemanates.[18]
InCivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary,[19]thisCourtenunciatedthat

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arriveatthereasonandpurposeoftheresultingConstitution,resorttheretomaybehadonlywhenotherguidesfailas
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the

constitutionalconvention"areofvalueasshowingtheviewsoftheindividualmembers,andasindicatingthereasonsfortheir
votes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,muchlessofthemassofour
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construetheconstitutionfromwhatappearsuponitsface."Theproperinterpretationthereforedependsmoreonhowitwas
understoodbythepeopleadoptingitthanintheframer'sunderstandingthereof.(Emphasessupplied,citationsomitted.)

AndaseloquentlyobservedbyCharlesP.Curtis,Jr.
TheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitution,evenassumingwecoulddiscoverwhatitwas,whenitisnotadequatelyexpressedin
theConstitution,thatistosay,whattheymeantwhentheydidnotsayit,surelythathasnobindingforceuponus.Ifwelookbehind
or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory.Theymaysitinatourcouncils.Thereisnoreasonwhyweshouldeavesdropontheirs.[20]
Synthesizedfromtheaforequoted,itisapparentthatdebatesandproceedingsofconstitutionalconventionslackbindingforce.Hence

Ifatall,theyonlyhavepersuasivevalueastheymaythrowausefullightuponthepurposesoughttobeaccomplishedorupon
themeaningattachedtothewordsemployed,ortheymaynot.Andthecourtsareatlibertytoavailthemselvesofanylight
derivablefromsuchsources,butarenotboundtoadoptitasthesolegroundoftheirdecision.[21]

Moreover, while the opinions of the members of the constitutional convention on the article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine
Constitutionmayhaveapersuasivevalue,itis,torepeat,notexpressiveofthepeople'sintent.Torecap:

TheproceedingsoftheConventionarelessconclusiveontheproperconstructionofthefundamentallawthanarelegislative
proceedingsoftheproperconstructionofastatute,forinthelattercaseitistheintentofthelegislaturethecourtsseek,while
in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives. The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention
whichframedit,butfromthepeoplewhoratifiedit,theintenttobearrivedatisthatofthepeople.[22]

In the present case, given that the language of the third and fourth paragraphs of the article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine
Constitutionclearlyfollowonlythedoctrineofjussanguinis,itis,therefore,neithernecessarynorpermissibletoresorttoextrinsicaids,
liketherecordsoftheconstitutionalconvention.Afoundling,whoseparentageand/orplaceofbirthisobviouslyunknown,doesnotcome
withintheletterorscopeofthesaidparagraphsoftheConstitution.ConsideringthesilenceoftheConstitutiononfoundlings,thepeople
who approved the Constitution in the plebiscite had absolutely no idea about the debate on the citizenship of foundlings and therefore,
theycouldnotbeboundbyit.
RulethatSpecificProvisionsof
LawPrevailsOverGeneral
Provisions
The specific provision of Article IV of the Constitution prevails over the general provisions of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.
GeneralinternationallawprinciplescannotoverturnspecificallyordainedprinciplesintheConstitution.
Section2,ArticleIIofthe1987Constitutionprovides:

SECTION2.ThePhilippinesrenounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,adoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesof
internationallawaspartofthelawofthelandandadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,
andamitywithallnations.(Emphasissupplied.)

Generally accepted principles of international law "may refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of law x x x, or to logical
propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies."[23] And it has been
observedthat,certainly,itisthisjudicialreasoningthathasbeentheanchorofPhilippinejurisprudenceonthedeterminationofgenerally
acceptedprinciplesofinternationallawandconsequentapplicationoftheincorporationclause.[24]
Petitioner Poe would like to apply to her situation several international law conventions that supposedly point to her entitlement to a
naturalbornFilipinocitizenship,notwithstandingherlackofbiologicaltiestoaFilipinofatherormother.Ineffect,shewantstocarvean
exception to the "jus sanguinis" principle through that generally accepted principles of international law which, under the theory of
incorporation,isconsideredbytheConstitutionaspartofthelawoftheland.[25]
Basicistheprincipleinstatutoryconstructionthatspecificprovisionsmustprevailovergeneralones,towit:

Aspecialandspecificprovisionprevailsoverageneralprovisionirrespectiveoftheirrelativepositionsinthestatute.Generalia
specialibusnonderogant.Wherethereisinthesamestatuteaparticularenactmentandalsoageneralonewhichinitsmost

comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
generalenactmentmustbetakentoaffectonlysuchcaseswithinitsgenerallanguageasarenotwithintheprovisionsofthe
particularenactment.

Hence,thegeneralprovisionofSection2,ArticleIIoftheConstitutionon"DeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies"cannotsupersede,
amendorsupplementtheclearprovisionsofArticleIVon"Citizenship."
InternationalLawInstruments/
Conventionsarenotselfexecuting
Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
NationalityLawsandthe1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness,inclaimingnaturalbornFilipinocitizenshipprimarilyforthe
followingreasons:firstly,thePhilippineshasnotratifiedsaidInternationalConventionssecondly,theyespouseapresumptionbyfiction
oflawwhichisdisputableandnotbasedonthephysicalfactofbiologicaltiestoaFilipinoparentthirdly,saidconventionsarenotself
executing as the Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine by enacting a domestic or national law the conditions and
manner by which citizenship is to be granted and fourthly, the citizenship, if acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin to a
citizenshipfallingunderSection1(4),ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution,recognizingcitizenshipbynaturalizationinaccordancewithlaw
orbyaspecialactofCongress.
Thecitedinternationalconventionsareasfollows:

(a)1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws
(b)1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness(c)1989UNConventionontheRightsoftheChild
(d)1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsand
(e)1947UNDeclarationonHumanRights

Noticemustbemadeofthefactthatthetreaties,conventions,covenants,ordeclarationsinvokedbypetitionerPoearenotselfexecuting,
i.e.,theinternationalinstrumentsinvokedmustcomplywiththe"transformationmethod"whereby"aninternationallaw[mustfirst]be
transformedintoadomesticlawthroughaconstitutionalmechanismsuchaslocallegislation."[26]
Each of the aforementioned recognizes the need for its respective provisions to be transformed or embodied through an enactment of
Congressbeforeitformspartofthedomesticormunicipallaw,viz.:
(a)The1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLaws,whichprovides:

Article14.

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established,itsnationalityshallbedeterminedbytherulesapplicableincaseswheretheparentageisknown.
Afoundlingis,untilthecontraryisproved,presumedtohavebeenbornontheterritoryoftheStateinwhichitwas
found.
Article15.

WherethenationalityofaStateisnotacquiredautomaticallybyreasonofbirthonitsterritory,achildbornontheterritoryof
thatStateofparentshavingnonationality,orofunknownnationality,mayobtainthenationalityofthesaidState.Thelawof
thatStateshalldeterminetheconditionsgoverningtheacquisitionofitsnationalityinsuchcases.

(b)The1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness,provides:

Article1

1.AContractingStateshallgrantitsnationalitytoapersonborninitsterritorywhowouldotherwisebestateless.
Suchnationalityshallbegranted:
(a)Atbirth,byoperationoflaw,or
(b) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the
mannerprescribedbythenationallaw.Subjecttotheprovisionsofparagraph2ofthisarticle,nosuchapplicationmaybe

rejected.
AContractingStatewhichprovidesforthegrantofitsnationalityinaccordancewithsubparagraph(b)ofthisparagraphmay
alsoprovideforthegrantofitsnationalitybyoperationoflawatsuchageandsubjecttosuchconditionsasmay
beprescribedbythenationallaw.
xxxx
Article2

AfoundlingfoundintheterritoryofaContractingStateshall,intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,beconsideredto
havebeenbornwithinthatterritoryofparentspossessingthenationalityofthatState.

Conspicuously,thePhilippineshasneitheraccedednorratifiedanyoftheaboveconventions.
The other international instruments to which the Philippines has acceded, require initially conversion to domestic law via the
transformationmethodofimplementinginternationalinstruments.Theyare:
(a)The1989UNConventionontheRightsoftheChild,ratifiedbythePhilippinesonAugust21,1990,providingthat:

Article7

1.Thechildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhavetherightfrombirthtoaname,therighttoacquirea
nationalityandasfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligationsundertherelevantinternationalinstrumentsinthisfield,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.

(b)The1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,whichthePhilippinesratifiedonOctober23,1986providingthat:

Article24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
propertyorbirth,therighttosuchmeasuresofprotectionasarerequiredbyhisstatusasaminor,onthepartofhisfamily,
societyandtheState.
2.Everychildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhaveaname.
3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.

(c)The1947UniversalDeclarationonHumanRights.

Article15

(1)Everyonehastherighttoanationality.
(2)Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.

The foregoing international conventions or instruments, reqmrmg implementing national laws to comply with their terms, adhere to the
conceptofstatehoodandsovereigntyoftheState,whichareinviolableprinciplesobservedinthecommunityofindependentStates.The
primaryobjectiveofsaidconventionsorinstrumentsistoavoidstatelessnesswithoutimpairingStatesovereignty.Hence,theContracting
State has the discretion to determine the conditions and manner by which the nationality or citizenship of a stateless person, like a
foundling, may be acquired. Neither do they impose a particular type of citizenship or nationality. The child of unknown parentage may
acquire the status of a mere "national." Nowhere in the identified international rules or principles is there an obligation to accord the
statelesschildacitizenshipthatisofa"naturalborn"character.Moreover,evenifitsoprovided,itcannotbeenforcedinourjurisdiction
becauseitwouldgoagainsttheprovisionsoftheConstitution.
StatutesandTreatiesor
InternationalAgreementsor
Conventionsareaccordedthe

SameStatusinRelationto
theConstitution
IncaseofconflictbetweentheConstitutionandastatute,theformeralwaysprevailsbecausetheConstitutionisthebasiclawtowhichall
other laws, whether domestic or international, must conform to. The duty of the Court under Section 4(2), Article VIII is to uphold the
Constitution and to declare void all laws, and by express provisions of said Section treaties or international agreements that do not
conformtoit.[27]Inacatenaofcases,theSupremeourtfurtherinstructedthat:

InSocialJusticeSocietyv.DangerousDrugsBoard,theCourtheldthat,"Itisbasicthatifalaworanadministrativerule
violatesanynormoftheConstitution,thatissuanceisnullandvoidandhasnoeffect.TheConstitutionisthebasic
lawtowhichalllawsmustconformnoactshallbevalidifitconflictswiththeConstitution."InSabiav.Gordon,the
Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the 'basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform." In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered.Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be
strickendownforbeingunconstitutional."InManilaPrinceHotelv.GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem,theCourtheld
that:

Underthedoctrineofconstitutionalsupremacy,ifalaworcontractviolatesanynormoftheconstitutionthat
laworcontractwhetherpromulgatedbythelegislativeorbytheexecutivebranchorenteredintobyprivate
personsforprivatepurposesisnullandvoidandwithoutanyforceandeffect.Thus,sincetheConstitution
isthefundamental,paramountandsupremelawofthenation,itisdeemedwrittenineverystatuteand
contract.[28](Emphasessuppliedcitationsomitted.)

Citizenshipby"Naturalization"
underInternationalLaw
CitizenshipisnotautomaticallyconferredundertheinternationalconventionscitedbutwillentailanaffirmativeactionoftheState,bya
nationallaworlegislativeenactment,sothatthenatureofcitizenship,ifeveracquiredpursuantthereto,iscitizenshipbynaturalization.
There must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired by a foundling. By no means will this citizenship can be considered that of a
naturalborn under the principle of jus sanguinis, which is based on the physical existence of blood ties to a Filipino father or Filipino
mother.Itwillbeakintocitizenshipbynaturalizationifconferredbyfictioncreatedbyaninternationalconvention,whichisoflegalstatus
equaltoastatuteorlawenactedbyCongress.
Probabilities/PossibilitiesBasedon
Statistics
TheSolicitorGeneralarguesforPetitionerPoecitingtheratioofchildrenborninthePhilippinesofFilipinoparentstochildrenborninthe
Philippinesofforeignparentsduringspecificperiods.Heclaimsthatbasedonstatistics,thestatisticalprobabilitythatanychildbornin
thePhilippineswouldbeanaturalbornFilipinoiseither99.93%or99.83%,respectively,duringtheperiodbetween2010to2014and
1965to1975.Thisargument,tosaytheleast,isfallacious.
Firstly, we are determining blood ties between a child and her/his parents. Statistics have never been used to prove paternity or
filiation.Withmorereason,itshouldnotbeusedtodeterminenaturalborncitizenship,asaqualificationtoholdpublicoffice,whichisof
paramount importance to national interest. The issue here is the biological ties between a specific or named foundling and her parents,
whichmustbesupportedbycredibleandcompetentevidence.Wearenotdealingwiththeentirepopulationofourcountrythatwilljustify
ageneralizedapproachthatfailstotakeintoaccountthatthecircumstancesunderwhichafoundlingisfoundmayvaryineachcase.
Secondly,theplaceofbirthofthefoundlingisunknownbuttheargumentisbasedonthewrongpremisethatafoundlingwasborninthe
place where he/she was found. The age of the foundling may indicate if its place of birth is the place where he or she is found. If the
foundlingisanewlybornbaby,theassumptionmayhavesolidbasis.Butthismaynotalwaysbethecase.Itdoesnotappearfromthe
documents on record that petitioner Poe was a newborn baby when she was found. There is no evidence as to her place of birth. The
Solicitor General cannot, therefore, use his statistics of the number of children born to Filipino parents and to alien parents in the
Philippinessincetheplacesofbirthoffoundlingsareunknown.
Naturalborncitizenship,asaqualificationforpublicoffice,mustbeanestablishedfactinviewofthejussanguinisprincipleenshrinedin
theConstitution,whichshouldnotbesubjectedtouncertaintynorbebasedinstatisticalprobabilities.Adisputablepresumptioncanbe
overcomeanytimebyevidencetothecontraryduringthetenureofanelectiveofficial.Resorttothisinterpretationhasagreatpotentialto
prejudicetheelectoratewhomayvoteacandidateindangerofbeingdisqualifiedinthefutureandtocauseinstabilityinpublicservice.
AFoundlingdoesnotMeetthe
DefinitionofaNaturalborn
FilipinoCitizenunderSection2,
ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution
OtherthanthosewhosefathersormothersareFilipinos,Section2,ArticleIVoftheConstitutionfurtherdefines"naturalborncitizens"to
cover "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their
Philippinecitizenship."
A foundling is one who must first go through a legal process to obtain an official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her to be a

foundlinginordertobegrantedcertainrightsreservedtoFilipinocitizens.Thiswillsomehowpreventopeningthefloodgatestothedanger
foreseen by Justice del Castillo that nonFilipinos may misuse a favorable ruling on foundlings to the detriment of national interest and
security. Stated otherwise, the fact of being a foundling must first be officially established before a foundling can claim the rights of a
Filipino citizen. This being the case, a foundling does not meet the abovequoted definition of a naturalborn citizen who is such "from
birth".
Toillustrate,RepublicActNos.8552and9523,provide,respectively:
Section5ofRepublicActNo.8552:

SECTION5.LocationofUnknownParent(s).ItshallbethedutyoftheDepartmentorthechildplacingorchildcaringagency
whichhascustodyofthechildtoexertalleffortstolocatehis/herunknownbiologicalparent(s).Ifsucheffortsfail,thechild
shallberegisteredasafoundlingandsubsequentlybethesubjectoflegalproceedingswherehe/sheshallbedeclared
abandoned.

Section2ofRepublicActNo.9523:

SECTION2.DefinitionofTerms.AsusedinthisAct,thefollowingtermsshallmean:
xxxx
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted
him/herforaperiodofatleastthree(3)continuousmonths,whichincludesafoundling.
xxxx
SECTION4.ProcedurefortheFilingofthePetition.ThepetitionshallbefiledintheregionalofficeoftheDSWDwherethe
childwasfoundorabandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form and substance and shall
authorizethepostingofthenoticeofthepetitioninconspicuousplacesforfive(5)consecutivedaysinthelocalitywherethe
childwasfound.
TheRegionalDirectorshallactonthesameandshallrenderarecommendationnotlaterthanfive(5)workingdaysafterthe
completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary
withinfortyeight(48)hoursfromthedateoftherecommendation.
SECTION 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. Upon finding merit in the petition, the Secretary shall issue a
certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the
recommendation.
Said certification, by itself, shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local civil registrar of a
foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the foundling certificate to the
NationalStatisticsOffice(NSO).
SECTION8.ThecertificationthatachildislegallyavailableforadoptionshallbeissuedbytheDSWDinlieuofajudicialorder,
thus,makingtheentireprocessadministrativeinnature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in domestic
adoptionproceeding,asprovidedinRepublicActNo.8552andinanintercountryadoptionproceeding,asprovidedinRepublic
ActNo.8043.

Theabovelaws,thoughpertainingtoadoptionofaFilipinochild,clearlydemonstratethatafoundlingfirstundergoesalegalprocesstobe
consideredasonebeforehe/sheisaccordedrightstobeadoptedavailableonlytoFilipinocitizens.Whenthefoundlingisaminor,itisthe
Stateundertheconceptof"parenspatriae" which acts for or on behalf of the minor, but when the latter reaches majority age, she/he
must,byherself/himself,takethenecessarysteptobeofficiallyrecognizedasafoundling.Priortothis,theerrorofoutrightlyinvoking
the"disputablepresumption"ofalleged"naturalborncitizenship"isevidentastherecanbenopresumptionofcitizenshipbeforethereis
an official determination of the fact that a child or person is a foundling. It is only after this factual premise is established that the
inferenceorpresumptioncanarise.[29]
That being so, a foundling will not come within the definition of a naturalborn citizen who by birth right, being the biological child of a
Filipinofatherormother,doesnotneedtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecthis/hercitizenship.
Itshouldalsobeemphasizedthatouradoptionlawsdonotconfer"naturalborncitizenship"tofoundlingswhoareallowedtobeadopted.
Toreadthatqualificationintotheadoptionlawswouldamounttojudiciallegislation.Thesaidlawsoflimitedapplicationwhichallows
theadoptionofafoundling,cannotalsobeusedasabasistojustifythenaturalborncitizenshipofafoundlingwhohasreachedmajority
age like petitioner Poe who applied to reacquire her citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The opinion of the seven (7) Justices if pursued,
therewillbenoneedforafoundlingtomisrepresenthimselforherselfasabiologicalchildofheradoptiveparentslikewhatpetitioner

Poedid,andinstead,afoundlingcanbetruthfulandjustsubmitaFoundlingCertificatetobeentitledtothebenefitsofR.A.No.9225.
Sincefromtheirpointofviewafoundlingneednotperformanyacttobeconsideredanaturalborncitizen,saidfoundlingneednotprove
the veracity of the Foundling Certificate. This will include a Foundling Certificate in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) prepared list of
evidenceofnaturalborncitizenship.Thisispureandsimplejudiciallegislation.FoundlingsarenotevenmentionedatallinR.A.No.9225.
Pursuing this logic further, will one who wish to take the Bar Examinations or to be appointed to the Judiciary need to submit only a
FoundlingCertificatetotheSupremeCourtandtheJudicialBarCounciltoprovehis/herqualificationasanaturalborncitizen?Thesame
question can be raised in other situations where naturalborn citizenship is required, not only by law, but most especially by the
Constitution.Dotheseven(7)Justicesintendthatthequestionbeansweredintheaffirmative?Ifso,myhumblesubmissionisthat,apart
fromviolatingtheConstitution,itwillbearecklesspositiontotakeasaFoundlingCertificateshouldnotautomaticallyconfernaturalborn
citizenshipasitcaneasilybeobtainedbyimpostorswhopretendtohavefoundachildofunknownparents.
TheJuly18,2006Orderofthe
BureauofImmigrationapproving
petitionerPoe'sapplicationfor
dualcitizenshipwasnotvalid.
First, petitioner Poe's claim to a dual citizenship by virtue of R.A. No. 9225 is invalid for the simple reason that the said law limits its
application to naturalborn Filipino citizens only. In other words, the right to avail of dual citizenship is only available to naturalborn
citizens who have earlier lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of acquisition of foreign citizenship. Second, petitioner Poe obtained
dualcitizenshipunderRepublicActNo.9225bymisrepresentingtotheBIthatsheisthebiologicalchildofaFilipinofatherandFilipino
mothersuchthattheBureauwasmisledintobelievingthat"[petitionerPoe]wasaformercitizenoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbeing
borntoFilipinoparents.Third,thesaidorderwasnotsignedbytheCommissioneroftheBIasrequiredbyimplementingregulations.And
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship being clearly invalid, petitioner Poe's acceptance and assumption to public office requiring
naturalborncitizenshipasconditionsinequanonislikewiseinvalid.
Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003)[30] governs the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship by a naturalborn Filipino who acquired citizenship in a foreign country. Under Section 3 thereof, naturalborn citizens of the
PhilippineswhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryaredeemedtohave
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines specifically stated therein.[31]The
foregoing point is reiterated under the Bureau of Immigration's Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05002 (Revised Rules Governing
PhilippineCitizenshipunderRepublicActNo.9225andAdministrativeOrderNo.91,Seriesof2004),particularlySection1thereof,itis
categoricallyprovidedthat

Section 1. Coverage. These rules shall apply to naturalborn citizens of the Philippines as defined by Philippine law and
jurisprudence,whohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountry.

Hence, given my preceding discussion on the citizenship of petitioner Poe, I submit that she could not have validly repatriated herself
undertheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.9225forpurposesof"reacquiring"naturalbornFilipinocitizenship.
Another point that I wish to emphasize is the fact that in her Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed
beforetheBIonJuly10,2006,petitionerPoeknowinglycommittedafalserepresentationwhenshedeclaredunderoaththatshewas"a
former naturalborn Philippine citizen, born on Sept. 3, 1968 at Iloilo City to Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a Filipino citizen and Jesusa
SonoraPoe,aFilipinocitizen[.]"[Emphasissupplied.]
In so answering the blank form of the petition, petitioner Poe plainly represented that she is the biologicalchild of the spouses Ronald
AllanKellyPoeandJesusaSonoraPoetherebyeffectivelyconcealingthefactthatshewasafoundlingwhowassubsequentlyadoptedby
thesaidspouses.
This false representation paved the way for the issuance by the BI of the Order dated July 18, 2006 that granted Poe's petition, which
declaredthatshe"wasaformercitizenoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,beingborntoFilipinoparentsandispresumedtobeanatural
bornPhilippinecitizen[.]"
Another point worthy of note is the fact that the said Order was not signed by the Commissioner of the BI as required under the
aforementionedMemorandumCircularNo.AFF.05002,towit:

Section10.Complianceandapprovalprocedures.Allpetitionsmuststrictlycomplywiththeprecedingrequirementspriorto
filingattheOfficeoftheCommissioneroratnearestPhilippineForeignPost,asthecasemaybexxx.
If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating officer shall submit the findings and
recommendationtotheCommissionerofImmigrationorConsulGeneral,asthecasemaybexxX.
[T]he Commissioner of Immigration, x x x, or the Consul General, x x x, shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, an Order of Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. 9225 and its IRR, and the
correspondingIC,asthecasemaybe.(Emphasissupplied.)

A perusal of the said order will show that an indecipherable signature or autograph is written above the type written name of then
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. (Fernandez). The said writing was not made by Commissioner Fernandez as the word "for" was

similarlywrittenbesidethenameofthelatterindicatingthatthesaidsignature/autographwasmadeinlieuofthenamedperson'sown
signature/autograph.Whosesignature/autographitwas,andunderwhoseauthorityitwasmade,arenotevidentfromthedocument.
Onthebasisoftheaboveundisputedfacts,IsubmitthattheJuly18,2006OrderoftheBIgrantingpetitionerPoe'sapplicationforthe
reacquisitionofhersupposedlylostnaturalborncitizenshipwasnotonlyimprovidentlyissued,butmoreimportantly,itwasnullandvoid.
The nullity stemmed from her concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact, not an error of law, regarding the identity of her
biological parents. The unlawful product of this concealment was carried over in her pursuit of high government positions
requiring naturalborn citizenship as a qualification. Therefore, the same could not be the source of her reacquisition of all the
attendantcivilandpoliticalrights,includingtherightsandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsofthePhilippines,grantedtonaturalborn
Filipinocitizens.
PetitionerPoe'sreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipwasnotvalidlyapprovedasitwasbasedonanerroneousfindingoffactbasedon
thefalserepresentationbypetitionerPoeastoherparentage.
TheResidencyRequirement

The assailed COMELEC resolutions uniformly held that petitioner Poe falsely claimed in her COC that she had been a resident of the
Philippines for ten years and eleven months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections. Assuming petitioner Poe may be validly
repatriatedunderRepublicActNo.9225,theCOMELECruledthatitwasonlywhenshereacquiredherFilipinocitizenshiponJuly18,2006
thatshecouldhavereestablishedherdomicileinthePhilippines.
BeforethisCourt,petitionerPoeprimarilyarguesthattheCOMELEC"actedwhimsicallyandcapriciously,ignoredsettledjurisprudenceand
disregarded the evidence on record in ruling that she made a false material representation in her COC for President when she stated
therein that her 'period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016' would be '10' years and '11' months."[32]
Petitioner Poe contends that she reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005, even before she
reacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipunderRepublicActNo.9225.
Section2,ArticleVIIofthe1987ConstitutionprovidesforthequalificationsforthepositionofPresident,towit:

ARTICLEVII
EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT

SECTION2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,ableto
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
yearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.(Emphasissupplied.)

Forelectionpurposes,thetermresidenceistobeunderstoodnotinitscommonacceptationasreferringtodwellingorhabitation.[33]In
contemplationofelectionlaws,residenceissynonymouswithdomicile.Domicileistheplacewhereapersonactuallyorconstructivelyhas
hispermanenthome,wherehe,nomatterwherehemaybefoundatanygiventime,eventuallyintendstoreturnandremain.Itconsists
not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.[34]
In Domino v. Commission on Elections,[35] the Court stressed that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
considerationofcircumstances,threerulesmustbeborneinmind,namely:(1)thatamanmusthavearesidenceordomicilesomewhere
(2)whenonceestablisheditremainsuntilanewoneisacquiredand(3)amancanhavebutoneresidenceordomicileatatime.
Domicileisclassifiedinto:(1)domicileoforigin,whichisacquiredbyeverypersonatbirth(2)domicileofchoice,whichisacquiredupon
abandonment of the domicile of origin and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his
residenceorintention.[36]Toacquireanewdomicileofchoice,thefollowingrequirementsmustconcur:(1)residenceorbodilypresence
inthenewlocality(2)anintentiontoremainthereand(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.Theremustbeanimusmanendi
coupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthedomicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftimethe
changeofresidencemustbevoluntaryandtheresidenceattheplacechosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.[37]
In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,[38] the Court held in no uncertain terms that naturalization in a foreign country results in the
abandonmentofdomicileinthePhilippines.
Thereafter,inJapzonv.CommissiononElections,[39]theCourtconstruedtherequirementofresidenceunderelectionlawsvisavisthe
provisionsofRepublicActNo.9225.Therespondentinsaidcase,JaimeS.Ty,wasanaturalbornFilipinowhobecameanAmericancitizen.
He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and ran for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
EasternSamar.ManuelB.Japzon,arivalcandidate,questionedTy'sresidencyinsaidplace.TheCourtruledthat

ItbearstopointoutthatRepublicActNo.9225governsthemannerinwhichanaturalbornFilipinomayreacquireorretainhis
Philippinecitizenshipdespiteacquiringaforeigncitizenship,andprovidesforhisrightsandliabilitiesundersuchcircumstances.
AclosescrutinyofsaidstatutewouldrevealthatitdoesnotatalltouchonthematterofresidenceofthenaturalbornFilipino
takingadvantageofitsprovisions.RepublicActNo.9225imposesnoresidencyrequirementforthereacquisitionor

retention of Philippine citizenship nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenshiponthecurrentresidenceoftheconcernednaturalbornFilipino.Clearly,RepublicActNo.9225treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. Since a natural born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establishresidenceeitherinthePhilippinesorintheforeigncountryofwhichheisalsoacitizen.
ResidencyinthePhilippinesonlybecomesrelevantwhenthenaturalbornFilipinowithdualcitizenshipdecidestorunforpublic
office.
Section5(2)ofRepublicActNo.9225reads:

SEC.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.
ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoyfullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbe
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2)ThoseseekingelectivepublicofficeinthePhilippinesshallmeetthequalificationsforholdingsuchpublicofficeas
requiredbytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy,makea
personalandswornrenunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadminister
anoath.

Breakingdowntheaforequotedprovision,foranaturalbornFilipino,whoreacquiredorretainedhisPhilippinecitizenshipunder
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreigncitizenshipsbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeranoath.
xxxx
AshasalreadybeenpreviouslydiscussedbythisCourtherein,Ty'sreacquisitionofhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderRepublicAct
No.9225hadnoautomaticimpactoreffectonhisresidence/domicile.HecouldstillretainhisdomicileintheUSA,andhedid
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
optiontoagainestablishhisdomicileintheMunicipalityofGeneralMacarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines,saidplacebecoming
his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice,anditshallnotretroacttothetimeofhisbirth.[40](Citationsomittedemphasissupplied.)

Applyingtheforegoingdisquisitiontotheinstantcases,itisbeyondquestionthatpetitionerPoelostherdomicileinthePhilippineswhen
shebecameanaturalizedAmericancitizenonOctober18,2001.Fromthenon,sheestablishedhernewdomicileofchoiceintheU.S.
Thereafter, on July 7, 2006, petitioner Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 9225.
Again,ontheassumptionthatpetitionerPoecanvalidlyavailherselfoftheprovisionsofsaidlaw,shewasdeemedtohavereacquiredher
Philippinecitizenshipunderthelatterdate.Subsequently,onOctober20,2010,petitionerPoeexecutedanAffidavitofRenunciationof
AllegiancetotheUnitedStatesofAmericaandRenunciationofAmericanCitizenship(AffidavitofRenunciation).
Following Japzon, petitioner Poe's reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship did riot automatically make her regain her residence in the
Philippines. She merely had the option to again establish her domicile here. The length of petitioner Poe's residence herein shall be
determinedfromthetimeshemadethePhilippinesherdomicileofchoice.WhetherpetitionerPoecompliedwiththetenyearresidency
requirementforrunningforthepositionofthePresidentofthePhilippinesisessentiallyaquestionoffactthatindeedrequiresthereview
andevaluationoftheprobativevalueoftheevidencepresentedbythepartiesbeforetheCOMELEC.
On this note, I concur with the ruling in Justice Del Castillo's Dissenting Opinion that the evidence[41] submitted by petitioner Poe was
insufficienttoestablishherclaimthatwhenshearrivedinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005,herphysicalpresencewasimbuedwithanimus
manendi.Atthatpointintime,petitionerPoe'sstatuswasmerelythatofanonresidentalien.
Notably, when petitioner arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, the same was through a visafree entry under the Balikbayan
Program.[42]UnderRepublicActNo.6768(AnActInstitutingaBalikbayanProgram), [43] as amended by Republic Act No. 9174,44 the
saidprogramwasinstituted"toattractandencourageoverseasFilipinostocomeandvisittheirmotherland."[45]
UnderSection3oftheabovementionedlaw,petitionerPoewasmerelyentitledtoavisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone
(1)year.[46]Thus,herstaytheninthePhilippineswascertainlynotforanindefiniteperiodoftime.[47]Thisonlyprovesthatpetitioner
Poe's stay was not impressed with animus manendi, i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of
time.
InCoquilla v. Commission on Elections,[48] We disregarded the period of a candidate's physical presence in the Philippines at the time
whenhewasstillanonresidentalien.Inthiscase,TeoduloM.CoquillalosthisdomicileoforigininOras,EasternSamarwhenhejoined
theU.S.Navyin1965andhewassubsequentlynaturalizedasaU.S.citizen.OnOctober15,1998,hecametothePhilippinesandtook
outaresidentcertificate.Afterwards,hestillmadeseveraltripstotheU.S.Coquillalaterappliedforrepatriationandtookhisoathasa
citizen of the Philippines on November 10, 2000. Coquilla thereafter filed his COC for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern Samar. A rival

candidatesoughtthecancellationofCoquilla'sCOCasthelatterhadbeenaresidentofOrasforonlysixmonthsafterhetookhisoathasa
Filipinocitizen.
The Court ruled that Coquilla indeed lacked the requisite period of residency. While he entered the Philippines in 1998 and took out a
residence certificate, he did so as a visafree balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for only one year. He then entered the
countryatleastfourmoretimesusingthesamevisafreebalikbayanentry.From1965untilhisreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipon
November10,2000,Coquilla'sstatuswasheldtobethatof"analienwithoutanyrighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveasourimmigration
lawsmayhaveallowedhimtostayasavisitororasaresidentalien."TheCourtalsoexplainedthat:

The status of being an alien and a nonresident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident
alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an
individualmayobtainanimmigrantvisaunder13[49]ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1948andanImmigrantCertificate
of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a nonresident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by
naturalizationunderC.A.No.473,asamended,or,ifheisaformerPhilippinenational,hemayreacquirePhilippinecitizenship
byrepatriationorbyanactofCongress,inwhichcasehewaivesnotonlyhisstatusasanalienbutalsohisstatusasanon
residentalien.[50](Citationsomitted.)

TheCourt,thus,foundthatCoquillacanonlybeheldtohavewaivedhisstatusasanalienandasanonresidentonlyonNovember10,
2000upontakinghisoathasacitizenofthePhilippines.TheCourtarrivedatthesamerulingintheearliercaseofUjanov.Republic[51]
andCaasiv.CourtofAppeals.[52]
In the cases at bar, petitioner Poe similarly failed to prove that she waived her status as a nonresident alien when she entered the
PhilippinesonMay24,2005asavisafreebalikbayanvisitor.Herstatusonlychangedwhensheostensiblytookheroathofallegianceto
theRepublicunderRepublicActNo.9225onJuly7,2006.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,[53] the entitlement to the full civil and political rights concomitant with the reacquired
citizenship shall commence only when the requirements in the said law have been completed and the Philippine citizenship has been
acquired. It is only then that that Filipinos who have reacquired their citizenship can be said to gain the right to exercise their right of
suffrageortoseekelectivepublicoffice,subjecttothecompliancewiththerequirementslaiddownintheConstitutionandexistinglaws.
Thus,itisthetakingoftheoathofallegiancetotheRepubliconJuly7,2006presumablyconferreduponpetitionerPoenotonlyPhilippine
citizenshipbutalsotherighttostayinthePhilippinesforanunlimitedperiodoftime.Itwasonlythenthatshecanclaimsubjecttoproof,
that her physical presence in the Philippines was coupled with animus manendi. Any temporary stay in the Philippines prior to the
aforesaid date cannot fall under the concept of residence for purposes of elections. The animus manendi must be proven by clear and
unmistakableevidencesinceadualcitizencanstillfreelyenjoypermanentresidentstatusinher/hisdomicileofchoiceifsaidstatusisnot
givenuporofficiallywaived.
Anentthepiecesofevidence[54]thatpetitionerPoesubmittedtoproveheranimusnonrevertenditoherdomicileintheU.S.,Iagreewith
thedissentofJusticeDelCastillothatlittleweightcanlikewisebeproperlyascribedtothesame,giventhattheyreferredtoactsorevents
thattookplaceafterMay24,2005.Assuch,theywerealsoinsufficienttoestablishpetitioner'sclaimthatshechangedherdomicileasof
May24,2005.PetitionerPoe'sevidencewasinsufficienttoproveanimusnonrevertendipriortoherrenunciationofherU.S.citizenshipon
October20,2010.Beforetherenunciation,itcannotbesaidthattherewasaclearandunmistakableintentonthepartofpetitionerPoeto
abandonherU.S.domicile.Tobeclear,onecannothavetwodomicilesatanygiventime.ItwasthusincumbentuponthepetitionerPoe
toprovebypositiveactsthatherphysicalpresenceinthePhilippineswascoupledwiththeintenttorelinquishherdomicileintheU.S.
AspointedoutbyJusticeDelCastillo,thecontinueduseofherAmericanpassportinhertravelstotheU.S.,aswellasherownershipand
maintenanceoftworesidentialhousesinthesaidcountryuntilthepresenttime,onlyservedtoweakenherstancethatsheactuallyand
deliberatelyabandonedherdomicileintheU.S.whenshecamehereonMay24,2005.Thisisbecauseshecontinuedtorepresentherself
as an American citizen who was free to return to the said country whenever she wished. Moreover, although petitioner Poe supposedly
reacquired her Philippine citizenship on July 7, 2006, she was issued a Philippine passport only three years thereafter on October 13,
2009.Thus,IconcurwiththefindingofthePonenciathatpetitionerPoe'saffidavitofrenunciationofU.S.citizenshipwastheonlyclear
andpositiveproofofherabandonmentofherU.S.domicile.
Given the above findings, the petitioner's evidence fails to substantiate her claim that she had established her domicile of choice in the
PhilippinesstartingonMay24,2005.
By stating in her COC that she had complied with the required ten year residency when she actually did not, petitioner made a false
materialrepresentationthatjustifiedtheCOMELEC'scancellationofherCOC.
Themajorityopinion,however,reachedadissimilarconclusionandruledthatCoquilla,Japzon,CaballeroandReyesareinapplicabletothe
case at bar. The maj?rity posited that, unlike in the aforesaid cases where the evidence presented on residency was sparse, petitioner
Poe'sevidenceisoverwhelmingandunprecedented.Themajorityfurthermoreassertedthatthereisnoindicationinthesaidcasesthat
theCourtintendedtohaveitsrulingthereinapplytoasituationwherethefactsaredifferent
Istronglybegtodiffer.
Butofcourse,thefactualmilieuofthesecasesisdifferentfromthoseofCoquilla,Japzon,CaballeroandReyes.Notwocasesareexactly
thesame.However,therearenosubstantialdifferencesthatwouldpreventtheapplicationhereoftheprinciplesenunciatedinthesaid
decidedcases.Moreover,absolutelynowhereinthesaidcasesdidtheCourtexpresslysaythattherulingsthereinonlyapplyprohacvice

(meaning,"forthisoneparticularoccasion").[55]Onthecontrary,thedoctrineslaiddowninsaidcasesarecitedinacatenaofelection
cases,whichsimilarlyinvolvetheresidencyrequirementforelectivepositions.Simplyput,thejurisprudentialdoctrinesandguidelinesset
outinsaidcases,alongwithothercasesdealingwiththesamesubjectmatter,serveasthestandardsbywhichthepiecesofevidenceof
apartyinaspecificcasearetobemeasured.EvenpetitionerPoeherselfadvertstoourrulinginJafzon,CoquillaandCaballero,albeitina
mannerthattendstosuithercause.[56]
InrelationtotheapplicationofCoquillatothesecasesrelativetopetitionerPoe'sutilisationofthevisafreebalikbayanentry,themajority
opinesthatunderRepublicActNo.6768,asamended,balikbayansarenotordinarytransientsinviewofthelaw'saimof"providingthe
opportunity to avail of the necessary training enable the balikbayan to become economically selfreliant members of society upon their
return to the country" in line with the government's "reintegration program." The majority, thus, concluded that the visafree period is
obviously granted to allow a balikbayan to reestablish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessaryformalandlegalrequirementsofrepatriation.
Onthispoint,themajorityapparentlylostsightofthefactthatthetrainingprogramenvisionedinRepublicActNo.6768,asamended,
that is to be pursued in line with the government's reintegration program does not apply to petitioner Poe. It applies to another set of
balikbayanswhoareFilipinooverseasworkers.Section6ofthelawexpresslystatesthat:

SEC.6.TrainingPrograms.TheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE)throughtheOWWA,incoordinationwith
the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),
livelihoodcorporationandotherconcernedgovernmentagencies,shallprovidethenecessaryentrepreneurialtrainingand
livelihoodskillsprogramsandmarketingassistancetoabalikbayan,includinghisorherimmediatefamilymembers,who
shall avail of the kabuhayan program in accordance with the existing rules on the government's reintegration
program.
InthecaseofnonOFWbalikbayan,theDepartmentofTourismshallmakethenecessaryarrangementwiththeTLRCandother
traininginstitutionsforpossiblelivelihoodtraining.(Emphasissupplied.)

Indeed,theOverseasWorkersWelfareAdministration(OWWA)isagovernmentagencythatisprimarilytaskedtoprotecttheinterestand
promotethewelfareofoverseasFilipinoworkers(OFWs).[57]AmongthebenefitsandservicesitrendersisaReintegrationProgram,which
definesreintegrationas"awayofpreparingforthereturnofOFWsintothePhilippinesociety."[58]NotbeinganOFW,petitionerPoeisnot
thebalikbayanthatisenvisionedtobetherecipientoftheabovereintegrationprogram.
Ifsheindeedwantedtoreestablishherlifehere,petitionerPoeshouldhaveappliedforaReturningFormerFilipinoVisa,insteadavailing
herselfofavisafreebalikbayanentry.ThisvisamaybeappliedforbyanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,whohasbeennaturalized
inaforeigncountry,andisreturningtothePhilippinesforpermanentresidence,includinghis/herspouseandminorchildren.Bythisvisa,
shewouldbeallowed,interalia,tostayinthePhilippinesindefinitely,establishabusiness,andallowedtoworkwithoutsecuringanalien
employmentpermit.ThiswouldhavedefinitelyestablishedherintenttoremaininthePhilippinespermanently.Unfortunatelyforpetitioner
Poe,shedidnotapplyforthisvisa.
The majority opinion also ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for giving more weight to the 2013 COC of
petitioner Poe instead of looking into the many pieces of evidence she presented in order to see if she was telling the truth that she
already established her domicile in the Philippines from May 24, 2005. The majority points out that when petitioner Poe made the
declarationinher2013COCthatshehasbeenaresidentforaperiodofsix(6)yearsandsix(6)monthscounteduptotheMay13,2013
elections,shenaturallyhadasreferencetheresidencyrequirementsforelectionasSenator,whichwassatisfiedbyherdeclaredyearsof
residence.Themajorityevenbelaborstheobviousfactthatthelengthofresidencerequiredofapresidentialcandidateisdifferentfrom
thatofasenatorialcandidate.
TothisIlikewisetakeexception.
It bears pointing out that the COMELEC did not tum a blind eye and deliberately refused to look at the evidence of petitioner Poe. A
readingoftheassailedCOMELECresolutionsrevealsthatthepiecesofevidenceofthepetitionerwereindeedconsidered,piecebypiece,
butthesamewereadjudgedinsufficienttoprovethepurposeforwhichtheywereoffered.Torepeat,theemphasismustbeontheweight
of the pieces of evidence, not the number thereof. The COMELEC, perforce, arrived at an unfavorable conclusion. In other words,
petitionerPoe'sevidencehadactuallybeenweighedandmeasuredbytheCOMELEC,butsamewasfoundwanting.
Moreover,Idonotfindsignificantthedistinctionmadeontheresidencyrequirementforapresidentialcandidateandthatofasenatorial
candidate for purposes of these cases. The truth of a candidate's statement on the fact of her residency must be consistent and
unwavering.Changesinacandidate'sassertionoftheperiodofresidencyinthePhilippinesshallnotinspirebelieforwillnotbecredible.
Deceit

As to the view that the material representation that is false should be "made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualificationsforpublicoffice,"[59]Icannotbutdeviatetherefrom.
Again,Section78oftheOEC,providesthat

SECTION78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourse
ortocancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentation

containedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfive
daysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthan
fifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasessupplied.)

InTagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,[60]theCourthadtheoccasiontoenlightenthat"thedeliberatenessofthe
misrepresentation,muchlessone'sintenttodefraud,isofbaresignificanceinaSection78petitionasitisenoughthatthe
person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC he false." The Court therein further acknowledged that "an express
findingthatthepersoncommittedanydeliberatemisrepresentationisoflittleconsequenceinthedeterminationofwhetherone'sCoC
shouldbedeemedcancelledornot"[61]andconcludedthat"[w]hatremainsmaterialisthatthepetitionessentiallyseekstoden
duecoursetoand/orcanceltheCoConthebasisoineligibilityandthatthesamehegrantedwithoutanyqualification."[62]
The above standard is in keeping with the tenor of Section 78 of the OEC. The said law used the phrase material representation
qualifiedbythetermfalseandnotmisrepresentationperse.Thisdistinction,Ibelieve,isquitesignificant.
AdeeperanalysisandresearchontheimportandmeaningofthelanguageofSection78,ledtotheconclusionthatasopposedtotheuse
oftheterm"misrepresentation" which, colloquially is understood to mean a statement made to deceive or mislead,[63] the qualifying
term "false" referring to the phrase "material representation" is said to have "two distinct and wellrecognized meanings. It
signifies (1) intentionally or knowingly, or negligently untrue, and (2) untrue by mistake, accident, or honestly after the exercise of
reasonable care."[64] Thus, the word "false" does not necessarily imply an intention to deceive. What is important is that an untrue
materialrepresentationismade.
RelatingtothedisqualificationunderSection78oftheOEC,therequirementofthesaidlaw(thatacancellationofacandidate'sCOCbe
exclusively grounded on the presence of any VS. contained therein that is required under Section 74 of the same isfalse) should only
pivot on the candidate's declaration of a material qualification that is false, and not on the deliberate intent to defraud. With this, good
faithonthepartofthecandidatewouldbeinconsequential.
Inthesepresentcases,thereisnoneedtogointothematterofquestioningpetitionerPoe'sintentinmakingamaterialrepresentation
thatisfalseItisenoughthatshesignifiedthatsheiseligibletorunforthePresidencynotwithstandingthefactthatsheappearedtoknow
thelegalimpedimenttoherclaimofnaturalbornFilipinocitizenship,asborneoutbyherconcealmentofhertruepersonalcircumstances,
andthatsheislikewiseawareofthefactthatshehasnotfulfilledthetenyearresidencyrequirementasshownbyherinconsistentand
ambivalentstandastothestartofherdomicileinthePhilippines.Apparently,sheiscognizantofthefactthatsheisactuallyineligiblefor
theposition.
However, that while an intent to deceive in petitioner Poe's actions is not an indispensable element under a Section 78 Petition, the
COMELEC'saffirmativefindingontheexistenceofdeceitisnotwithoutbasis.TheCOMELECobserved,andIquote:

ThesimplicityandclarityofthetermsusedinourConstitutionandlawsoncitizenship,thefactthat[petitionerPoe]isahighly
educatedwomanandallothercircumstancesfoundbytheHonorableSecondDivisiontobepresentinthiscase,wouldleave
littledoubtastotheintentionof[petitionerPoe]whenshemadethefalserepresentationsintheCertificatesxxxthatis,to
mislead[the]peopleintothinkingthatshewasthenaFilipino.
TheCommissionisespeciallybotheredby[petitionerPoe's]representationinthePetitionforRetentionand/orReacquisitionof
PhilippineCitizenshipthatshewasBORNTOheradoptiveparents.Torecall,itwasthisPetition,grantedbytheBID,that
ledto[petitionerPoe]supposedacquisitionofFilipinocitizenshipinJuly2006underRA9225alawwhichlimitsitsapplication
onlytonaturalbornFilipinoswholosttheircitizenships.Thedesigntomisleadinordertosatisfytherequirementsofthelawis
evident,reminiscentoftheintenttomisleadinthe2016COC,putinissueinthepresentcase.
All told, the foregoing misrepresentations may be for different purposes, but all seems to have been deliberately done. It is,
therefore,hardtothink,giventheaforementionedpatternofbehavior,thattherepresentationin[petitionerPoe's]2016COC
forPresidentthatshewasanaturalborncitizenwasnotadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactthatwould
otherwiserenderherineligiblefortheofficethatsheseekstobeelectedto.[65]

Onthematterofherresidencyrequirement,petitionerPoeconcedesthatsheindicatedinher2013COCthather"periodofresidencein
thePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013"was"6yearsand6months."Consequently,herresidenceinthePhilippinescouldhaveonlybegun
onNovember2006,suchthatbyMay9,2016,heraggregateperiodofresidenceinthePhilippineswasapproximatelyonly9yearsand6
months,whichisshortoftheperiodofresidencerequiredforpresidentialcandidates.
PetitionerPoeexplains,however,thatshemadetheabovestatementasan"honestmisunderstanding"ofwhatwasbeingaskedofher.
[66]Shecontendsthatshedidnotfullycomprehendthatthephrase"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013"inher

2013COCactuallyreferredtotheperiodofresidenceonthedayrightbeforetheMay13,2013elections.Sheallegedlyconstrueditto
meanher"periodofresidenceinthePhilippinesasofthesubmissionofCOCsinOctober2012(whichistechnicallyalsoaperiod'before
May 13, 2013')."[67] Thus, she counted backwards from October 2012, instead from May 13, 2013 and in so doing she brought herself
backto"MarchApril2006,"whichwastheperiodwhenherhouseintheU.S.wassoldandwhenherhusbandresignedfromhisjobin
theU.S.[68]Shearguesthatthatwastheperiodsheindicated,albeititwasamistakeagainonherpartasitshouldhavebeenMay24,
2005.
Petitioner Poe's ambivalent or varying accounts do not inspire beliefs of the truthfulness of her latest allegation of the period of her

residenceinthePhilippines.
Itisindeedincredibleofsomeoneofherstaturetogravelymisinterpretthephrase"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforetheMay
13, 2013" in the 2012 COC. At any rate, having been informed as early as June 2015 of this supposedly honest mistake, it is quite
perplexing that the same was not immediately rectified. As it were, the above mentioned explanations that were belatedly given even
muddled the issue further. Petitioner Poe can hardly blame the COMELEC for casting a suspicious and skeptic eye on her contentions
regardingherresidency.
PetitionerPoe'sclaimofgoodfaith,thus,standsonveryshakygrounds.AsfoundbytheCOMELECEnbanc:

x x x worthy of note are certain arguments raised such as [petitioner Poe's] claim that she never hid from the public her
supposed mistake in the 2013 COC, as evinced by the following: 1.) she publicly acknowledged the same in an interview in
June 2015, after the issue of compliance with the residency requirement for President was raised by Navotas City
RepresentativeandthenUnitedNationalistAllianceSecretaryGeneralTobiasTiangcoand2.)thatasearlyasSeptember1,
2015,inherVerifiedAnswerfiledbeforetheSenateElectoralTribunal
(hereinafter"SET")inSETCaseNo.00115,shealreadymadeitofrecordthatasofMay13,2013,shehadbeenresidingin
thePhilippines"formorethansix(6)yearsandsix(6)months."
While the two statements were indeed made before respondent filed her 2016 COC, it was nonetheless delivered at a time
when,attheveryleast,thepossibilityof[petitionerPoe]runningforPresidentofthecountryin2016,wasalreadyamatterof
publicknowledge.Bythen,[petitionerPoecouldhavealreadybeenawarethatshecannotmaintainherdeclarationinthe2013
COCasitwouldbeinsufficienttomeetthe10yearresidencyrequirementforPresident.
Indeed,theCommissionfindsithardtobelievethatawomanaseducatedas[petitionerPoe],whowasthenalreadyahigh
ranking public official with, no doubt, a competent staff and a band of legal advisers, and who is not herself entirely
unacquaintedwithPhilippinepoliticsbeingthedaughterofaformerhighprofilepresidentialaspirant,wouldnotknowhowto
correctlyfillupaproformaCOCin2013.Wearenotconvincedthatthesubjectentrythereinwasanhonestmistake.

Conclusion

TheforegoingdiscussionpointstothefailureofpetitionerPoetoprovehercases.Therefore,IsubmitthatthetwoassailedCOMELECEn
banc Resolutions dated December 23, 2015, separately affirming the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the Second Division and the
December 11, 2015 Resolution of the First Division are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner Poe implores this Court not to allow the supposed disenfranchisement of the sovereign people by depriving them of "of
somethingrightfullytheirs:theconsiderationofpetitionerasaviableandvalidchoiceforPresidentinthenextelections."[69]
But the Constitution itself is the true embodiment of the supreme will of the people. It was the people's decision to require in the
Constitution, which they approved in a plebiscite, that their President be a naturalborn Filipino citizen. The people did not choose to
disenfranchisethemselvesbutrathertodisqualifythosepersons,whodidnotdescendbybloodfromFilipinoparents,fromrunninginan
electionforthePresidency.
Thewilloftheelectoratewillnevercuretheviceofineligibility.AssoeloquentlyremindedbythenJusticeIsaganiA.CruzinFrivaldov.
CommissiononElections[70]:

The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
throughtheballotcannotcuretheviceofineligibility,especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,thatthecandidate
wasqualified.Obviously,thisrulerequiresstrictapplicationwhenthedeficiencyislackofcitizenship.

WHEREFORE,Ivoteto(i)DISMISSthefourpetitionsforcertiorarifiledbypetitionerMaryGraceNatividadS.PoeLlamanzaresand(ii)
LIFTthetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedbythisCourtonDecember28,2015.

[1]Section2,Rule64oftheRulesofCourtstates:

SEC.2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
broughtbytheaggrievedpartytotheSupremeCourtoncertiorariunderRule65,exceptashereinafterprovided.
[2]G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267,279280.
[3]636Phil.753(2010).
[4]686Phil.649(2012).

[5]468Phil.421,461462(2004).
[6]Id.at518.
[7]Id.at562563.
[8]G.R.No.20724,June25,2013.
[9]595Phil.449(2008).
[10]June25,2013.
[11]Annex"B"ofthePetitioninG.R.No.221697.
[12] Irene R. Cortes and Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla, Nationality and International Law from the Philippine Perspective, published in the

PhilippineLawJournal,VolumeLX,March1985,UniversityofthePhilippines(UP)CollegeofLaw,p.7.citingArt.17(1and2)Spanish
CivilCode.
[13]Id.at10.
[14]Id.
[15]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,supranote5at469471.
[16]Garciav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.216691,July21,2015.
[17]WordsandPhrases,Vol.2,p.1462CitingMcKoanvs.Devries,3Barb.,196,198[quoting1Story,Const.,Sees.338,339]Church

vs.Kelsey,7Sup.Ct.,897,898121U.S.,28230L.ed.,960,andBatesvs.Kimball[Vt.],2D.Chip.,77,84.
[18]ManilaPrinceHotelv.GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem,335Phil.82,101(1997).
[19]272Phil.147,169170(1991).
[20]CharlesP.Curtis,LIONSUNDERTHETHRONE2,HoughtonMifflin,1947.
[21]DennisB.Funa,CannonsofStatutoryConstruction(2012Edition)CitingHenryCampbellBlack,Handbook on the Construction and

InterpretationoftheLaws,p.30,quotingCityofSpringfieldv.Edwards,84IlL626.
[22] Retired Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's Separate Opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 PhiL 618, 668669

(2000).
[23]SeparateOpinionofJ.CarpioMoralesinRubrico v. MacapagalArroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 80 (2010) citing IAN BROWNLIE, Principlesof

PublicInternationalLaw,SixthEd.,18(2003).
[24]Id.
[25]1987Constitution,ArticleII,Section2.
[26]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,561Phil.386,398(2007).
[27]TawangMultiPurposeCoopetativev.LaTrinidadWaterDistrict,661Phil.390(2011).
[28]Id.at402403.
[29]Martinv.CourtofAppeals,supra.
[30]ApprovedonAugust29,2003.
[31]Section3ofRepublicActNo.9225states:

SEC. 3. RetentionofPhilippineCitizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines
whohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryareherebydeemedtohavere
acquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthefollowingoathofallegiancetotheRepublic:

"I_________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
PhilippinesandobeythelawsandlegalorderspromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesofthePhilippinesandIhereby

declarethatIrecognizeandacceptthesupremeauthorityofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancethereto
andthatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarilywithoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion."

Naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.
[32]Petitioner'sMemorandum,p.241.
[33]Coquillav.CommissiononElections,434Phil.861,871(2002).
[34]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,575Phil.253,263(2008).
[35]369Phil.798,818(1999).
[36]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,supra.at263.
[37]Papandayan,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,430Phil.754,770(2002).
[38]Supra.at872.
[39]596Phil.354(2009).
[40]Id.at367370.
[41]Inpetitioner'sMemorandum,shecitedthefollowingpiecesofevidencetoproveheranimusmanendi,orintenttostaypermanentlyin

thePhilippines,amongothers:
(a) Petitioner's travel records, which show that whenever she was absent for a trip abroad, she would consistently return to the
Philippines
(b)AffidavitofMs.JesusaSonoraPoe,attestingto,interalia,thefactthataftertheirarrivalinthePhilippinesinearly2005,petitionerand
her children first lived with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City, which even necessitated a modification of the living
arrangementsatherhousetoaccommodatepetitioner'sfamily
(c)Schoolrecordsofpetitioner'schildren,whichshowthattheyhadbeenattendingPhilippineschoolscontinuouslysinceJune2005
(d)Petitioner'sTINI.D.,whichshowsthatshortlyafterherreturninMay2005,sheconsideredherselfataxableresidentandsubmitted
herselftothePhilippines'taxjurisdictionand
(e)CCTforUnit7FandaparkingslotatOneWilsonPlace,purchasedinearly2005,anditscorrespondingDeclarationsofRealProperty
forrealpropertytaxpurposes,whichclearlyestablishintenttoresidepermanentlyinthePhilippines.
[42]Petitioner'sMemorandum,pp.249250.
[43]ApprovedonNovember3,1989.
[44]ApprovedonNovember7,2002.
[45]TherelevantportionofSectionlofRepublicActNo.9174states:

SEC.I.Section1ofRepublicActNo.6768isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
"Section 1. BalikbayanProgram. ABalikbayan Program is hereby instituted under the administration of the Department of Tourism to
attractandencourageoverseasFilipinostocomeandvisittheirmotherland.Thisisinrecognitionoftheircontributiontotheeconomyof
thecountrythroughtheforeignexchangeinflowandrevenuesthattheygenerate."
[46]Section3ofRepublicActNo.9174states:

SEC.3.Section3ofthe[RepublicActNo.6768]isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
"Sec. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following benefits and
privileges:
xxxx
(c)VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexceptionofrestrictednationals[.]"
[47] The one year period may be extended for another one (1), two (2) or six (6) months, subject to specific requirements.

[http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visainquiry/balikbayanprevilege.Lastaccessed:February27,2016.]
[48]Supranote33.
[49]Thepertinentportionsofthisprovisionstates:

"UndertheconditionssetforthinthisAct,theremaybeadmittedinthePhilippines
immigrants,termed"quotaimmigrants"notinexcessoffifty(50)ofanyonenationalityorwithoutnationalityforanyonecalendaryear,
exceptthatthefollowingimmigrants,termed"nonquotaimmigrants,"maybeadmittedwithoutregardtosuchnumericallimitations.
ThecorrespondingPhilippineConsularrepresentativeabroadshallinvestigateandcertifYtheeligibilityofaquotaimmigrantpreviousto
hisadmissionintothePhilippines.QualifiedanddesirablealienswhoareinthePhilippinesundertemporarystaymaybeadmittedwithin
thequota,subjecttotheprovisionsofthelastparagraphofSection9ofthisAct.
xxxx
(g) A naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the Philippines for
permanent residence, including the spouse and minor children, shall be considered a nonquota immigrant for purposes of entering the
Philippines(AsamendedbyRep.ActNo.4376,approvedJune19,1965)."
[50]Coquillav.CommissiononElections,supranote33at873875.
[51]17SCRA147.
[52]191SCRA229.
[53]Section5ofRepublicActNo.9225states:

SECTION5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoyfullcivil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1)ThoseintendingtoexercisetheirrightofsuffragemustmeettherequirementsunderSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution,Republic
ActNo.9189,otherwiseknownas"TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003"andotherexistinglaws
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy,makeapersonalandswornrenunciationofany
andallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeranoath
(3)ThoseappointedtoanypublicofficeshallsubscribeandsweartoanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesanditsduly
constitutedauthoritiespriortotheirassumptionofoffice:Provided,Thattheyrenouncetheiroathofallegiancetothecountrywherethey
tookthatoath
(4)ThoseintendingtopracticetheirprofessioninthePhilippinesshallapplywiththe
properauthorityforalicenseorpermittoengageinsuchpracticeand
(5)ThatrighttovoteorbeelectedorappointedtoanypublicofficeinthePhilippinescannotbeexercisedby,orextendedto,thosewho:
(a)arecandidatesfororareoccupyinganypublicofficeinthecountryofwhichtheyarenaturalizedcitizensand/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces ofthe country which they are naturalized
citizens.
[54]Inpetitioner'sMemorandum,shecitedthefollowingpiecesofevidencetoproveheranimusnonrevertendi,orintenttoabandonher

U.S.A.domicile,amongothers:
(a) Affidavit of Ms. Jesusa Sonora Poe, attesting to, among others, the reasons which prompted the petitioner to leave the U.S.A. and
returnpermanentlytothePhilippines
(b)Affidavitofpetitioner'shusband,Mr.TeodoroV.Llamanzares,corroboratingthepetitioner'sstatementandexplaininghowheandthe
petitionerhadbeenactivelyattendingtothelogisticsoftheirpermanentrelocationtothePhilippinessinceMarch2005
(c)Thepetitionerandherhusband'sdocumentedconversationswithpropertymoversregardingtherelocationoftheirhouseholdgoods,
furniture, and cars, then in Virginia, U.S.A., to the Philippines, which show that they intended to leave the U.S.A. for good as early as
March2005
(d)Relocationoftheirhouseholdgoods,furniture,cars,andotherpersonalpropertytheninVirginia,U.S.A.,tothePhilippines,whichwere
packedandcollectedforstorageandtransporttothePhilippinesonFebruaryandApril2006
(e)Petitioner'shusband'sactofinformingtheU.S.A.PostalServiceoftheirabandonmentoftheirformerU.S.A.addressonMarch2006

(f)Petitionerandherhusband'sactofsellingtheirfamilyhomeintheU.S.A.onApril27,2006
(g)Petitioner'shusband'sresignationfromhisworkintheU.S.A.inApril2006and
(h)ThereturntothePhilippine'sofpetitioner'shusbandonMay4,2006.
[55]PartidoNgManggagawav.CommissiononElections,519Phil.644,671(2006).
[56]SeePetitioner'sMemorandum,pp.268,271,272.
[57]OverseasWorkersWelfareAdministrationv.Chavez,551Phil.890,896(2007).
[58]http://www.owwa.gov.ph/?q=node/23/#reintegration.LastaccessedonMarch11,2016at1:52p.m.
[59]Salcedov.CommissiononElections.371Phil.377,390(1999).
[60]G.R.No.202202,March19,2013.
[61]Tagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,citingMirandav.Abaya,370Phil.642.
[62]Id.
[63]Black'sLawDictionary,6thEd.
[64]MetropolitanLifeIns.Co.v.Adams,D.C.Mun.App.,37A.2d345,350.
[65]COMELECDecisioninSPANo.15001(DC),pp.3031.
[66]Petitioner'sMemorandum,p.285.
[67]Petitioner'sMemorandum,p.285.
[68]Petitioner'sMemorandum,pp.286287.
[69]PetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.1rollo,p.1.
[70]G.R.No.87193,[June23,1989],255PHIL934947.

DISSENTINGOPINION

BRION,J.:
IwritethisDISSENTINGOPINIONtoexpressmydisagreementswiththeponenciaofmyesteemedcolleague,Mr.JusticeJOSEP.PEREZ,
whowrotethemajorityopinionofthisCourt.
TheponenciaisbasedontheexclusivegroundthattheCOMELECcommitted"graveabuseofdiscretion"in"denyingduecourseto
and/or cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy for the President for the May 9, 2016 elections for false material
representationastohercitizenshipandresidency."
I write as well to offer help to the general public so that they may be enlightened on the issues already darkened by political and self
interested claims and counterclaims, all aired by the media, paid and unpaid, that only resulted in confusing what would otherwise be
fairlysimpleandclearcutissues.
I respond most especially to the appeal of our President Benigno C. Aquino for this Court to rule with clarity for the sake of the voting
public. Even a Dissent can contribute to this endeavor. Thus, I write with utmost frankness so that everyone may know what really
transpiredwithintheCourt'sveiledchambers.
ForasystematicandorderlyapproachinpresentingmyDissent,Ishall:
Firstsummarizetheponenciaandthevotesoftherulingmajority(PartA)
Thenproceedtomymorespecificobjectionstotheponencia'segregiousclaims(PartB)and
quotetheportionsofmyoriginalSeparateConcurringOpinionthatspecificallydisputethemajority'sruling(PartC).

Inthismanner,Icanshowhowmistakenandmisplacedthemajority'srulinghadbeen,andhowitdishonoredourConstitutionthroughits
slantedreadingthatallowsonewhodoesnotqualifytoserveasPresident,tobeacandidateforthisoffice.
Shornoftheglamorandpufferythatpaidadvertisingandmediacanprovide,thiscaseisaboutanexpatriateapopularonewhonow
wants to run for the presidency after her return to the country. Her situation is not new as our jurisprudence is replete with rulings on
similarsituations.Asearlyas1995,agreatjuristJusticeIsaganiCruz[1](nowdeceasedbutwhosereputationfortheenergeticdefense
of and respect and love for the Constitution still lives on) gave his "take" on this situation in his article Return of the Renegade. He
wrote:

"...SeveralyearsagoapermanentresidentoftheUnitedStatescamebacktothePhilippinesandwaselectedtoa
localoffice.Aprotestwaslodgedagainsthimonthegroundoflackofresidence.Theevidencesubmittedwashis
greencard,anditwasirrefutable.TheSupremeCourtruledthathispermanentandexclusiveresidencewasinthe
UnitedStatesandnotinthemunicipalitywherehehadrunandwon.Hiselectionwasannulled.
Where a former Filipino citizen repents his naturalization and decides to resume his old nationality, he must
manifestabecomingcontrition.Hecannotsimplyabandonhisadoptedcountryandcomebacktothiscountryasif
hewerebestowingagiftofhimselfuponthenation.Itisnotaseasyasthat.Heisnotadonorbutasupplicant.
Inasense,heisanapostate.HehasrenouncedPhilippinecitizenshipbyaknowingandaffirmativeact.Whenhe
pledged allegiance to the adopted country, he also flatly disavowed all allegiance to the Philippines. He cannot
erasetheinfidelitybysimplyestablishinghisresidenceshereandclaimingthestatushehaslost.
TheremorsefulFilipinoturnedalienbyhisownchoicecannotsaythathesoughtnaturalizationinanothercountry
onlyforreasonsofconvenience.Thatpretextisitselfabadgeofbadfaithandinsincerity.Itreflectsonhismoral
character and suggests that he is not an honest person. By his own admission, he deceived his adopted country
whenhepretendedunderoathtoembraceitswayoflife."[Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied]

Ofcourse,thisisonlyonesideofthestoryandcannotrepresentthetotaltruthofthereturningcitizensituation.Still,itwouldbebestto
remembertherenegade,lestweforgetthishiddenfacetofthiscaseaswehearmanyimpassionedpleasforjusticeandfairness,among
them for foundlings, within and outside the Court. What should be before us should be one whole story with all the pieces woven
together, both for and against the parties' respective sides. Part of this story should be the general public whose interests should be
foremostinourminds.Inconsideringthem,weshouldconsidermostofalltheConstitutionthatthattheyapprovedintheexercise
oftheirsovereignpower.
PARTA
SUMMARYOFTHEponencia'SVOTES&POSITIONS

Ofthenine(9)membersoftheCourtsupportingtheponencia,four(4)amongthem,JusticesBenjaminCaguioa,FrancisJardeleza,and
MarioVictorM.V.F.Leonen,aswellasChiefJusticeMariaLourdesP.A.Serenoherselfsubmittedtheirrespectiveopinionstoexplaintheir
ownvotesasreasonsforsupportingtheponencia'sconclusions.
Whiletheyofferedtheirrespectiveviews(particularlyonPoe'sclaimednaturalborncitizenstatus,tenyearresidency,andtheCOMELEC's
conclusionoffalserepresentations),theyfullyconcurred(bynotqualifyingtheirrespectiveconcurrences)withtheponencia'sbasicreason
inconcludingthatgraveabuseofdiscretionattendedtheCOMELEC'schallengedrulings.
Ontheotherhand,theotherfour(4)memberswhovotedwiththemajorityfullyconcurredwithoutqualificationwiththeponencia,thus
fullyjoinedit.
IngrantingPoe'scertioraripetitions,theponenciaruledthat

" .. .[t]he procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [Poe] is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the May 9, 2016 National
Elections."[2][emphasisandunderscoringsupplied]

Underthetermsofthisgrant,theponenciaconfirmeditspositionthattheCOMELECrulingwasattendedbygraveabuseofdiscretionand
thiswasthesolebasisfortheCourtdecisionthatCOMELECrulingshouldbenullifiedandsetaside.
The ponencia gave the following explanations, which I quote for specific reference (as I do not wish to be accused of maliciously
misreadingtheponencia):

"TheissuebeforetheCOMELECiswhetherornottheCOCof[Poe]shouldbedeniedduecourseorcancelled'ontheexclusive
ground' that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretionoftheCOMELECandrestrainitfromgoingintotheissueofthequalificationsofthecandidatefortheposition,if,as
in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same

cancellationcase,decidethequalificationorlackthereofofthecandidate.
xxxx

xxxaspresentlyrequired,todisqualifyacandidatetheremustbeadeclarationbyafinaljudgmentofacompetentcourtthat
the candidate sought to be disqualified 'is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
providedbylawortheConstitution.[3]
xxxThefactsofqualificationmustbeforehandbeestablishedinapriorproceedingbeforeanauthorityproperlyvestedwith
jurisdiction.Thepriordeterminationofqualificationmaybebystatute,byexecutiveorderorbyjudgmentofacompetentcourt
ortribunal."[4]
Ifacandidatecannotbedisqualifiedwithoutpriorfindingthatheorsheissufferingfromadisqualification'providedbylawor
the Constitution, ' neither can the [CoC] be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false material representations
regardinghisorherqualifications,suchpriorauthoritybeingthenecessarymeasurebywhichfalsityofrepresentationcanbe
found. The only exception that can be made conceded are selfevident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and
judicial confessions xx x [which] are equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined".[5]

To summarize all these in a more straightforward format, the ponencia concluded that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancellingPoe'sCoCbecause:

(1) the Comelec did not have the authority to rule on Poe's citizenship and residency qualifications as these
qualificationshavenotyetbeendeterminedbytheproperauthority.
(2)sincethereisnosuchpriordeterminationastoPoe'squalifications,thereisnobasisforafindingthatPoe's
representationsarefalse
(3)whileacandidate'sCoCmaybecancelledwithoutpriordisqualificationfindingfromtheproperauthority,the
issues involving Poe's citizenship and residency do not involve self evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionableveracityfromwhichthefalsityofrepresentationcouldhavebeendeterminedand
(4) The COMELEC's determinations on Poe's citizenship and residency are acts of grave abuse of discretion
because:
(a)Poe's naturalborn citizenship is founded on the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution, domestically
recognizedpresumptions,generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallaw,andexecutiveandlegislativeactions
and
(b) Poe's residency claims were backed up not only by jurisprudence, but more importantly by overwhelming
evidence.

Justice Caguioa additionally offered the view that the requirement of "deliberate intent to deceive" cannot be disposed of by a simple
finding that there was false representation of a material fact. Rather, there must also be a showing of the candidate's intent to deceive
animatedthefalsematerialrepresentation.[6]
J. Caguioa also pointed out that the COMELEC shifted the burden to Poe to prove that she had the qualifications to run for President
instead of requiring the private respondents (as the original petitioners in the petitions before the COMELEC) to prove the three (3)
elementsrequiredinaSection78proceeding.Itfailedtoappreciatethattheevidenceofbothpartiesrested,attheleast,atequipoise,
andshouldhavebeenresolvedinfavorofPoe.
A.1.TheponenciaonPoe'scitizenship

First, on Poe's citizenship, i.e, that Poe was not a naturalborn Philippine citizen the ponencia essentially ruled that
althoughsheisafoundling,herbloodrelationshipwithaFilipinocitizenisdemonstrable.[7]
J.Leonenagreedwiththispointandadded[8]thatallfoundlingsinthePhilippinesarenaturalbornbeingpresumptivelyborntoeithera
Filipinobiologicalfatherormother,unlesssubstantialprooftothecontraryisshown.Thereisnorequirementthatthefatherormother
shouldbeidentified.Therecanbeproofofareasonablebeliefthatevidencepresentedinarelevantproceedingsubstantiallyshowsthat
eitherthefatherorthemotherisaFilipinocitizen.
Forhispart,J.Caguioasubmittedthatifindeedamistakehadbeenmaderegardingherrealstatus,thiscouldbeconsideredamistakeon
adifficultquestionoflawthatcouldbethebasisofgoodfaith.[9]
Second, more than sufficient evidence exists showing that Poe had Filipino parents since Philippine law provides for presumptions

regardingpaternity.[10]Poe'sadmissionthatsheisafoundlingdidnotshifttheburdenofprooftoherbecauseherstatusdidnotexclude
thepossibilitythatherparentsareFilipinos.[11]
The factual issue is not who the parents of Poe are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents were Filipinos.[12] The
followingcircumstantialevidenceshowthatPoewasanaturalbornFilipino:(1)statisticalprobabilitythatanychildborninthePhilippines
atthetimeofPoe'sbirthisnaturalbornFilipino(2)theplaceofPoe'sabandonmentand(3)Poe'sFilipinophysicalfeatures.[13]
Third,theframersofthe1935ConstitutionandthepeoplewhoadoptedthisConstitutionintendedfoundlingstobecoveredbythelistof
Filipino citizens.[14] While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would
definitelyexcludefoundlings.[15]
Thusviewed,theponenciabelievesthatPoeisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesbycircumstantialevidence,bypresumption,andby
implicationfromthesilenttermsoftheConstitution.
TheponenciaalsoclarifiedthattheRafolsamendmentpointedoutbyPoewasnotcarriedinthe1935Constitutionnotbecausetherewas
anyobjectiontotheirinclusion,butbecausethenumberoffoundlingsatthetimewasnotenoughtomeritspecificmention.[16]
More than these reasons, the inclusion of foundlings in the list of Philippine citizens is also consistent with the guarantee of equal
protectionofthelawsandthesocialjusticeprovisionsintheConstitution.[17]
J. Jardeleza particularly agreed with these reasons and added that in placing foundlings at a disadvantaged evidentiary position at the
startofthehearingandimposinguponthemahigherquantumofevidence,theCOMELECeffectivelycreatedtwoclassesofchildren:(1)
those with known biological parents and (2) those whose biological parents are unknown. This classification is objectionable on equal
protection grounds because it is not warranted by the text of the Constitution. In doing so, the COMELEC effectively subjected her to a
higherstandardofproof,thatofabsolutecertainty.[18]
Fourth, the domestic laws on adoption and the Rule on Adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos as these include
foundlingsamongtheFilipinochildrenwhomaybeadopted.[19]
Insupportofthisposition,J.Leonenadditionallypointedoutthatthelegislaturehasprovidedstatutesessentiallybasedonapremisethat
foundlingsarePhilippinecitizensatbirth,citingtheJuvenileJusticeandWelfareActof2006andthatthePhilippinesalsoratifiedtheUN
ConventionontheRightsoftheChildandthe1966InternationalConventiononCivilandPoliticalRights,whicharelegallyeffectiveand
bindingbytransformation.
J. Leonen further argued that the executive department had, in fact, also assumed Poe's naturalborn status when she reacquired
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, hereinafter RA 9225) and when she
wasappointedastheChairpersonoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoard(MTRCB).[20]Hernaturalbornstatuswas
recognized, too, by the people when she was elected Senator and by the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) when it affirmed her
qualificationstorunforSenator.[21]
TheChiefJusticeadded,onthispoint,thattheSETdecisionisanotherdocumentthatshowsthatshewasnotlyingwhensheconsidered
herselfanaturalbornFilipino.Attheveryleast,itisaprimafacieevidencefindingofnaturalborncitizenshipthatPoecanrelyon.The
SETrulingnegatedtheelementofdeliberateattempttomislead.[22]
Fifth.theissuanceofafoundlingcertificateisnotanacttoacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenshipthatmakesafoundlinganaturalized
Filipino at best. "Having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In the case of foundlings, the
determinationofhis/herfoundlingstatusisnotdonebyhimself,butbytheauthorities.[23]
Sixth,foundlingsarePhilippinecitizensunderinternationallaw,i.e.,theUniversalDeclarationonHumanRights(UDHR),UnitedNations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), all obligate the
Philippinestograntthemnationalityfrombirthandtoensurethatnochildisstateless.Thisgrantofnationalitymustbeatthetimeof
birthwhichcannotbeaccomplishedbytheapplicationofourpresentNaturalizationLaws.[24]
The principle that the foundlings are presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth, under the 1930 Hague Convention on
CertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLawsandthe1961UnitedNationsConventionontheReductionofStatelessness
is a generally accepted principle of international law. "Generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
internationalcustom,butalsoon"generalprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations."[25]
TherequirementofopinioJurissivenecessitatesinestablishingthepresumptionofthefoundingState'snationalityinfavoroffoundlings
underthe1930HagueConventionandthe1961ConventiononStatelessnessasgenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawwas,in
fact,establishedbythevariousexecutiveandlegislativeactsrecognizingfoundlingsasPhilippinecitizens,i.e.,bytheexecutivethrough
theDepartmentofForeignAffairsinauthorizingtheissuanceofpassportstofoundlings,andbytheLegislature,viatheDomesticAdoption
Act.Adoptingtheselegalprinciplesinthe1930HagueConventionandthe1961ConventiononStatelessnessisrationalandreasonable
andconsistentwiththejussanguinisregimeinourConstitution.[26]
Lastly,theCOMELECdisregardedsettledjurisprudencethatrepatriationresultsinthereacquisitionofnaturalbornPhilippinecitizenship.
[27]Poe'srepatriationunderRANo.9225didnotresultinherbecominganaturalizedFilipino,butrestoredherstatusasanaturalborn

Philippine citizen. Repatriation is not an act to "acquire or perfect one's citizenship" nor does the Constitution require the naturalborn
statustobecontinuousfrombirth.[28]

A.2.TheponenciaonPoe'sresidency
The ponencia ruled that the COMELEC gravely erred on the residency issue when it blindly applied the ruling in Coquilla, Japzon, and
Caballero reckoning the period of residence of former naturalborn Philippine citizens only from the date of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship,andreliedsolelyinherstatementinher2012CoCastotheperiodofherresidenceinthePhilippines.TheCOMELECreached
theseconclusionsbydisregardingtheimportofthevariouspiecesofevidencePoepresentedestablishingheranimusmanendiandanimus
nonrevertendi.[29]
Poe,infact,hadshownmorethansufficientevidencethatsheestablishedherPhilippineresidenceevenbeforerepatriation.Thecasesof
Coquilla,Japzon,Caballero,andReyesarenotapplicabletoPoe'scasebecauseinthesecases,thecandidatewhoseresidencyqualification
was questioned presented "sparse evidence"[30] on residence which gave the Court no choice but to hold that residence could only be
countedfromtheacquisitionofapermanentresidentvisaorfromreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.Underthisreasoning,Poeshowed
overwhelmingevidencethatshedecidedtopermanentlyrelocatetothePhilippinesonMay24,2005,orbeforerepatriation.[31]
J.Leanen,onthispoint,addedthattheCOMELEC'sdogmaticrelianceonformalpreconceivedindicatorshasbeenrepeatedlydecriedby
theCourtasgraveabuseofdiscretion.Worse,theCOMELECreliedonthewrongformalindicatorsofresidence.[32]
Astheponenciadid,J.LeanenstressedthattheCOMELECdisregardedPoe'sevidenceofreestablishmentofPhilippineresidencepriorto
July 2006 when it merely invoked Poe's status as one who had not reacquired Philippine citizenship. To him, the COMELEC relied on a
manifestlyfaultypremisetojustifythepositionthatallofPoe'sevidencebeforeJuly2006deservednoconsideration.[33]
Second,PoemayreestablishherresidencenotwithstandingthatshecarriedabalikbayanvisainenteringthePhilippines.Theoneyear
visafreeperiodallowsabalikbayantoreestablishhisorherlifeandtoreintegratehimselforherselfintothecommunitybeforeattending
totheformalandlegalrequirementsofrepatriation.Thereisnooverridingintentunderthebalikbayanprogramtotreatbalikbayansas
temporaryvisitorswhomustleaveafteroneyear.[34]
Third,Poecommittedanhonestmistakeinher2012CoCdeclarationonherresidenceperiod.[35]Followingjurisprudence,itisthefactof
residence and not the statement in a CoC which is decisive in determining whether the residency requirement has been satisfied. The
COMELEC,infact,acknowledgedthatthequeryontheperiodofresidenceintheCoCformfortheMay2013electionswasvaguethus.it
changed the phrasing of this query in the current CoC form for the May 9, 2016 elections. It was grave abuse of discretion for the
COMELECtotreatthe2012CoCasbindingandconclusiveadmissionagainstPoe.
Fourth,assumingthatPoe'sresidencystatementinher2015CoCiserroneous,Poehadnodeliberateintenttomisleadortohideafactas
shownbyherimmediatedisclosureinpublicofhermistakeinthestatedperiodofresidenceinher2012CoCforSenator.[36]
PARTB
SPECIFICREFUTATIONOFTHEponencia'SOUTSTANDINGERRORS
MyoriginalSeparateConcurringOpinion(totheoriginalponenciaofJusticeMarianodelCastillo)dealswithmost,ifnotall,ofthepositions
that the majority has taken. My Separate Concurring Opinion is quoted almost in full below (with some edits for completeness) as my
detailedrefutationoftheponencia.
Nevertheless, I have incorporated Part B in this Opinion to address the ponencia's more egregious claims that, unless refuted, would
drastically change the constitutional and jurisprudential landscape in this country, in order only to justify the candidacy of one popular
candidate. As I repeated often enough in my Separate Concurring Opinion, the Court operates outside of its depth and could possibly
succeedindrowningthisnationifitaddsto,detractsfrom,negates,enlargesormodifiesthetermsoftheConstitutionasapprovedbythe
sovereignpeopleofthePhilippines.
B.1.TheponenciaontheComelec'slackofjurisdiction
Theponencia presented two arguments in concluding that the COMELEC lacked the jurisdiction to determine Poe's eligibility to become
Presidentinthecourseofasection78proceedingagainsther:
First, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution on the COMELEC's jurisdiction had no specific provision regarding the qualification of the
President,VicePresident,SenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whileArticleVI,Section17andArticleVII,Section4of
the1987ConstitutionspecificallyincludedcontestinvolvingthequalificationsofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
andofthePresidentandVicePresident,tothejurisdictionoftheSenateElectoralTribunal(SET),theHouseofRepresentativesElectoral
Tribunal(HRET)andthePresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET)respectively.[37]
Second,Ferminv.Comelec,[38]citingtheSeparateOpinionofJusticeVicenteV.MendozainRomualdezMarcosv.Comelec,[39]notedthat
"thelackofprovisionfordeclaringtheineligibilityofcandidates,however,cannotbesuppliedbyamererule."[40]Thisviewwasadopted
intherevisionoftheCOMELECRulesofProcedurein2012,asreflectedinthechangesmadeinthe2012Rulesfromthe1993Rulesof
Procedure,[41]asfollows:
1993RulesofProcedure:
Section1.GroundsforDisqualification.Anycandidatewhodoesnotpossessallthequalificationsofacandidateasprovidedforbythe
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuingasacandidate.

2012RulesofProcedure:
Rule 25, Section 1. Grounds, Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competentcourt,guiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissiontobesufferingfromanydisqualificationprovidedbylawortheConstitution.
APetitiontoDisqualifyaCandidateinvokinggroundsforaPetitiontoDenyortocancelaCertificateofCandidacyorPetitiontoDeclarea
CandidateasaNuisanceCandidate,oracombinationthereof,shallbesummarilydismissed.
TheponenciareadFerminandthe2012RulesofProceduretomeanthatthereisnoauthorizedproceedingtodeterminethequalifications
ofacandidatebeforethecandidateiselected.Todisqualifyacandidate,theremustbeadeclarationbyafinaljudgmentofacompetent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
providedbylawortheConstitution."[42]
Thus, the ponencia held that a certificate of candidacy "cannot be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the
necessarymeasurebywhichthefalsityoftherepresentationcanbefound.Theonlyexceptionthatcanbeconcededareselfevidentfacts
ofunquestionedorunquestionableveracityandjudicialconfessions."[43]
TheargumentsinmyoriginalSeparateConcurringOpinionregardingtheCOMELEC'sjurisdictiontoruleonSection78casesaddressthe
ponencia'sarguments,asfollows:
a)TheCOMELEC'squasijudicialpowerinresolvingaSection78proceedingincludesthedeterminationofwhetheracandidatehasmadea
falsematerialrepresentationinhisCoC,andthedeterminationofwhethertheeligibilityherepresentedinhisCoCistrue.
b) In Tecson v. COMELEC"[44] the Court has recognized the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over a presidential
candidate.
c)Fermin'squotationofJusticeMendoza'sSeparateOpinioninRomualdezMarcosshouldbetakenincontext,asFerminitselfclarified:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a
findingthatthecandidatemadeamaterialrepresentationthatisfalse,whichmayrelatetothequalificationsrequiredofthepublicoffice
he/sheisrunningfor.Itisnotedthatthecandidatestatesinhis/herCoCthathe/sheiseligiblefortheofficehe/sheseeks.Section78of
theOEC,therefore,istobereadinrelationtotheconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsonqualificationsoreligibilityforpublicoffice.If
the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceedingunderSection253oftheOECsincetheybothdealwiththeeligibilityorqualificationofacandidate,withthedistinctionmainly
in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winningcandidate.[45][underscoringsupplied]
Asidefromthesearguments,Ipointoutthat:
d)Theponente'sconclusioncontradictshisownrecentaffirmationoftheCOMELEC'sjurisdictiontodeterminetheeligibilityofacandidate
throughaSection78proceedinginOngsiakoReyesv.COMELEC(G.R.No.207264,June25,2013)andinCeraficav.COMELEC(G.R.No.
205136December2,2014).
InOngsiakoReyesv.COMELEC,theCourt,speakingthroughJ.Perez,affirmedtheCOMELEC'scancellationofOngsiakoReyes'CoCand
affirmeditsdeterminationthatOngsiakoReyesisneitheraPhilippinecitizennoraresidentofMarinduque.
The Court even affirmed the COMELEC's capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in response to OngsiakoReyes'
allegationthattheCOMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninadmittingnewlydiscoveredevidencethathadnotbeentestifiedon,offered
andadmittedinevidence.TheCourtheld:
Allinall,consideringthatthepetitionfordenialandcancellationoftheCoCissummaryinnature,theCOMELECisgivenmuchdiscretion
in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of whether or not the CoC should be
cancelled.WeheldinMasturav.COMELEC:
Therulethatfactualfindingsofadministrativebodieswillnotbedisturbedbycourtsofjusticeexceptwhenthereisabsolutelynoevidence
ornosubstantialevidenceinsupportofsuchfindingsshouldbeappliedwithgreaterforcewhenitconcernstheCOMELEC,astheframers
oftheConstitutionintendedtoplacetheCOMELECcreatedandexplicitlymadeindependentbytheConstitutionitselfonalevelhigher
thanstatutoryadministrativeorgans.TheCOMELEChasbroadpowerstoascertainthetrueresultsoftheelectionbymeansavailabletoit.
Fortheattainmentofthatend,itisnotstrictlyboundbytherulesofevidence.[46][emphasis,italicsandunderscoringsupplied]
In Cerafica, the Court, again speaking through J. Perez, held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly
Cerafica(acandidateforcouncilor)didnotfileavalidCoCandsubsequentlycannotbesubstitutedbyOliviaCerafica.Kimberly'sCoCis
consideredvalidunlessthecontentstherein(includinghereligibility)isimpugnedthroughaSection78proceeding.AsKimberly'sCoChad
not undergone a Section 78 proceeding, then her CoC remained valid and she could be properly substituted by Olivia. In so doing, the
CourtquotedandreaffirmeditspreviousrulinginLunav.COMELEC:[47]
"IfHansRogermadeamaterialmisrepresentationastohisdateofbirthorageinhiscertificateofcandidacy,hiseligibilitymayonlybe
impugnedthroughaverifiedpetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelsuchcertificateofcandidacyunderSection78oftheElectionCode."
[48][italicssupplied]

e) The ponencia's conclusion would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a
candidate'seligibilityinthecourseofdecidingaSection78proceedingbeforeit.
TheponenciadisregardedthefollowingcaseswhereitrecognizedtheCOMELEC'sjurisdictiontodetermineeligibilityaspartofdetermining
false material representation in a candidate's CoC. Cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (the year the COMELEC amended its
RulesofProcedure)areshowninthetablebelow:

Case
Arateav.Comelec
C.R.No.195229
October9,2012

Ponente,Division
Carpio,J.Enbanc

MaquilingV.Comelec, Sereno,CJ,Enbanc
G.R. No. 195649,
April16,2013
Ongsiako Reyes v. Perez,J.,EnBanc
Comelec, G.R. No.
207264, June 25,
2013

Ruling:
The Court affirmed the Comelec's determination that Lonzanida
has served for three terms already and therefore misrepresented
his eligibility to run for office this, according to the Court, is a
groundforcancellingLonzanida'sCoCunderSection78.
The Court reversed the Comelec's determination of the Arnado's
qualification to run for office because of a recanted oath of
allegiance,andthuscancelledhisCoeandproclaimedMaquilingas
the winner. The Court, in reviewing the Comelec's determination,
didnotdisputeitscapacitytodetermineArnado'squalifications.
The Court affirmed the Comelec's evaluation and determination
that OngsiakoReyes is not a Philippine citizen and a resident of
thePhilippines.

It even upheld the Comelec's cognizance of "newlydiscovered

evidence"andheldthattheComeleccanliberallyconstrueitsown
rulesofprocedureforthespeedydispositionofcasesbeforeit.
Cerafica v. Comelec, Perez, J. En Banc The Court held that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
G.R.
No.
205136 Decision
holding that Kimberly did not file a valid CoC and subsequently
December2,2014
cannotbesubstitutedbyOliviainsodoing,theCourtquotedand
reaffirmeditspreviousrulinginLunavComelec,thus:

Lunav.Comelec, G.R. Carpio,J.EnBanc

No. 165983 April 24,
2007
(cited
as
reference
to
its
affirmation
in
Cerafrica)

"If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date

of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may
onlybeimpugnedthroughaverifiedpetitiontodenyduecourseto
or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
ElectionCode."
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the
COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute
forHansRoger.
xxx
IfHansRogermadeamaterialmisrepresentationastohisdateof
birthorageinhiscertificateofcandidacy,hiseligibilitymayonly
be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
ElectionCode.
Inthiscase,therewasnopetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancel
the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only
declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to
deny due course to or cancel Luna's certificate of candidacy. In
effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled
HansRoger'scertificateofcandidacyanddeclaredthesubstitution
byLunainvalid.

f)Rules23ofthe2012COMELECRulesofProceduredoesnotlimittheCOMELEC'sjurisdictionindeterminingtheeligibility
ofacandidateinthecourseofrulingonaSection78proceeding.
ThesecondparagraphinRule23delineatesthedistinctionbetweenaSection78cancellationproceedingandaSection68
disqualificationproceedingtoavoidthemuddlingormixingofthegroundsforeachremedy,theCOMELECoptedtoprovide
thatpetitionsthatcombineorsubstituteoneremedyfortheothershallbedismissedsummarily.
Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for
disqualification.
Rule23provides:

Section1.GroundforDenialorCancellationofCertifcateofCandidacy.
A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any
registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that
anymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredbylawisfalse.

APetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCancelCertificateofCandidacyinvokinggroundsotherthanthosestatedaboveorgrounds
fordisqualification,orcombininggroundsforaseparateremedy,shallbesummarilydismissed

Thus,Rule23recognizesmaterialmisrepresentationintheCoCasthesolegroundforSection78withoutamendingthedefinitionoffalse
materialrepresentationthatjurisprudencehasprovidedasearlyas1999inSalcedoIIv.COMELEC:[49]

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresentedinthecertificateofcandidacyandtheproceedingsmustbeinitiatedbeforetheelections,whereasapetitionfor
quowarrantoundersection253maybebroughtonthebasisoftwogrounds(1)ineligibilityor(2)disloyaltytotheRepublic
of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a
candidateisineligibleifheisdisqualifiedtobeelectedtooffice,[21]andheisdisqualifiedifhelacksanyofthequalifications
forelectiveoffice.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to
qualificationsforelectiveoffice.Thisconclusionisstrengthenedbythefactthattheconsequencesimposeduponacandidate
guiltyofhavingmadeafalserepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacyaregravetopreventthecandidatefromrunningor,
ifelected,fromserving,ortoprosecutehimforviolationoftheelectionlaws.[23]Itcouldnothavebeentheintentionofthe
lawtodepriveapersonofsuchabasicandsubstantivepoliticalrighttobevotedforapublicofficeuponjustanyinnocuous
mistake:
xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.[25]Inotherwords,itmustbemade
withanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastoonesqualificationsforpublicoffice.xxx

B.1.a.Effectoftheponencia'smisinterpretationof
Section78proceedingstotheCourt'scertiorari
jurisdictionoverthepresentcase
Ifweweretofollowtheponencia'slimitationontheCOMELEC'sfunctiontodeterminePoe'seligibilitytobecomePresidentinaSection78
proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poe's citizenship and residence eligibilities in
thecourseofreviewingaSection78COMELECrulinganydeclarationregardingtheseissueswouldbeobiterdictum.
In practical terms, the Court's ruling only assured Poe the chance to run conceivably, if she wins, the Court, through the Presidential
ElectoralTribunal,willthenrulethatthepeoplehavespokenandthattheycannotbedeniedtheirvoiceaftertheelections.Basedonthe
presentcircumstances,thisisascenariothatcannotbeentirelyruledout.
Toreiterate,theponenciadeclaredthattheCOMELEChasnojurisdictiontodetermine,evenpreliminarily,theeligibilityofcandidatesprior
to an election under a Section 78 proceeding, except for disqualifications already or previously acted upon by the proper authorities or
where the facts are selfevident or of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the falsity of representation could readily be
determined.
SincetheCOMELEClacksjurisdiction"toruleandcannotevenpreliminarilydeterminequestionsofeligibility,thentheissuesinvolvingthe
COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in ruling on Poe's eligibilities cannot effectively be resolved except through a ruling that,
given the lack of authority, it was grave abuse of discretion for COMELEC to rule as it did. And given the same lack of authority, the
reversalofthecancellationofherCoCmustfollowasaconsequence.Thus,herCoCeffectivelyremainsvalid.
TheconsequenceofrulingthattheCOMELECiswithoutjurisdictiontodetermineeligibilityaspartofaSection78proceedingisthatany
othersubsequentdiscussionsbythisCourtupholdingPoe'seligibilitieswouldbeobiterdicta,orpronouncementsthatarenotessentialto
theresolutionofacase.WiththeCOMELECstrippedofthejurisdictiontodetermine,evenpreliminarily,Poe'scitizenshipandresidence,
thenitsdeterminationsarenullandvoid,leadingtothefurtherconclusionthatthisCourtnolongerhasanyissuelefttoreviewandto
decideuponasneitherwoulditbenecessarytodeterminePoe'seligibilities.
Inotherwords,anypronouncementsoutsidetheCOMELEC'slimitedjurisdictioninSection78wouldonlybeexpressionsoftheCOMELEC's
opinionandwouldhavenoeffectinthedeterminationofthemeritsoftheSection78casebeforeit.Findingsofineligibilityoutsideofthe
limits do not need to be resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the
presidency,withhereligibilitiesopentopostelectionquestions,ifstillnecessaryatthatpoint.
B.1.b.Aruego'saccountofthedeliberations,
ascitedintheponencia
Ironically,theponencia'scitationofJoseM.Aruego'srecountingofthedeliberationsevenreinforcesmypositionthattheframersnever
intendedtoincludefoundlingswithinthetermsofthe1935Constitution'sparentageprovisions.Aruegoallegedlysaid:

Duringthedebatesonthisprovision,DelegateRafolspresentedanamendmenttoincludeasFilipinocitizensthe
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings

but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.[50]

Aruego'saccountofthedeliberationsreinforcesmypositionforthefollowingreasons:
First,Aruegosaidthat"thisamendmentwasdefeatedprimarilybecausetheConventionbelievedthatthecases,beingtoofewtowarrant
theinclusionofaprovisionintheConstitutiontoapplytothem,shouldbegovernedbystatutorylegislation."
Insayingthis,Aruegoalsorecountedthatmany,ifnotmost,ofthemajorityofthosewhovotedagainsttheinclusionoffoundlingsinthe
1935Constitutionbelievedthatthematteroftheircitizenshipshouldbegovernedbystatutorylegislationbecausethecasesoffoundlings
aretoofewtobeincludedintheConstitution.
Thus,theprincipleofinternationallawonfoundlingsismerelysupportiveoftheprimaryreasonthatthemattershouldbegovernedby
statute,orisasecondaryreasontothemajority'sdecisionnottoincludefoundlingsinArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitution.
Notably, both the text of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention and the account of its member Jose Aruego do not
disclose that the intent behind the noninclusion of foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution was because they are
deemedalreadyincluded.
What deliberations show is that a member of the Convention thought that it would be better for a statute to govern the citizenship of
foundlings, which Aruego, in his subsequent retelling of what happened in the deliberations, described as the primary belief of the
majority.Attheveryleast,therewasnoclearagreementthatfoundlingswereintendedtobepartofArticleIV,Section1.
Theponencia'srulingthusdoesnotonlydisregardthedistinctionofcitizenshipbasedonthefatherorthemotherunderthe
1935 Constitution it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization
accordedtofoundlingswhodonotenjoysimilarroots.
Another drastic change appears to be coming for no clear and convincing legal reason in the present case: Section 78 would now be
emasculateddespiteestablishedrulingsbythisveryCourtonwhattheCOMELECcanundertakewithinitsSection78jurisdiction.
AclosereadingofOngsiakoReyesv.COMELEC,alsopennedbyJ.Perezasabovenoted,willshowthattheissuestheCOMELECdecided
there were practically the same issues in this cited case. Yet, the Court's majority in the present case holds that the COMELEC has no
jurisdictiontoruleontheissuesofacandidate'scitizenshipandresidencerequirementsinthecourseofaSection78proceeding,despite
its previous affirmation of the same COMELEC power in OngsiakoReyes also in a Section 78 proceeding. Have established precedents
beensacrificedtoachievedesiredresults?
ButtheworstimpactyetontheConstitutionisthediscoverythatthisCourtcanplayaroundevenwiththeexpresswordingsofthe
Constitution.Whilethismayalreadybeknowntothoseinthelegalprofession,therealitybecomesglaringandmaybeanewdiscovery
for the general public because of the recent EDCA case the present case and ruling may very well be considered another instance of
judicialtinkeringwiththeexpresstermsoftheConstitution.
B.1.c.BurdenofProof.

Acontestedissuethatsurfacedearlyoninthesecasesisthequestion:whocarriestheburdenofprovingthatthepetitionerisanatural
bornPhilippinecitizen?
Lest we be distracted by the substance of this question, let me clarify at the outset that the cases before us are petitions for certiorari
underRule64(inrelationtoRule65)oftheRulesofCourt.Inthesetypesofpetitions,thepetitionerchallengestherulings/smadebythe
respondent pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. Thus, it is the petitioner who carries the burden of showing that the
respondent,theCOMELECinthiscase,committedgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Ofcourse,inmakingthechallengedruling,theCOMELEChadawiderviewandhadtoconsidertheparties'respectivesituationsatthe
outset. The present private respondents were the petitioners who sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC and who thereby procedurally
carriedtheburdenofprovingtheclaimthatPoefalselyrepresentedhercitizenshipandresidencyqualificationsinherCoC.
Iwouldrefertothisastheproceduralaspectoftheburdenofproofissue.TheoriginalpetitionersbeforetheCOMELEC(therespondentsin
thepresentpetitions)fromtheperspectiveofprocedurecarriedtheburdenunderitsSection78cancellationofCoCpetition,toprove
thatPoemadefalsematerialrepresentationssheclaimedinherCoCthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizenwhensheisnotshealso
claimed that she has resided in the Philippines for ten years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, when she had not. The
originalpetitionershadtoprovewhattheyclaimedtobefalserepresentations.
Thus viewed, the main issue in the case below was the false material representation, which essentially rested on the premises of
citizenshipandresidenceisPoeanaturalborncitizenassheclaimedandhadsheobservedtherequisitequalifyingperiodofresidence?
TheoriginalpetitionersundertookthetaskonthecitizenshipissuebyallegingthatPoeisafoundlingassuch,herparentsareunknown,
sothatsheisnotaPhilippinecitizenunderthetermsofthe1935Constitution.

Poerespondedbyadmittingthatindeedsheisafoundling,butclaimedthattheburdenisontheoriginalpetitionerstoprovethatsheisin
factaforeignerthroughproofthatherparentsareforeigners.
Since Poe indeed could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original
petitionersarecorrectintheirpositionthattheyhavedischargedtheiroriginalburdentoprovethatPoeisnotanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippines.Toarriveatitsconclusion,theCOMELECconsideredandreliedonthetermsofthe1935Constitution.
With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her admission that she is a
foundling, she is in fact a naturalborn Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments
supportingtheviewthatafoundlingfoundinthePhilippinesisanaturalborncitizen.
The same process was repeated with respect to the residency issue, after which, the COMELEC ruled that Poe committed false
representations as, indeed, she is not a naturalborn Philippine citizen and had not resided in the country, both as required by the
Constitution.
TheseweretheprocessesanddevelopmentsattheCOMELEClevel,basedonwhichthepresentCourtmajoritynowsaythattheCOMELEC
committedgraveabuseofdiscretionfornotobservingtherulesontheburdenofproofonthecitizenshipandtheresidencyissues.
SeparatelyfromthestrictlyproceduralaspectsofthecancellationofCoCproceedings,itmustbeconsideredthatthepetitioner,byfilinga
CoC, actively represents that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the office she is
runningfor.
Whenthisrepresentationisquestioned,particularlythroughproofofbeingafoundlingasinthepresentcase,theburdenshouldreston
thepresentpetitionertoprovethatsheisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen,aresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediately
prior to the election, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a registered voter. This is the
opportunitythattheCOMELECgavePoetothefullest,andIseenoquestionofgraveabuseofdiscretiononthisbasis.
Fromthesubstantiveperspective,too,asovereignStatehastherighttodeterminewhoitscitizensare.[51]Byconferringcitizenshipona
person,theStateobligatesitselftograntandprotecttheperson'srights.Inthislightandasdiscussedmorefullybelow,thelistofFilipino
citizensundertheConstitutionmustbereadasexclusiveandexhaustive.
Thus,thisCourthasheldthatanydoubtregardingcitizenshipmustberesolvedinfavoroftheState.[52]Inotherwords,citizenship
cannotbepresumedthepersonwhoclaimsFilipinocitizenshipmustprovethatheorsheisinfactaFilipino.[53] It is only
uponproperproofthataclaimantcanbeentitledtotherightsgrantedbytheState.[54]
This was the Court's ruling in Paa v. Chan[55] where this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims
Philippinecitizenship,toprovetothesatisfactionofthecourtthatheisreallyaFilipino.Thisshouldbetrueparticularlyafterproofthat
theclaimanthasnotproven(andevenadmitsthelackofproven)Filipinoparentage.Nopresumptioncanbeindulgedinfavorofthe
claimantofPhilippinecitizenship,andanydoubtregardingcitizenshipmustberesolvedinfavoroftheState.
The Court further explained that the exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not
conclusiveproofthatheorsheisaPhilippinecitizen.Aperson,otherwisedisqualifiedbyreasonofcitizenship,mayexerciseandenjoythe
rightorprivilegeofaPhilippinecitizenbyrepresentinghimselftobeone.[56]
Based on these considerations, the Court majority's ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both
counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus, the
Courtmajority'spositionsonwhereandhowtheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionaretrulypuzzling.Withnograveabuseat
theCOMELEClevel,thepresentpetitioner'sownburdenofproofinthepresentcertiorariproceedingsbeforethisCourtmustnecessarily
fail.
PARTC
MYORIGINAL"SEPARATECONCURRINGOPINION"
TOTHEponenciaOF
JUSTICEMARIANODELCASTILLO
I am submitting this original Separate Concurring Opinion to refute in detail the ponencia 's main points that I disagree with. For
convenience,theoriginalnumberingsystemoftheoriginalhasbeenretainedandIhaveintroducededitsandsuppliedthefootnotesthat
weremissingwhenthisOpinionwascirculatedonMonday,March7,2016.
ThedeadlineforsubmissionofOpinionswasonMarch8,2016.ThedeliberationandthevotewereoriginallyscheduledforWednesday,
March9,2016toallowtheindividualJusticestoreadthroughallthesubmittedOpinions.Unfortunately,forreasonsnotfullydisclosedto
me,theactualdeliberationandvotingtookplaceonMarch8,2016(whenIwasonleaveformedicalreasons).
Thus, while my Separate Concurring Opinion was circulated, made available on time to all the Justices and accounted for in the Court's
countofvotes,Ididnothavethefullopportunitytoorallyexpoundonthem.Inthislight,thisDissentingOpinionismyopportunityto
covertheviewsIhavenotorallyaired.
I.
TheRelevantFactsandtheirLegalSignificance.

I.A.ThePetitionsforCancellationofCoC
andtheCOMELECruling
Four(4)petitionswerefiledwiththeCOMELECtocancelPoe'sCoCforthePresidencyunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode
(OEC).
ThefirstpetitionbeforetheCOMELECwasthepetitionforcancellationfiledbyEstrella C. Elamparo,whichwasdocketedasG.R. No.
221697.
Theotherthree(3)petitionweresimilarlyforthecancellationofPoe'sCoCfiledbyseparatepartiesbyFranciscoS.Tatad,AmadoD.
Valdez,andAntonioP.ContrerasandarebeforethisCourtunderG.R.Nos.221298700.
The petitions before this Court all of them for the nullification of the COMELEC en banc rulings through a writ of certiorari were
consolidatedforhearingandhandlingbecausetheyalldealtwiththecancellationofPoe'sCoe.
Thesepetitionsessentiallyraisedtwogroundsasbasisforthecancellationprayedfor:
First,shefalselyrepresentedhercitizenshipinherCoCbecausesheisnotanaturalbornFilipinocitizenand
Second,shefalselyrepresentedtheperiodofherresidencypriortotheMay9,2016electionsasshehasnotresidedinthePhilippines
foratleastten(10)yearsbeforethedayoftheelection.
Theseissueswereraisedbasedontheconstitutionalcommandthat:

SECTION2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,able
toreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyears
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.[ArticleVII,1987Constitution,emphasisandunderscoringsupplied]

TheCOMELECenbancintheappealthatPoefiledfromtheCOMELECDivisions'decisionsruledthatPoe'sCoCshouldbecancelledfor
thefalserepresentationsshemaderegardinghercitizenshipandresidency.Inthepetitionsbeforeus,PoeclaimsthattheCOMELECen
bancactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionwhenitmadethisruling.
Thus,theissuebeforethisCourtisnotperseabouttheCOMELEC'slegalauthoritytoruleonthecancellationofPoe'sCoC,butaboutthe
mannertheCOMELECexerciseditsjurisdiction,itsallegedlyabusiveactsthatcausedittoexceeditsjurisdiction.
I say this under the view that the COMELEC's primary authority in this case is to pass upon the candidates' certificates of
candidacyandtoordertheircancellationifwarranted,forfalserepresentationonmaterialpoints.ButtheCOMELECcan,inthe
exerciseofthisauthority,preliminarily(andasanecessarilyincludedpower)passonthecorrectnessoftheclaimsmadeonthe
materialpointsofcitizenship,residency,andotherqualifications.Iexplainthispointmoreextensivelybelow.
I.B.TheCitizenshipTable
ThecitizenshipissuesrelatetoPoe'sstatusasacitizenofthePhilippinesandtothecharacterofthiscitizenship:whetherornotsheisa
Philippinecitizenifso,whetherornotsheisanaturalborncitizenastheConstitutionrequires.
TheissuesstartedbecauseoftheundisputedevidencethatPoeisafoundling,whichraisedthequestion:

(a) what is the status of a foundling under the 1935 Constitution given that this is the governing law when Poe
wasfoundinSeptemberof1968.

PoewaslikewisenaturalizedasanAmericancitizenandthereafterappliedforthereacquisitionofFilipinocitizenshipunderRANo.9225.
Thiscircumstancegaverisetothequestions:

(a) was she qualified to apply under RA No. 9225 given that the law specifically applies only to former natural
borncitizens
(b) even granting arguendo that she can be considered naturalborn, did she under RA 9225 reacquire her
naturalbornstatusorisshenowanaturalizedcitizeninlightoftheconstitutionaldefinitionofwhoisanatural
borncitizen?

The COMELEC, after considering the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, noted that Poe's citizenship claim was based on the
materialrepresentationthatsheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswheninfact,sheisnotthusherrepresentationonamaterial
pointwasfalse.Onthisbasis,theCOMELECresolvedtocancelPoe'sCoCbasedonhercitizenshipstatements.
The false material representation started in Poe's application for reacquisition of citizenship under RA No. 9225 which became the
foundation for the exercise of critical citizenship rights (such as the appointment to the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board[MTRCB],hercandidacyandelectiontotheSenate,andherpresentcandidacyforthepresidency).

Had Poe early on identified herself as a foundling (i.e., one who cannot claim descent from a Filipino parent), then the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) would have at least inquired further because this undisclosed aspect of her personal circumstances
touchesonherformernaturalborncitizenshipstatusthebasicirreplaceablerequirementfortheapplicationofRANo.9225.
Notably, the BID approval led the career of Poe to her appointment to the MTRCB and her subsequent election to the Senate. Both
positionsrequirethenaturalborncitizenshipstatusthattheBIDpreviouslyrecognizedinapprovingPoe'sRANo.9225application.
Foreasyandconvenientreferenceandunderstandingoftheessentialfactsandissues,separatetablesofthemajorincidentsinthelifeof
Poe,relevanttotheissuesraisedandbasedonthedulyfootnotedparties'evidence,areherebypresented.
TableI
CITIZENSHIPTABLE

DATE
September3,1968

Particular's(withlegalsignificance)
ThedatePoewasfoundherparentageaswellastheexactdateandactualplaceof
birthareunknown.
PoeclaimsthatshewasbornonthisdatewhenEdgardoMilitarfoundherattheJaro
IloiloCathedral.[57]
Legalsignificance:OurConstitutionrequiresaPresidenttobeanaturalborncitizen.
Poeadmittedthatsheisafoundling(i.e.,onebornofunknownparents)[58]andlater
claimedthatsheisanaturalborncitizen.[59]
She made her representation on the basis of a claimed presumption of Filipino
citizenship(apparently stemming from the circumstances under which she was found
[on September 3,1968in JaroIloilo])[60]and on the basis of international law which
allegedlygavehernaturalborncitizenshipstatus.

September6,1968

November27,1968

1973
May13,1974

In2006

December13,1986

Poe never formally claimed that she is presumed a Filipino citizen under Philippine
adoptionlaws,althoughadoptionwasmentionedinpassinginherMemorandum.[61]
Emiliano reported Poe as a foundling with the Office I of the Civil Registrar (OCR) in
Jaro,Iloiloforregistration.[62]
Legalsignificance:officialrecordthatPoeisafoundling.Nolegalquestionhasbeen
raisedaboutthisdocument.
The OCR issued the foundling certificate under the name "Mary Grace Natividad
ContrerasMilitar."[63]
TheOriginalCertificateofLiveBirthdatedNovember27,1968containsthenotation
'foundling" and now appears to have erasures, to reflect apparently the subsequent
adoptionofPoebyRonaldAllanPoeandJesusaSonoraPoe.
WhenPoewasfiveyearsold,RonaldAllanPoeandJesusaSonoraPoefiledapetition
forPoe'sIadoption.[64]
TheCourtapprovedtheSpousesPoe'spetitionforadoption.Poe'snamewaschanged
to"MaryGraceSonoraPoe.[65]
LegalSignificance:Sheofficiallyassumedthestatusofalegitimatechildbyadoption
oftheSpousesPoe,buttheadoptiondidnotaffecthercitizenshipstatusunderP.D.
603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), the adopted child does not follow the
citizenshipoftheadoptingparents.[66]
Significantly,noquestionaroseregardingPoe'slegalcapacitytobeadoptedasthe
lawlikewisedoesnotbartheadoptionofanalien.[67]
Jesusa Sonora Poe registered Poe's birth and secured a birth certificate from the
NationalStatisticsOfficeonMay4,2006.Thecertificatedidnotreflectthatshewasa
foundling who had been adopted by the spouses Poe.[68] The changes were in
accordance with Adm. Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the Implementing Rules on the
CivilRegistryLaw,andP.D.603(TheChildandYouthWelfareCode)whichspecifically
allowstheconfidentialtreatmentoftheadoption.
TheComelecissuedavoter'sidentificationcardtoPoeforPrecinctNo.196,Greenhills,
SanJuan,MetroManila[69]
LegalSignificance:TherecordsofthecasedonotdisclosethedocumentsPoeused
to support her voter registration, but she must have surely claimed to be a Filipino
citizenotherwise,thevoter'sIDwouldnothavebeenissued.[70]

April4,1988

Poe Obtained her Philippine Passport No. F927287[71] from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
SherenewedherpassportonApril5,1993(PassportiNo.L881511)andonMay19,
1998(PassportNo.IDD155616).[72]

LegalSignificance:Shecouldhavebeengrantedapassportonlyifshehadapplied
as,andclaimedthatsheisaFilipinocitizen.[73]
Filipinocitizenshipisexpresslystatedonthefacesofthepassports.[74]

July29,1991

TheexerciseoftherightsofaFilipinocitizendoesnotripentonorcanitbethebasis
forclaimofFilipinocitizenship.[75]
Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an American citizen of
Filipinoextraction)inthePhilippinesonJuly27,1991.[76]
LegalSignificance:HerUS.residencystatusdidnotaffectthePhilippinecitizenship
status reflected in her passport and voter's ID, but affected her Philippine residency
status as soon as she applied for and was granted US. residency status. Specifically,
sheabandonedthePhilippinedomicilethatshehadfromthetimeshewasfound.[77]

October18,2001

PoebecameanaturalizedUnitedStates(US.)citizen.[78]
Legal significance: Poe lost whatever claim she had to Philippine citizenship
through"expressrenunciationofthecitizenship.[79]
U.S.citizenshipconfirmedherabandonmentofthePhilippinecitizenshipwhoserights
shehadbeenexercising,aswellasherPhilippineresidence.[80]
Note that in her oath to the U.S., she "absolutely and entirely renounce[d] and
abjure[d] all allegiance and fidelity ... to any state ... of whom or which I have
heretoforebeenasubjectorcitizen."(Thiswasthe"infidelity"thattheReturnofthe
Renegadequotation,above,referredto.)
SheturnedherbackonthePhilippinesundertheseterms.

December19,2001
October18,2001toJuly18,2006

PoeobtainedU.S.PassportNo.017037793,expiringonDecember18,2011.[81]
LegalSignificance:PartofherrightasaU.S.citizen.
Various travels of Poe to the Philippines before she applied for Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225. She used her U.S. Passport and entered the Philippines through
PhilippineBalikbayanvisas.[82]
DatesofArrival
December27,2001
January13,2002
November9,2003
April8,2004
December13,2004
May24,2005
September14,2005
January7,2006
March11,2006
July5,2006

Visa
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan

Passport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport

LegalSignificance:Duringthisperiod,PoeanAmericancitizenwasavisitorwho
hadabjuredallallegianceandfidelitytothePhilippinesshewasnotaFilipinocitizen
oralegalresidentofthecountry.
July7,2006

Julyl0,2006

ShetookheroathofallegiancetothePhilippines.[83]
LegalSignificance:ThestartoftheprocessofreacquiringFilipinocitizenshipbyan
alien under RA No. 9225. The process assumes that the applicant was a
NATURALBORNPhilippinecitizenshipbeforeshelostthiscitizenship.
Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) applications for: (a)
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 and (b)
derivativecitizenshipforherthreeminorchildren.[84]
LegalSignificance:RANo.9225isavailableonlytoformernaturalhornFilipino
citizens.[85] Thus, the validity of her RA No. 9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship
dependedonthevalidityofhernaturalborncitizenshipclaim.
ShefalselyrepresentedunderoathinherRANo.9225applicationthatshewasa
former naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and was the daughter of Ronald
andSusanPoe,therebyalsoconcealingthatshehadbeenafoundlingwhowas
adoptedbytheSpousesPoe,nottheirnaturalbornchild.Asanadoptedchild,she
couldnothavebeenanaturalborncitizenwhofollowedthecitizenshipoftheSpouses
Poeundertheruleofjussanguinis.
Thisfalsematerialrepresentationbecamethebasisforhersubsequentclaimtobea
naturalborn citizen, notably in her MTRCB appointment, her election to the Senate
and her present candidacy for President. The COMELEC 's ruling on Poe 's CoC for
Presidentisnowthesubjectofthepresentpetitions.

July18,2006

Despite the privilege under the adoption laws and rules[86] to keep the fact of
adoptionconfidential,shestillhadthedutytodiscloseherfoundlingstatusunderRA
No.9225becausethisismaterialinformationthatthelawmandatorilyrequirestobe
madeunderoathasaconditionfortheapplicationofthelaw.[87]
The BID approved Poe's application for Philippine citizenship and the applications for
derivativecitizenshipforherthreechildren.[88]
Legal Significance: The approval of Poe's RA No. 9225 application, on its face,
entitledhertoclaimdualcitizenshipstatusPhilippineandAmerican.[89]
To quote the BID Order approving Poe's application "the petitioner was a former
naturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,havingbeenborntoFilipinoparents...."This
OrderimmeasurablyfacilitatedPoe'ssubsequentclaimtonaturalbornstatus.
ThepresentcaseisnotthemediumtoquestionvalidityoftheBIDapproval,butstill
laysopenthequestionofwhetherPoecommittedfalsematerialrepresentationsinthe
application process a question of fact that the COMELEC ruled upon, [90] i.e., that
shefalselyrepresentedthatshehadbeenanaturalborncitizen.

August31,2006

The BID issued to Poe her Identification Certificate No. 0610918[91] pursuant to RA
No.9225inrelationwithAdministrativeOrderNo.91,seriesof2004andMemorandum
CircularNo.AFF2005.
PoeregisteredagainasvoterinBarangaySantaLucia,SanJuanCity.[92]

October31,2006

LegalSignificance:UnderRANo.9225,adualcitizencanvotebutcannotbevoted
upontoelectivepositionunlessarenunciationoftheothercitizenshipismade.[93]
PoeobtainedPhilippinePassportNo.XX473199.[94]

July31,2006

July18,2006October13,2009
(Thedateofthe
BID's approval, to the date of the
issuanceofPoe'sPhilippinepassport

LegalSignificance:ThepassportwasissuedaftertheapprovalofPoe'sRANo.9225
citizenshipandwasthereforeonthestrengthoftheapprovalmade.
PoetravelledabroadusingherU.S.passporttheBIDstampedtheentry"RC"and/or
"ICNo.0610918"forhertravelstoandfromthePhilippinesonthesedates:[95]
DatesofArrival
July21,2007
March28,2008
May8,2008
October2,2008
October5,2008
April20,2009
May21,2009
July31,2009

Visa
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC

Passport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport

October6,2010

October20,2010

LegalSignificance:TheBIDallowedPoetoenterandleavethecountryas"RC."Atty.
Poblador mentioned that "RC" means "resident citizen" to claim the marking as
evidenceofcontinuingresidency.
PoewasappointedChairoftheMTRCB.[96]
Legalsignificance:PoecouldhavebeenappointedasMTRCBChairpersononlyifshe
hadbeenanaturalborncitizen.[97]
Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and citizenship to comply with RA No. 9225's
requirements.[98]
Legal Significance: Her renunciation of US. Citizenship complied with the
requirementsofRANo.9225andwouldhavemadehera"pure"Filipinocitizenifshe
hadvalidlyreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipunderthislaw.[99]
A seldom noticed aspect of this renunciation is that Poe only renounced her U.S.
citizenshipbecauseitwasrequiredbyherappointmentandsubsequentassumptionto
officeattheMTRCB.[100]

October21,2010
October26,2010

PoetookherOathofOfficeforthepositionofMTRCBChairperson.[101]
Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of the MTRCB Chairperson.
[102]

Legalsignificance:PoecouldhavebeenappointedasMTRCBChairpersononlyifshe
hadbeenanaturalbornFilipinoCitizenship.[103]
U.S.governmentactionsontherenunciationofU.S.citizenshipthatPoemade.
TheU.S.immigrationnotedinPoe'spassportthatsherepatriatedherselfonthisdate.
[104]

July12,2011

Poe executed the Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of U.S. Nationality at the U.S.
EmbassyinManila.[105]

December9,2011
February3,2012

ShealsoexecutedaStatementofVoluntaryRelinquishmentofU.S.Citizenship.[106]
TheU.S.ViceConsulsignedaCertificateofLossofNationalityoftheU.S.[107]

February3,2012

TheU.S.ViceConsulsignedaCertificateofLossofNationalityoftheU.S.[107]
TheU.S.DepartmentofStateapprovedtheCertificateofLossofU.S.Nationality.[108]
Legal significance: Confirmatory renunciation, before U.S. authorities, of her
previousrenunciationunderRANo.9225.Upuntiltheseseriesofacts,Poewasadual
citizen.

October2,2012

Legally, this was the conclusive evidence that she had abandoned her U.S.
domicile,asatravelercarryingapurelyPhilippinepassport,shecouldnolongertravel
atwilltoandfromtheU.S..norresideinthatcountry.
PoefiledherCoCforSenatorfortheMay13,,2013Electionsshestatedthatsheisa
naturalbornFilipinocitizen.[109]
Legal Significance: This is another case involving the material representation of
being a naturalborn Filipino, having been born to Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa
SonoraPoe.
She was elected Senator without any question about her citizenship being
raised.

November18,2015

TheSenateElectoralTribunal(SET)(voting5to4)issueditsDecision[110]dismissing
theQuoWarrantopetitionofRizalitoDavidwhichwasbasedontheclaimthatPoeis
notanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.
LegalSignificanceTheSETrulingdoesnotbindnorbartheCOMELECfromruling
onthecancellationofCoCpetitionsbecausethesetribunalsaredifferent,thecauseof
actionsbeforethemaredifferent,andthepartiesarelikewisedifferent.

October15,2015

Significantly,thedissentsattheSETwerewhollybasedonlegalconsiderationson
theConstitution,oninternationallaw,andPhilippinestatutes.TheSETmajorityruling
reliedmoreonpoliticalconsiderations.
PoefiledherCoC[111]forPRESIDENTfortheMay9,2016Electionsshesignedthe
statementunderoaththatsheisaNATURALBORNFILIPINOCITIZEN.
Legal Significance: This is the citizenship issue in the present case which posed to
theComelec2subissues:
First.IsPoeanaturalbornFilipinocitizen
Afterconsideringherfoundlingstatus,her
Acquisition of U.S. citizenship and the consequent loss of her claimed naturalborn
Philippinecitizenship,andherallegedreacquisitionunderRANo.9225?
Second . Since she claimed she was a naturalborn citizen, did she commit false
material representations in her CoC and in the official documents supporting her
claim? If she did, should this false material representation lead to the cancellation of
herCoC?
Given the succession of falsities that Poe made on her naturalborn status, may the
COMELECbefaultedwithGADforrulingasitdid?
Ironically, she claims in the present CoC cancellation case that the grant by the
Philippines of her right to vote, her passport, and her appointment to the MTRCB
should be considered evidence of government recognitions of her naturalborn
Philippine citizen status.[112] She thus wants her very own misdeeds to be the
evidenceofhernaturalbornstatus.
The previous false claims open the question: could they count as evidence of
naturalborn status if they have all been rooted on documents that were based on
misrepresentations?
Moreimportantly,couldherelectionorappointmenttopublicofficehaveworkedto
automaticallygrantorrestoreherPhilippinecitizenship?
While the fact of adoption is confidential information in the Amended Certificate of
LiveBirth(butmustappearintheRegistryofBirth),thegrantofconfidentialityisnot
an absolute shield against the disclosure of being a foundling nor a defense against
falserepresentation.WhileinRANo.9225,thenaturalbornrequirementisastatutory
onethatarguablystandsatthesamelevelandfootingastheconfidentialprivilegeon
the law on adoption, in the present case, the naturalborn requirement is a
constitutional one that stands on a very much higher plane than the
confidentiality privilege. In the latter case, national interest is already plainly
involvedinelectingthehighestofficialoftheland.
Note,too,thatinFrivaldov.COMELEC,[113]theCourtruledthattheelectionofa
former Filipino to office does not automatically restore Philippine citizenship, the
possessionofwhichisanindispensablerequirementforholdingpublicoffice."Thewill

of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,thatthecandidatewasqualified.
[114]

I.C.RESIDENCYTABLE
Theresidencyissuesmainlystemmedfromtwoevents(1)thenaturalizationofPoeasaU.S.citizenand(2)herapplicationfor
reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225.
ThefirstmadeheradomiciliaryoftheU.S.,[115]whilethesecond(assumingtheclaimedreacquisitiontobevalid)gavehertherightto
reside in the Philippines and to be considered a domiciliary of the Philippines for the exercise of her political rights, i.e., for election
purposes, based on her compliance with the requisites for change of residence. Still assuming that she complied with the RA 9225
requisites,theconsolidatedpetitionsstillposethefollowingquestionstotheCOMELECandtothisCourt:
(a)WhethershebecamearesidentofthePhilippinesforelectionpurposesand
(b)Ifso,whendidshebecomearesident.
TheCOMELEC,afterconsideringtheevidenceandthesurroundingcircumstances,ruledthatsheengagedinfalsematerialrepresentations
in claiming her residency status in her CoC for the Presidency she tailorfitted her claim to the requirements of the position by
deviatingfromtheclaimshemadewhensheran/ortheSenate.
While she claimed that a mistake intervened in her Senate CoC, she failed to adduce evidence on the details and circumstances of the
mistake,thusmakingherclaimaselfservingone.Herclaim,too,wentagainstestablishedjurisprudencewhichholdsthatthecountingof
theperiodofresidencyforelectionpurposesstartsattheearliestfromtheapprovaloftheRANo.9225application.
Table2
THERESIDENCYTABLE

DATE
Particulars(withlegalsignificance)
Days prior to September 3, 1968 WithPoe'sparentageunknown,herresidencefromthetimeofherbirthuntilshewas
thedatePoewasfoundinJaro,Iloilo foundislikewiseunknown.

September3,1968[116]

LegalSignificance:Poe'scircumstancesofbirthhavebeenabigcipherfromthevery
beginning.
This is Poe's declared birthday, which is really the date Poe was found by Edgardo
MilitarattheJaroIloiloCathderal.ShewassubsequentlygiventothecareofEmiliano
Militarandhiswife,residentsofJaro,Iloilo.
LegalSignificance:ThespousesMilitarbecamePoe'sdefactoguardianshence,Poe
technicallybecamearesidentofJara,Iloilo

1973
May13,1974

RonaldAllanPoeandJesusaSonoraPoefiledapetitionforPoe'sadoption.[117]
ThecourtapprovedtheSpousesPoe'spetitionforadoption.Poe'snamewaschanged
to"MaryGraceSonoraPoe.[118]
Legal Significance: She officially assumed the status of a legitimate child after the
Spouses Poe adopted her. She then followed her adoptive parents' residence as her
domicileoforigin.

December13,1986

UndertheCivilCode,thegeneraleffectofadecreeofadoptionistotransfertothe
adoptive parents parental authority over the adopted child ... they must have the
sameresidence.[119]
The COMELEC issued a voter's identification card to Poe for Precinct No. 196,
Greenhills,SanJuan,MetroManila.[120]
Legal Significance: She could have been registered as a voter only if she had
representedthatshewasaFilipinocitizenandaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleast
oneyearandofGreenhills,SanJuan,MetroManilaforatleastsixmonthsimmediately
precedingtheelections.[121]
PoewenttotheU.S.tocontinuehertertiarystudiesattheBostonCollegeinChestnut
Hill,Massachusetts.[122]
Legal Significance: Poe remained a Philippine resident while studying in the US.
AbsencefromPhilippinedomiciletopursuestudiesoverseasdoesnotconstitutelossof
domicileorresidence.

1991

PoegraduatedfromBostonCollege.[123]
Legal significance. Absence from the domicile of origin to pursue studies does not
constitutelossofdomicileorresidence.
WhileastudentintheU.S.,Poe'spermanentresidenceremainedinthePhilippines,
there was intent to return to the Philippines or animusrevertendi.[124] There is no

evidenceorprovenintenttomakeBostonherfixedandpermanenthome.[125]
July29,1991

Thus,PoewasapermanentPhilippineresidentfor23years(1968to1991).
Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an American citizen of
.Filipinoextraction)inthePhilippinesonJuly27,1991.[126]
Legal Significance: Her initial US stay was presumably preparatory to being a
permanent resident of the U.S. for purposes of the U.S. citizenship that she
eventuallyclaimed.
Significantly,PoeadmitsthatshewillinglychosetolivewithherhusbandintheU.S.,
and thus left on July 29, 1991. Very clearly, Poe intended to abandon her
Philippine residence for a new residence in the U.S. when she went with her
husbandtotheU.S.[127]

19912001

Poe lived with her husband and children in the U.S.[128] They travelled frequently to
thePhilippinesbutonlytovisitfamilyandfriends.
Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident from the time she secured
permanent U.S. visa status. The permanent resident status confirmed her intent to
establishfamilylife,andthus,residence,intheU.S.[129]

October18,2001

PoebecameanaturalizedAmericanCitizen[130]
Legal significance: U.S. citizenship erased all doubts that Poe had completely
abandoned her Philippine residence.[131] It confirmed as well that she had been a
permanentresidentoftheU.S.beforeherapplicationforU.S.citizenship.
ThePhilippinedomicilesheabandonedwasthedomicileshehadfromthetimeshe
wasadoptedbythespousesPoe.[132]
ToqualifyforcitizenshipunderU.S.naturalizationlaws,itisrequiredthatonemust
have been a permanent resident for 3 {three) years or more if one is filing for
naturalizationasthespouseofaU.S.citizen.[133]

2004

Her subsequent acts of living and remaining in the U.S. for ten years until her
naturalizationin2001pointtotheconclusionthatatsomepointduringthistime(after
arrivalin1991),shewasalreadyaU.S.andcouldnolongerbeconsideredaPhilippine
resident.
Poe resigned from her work in the U.S. and allegedly never sought reemployment.
[134]

Legal Significance: Resignation from work had no immediate legal effect on

residence and is thus immaterial to Poe's claimed Philippine residency status. Poe
remainedaUSresidentandwasinfactaU.S.citizendomiciledinthatcountry.

April8,2004uptoJuly7,2004

Resignation from one's employment per se does not amount to abandonment of

residence.[135]
Poe travelled to the Philippines with her daughter, Hanna. Poe also wanted to give
birth to Anika in the Philippines and to give moral support to her parents during her
father'scampaignforthepresidency.[136]
Legalsignificance:PoeremainedaU.S.resident.
Poe's travels (to and from the U.S. and the Philippines) between April 2004 and
February2005didnotaffectherU.S.residencystatus.
The admitted purposes for these travels had nothing to do with any intent to re
establishPhilippineresidence.

July8,2004

PoereturnedtotheU.S.withhertwodaughters.[137]

Legalsignificance:ThisreturntripfurtherprovesthatPoeremainedaU.S.resident.
December 13, 2004 up to February Poe was in the Philippines when Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized. She eventually
3,2005
tookcareofsettlinghisaffairsafterhedied.[138]
Legalsignificance:PoeremainedqU.S.resident.

FirstQuarterof2005

TheadmittedpurposesofherstayinthePhilippinesduringthisperiodhadnothing
todowiththereestablishmentofherresidenceinthePhilippines.
PoeandherhusbandallegedlydecidedtoreturntothePhilippinesforgood.[139]
Legal Significance: Poe did not abandon her US. Residence. Their (Poe and her
husband's) alleged intent are internal subjective acts that are meaningless without
external supporting action under the legal conditions that would allow a change of
domicile. Notably, Poe was in the Philippines during the year as a Visitor under a
Balikbayanvisa.[140]
Merechangeofresidenceintheexerciseofthecivilrighttochangeresidenceis
likewisedifferentfromachangeofdomicilefortheexerciseofthepoliticalrightto

be voted into public office. For the exercise of this political right, the candidate must
beaPhilippinecitizen.
US. residency which started in 1991 and which was later confirmed by Poe's
acquisitionofUS.citizenshipremaineduntilspecificallygivenup,foraslongas
therighttoresideintheU.S.subsisted.

Inearly2005

Note:PoearguesthathertravelstoandinitialstayinthePhilippineswerepreparatory
actsinthegoaltoestablishresidenceinthePhilippines.Evenassumingthattheywere
preparatory acts, they are not material to the issue of when Poe became a
Philippineresident(ascontemplatedbytheConstitutionandorelectionlaws).They
arenotalsoconclusiveonwhensheabandonedherU.S.residence.
Poe and her husband informed their children's schools that the children would be
transferringtoPhilippineschoolsinthenextsemester.[141]
Legal Significance: Poe remained a US. resident. This act establishes the intent to
transferschools,butdoesnot,byitself,conclusivelyprovetheintenttochangeorto
abandonherUS.residence.

May24,2005

AbsencefromherUS.residence(andpresenceinthePhilippines)topursuestudies
does not constitute loss of US. domicile and acquisition of a new domicile in the
Philippines.
Poe returned to the Philippines and allegedly decided to resettle here for good.[142]
Note that Poe was still under a Balikbayan visa and was thus a visitor to the
Philippines.[143]
PoearguesthatshereestablishedpermanentPhilippineresidenceatthispoint.Cana
US. citizen, on a Balikbayan visit to the Philippines, thereby establish residence for
purposesoftheexerciseofpoliticalrightsinthePhilippines?
Legal Significance: The evidence speak for themselves. Poe's Balikbayan visa does
notpointtoorconfirmanyintenttopermanentlysettleinthePhilippines.[144]
SincesheenteredthePhilippinesunderaBalikbayanvisaandwasthusatemporary
visitortothecountryunderSection13ofCA613(asamendedbyRANo.4376),her
allegedintentwasnotsupportedbyhercontemporaneousact.

March2005toNovember2006

Consider too from here on that from the perspective of change of domicile,
although Poe's acts may collectively show her intent to settle m the Philippines,
theydonotconclusivelytheintenttoabandonherU.S.domicile.Shewasatthis
pointstillaUS.citizenwhohadbeenapermanentresidentsince1991andwhocould
returnatwilltotheUS.asaresident.
Poe and her husband transacted with shipping agents for the transport of their
personal belongings and other personal property from the U.S. to the Philippines in
viewoftheirdecisiontoresettleinthePhilippines.[145]
LegalSignificance:PoeremainedaUS.ResidenttemporarilyinthePhilippinesher
visa status did not point to residence that could be credited as legal residence for
election purposes. She might have been physically present in the Philippines but
whatwasthenatureofherstayinthePhilippines?Shewaslegallyinthecountryfor
purposes only of a temporary stay and had no legally established basis to stay
beyondthis.[146]
Animportantpointtonoteisthatshewasnotexercisinganypoliticalrighttoreside
inthePhilippinesatthispoint.

August2005

Again,anobviousmissingelementwasherclearintenttoabandonherUS.domicile.
HerclaimedactsdonotclearlyshowPoe'sintenttoabandonherUS.Domicile.
PoeandherhusbandinquiredwiththePhilippineauthoritiesontheproceduretobring
theirpetdogfromtheU.S.A.tothePhilippines.[147]
Legal Significance: Poe's inquiry did not affect her residency at all she remained a
US. resident, and is totally worthless as she did not even show by subsequent
evidence that she actually brought the dog to the Philippines. This act, too, does not
proveabandonmentoftheirUS.residence.

June2005

PoeenrolledherchildrenmdifferentschoolsmthePhilippines.[148]
Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's intent to abandon their U.S.
domicile, Poe's children entered the Philippines for a temporary period under the
Balikbayan program. Note too, that the enrollment in schools is only for a period of
oneschoolyear.Atmost,thisshowsthatPoeandherchildrenwerephysicallypresent
inthePhilippinesatthistime.Notethatundercertainconditions,alienslikePoe,can
enrolltheirchildreninthePhilippines.[149]
AbsencefromherU.S.residence(andpresenceinthePhilippines)topursuestudies
does not conclusively point to the loss of U.S. domicile and acquisition of a new

July22,2005

Philippinedomicile.NotethatPoeherselfpreviouslystudiedintheU.S.withoutlosing
herPhilippineresidence.
Poe registered with and secured Tax Identification No. (TIN)[150] from the Bureau of
InternalRevenue(BIR).
Legal Significance: This act was undertaken as an alien and does not prove Poe's
intenttoremaininthePhilippinesortheintenttoabandonU.S.domicile(animusnon
revertendi)hence,itisnotlegallysignificantfortheresidencyissuebeforetheCourt.
She was then on a temporary visitor who was simply physically present in the
Philippines.ATaxpayerIdentificationNo.couldhavebeennecessaryforthepurposes
indicatedbelowasPoewasaforcedheirofRonaldPoewhorecentlydied.
"Any person, whether natural or juridical, required under the authority of the
Internal Revenue Code to make, render or file a return, statement or other
documents,shallbesuppliedwithorassignedaTaxpayerIdentificationNumber(TIN)
to be indicated in the return, statement or document to be filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, for his proper identification for tax purposes." (Sec. 236 (i) of the
TaxCode).

February20,2006

The absence of definitive abandonment of U.S. residency status and lack of legal
capacity to establish Philippine residence for election purposes can only point to the
conclusion that Poe remained a U.S. resident until July 18, 2006,[151] the date she
acquiredtherighttoresideinthePhilippines.
TheRegisterofDeeds(RD)ofSanJuanCityissuedtoPoeandherhusbandCCTNo.
11985R covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, and CCT No. 11986R covering the
parkingslotforUnit7F.[152]
Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's intent to abandon U.S. domicile
(animus nonrevertendi). It is, at best, evidence of an investment in Philippine real
estateamovethatalienscanmake.
Aliensorforeignnationals,whetherformernaturalbornFilipinocitizensornot,can
acquirecondominiumunitsandsharesincondominiumcorporationsupto40%ofthe
total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino owned or controlled condominium
Corporation, per RA No. 4726, as amended by RA No. 7899, (or An Act to Define
Condominium, Establish Requirements For Its Creation, And Govern Its Incidents).
[153]

February 14, 2006 to March 11, Poe travelled to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of her family's remaining
2006
householdbelongings.[154]ShereturnedtothePhilippinesonMarch11,2006.[155]

LateMarch2006

LegalSignificance:PoeremainedaUS.resident.Thisisanunequivocalactthatdoes
notprovePoe'sintenttoabandonherUS.domicile(animusnonrevertendi).
Poe'shusbandofficiallyinformedtheU.S.PostalServiceoftheirchangeoftheirU.S.
address.[156]
Legal Significance: Poe and her husband may have merely complied with the US.
Laws for convenience and for mail forwarding purposes while on extended but
temporaryabsence.

April25,2006

April27,2006

This act, by itself, does not prove the establishment of domicile in the Philippines.
Poe did not have at that point the legal capacity or right to establish domicile or
residence in the country. The act does not conclusively signify abandonment of U.S.
domicile.
Unit 7F of One Wilson Place and its parking slot were declared for taxation purposes
underPoeandherhusband'snames.[157]
LegalSignificance:ItdoesnotestablishpermanentresidenceinthePhilippines.Itis
merelyincompliancewithanobligationthatarisesfromownershipofrealpropertyin
thePhilippinesanobligationthatevenalienownersofrealpropertymustfulfill.
Poe'sU.S.familyhomewassold.[158]
LegalSignificance:PoeremainedaU.S.resident.Thesaleoftheirfamilyhomemay
indicate intent to transfer residence (within or without the U.S.) but it does not
automaticallyresultmreacquiringdomicilemthePhilippines.Saleofthefamilyhome
is a practical recourse for one who may be on extended absence or who may be
relocatingforemploymentpurposesorwhoissimplyengagedinprofittaking.

June1,2006

What is important for the exercise of political right at issue is the legal capacity to
establishresidenceinthePhilippines.Notably,too,intermsofthelegalstatusofher
Philippinestay,shewasstillunderaBalikbayanVisitor'sVisaatthistime.
The RD for Quezon City issued to Poe and her husband TCT No. 290260 covering a
509square meter lot located at No. 106 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay
UgongNorte,QuezonCitytobeusedastheirnewfamilyhome.[159]
LegalSignificance:PoestillremainedaUS.residentforlackoflegalcapacityandthe
righttoestablishresidenceinthePhilippines.ShewasalsostillaUS.citizenwhohad
notconclusivelyabandonedherUS.domicile.

EvenaliennonresidentswhowereformerFilipinocitizenscanbetransfereesofup
to 5, 000 sqm. of urban land or 3 has. of rural land for business or other purposes
under RA No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179,[160] in relation with Article XII,
Section8oftheConstitution,[161]withouttheneedtoreacquirePhilippinecitizenship
or to reestablish Philippine residence, provided they were former naturalborn
Filipinos. Acquisition of Philippine real estate is not evidence of the citizenship of
formerFilipinocitizens,muchlessoftheirnaturalbornstatus.
TheoriginalponenciaofJusticeMarianoC.de/Castillonotedthatafterthissale,Poe
and her husband still owned and retained two (2) other residential properties in the
U.S.[162] The retained properties negate whatever evidentiary worth the sale of the
"familyhome"provided,Poecouldstillreturntoaresidencethecouplealreadyown.
July7,2006

PoetookheroathofallegiancetothePhilippines.[163]
Legal Significance: Poe's oath of allegiance to the Philippines started the legal
process under RA No. 9225 but had no immediate legal effect on her change of
domicile she was still a U.S. resident at this point and would remain to be so even
afterherRANo.9225isapproved.

July10,2006

Dual citizens do not become Philippine domiciliaries upon the approval of their RA
No. 9225 petitions note that former naturalborn Filipino citizens who are U.S.
residents can apply under RA No. 9225 even without need of establishing actual
Philippineresidence.[164]Alltheyhaveafterapprovalisthecivilandpoliticalrightto
establish residence in the Philippines, but this they must do by complying with the
rulesonchangeofdomicile.
Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an application for
reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225orthe"CitizenshipRetention
andReacquisitionActof2003"shealsofiledforderivativecitizenshiponbehalfofher
threechildren,whowereallbeloweighteenyearsofageatthattime.[165]
LegalSignificance:RANo.9225isavailableonlytoformernaturalborncitizens.[166]
Thus, the validity of Poe's RA No. 9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship
dependsonthevalidityofhernaturalborncitizenshipclaim.

July18,2006

Poe'sapplicationforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship(RANo.9225)didnot,by
thatactalone,conclusivelyproveabandonmentofherUS.domicile.Asnotedbelow,
Poe,atthatpoint,hadtheoptiontoestablishresidenceinboththePhilippinesandthe
US.
TheBIDapprovedPoe'sapplicationforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipunderRA
No.9225,andtheapplicationsforderivativecitizenshipforherthreechildren.[167]
LegalSignificance:Subjecttothereservationmadeabove,theapprovalentitledher
torecognitionasadualcitizenPhilippineandAmerican.[168]
Assuming Poe to be a former naturalborn citizen, July 18, 2006 would be the
earliestpossiblereckoningpointforPoetoestablishPhilippineresidencyfor
purposes of the exercise of political rights as it was only then that she was
grantedcivilandpoliticalrights.Tovoteandbevotedforarebothpoliticalrights.
ButnotethatactualresidenceisstillnecessaryasanRANo.9225Filipinocitizenisa
dual citizen who can reside either in the Philippines or in the other country of dual
citizenship.[169] As already mentioned, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship only
gives the RA No. 9225 dual citizen an option to reestablish residence in the
Philippinesandtoexercisethelimitedrightofsuffrageinnationalelectionsbutnotthe
righttorunforpublicoffice.
Atthisexactpoint,theresolutionoftheissueofresidenceisstillunclearasPoewas
a dual PhilippineUS citizen who could be a resident physical as opposed to legal or
juridicalresidentofboththeUS.AndthePhilippines.Notethat Poestarted asa
U.S.domiciliary.Thischaracterizationstaysuntilshecouldcarryachangeof
domicile into effect. This change admits of evidence showing compliance with the
required elements, and becomes conclusive only when dual citizenship is given
upinfavorofoneofthecitizenshipsuponthissurrender,therighttoreside
intheothercountryislikewisegivenup.

July31,2006

In the case of Poe, she secured her civil and political rights as a RA No. 9225 dual
citizenonJuly18,2006.Thisistheearliestdateshecouldexerciseherrighttoreside
in the Philippines for the exercise of her political rights, particularly of her right to
vote.Butsheenjoystherighttobevoteduponasacandidateupontherenunciation
of her other citizenship. It was only then that that she conclusively gave up the US.
domiciliarytagthatshestartedwith.Ofcourse,hangingaboveandbecloudingthese
issues is the naturalborn citizenship question was she in the first place a former
naturalbornFilipinowhocouldavailofRANo.9225?[170]
TheBIDissuedPoeIdentificationCertificateNo.0610918pursuanttoRANo.9225in
relation with Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular

No. AFF2005.[171] Her children were likewise issued their respective Identification
CertificateNos.[172]

August31,2006

Legal Significance: These are the effects of the approval of Poe's application for
PhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225,andrelateprimarilytothecitizenship,notto
theresidencyissue.TherighttoresideinthePhilippinesofcoursecamewhentheRA
No.9225applicationwasapproved.Theexerciseofthisrightisanothermatter.
PoeregisteredasvoterinBrgy.SantaLucia,SanJuanCity.[173]
LegalSignificance:RegistrationasavotercouldserveasproofofthestartofPoe's
stay in the Philippines after she acquired the legal capacity to do so through RA No.
9225,butdoesnotconclusivelyestablishherintenttoremainmthePhilippinesorthe
intenttoabandonherUS.citizenshipanddomicile.
Shecouldhavebeenregisteredasavoteronlyifshehadrepresentedthatshewasa
residentofthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandofBrgy.SantaLucia,SanJuanCity
foratleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelections.[174]

October18,2001toJuly18,2006

In Japzon v. COMELEC,[175] the Court considered Ty's registration as a voter as

evidence of his intent to establish a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur,
EasternSamar.
On these dates, Poe returned to the Philippines using her U.S. Passport under the
Balikbayanprogram[176]pertheentry"BB"or"1YR"andstampeddatesinherU.S.
Passport:[177]
DatesofArrival
December27,2001
January13,2002
November9,2003
April8,2004
December13,2004
May24,2005
September14,2005
January7,2006
March11,2006
July5,2006
November4,2006

Visa
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan
Balikbayan

Passport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport

LegalSignificance:ThesenotationsareevidenceofthecharacterofPoe'sstayinthe
Philippines from May 24, 2005 up to the time her RA No. 9225 application was
approved.

July18,2006toOctober13,2009

Duringthisperiod,PoeanAmericancitizenwasavisitortothePhilippines,nota
Filipinocitizennoralegalresidentofthiscountry.
Onthesedates,[178]PoetravelledtoandfromthePhilippinesusingherU.S.Passport,
but the BID stamp on her U.S. Passport changed from "BB" or "l YR" to "RC" and/or
"ICNo.0610918:"[179]
DatesofArrival
July21,2007
March28,2008
May8,2008
October2,2008
October5,2008
April20,2009
May21,2009
July31,2009

Visa
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC

Passport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport
USPassport

October13,2009

Legal Significance The continued use of Poe's US. passport could be explained by
Poe'slackofaPhilippinepassport.ThedelayofthreeyearsbetweentheRANo.9225
approvalandtheissuanceofthepassportonOctober13,2009raisesquestionsabout
herintents,boththeintenttoremaininthePhilippinesandtheintenttoabandonher
US.domicile.Duringthisperiodatleast,anyclaimedresidencefortheexerciseofthe
right to be voted upon as a candidate cannot and should not be recognized her
abandonmentofherUSdomicilewasincompleteanduncertain.
PoeobtainedPhilippinePassportNo.XX473199.[180]
LegalSignificance:TheissuanceofaPhilippinepassport,perse,hasnolegaleffect
on Poe's Philippine residency status. A Philippine citizen on dual citizenship status is
entitledtoaPhilippinepassport.

October6,2010

October20,2010

The BID allowed Poe to enter and leave the country as "RC "Atty. Poblador
mentionedthat"RC"means"residentcitizen."
Poe was appointed as the Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
ClassificationBoard(MTRCB).[181]
LegalSignificance:PoecouldhavebeenappointedasMTRCBChairpersononlyifshe
had been a naturalborn Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Philippines for
purposesoftheexerciseofpoliticalrights.[182]Thenaturalborncitizenshipstatusisa
directlegalrequirement.Residency,ontheotherhand,isaconsequenceoftheneed
to make a renunciation of the other citizenship (pursuant to RA No. 9225), as
renunciation would leave the appointee with no other residence other than the
Philippines.
PoerenouncedherU.S.allegianceandcitizenship.[183]
Legal Significance: This is a requirement under RA No. 9225 and served to
complete the necessary requirements before she could assume appointive
publicoffice.
The event should be very significant for a Presidential candidate who had
been previously naturalized in a foreign country, and who now claims
residency status for the period required by the Philippine Constitution. This
should serve as the conclusive proof that the candidate has undertaken a
changeofdomicilethroughproofofabandonmentofherolddomicile.
Thestrictestruleofinterpretationandappreciationofevidenceshouldbeusedgiven
the previous loss of both Philippine citizenship and residency status. She is not the
usualcandidateassheisvyingforthehighestofficeinthelandwhosecitizenship
shepreviouslyrenounced.
Her renunciation of her foreign citizenship should be the lowest acceptable level of
proofofPoe'sintenttoabandonherUS.domicile(animusnonrevertendi),aspointed
outbyJusticeDelCastilloduringthethirdroundoforalarguments.)

October21,2010
October26,2010

October2,2012

Note that by her own admission, Poe renounced her US. Citizenship and thereby
likewise abandoned her US. domiciliary status only to comply with the requirements
o[RANo.9225andtheMTRCBappointmentextendedtoher.[184]
PoetookherOathofOfficeforthepositionofMTRCBChairperson.[185]
Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of the MTRCB Chairperson.
[186]

Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR CB Chairperson only if
shehadbeenanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,andaresidentofthePhilippines
forpurposesofexercisingpoliticalrights.[187]
PoefiledherCoCforSenatorfortheMay13,2013ElectionsshestatedinItemNo.7
of her CoC that her " PERIOD OF RESIDENCE BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" was '6 years
and6months."[188]ThisstatementwasmadeonOctober2,2012.
Legal Significance: The residency statement in the CoC for the Senate was a
materialrepresentationthatPoenowclaimstobeamistake.
Ironically for Poe, the period she claimed in her Senate CoC dovetailed with
herPhilippineresidencycomputedfromthetimeherRANo.9225application
wasapproved.

December19,2013

Poe never introduced any evidence relating to her claimed "mistake," thus
leaving this claim a selfserving one that allows her this time to qualify for the
residencyrequirementfortheOfficeofthePresidentofthePhilippines.
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued to Poe, Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530.[189]
NoeffectonPoe'sresidencystatus.

March14,2014

TheDFAissuedtoPoe,PhilippinePassportNo.EC0588861.[190]
NoeffectonPoe'sresidencystatus.

October15,2015

PoefiledherCoCforthePresidencyfortheMay9,2016ElectionsshestatedinItem
No. 7 of her CoC that her " PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE
DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016 is '10 YEARS, 11 MONTHS,"[191] which the petitions
beforeusnowclaimtobeafalsematerialrepresentation.
Legal significance: The residency claim, under the given facts and in light of the
Senate CoC statement, gives rise to the question: did Poe commit a false material
representationregardinghercompliancewiththeresidencyrequirement?
Poe claims that she made a mistake in the Senate CoC declaration, but the claim
remainedselfservingwithnoevidencetosupportit.

 An unavoidable observation is that Poe's belated claim of mistake in her

Senate CoC now allows her to claim the longer period of residency that her
candidacyforthePresidencynowrequires.
ShouldtheCOMELECbenowfaultedforarrivingatthisobviousconclusion?

II.
PreliminaryIThresholdIssuesandConcerns

II.A.NatureofthePresentPetitionandtheCourt'sResponses.
AstheultimateinterpreteroftheConstitutionandofourlaws,thisCourtwillhavethefinalsayinthecasenowbeforeus.Ourcollective
actions and decisions are not subject to review by any other institution of government we are the ultimate Guardians with no other
guardianstocheck,correct,andchastiseus.Beyondthedictatesoftheestablishedstandardsoflegalinterpretationandapplication,only
ourindividualconscienceguidesusasunelectedofficials,onlyhistorycanjudgeus.
Thus, for the sake of the country and for the maintenance of the integrity of this Court, we must render our ruling with the utmost
circumspection.
Asdefined,theproblemdirectlybeforetheCourtisthedeterminationofthepresenceorabsenceofgraveabuseofdiscretioninthe
COMELEC's cancellation of petitioner Poe's CoC for its invalidity, based on the false material representations the COMELEC found in her
statementsofcitizenshipandresidencyqualificationsforthepositionofPresidentofthePhilippines.FromtheperspectiveoftheCourt,the
presentcasecallsfortheexerciseoftheCourt'spowerofjudicialreview.
The main issues in this case the conformity of the COMELEC 's ruling with legal [192] and constitutional standards [193] are directly
governedbytheConstitution.Thus,thedisputebeforeusisaconstitutionallawcase,notsimplyanelectionnorasocialjustice
case,andonethatshouldbedealtwithaccordingtothetermsoftheConstitution,followingthenormsoftheruleoflaw.
To be sure, the applicable measuring standards cannot simply be the individual Justices' notions of the fairness of the
constitutional terms involved (which are matters of policy that the Court cannot touch), nor their pet social and human rights
advocaciesthatarenotjustifiedbythecleartermsoftheConstitution.
Iftheseconstitutionaltermsareclear,theonlyoptionfortheCourtistoapplythemiftheylackclarity,theCourtmayinterpretthem
using the established canons of constitutional interpretation but without touching on matters of policy that an authority higher than the
Court'sthatofthesovereignFilipinopeoplehasputinplace.[194]
IfindeedtheCourtdeemstheconstitutionaltermstobeclearbuttaintedwithunfairness,theCourt'sremedyistonotethetainted
termsandobservethattheyshouldberaisedwiththepeopleandtheirrepresentativesforconstitutionalamendmenttheCourtcannot
actonitsowntoremedytheunfairnessassuchstepisapoliticalonethattheCourtcannotdirectlyundertake.Definitely,theremedy
isnottoengageininterpretationinordertoreadintotheConstitutionwhatisnotwrittenthere.Thisisjudiciallegislationof
thehighestorderthatIdonotwanttobeapartyto.
II.B.TheParametersoftheCourt'sExerciseofJudicialPowerinactingonthecase.
II.B.1.TheExerciseofthePowerofJudicialReview.
The Supreme Court in entertaining the present petitions acts pursuant to Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:

SECTION1.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.[Underscoringsupplied)

IntheseminalcaseofAngarav.ElectoralTribunal[195] the Court mandated in no uncertain terms that judicial review is "limited to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented," and without passing upon "questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation."Withthescopeofthejusticiableissuesodelimited,theCourtinresolvingtheconstitutionalissueslikewisecannotaddto,
detractfrom,ornegatewhattheConstitutioncommandsitcannotsimplyfollowitssenseofjusticebasedonhowthingsouttobe,
norlaydownitsownpolicy,norslantitsrulingtowardstheindividualJustices'petadvocacies.TheindividualJusticesthemselvescannot
simplyraiseissuesthatthepartiesdidnotraiseattheCOMELEClevel,norexploreconstitutionalissuesforthefirsttime.atthisstageof
thecase.
Procedurally,thepresentcasecomestothisCourtunderRule64,inrelationwithRule65,oftheRulesofCourtapetitionforcertiorari
thatcallsforthejudicialreviewoftheCOMELECdecisiontoensurethattheCOMELECactswithinitsjurisdiction.
TheCourt'sreviewislimitedbythegraveabuseofdiscretionstandardthattheConstitutionitselfprovidestodeterminetheproprietyof
theCOMELECactionbasedonthequestionofwhetheritactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionincancellingPoe'sCoC.

"Grave abuse of discretion" as mentioned in the Constitution and as implemented by the Court under Rule 65 and in its established
rulings,carriesaspecificmeaning.Itisthearbitraryordespoticexerciseofpowerduetopassion,prejudiceorpersonalhostilityorthe
whimsical,arbitrary,orcapriciousexerciseofpowerthatamountstoanevasionorrefusaltoperformapositivedutyenjoinedbylaworto
actatallincontemplationoflaw.Foranacttobestruckdownashavingbeendonewithgraveabuseofdiscretion,theabuseofdiscretion
mustbepatentandgross."[196]
Thus,forthisCourttostrikedownandnullifythechallengedCOMELECrulings,theCOMELECmustbeconsideredtohaveactedwithout
jurisdictionbecauseitdidnotsimplyerr,eitherintheappreciationofthefactsorthelawsinvolved,butbecauseitactedinapatent
andgrossmanner,therebyactingoutsidethecontemplationofthelaw.[197]
II.C.TheSeparationofPowersPrinciple.
The same citedAngara ruling, in expounding on what "judicial power" encompasses, likewise fully provided a constitutional standard to
ensurethatthejudiciaryanditsexerciseofthepowerofjudicialreviewdonotexceeddefinedparameters.Thestandardistheseparation
ofpowersprinciplethatunderliestheConstitution.
Separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of govemment[198] that divides the powers of government into the
legislative,theexecutive,andjudicial.[199]Thepowertoenactlawslieswiththelegislaturethepowertoexecuteiswiththeexecutive
and,thepowertointerpretlawsrestswiththejudiciary.[200]Eachbranchissupremewithinitsownsphere.
Thus, the judiciary can only interpret and apply the Constitution and the laws as they are written it cannot, under the guise of
interpretation in the course of adjudication, add to, detract from or negate what these laws provide except to the extent
thattheyruncountertotheConstitution. With respect to the Constitution and as already mentioned above, the judiciary cannot
interprettheConstitutiontoreadintoitwhatisnotwrittenthere.
TheseparationofpowerscanbeverymaterialinresolvingthepresentcaseaspetitionerPoeessentiallyreliesontwopositionsinclaiming
naturalbornPhilippinecitizenshipasafoundling.Thefirstofthesepositionsistheclaimthatfoundling'sfallwithinthelistingof"citizens
ofthePhilippines"underthe1935Constitution,undertheviewthatthiswastheintentoftheframersoftheConstitution.
AsIreasonoutbelow,foundlingsaresimplynotincludedinthewordingsoftheConstitutionandcannotbereadintoitsclearandexpress
terms.Norcananyintenttoincludefoundlingsbediscerned.Thus,foundlingsarenotwithinthe1935constitutionallisting,excepttothe
extentthattheapplicationofitsgeneraltermswouldallowtheircoverage.
11.D.TheEqualProtectionClause.
11.D.1.InGeneral.
Theequalprotectionclauseisaspecificconstitutionalguarantyoftheequalapplicationofthelawstoallpersons.Theequalityguaranteed
does not deny the State the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that
inherentintherighttolegislateistherighttoclassify.[201]
The wellsettled principle is that the equal protection of the laws guaranty is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification.[202]
Thus,theprobleminequalprotectioncasesisprimarilyinthedeterminationofthevalidityoftheclassificationmadebylaw,[203]ifresort
toclassificationisjustified.Forthisreason,three(3)differentstandardsofscrutinyintestingtheconstitutionalityofclassificationshave
beendevelopedovertime[204]therationalbasistesttheintermediatescrutinytestandstrictscrutinytest.
II.D.2.TheApplicableTests.
Under the rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an accepted or established
governmentalend.[205]ThisisarelativelyrelaxedstandardreflectingtheCourt'sawarenessthatclassificationisanunavoidablelegislative
task.Thepresumptionisinfavoroftheclassification'svalidity.[206]
If the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification
disadvantagesa"quasisuspectclass"[207]itwillbetreatedunderaheightenedreviewcalledtheintermediatescrutinytest.[208]
Intermediatescrutinyrequiresthattheclassificationserveanimportantgovernmentalendorobjectiveandissubstantiallyrelatedtothe
achievementofthisobjective.[209]Theclassificationispresumedunconstitutionalandtheburdenofjustificationfortheclassificationrests
entirelywiththegovernment.[210]
Finally, the strict scrutiny test is used when suspect classifications or fundamental rights are involved. This test requires that the
classificationserveacompellingstateinterestandisnecessarytoachievesuchinterest.[211]
Asuspectclassificationisonewheredistinctionsaremadebasedonthemostinvidiousbasesforclassificationthatviolatethemostbasic
humanrights,i.e.onthebasisofrace,nationalorigin,alienstatus,religiousaffiliation,andtoacertainextent,sexandsexualorientation.
[212]

TheCourthasfoundthestrictscrutinystandardusefulindeterminingtheconstitutionalityoflawsthattendtotargetaclassofthingsor

persons.Bythisstandard,thelegislativeclassificationispresumedunconstitutionalandtheburdenrestsonthegovernmenttoprovethat
theclassificationisnecessarytoachieveacompellingstateinterestandthatitistheleastrestrictivemeanstoprotectsuchinterest.The
strictscrutinystandardwaseventuallyusedtoassessthevalidityoflawsdealingwiththeregulationofspeech,gender,orraceaswellas
otherfundamentalrights,astheearlierapplicationshadbeenexpandedtoencompassthecoverageoftheseotherrights.[213]
II.D.3.TheApplicationoftheEqualProtectionClausetoaconstitutionalprovision.
Theargumentthattheequalprotectionclauseshouldbeappliedtotheconstitutionalprovisionsoncitizenshipispatentlymisplaced.The
Constitutionissupremeasthehighestlawoftheland,itservesasthegaugeorstandardforalllawsandfortheexerciseofallpowersof
government.TheSupremeCourtitselfisacreationof,andcannotrisehigherthan,theConstitution.
Hence,thisCourtcannotinvalidateaconstitutionalprovisionitcanonlyactonanunconstitutionalgovernmentalactiontramplingon
theequalprotectionclause,suchaswhenaconstitutionalprovisionisinterpretedinawaythatfosterstheillegalclassificationthatthe
Constitutionprohibits.ThisisthequestionnowbeforethisCourt.
II.D.4.TheCitizenshipofaFoundling.
ThecitizenshipprovisionsoftheConstitutionauthorizetheState'sexerciseofitssovereignpowertodeterminewhoitscitizensare.These
citizens constitute one of the pillars in the State's exercise of its sovereignty.[214] Based on this exercise, the State accordingly grants
rightsandimposesobligationstoitscitizens.Thisgrantedauthorityanditsexerciseassumeprimaryandmaterialimportance,notonly
becauseoftherightsandobligationsinvolved,butbecausetheState'sgrantsinvolvetheexerciseofitssovereignty.
AsidefromtheabovediscussionsontheapplicationoftheequalprotectionclausetothetermsoftheConstitutionitself,itmustfurtherbe
consideredinappreciatingtheequalprotectionclauseinrelationwithfoundlingsthat:
First,foundlingsdonotfallunderanysuspectclass.
A"suspectclass"isidentifiedasaclasssaddledwithsuchdisabilities,orsubjectedtosuchahistoryofpurposefulunequaltreatment,or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Examplesofsuspectclassificationsarebasedonraceornationalorigin,alienage,orreligion.[215]
Foundlingsarenotbeingtreateddifferentlyonthebasisoftheirrace,nationalorigin,alienage,orreligion.Itisthelackofinformation
on the circumstances of their birth because of their unknown parentage and the jus sanguinis standard of the Constitution
itself,thatexcludethemfrombeingconsideredasnaturalborncitizens.Theyarenotpurposelytreatedunequallynoraretheypurposely
renderedpoliticallypowerlesstheyareinfactrecognizedunderbindingtreatiestohavetherighttobenaturalizedasPhilippinecitizens.
AllthesetakeplacebecauseofdistinctionsthattheConstitutionitselfmade.
Second, there is likewise no denial of a fundamental right that does not emanate from the Constitution. As explained elsewhere in this
Opinion,itistheConstitutionitselfthatrequiresthatthePresidentofthePhilippinesbeanaturalborncitizenandmusthaveresidedin
thecountryfor10yearsbeforethedayoftheelection.
Thus, naturalized citizens and those who do not fall under the definition of a naturalborn citizen, again as defined in the Constitution
itself,havenoactionablecauseforcomplaintforunfairtreatmentbasedontheequalprotectionclause.Thisconsiderationrulesoutthe
applicationofthestrictscrutinytestastheCOMELECrecognizeddistinctionstheConstitutionitselfmade.
On the test of intermediate scrutiny, the test has been generally used for legislative classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.
Foundlings,however,mayarguablybesubjecttointermediatescrutinysincetheirclassificationmaygiverisetorecurringconstitutional
difficulties,i.e.qualificationquestionsforotherfoundlingswhoarepublicofficialsorareseekingpositionsrequiringPhilippinecitizenship.
Topassanintermediatescrutiny,itmustbeshownthatthelegislativepurposeisimportantandtheclassificationissubstantiallyrelated
tothelegislativepurposeotherwise,theclassificationshouldbeinvalidated.
The classification of foundlings visavis Philippine citizens is undeniably important as already explained and the purpose of the
classification is the State exercise of sovereignty: it has the inherent power to determine who are included and excluded as its own
nationals.Ontheseconsiderations,Iruleouttheuseoftheintermediatescrutinytest.
Third, under the circumstances, the most direct answer can be provided by the rational basis test in considering the petitioner's charge
thattheCOMELECdeniedherequalprotectionbyapplyingtheconstitutionalprovisionsoncitizenshiptheywayitdid.
Itisawellsettledprinciplethattheequalprotectionguarantyofthelawsisnotviolatedbyalegislation(orgovernmentalaction)based
onreasonableclassification.Aclassification,tobereasonablemust:1)relyonsubstantialdistinctions2)begermanetothepurposeof
thelaw3)notbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand4)applyequallytoallmembersofthesameclass.[216]
To restate and refine the question posed to us in the context of the present petition: did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretionwhenitdidnotincludePoeinthenaturalbornclassification?
Thisquestionpracticallybringsusbacktothemainissuestheseconsolidatedcasesposetous.
Tostartfromsquareone,IstartwiththeadmittedfactthatPoeisafoundling,i.e.,onewhoseparentsarenotknown.Withnoknown
parents, the COMELEC could not have abused the exercise of its discretion when it concluded that Poe did not fall under the express
listingofcitizensunderthe1935Constitutionand,hence,cannotevenbeacitizenundertheexpresstermsoftheConstitution.

In the context of classification, the COMELEC effectively recognized that Poe, whose parents are unknown, cannot be the same, and
cannotbesimilarlytreated,asotherpersonsborninthePhilippinesofFilipinoparentsasprovidedunderArticleIV,Section1,paragraphs
3and4ofthe1935Constitution.
TheCOMELECdidnotalsofavorablyentertainPoe'sviewthatthe1935Constitutionimpliedlyrecognizedafoundlingtobeincludedinits
listing.BasedonthereasonsonthemeritsthataremorelengthilydiscussedelsewhereinthisOpinion,theCOMELECatthemostcould
haveerredinitsconclusions,butitsreasonedapproach,evenassumingittobeerroneous,cannotamounttograveabuseofdiscretionas
Ihaveabovespecificallydefined.
Lastly, the COMELEC did not recognize that the Philippines is bound under international law to recognize Poe as a naturalborn citizen
these treaties merely grant Poe the right to acquire a nationality. This COMELEC conclusion is largely a conclusion of law and is not
baseless in fact, it is based on the clear terms of the cited treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory and on the principles of
internationallaw.Thus,again,theCOMELECcommittednograveabuseofdiscretioninitsrulingonthispoint.
ThissameconclusionnecessarilyresultsinconsideringPoe'sargumentthatsheshouldbetreatedlikeotherfoundlingsfavorablyaffected
by treaties binding on the Philippines. All foundlings found in the Philippines and covered by these treaties have the right to acquire
Philippine nationality it is a question of availing of the opportunity that is already there. Thus, I can see no cause for complaint in this
regard. In fact, Poe has not pointed to any foundling or to any specific treaty provision under which she would be treated the way she
wantstoasanaturalborncitizen.
Intheselights,theCOMELEC'sexerciseinclassificationcouldnotbutbereasonable,basedasitwereonthestandardsprovidedby
theConstitution.ThisclassificationwasmadetogiveeffecttotheConstitutionandtoprotecttheintegrityofourelections.It
holdstrue,notonlyforPoe,butforallfoundlingswhomaybeinthesamesituationassheisin.
II.E.JurisdictionalIssues
ThepetitionerquestionstheCOMELEC'sdecisiontocancelherCoConthegroundthatshefalselyrepresentedherPhilippinecitizenship
becauseitallegedly:

a.ignored the Senate Electoral Tribunal's (SET) Decision dated November 17, 2015, as well as relevant law and jurisprudence
bestowingonfoundlingsthestatusofPhilippinecitizenship
b.disregarded the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) in its
applicationofRANo.9225and
c.prematurelyraisedeligibilitychallengesthatisproperlythejurisdictionofthePresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET).

In particular, the petitioner Poe argues that the COMELEC does not have the primary jurisdiction to resolve attacks against her
citizenship.TheDOJ,astheadministrativeagencywithadministrativecontrolandsupervisionovertheBID,hastheauthoritytorevoke
the latter's Order approving her reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship. Petitions for cancellation of CoCs are thus, by their nature,
prohibitedcollateralattacksagainstthepetitioner'sclaimedPhilippinecitizenship.
Additionally, since the allegations in the petitions for cancellation of CoC seek to establish Poe's ineligibilities to become President, the
issuelieswithintheexclusivejurisdictionofthePET,andshouldbefiledonlyaftershehasbeenproclaimedPresident.
Atthecoreofthesechallengeslietwomaininquiries,fromwhichallotherissuesraisedbythepetitionerspring:

First,whatisthescopeandextentoftheCOMELEC'sjurisdictioninaSection78proceeding?
Second,giventhescopeandextentoftheCOMELEC'sjurisdictioninaSection78proceeding,diditgravelyabuse
its discretion in its interpretation and application of the law and jurisprudence to the evidence presented before
it?

Tomymind,theCOMELEChasamplejurisdictiontointerpretandapplytherelevantlawsandapplicablejurisprudenceintheSection78
proceedingagainstthepetitioner,anddidnotcommitanygraveabuseofdiscretionindoingso.
II.E.1.TheCOMELEC'sauthoritytoactonpetitions
forcancellationofCoC'sofpresidentialcandidates.
As the constitutional authority tasked to ensure clean, honest and orderly elections, the COMELEC exercises administrative, quasi
legislative,andquasijudicialpowersgrantedunderArticleIXofthe1987Constitution.
These constitutional powers are refined and implemented by legislation, among others, through the powers expressly provided in the
OmnibusElectionCode(OEC).ThesestatutorypowersincludetheauthoritytocancelacertificateofcandidacyunderSection78of
theOEC,whichprovides:

Sec.78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseorto
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation

containedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfive
daysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthan
fifteendaysbeforetheelection.[emphasisandunderscoringsupplied]

ThepetitionerinjectsherdesiredcolortoSection78withtheargumentthattheCOMELEC'sjurisdictionintheseproceedingsislimitedto
determiningdeliberatefalserepresentationinherCoC,andshouldnotincludethesubstantiveaspectofhereligibility.Onthisview,Poe
assertsthatshehadnotdeliberatelymisrepresentedhercitizenshipandresidence.
II.E.2.TheCOMELEC'spowerunderSection78isQuasiJudicialinCharacter.
InCiprianov.COMELEC,[217]thisCourtrecognizedthatthisauthorityisquasijudicialinnature. The decision to cancel a candidate's
CoC,basedongroundsprovidedinSection78,involvesanexerciseofjudgmentordiscretionthatqualifiesasaquasijudicialfunctionby
theCOMELEC.
Quasijudicialpowerhasbeendefinedas:

xxxthepoweroftheadministrativeagencytoadjudicatetherightsofpersonsbeforeit.Itisthepowertohearanddetermine
questionsoffacttowhichthelegislativepolicyistoapplyandtodecideinaccordancewiththestandardslaiddownbythelaw
itselfinenforcingandadministeringthesamelaw.Theadministrativebodyexercisesitsquasijudicialpowerwhenitperforms
inajudicialmanneranactwhichisessentiallyofanexecutiveoradministrativenature,wherethepowertoactinsuchmanner
isincidentaltoorreasonablynecessaryfortheperformanceoftheexecutiveoradministrativedutyentrustedtoit.Incarrying
outtheirquasijudicialfunctionstheadministrativeofficersorbodiesarerequiredtoinvestigatefactsorascertaintheexistence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretioninajudicialnature.[218]

In Section 78 proceedings, the COMELEC determines whether the allegations in a petition to cancel a CoC are supported by sufficient
evidence.Intheprocess,theCOMELECallowsboththepetitionerandtherespondentcandidatetheopportunitytopresenttheirevidence
andargumentsbeforeit.Basedonthesesubmissions,theCOMELECthendetermineswhetherthecandidate'sCoCshouldbecancelled.
To arrive at its decision in a cancellation case, the COMELEC must determine whether the candidate committed a material
representation that is false the statutory basis for the cancellation in his or her CoC statements. While Section 78 itself does not
expressly define what representation is "material," jurisprudence has defined "materiality" to be a false representation related to the
candidate's eligibility to run for office.[219] The representation is "false" if it is shown that the candidate manifested that he or she is
eligibleforanelectiveofficethatheorshefiledaCoCfor,wheninfactheorsheisnot.
Thus,wehaveaffirmedthecancellationofCoCsbasedonacandidate'sfalserepresentationsoncitizenship,residence,andlackofaprior
criminalrecord.Thesecasesalsorefertotheneedtoestablishacandidate'sdeliberateintenttodeceiveanddefraudtheelectoratethat
heorsheiseligibletorunforoffice.
Thelinkagebetweenthequalificationtheelectiveofficecarriesandtherepresentationthecandidatemade,directlyshowsthatSection
78proceedingsmustnecessarilyinvolve:

(i)>aninquiryintothestandardsforeligibility(whicharefoundinthelawandinjurisprudence)
(ii)theapplicationofthesestandardstothecandidateand
(iii)therepresentationsheorshemadeaswellasthefactssurroundingtheserepresentations.

OnlyinthismannercantheCOMELECdetermineifthecandidatefalselyrepresentedhisorherqualificationfortheelectiveofficeheor
sheaspiresfor.
Asidefrominquiringintotheapplicablelawsbearingontheissuesraised,theCOMELECcaninterprettheselawswithintheboundsallowed
by the principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation. It can then apply these laws to the evidence presented after they are
previouslyweighed.
Thecapacitytointerpretandapplytherelevantlawsextendstosituationswherethereexistsnojurisprudencesquarelyapplicabletothe
factsestablishedbyevidence.Theexerciseofafunctionthatisessentiallyjudicialincharacterincludesnotjusttheapplicationbywayof
stare decisis of judicial precedent it includes the application and interpretation of the text of the law through established principles of
construction. To say otherwise would be to unduly cripple the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions every time a case
beforeitfindsnospecificprecedent.
II.E.2(a).PoeandtheSection78Proceedings.
II.E.2(a)(i)IntenttoDeceiveasanElement.
Inthepresentcase,theprivaterespondentssoughtthecancellationofPoe'sCoCbasedonthefalserepresentationssheallegedlymade

regardingherPhilippinecitizenship,hernaturalbornstatus,andherperiodofresidence.Theseareallmaterialqualificationsastheyare
requiredbytheConstitutionitself.
To determine under Section 78 whether the representations made were false, the COMELEC must necessarily determine the eligibility
standards,theapplicationofthesestandardstoPoe,andtheclaimsshemadei.e.,whethersheisindeedanaturalbornPhilippine
citizen who has resided in the Philippines for at least ten years preceding the election, as she represented in her CoC, as well as the
circumstancessurroundingtheserepresentations.InrelationtoPoe'sdefense,thesecircumstancesrelatetoherclaimthatshedid
notdeliberatelyfalselyrepresenthercitizenshipandresidence,nordidsheactwithintenttodeceive.
The element of "deliberate intent to deceive" first appeared in Philippine jurisprudence in Salcedo III v. COMELEC[220] under the
followingruling:

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.Inotherwords,itmustbemadewithan
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to
misleadordeceivethepublicastoonesidentity,isnotwithinthescopeoftheprovision.[italicssupplied]

SalcedoIIIcitedRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,[221]whichprovidedthat:

Itisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacywhichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornot
and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificateofcandidacywhichwouldleadtohisorherdisqualification.[italicssupplied]

FromSalcedoandwiththeexceptionofTagolinov.HRET,[222]the"deliberateintenttodeceive"elementhadbeenconsistentlyincluded
asarequirementforaSection78proceeding.
TheCourtinTagolinov.HRET[223]ruled:

Corollarythereto,itmustbenotedthatthedeliberatenessofthemisrepresentation,muchlessone'sintenttodefraud,isof
baresignificanceinaSection78petitionasitisenoughthattheperson'sdeclarationofamaterialqualificationinthe
CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate
misrepresentationisoflittleconsequenceinthedeterminationofwhetherone'sCoCshouldbedeemedcancelledornot.What
remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's
ineligibilityandthatthesamebegrantedwithoutanyqualification.[emphasis,italics,andunderscoringsupplied]

ThisstatementinTagolinoassumesvalidityandmeritwhenweconsiderthatRomualdezMarcos,thecasethatSalcedoIIIused
asbasis,isnotaSection78proceeding,butadisqualificationcase.
JusticeVicenteV.Mendoza'sSeparateOpinion[224]inRomualdezMarcospointedoutthattheallegationsinthepleadingsinRomualdez
Marcos referred to Imelda RomualdezMarcos' disqualification, and not to an allegation for the cancellation of her CoC. This
wasallowableatthetime,asRule25oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,priortoitsnullificationinFerminv.Comelec,[225]hadallowed
theinstitutionofdisqualificationcasesbasedonthelackofresidence.
ThequotedportioninRomualdezMarcosthuspertainstothechallengetoRomualdezMarcos'residenceinadisqualification
proceeding,andnotinaCoCcancellationproceeding.
TheCourtheldthatthestatementinRomualdezMarcos'sCoCdoesnotnecessarilydisqualifyherbecauseitdidnotreflectthenecessary
residenceperiod,astheactualperiodofresidenceshowshercompliancewiththelegalrequirements.Thestatement"[t]hesaidstatement
becomesmaterialonlywhenthereisorappearstobeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwise
renderacandidateineligible"shouldthusbeunderstoodinthecontextofadisqualificationproceedinglookingatthefactofa
candidate's residence, and not at a CoC cancellation proceeding determining whether a candidate falsely represented her
eligibility.
Arguably,theelementof"deliberateintenttodeceive,"hasbeenentrenchedinourjurisprudencesinceitwasfirstmentionedinSalcedo
III.Giventhehistoryofthisrequirement,andthelackofclearreferenceof"deliberateintenttodeceive"inSection78,thisdeliberate
intentioncouldbeanchoredfromthetextualrequirementinSection78thattherepresentationmademusthavebeenfalse,
suchthattherepresentationwasmadewiththeknowledgethatithadnotbeentrue.
Viewed from this perspective, the element of "deliberate intent to deceive" should be considered complied with upon proof of the
candidate'sknowledgethattherepresentationheorshemadeintheCoCwasfalse.
Note,atthispoint,thattheCoCmustcontainthecandidate'srepresentation,underoath,thatheorsheiseligiblefortheofficeaspired
for, i.e., that he or she possesses the necessary eligibilities at the time he or she filed the CoC. This statement must have also been

consideredtobetruebythecandidatetothebestofhisorherknowledge.
Section74oftheOEC,whichliststheinformationrequiredtobeprovidedinaCoC,states:

Sec.74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncinghis
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post office address for all election purposes his
profession or occupation that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesthat
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretrue
tothebestofhisknowledge.[italicsandunderscoringsupplied]

Morespecifically,COMELECResolutionNo.9984requiresthefollowingtobecontainedinthe2015CoC:

Section4.ContentsandFormofCertificateofCandidacy.TheCOCshallbeunderoathandshallstate:
a.officeaspiredfor
xxxx

g.citizenship,whethernaturalbornornaturalized
xxxx

k.legalresidence,givingtheexactaddressandthenumberofyearsresidinginthePhilippinesxxx
xxxx

n.thattheaspirantiseligibleforsaidoffice
xxxx

t.thatthefactsstatedinthecertificatearetrueandcorrecttothebestof'theaspirant'sknowledge
xxxx
TheCOCshallbesworntobeforeaNotaryPublicoranyofficialauthorizedtoadministeroath.COMELECemployeesarenot
authorizedtoadministeroath,evenintheircapacitiesasnotarypublic.[emphasisandunderscoringsupplied]

Theoath,therepresentationofeligibility,andtherepresentationthatthestatementsintheCoCaretruetothebestofthecandidate's
knowledge all operate as a guarantee from a candidate that he or she has knowingly provided information regarding his or
hereligibility.TheinformationheorsheprovidedintheCoCshouldaccordinglybeconsideredadeliberaterepresentationonhisor
herpart,andanyfalsehoodregardingsucheligibilitywouldthusbeconsidereddeliberate.
In other words, once the status of a candidate's ineligibility has been determined, I do not find it necessary to establish a candidate's
deliberate intent to deceive the electorate, as he or she had already vouched for its veracity and is found to have committed
falsehood. The representations he or she has made in his or her CoC regarding the truth about his or her eligibility comply with the
requirementthatheorshedeliberatelyandknowinglyfalselyrepresentedsuchinformation.
II.E.2(a)(ii)Poehadthe"IntenttoDeceive"

ButevenifweweretoconsiderdeliberateintenttodeceiveasaseparateelementthatneedstobeestablishedinaSection
78 proceeding, I find that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in concluding that Poe deliberately falsely
representedherresidenceandcitizenshipqualifications.
TheCOMELEC,inconcludingthatPoehadknownofherineligibilitiestorunforPresident,notedthatsheisahighlyeducatedwomanwith
a competent legal team at the time she filled up her 2012 and 2015 CoCs. As a highly educated woman, she had the necessary
acumentoreadandunderstandtheplainmeaningofthelaw.Iaddthatsheisnowafterthehighestpostinthelandwherethe
understandingoftheplainmeaningofthelawisextremelybasic.
TheCOMELECthusfounditunconvincingthatPoewouldnothaveknownhowtofillupaproformaCoC,muchlesscommitan"honest

mistake"infillingitup.(Interestingly,Poeneverintroducedanyevidenceexplainingher"mistake"ontheresidencyissue,thusrendering
ithighlysuspect.)
A plain reading of Article JV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution could have sufficiently appraised Poe regarding her
citizenship. Article IV, Section 1 does not provide for the situation where the identities of both an individual's parents from whom
citizenship may be traced are unknown. The ordinary meaning of this noninclusion necessarily means that she cannot be a Philippine
citizenunderthe1935Constitution'sterms.
The COMELEC also found that Poe's Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before the BID deliberately
misrepresented her status as a former naturalborn Philippine citizen, as it lists her adoptive parents to be her parents
without qualifications. The COMELEC also noted that Poe had been falsely representing her status as a Philippine citizen in
variouspublicdocuments.Alltheseinvolveasuccessionoffalsities.
Withrespecttotherequiredperiodofresidency,PoedeliberatelyfalselyrepresentedthatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesfor
atleasttenyearspriortotheMay9,2016elections.Poe'sCoCwhensheranfortheSenateintheMay2013nationalelections,however,
shows that she then admitted that she had been residing in the Philippines for only six years and six months. Had she
continuedcountingtheperiodofherresidencebasedontheinformationsheprovidedinher2012CoC,shewouldhavebeenthreemonths
shortoftherequiredPhilippineresidenceoftenyears.Insteadofadoptingthesamerepresentation,her2015CoCshowsthatshe
has been residing in the Philippines from May 24, 2005, and has thus been residing in the Philippines for more than ten
years.
To the COMELEC, Poe's subsequent change in counting the period of her residence, along with the circumstances behind this change,
stronglyindicatesherintenttomisleadtheelectorateregardinghereligibility.
First,atthetimePoeexecutedher2012CoC,shewasalreadyahighrankingpublicofficialwhocouldnotfeignignoranceregardingthe
requirementofestablishinglegaldomicile.ShealsopresumablyhadateamoflegaladvisersatthetimesheexecutedthisCoCasshewas
then the Chair of the MTRCB. She also had experience in dealing with the qualifications for the presidency, considering that she is the
adoptivedaughterofaformerpresidentialcandidate(whohimselfhadtogototheSupremeCourtbecauseofhisownqualifications).
Second,Poe's2012CoChadbeentakenunderoathandcanthusbeconsideredanadmissionagainstinterestthatcannoteasilybe
brushedofforbesetasidethroughthesimplisticclaimof"honestmistake."
Third,theevidencePoesubmittedtoprovethatsheestablishedherresidence(ordomicile)inthePhilippinesasshenowclaimsmostly
refer to events prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, contrary to the established jurisprudence requiring Philippine
citizenshipinestablishinglegaldomicileinthePhilippinesforelectionpurposes.
Fourth,thatPoeallegedlyhadnolifechangingeventonNovember2006(thestartingpointforcountingherresidenceinher2012CoC)
doesnotprovethatshedidnotestablishlegaldomicileinthePhilippinesatthattime.
Lastly,Poeannouncedthechangeinthestartingpointofherresidencyperiodwhenshewasalreadypubliclyknowntobeconsideringa
runforthepresidencythus,itappearslikelythatthechangewasmadetocomplywiththeresidenceperiodrequirementforthe
presidency.
These COMELEC considerations, to my mind, do not indicate grave abuse of discretion. I note particularly that Poe's false
representation regarding her Philippine citizenship did not merely involve a single and isolated statement, but a series of acts a
seriesoffalsitiesthatstartedfromherRANo.9225application,ascanbeseenfromthepresentedpublicdocumentsrecognizingher
citizenship.
InoteinthisregardthatPoe'soriginalcertificateoflivebirth(foundlingcertificate)doesnotindicateherPhilippinecitizenship,asshehad
noknownparentsfromwhomhercitizenshipcouldbetraced.Despitethis,shehadbeenissuedvariousgovernmentdocuments,suchasa
Voter'sIdentificationCardandPhilippinepassportrecognizingherPhilippinecitizenship.Theissuanceofthesesubsequentdocuments
alone should be grounds for heightened suspicions given that Poe's original birth certificate provided no information
regardingherPhilippinecitizenship,andcouldnothavebeenusedasreferenceforthiscitizenship.
AnotherbasisforheightenedsuspicionisthetimingofPoe'samendedbirthcertificate,whichwasissuedonMay4,2006(appliedforin
November 2005), shortly before she applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship with the BID. This amended certificate, where
referencetobeinganadopteehasallbeenerasedasallowedbylaw,wasnotusedinPoe'sRANo.9225BIDapplication.
Thetimingoftheapplicationforthisamendedbirthcertificatestronglysuggestthatitwasusedpurposelyasareservedocumentincase
questionsareraisedaboutPoe'sbirththeybecameunnecessaryandwerenotusedwhentheBIDacceptedPoe'sstatementunderoath
thatshewasaformernaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineasrequiredbyRANo.9225.
That government documents that touched on Poe's birth origins had been tainted with irregularities and were issued beforePoeranfor
elective office strongly indicate that at the time she executed her CoC, she knew that her claimed Philippine citizenship is
taintedwithdiscrepancies,andthatsheisnotaPhilippinecitizenunderArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitution.
II.E.2(a)(iii)PoeandherResidencyClaim

OnPoe'sresidence,Ifinditworthytoaddthattheinformationinher2012CoC(fortheSenate)complieswiththerequirementthata
personmustfirstbeaPhilippinecitizentoestablishlegaldomicileinthePhilippines.BasedonPoe's2012COC,herlegaldomicileinthe
PhilippinesbeganinNovember2006,shortlyaftertheBIDissuedtheOrdergrantingherreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshiponJuly18,
2006.

That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling in Japzon v. Comelec,[226] a 2009 case requiring Philippine citizenship prior to establishing
legaldomicileinthePhilippines,indicatesPoe'sknowledgeofthisrequirement.Italsoindicatesherpresentdeliberateintenttodeceive
theelectoratebychangingthestartingpointofherclaimedresidencyinthePhilippinestoMay24,2005.This,shediddespitebeinginthe
Philippinesatthattimeasanalienunderabalikbayanvisa.
II.E.3.TheCOMELEC'sinterpretationofthelawdespitetheSenateElectoralTribunal's(SET)decisioninthequo warranto
caseagainstthepetitioner.
Icannotagreewiththepetitioner'spos1t10nthattheCOMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitdidnotconsidertheSET'sdecision
datedNovember17,2005.
Bywayofbackground,thepetitioner'sPhilippinecitizenshipwasearlierchallengedinaquowarrantoproceedingbeforetheSET.Aquo
warrantoproceedinginvolvesadirect,notapreliminarychallenge(unlikeinacancellationproceeding),toapublicofficer's
qualificationoroffice.TheSET,voting5to4,dismissedthepetitionandeffectivelyheldthatshewasfittoholdofficeasSenator.
TheSET'sdismissalofthequowarrantopetitionagainstPoe,however,isnotbindingontheCOMELEC,nordoesithaveanyeffectonthe
COMELEC'sauthoritytorenderitsowndecisionovertheSection78proceedingsfiledagainsther.
AFirstimportantpointtoconsiderinlookingattheSETdecisionisthatuntilnowitisstillthesubjectofjudicialreviewpetitionbefore
thisCourtbutdoesnotserveasaprejudicialquestionthatmustberesolvedbeforetheCOMELECcanruleontheseparateanddistinct
petitionbeforeit.RizalitoY.David,thepetitionerwhoinitiatedthequowarrantoproceeding,timelyinvokedtheexpandedjurisdictionof
the Court in G.R. No. 221538. While the decision's implementation has not been prohibited by the Court, its legal conclusions and
reasoning are still under question. Thus, the decision has not yet been affirmed by the Court and cannot be applied, by way of judicial
precedent,totheCOMELEC'sdecisionmaking.
Note in this regard that only rulings of the Supreme Court are considered as part of the laws of the land and can serve as judicial
precedent.[227]Casesdecidedbythelowercourts,oncetheyhaveattainedfinality,mayonlybartheinstitutionofanothercaseforres
adjudicata,i.e.,bypriorjudgment(claimpreclusion)orthepreclusionoftherelitigationofthesameissues(issuepreclusion).[228]For
resjudicatatotake.Effect,however,thepetitionershouldhaveraiseditaspartofherdefenseandproperlyestablishedthattheelements
foritsapplicationarepresent.Thepetitionerhasdoneneither.
Likewisenotethatacourt'srulingoncitizenship,asageneralrule,doesnothavetheeffectofresjudicata,especiallywhenthecitizenship
rulingisonlyantecedenttothedeterminationofrightsofapersoninacontroversy.[229]Thispointisfurtherdiscussedbelow.
Second,theCOMELECcanconductitsowninquiryregardingthepetitioner'scitizenship,separatefromandindependentlyoftheSET.
TheCOMELEC,inordertodeterminethepetitioner'seligibilityanddecideonwhetherherCoCshouldbecancelled,caninquireintoher
citizenship. Courts, including quasijudicial agencies such as the COMELEC, may make pronouncements on the status of Philippine
citizenshipasanincidentintheadjudicationoftherightsofthepartiestoacontroversy.
Inmakingthisdetermination(andseparatelyfromthereasonsdiscussedabove),theCOMELECisnotboundbytheSET'sdecision
sincetheseconstitutionalbodiesareseparateandindependentfromoneanother,eachwithitsownspecificjurisdictionand
differentissuestoresolve.TheCOMELEC,astheindependentconstitutionalbodytaskedtoimplementelectionlaws,hastheauthority
todeterminecitizenshiptodeterminewhetherthecandidatecommittedfalsematerialrepresentationinherCoC.TheSET,ontheother
hand,isaconstitutionalbodytaskedtoresolveallcontestsinvolvingtheeligibilityofSenatorstoholdoffice.
That these two bodies have separate, distinct, and different jurisdictions mean that neither has the authority nor the ascendancy
overtheother,witheachbodysupremeinitsownsphereofauthority.Conversely,thesebodieshavenoascendancytoruleupon
issues outside their respective specific authority, much less bind other bodies with matters outside their respective jurisdictions. The
decisionoftheSET,withitsspecificjurisdictiontoresolvecontestsinvolvingthequalificationsofSenators,doesnothavetheauthorityto
bindtheCOMELEC,anotherconstitutionalbodywithaspecificjurisdictionofitsown.
Consider, too, that the actual ruling and reasoning behind the SET's decision are suspect and ambiguous. All the members of the SET,
exceptforSenatorNancyBinay(whovotedwiththeminority),issuedhisorherownseparateopiniontoexplainhisorhervote:aside
fromthethreemembersoftheSETwhodissentedandissuedtheirownseparateopinions,thefivemembersofthemajorityalsowrote
theirownseparateopinionsexplainingtheirvotes.
Notably,onememberoftheSETmajorityopinedthattheSET'sdecisionisapoliticalonesincethemajorityofSETmembershipcomes
fromthepoliticallegislativebranchofgovernment.
While I do not subscribe to this view, the fact that this was said by one of the members in the majority could reasonably affect the
COMELEC's(andeventhepublic's)opinionontheSET'sgroundsforitsconclusion.
AnothermemberoftheSETmajorityinfactpointedlysaid:

ThecompositionoftheSenateElectoralTribunalispredominantlypolitical,sixSenatorsandthreeJusticesofthe
Supreme Court. The Philippine Constitution did not strictly demand a strictly legal viewpoint in deciding
disqualificationcasesagainstSenators.Hadtheintentionbeendifferent,theConstitutionshouldhavemadetheSupreme
CourtalsositastheSenateElectoralTribunal.ThefactthatsixSenators,electedbythewholecountry,formpartoftheSenate
ElectoralTribunalwouldsuggestthatthejudgmentofthewholeFilipinonationmustbetakenintoconsideration.[Emphases,
italics,andunderscoringsupplied]

StillanothermemberoftheSETmajorityopenlyexplainedthathisvotestemsfromthebeliefthattheSETis"predominantlyapolitical
body" that must take into consideration the will of the Filipino people, while another expressly stated that her opinion should not be
extendedtotheissuesraisedintheCOMELEC:

Finally,itisimportantforthepublictounderstandthatthemaindecisionoftheSETandmyseparateopinionarelimitedtothe
issues raised before it. This does not cover other issues raised in the Commission on Elections in connection with the
Respondent'scandidacyasPresidentorissuesraisedinthepublicfora.

These opinions reasonably cast doubt on the applicability whether as precedent or as persuasive legal points of view to the present
COMELECcasewhichnecessarilyhastoapplythelawandjurisprudenceinresolvingaSection78proceeding.
Given the structure and specific jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the SET, as well as the opinions of some of the latter's members
regarding the nature of their decision, the COMELEC could not have acted beyond its legitimate jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretionwhenitinquiredintothepetitioner'scitizenship.
II.E.4.TheCOMELEC'sauthorityunderSection78
andtheBID'sOrderunderRANo.9225.
Neither do I agree that the COMELEC's decision amounted to a collateral attack on the BID Order, nor that the COMELEC usurped the
DOJ'sprimaryjurisdictionovertheBIDOrder.
In the present case, the private respondents sought the cancellation of the petitioner's CoC based on her false material representations
regardingherPhilippinecitizenship,naturalbornstatus,andperiodofresidence.TheBID,ontheotherhand,passeduponpetitionerPoe's
compliancewithRANo.9225whensheappliedforthe"reacquisition"ofPhilippinecitizenship.TheBIDapprovedtheapplicationandthus
certifiedPoeasadualPhilippineU.S.citizen.
WhethertheCOMELEC'sSection78decisionisacollateralattackontheBIDOrderdependsontheCOMELEC'spurpose,authoritytomake
theinquiry,andtheeffectofitsdecisionontheBIDOrder.
AsIpointedoutearlier,theCOMELECcanmakepronouncementsonthestatusofPhilippinecitizenshipasanincidentintheadjudication
oftherightsofthepartiestoacontroversythatiswithinitsjurisdictiontoruleon.[230]
AsignificantpointtounderstandoncitizenshipisthatRANo.9225thelawauthorizingtheBIDtofacilitatethereacquisitionofPhilippine
citizenshipandpursuanttowhichPoenowclaimsFilipinocitizenshipdoesnotipsofactoauthorizeaformernaturalbornPhilippinecitizen
torunforelectiveoffice.
AnRANo.9225proceedingsimplymakesafindingontheapplicant'scompliancewiththerequirementsofthislaw.Uponapprovalofthe
application,theapplicant'spoliticalandcivilrightsasaPhilippinecitizenarerestored,withthesubsequentenjoymentoftherestored
civilandpoliticalrights"subjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsofthePhilippinesxxx."
Inotherwords,theBID handles the approval process and the restoration of the applicant's civil and political rights, but how
and whether the applicant can enjoy or exercise these political rights are matters that are covered by other laws the full
enjoyment of these rights also depends on other institutions and agencies, not on the BID itself whose task under RA No. 9225 at that
pointisfinished.
Thus,theBIDOrderapprovingpetitionerPoe'sreacquisitionofherPhilippinecitizenshipallowedherthepoliticalrighttofileaCoC,but
likeothercandidates,shemaybethesubjectofprocessescontestingherrighttorunforelectiveofficebasedonthequalificationsshe
representedinherCoC.
Inthepetitioner'scase,herCoChasbeenchallengedunderSection78oftheOECforherfalsematerialrepresentationofherstatusasa
naturalborn Philippine citizen and as a Philippine resident for at least ten years before the May 9, 2016 elections. Thus, as Section 78
provides,theCOMELECconducteditsowninvestigationandreacheditsconclusionsbasedonitsinvestigationoftheclaimedfalsematerial
representations.AsthisispartofitsauthorityunderSection78,theCOMELECcannotbefaultedforlackofauthoritytoactitpossesses
therequiredconstitutionalandstatutoryauthorityforitsactions.
Moreimportantlyinthiscase,theCOMELEC'sactiondoesnotamounttoacollateralattackagainsttheBIDOrder,astheconsequences
of the BID Order allows the petitioner to enjoy political rights but does not exempt her from the liabilities and challenges
thattheexerciseoftheserightsgaveriseto.
In more precise terms, the COMELEC did not directly hold the Order to be defective for purposes of nullifying it it simply declared
pursuant to its own constitutional and statutory power that petitioner Poe cannot enjoy the political right to run for the
Presidencybecauseshefalselyrepresentedhernaturalborncitizenshipandresidencystatus.Thesefactsarematerialbecause
theyareconstitutionalqualificationsforthePresidency.
ItisnotwithoutsignificancethattheCOMELEC'sdeterminationunderSection78oftheOECofacandidate'sPhilippinecitizenshipstatus
despite having reacquired it through RA No. 9225 has been affirmed by the Court several times notably, in Japzon v. Comelec,[231]
Condonv.Comelec,[232]andLopezv.Comelec.[233]

II.E.5.TheclaimedCOMELECencroachmentonthepowersofthe
PresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET).
ThepetitionerpositsonthispointthattheCOMELEC,byrulingonherqualificationsforthePresidency,encroachedonthepowerofthe
PET to rule on election contests involving the Presidency. In short, she claims that the COMELEC, without any legal basis, prematurely
determinedtheeligibilityofapresidentialcandidate.
Toproperlyconsiderthisposition,itmustbeappreciatedthattheCOMELECisnotanordinarycourtorquasijudicialbodythatfallswithin
the judicial supervision of this Court. It is an independent constitutional body that enjoys both decisional AND institutional
independencefromthethreebranchesofthegovernment.Itsdecisionsarenotsubjecttoappealbutonlytothecertiorarijurisdictionof
thisCourtforthecorrectionofgraveabusesintheexerciseofitsdiscretionaveryhighthresholdofreviewasdiscussedabove.
IfthisCourtholdsthattheCOMELECdidindeedencroachonthePET'sjurisdictiondeterminingthequalificationsofPoeinthecourseof
theexerciseofitsjurisdictionunderSection78oftheOEC,therulingvastlydelimitstheCOMELEC'sauthority,whiletheCourtwillitself
unconstitutionallyexpanditsownjurisdiction.
Foreasyreference,tabulatedbelowisacomparisonofthehistoryofthegrantofpower,withrespecttoelections,totheCommissionand
tothePET(nowtransferredtotheSupremeCourt):

TheSupremeCourt

COMELEC

RepublicActNo.1793(1957):

CommonwealthActNo.607(1940),Sec.2:

Sec. l. There shall be an independent residential Electoral

Tribunal to be composed of eleven members which shall be
thesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelectionreturns,
and qualifications of the presidentelect and the vice
presidentelectofthePhilippinesxxxx

The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of

theenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativetothe
conductofelections.Itshalldecidesavethoseinvolvingthe
right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections
xxx
1935Constitution(asamendedm1940),Art.X,Sec.2:
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of
theenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativetothe
conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
whichmaybeconferreduponitbylaw.Itshalldecide,save
thoseinvolvingtherighttovote,alladministrativequestions
affectingelections,includingthedeterminationofthenumber
and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials. All law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government,whensorequiredbytheCommission,shallact
asitsdeputiesforthepurposeofinsuringfree,orderly,and
honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court.Xxx

BatasPambansaBig.884(1985),Sec.1:

1973Constitution,Art.XIIC,Sec.2:

ThereshallbeanindependentPresidentialElectoralTribunal,
hereinafterreferredtoastheTribunal,tobecomposedofthe
nine members which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
PresidentandtheVicePresidentofthePhilippines.xxx

TheCommissiononElectionsshallhavethefollowingpowers
andfunctions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections.xxxx
3. Decide, save those involving the right to vote,
administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places,
the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the
registrationofvotes.

1987Constitution,Art.VII,Sec.4:

1987Constitution,Art.IXC,Sec.2:

xxxx

The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following

powersandfunctions:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge

of all contests relating to the election, returns, and (1)Enforceandadministeralllawsand
qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may
Regulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,
promulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.
initiative,referendum,andrecall.
xxxx
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote , all
questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of
electionofficialsandinspectors,andregistrationofvoters.
1987Constitution,Art.IX,Sec.7:

1987Constitution,Art.IX,Sec.I:

x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by TheConstitutionalCommissions,whichshallbeindependent,

law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on

be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the Elections,andtheCommissiononAudit.

Aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt o r a copy Executive Order 292 ( 1987), Book V, Title I, Subtitle C,
thereof.
Chapter1,Sec.2:
Powers and functions. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful,andcredibleelections,andshall:
(20) Have exclusive jurisdiction over all preproclamation
controversies. It may motuproprio or upon written petition,
and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidateelect or
annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been
made, as the evidence shall warrant. Notwithstanding the
pendency of any preproclamation controversy, the
Commission may, motuproprio or upon filing of a verified
petition and after due notice and hearing, oder the
proclamationofotherwinningcandidateswhoseelectionwill
notbeaffectedbytheoutcomeofthecontroversy.

II.E.5(a).HistoryofthePET.
Anexaminationofthe1935Constitutionshowsthatitdidnotprovideforamechanismfortheresolutionofelectioncontestsinvolvingthe
office of the President or VicePresident. This void was only filled in 1957 when Congress enacted RA No. 1793,[234] creating the
PresidentialElectoralTribunal.Untilthen,controversiesordisputesinvolvingelectioncontests,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident
electandVicePresidentelectwerenotjusticiable.[235]
RANo.1793gavetheSupremeCourt,actingasthePET,thesolejurisdictiontodecideallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,and
qualificationsofthePresidentelectandtheVicePresidentelect.
The PET became irrelevant under the 1973 Constitution since the 1973 President was no longer chosen by the electorate but by the
membersoftheNationalAssemblytheofficeoftheVicePresidentintumceasedtoexist.[236]
The PET was only revived in 1985 through Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 884[237] after the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution
restoredtothepeoplethepowertodirectlyelectthePresidentandreinstalledtheofficeoftheVicePresident.
ThePETunderB.P.884exercisedthesamejurisdictionasthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualifications
ofthePresidentandtheVicePresident,albeititomittedthesuffix"elect."ItwasalsoanentirelydistinctentityfromtheSupremeCourt
withmembershipcomposedofbothSupremeCourtJusticesandmembersoftheBatasangPambansa.[238]
ThePET'sjurisdictionwasrestoredunderthe1987ConstitutionwiththeJusticesoftheSupremeCourtastheonlymembers.Presently,
this Court, sitting enbanc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice
President.
ThegrantofjurisdictiontothePETisexclusivebutatthesametime,limited.TheconstitutionalphraseologylimitsthePET'sjurisdiction
to election contests which can only contemplate a postelection and post proclamation controversy[239] since no "contest" can exist
beforeawinnerisproclaimed.Understoodinthissense,thejurisdictionofthemembersoftheCourt,sittingasPET,doesnotpertainto
PresidentialorVicePresidentialcandidatesbuttothePresident(elect)andVicePresident(elect).
II.E.S(b).TheCOMELEC'sHistory.
The PET's history should be compared to the history of the grant of jurisdiction to the COMELEC which was created in 1940, initially by
statute whose terms were later incorporated as an amendment to the 1935 Constitution. The COMELEC was given the power to decide,
savethoseinvolvingtherighttovote,alladministrativequestionsaffectingelections.
Whenthe1973Constitutionwasadopted,thisCOMELECpowerwasretainedwiththesamelimitations.
The1987Constitutiondeletedtheadjective"administrative"inthedescriptionoftheCOMELEC'spowersandexpandeditsjurisdictionto
decide all questions affecting elections, except those involving the right to vote. Thus, unlike the very limited jurisdiction of
electioncontestsgrantedtotheSupremeCourt/PET,theCOMELEC'sjurisdiction,withitscatchallprovision,isallencompassingitcovers
allquestions/issuesnotspecificallyreservedforothertribunals.
TheAdministrativeCodeof1987furtherexplicitlygrantedtheCOMELECexclusivejurisdictionoverallpreproclamationcontroversies.
Section78oftheOECstillfurtherrefinestheCOMELEC'spowerbyexpresslygrantingitthepowertodenyduecourseortocancela
CertificateofCandidacyonthegroundoffalsematerialrepresentation.Exnecessitatelegis.Expressgrantsofpoweraredeemed
to include those of necessary or fair implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto. This power under
Section 78, therefore, necessarily includes the power to make a determination of the truth or falsity of the representation made in the
CoC.

The bottom line from this brief comparison is that the power granted to the PET is limited to election contests while the powers of the
COMELECarebroadandextensive.ExceptforelectioncontestsinvolvingthePresidentorVicePresident(andmembersofCongress)[240]
andcontroversiesinvolvingtherighttovote,theCOMELEChasthejurisdictiontodecideALLquestionsaffectingtheelections.Logically,
thisincludespreproclamationcontroversiessuchasthedeterminationofthequalificationsofcandidatesforpurposeofresolvingwhether
acandidatecommittedfalsematerialrepresentation.
Thus, if this Court would deny the COMELEC the power to pass upon the qualifications of a Presidential candidate to stress, not a
PresidentoraPresidentelectonthegroundthatthispowerbelongstothePETcomposedofthemembersofthisCourt,weshallbe
selfservinglyexpandingthelimitedpowergrantedtothisCourtbyArticleVII,Section4,attheexpenseoflimitingthepowersexplicitly
grantedtoanindependentconstitutionalcomm1ss10n.TheCourtwouldthuscommitanunconstitutionalencroachmentontheCOMELEC's
powers.
II.E.S(c).JurisprudenceonCOMELECPETJurisdiction.
In Tecson v. COMELEC,[241] the Court indirectly affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction over a presidential candidate's eligibility in a
cancellation proceeding. The case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the eligibility of presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr.
(FPJ): one petition, G.R. No. 161824, invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court over a COMELEC
decision in a CoC cancellation proceeding, while the other, G.R. No. 161434, invoked the Court's jurisdiction as a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
TheG.R.No.161824petition,ininvokingtheCourt'sjurisdictionovertheCOMELEC'sdecisiontoupholdFPJ'scandidacy,arguedthatthe
COMELEC'sdecisionwaswithinitspowertorenderbutitsconclusionissubjecttotheCourt'sreviewunderRule64oftheRulesofCourt
andArticleIX,Section7ofthe1987Constitution.
Incontrast,theG.R.No.161434petitionarguedthatthattheCOMELEChadnojurisdictiontodecideapresidentialcandidate'seligibility,
asthiscouldonlybedecidedbythePET.IttheninvokedtheCourt'sjurisdictionasthePETtoruleuponthechallengetoFPJ'seligibility.
TheCourteventuallydismissedbothpetitions,butfordifferentreasons.TheCourtdismissedG.R.No.161824forfailuretoshowgrave
abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCOMELEC.G.R.No.161434wasdismissedforwantofjurisdiction.
ThedifferenceinthereasonsforthedismissalofthetwopetitionsineffectaffirmedtheCOMELEC'sjurisdictiontodetermineapresidential
candidate'seligibilityinapreelectionproceeding.ItalsoclarifiedthatwhilethePETalsohasjurisdictionoverthequestionsofeligibility,
itsjurisdictionbeginsonlyafteraPresidenthasbeenproclaimed.
Thus,thetwoTecsonpetitions,readinrelationwithoneanother,standforthepropositionthatthePEThasjurisdictionoverchallengesto
aproclaimedPresident'seligibility,whiletheCOMELEChasjurisdictionovertheeligibilitiesanddisqualificationsofpresidentialcandidates
filedpriortotheproclamationofaPresident.
Thisistheprecisepointofmydiscussionsabove.
As against the Tecson ruling, the case of Fermin v. COMELEC[242] that petitioner Poe relies on, does not divest the COMELEC of its
authoritytodetermineacandidate'seligibilityinthecourseofresolvingSection78petitions.
Fermin held that a candidate's ineligibility is not a ground for a Section 68 proceeding involving disqualification cases, despite a
COMELEC rule including the lack of residence (which is an ineligibility) in the list of grounds for a petition for disqualification. It then
characterizedthedisputedpetitionasapetitionforthecancellationofaCoCandnotapetitionfordisqualification,andheldthatithad
beenfiledoutoftime.
TheCourt'scitationinFerminofJusticeVicenteV.Mendoza'sSeparateOpinioninRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC[243] thus refers to
theCOMELEC'slackofauthoritytoaddtothegroundsforapetitionfordisqualificationasprovidedinthelaw,evenifthese
groundsinvolveanineligibilitytoholdoffice.ItcannotbeconstruedtodivesttheCOMELECofitsauthoritytodeterminethe
veracityofrepresentationsinacandidate'sCoC,which,tobeconsideredmaterial,mustpertaintoacandidate'seligibilityto
holdelectiveoffice.Ferminitselfclarifiedthispointwhenitsaidthat:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualificationsbutonafindingthatthecandidatemadeamaterialrepresentationthatisfalse,whichmayrelateto
the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsonqualificationsoreligibilityforpublicoffice. If the candidate subsequently
statesamaterialrepresentationintheCoCthatisfalse,theCOMELEC,followingthelaw,isempoweredtodenyduecourseto
orcancelsuchcertificate.Indeed,theCourthasalreadylikenedaproceedingunderSection78toaquowarrantoproceeding
underSection253oftheOECsincetheybothdealwiththeeligibilityorqualificationofacandidate,withthedistinctionmainly
inthefactthata"Section78"petitionisfiledbeforeproclamation,whileapetitionforquowarrantoisfiledafterproclamation
ofthewinningcandidate.[244][emphasesanditalicssupplied]

III.
TheClaimofGraveAbuseofDiscretionwithrespecttotheCITIZENSHIPISSUE

Aside from committing acts outside its jurisdiction, petitioner Poe claims that the COMELEC also committed acts of grave abuse of
discretionwhenitmisappliedthelawandrelatedjurisprudenceinholdingthatArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitutiondoesnotgrant
hernaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshipandindisregardingthecountry'sobligationsundertreatiesandthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesof
internationallawthatrequirethePhilippinestorecognizethePhilippinecitizenshipoffoundlingsinthecountry.
Petitioner Poe also questions the COMELEC's evaluation of the evidence, and alleges that it disregarded the evidence she presented
provingthatsheisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.
PoelastlyraisestheCOMELEC'sviolationofherrighttoequalprotection,asithastherighttobetreatedinthesamemannerasother
foundlingsbornafterthePhilippines'ratificationofseveralinstrumentsfavorabletotherightsofthechild.
III.A.TheCOMELECdidnotgravelyabuseitsdiscretionininterpretingArticleJV,Section1ofthe1935Constitution.

III.A.1.ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitutiondoesnot,onitsface,includefoundlingsinlistingthe"citizens
ofthePhilippines."

Jurisprudencehasestablishedthreeprinciplesofconstitutionalconstruction:first,verbalegisnonestrecedendumfromthewordsofthe
statutethereshouldbenodeparturesecond,whenthereisambiguity,ratiolegisestanimathewordsoftheConstitutionshouldbe
interpretedbasedontheintentoftheframersandthird,utmagisvaleatquampereattheConstitutionmustbeinterpretedasawhole.
[245]

IholdtheviewthatnoneofthesemodessupporttheinclusionoffoundlingsamongtheFilipinocitizenslistedinthe1935Constitution.
The1935ConstitutiondoesnotexpresslylistfoundlingsamongFilipinocitizens.[246]Usingverbalegis,theConstitutionlimitscitizensof
the Philippines to the listing expressly in its text. Absent any ambiguity, the second level of constitutional construction should not also
apply.
Even if we apply ratio legis, the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention do not reveal an intention to consider foundlings to be
citizens, much less naturalborn ones. On the contrary the Constitutional Convention rejected the inclusion of foundlings in the
Constitution.Iftheywerenowtobedeemedincluded,theresultwouldbeananomaloussituationofmonstrousproportionsfoundlings,
with unknown parents, would have greater rights than those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and who had to
electPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority.
IninterpretingtheConstitutionfromtheperspectiveofwhatitexpresslycontains(verbalegis),onlythetermsoftheConstitutionitself
requiretobeconsidered.ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935ConstitutiononCitizenshipprovides:

ARTICLEIV
CITIZENSHIP

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2)ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeen
electedtopublicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Section2.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw.

Toreiterate,thelistofpersonswhomaybeconsideredPhilippinecitizensisanexclusivelist.Accordingtotheprincipleofexpressiounius
estexclusioalterius,itemsnotprovidedinalistarepresumednottobeincludedinit.[247]
Inthislist,Paragraphs(1)and(2)neednotobviouslybeconsideredastheyrefertopersonswhowerealreadybornatthetimeofthe
adoptionofthe1935Constitution.PetitionerPoewasbornonlyin1968.Paragraphs(5),ontheotherhandandexceptundertheterms
mentionedbelow,doesnotalsoneedtobeincludedforbeingimmaterialtothefactsandtheissuesposedinthepresentcase.
Thus,weareleftwithparagraphs(3)and(4)whichrespectivelyrefertoaperson'sfatherandmother.Eitherorbothparentsofachild

mustbePhilippinecitizensatthetimeofthechild'sbirthsothatthechildcanclaimPhilippinecitizenshipundertheseparagraphs.[248]
This is the rule of jussanguinis or citizenship by blood,i.e., as traced from one or both parents and as confirmed by the established
rulingsofthisCourt.[249]Significantly,noneofthe1935constitutionalprovisionscontemplatethesituationwherebothparents'identities
(andconsequently,theircitizenships)areunknown,whichisthecaseforfoundlings.
As the list of Philippine citizens under Article IV, Section 1 does not include foundlings, then they are not included among those
constitutionallygrantedorrecognizedtobePhilippinecitizensexcepttotheextentthattheyfullunderthecoverageofparagraph5,i.e.,if
theychoosetoavailoftheopportunitytobenaturalized.Establishedrulesoflegalinterpretationtellusthatnothingistobeaddedto
whatthetextstatesorreasonablyimpliesamatterthatisnotcoveredistobetreatedasnotcovered.[250]
The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution, in particular of paragraphs (3) and (4) parentage provisions, on the
citizenshipoffoundlingsinthePhilippines,infactspeaksloudlyanddirectlyabouttheirlegalsituation.Suchsilencecanonlymeanthat
the 1935 Constitution did not address the situation of foundlings via paragraphs (3) and (4), but left the matter to other
provisionsthatmayheapplicableasdiscussedbelow.
Specifically, foundlings can fully avail of Paragraph (5) of the above list, which speaks of those who are naturalized as citizens in
accordance with law. Aside from the general law on naturalization,[251] Congress can pass a law specific to foundlings or ratify other
treatiesrecognizingtherightoffoundlingstoacquireFilipinocitizenship.Thefoundlinghimselforherself,ofcourse,mustchoosetoavail
oftheopportunityunderthelaworthetreaty.
To address the position that petitioner Poe raised in this case, the fact that the 1935 Constitution did not provide for a situation where
both parents are unknown (as also the case in the current 1987 Constitution) does not mean that the provision on citizenship is
ambiguouswithrespecttofoundlingsitsimplymeansthattheconstitutionalprovisiononcitizenshipbasedonbloodorparentagehasnot
beenmadeavailableundertheConstitutionbuttheprovisionmustbereadinitstotalitysothatwemustlooktootherapplicableprovision
thatareavailable,whichinthiscaseisparagraph(5)asexplainedabove.
In negative terms, even if Poe's suggested interpretation via the parentage provision did not expressly apply and thus left a gap, the
omissiondoesnotmeanthatwecantakelibertieswiththeConstitutionthroughstretchedinterpretation,andforciblyreadthesituationso
astoplacefoundlingswithinthetermsoftheConstitution'sparentageprovisions.Wecannotandshouldnotdothisaswewouldthereby
crosstheforbiddenpathofjudiciallegislation.
The appropriate remedy for the petitioner and other foundlings, as already adverted to, is via naturalization, a process that the
Constitutionitselfalreadyprovidesfor.NaturalizationcanbebyspecificlawthattheCongresscanpassforfoundlings,oronthestrength
ofinternationallawviathetreatiesthatbindsthePhilippinestorecognizetherightoffoundlingstoacquireanationality.(PetitionerPoe
obviouslydoesnotwanttomakethisadmissionas,thereby,shewouldnotqualifyforthePresidencythatshenowaspires
for.) There, too, is the possible amendment of the Constitution so that the situation of foundlings can be directly addressed in the
Constitution (of course, this may also be an unwanted suggestion as it is a course of action that is too late [or the 2016
elections.)
Notably,thegovernmentoperatingunderthe1935ConstitutionhasrecognizedthatfoundlingswhowishtobecomefullfledgedPhilippine
citizensmustundergonaturalizationunderCommonwealthActNo.473.DOJOpinionNo.377Seriesof1940,inallowingtheissuanceof
PhilippinepassportstofoundlingsfoundinthePhilippines,said:

HoweverundertheprinciplesofInternationalLaw,afoundlinghasthenationalityoftheplacewhereheisfoundorborn(See
chapterontheConflictofLaw,footnote,p.57citingBluntschliinanarticleintheRevuedeTraitint.for1870,p.107Mr.Hay,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760 Moore, International Law
Digest, Vol. III, p. 281 Garcia's Quizzer on Private International Law, p. 270) which in this case, is the Philippines.
Consequently,EddyHowardmayberegardedasacitizenofthePhilippinesforpassportpurposesonlyifhedesires
tobeafullfledgedFilipino,hemayapplyfornaturalizationundertheprovisionsofCommonwealthActNo.473as
amendedbyCommonwealthActNo.535.[emphasis,italics,andunderscoringsupplied]

AsubsequentDOJOpinion,DOJOpinionNo.189,seriesof1951,stated:

HoweverundertheprinciplesofInternationalLaw,afoundlinghasthenationalityoftheplacewhereheisfoundorborn(See
chapterontheConflictofLaw,footnote,p.57citingBluntschliinanarticleintheRevuedeTraitint.for1870,p.107Mr.Hay,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760 Moore, International Law
Digest,Vol.III,p.281)whichinthiscase,isthePhilippines.Consequently,AnthonySatanHalemayberegardedasacitizenof
thePhilippines,andentitledtoapassportassuch.

ThetwoDOJopinionsbothsaythatafoundlingisconsideredaPhilippinecitizenforpassportpurposes.ThatthesecondDOJOpinion
does not categorically require naturalization for a foundling to become a Philippine citizen does not mean it amended the government's
stance on the citizenship of foundlings, as these opinions were issued to grant them a Philippine passport and facilitate their
righttotravel.Internationallawiscitedasreferencebecausetheywouldbetravellingabroad,anditispossiblethatothercountriesthey
willtraveltorecognizethatprinciple.ButforpurposesofapplicationinthePhilippines,thedomesticlawoncitizenshipprevails,
thatis,ArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitution.ThisiswhyDOJOpinionNo.377,Seriesof1940clarifiedthatifafoundling
wantstobecomeafullfledgedPhilippinecitizen,thenheshouldapplyfornaturalizationunderCANo.473.

Inanycase,DOJOpinionNo.189,Seriesof1950shouldnotbeinterpretedinsuchawayastocontravenethe1935Constitution,andit
mostcertainlycannotamendoralterArticleIV.Sectionl,ofthe1935Constitution.
III.A.2.TheConstitutiondidnotintendtoinclude
foundlingswithinitsexpresstermsbutdidnot
totallyleavethemwithoutanyremedy.
Poe,inarguingthispoint,effectivelyimputesgraveabuseofdiscretionontheCOMELECfornotrecognizingthatanambiguityexistsunder
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, and for not recognizing that the framers of the 1935
Constitutionintendedtoincludefoundlingsintheconstitutionallisting.
Iseenoambiguityasexplainedabove,butIshallcontinuetodwellonthispointunderthepresenttopictotheextentofpetitionerPoe's
argumentthattheexclusiouniosprincipleisnotanabsoluteruleandthat"unfairness"wouldresultiffoundlingsarenotdeemedincluded
withintheconstitutionallisting.
Ishalldiscussthesepointsthoughinrelationwiththepetitioner'ssecondpointtheallegedintentoftheframersofthe1935Constitution
toincludefoundlingswithinthetermsofthe1935Constitution.Thelinkbetweenthefirstandthesecondpointsofdiscussionliesinthe
claimthatambiguityandfairnessrenderthediscussionoftheframers'intentnecessary.
Poe bases her ambiguity and unfairness argument on the Court's ruling in People v. Manantan[252] which provided an exception to the
exclusiouniusestexclusioalteriusprincipleundertherulingthat:

Whereastatuteappearsonitsfacetolimittheoperationofitsprovisionstoparticularpersonsorthingsbyenumeratingthem,
butnoreasonexistswhyotherpersonsorthingsnotsoenumeratedshouldnothavebeenincluded,andmanifestinjusticewill
followbynotsoincludingthem,themaximexpressiouniusestexclusioalterius,shouldnotbeinvoked.[253]

Thepetitionerappearstoforgetthat,asdiscussedabove,thetermsoftheConstitutionarecleartheysimplydidnotprovideforthe
situationoffoundlingsbasedonparentagebutleftthedooropenfortheuseofanothermeasure,theirnaturalization.Thereisthus
thatbackdooropeningintheConstitutiontoprovideforfoundlingsusingawayotherthanparentage.
The 1935 Constitution did not also have the effect of fostering unfairness by not expressly including foundlings as citizens via the
parentagerouteasfoundlingscouldnotriseanyhigherthanchildren:whosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.Likethem,theyfell
underthenaturalizedclassificationunderthetermsofthe1935Constitution.ThatunderthetermsofthesubsequentConstitutionsthe
children of Filipino mothers were deemed naturalborn citizens of the Philippines does not also unfairly treat foundlings as there is a
reasonabledistinctionbetweentheirsituationstheformerhaveestablishedFilipinoparentagewhilethelatter'sparentsareunknown.
Fromtheseperspectives,theConstitutiondidnotleaveoutthesituationoffoundling'saltogethersothattherecouldbeagapthatwould
callforinterpretation.Apparently,thepetitionersimplyobjectsbecauseshewantsthecaseoffoundlingstobeaddressedvia
the parentage route which is a matter of policy that is not for this Court to take. In the absence of a gap that would call for
interpretation,theuseofinterpretativeprinciplesisuncalledfor.
III.A.3.Neitherdidtheframersofthe1935
Constitutionintendtoincludefoundlingswithinthe
parentageprovisionsofthisConstitution.
Thefulltranscriptofthedeliberationsshowsthattheexpressinclusionoffoundlingswithinthetermsofthe1935Constitutionwastaken
up during its deliberations. These records show that the proposal to include them was rejected. Other than this rejection, no definitive
decisionwasreached,notevenintermsofaconcreteproposaltodeemthemincluded,withinthemeaningoftheparentageprovisionsof
ArticleIV,Sectionlofthe1935Constitutiontherewereonlyvagueandinconclusivediscussionsfromwhichwecannotandshouldnot
infertheintentoftheframersoftheConstitutiontoconsiderandthentoincludethemwithinitsterms.
In this regard, the Court should not forget the fine distinction between the evidentiary value of constitutional and congressional
deliberations: constitutional deliberation discussions that are not reflected in the wording of the Constitution are not as material as the
congressional deliberations where the intents expressed by the discussants come from the very legislators who would reject or approve
thelawunderconsideration.Inconstitutionaldeliberations,whattheframersexpressdonotnecessarilyreflecttheintentofthe
peoplewhobytheirsovereignactapprovetheConstitutiononthebasisofitsexpresswording.[254]
Torefertothespecificsofthedeliberations,Mr.Rafols,aConstitutionalConventionmember,proposedtheinclusionoffoundlingsamong
those who should be expressly listed as Philippine citizens. The proposal was framed as an amendment to the agreed provision
thatchildrenbornofFilipinamotherandforeignfathersshallbeconsideredPhilippinecitizens.
AspetitionerPoepointedout,Mr.Roxasraisedthepoint(asanobservation,notasanamendmenttotheproposalonthetable)thatthe
expressinclusionoffoundlingswasnolongerneededastheircaseswererareandinternationallawatthattimealreadyrecognizedthem
ascitizensofthecountrywheretheyarebornin.
Mr.Buslon,anothermember,voicedoutanotherpointthatthemattershouldbelefttothediscretionofthelegislature.
ThepresentdisputeessentiallyarosefromthesestatementswhichprecededthevoteontheRafolsproposal(whichdidnotreflecteither

oftheobservationsmade).Forclarity,theexchangesamongtheConventionmemberswentasfollows:
Table3

Espaol

English

SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda, Senor Presidente.

Propongo que despues def inciso 2 se inserte lo siguiente:
"Loshijosnatura!esdeunpadreextranjeroydeunamadre
filipinanoreconocidosporaquel,

MR. RAFOLS: For an amendment, Mr. Chairman. I propose

that after the paragraph 2, the following be inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
recognizedthat"

xxxx

xxxx

EL PRES/DENTE: La Mesa desea pedir una aclara. cion def THE PRESIDENT: The Board wishes to request a clarification
proponente de la enmienda. ,Se refiere Su Senoria a hijos totheproponentoftheamendment.DoesHisHonorreferto
naturalesoatodaclasedehijosilegitimos?
naturalchildrenoranykindofillegitimatechildren.
SR. RAFOLS: A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. Tambien se MR. RAFOLS: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
incluyealoshijosnaturalesdepadresconocidos,yloshijos includes the natural children of unknown parentage, and
naturalesoilegitimosdepadresdesconocidos.
naturalorillegitimatechildrenofunknownparentage.
SR.MONTINOLA:Paraunaaclaracion.Allisedice"depadres
desconocidos."LosCodigosactuatesconsideracomofilipino,
esdecir,mere__fzeroalCodigoespanolqueconsideracomo
espano!esatodosloshijosdapadreadesconcidosnacidosen
terrilorio espanol, porque la presuncion es que el hijo de
padres desconocidos es hijo de un espanol, y de igual
manera se podra aplicar eso en Filipinas, de que un hijo de
padredesconocidoynacidoenFilipinasseconsideraraquees
filipino.demodoquenohaynecesidad...

MR.Montinola:forclarification.Theyarecalled"ofunknown
parents."TheCodesactuallyconsiderthemFilipino,thatis,I
mean the Spanish Code considers all children of unknown
parents born m Spanish territory as Spaniards because the
presumption is that the child of unknown parentage is the
son of a Spaniard this treatment can likewise be applied in
thePhilippinessothatachildofunknownfatherborninthe
PhilippinesisFilipino,sothereisnoneed...

SR. RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque estamos relatando las

MR.RAFOLS:Thereisaneed,becausewearerelatingthose
condicionesdelosquevanaserfilipinos.
conditionstothosewhoaregoingtobeFilipinos.
SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la interpretacion de la ley
ahora,demaneradequenohaynecesidaddelaenmienda. MR. Montinola: But that's the lay interpretation of law now,
sothereisnoneedfortheamendment.
SR.RAFOLS:Laenmiendadebeleersedeestamanera:"Los
hijosnaturaleso ilegitimos deun padre extranjero y deuna
madre filipina, no reconocidos par aquel, o los hijos de MR.RAFOLS:Theamendmentshouldbereadthisway:"The
natural or illegitimate children of a foreign father and a
padresdesconocidos."
Filipinomother,notrecognizedbyeitherone,orthechildren
xxxx
ofunknownparents."
SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you think it would be xxxx
better to leave this matter to the hands of the Legislature?
MR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you think it would be
(originalinEnglish)
bettertoleavethismattertothehandsoftheLegislature?
SR. ROXAS: Senor Presidente, mi opinion hum ii de es que
estos son casos muy insignificantes y contados, para que la MR.ROXAS:Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these
Constitucion necesite referirse a ellos. Por las /eyes are very insignificant and rare cases for the Constitution to
internacionalessereconoceelprincipiodequeloshijosolas refer to them. Under international law the principle that
personas nacidas en un pais y de padres desconocidos son childrenorpeopleborninacountryandofunknownparents
ciudadanos de esa nacion, y no es necesario incluir en la are citizens of that nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include in the Constitution an exhaustive
Constitucionunadisposiciontaxativasobreelparticular.
provisiononthematter.
xxxx

EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a votacion dicha

enmienda.Losqueestenconformesconlamisma,quedigan xxxx
Si. (Una minoria: Si.) Los que no lo esten, que digan No.
THEPRESIDENT:TheChairplacestheamendmenttoavote.
(Unamayoria:No.)Quedarechazadalaenmienda.
Thosewhoagreewiththeamendment,sayYes.(Aminority:
Yes.) Those who do not, say No. (the majority: No.) The
amendmentisrejected.

Mr. Roxas, a known and leading lawyer of his time who eventually became the fifth President of the Philippines, was clearly giving his
personal"opinionhumilde"(humbleopinion)followingMr.Buslon'salternativeviewthatthemattershouldbereferredtothelegislature.
He did not propose to amend or change the original Rafols proposal which was the approval or the rejection of the inclusion to the
provision"[t]henaturalorillegitimatechildrenofaforeignfatherandaFilipinomother,notrecognizedbyeitherone,orthechildrenof
unknownparents."
The Convention rejected the Rafols proposal. As approved, paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution finally read:
"ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesanduponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship."
Underthesesimple unadorned terms, nothing was thus clear except the Rafols proposal to include "children of unknown parents," after
which a vote followed. As the transcripts show, the assemblage rejected the proposal. To be sure, the rejection was not because

foundlingswerealreadyPhilippinecitizensunderinternationallawtheRafolsproposalwasnotamendedtoreflectthisreasoningandwas
simplyrejectedafteranexchangeofviews.
TosayunderthesecircumstancesthatfoundlingswereinfactintendedtobeincludedintheFilipinoparentageprovisionis
clearlyalreadyamodificationoftherecordstoreflectwhattheydonotsay.
Themostthatcanperhapsbeclaimedundertheserecordsisthattheframerswereinconclusiveonthereasonfortherejection.Itshould
notbelostontheCourtthatthedeemedinclusionthatPoenowclaimsdoesnotlogicallyarisefromthemainprovisionthatMr.Rafols
wantedtoamendhisproposalhadapremisedifferentfromtheFilipinoparentagethatwassoughttobemodified.
In clearer terms, the main provision sought to be amended was based on the existence of a Filipino mother what Rafols
wantedwastoincludeasituationofcompletelyunknownparentage.ThisRafolsproposalwasrejected.Nothingwasdecidedon
whytherejectionresulted.Anythingbeyondthissimplereadingisconjectural.
Tomymind,theseconsiderationsshouldcautionusagainstbowingtopetitionerPoe'sselfservinginterpretationofMr.Roxas'sstatement
in effect, an interpretation, not of an express constitutional provision, but of an observation made in the course of the
constitutionaldebate.
Tosummarizemyreasonsfordisagreeingwiththispropositionareasfollows:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

another member of the 1934 Constitutional Convention provided for a different reason for not including
foundlingsintheenumerationofcitizensunderArticleIV,i.e.,thatthemattershouldbelefttothediscretionof
thelegislature
Mr.Roxas'statementcouldinfactreasonablybeconstruedtobeinsupportaswellofthisalternativereason
whatiscertainisthatMr.RoxasdidnotsupporttheRafolsproposal
Mr. Roxas's view is only one view that was not supported by any of the members of the Constitutional
Convention,andcannotbeconsideredtohavebeenrepresentativeoftheviewsoftheother201delegates,102
ofwhomwerealsolawyerslikeMr.Roxasandmightbepresumedtoknowthebasicsofstatutoryconstruction
referencestointernationallawbymembersoftheConstitutionalConventioncannot,withoutitscorresponding
textintheConstitution,beconsideredasappendedtoorincludedintheConstitution
Poe's position is based on an interpretation of a lone observation made in the course of the constitutional
debateitisnotevenaninterpretationofaconstitutionalprovision
the deemed inclusion would have rendered paragraph 3 of Section 1 absurdly unfair as foundlings would be
consideredFilipinocitizenswhilethosebornofFilipinamothersandforeignfatherswouldhavetoundertakean
electionandlastly,
thesovereignFilipinopeoplecouldnotbeconsideredtohaveknownandratifiedtheobservationofonemember
oftheConstitutionalConvention,especiallywhentheprovisionswhichsupposedlyreflectthisobservationdonot
indicateevenahintofthisintent.

These reasons collectively provide the justification under the circumstances that lead us to the first and primordial rule in constitutional
construction, that is, the text of the constitutional provision applies and is controlling. Intent of the Constitution's drafters may only be
resorted to in case of ambiguity, and after examining the entire text of the Constitution. Even then, the opinion of a member of the
ConstitutionalConventionismerelyinstructive,itcannotbeconsideredconclusiveofthepeople'sintent.
III.A.4.TheapplicationofArticleJV,Section1ofthe1935
Constitutiondoesnotviolatesocialjusticeprinciples
ortheequalprotectionclause.
InlightoftheclarityofthetextofArticleIV,Sectionlofthe1935Constitutionregardingtheexclusionoffoundlingsandtheunreliability
oftheallegedintentofthe1934ConstitutionalConventiontoincludefoundlingsinthelistofPhilippinecitizens,Idonotthinkthe1987
Constitution's provisions on social justice and the right of a child to assistance, as well as equal access to public office should be
interpretedtoprovidePhilippinecitizenshiptofoundlingsbornunderthe1935Constitution.
As I earlier pointed out, there is no doubt in the provision of Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. Foundlings had been
contemplatedatonepointtobeincludedintheprovision,butthispropositionwasrejected,andtheultimateprovisionofthetextdidnot
providefortheinclusionofpersonswithbothparents'identitiesunknown.
Additionally,I do not agree that the Court should interpret the provisions of a new Constitution (the 1987 Constitution) to
addmeaningtotheprovisionsoftheprevious1935Constitution.Indeed,wehavecitedpastConstitutionstolookatthehistory
anddevelopmentofourconstitutionalprovisionsasatoolforconstitutionalconstruction.Howourpastgovernmentshadbeengoverned,
andthechangesoruniformitysincethen,areinstructiveindeterminingtheprovisionsofthecurrent1987Constitution.
I do not think that a reverse comparison can be done, i.e., that what the 1935 Constitution provides can be amended and
appliedatpresentbecauseofwhatthe1987Constitutionnowprovides.ItwouldamounttotheCourtamendingwhathadbeen
agreed upon by the sovereign Filipino nation that ratified the 1935 Constitution, and push the Court to the forbidden road of judicial
legislation.
Moreover,determiningtheparametersofcitizenshipisasovereigndecisionthatinherentlydiscriminatesbyprovidingwhomayandmay
notbeconsideredPhilippinecitizens,andhowPhilippinecitizenshipmaybeacquired.ThesedistinctionshadbeenratifiedbytheFilipino
nationactingasitsownsovereignthroughthe1935Constitutionandshouldnotbedisturbed.
Intheselights,IalsocannotgivecredencetoPoe'sassertionthatinterpretingthe1935ConstitutiontonotprovidePhilippinecitizenship
tofoundlingsis"baseless,unjust,discriminatory,contrarytocommonsense",andviolativeoftheequalprotectionclause.

Note,atthispoint,thatthe1935ConstitutioncreatesadistinctionofcitizenshipbasedonparentageapersonborntoaFilipinofatheris
automaticallyconsideredaPhilippinecitizenfrombirth,whileapersonborntoaFilipinomotherhastheinchoaterighttoelectPhilippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Distinguishing the kind of citizenship based on who of the two parents is Filipino is a
hallmark(justlyorunjustly)ofthe1935Constitution,andallowingpersonswithwhomnoparentcanbeidentifiedforpurposesoftracing
citizenshipwouldcontravenethisdistinction.
Lastly, as earlier pointed out, adhering to the clear text of the 1935 Constitution would not necessarily deprive foundlings the right to
becomePhilippinecitizens,astheycanundergonaturalizationunderourcurrentlaws.
III.A.5.ThePhilippineshasnotreatyobligationto
automaticallybestowPhilippinecitizenshipto
foundlingsunderthe1935Constitution.
TreatiesareenteredintobythePresidentandmustberatifiedbyatwothirdsvoteofthePhilippineSenateinordertohavelegaleffectin
thecountry.[255]Uponratification,atreatyistransformedintoadomesticlawandbecomeseffectiveinthePhilippines.Dependingonthe
termsandcharacterofthetreatyobligation,sometreatiesneedadditionallegislationinordertobeimplementedinthePhilippines.This
processtakesplacepursuanttothedoctrineoftransformation.[256]
The Philippines has a dualistapproach in its treatment of international law.[257] Under this approach, the Philippines sees international
lawanditsinternationalobligationsfromtwoperspectives:first,fromtheinternationalplane,whereinternationallawreignssupreme
over national laws and second, from the domestic plane, where the international obligations and international customary laws are
consideredinthesamefootingasnationallaws,anddonotnecessarilyprevailoverthelatter.[258]
The first approach springs from the international customary law ofpactasuntservanda that recognizes that obligations entered into by
statesarebindingonthemandrequiresthemtoperformtheirobligationsingoodfaith.[259]ThisprinciplefindsexpressionunderArticle
27oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,[260]whichprovidesthat"[a]partymaynotinvoketheprovisionsofitsinternallawas
justificationforitsfailuretoperformatreaty."[261]
Thus, in the international plane, the Philippines cannot use its domestic laws to evade compliance with its international obligations
noncompliancewouldresultinrepercussionsinitsdealingswithotherStates.
On the other hand, under Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, a treaty may be the subject of judicial review,[262] and is thus
characterized as an instrument with the same force and effect as a domestic law.[263] From this perspective, treaty provisions cannot
prevail over, or contradict, constitutionalprovisions[264] they can also be amended by domesticlaws, as they exist and operate at the
samelevelastheselaws.[265]
Asalastpoint,treatiesareinthesamemannerasthedeterminationofaState'sdeterminationofwhoitscitizensareanactmadein
the exercise of sovereign rights. The Philippines now has every right to enter into treaties as it is independent and sovereign. Such
sovereigntyonlycamewiththefullgrantofPhilippineindependenceonJuly4,1946.
Thus,thePhilippinescouldnothaveenteredintoanybindingtreatybeforethisdate,exceptwiththeconsentoftheU.S.whichexercised
foreignaffairspowersforitselfandallcoloniesandterritoriesunderitsjurisdiction.NosuchconsentwasevergrantedbytheU.S.sothat
any claim of the Philippines being bound by any treaty regarding its citizens and of foundlings cannot but be empty claims that do not
evendeservetoberead,muchlessseriouslyconsidered.
III.A.5(a).ThePhilippines'treatyobligations
undertheJCCPRandUNCRCdonotrequiretheimmediate
andautomaticgrantofPhilippinecitizenship
tofoundlings.
While the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the
Child(UNCRC)arevalidandbindingonthePhilippinesastheyhavebeensignedbythePresidentandconcurredinbyourSenate,our
obligations under these treaties do not require the immediate and automatic grant of Philippine citizenship, much less of naturalborn
status,tofoundlings.
Treatiesareenforceableaccordingtothetermsoftheobligationstheyimpose.ThetermsandcharacteroftheprovisionsoftheICCPRand
UNCRCmerelyrequirethegranttoeverychildoftherighttoacquireanationality.
Section3,Article24oftheICCPRonthispointprovides:

3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.[Emphasissupplied]

whileArticle7,Section1oftheUNCRCprovides:

1.Thechildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhavetherightfrombirthtoaname,therighttoacquirea
nationalityand,asfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.[emphasissupplied]

The right to acquire a nationality is different from the grant of an outright Filipino nationality. Under the cited treaties,
Statesaremerelyrequiredtorecognizeandfacilitatethechild'srighttoacquireanationality.
The method through which the State complies with this obligation varies and depends on its discretion. Of course, the automatic and
outrightgrantofcitizenshiptochildrenindangerofbeingstatelessisoneofthemeansbywhichthistreatyobligationmaybecomplied
with.Butthetreatiesallowothermeansofcompliancewiththeirobligationsshortoftheimmediateandautomaticgrantofcitizenshipto
statelesschildrenfoundintheirterritory.
Thesetreatiesrecognize,too,thattheobligationsshouldbecompliedwithwithintheframeworkofaState'snationallaws.Thisviewis
reinforcedbytheprovisionsthatimplementthesetreaties.
Article2oftheICCPRonthispointprovides:

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakestotakethenecessarysteps,inaccordancewithitsconstitutionalprocessesandwiththeprovisionsofthepresent
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.

Ontheotherhand,Article4oftheUNCRCstates:

StatesPartiesshallundertakeallappropriatelegislative,administrative,andothermeasuresfortheimplementation
of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall
undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of
internationalcooperation.[emphasisanditalicssupplied]

ThesetermsshouldbecrossreferencedwithSection2,Article7oftheUNCRC,whichprovides:

States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligationsundertherelevantinternationalinstrumentsinthisfield,inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless.
[Emphasis,italics,andunderscoringsupplied]

Takentogether,theseICCPRandUNCRCimplementationprovisionsrevealthemeasureofflexibilitymentionedabove.[266]Thisflexibility
runs from the absolute obligation to recognize every child's right to acquire a nationality, all the way to the allowable and varying
measuresthatmaybetakentoensurethisright.Thesemeasuresmayrangefromanimmediateandoutrightgrantofnationality,tothe
passageofnaturalizationmeasuresthatthechildmayavailoftoexercisehisorherrights,allinaccordancewiththeState'snationallaw.
This view finds support from the history of the provision "right to acquire nationality" in the ICCPR. During the debates that led to the
formulationofthisprovision,theword"acquire"wasinsertedinthedraft,andthewords"fromhisbirth"weredeleted.Thischangeshows
the intent of its drafters to, at the very least, vest discretion on the State with respect to the means of facilitating the acquisition of
citizenship.
MarcBussoyt,inhisGuidetothe"TravauxPreparatoires"oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,"[267]evenconcluded
that"theword'acquire'wouldinferthatnaturalizationwasnottobeconsideredasarightoftheindividualbutwasaccordedbytheState
atitsdiscretion."
III.A.5(b).TherighttoanationalityundertheUDHR
doesnotrequireitssignatoriestoautomaticallygrant
citizenshiptofoundlingsinitsrespectiveterritories.
Neither does the Philippines' participation as signatory to the United Nation Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)[268] obligate it to
automaticallygrantFilipinocitizenshiptofoundlingsinitsterritory.
AllowmetopointoutattheoutsetthattheUDHRisnotatreatythatdirectlycreateslegallybindingobligationsforitssignatories.[269]
It is an international document recognizing inalienable human rights, which eventually led to the creation of several legallybinding
treaties,suchastheICCPRandtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESCR).[270]Thus,thePhilippinesis
not legallyobligated to comply with the provisions of the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it recognizes the rights and values
enumeratedintheUDHRthisrecognitionledittosignboththeICCPRandtheICESCR.[271]
To be sure, international scholars have been increasingly using the provisions of the UDHR to argue that the rights provided in the
document have reached the status of customary international law. Assuming, however, that we were to accord the right to nationality
under the UDHR the status of a treaty obligation or of a generallyaccepted principle of international law, it still does not require the
PhilippinegovernmenttoautomaticallygrantPhilippinecitizenshiptofoundlingsinitsterritory.

Article15oftheUDHRprovides:

Article15.
(1)Everyonehastherighttoanationality.
(2)Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.

Thus,thelanguageoftheUDHRitselfrecognizestherightofeveryonetoanationality,withoutimposingonthesignatoryStateshowthey
wouldrecognizethisright.
Interestingly,BenignoAquino,thethenPhilippinedelegatetotheUnitedNations,evenopposedthedeclarationoftherighttonationality
under the UDHR, and opined that the UDHR should be confined to principles whose implementation should be left to the proposed
covenant.
III.A.5(c).ThePhilippines'compliancewithits
internationalobligationsdoesnotincludethegrant
ofnaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshiptofoundlings.
Inlegalterms,aStateisobligedtoensureeverychild'srighttoacquireanationalitythroughlawsintheState'slegalsystemthatdonot
contradictthetreaty.
In the Philippines, the Constitution defines the overall configuration of how Filipino citizenship should be granted and acquired. Treaties
suchastheICCPRandUNCRCshouldbecompliedwith,insofarastheytouchoncitizenship,withinthetermsoftheConstitution'sArticle
onCitizenship.
Inthecontextofthepresentcase,compliancewithourtreatyobligationstorecognizetherightoffoundlingstoacquireanationalitymust
beundertakenunderthetermsof,andmustnotcontradict,thecitizenshipprovisionsofourConstitution.
The1935ConstitutiondefinedwhothecitizensofthePhilippinesthenwereandthemeansofacquiringPhilippinecitizenshipatthetime
therespondentwasfound(andborn).Thisconstitutionaldefinitionmustnecessarilygovernthepetitioner'scase.
As repeatedly mentioned above, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution generally follows the jus sanguinis rule: Philippine citizenship is
determinedby blood, i.e., by the citizenship of one's parents. The Constitution itself provides the instances when jus sanguinis is not
followed:forinhabitantswhohadbeengrantedPhilippinecitizenshipatthetimetheConstitutionwasadoptedthosewhowereholding
publicofficeatthetimeofitsadoptionandthosewhoarenaturalizedasFilipinosinaccordancewithlaw.
Asearlierexplained,theconstitutionallistingisexclusive.Itneitherprovidednorallowedforthecitizenshipoffoundlingsexceptthrough
naturalization. Since the obligation under the treaties can be complied with by facilitating a child's right to acquire a nationality, the
presenceofnaturalizationlawsthatallowpersonstoacquirePhilippinecitizenshipalreadyconstitutescompliance.
Petitioner Poe argues against naturalization as a mode of compliance on the view that this mode requires a person to be 18 years old
beforeheorshecanapplyforaPhilippinecitizenship.Thesufficiencyofthismode,inlightparticularlyofthepetitioner'sneeds,however,
is not a concern that neither the COMELEC nor this Court can address given that the country already has in place measures that the
treatiesrequireournaturalizationlaws.
As likewise previously mentioned, the ICCPR and the UNCRC allow the States a significant measure of flexibility in complying with their
obligations. How the Philippines will comply within the range of the flexibility the treaties allow is a policy question that is fully and
whollywithinthecompetenceoftheCongressandoftheFilipinopeopletoaddress.
To recall an earlier discussion and apply this to the petitioner's argument, the country has adopted a dualist approach in conducting its
internationalaffairs.Inthedomesticplanewherenoforeignelementisinvolved,wecannotinterpretandimplementatreatyprovisionin
amannerthatcontradictstheConstitutionatreatyobligationthatcontravenestheConstitutionisnullandvoid.
For the same reason, it is legally incorrect for the petitioner to argue that the ICCPR, as a curative treaty, should be given retroactive
application.Anullandvoidtreatyprovisioncannever,overtime,beaccordedconstitutionalvalidity,exceptwhentheConstitutionitself
subsequentlysoprovides.
Theruleinthedomesticplaneis,ofcourse,separateanddifferentfromourruleintheinternationalplanewheretreatyobligationsprevail.
If the country fails to comply with its treaty obligations because they contradict our national laws, there could be repercussions in our
dealings with other States. This consequence springs from the rule that our domestic laws cannot be used to evade compliance with
treatiesintheinternationalplane.Repercussionsintheinternationalplane,however,donotmakeanunconstitutionaltreatyconstitutional
andvalid.Theserepercussionsalsocannotserveasanexcusetoenforceatreatyprovisionthatisconstitutionallyvoidinthedomestic
plane.
III.A.6.Theallegedgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawpresumingtheparentageoffoundlings
iscontrarytothe1935Constitution.

III.A.6(a).Generallyacceptedprinciplesof
internationallaw.

Unlike treaty obligations that are ratified by the State and clearly reflect its consent to an obligation, the obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law are recognized to bind States because state practice shows that the States themselves
considertheseprinciplestobebinding.
Generally accepted principles of international law are legal norms that are recognized as customary in the international plane. States
followthemonthebeliefthatthesenormsembodyobligationsthattheseStates,ontheirown,areboundtoperform.Also
referred to as customary international law, generally accepted principles of international law pertain to the collection of international
behavioralregularitiesthatnations,overtime,cometoviewasbindingonthemasamatteroflaw.[272]
In the same manner that treaty obligations partake of the character of domestic laws in the domestic plane, so do generally accepted
principlesofinternationallaw.ArticleII,Section2ofthe1987Constitutionprovidesthattheselegalnorms"formpartofthelawofthe
land."Thisconstitutionaldeclarationsituatesinclearanddefinitetermstheroleofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawinthe
hierarchyofPhilippinelawsandinthePhilippinelegalsystem.
Generally accepted principles of international law usually gain recognition in the Philippines through decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court,pursuanttothedoctrineofincorporation.[273]TheSupremeCourt,initsdecisions,appliestheseprinciplesasrulesorascanonsof
statutoryconstruction,orrecognizesthemasmeritoriouspositionsofthepartiesinthecasestheCourtdecides.[274]
Separately from Court decisions, international law principles may gain recognition through actions by the executive and legislative
branchesofgovernmentwhenthesebranchesusethemasbasesfortheiractions(suchaswhenCongressenactsalawthatincorporates
whatitperceivestobeagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw).
ButuntiltheCourtdeclaresalegalnormtobeagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw,noothermeansexistsinthePhilippine
legalsystemtodeterminewithcertaintythatalegalnormisindeedagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawthatformspartof
thelawoftheland.
The main reason for the need for a judicial recognition lies in the nature of international legal principles. Unlike treaty obligations that
involve the expresspromisesofStates to other States, generally accepted principles of international law do not require any categorical
expressionfromStatesfortheseprinciplestobebindingonthem.[275]
Alegalnormrequirestheconcurrenceoftwoelementsbeforeitmaybeconsideredasagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw:
theestablished,widespread,andconsistentpracticeonthepartofStatesandapsychologicalelementknownastheopinio
jurissivenecessitates(opinionastolawornecessity).[276]Implicitinthelatterelementisthebeliefthatthepracticeisrendered
obligatorybytheexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice(ICJ), which provides that the ICJ shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.[277] The
material sources of custom include state practices, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to
legalquestionsintheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.[278]
Sometimesreferredtoasevidenceofinternationallaw,thesesourcesidentifythesubstanceandcontentoftheobligationsofStatesand
areindicativeofthestatepracticeandtheopiniojurisrequirementsofinternationallaw.
In the usual course, this process passes through the courts as they render their decisions in cases. As part of a court's function of
determiningtheapplicablelawincasesbeforeit(includingthemanneralawshouldbereadandapplied),thecourthastodeterminethe
existence of a generally applied principle of international law in the cases confronting it, as well as the question of whether and how it
appliestothefactsofthecase.
To my mind, the process by which courts recognize the effectivity of general principles of international law in the Philippines is akin or
closely similar to the process by which the Supreme Court creates jurisprudence. Under the principle of stare decisis, courts apply the
doctrinesinthecasestheSupremeCourtdecidesasjudicialprecedentsinsubsequentcaseswithsimilarfactualsituations.[279]
Inasimilarmanner,theSupremeCourt'spronouncementsontheapplicationofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawtothe
cases it decides are not only binding on the immediately resolved case, but also serve as judicial precedents in subsequent cases with
similarsetsoffacts.Thatbothjurisprudenceandgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawform"partofthelawoftheland"
(butarenotlawsperse)is,therefore,notpurecoincidence.[280]
To be sure, the executive and legislative departments may recognize and use customary international law as basis when they perform
theirfunctions.Butwhilesuchuseisnotwithoutlegalweight,thecontinuedefficacyandeventhevalidityoftheiruseassuchcannotbe
certain.Whiletheirbasismaybeprinciplesofinternationallaw,theirinapplicabilityoreveninvalidityinthePhilippinelegalsettingmay
stillresultiftheappliedprinciplesareinconsistentwiththeConstitutionamatterthatisfortheSupremeCourttodecide.
Thus viewed, the authoritative use of general principles of international law can only come from the Supreme Court whose decisions
incorporatetheseprinciplesintothelegalsystemaspartofjurisprudence.
III.A.6(b).Theconceptandnatureofgenerallyaccepted
principlesofinternationallawisinconsistentwiththeState's
sovereignprerogativetodeterminewhomayormay

notbeitscitizens.
Petitioner Poe argues that the presumption of the parentage of foundlings is a legal norm that has reached widespread practice and is
indicativeoftheopiniojurisofStatessothatthepresumptionisbinding.Thus,itisagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawthat
shouldberecognizedandappliedbytheCourt.
I cannot agree with this reasoning as the very nature of generally accepted principles of international law is inconsistent with and thus
inapplicableto,theState'ssoleandsovereignprerogativetochoosewhomayormaynotbeitscitizens,andhowthechoiceiscarriedout.
A generally accepted principle of international law is considered binding on a State because evidence shows that it considers this legal
norm to be obligatory. No express consent from the State in agreeing to the obligation its binding authority over a State lies from the
inferencethatmost,ifnotallStatesconsiderthenormtobeanobligation.
Incontrast,Stateshavetheinherentrighttodecidewhomayormaynotbeitscitizens,includingtheprocessthroughwhichcitizenship
maybeacquired.Theapplicationofpresumptions,orinferencesoftheexistenceofafactbasedontheexistenceofotherfacts,ispartof
thisprocessofdeterminingcitizenship.
Thisrightisstronglyassociatedwithandattendanttostatesovereignty.Traditionally,nationalityhasbeenassociatedwithaState's"right
toexcludeothers",andtodefendtheterritoryofthenationfromexternalaggressionhasbeenapredominantelementofnationality.[281]
Sovereigntyinitsmodemconceptionisdescribedastheconfluenceofindependenceandterritorialandpersonalsupremacy,expressedas
"thesupremeandindependentauthorityofStatesoverallpersonsintheirterritory."[282]
Indeed,aStateexercisespersonalsupremacyoveritsnationalswherevertheymaybe.Therighttodeterminewhothesenationalsareis
aprerequisiteofaState'spersonalsupremacy,andthereforeofsovereignty.[283]
ItisinthiscontextthatOppenheimersaidthat:

ItisnotforInternationalLaw,butforMunicipalLawtodeterminewhois,andwhoisnotconsideredasubject.[284]

GiventhattheState'srighttodeterminewhomaybeitsnationals(aswellashowthisdeterminationisexercised)isinextricablylinkedto
its sovereignty, I cannot see how it can properly be the subject of state consensus or norm dictated by the practice of other States. In
otherwords,thenormpertainingtothedeterminationofwhomayormaynotbeacitizenofaStatecannotbethesubjectofanimplied
obligationthatcametoexistencebecauseotherStatesimpliedlyconsiderittobetheirobligation.
Inthefirstplace,aStatecannotbeobligatedtoadoptameansofdeterminingwhomaybeitsnationalsasthisisanunalterableandbasic
aspect of its sovereignty and of its existence as a State. Additionally, the imposition of an implied obligation on a State simply because
otherStatesrecognizethesameobligationcontradictsandimpingesonaState'ssovereignty.
Noteatthispoint,thattreatyobligationsthataStateentersintoinvolvingthedeterminationofitscitizenshastheexpressconsentofthe
StateunderPhilippinelaw,thisobligationistransformedintoamunicipallawonceitisratifiedbytheExecutiveandconcurredinbythe
Senate.
TheevidencepresentedbypetitionerPoetoestablishtheexistenceofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawactuallyreflects
theinherentinconsistencybetweentheState'ssovereignpowertodetermineitsnationalsandthenatureofgenerallyacceptedprinciples
of international law as a consensusbased, implied obligation. Poe cites various laws and international treaties that provide for the
presumption of parentage for foundlings. These laws and international treaties, however, have the expressed imprimatur of the States
adoptingthepresumption.
In contrast, the Philippines had not entered into any international treaty recognizing and applying the presumption of parentage of
foundlingsneitherisitsoprovidedinthe1935Constitution.Referencestointernationallawinthedeliberationsofthe1934Constitutional
Conventionwithoutanactualratifiedtreatyoraprovisionexpressingthisprinciplecannotbeconsideredbindinguponthesovereign
Filipino people who ratified the 1935 Constitution. The ratification of the provisions of the 1935 Constitution is a sovereign act of the
Filipino people to reiterate for emphasis, this act cannot be amended by widespread practice of other States, even if these
otherStatesbelievethispracticetobeanobligation.
III.A.6(c).Thepresumptionofparentage
contradictsthedistinctionsetoutin
the1935Constitution.
Further, even if this presumption were to be considered a generally accepted principle of international law, it cannot be applied in the
Philippines as it contradicts the jus sanguinis principle of the 1935 Constitution, as well as the distinction the 1935 Constitution made
betweenchildrenbornofFilipinofathersandofFilipinamothers.
As earlier discussed, a presumption is an established inference from facts that are proven by evidence.[285] The undisputed fact in the
presentcaseisthatthepetitionerwasfoundinachurchinJara,Iloilobecauseofherageatthattime,shemayconceivablyhavebeen
bornintheareasothatJarowasherbirthplace.
Thislineofthought,ifitistoleadtoPoe'spresumption,signifiesapresumptionbasedonjussoliorplaceofbirthbecausethisisthe
inferencethatisnearesttheestablishedfactoflocationofbirth.Jussanguinis(bloodrelationship)cannotbetheresultingpresumptionas

thereisabsolutelynoestablishedfactleadingtotheinferencethatthepetitioner'sbiologicalparentsareFilipinocitizens.
Jussoli,ofcourse,isatheoryonwhichcitizenshipmaybebasedandisaprinciplethathasbeenpointedlyrejectedinthecountry,
atthesametimethatjussanguinishasbeenaccepted.Fromthisperspective,thepetitioner'sadvocatedpresumptionrunscountertothe
1935Constitution.
Thesameresultobtainsinthelineofreasoningthatstartsfromtheconsiderationthataprincipleofinternationallaw,evenifitiswidely
observed,cannotformpartofthelawofthelandifitcontravenestheConstitution.
Petitioner Poe's desired presumption works at the same level and can be compared with existing presumptions in determining the
parentage of children and their citizenship, which are based on the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence.[286] These are the
presumptionsformulatedandappliedinapplyingourcitizenshiplaws,particularlywhentheparentageofachildisdoubtfulordisputed.
Forinstance,achildbornduringhisorherparent'smarriageispresumedtobethechildofbothparents.[287]Thus,thechildfollowsthe
citizenship of his or her father. A child born out of wedlock, on the other hand, can only be presumed to have been born of his or her
mother,andthusfollowsthecitizenshipofhisorhermotheruntilheorsheprovespaternalfiliations.TheseCivilCodepresumptionsare
fullyinaccordwiththeconstitutionalcitizenshiprules.
A presumption that a child with no known parents will be considered to have Filipino parents, on the other hand, runs
countertothemostbasicrulesoncitizenshipunderthe1935Constitution.
Otherthanthroughnaturalizationorthroughoutrightconstitutionalgrant,the1935Constitutionrequiresthatthefatherorthemotherbe
knowntobeFilipinoforapersontoacquireFilipinocitizenship.Thisisaconsequenceoftheclearandcategoricaljussanguinisrulethat
the1935Constitutionestablishedforthecountry.
Under its terms, should a child's father be Filipino, then he or she acquires Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, should his or her
fatherbeaforeignerbutthemotherisaFilipina,the1935constitutionalRuleistogivethechildtherighttoelectPhilippinecitizenship
whenheorshereaches18yearsofage.
Withouttheidentityofeitherorbothparentsbeingknowninthecaseoffoundlings,nodeterminationofthefoundling'scitizenshipcanbe
made under jussanguinis. Specifically, whose citizenship shall the foundling follow: the citizenship of the father, or the option to
electthecitizenshipofthemother?
Applying Poe's desired presumption would obviously erase the distinction that the 1935 Constitution placed in acquiring Philippine
citizenship,andonlystrengthensthelackofintent(asidefromalackoftextualprovision)tograntPhilippinecitizenshiptofoundlings.
This inherent irreconcilability of Poe's desired presumption with the 1935 Constitution renders futile any discussion of
whetherthisdesiredpresumptionhasreachedthestatusofagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawapplicablein
the Philippines. We cannot (and should not) adopt a presumption that contradicts the fundamental law of the land,
regardlessofthestatusofobservanceithasreachedintheinternationalplane.
Irecognizeofcoursethatinthefuture,Congressmay,bylaw,adoptthepetitioner'sdesiredpresumptionunderthe1987Constitution.A
presumptionofFilipinoparentagenecessarilymeansapresumptionofjussanguinisforfoundlings.
But even if made, the presumption remains what it is a presumption that must yield to the reality of actual parentage when such
parentage becomes known unless the child presumed to be Filipino by descent undertakes a confirmatory act independent of the
presumption,suchasnaturalization.
Notethatthe1987Constitutiondoesnotsignificantlychangethejussanguinisruleunderthe1935Constitution.Currently,anaturalborn
Filipino is one whose father or mother is a Filipino at the time of the child's birth. As in 1935, the current 1987 Constitution speaks of
parents who are actually Philippine citizens at the time of the child's birth how the parents acquired their own Philippine citizenship is
besidethepointandisnotaconsiderationforaslongasthiscitizenshipstatusisthereatthetimeofthechild'sbirth.
ApresumptionofFilipinoparentagecannotsimilarlyapplyorextendtothecharacterofbeingnaturalborn,asthischaracter
ofcitizenshipcanonlybebasedonrealitywhentheConstitutionspeaksof"naturalborn,"itcannotbutrefertoactualornatural,not
presumed birth. A presumption of being naturalborn is effectively a legal fiction that the definition of the term "naturalborn"
undertheConstitutionandthepurposesthisdefinitionservescannotaccommodate.
Tosumup,thepetitioner'sargumentbasedonafoundling'spresumedFilipinoparentageunderaclaimedgenerallyacceptedprincipleof
international law is legally objectionable under the 1935 Constitution and cannot be used to recognize or grant naturalborn Philippine
citizenship.
III.B.GraveAbuseofDiscretioninResolving
theCitizenshipIssues:Conclusions.
Based on all these considerations, I conclude that the COMELEC laid the correct premises on the issue of citizenship in cancelling Poe's
CoC.
Torecapitulate,Poeanchorsherargumentsmostlyontwobasicpoints:first,thattheframersofthe1935Constitutionagreedtoinclude
foundlingsintheenumerationofcitizensinArticleIV,Section1ofthe1935Constitutionalthoughtheydidnotexpresslysoprovideitin
its express provisions and second, that the Philippines' international obligations include the right to automatically vest Philippine
citizenshiptofoundlingsinitsterritory.

With her failure on these two points, the rest of Poe's arguments on her naturalborn citizenship status based on the 1935 Constitution
and under international law, and the grave abuse of discretion the COMELEC allegedly committed in cancelling her CoC, must also
necessarily fail. The unavoidable bottom line is that the petitioner did indeed actively, knowingly, and falsely represent her
citizenshipandnaturalbornstatuswhenshefiledherCoC.
IV.
TheClaimofGraveAbuseofDiscretion
inrelationwiththeRESIDENCYIssues.

I likewise object to the majority's ruling that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Poe's CoC for falsely representing
thatshehascompliedwiththetenyearresidenceperiodrequiredofPresidentialcandidates.
TheCOMELECcorrectlyappliedprevailingjurisprudenceinholdingthatPoehasnotestablishedherlegalresidenceinthePhilippinesforat
leasttenyearsimmediatelypriortotheMay9,2016elections.
Inaddition,Ioffermyownviewsregardingthepoliticalcharacteroftherighttoestablishdomicile,whichnecessarilyrequiresPhilippine
citizenshipbeforedomicilemaybeestablishedinthePhilippines.
Inmyview,alienswhoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225mayonlybeginestablishinglegalresidenceinthePhilippines
fromthetimetheyreacquirePhilippinecitizenship.ThisistheclearimportfromtheCourt'srulingsinJapzonv.COMELEC[288]and
Caballerov.COMELEC,[289]casesinvolvingcandidateswhoreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225theirlegalresidence
inthePhilippinesonlybeganaftertheirreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.
I find it necessary to elaborate on this legal reality in light of Poe's insistence that the Court's conclusions in Coquilla,[290] Japzon, and
Caballero do not apply to her. To emphasize, these cases Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero are one in counting the period of legal
residenceinthePhilippinesfromthetimethecandidatereacquiredPhilippinecitizenship.
PoeresiststheserulingsandinsiststhatsheestablishedherlegalresidenceinthePhilippinesbeginningMay24,2005,i.e.,evenbefore
theBIDOrder,declaringherreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship,wasissuedonJuly18,2006.
ShedistinguisheshersituationfromCoquilla,Japzon,andCaballero,onthepositionthatthecandidatesinthesecasesdidnotprovetheir
legalresidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeacquiringtheirPhilippinecitizenship.Incontrast,Poeclaimstohavesufficientlyproventhatshe
establishedherdomicileinthePhilippinesasearlyasMay24,2005,ortenyearsandelevenmonthspriortotheMay9,2016elections.
ThattheCOMELECignoredtheevidenceshepresentedonthispointconstitutesgraveabuseofdiscretion.
To my mind, the conclusion in Japzon and Caballero is not just based on the evidence that the candidates therein presented. The
conclusionthatcandidateswhoreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225mayonlyestablishresidenceinthePhilippinesafter
becoming Philippine citizens reflects the character of the right to establish a new domicile for purposes of participating in
electoral exercises as a political right that only Philippine citizens can exercise. Thus, Poe could only begin establishing her
domicileinthePhilippinesonJuly18,2006,thedatetheBIDgrantedherpetitionforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.
Furthermore, an exhaustive review of the evidence Poe presented to support her view shows that as of May 24, 2005, Poe
hadnotcompliedwiththerequirementsforestablishinganewdomicileofchoice.
IV.A.Domicileforpurposesofdeterminingpolitical
rightsandcivilrights.
Theterm"residence"isanelasticconceptthatshouldbeunderstoodandconstruedaccordingtotheobjectorpurposeofthestatutein
whichitisemployed.Thus,wehavecaselawdistinguishingresidencetomeanactualresidence,incontrasttodomicile,whichpertainsto
apermanentabode.Note,however,thatbothtermsimplyarelationbetweenapersonandaplace.[291]determiningwhichconnotationof
thetermresidenceappliesdependsonthestatuteinwhichitisfound.
Generally, we have used the term "residence" to mean actual residence when pertaining to the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of
civilobligations.
Residence,inthissensepertainstoaplaceofabode,whetherpermanentortemporary,orastheCivilCodeaptlydescribesit,aplaceof
habitualresidence.Thus,theCivilCodeprovides:

Art.50.Fortheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,thedomicileofnaturalpersonsistheplaceof
theirhabitualresidence.(40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the
sameshallbeunderstoodtobetheplacewheretheirlegalrepresentationisestablishedorwheretheyexercisetheirprincipal
functions.(41a)[emphasessupplied]

Still,theactualresidenceforpurposesofcivilrightsandobligationsmaybefurtherdelineatedtoresidenceinthePhilippines,orresidence
inamunicipalityinthePhilippines,dependingonthepurposeofthelawinwhichtheyareemployed.[292]
On the other hand, we generally reserve the use of the term residence as domicile for purposes of exercising political rights.

Jurisprudence has long established that the term "residence" in election laws is synonymous with domicile.When the Constitution or
theelectionlawsspeakofresidence,itreferstothelegalorjuridicalrelationbetweenapersonandaplacetheindividual's
permanenthomeirrespectiveofphysicalpresence.
Tobesure,physicalpresenceisamajorindicatorwhendeterminingtheperson'slegalorjuridicalrelationwiththeplaceheorsheintends
to be voted for. But, as residence and domicile is synonymous under our election laws, residence is a legal concept that has to be
determinedbyandinconnectionwithourlaws,independentoforinconjunctionwithphysicalpresence.
Domicileisclassifiedintothree,namely:(1)domicileoforigin,whichisacquiredbyeverypersonatbirth(2)domicileofchoice,whichis
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person
independentlyofhisresidenceorintention.
Domicileoforiginisthedomicileofaperson'sparentsatthetimeofhisorherbirth.Itisnoteasilylostandcontinuesuntil,uponreaching
themajorityage,heorsheabandonsitandacquiresanewdomicile,whichnewdomicileisthedomicileofchoice.
Theconceptofdomicileisfurtherdistinguishedbetweenresidenceinaparticularmunicipality,city,province,orthePhilippines,depending
onthepoliticalrighttobeexercised.PhilippinecitizensmustberesidentsofthePhilippinestobeeligibletovote,buttobeabletovotefor
elective officials of particular local government units, he must be a resident of the geographical coverage of the particular local
governmentunit.
To effect a change of domicile, a person must comply with the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile(2)abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneand(3)actswhichcorrespond
withsuchpurpose.
Inotherwords,achangeofresidencerequiresanimusmanendicoupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Theintenttoremain in or at the
domicileofchoicemustbeforanindefiniteperiodoftimethechangeofresidencemustbevoluntaryandtheresidenceattheplace
chosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.[293]
InLimbonav.COMELEC,[294]theCourtenumeratedthefollowingrequirementstoeffectachangeofdomicileortoacquireadomicileby
choice:

(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality
(2)abonafideintentiontoremainthereand
(3)abonafideintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.

Thelattertwoaretheanimusmanendiandtheanimusnonrevertendithatthoseconsideringachangeofdomicilemusttakeintoaccount.
Undertheserequirements,nospecificunbendingruleexistsintheappreciationofcompliancebecauseoftheelementofintent[295]an
abstract and subjective proposition that can only be determined from the surrounding circumstances. It must be appreciated, too, that
asidefromintentisthequestionoftheactionstakenpursuanttotheintent,tobeconsideredinthelightoftheapplicablelaws,
rules,andregulations.
Jurisprudence,too,haslaidoutthreebasicfoundationalrulesintheconsiderationofresidencyissues,namely:
First,amanmusthavearesidenceordomicilesomewhere
Second,whenonceestablished,itremainsuntilanewoneisacquiredand
Third,amancanhavebutoneresidenceordomicileatatime.[296]
Thesejurisprudentialfoundationalrules,handinhandwiththeestablishedrulesonchangeofdomicile,shouldbefullytakenintoaccount
inappreciatingPoe'scircumstances.
IV.A.1.Therighttoestablishdomicileisimbued
withthecharacterofapoliticalrightthatonlycitizens
mayexercise.
Domicile is necessary to be able to participate in governance, i.e., to vote and/or be voted for, one must consider a locality in the
Philippinesashisorherpermanenthome,aplaceinwhichheintendstoremaininforanindefiniteperiodoftime(animusmanendi)and
toreturntoshouldheleave(animusrevertendi).
In this sense, the establishment of a domicile not only assumes the color of, but becomes one with a political right because it allows a
person, not otherwise able, to participate in the electoral process of that place. To logically carry this line of thought a step further, a
personseekingtoestablishdomicileinacountrymustfirstpossesthenecessarycitizenshiptoexercisethispoliticalright.
Note,atthispoint,thatPhilippinecitizenshipisnecessarytoparticipateingovernanceandexercisepoliticalrightsinthePhilippines.The
preambleofour1987Constitutioncannotbecleareronthispoint:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establishaGovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,conserveanddevelopour
patrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposterity,theblessingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawanda
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. [emphases,
italics,andunderscoringsupplied)

ItisthesovereignFilipinopeople(i.e.,thecitizensthroughwhomtheStateexercisessovereignty,andwhocanvoteandparticipatein
governance)whoshallestablishtheGovernmentofthecountry(i.e. one of the purposes why citizens get together and collectively
act),andtheythemselvesordainandpromulgatetheConstitution(i.e.,thecitizensthemselvesdirectlyact,notanybodyelse).
Corollarily,apersonwhodoesnotpossessPhilippinecitizenship,i.e.,analien,cannotparticipateinthecountry'spoliticalprocesses.An
alien does not have the right to vote and be voted for, the right to donate to campaign funds, the right to campaign for or aid any
candidateorpoliticalparty,andtodirectly,orindirectly,takepartinorinfluenceinanymanneranyelection.
Thecharacteroftherighttoestablishdomicileasapoliticalrightbecomesevenmoreevidentunderourelectionlawsthatrequirethata
person'sdomicileandcitizenshipcoincidetoenablehimtovoteandbevotedforelectiveoffice.Inmoreconcreteterms(subjectonlytoa
fewspecificexceptions),aPhilippinecitizenmusthavehisdomicileinthePhilippinesinordertoparticipateinourelectoralprocesses.
Thus, a Philippine citizen who has chosen to reside permanently abroad may be allowed the limited opportunity to vote (under the
conditions laid down under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act)[297] but he or she cannot be voted for he or she is disqualified from
runningforelectiveofficeunderSection68oftheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC).[298]
Inthesamelight,analienwhohasbeengrantedapermanentresidentvisainthePhilippinesdoesnothavetherightofsuffrageinthe
Philippines,andthisshouldincludetherighttoestablishlegaldomicileforpurposesofelectionlaws.AnaliencanresideinthePhilippines
foralongtime,buthisstay,nomatterhowlengthy,willnotallowhimtoparticipateinourpoliticalprocesses.
Thus, an inextricable link exists among citizenship, domicile, and sovereignty citizenship and domicile must coincide in
ordertoparticipateasacomponentofthesovereignFilipinopeople.Inplainerterms,domicileforelectionlawpurposescannotbe
establishedwithoutfirstbecomingaPhilippinecitizentheymustcoincidefromthetimedomicileinthePhilippinesisestablished.
IV.A.2.TherighttoREESTABLISHdomicileinthePhilippinesmaybeexercisedonlyafterreacquiringPhilippinecitizenship.

Unlessachangeofdomicileisvalidlyeffected,one
withreacquiredFilipinocitizenshipacquirestherighttoresideinthe
country,hutmusthaveachangeofdomicile,otherwise,
heisaFilipinophysicallyinthePhilippineshutis
domiciledelsewhere.

OnceaPhilippinecitizenpermanentlyresidesinanothercountry,orbecomesanaturalizedcitizenthereof,heloseshisdomicileofbirth
(thePhilippines)andestablishesanewdomicileofchoiceinthatcountry.
IfaformerFilipinoreacquireshisorherPhilippinecitizenship,hereacquiresaswellthepoliticalrighttoresideinthePhilippines,buthe
doesnotbecomeaPhilippinedomiciliaryunlesshevalidlyeffectsachangeofdomicileotherwise,heremainsaFilipinophysicallyinthe
Philippinesbutisdomiciledelsewhere.Thereasonissimple:anindividualcanhaveonlyonedomicilewhichremainsuntilit
isvalidlychanged.
InCoquilla,[299]theCourtpointedoutthat"immigrationtothe[U.S.]byvirtueofagreencard,whichentitlesonetoresidepermanently
in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country
resultinanabandonmentofdomicileinthePhilippines."
Thus,PhilippinecitizenswhoarenaturalizedascitizensofanothercountrynotonlyabandontheirPhilippinecitizenshiptheyalsoabandon
theirdomicileinthePhilippines.
To reestablish the Philippines as his or her new domicile of choice, a returning former Philippine citizen must thus comply with the
requirementsofphysicalpresence(ortherequiredperiod(whenexercisinghispoliticalright),animusmanendi,andanimus
nonrevertendi.
SeverallawsgovernthereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbyformerPhilippinecitizensalienseachprovidingforadifferentmodeof,
and different requirements for, Philippine citizenship reacquisition. These laws are Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473 RA No. 8171
andRANo.9225.
Alltheselawsaremeanttofacilitateanalien'sreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbylaw.CANo.473[300]asamended,[301] governs
reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbynaturalizationitisalsoamodefororiginalacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.RANo.8171,[302]
on the other hand, governs repatriation of Filipino women who lost Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and Filipinos who lost
PhilippinecitizenshipbypoliticaloreconomicnecessitywhileRANo.9225[303] governs repatriation of former naturalborn Filipinos in
general.
Whether termed as naturalization, reacquisition, or repatriation, all these modes fall under the constitutional term

"naturalizedinaccordancewithlaw"asprovidedunderthe1935,the1973,andthe1935Constitutions.
NotethatCANo.473[304] provides a more stringent procedure for acquiring Philippine citizenship than RA Nos. 9225 and 8171 both of
whichprovideforamoreexpeditedprocess.Note,too,thatunderourConstitution,thereareonlytwokindsofPhilippinecitizens:natural
bornandnaturalized.AsRANos.8171and9225applyonlytoformernaturalbornFilipinos(wholosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyforeign
naturalization),CANo.473whichisbothamodeforacquisitionandreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshiplogicallyappliesingeneralto
allformerFilipinosregardlessofthecharacteroftheirPhilippinecitizenship,i.e.,naturalbornornaturalized.
The difference in the procedure provided by these modes of Philippine citizenship reacquisition presumably lies in the assumption that
those who had previously been naturalborn Philippine citizens already have had ties with the Philippines for having been directly
descendedfromFilipinocitizensorbyvirtueoftheirbloodandarewellversedinitscustomsandtraditionsontheotherhand,the
alienformerFilipinoingeneral(andnomatterhowlongtheyhaveresidedinthePhilippines)couldnotbepresumedtohavesuchties.
In fact, CA No. 473 specifically requires that an applicant for Philippine citizenship must have resided in the Philippines for at least six
monthsbeforehisapplicationforreacquisitionbynaturalization.
Ujanov.Republic[305]interpretedthisresidencerequirementtomeandomicile,thatis,priortoapplyingfornaturalization,theapplicant
musthavemaintainedapermanentresidenceinthePhilippines.Inthissense,UjanoheldthatanalienstayinginthePhilippinesundera
temporary visa does not comply with the residence requirement, and to become a qualified applicant, an alien must have secured a
permanent resident visa to stay in the Philippines. Obtaining a permanent resident visa was, thus, viewed as the act that establishes
domicileinthePhilippinesforpurposesofcomplyingwithCANo.473.
The ruling in Ujano is presumably the reason for the Court's reference that residence may be waived separately from citizenship in
Coquilla.InCoquilla,theCourtobservedthat:

The status of being an alien and a nonresident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident
alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an
individualmayobtainanimmigrantvisaunder13[28]ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1948andanImmigrantCertificate
ofResidence(ICR)[29]andthuswaivehisstatusasanonresident.Ontheotherhand,hemayacquirePhilippinecitizenshipby
naturalizationunderC.A.No.473,asamended,or,ifheisaformerPhilippinenational,hemayreacquirePhilippinecitizenship
byrepatriationorbyanactofCongress,inwhichcasehewaivesnotonlyhisstatusasanalienbutalsohisstatusasanon
residentalien.[306][underscoringsupplied]

The separate waiver refers to the application for Philippine citizenship under CA No. 437, which requires that the applicant alien be
domiciledinthePhilippinesasevidencedbyapermanentresidentvisa.AnalienintendingtobecomeaPhilippinecitizenmayavailofCA
No.473andmustfirstwaivehisdomicileinhiscountryoforigintobeconsideredapermanentresidentalieninthePhilippines,orhemay
establishdomicileinthePhilippinesafterbecomingaPhilippinecitizenthroughdirectactofCongress.
Note,atthispoint,thatthepermanentresidencerequirementunderCANo.473doesnotprovidetheapplicantalienwiththeright
toparticipateinthecountry'spoliticalprocess,andshouldthusbedistinguishedfromdomicileinelectionlaws.
Inotherwords,analienmaybeconsideredapermanentresidentofthePhilippines,butwithoutPhilippinecitizenship,hisstaycannotbe
considered in establishing domicile in the Philippines for purposes of exercising political rights. Neither could this period be retroactively
countedupongainingPhilippinecitizenship,ashisstayinthePhilippinesatthattimewasasanalienwithnopoliticalrights.
In these lights, I do not believe that a person reacquiring Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 could separately
establishdomicileinthePhilippinespriortobecomingaPhilippinecitizen,astherighttoestablishdomicilehas,asearlier
pointedout,thecharacterofapoliticalright.
RANo.9225restoresPhilippinecitizenshipupontheapplicant'ssubmissionoftheoathofallegiancetothePhilippinesandotherpertinent
documents to the BID (or the Philippine consul should the applicant avail of RA No. 9225 while they remain in their country of foreign
naturalization). The BID (or the Philippine consul) then reviews these documents, and issues the corresponding order recognizing the
applicant'sreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.
Upon reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, a person becomes entitled to full political and civil rights, subject to its
attendantliabilitiesandresponsibilities.TheseincludetherighttoreestablishdomicileinthePhilippinesforpurposesofparticipatinginthe
country's electoral processes. Thus, a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not
automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, but is given the option to establish domicile in the Philippines to
participateinthecountry'selectoralprocess.
This, to my mind, is the underlying reason behind the Court's consistent ruling in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero that domicile in the
Philippinescanbeconsideredestablishedonlyupon,orafter,thereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipundertheexpeditedprocessesof
RA No. 8171 or RA No. 9225. More than the insufficiency of evidence establishing domicile prior to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship,thislegalrealitysimplydisallowstheestablishmentofdomicileinthePhilippinespriortobecomingaPhilippinecitizen.
Toreiterate,theCourtinthesethreecasesheldthatthecandidatesthereincouldhaveestablishedtheirdomicileinthePhilippinesonly
afterreacquiringtheirPhilippinecitizenship.
Thus,theCourtinCoquillasaid:

Inanyevent,thefactisthat,byhavingbeennaturalizedabroad,helosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwithithisresidencein
the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal
residenceinthiscountry.[307][underscoringsupplied]

InJapzon,theCourtnoted:

"[Ty's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under [RA] No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence
/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of
GeneralMacarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines.TymerelyhadtheoptiontoagainestablishhisdomicileintheMunicipalityof
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
thereinshallbedeterminedfromthetimehemadeithisdomicileofchoiceanditshallnotretroacttothetimeofhisbirth.[308]

Caballero,afterquotingJapzon,held:

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablishedUyugan,Batanesashisnewdomicileofchoicewhichisreckonedfromthetimehemadeitassuch.[309]

Intheselights,theCOMELECcorrectlyappliedthedoctrinelaidoutinCoquilla,Japzon,andCaballeroinPoe'scase,i.e.,that
herphysicalpresenceallegedlycoupledwithintentshouldbecounted,forelectionpurposes,onlyfromherreacquisitionof
Philippine citizenship or surrender of her immigrant status. Any period of residence prior to such reacquisition of Philippine
citizenshiporsurrenderofimmigrantstatuscannotsimplybecountedasPoe,atsuchtime,wasanaliennonresidentwhohadnorightto
permanentlyresideanywhereinthePhilippines.
Significantly, these are the established Court rulings on residency of former naturalborn Filipinos seeking elective public
officethatwouldbedisturbediftheCourtwouldallowPoetorunforthePresidencyintheMay9,2016elections.Application
ofthesocialjusticeandequityprinciplesthatsomesectors(withinandoutsidetheCourt)urgethisCourttodoandtheirpersistentappeal
tofairnessmustnotbeallowedtoweighinandoverridewhatthecleartermslawsandthesejurisprudenceprovide.
IV.B.Poe'srepresentationastoherresidence:PoehasnotbeenaPhilippineresident(ortheperiodrequiredbyArticleVII,
Section2oftheConstitution.
Based on the foregoing laws, principles, and relevant jurisprudence, I find the COMELEC correct in ruling that Poe does not meet the
Constitution'stenyearresidencerequirementforthePresidency.
IV.B.1.PoewasnotanaturalborncitizenwhocouldvalidlyreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225hence,she
could not have reestablished residence in the Philippines under the laws' terms even with the BID's grant of her RA No.
9225application.
The simplified repatriation procedure under RA No. 9225 applies only to former naturalborn Filipino citizens who became naturalized
foreign citizens. Thus, persons who were not naturalborn citizens prior to their foreign naturalization cannot reacquire
Philippine citizenship through the simplified RA No. 9225 procedure, but may do so only through the other modes CA No.
63[310]provides,i.e.,bynaturalizationunderCANo.473,asamendedbyRANo.530,orbydirectactofCongress.
PriortoavalidreacquisitionunderRANo.9225,aformerPhilippinecitizendoesnothavepoliticalrightsinthePhilippines,asheorsheis
consideredanalien.HispoliticalrightsbeginonlyuponreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship:12
InPoe'scase,shewasnotanaturalborncitizenwhocouldhavevalidlyrepatriatedunderRANo.9225.AsshedidnotreacquirePhilippine
citizenshipundertheappropriatemode,shelikewisedidnotreacquiretherighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveonlyasourimmigration
lawsmayhaveallowedhertostayasvisitor.Butregardlessofitslength,anysuchperiodofstaycannotbecountedasresidence
inthePhilippinesundertheelectionlaws'terms.
IV.B.2.Assuming,arguendo,thatPoereacquiredPhilippineCitizenshipshestillhasnotbeenaPhilippineresident[or"10
yearsand11months"onthedaybeforetheelection.
Evenassuming,arguendo,thatPoereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipwiththeBID'sgrantofherRANo.9225application,shestillfailsto
meettheConstitution'stenyearresidencerequirement,asexplainedbelow.
IV.B.2(a). Poe arrived in the Philippines using her U.S. passport as an American citizen and under a "Balikbayan" visa
hence,shecouldnothavereestablishedPhilippineresidencebeginningMay24,2005.
WhenPoereturnedtothePhilippinesonMay24,2005,shewasanonresidentalienanaturalizedAmericancitizen.SheusedherU.S.
passportinhertraveltoandarrivalinthePhilippinesundera"Balikbayan"visa,astheparties'evidenceshowandasevenPoeadmits.
ThesedatesstampedinherU.S.passport,inparticular,bearthemark"BB"(whichstandsforBalikbayan)or"1YR"(whichstandsfor1
Year stay in the Philippines): September 14, 2005, January 7, 2006 (arrival), March 11, 2006 (arrival), July 5, 2006 (arrival), and
November4,2006(arrival).[311]

Theterm"balikbayan"referstoaFilipinocitizenwhohasbeencontinuouslyoutofthePhilippinesforaperiodofatleastone(1)year,a
Filipino overseas worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her family who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or
returnstothePhilippines.[312]
Inotherwords,abalikbayanmaybeaFilipinocitizenoraformerFilipinowhohasbeennaturalizedinaforeigncountry.Notably,thelaw
itself provides that a former Filipino citizen may "come or return" to the Philippines this means that he/she may be returning to
permanentlyresideinthecountryormayjustvisitforatemporarystay.
RANo.6768,asamended,furtherprovidesfortheprivilegeofavisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeign
passportholders,withtheexceptionofrestrictednationals.[313]IstressinthisregardthatnotallbalikbayansenterthePhilippinesviaa
visafreeentry,astheprivilegeappliesonlytoforeignpassportholdersandnottoFilipinocitizensbearingPhilippinepassportsuponentry.
ThedistinctionissignificantbecauseaFilipinobalikbayan,byvirtueofhisPhilippinecitizenship,hastherighttopermanentlyresideinany
part of the Philippines. Conversely, a foreignerbalikbayan, though a former Philippine citizen, may only acquire this right by
applying for an immigrant visa and an immigrant certificate of residence or by reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.[314]
Evidently,thenatureofthestayofaforeignerbalikbayanwhoavailsofthevisafreeentryprivilegeisonlytemporary,unlessheacquires
animmigrantvisaoruntilhereacquiresPhilippinecitizenship.
TheBIDitselfdesignatesabalikbayanvisafreeentryunderthetemporaryvisitor'svisacategoryfornonvisarequirednationals.[315]In
addition,thevisafreeentryprivilegeislimitedtoaperiodofone(1)yearsubjecttoextensionsforanotherone(1),two(2)orsix(6)
months, provided that the balikbayan presents his/her valid passport and fills out a visa extension form and submits it to the Visa
ExtensionSectionintheBIDMainOfficeoranyBIDOfficesnationwide.Afterthirtysix(36)monthsofstay,anadditionalrequirementwill
beaskedfromabalikbayanwhowishestofurtherextendhis/herstay.[316]
From her arrival on May 24, 2005 until the BID Order recognized her Philippine citizenship on July 18, 2006, Poe was an
alienunderabalikbayanvisawhohadnorighttopermanentlyresideinthePhilippinessaveonlyintheinstancesandunder
the conditions our Immigration laws allow to foreign citizens. This period of stay under a temporary visa should thus not be
consideredforpurposesofArticleVII,Section2oftheConstitutionasitdoesnotfallwithintheconceptof"residence."
IV.B.2(b).Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the BID granted her RA No. 9225 application,
hence,July18,2006shouldbetheearliestpossiblereckoningpoint(orherPhilippineresidence.
To recall, Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the BID granted her RA No. 9225 application.[317] Under
Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225, the right to enjoy full civil and political rights that attach to Philippine citizenship begins only upon its
reacquisition. Thus, under RA No. 9225, a person acquires the right to establish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine
citizenship.Priortothis,aformerPhilippinecitizenhasnorighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveonlytemporarilyasourImmigrationlaws
allow.
In this light, the COMELEC correctly ruled that July 18, 2006 is the earliest possible date for Poe to establish her domicile in the
Philippines,asitisonlythenthatPoeacquiredtherighttoestablishdomicileinthePhilippines.Countingtheperiodofherresidenceinthe
PhilippinestobeginonJuly18,2006,however,rendersPoestillineligibletorunforPresident,astheperiodbetweenJuly18,2006toMay
9,2016is9years,9months,and20days,or2monthsand10daysshortoftheConstitution'stenyearrequirement.
IV.B.2(c). Poe's moves to resettle in the Philippines prior to July 18, 2006 may have supported her intent which intent
becametrulyconcretebeginningonlyonJuly18,2006.
I do not deny that Poe had taken several moves to reestablish her residence in the Philippines prior to July 18, 2006. As the evidence
showed,whichtheCOMELECconsideredandreviewed,Poehadtakenseveralactionsthatmayarguablybereadasmovestorelocateand
resettleinthePhilippinesbeginningMay24,2005,namely:(1)enrollingherchildreninPhilippineschoolsinJuly2005asshownbytheir
schoolrecords[318](2)purchasingrealpropertyinthePhilippinesasevidencedbytheFebruary20,2006condominiumunitandparking
lottitles,[319]theJune1,2006landtitle,[320]andthetaxdeclarationsforthese[321](3)sellingtheirU.S.homeasshownbytheApril27,
2006finalsettlement[322](4)arrangingfortheshipmentoftheirU.S.propertiesfromtheU.S.tothePhilippines[323](5)notifyingthe
U.S.PostalServiceoftheirchangeoftheirU.S.address[324]and(6)securingaTaxIdentificationNumber(TIN)fromtheBIRonJuly22,
2005.[325]
I clarify, however, that any overt resettlement moves Poe made beginning May 24, 2005 up to and before July 18, 2006 may be
considered merely for the purpose of determining the existence of the subjective intent to reestablish Philippine residence
(animusrevertendi),butshouldnotbeconsideredforthepurposeofestablishingthefactofresidencethattheConstitution
contemplates.
As earlier explained, entitlement to the enjoyment of the civil and political rights that come with the reacquired citizenship that RA No.
9225 grants attaches when the requirements have been completed and Philippine citizenship has been reacquired. Only then can
reacquiring Filipino citizens secure the right to reside in the country as Filipinos with the right to vote and be voted for
public office under the requirements of the Constitution and applicable existing laws. Prior to reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship,theyareentitledonlytosuchrightsastheConstitutionandthelawsrecognizeasinherentinanyperson.
Significantly,thesepiecesofevidencedonotprovePoe'sintenttoabandonU.S.domicile(animusnonrevertendi)asshewas,between
May24,2005andJuly18,2006,atemporaryvisitorphysicallypresentinthePhilippines.Isubmitthefollowingspecificreasons.
Poe's purchase of real property in the Philippines. Aliens, former naturalborn Filipinos or not, can own condominium units in the

Philippines while aliens who were former naturalborn Filipinos can purchase Philippine urban or rural land even without acquiring or
reacquiringPhilippinecitizenshipwiththerighttopermanentlyresideherein.
UnderRANo.4726[326]asamendedbyRANo.7899,[327]aliensorforeignnationals,whetherformernaturalbornFilipinocitizensornot,
canacquirecondominiumunitsandsharesincondominiumcorporationsupto40o/oofthetotalandoutstandingcapitalstockofaFilipino
ownedorcontrolledcondominiumCorporation.
Ontheotherhand,underRANo.7042,[328]asamendedbyRANo.8179,formernaturalbornFilipinoswholosttheirPhilippinecitizenship
andwhohasthelegalcapacitytocontract"maybeatransfereeofaprivatelanduptoamaximumareaoffivethousand(5,000)square
metersinthecaseofurbanlandorthree(3)hectaresinthecaseofrurallandxxxforbusinessorotherpurposes."[329]
Inshort,Poe'spurchaseofacondominiumunitandanurbanland,aswellasherdeclarationofthesefortaxpurposes,donotsufficiently
prove that she reestablished residence in the Philippines. At most, they show that she acquired real property in the Philippines for
purposeswhichmaynotnecessarilybeforresidence,i.e.,businessorotherpurposesandthatshecompliedwiththelaw'srequirements
forowningrealpropertyinthePhilippines.
ThesaleofU.S.homeandnoticetotheU.S.Postalservice.ThesaleoftheirU.S.homeonApril27,2006establishesonlythefactof
itssale.Atmost,itmayindicateintenttotransferresidence(withinorwithouttheU.S.)butitdoesnotautomaticallyresultinthechange
ofdomicilefromtheU.S.tothePhilippines.
ThenoticetotheU.S.PostalServiceinlateMarchof2006,ontheotherhand,merelyshowsthattheymayhavecompliedwiththeU.S.
lawswhentransferringresidence,forconvenienceandformailforwardingpurposeswhileonextendedbuttemporaryabsence.Thisact,
however,doesnotconclusivelysignifyabandonmentofU.S.residence,moresoreestablishmentofPhilippinedomicile.
Note that at both these times, Poe did not have the established legal capacity or the right to establish residence in the Philippines.
Besides,thewindingupofawouldbecandidate'spropertyaffairsinanothercountryisnotaqualificationrequirementunderthelawfor
reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipnorisitaconditiontotheresidencyrequirementforholdingpublicoffice.
TheenrollmentofherchildreninPhilippineschools.TheenrollmentofPoe'schildreninPhilippineschoolsinJune2005establishes
theirphysicalpresenceinthePhilippineduringthistime,butnotherintenttoabandonU.S.domicile.Notethatherchildrenenteredthe
Philippinesforatemporaryperiodundertheirbalikbayanvisas.Enrollment,too,inschoolsisonlyforaperiodofoneschoolyear,orabout
tenmonths.
Moreover,aliensorforeignnationalstudentscan,infact,enrollandstudyinthePhilippineswithouthavingtoacquirePhilippinecitizenship
orwithoutsecuringimmigrantvisas(andICRs).Foreignersoraliensatleast18yearsofagemayapplyfornonimmigrantstudentvisa,
whilethosebelow18yearsofageelementaryandhighschoolstudentsmayapplyforSpecialStudyPermits.[330]
Poe's BIR TIN number. Poe's act of securing a TIN from the BIR on July 22, 2005 is a requirement for taxation purposes that has
nothing to do with residence in the Philippines. Under Section 236(i) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), "[a]ny person,
whethernaturalorjuridical,requiredundertheauthorityoftheInternalRevenueCodetomake,renderorfileareturn,statementorother
documents, shall be supplied with or assigned a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to be indicated in the return, statement or
document to be filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for his proper identification for tax purposes." Under the same Tax Code,
nonresident aliens are subject to Philippine taxation under certain circumstances,[331] thus likewise requiring the procurement of a TIN
number.
Over and above all these reasons, it should be pointed out, too, that the nature and duration of an alien's stay or residence in the
PhilippinesisamatterdeterminedandgrantedbytheConstitutionandbythelaw.AstheCOMELECcorrectlynoted,aforeigner'scapacity
toestablishPhilippineresidenceislimitedbyandissubjecttoregulationsandpriorauthorityoftheBID.[332]Indeed,theStatehasthe
righttodenyentrytoand/orimposeconditionsontheentryofaliensinthePhilippines,asIhaveelsewherediscussedinthisOpinion
and, in the exercise of this right, the State can determine who and for how long an alien can stay in its territory. An alien's intent
regardingthenatureanddurationofhisorherstayinthePhilippinescannotoverrideorsupersedethelawsandtheState's
right,eventhoughthealienisaformernaturalbornFilipinocitizenwhointendstoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderRA
No.9225.
In short, these pieces of evidence Poe presented may be deemed material only for the purpose of determining the existence of the
subjective intent to effect a change of residence (from the U.S. to the Philippines) prior to reacquiring Philippine citizenship (with the
concomitant right to reestablish Philippine domicile). For the purpose of counting the period of her actual legal residence to determine
compliance with the Constitution's residency qualification requirement, these antecedent actions are immaterial as such residence
shouldbecountedonlyfromherreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.
Tosummarizeallthese:PoemayhavehintedherintentiontoresettleinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005,whichintentionshesupported
with several overt actions. The legal significance of these overt actions, however, is at best equivocal and does not fully support her
claimedanimusnonrevertenditotheU.S.Shecanbeconsideredtohaveactedonthisintentionundertheelectionlaws'termsonlyon
July18,2006whenshereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshiplegallysecuringtoherselftheoptionandtherighttoreestablishlegalresidence
inthePhilippines.(Buteventhen,asdiscussedbelow,whenshebecameadualRPU.S.citizen,shecouldatanytimereturntotheU.S.
thusherabandonmentofherU.S.domicileis,atbest,anarguablematter.)
IV.C.PoewasstillanAmericancitizenwithresidence
intheUnitedStatesbetweenMay24,2005to
July18,2006.
Conversely,Poe'sincapacitytoestablishdomicileinthePhilippinesbecauseshelackstherequisitePhilippinecitizenshipreflectsherstatus

asanAmericanwithresidenceintheUnitedStates.
Asarequirementtoestablishdomicile,apersonmustshowthatheorshehasanimusnonrevertendi,orintenttoabandonhisorherold
domicile.Thisrequirementreflectstwokeycharacteristicsofadomicile:first,thatapersoncanhaveonlyoneresidenceatanytime,and
second,thatapersonisconsideredtohaveananimusrevertendi(intenttoreturn)tohiscurrentdomicile.
Thus,forapersontodemonstratehisorher animus non revertendi to the old domicile, he or she must haveabandoned it completely,
such that he or she can no longer entertain any animus revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This complete abandonment is
necessaryinlightoftheonedomicilerule.
Inmoreconcreteterms,apersonseekingtodemonstratehisorheranimusnonrevertendimustnotonlyleavetheolddomicileandisno
longerphysicallypresentthere,heorshemusthavealsoshownactscancellinghisorheranimusrevertenditothatplace.
Note,atthispoint,thatapersonwhohaslefthisorherdomicileisconsiderednottohaveabandoneditsolongasheorshehasanimus
revertendiorintenttoreturntoit.Wehaveallowedthedefenseofanimusrevertendiforchallengestoaperson'sdomicileontheground
thatheorshehasleftitforaperiodoftime,andheldthataperson'sdomicile,onceestablished,doesnotautomaticallychangesimply
becauseheorshehasnotstayedinthatplaceforaperiodoftime.
Applying these principles to Poe's case, as of May 24, 2005, her overt acts may have established an intent to remain in the
Philippines,butdonotcomplywiththerequiredanimusnonrevertendiwithrespecttotheU.S.,thedomicilethatshewas
abandoning.
OnMay24,2005,Poeandherfamily'shomewasstillintheU.S.astheysoldtheirU.S.familyhomeonlyonApril27,2006.
TheyalsoofficiallyinformedtheU.S.PostalServiceoftheirchangeoftheirU.S.addressonlyinlateMarch2006.Lastly,asof
thisdate(May24,2005),Poe'shusbandwasstillintheU.S.andalegalresidentthereof.
Takentogether,thesefactsshowthatasofMay24,2005,PoehadnotcompletelyabandonedherdomicileintheU.S.thus,shehadnot
compliedwiththenecessaryanimusnonrevertendiatthatdate.
Note, too, that Poe's travel documents between May 24, 2005 and July 18, 2006 strongly support this conclusion. In this
period,shetravelledtoandfromthePhilippinesunderabalikbayanvisathat,asearlierpointedout,hasafixedperiodofvalidityandis
anindicationthatherstayinthePhilippinesduringthisperiodwastemporary.
While it is not impossible that she could have entered the Philippines under a balikbayan visa with the intent to eventually establish
domicileinthePhilippines,herreturntotheU.S.severaltimeswhileshewasstayinginthePhilippinesunderatemporaryvisa
preventsmefromagreeingtothispossibility.
On the contrary, Poe's acts of leaving the Philippines for the U.S. as an American citizen who had previously stayed in the Philippines
underatemporaryvisaisanindicationofheranimusrevertenditotheU.S.,herolddomicile.
Worthyofnote,too,isthatinbetweenPoe'sarrivalonMay24,2005andheracquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship,Poemadefourtripsto
andfromtheU.S.inaspanofoneyearandtwomonthsthisfrequencyoverashortperiodoftimeindicatesandsupportstheconclusion
thatshehasnotfullyabandonedherdomicileintheU.S.duringthisperiod.
Additionally,too,duringthistime,PoecontinuedtoowntwohousesintheU.S.,onepurchasedin1992andanotherin2008(orafterher
reacquisitionofthePhilippinecitizenship.[333]Theownershipofthesehouses,whentakentogetherwithhertemporaryvisaintravellingto
thePhilippinesfromMay24,2005toJuly18,2006,manifesttheexistenceofananimusrevertenditotheU.S.,whichmeansthatasof
May24,2005,shehadnotyetcompletelyabandonedtheU.S.asherdomicile.
IV.D. Poe made several inconsistent claims regarding her period of residence in the Philippines that shows a pattern of
deliberateattempttomisleadandtoqualifyherforthePresidency.
Lest we forget, I reiterate that Poe declared in her 2012 CoC for Senator that she has been a resident of the Philippines for at least "6
yearsand6months"beforetheMay13,2013.Thiswasapersonaldeclarationmadeunderoath,certifiedtobetrueandcorrect,
andwhichsheannouncedtothepublictoprovethatshewaseligiblefortheSenatorialpost.
Six(6)yearsandsix(6)monthscountedbackfromthedaybeforetheMay13,2013electionspointtoNovember2006asthebeginning
ofherPhilippineresidencewhichperiodofresidencebeforetheMay9,2016electionsleadstoonly9yearsand6months,shortofthe
tenyearrequirementforthePresidency.
WhensherealizedthispotentialdisqualifyinggroundsometimeinJuneof2015,shetoldadifferentstorytothepublicby
claimingthatshecountedthe"6year6month"periodasofthedayshefiledherCoCforSenatoronOctober2,2012.[334]
Effectively,sheclaimedthatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinessinceApril2006therebyremovingherineligibility.
Subsequently,sheclaimedthatshehasbeenaresidentofthePhilippinessinceMay24,2005whenshearrivedinthePhilippinesandhas
allegedlydecidedtoresettlehereforgood.Thus,inher2015CoCforPresident,shedeclaredthe"10yearand11month"periodasher
Philippineresidence.
Aswithher2012CoC,thiswasapersonaldeclarationwhichshemadeunderoathandwhichsheannouncedtothepublictoprove
thatshewaseligible,thistimeforthePresidency.Thisdeclaration,however,iscontrarytothedeclarationshemadeinher2012CoC
aswellastothedeclarationsshemadetothepublicin2015whenshetriedtoexplainawayherpotentialdisqualifyingcircumstance.
Iclarifythatthesedeclarations,particularlythedeclarationPoemadeinthe2012CoC,arenotandtheCOMELECdidnotconsiderthem

tobeevidenceoftheactualnumberofyearsshehadbeenlegallyresidinginthePhilippinesfromwhichIdrawtheconclusionthatshe
hasnotbeenaPhilippineresidentfortenyearsandthuscommittedfalsematerialrepresentation.AstheCOMELECdid,Idonotconclude
thatPoehasonlybeenaPhilippineresidentfor9yearsand6monthsfollowingher2012CoCdeclaration.
Rather, I consider these declarations to be evidence of falsehoods and inconsistent representations with respect to her
residencyclaim:shemadearepresentationinher2015CoCthatiscompletelydifferentfromherrepresentationinher2012
CoCaswellasfromherpublicdeclarations.Poe'spublicdeclarationsunderoathconsidered as a whole reveala pattern that
confirms her deliberate attempt to mislead and to falsely represent to the electorate that she was eligible for the
Presidency.ThisevidencefullyjustifiedtheCOMELECdecisiontocancelherCoC.
V.
CONCLUSION

In light of all these considerations, I vote for the reversal of the majority's ruling granting the petitions based on the COMELEC's grave
abuseofdiscretion.Inlieuthereof,theCourtshouldenteraRevisedRulingdismissingthepetitionsandorderingtheCOMELECtoproceed
withthecancellationoftheCertificateofCandidacyofpetitionerGracePoe.

[1]PhilippineDailyInquirer,'ReturnoftheRenegade"Mar.4,1995.
[2]Seep.16,par.Ioftheponencia.
[3]Seep.20,lastparagraphoftheponencia.
[4]Seep.21,par.Ioftheponencia.
[5]Seep.21,par.2oftheponencia.
[6]Seep.4ofJ.Caguioa'sSeparateConcurringOpinion.
[7]Seep.22,par.Ioftheponencia.
[8]Seep.2ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Leonen'sOpinion.
[9]Seep.10ofJ.Caguioa'sSeparateConcurringOpinion.
[10]Seep.22,par.2oftheponencia.
[11]Seep.22,par.2oftheponencia.
[12]Seep.22,par.3oftheponencia.
[13]Seep.2223oftheponencia
[14]Seep.2428oftheponencia.
[15]Seep.24,par.Ioftheponencia.
[16]Seep.26,par.Ioftheponencia.
[17]Seepp.2728par.2oftheponencia.
[18]Seep.25ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Jardeleza'sOpinion.
[19]Seep.28,pars.Iand2oftheponencia.
[20]Seep.66ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Leonen'sOpinion.
[21]Seep.Iandp.66ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Leonen'sOpinion.
[22]Seepage68oftheoriginallycirculatedopinion.
[23]Seepp.2829oftheponencia.
[24]Seepp.2930oftheponencia
[25]Seepp.3032oftheponencia

[26]Seepp.33,pars.2and3oftheponencia.
[27]Seepp.3436oftheponencia
[28]Seep.35,par.2oftheponencia.
[29]Seepp.3639oftheponencia.
[30]Seep.39.Par.2oftheponencia.
[31]Seediscussionsonpp.3839oftheponenciaonthesepoints.
[32]Seep.86ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Leonen'sOpinion.
[33]Seediscussionsonpp.84to87ofthefirstcirculatedversionofJ.Leonen'sOpinion.
[34]Seepp.3940oftheponencia.
[35]Seediscussiononpp.4144oftheponenciaonthesepoints.
[36]Seediscussiononpp.4144oftheponenciaonthesepoints.
[37]Seepp.1718oftheponencia.
[38]595Phil.449(2008).
[39]G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300.
[40]Seep.19oftheponencia.
[41]Seep.20oftheponencia.
[42]Seepp.2021oftheponencia.
[43]Ibid.
[44]G.R.No.161434,March3,2004,424SCRA277.
[45]595Phil.449,46567(2008).
[46]OngsiakoReyesv.Comelec,G.R.No.207264,June25,2013,699SCRA522,543544.
[47]G.R.No.165983,April24,2007.
[48]Cerajicav.Comelec,G.R.No.205136,December2,2014.
[49]G.R.No.135886,August16,1999,312SCRA447,459.
[50]Seep.26oftheponencia,citingIJoseM.Aruego,TheFramingofthePhilippineConstitution209(1949).
[51]AlexanderMarieStuyt,TheGeneralPrinciplesofLawasAppliedbyInternationalTribunalstoDisputesonAttributionandExerciseof

StateJurisdiction(2013),p.101.
[52]Gov.Ramos,614Phil.451(2009).
[53]Ibid.
[54] J. Bernas SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 1st edition (1987), p. 500, citing Justice Warren's

dissentingopinioninPerezv.Brownell,356U.S.44(1958).
[55]Paav.Chan,128Phil.815(1967).
[56]Ibid.
[57]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.12,14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.15,17.SeealsoFoundlingCertificate,Annex

"Mseries",Exhibit"l"(bothofTatad,andContreras/Valdezcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"l"(ofElamparo

case)inG.R.No.221697.
[58]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.10,12(pars.12and13),109120(subsection8.3),112(par.148),and120(par.156)and

petitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.6,7,15(par.17),7989(subsection8.3),84(pars.122and122.l),and87(par.125).
[59]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.9,10,94(subsection8),97109(subsection8.2),109120(subsection8.3),153(par.202),156

(par.204.8),and157(par.205)andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.5,24(par.47),5559(subsection8and8.1),6976,7989,
and141146(subsectionB.11).
[60]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.104108(pars.136138)andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.7276(pars.106108).
[61] See Paragraph 4.23.8 of Poe's Memorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration, both in the Tatad case,

Annexes"N"and"U"ofG.R.No.221698700.
Paragraph4.23.8stated:
ii.OfficialactsinrecognitionofRespondent's[Poe's]Philippinecitizenship
4.23.8.On13May1974,theSanJuanCourtissuedaDecisiongrantingtheSpousesPoe'spetitiontoadoptRespondent.Article15ofthe
CivilCodestatesthat"(l)awsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindingupon
citizensofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad."Respondentdoesnotargue,andhasneverargued,thatheradoptionbythePoe
spousesconferredcitizenshiponher.However,theadoptionaffirmsthatRespondentwasaFilipinointhefirstplace.TheSanJuanCourt
couldnothaveappliedPhilippineadoptionlaw(whichrelatesto"familyrightsandduties"andto"status"ofpersons),ifitdidnotinthe
firstplace,considerRespondenttobeaFilipinowhowouldbe"bound"bysuchlaws.
Page24ofPoe'sMotionforReconsideration,ontheotherhand,read:
30.6.On13May1974,theSanJuanCourtissuedaDecisiongrantingtheSpousesPoe'spetitiontoadoptRespondent.Respondentdoes
notarguethathercitizenshipisderivedfromherFilipinoadoptiveparentsratheritisherpositionthattheadoptionaffirmsthatshewas
aFilipinointhefirstplace.TheSanJuanCourtcouldnothaveappliedPhilippineadoptionlaw(whichrelatesto"familyrightsandduties"
andto"status"ofpersons),ifitdidnotinthefirstplace,considerRespondenttobeaFilipinowhowouldbe"bound"bysuchlaws.
[62]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.12,14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.15,17.SeealsoFoundlingCertificate,Annex

"Mseries",Exhibit"l"(bothofTatad,andContreras/Valdezcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"1"(ofElamparo
case)inG.R.No.221697.
[63]FoundlingCertificate(LCR4175),Annex"Mseries'',Exhibit"1"(bothofTatad,andContreras/Valdezcase)inG.R.No.221698700

andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibit"I"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[64]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,par.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,par.19.
[65]MTCDecision,Annex"Mseries'',Exhibit"2"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"2"(ofElamparo

case)inG.R.No.221697.
See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "Mseries'', Exhibit "2A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698700 and
Annex"Iseries",Exhibit"2A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[66]Art.39(1)ofPD603.
[67]SeeArticles337and339oftheCivilCodeandSection2,Rule99oftheRulesofCourt.thegoverninglawsandrulesonadoptionat

thetimeGracePoewasadoptedbythespousesPoe.Articles337and339provideswhomaybeadoptedimpliedly,theyallowadoptionof
aliens, save those aliens whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. Section of Rule 99, on the
otherhand,enumeratesthecontentsofapetitionforadoptionthepetitiondoesnotrequireallegationthatthechildisaPhilippinecitizen.
[68]SeeNSOBirthCertificate,Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"10"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"10"

(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[69]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,par.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,par.20.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"3"(ofTatadcase)

inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"3"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[70]SeeArticleV,Section1oftheConstitution.Itreads:

SECTION1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoareatleasteighteenyears
ofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsix
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.[Emphasissupplied]
[71]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.13andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,17.Annex"Mseries'',Exhibit"4"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.

No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"4"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.

[72]Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"4A"and"4B"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"4A"and"4B"(of

Elamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[73]Section5ofRANo.8239(PhilippinePassportActof1996)pertinentlystates:

SECTION 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly
authorizedrepresentativeissatisfiedthattheapplicantisaFilipinocitizenwhohascompliedwiththefollowingrequirements:
a)Adulyaccomplishedapplicationformandphotographsofsuchnumber,sizeandstyleasmaybeprescribedbytheDepartment
xxxx
g)Iftheapplicantisanadoptedperson,thedulycertifiedcopyofcourtorderofadoption,togetherwiththeoriginalandamendedbirth
certificates duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General shall be presented: Provided, That in case the
adopted person is an infant or a minor or the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents, an authority from the Department of Social
WelfareandDevelopmentshallberequired:Provided,further,Thattheadoptingforeignparentsshallalsosubmitacertificatefromtheir
embassyorconsulatethattheyarequalifiedtoadoptsuchinfantorminorchildxxx.[emphasessupplied]
[74]Section3(d)ofRANo.8239states:"xxx(d)PassportmeansadocumentissuedbythePhilippineGovernmenttoitscitizensand

requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and
protection.
See Poe's Philippine passport issued on May 19, 1998, October 2009, and March 18, 2014 and her Diplomatic passport issued on
December19,2013,Annex"Mseries"inGRNos.G.R.No.221698700andAnnex"IseriesinGRNo.221697.
[75]Paav.Chan,128Phil.815,824(1967).
[76]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.18.
[77]SeeCoquillavs.COMELEC,434Phil.861,872873(2002)Romualdezv.Comelec,G.R.No.119976,248SCRA300,328329(1995),

citing Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) Nuval v. Ouray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928) Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160A Phil. 1034, 1042
(1975)Caraballov.Republic,114Phil.991(1962)Fulev.CourtofAppeals,165Phil.785,797798(1976).
[78]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.18.
[79]"Iherebydeclare,onoath,thatIabsolutelyandentirelyrenounceandabjureallallegianceandfidelitytoforeignprince,potentate,

state,orsovereignty,ofwhomorwhichIhaveheretoforebeenasubjectorcitizenthatIwillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionand
lawsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaagainstallenemies,foreignanddomesticthatIwillbeartruefaithandallegiancetothesamethat
IwillbeararmsonbehalfoftheUnitedStateswhenrequiredbythelaw.thatIwillperformnoncombatantserviceintheArmedForcesof
theUnitedStateswhenrequiredbythelawthatIwillperformworkofnationalimportanceunderciviliandirectionwhenrequiredbythe
lawandthatItakethisobligationfreely,withoutanymentalreservationorpurposeofevasionsohelpmeGod."
Source: The Immigration and Nationality Act of the U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenshipthroughnaturalization (last
accessedonFebruary15,2016).
[80] See the Immigration and Nationality Act of the U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenshipthroughnaturalization (last

accessedonFebruary7,2016).
[81] Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "5" (of

Elamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[82]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.23andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2829.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)

inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[83]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.24.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"19"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "13" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[84]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.25.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"20"and"21"to"21B"

(ofTatadcase),Exhibits"14"and"15"to"15B"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibits"20"
and"21"to"21B"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[85]SeeSection3ofRANo.9225.Itpertinentlyreads:

Section3.RetentionofPhilippineCitizenshipAnyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,naturalborncitizenshipbyreasonof
theirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryareherebydeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthefollowing
oathofallegiancetotheRepublic:
xxxx

NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivityofthisAct,becomecitizensofaforeigncountryshallretaintheirPhilippine
citizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.[Emphasessupplied]
[86]Art.38ofPD603.
[87]M.C.No.Aff0401,Secs.25and8.
[88]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.25.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"22"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[89] The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN

CITIZENSHIPPERMANENT.AMENDINGFORTHEPURPOSECOMMONWEALTHACT.NO.63,ASAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES".
SeealsoSection2ofRA9225.Itstates:
Section2.DeclarationofPolicyItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheStatethatallPhilippinecitizensofanothercountryshallbedeemed
nottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipundertheconditionsofthisAct.
SeealsoexcerptsofCongressdeliberationsonRA9225inAASJSv.Hon.Datumanong,51Phil.110,116117(2007).
[90]SeeDecember23,2015ComelecenbancresolutionintheElamparocase,Annex"B"ofG.R.No.221697andDecember23,2015

ComelecenbancresolutionintheTatad,Contreras,andValdezcases,Annex"B"ofG.R.No.221698700.
91SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.26.Poe'sIdentificationCardwassignedbysignedby
Commission Alipio Fernandez: Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "23" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "17'' (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No.
221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"23"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[92]SeealsotheIdentificationCertificatesofherchildren:Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"23A"to"23C"(ofTatadcase),Exhibits"17A"to

"17C"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"23A"to"23C"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.
No.221697.
[93]RANo.9225,Sec.5(1)and(2).
[94]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21petitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.26.Annex"Iseries",Exhibit"25"(ofElamparocase)in

G.R.No.221697andAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"25"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700.
[95]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.23andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2829.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)

inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries"',Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[96] See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23 and petition in G.R. No. 221698700, pp. 2829. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad

case),Exhibit"19"(ofContrera/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"26"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.
221697.
[97]SeeSections2ofPresidentialDecree(PD)No.1986,enactedonOctober5,1985.Section2pertinentlyprovides:

Section 2. Composition Qualifications Benefits The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a ViceChairman and thirty (30)
members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the ViceChairman, and the members of the
BOARD,shallholdofficeforatermofone(1)year,unlesssoonerremovedbythePresidentforanycause.xxx.
NopersonshallbeappointedtotheBOARD,unlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,notlessthantwentyone(21)yearsof
age,andofgoodmoralcharacterandstandinginthecommunityxxxx.[emphasissupplied]
[98]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.22andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.29.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"27"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "21" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[99]SeeJapzonv.Comelec,596Phil.354(2009).
[100]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21,par.49andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2627,par.54.

UnderSec.5(3)ofRANo.9225,"[t]hoseappointedtoanypublicofficeshallsubscribeandsweartoanoathofallegiancetotheRepublic
of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of
allegiancetothecountrywheretheytookthatoath."'Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied]
[101]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"29"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"!series",Exhibit"29"(ofElamparocase)in

G.R.No.221697.
[102]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"26A"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit"20"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex

"Iseries'',Exhibit"26A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.

[103]SeeSections2ofPresidentialDecree(PD)No.1986,enactedonOctober5,1985.Section2pertinentlyprovides:

Section 2. Composition Qualifications Benefits The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a ViceChairman and thirty (30)
members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the ViceChairman, and the members of the
BOARD,shallholdofficeforatermofone(1)year,unlesssoonerremovedbythePresidentforanycause.xxx.
NopersonshallbeappointedtotheBOARD,unlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,notlessthantwentyone(21)yearsof
age,andofgoodmoralcharacterandstandinginthecommunityxxx.[emphasissupplied]
[104]Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.

No.221697.
[105]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.24petitioninG.R.No.221697,p.30.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"30"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit

"22"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"30"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[106]Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"30A"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit"23"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"I

series",Exhibit"30A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[107] Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "I

series",Exhibit"31"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.2216971.
[108] Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "I

series",Exhibit"31"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[109]Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"32"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"32"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.

No.221697.
SeealsoComeleeenbancDecember11,2015resolutioninSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC),andSPANo.15139(DC),pp.
43and47,Annexes"A"and"BinG.R.No.221698700.
[110]Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"43"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"43"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.

No.221697.
[111] See petition in G.R. No. 221698700, p. 16 and petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 6263 and 7072. Annex "C" both in G.R. No.

221697andG.R.No.221698700.
[112]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.102104andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.6972.
[113]255Phil.934(1989).
[114]Frivaldov.Comelec,255Phil.934(1989).
[115]UScitizenshipacquiresrequiresapriorperiodofpermanentresidenceinthatcountry.
[116]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.12,14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.15,17.SeealsoFoundlingCertificate(LCR

4175),Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"I"(bothofTatadandContreras/Valdezcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"I"
(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[117]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,par.14,andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,par.19.
[118]MTCDecision,Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"2"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"2"(ofElamparo

case)inG.R.No.221697.
See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "2A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698700 and
Annex"Iseries",Exhibit"2A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
SeealsoOCRCertificationofreceiptofMTCDecision,Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"2B"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex
"Iseries",Exhibit"2B"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[119]SeeTolentino,A.(1960).CivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.I,pp.651652,inrelationtop.624.
[120]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,par.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,par.20.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"3"(ofTatadcase)

inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"3"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[121]SeeArticleV,SectionIoftheConstitution.
[122]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.17.

[123]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.12,14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.15,17.
[124] Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928) Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160A Phil. 1034, 1042

(1975)Caraballov.Republic,114Phil.991,995(1962)Fulev.CourtofAppeals,165Phil.785,797798(1976).
[125]Ibid.
[126]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.18.
[127]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.14,par.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.17,par.24.
[128]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,pp.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.18.
[129]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.14andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.17.
[130]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.18.
[131]SeeCoquillavs.COMELEC,434Phil.861(2002).
[132]Romualdezv.Comelec,G.R.No.119976,248SCRA300,328329(1995),citingFayponv.Quirino,96Phil.294(1954)Nuvalv.

Guray,52Phil.645,651652(1928)Kohv.CourtofAppeals,160APhil.1034(1975)Caraballov.Republic,114Phil.991,995(1962)
Fulev.CourtofAppeals,165Phil.785,797798(I976).
[133] See US Immigration and Nationality Act. htt.ps://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenshipthroughnaturalization (last accessed on

February7,2016).
[134]SeepetitionG.R.No.221697,p.16andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.20.
[135] Jurisprudence tells us that absence from one's residence to pursue study or profession someplace else does not amount to

abandonmentofthatresidence(Supranote7).Analogously,itcanbearguedthatresignationfromone'semploymentdoesnotipsofacto
translatetoabandonmentofresidence(incaseswheretheplaceofemploymentisthesameastheplaceofresidence).
[136]SeepetitionG.R.No.221697,p.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.1819.SeealsoPoe'sU.S.passport,Annex"Mseries",

Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[137]SeepetitionG.R.No.221697,p.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.19.
[138]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.15andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.19.
[139]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.16andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.1920.
[140]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.23andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2829.SeePoe'sU.S.passport,Annex"Mseries",

Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[141]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.16andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.20.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"7"and"7A"to"7F"

(ofTatadcase),andExhibits"3"and"3A"to"3F"(ofContrerasandValdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700Annex"Iseries",Exhibits
"7"and"7A"to"7F"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[142]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.16andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.20.
[143]OralArguments,January19,2016.
[144]SeeCoquillav.Comelec,434Phil.861,875(2002).

"Under2ofR.A.No.6768(AnActInstitutingaBalikbayanProgram),thetermbalikbayanincludesaformerFilipinocitizenwhohadbeen
naturalizedinaforeigncountryandcomesorreturnstothePhilippinesand,ifso,heisentitled,amongothers,toa"visafreeentrytothe
Philippinesforaperiodofone(I)year"(3(c)).Itwouldappearthenthatwhenpetitionerenteredthecountryonthedatesinquestion,
hedidsoasavisafreebalikbayanvisitorwhosestayassuchwasvalidforoneyearonly."[emphasissupplied]
[145]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"6series"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit"2series"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700and

Annex"Iseries",Exhibit"2series"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[146]SeeRomualdezv.RTC.G.R.No.104960,14September1993,226SCRA408,415416.
[147]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.16andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.20.
[148]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.17andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.21.SeealsoAnnex"Mseries",Exhibits"7"to"7F"

(ofTatadcase)andExhibits"3"to''3F"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"7"to"7F"

(ofElamparocase),inG.R.No.221697.
[149]SeeSection9(f)ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,ExecutiveOrdersNo.423(signedinJune1997)andExecutiveOrderNo.

285(signedinSeptember4,2000).
In2011,theBureauofImmigrationrecordsshowthatthePhilippineshadmorethan26,000foreignstudentsenrolledinvariousPhilippine
schools more than 7,000 of these are college enrollees while the rest were either in elementary and high school or taking shortterm
languagecourses(seehttp://globalnation.inguirer.net/978l/philippineshas26kforeignstudentslastaccessedonFebruary12,2016).
SeealsoTheInternationalMobilityofStudentsinAsiaandthePacific,publishedin2013bytheUnitedNationsEducational,Scientificand
Cultural Organization http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/ Documents/internationalstudentmobilityasiapacificeducation2013en.pdf
(lastaccessedonFebruary12,2016)andImmigrationPoliciesonVisitingandReturningOverseasFilipinoshttp://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/
handbook/ImmigrationPoliciesonVisitingandReturningOverseasFilipinoschapterlV.pdf(lastaccessedonFebruary15,2016).
[150]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.17andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.22.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"8"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit"4"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"8"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[151]Romualdezv.RTC,G.R.No.104960,14September1993,226SCRA408,415416.
[152]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.22.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"II"and"12"inG.R.

No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibits"5"and"6"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[153]Section5ofRANo.4726reads:

Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein, shall include the transfer or
conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the condominium
corporation:Provided,however,Thatwherethecommonareasinthecondominiumprojectareownedbytheownersofseparateunitsas
coownersthereof,nocondominiumunitthereinshallbeconveyedortransferredtopersonsotherthanFilipinocitizens,orcorporationsat
leastsixtypercentofthecapitalstockofwhichbelongtoFilipinocitizens,exceptincasesofhereditarysuccession.Wherethecommon
areasinacondominiumprojectareheldbyacorporation,notransferorconveyanceofaunitshallbevalidiftheconcomitanttransferof
the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits
imposedbyexistinglaws.
SeealsoHulstv.PRBuilders,Inc.,558Phil.683,698699(2008).
[154]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.2.Annex"!series",Exhibits"6series","15",and

"15A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"6series","15",and"15A"(ofTatadcase),Exhibits"2series",
"9"and"9A"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700.
[155]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.
[156]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"16"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "10" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "16" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[157]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"13and14"(ofTatad

case),Exhibits"7"and"8"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibits"13''and"14"(ofElamparo
case)inG.R.No.221697.
[158]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"17"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "II" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[159]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"17"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "I I" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[160]"ANACTTOPROMOTEFOREIGNINVESTMENTS,PRESCRIBETHEPROCEDURESFORREGISTERINGENTERPRISESDOINGBUSINESS

INTHEPHILIPPINES,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES",enactedonMarch28,1996.
Sectionl0ofRANo.7042,asamendedbyR.A.8179,states:
SEC.l0.OtherRightsofNaturalBornCitizenPursuanttotheProvisionsofArticleXII,Section8oftheConstitution.Anynaturalborn
citizen who has Jost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transfereeofaprivatelanduptoamaximumareaoffivethousand(5,000)squaremetersinthecaseofurbanlandorthree(3)hectares
inthecaseofrurallandtobeusedbyhimforbusinessorotherpurposes.Inthecaseofmarriedcouples,oneofthemmayavailofthe
privilegehereingranted:Provided,Thatifbothshallavailofthesame,thetotalareaacquiredshallnotexceedthemaximumhereinfixed.
[emphasissupplied]
[161]ArticleXII,Section8oftheConstitutionreads:

SECTION8.NotwithstandingtheprovisionsofSection7ofthisArticle,anaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippine
citizenshipmaybeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbyJaw.[emphasissupplied]
[162]SeePetitioner'sMemorandum,pp.278279ponencia,pp.4547.
[163]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.24.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"19"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "13" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[164]SeeSection3ofMemorandumCircularNo.MCL08006orthe"2008RevisedRulesGoverningPhilippineCitizenshipUnderRepublic

Act(R.A.)No.9225andAdministrativeOrder(A.O.)No.91,Seriesof2004.
[165]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.25.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"20"and"21"to"21

B"(ofTatadcase),Exhibits"14"and"IS"to"15B"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibits
"20"and"21"to"21B"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[166]SeeSection3ofRA9225.Itpertinentlyreads:

Section3.RetentionofPhilippineCitizenshipAnyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,naturalborncitizenshipbyreasonof
theirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryareherebydeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthefollowing
oathofallegiancetotheRepublic:
xxxx
NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivityofthisAct,becomecitizensofaforeigncountryshallretaintheirPhilippine
citizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.[emphasessupplied]
[167]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.25.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"22"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[168] The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN

CITIZENSHIPPERMANENT.AMENDINGFORTHEPURPOSECOMMONWEALTHACT.NO.63,ASAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES".
SeealsoSection2ofRA9225.Itstates:
Section2.DeclarationofPolicyItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheStatethatallPhilippinecitizensofanothercountryshallbedeemed
nottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipundertheconditionsofthisAct.
SeealsoexcerptsofCongressdeliberationsonRA9225inAASJSv.Hon.Datumanong,51Phil.II0,116117(2007).
[169] See the cases of Japzon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331 and Caballero v. Comelec. G.R. No.

209835,September22,2015.
[170] R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino citizenship for naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine

citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. See SobejanaCondon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678
SCRA267.
[171]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.26.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"23"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "17'' (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit ''23" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[172]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibits"23A"to"23C"(ofTatadcase),Exhibits"17A"to"17C"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.

221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"23A"to"23C"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[173]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.26.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"24"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "18" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "24" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[174]SeeArticleV,SectionIoftheConstitution.
[175]G.R.No.180088,January19,2002,576SCRA331.
[176]UnderSection3ofR.A.6768,asamended,abalikbayan,whoisaforeignpassportholder,is.entitledtoavisafreeentrytothe

Philippinesforaperiodofone(1)year,withtheexceptionofrestrictednationals.
[177] See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23 and petition in G.R. No. 221698700, pp. 2829. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad

case)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[178] See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23 and petition in G.R. No. 221698700, pp. 2829. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad

case)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[179]GracePoe'sIdentificationCertificateNumber.
[180]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.26.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"25"(ofTatadcase)in

G.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"25"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[181] See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23 and petition in G.R. No. 221698700, pp. 2829. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad

case),Exhibit"19"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"26"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.
221697.
[182]SeeSections2,3,and5ofPresidentialDecree(PD)No.1986,enactedonOctober5,1985.Section2pertinentlyprovides:

Section 2. Composition Qualifications Benefits The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a ViceChairman and thirty (30)
members, who shall all be appointed by the President of t:ie Philippines. The Chairman, the ViceChairman, and the members of the
BOARD,shallholdofficeforatermofone(I)year,unlesssoonerremovedbythePresidentforanycause.xxx
NopersonshallbeappointedtotheBOARD,unlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,notlessthantwentyone(21)yearsof
age,andofgoodmoralcharacterandstandinginthecommunityxxx
Section 3 of PD No. 1986, on the other hand, enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the MTRCB Board, while Section 5
enumeratesthepowersoftheChairmanoftheBoardwhoshalllikewiseactastheChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheBoard.
[183]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.22andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.29.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"27"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "21" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[184]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.21,par.49andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2627,par.54.
[185]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"29"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"(series",Exhibit"29"(ofElamparocase)in

G.R.No.221697.
[186]SeeAnnex"Mseries'',Exhibit"26A"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit"20"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex

"Iseries",Exhibit"26A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[187]SeeSections2,3,and5ofPresidentialDecree(PD)No.1986,enactedonOctober5,1985.

Section2pertinentlyprovides:
Section2.CompositionQualifications,BenefitsTheBOARDshallbecomposedofaChairman,aViceChairmanandthirty(30)members,
whoshallallbeappointedbythePresidentofthePhilippines.TheChairman,theViceChairman,andthemembersoftheBOARD,shall
holdofficeforatermofone(1)year,unlesssoonerremovedbythePresidentforanycause.xxx
NopersonshallbeappointedtotheBOARD,unlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,notlessthantwentyone(2I)yearsof
age,andofgoodmoralcharacterandstandinginthecommunityxxx
Section3ofPD1986,ontheotherhand,enumeratesthepowers,functions,anddutiesoftheMTRCBBoard,whileSection5enumerates
thepowersoftheChairmanoftheBoard.whoshalllikewiseactastheChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheBoard.
[188]SeeComelecenbancDecember11,2015resolutioninSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC),andSPANo.15139(DC),pp.

43and47,Annexes"A"and"BinG.R.No.221698700.SeealsopetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.168.
[189]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"33"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"33"(ofElamparocase)in

G.R.No.221697.
[190]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"34"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"!series",Exhibit"34"(ofElamparocase)in

G.R.No.221697.
[191] See petition in G.R. No. 221698700, p. 16 and petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 6263 and 7072. Annex "C" both in G.R. No.

221697andG.R.No.221698700.
[192]Sections78and52,inrelationwithSections74and63oftheOmnibusElectionCode.
[193]SeeArticleIXC,Section2inrelationwithArticleVIII,SectionIoftheConstitution.ArticleVIII,SectionIprovidesinnocategorical

terms:
SECTIONI.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.Judicialpower
includesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.[emphasessupplied]

[194]SeeFrancisco,Jr.v.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,885(2003).
[195]63Phil.139,15859(1936).
[196]Belusov.Comelec,G.R.No.180711,22June2010,621SCRA450,456Fajardov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.157707,October29,

2008,570SCRA156,163Peoplev.Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.15878082,October12,2004,440SCRA206,212.
[197]Variasv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.189078,February11,2010,612SCRA386.
[198] Justice Puno 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil: 586, 740 (2003) citing Angara v. Electoral

Commission,63Phil.139(1936).
[199]JusticePuna'sConcurringandDissentingOpinioninMacalintalv.Comelec,453Phil.586(2003).
[200]AnakMindanaoPartyListGroupv.ExecutiveSecretary,558Phil.338(2007).
[201]Bernas,S.J.The1987ConstitutiunoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,(2003),pp.136137.
[202]Peoplev.Cayat,68Phil.12,l8(1939).
[203]Bernas,id.note1,at137.
[204]SeeJ.LeonardoDeCastro,Concu1TingOpinioninGarciav.Drilon,G.R.No.I79267,June25,2013,699SCRA352,435.
[205] J. Panganiban, Dissenting Opinion. Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,

December15,2004,446SCRA299,392.
[206]Bernas,S.J.Thel987ConstitutionoftheRep11blicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,(2009),p.139.
[207] J. CarpioMorales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,

December15,2004,699SCRA352,435.
Examples of these socalled "quasisuspect" classifications are those based on gender, legitimacy under certain circumstances, legal
residencywithregardtoavailmentoffreepubliceducation,civilserviceemploymentpreferenceforarmedforcesveteranswhoarestate
residents upon entry to military service, and the right to practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been
qualifiedandlicensed.
[208]Ibid.
[209]Ibid.
[210]Ibid.
[211] J. LeonardoDe Castro, Concurring Opimon in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 435. Emphasis

supplied.
[212]J.Brion,ConcurringandDissentingOpinion,SameerOverseasPlacementAgency,Inc.v.Cabiles,G.R.No.170139,August5,2014.
[213]Disiniv.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.203335,February18,2014,716SCRA237.
[214]ArticleII,Section1statesthat"sovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem."

Followingthedefinitionoftheconceptof"state"providedunderArticleIoftheMontevideoConventionof1933,theelementsofastate:
people,territory,sovereignty,andgovernment.
Bernas defines "people" as "a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining continued existence of the
communityandheldtogetherbyacommonbondoflaw."Ontheotherhand,hedefines"sovereignty"as"thecompetence,withinitsown
constitutionalsystem,toconductinternationalrelationswithotherstates,aswellasthepolitical,technicalandfinancialcapabilitiestodo
so."(SeeBernas,S.J.The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,(2009),pp.40and54,respectively).
Cruz,citingMalcolm,definesitas"apeopleboundtogetherbycommonattractionsandrepulsionsintoalivingorganismpossessedofa
common pulse, common intelligence and inspiration, and destined apparently to have a common history and a common fate." While he
defines"sovereignty"as"thesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichthatstateisgoverned."(Cruz,Constitutional
Law,(2007),pp.16and26,respectively).
[215] J. Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,

December15,2004,699SCRA352,435.

[216]Peoplev.Cayat,68Phil.12,18(1939).
[217]G.R.No.158830,August10,2004,436SCRA45.
[218]Bedolv.CommissiononElections,G.R.179830,December3,2009,606SCRA554,57071.
[219]SalcedoIIv.Comelec,G.R.No.135886,August16,1999,312SCRA447LluzandAdeloesav.Comelec,G.R.No.172840,June7,

2007,523SCRA456.
[220]G.R.No.135886,August16,1999,312SCRA447,459.
[221]G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300,326.
[222]706Phil.534(2013).
[223]Id.at551.
[224]G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300,392400.
[225]595Phil.449(2008).
[226]G.R.No.180088,January19,2002,576SCRA331.
[227]SeeCivilCode,Art.8.SeealsoTingv.VelezTing,G.R.No.166562,March31,2009,582SCRA694,704705 Cabigon v. Pepsi

Cola Products Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 168030, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 149, 156157 Hacienda Bino/Hortencia Starke, Inc.,
G.R.No.150478,April15,2005,456SCRA300,309.
[228]SeeApoFruitsCorporationv.LandBankofthePhlippines,G.R.No.164195,October12,2010,632SCRA727,760FilipinasPalmoil

Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa, G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011, 641 SCRA 572, 581. See also Pasiona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165471,July21,2008,559SCRA137.
[229]SeeGo,Sr.v.Ramos,614Phil.451,473(2009).SeealsoMoyYaLimYaov.CommissionerofImmigration,No.L21289,October4,

1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367 Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L23446, December 20. 1971, 42 SCRA 561, 565 Board of
Commissioners(CID)v.DelaRosa,G.R.Nos.9561213,May31,1991,197SCRA854,877878.
[230]Palaranv.Republic,4Phil.79(1962).
[231]596Phil.354(2009).
[232]G.R.No.198742,August10,2012,678SCRA267.
[233]581Phil.657(2008).
[234] An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the

PresidentElectandtheVicePresidentElectofthePhilippinesandProvidingfortheMannerofHearingtheSame(21June1957).
[235]Lopezv.Roxas,124Phil.168(1966).
[236]1973Constitution,Art.VII,Sec.2.
[237] An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the

PresidentandVicePresidentofthePhilippines,AppropriatingFundsThereforandForOtherPurposes(1985).
[238]B.P.883,Sec.I.
[239]Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,

G.R.No.191618,November23,2010,635SCRA783.
[240]Art.VI,Sec.17.
[241]G.R.No.161434,March3,2004,424SCRA277.
[242]595Phil.449(2008).
[243]318Phil.329(1995).
[244]595Phil.449,46567(2008).

[245]Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830(2003)Chavezv.JudicialandBarCouncil,691Phil.173(2012).
[246]1935CONSTITUTION,ARTICLEIV,SECTION1:

"SectionI.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippines,anduponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw."

[247] Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities

ManagementCorporation,G.R.No.192088,October9,2012,682SCRA602,649.
[248]ThisisalsotheprevailingruleunderSection1(2),ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution.
[249]TanChongv.SecretaryofLabor,73Phil.307(1941)Talarocv.Uy,92Phil.52(1952)Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468

Phil421(2004).
[250]A.ScaliaandB.Gamer.ReadingLaw:TheInterpretationofLegalTexts(2012ed.),p.93.
[251]CANo.473.
[252]115Phil.657(1962).
[253]Peoplev.Manantan,115Phil.657,66869(1962).
[254]SeeFrancisco,Jr.v.HouseofRepresentatives.460Phil.830,887(2003).
[255]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVil,Section21.
[256]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,561Phil:386,399(2003).
[257]M.Magallona."TheSupremeCourtandInternationalLaw:ProblemsandApproachesinPhilippinePractice"85PhilippineLawJournal

1,2(2010).
[258]See:SecretaryofJusticev.Hon.Lantion,379Phil.165,212213(2000).
[259]Ibid.
[260]SignedbythePhilippinesonMay23,1969andratifiedonNovember15,1972.SeeViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,March

23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 512. Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20l155/volume1155118232

English.pdf
[261]Id.at339.
[262]Section5,(2)(a),ArticleVIIIprovides:

SECTION5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:

xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree,proclamation,order,instruction,ordinance,orregulationisinquestion.
xxxx

[263]See:I.CortesandR.Lotilla."NationalityandInternationalLawFromthePhilippinePerspective"60(1)PhilippineLawJournalI,12

(1990)and,M.Magallona."TheSupremeCourtandInternationalLaw:ProblemsandApproachesinPhilippinePractice"85Philippinelaw
JournalI,23(2010).
[264]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVlll,Section4('2)onthepoweroftheSupremeCourttonullifyatreatyonthegroundofunconstitutionality.

Seealso:M.Magallona,supranote111,at67.
[265]M.Magallona,supranote111,at4,citingIchongv.Hernandez,10IPhil.1156(1957).
[266] See: M. Dellinger. "Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The Deprivation of Democratic Rights by Nation States Not

RecognizingDualCitizenship"20JournalofTransnationallaw&Policy41,61(20102011).
[267] See: M. Bussuyt. "Guide to the"Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" Martinus Nijhojf

Publishers(1987).
[268] Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Available from http://www.un.org/en/universal

declarationhumanrights/index.html
[269]See:SeparateOpinionofCJPunoinRepublicv.Sandiganbayan,supranoteI04,at577.
[270]See:J.vonBemstorff."TheChangingFortunesoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:GenesisandSymbolicDimensionsof

theTumtoRightsinInternationalLaw"19(5)EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw903,913914(2008).
[271] See: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. I, 5051 (2008) and Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v.

Sandiganbayan,supraNote104at577.
[272]JLeonen,ConcurringOpinioninArigov.Swift,G.R.No.206510,September16,2014,735SCRA208,209citingE.PosnerandJ.L

Goldsmith,"ATheoryofCustomaryInternationalLaw"(1998).SeealsoRazon,Jr.v.Tagitis,621Phil.536,600605(2009).
[273]SeeCONSTITUTION,ArticleII,Section2.
[274]SeePharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIll,561Phil.386,399(2003).
[275]See:M.Magallona,supranote111,at23.
[276]Razonv.Tagitis,supranoteI19,at601.
[277]StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,Article38(1)(b).Availableathttp://www.icjcij.org/documents/?pI=4&p2=2
[278]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,supranote115,at199.
[279]Tingv.VelezTing,601Phil.b76,687(2009).
[280]CONSTITUTION,ArticleII,Section2inrelationtoCIVILCODE,Article8.
[281]See:K.Hailbronner."NationalityinPublicInternationalLawandEuropeanLaw,"EUDOCitizenshipObservatory,(2006).Availableat

http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/chapter1Hailbronner.pdf
[282]See:P.Weiss."NationalityandStatelessnessinInternationalLaw"Sijthojf&NoordhojfInternationalPublishersB.V.,(1979).
[283]Ibid
[284]I.Oppenheim,InternationalLaw643(8thed.1955).
[285]MetropolitanBankCorporationv.Tobias,supranote63,at188189.
[286]CIVILCODE,TitleVIII,ChapterI.
[287]Id.,Article255
[288]596Phil.354(2009).
[289]G.R.No.209835,September22,2015.
[290]434Phil.861(2002).

[291]SeeRomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329(1995).
[292]Thus,forpurposesofdeterminingvenueforfilingpersonalactions,welooktotheactualaddressofthepersonortheplacewherehe

inhabits, and noted that a person can have more than one residence. We said this in light of the purpose behind fixing the situs for
bringingrealandpersonalcivilactions,whichistoproviderulesmeanttoattainthegreatestpossibleconveniencetothepartylitigantsby
takingintoconsiderationthemaximumaccessibilitytothemi.e.,tobothplaintiffanddefendant,notonlytooneortheotherofthecourts
ofjustice.
[293]Limbonav.Comelec,578Phil.364(2008).
[294]619Phil.226(2009).SeealsoMacalintalv.Comelec,453Phil.586(2003).
[295] See Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larazzabal v. Commission on Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v.

Comelec,616Phil.167(2009).
[296]SeePundaodayav.Comelec,616Phil.167(2009)andJalosjosv.Comelec,686Phil.563(2012).
[297]See:Sections4,5,6&8ofR.A.No.9189
[298] Sec. 68. Disqualifications. x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be

qualifiedtorunforanyelectiveofficeunderthiscode,unlesssaidpersonhaswaivedhisstatusaspermanentresidentorimmigrantofa
foreigncountryinaccordancewiththeresidencerequirementprovidedforintheelectionlaws.
[299]301J02434Phil.861(2002).
[300]Entitled"AnActToProvideForTheAcquisitionOfPhilippineCitizenshipByNaturalization,AndToRepealActsNumberedTwentyNine

HundredAndTwentySevenAndThirtyFourHundredandFortyEight",enactedonJune17,1939.
CANo.63,asworded,providesthattheprocedureforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbynaturalizationshallbeinaccordancewith
theprocedurefornaturalizationunderActNo.2927(orTheNaturalizationLaw,enactedonMarch26,1920),asamended.CANo.473,
however,repealedActNo.2927and3448,amending2927.
[301]Entitled"AnActMakingAdditionalProvisionsforNaturalization",enactedonJune16,1950.
[302]ANACTPROVIDINGFORTHEREPATRIATIONOFFILIPINOWOMENWHOHAVELOSTTHEIRPHILIPPINECITIZENSHIPBYMARRIAGE

TOALIENSANDOFNATURALBORNFILIPINOS.ApprovedonOctober23,1995.

PriortoRANo.8171,repatriationwasgovernedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.725,enactedonJune5,1975.Paragraph5ofPD
No. 725 provides that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (2) natural born
FilipinoswhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipmayrequirePhilippinecitizenshipthroughrepatriationbyapplyingwiththe
SpecialCommitteeonNaturalizationcreatedbyLetterofInstructionNo.270,and,iftheirapplicationsareapproved,takingthe
necessaryoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,afterwhichtheyshallbedeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippine
citizenship.TheCommissiononImmigrationandDeportationshallthereuponcanceltheircertificateofregistration."Notethat
therepatriationprocedureunderPDNo.725issimilartotherepatriationprocedureunderSection4ofCANo.63.

[303]SeeSection3ofRA9225.Itpertinentlyreads:

Section3.RetentionofPhilippineCitizenshipAnyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,naturalborncitizenshipby
reasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryareherebydeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupon
takingthefollowingoathofallegiancetotheRepublic:
xxxx
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
theirPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.[emphasessupplied]

[304]CANo.473providesthefollowingexceptions:(1)thequalificationsandspecialqualificationsprescribedunderCANo.473shallnot

berequiredand(2)theapplicantbe,amongothers,atleasttwentyoneyearsofageandshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesatleastsix
monthsbeforeheappliesfornaturalization.PerSection3ofCANo.63:

"The applicant must also: have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living and subscribe to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the
foreignauthority,stateorsovereigntyofwhichhewasacitizenorsubject."

Section7ofCANo.473.Itstatesinfull:

Sec. 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a
petitionintriplicate,accompaniedbytwophotographsofthepetitioner,settingforthhisnameandsurnamehispresentand
formerplacesofresidencehisoccupationtheplaceanddateofhisbirthwhethersingleormarriedandthefatherofchildren,
thename,age,birthplaceandresidenceofthewifeandofeachofthechildrentheapproximatedateofhisorherarrivalinthe
Philippines,thenameoftheportofdebarkation,and,ifheremembersit,thenameoftheshiponwhichhecameadeclaration
thathehasthequalificationsrequiredbythisAct,specifyingthesame,andthatheisnotdisqualifiedfornaturalizationunder
the provisions of this Act that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act and that he will reside
continuouslyinthePhilippinesfromthedateofthefilingofthepetitionuptothetimeofhisadmissiontoPhilippinecitizenship.
Thepetitionmustbesignedbytheapplicantinhisownhandwritingandbesupportedbytheaffidavitofatleasttwocredible
persons,statingthattheyarecitizensofthePhilippinesandpersonallyknowthepetitionertobearesidentofdiePhilippinesfor
theperiodoftimerequiredbythisActandapersonofgoodreputeandmorallyirreproachable,andthatsaidpetitionerhasin
theiropinionallthequalificationsnecessarytobecomeacitizenofthePhilippinesand,isnotinanywaydisqualifiedunderthe
provisionsofthisAct.Thepetitionshallalsosetforththenamesandpostofficeaddressesofsuchwitnessesasthepetitioner
maydesiretointroduceatthehearingofthecase.

Thecertificateofarrival,andthedeclarationofintentionmustbemadepartofthepetition.
SeeSection9ofCANo.473.Itreads:

Sec.9.Notificationandappearance.Immediatelyuponthefilingofapetition,itshallbethedutyoftheclerkofthecourtto
publishthesameatpetitioner'sexpense,onceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeks,intheOfficialGazette,andinoneofthe
newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said public and
conspicuousplaceinhisofficeorinthebuildingwheresaidofficeislocated,settingforthinsuchnoticethename,birthplace
and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the
petitionerproposestointroducesupportofhispetition,andthedateofthehearingofthepetition,whichhearingshallnotbe
heldwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthelastpublicationofthenotice.Theclerkshall,assoonaspossible,forwardcopiesof
thepetition,thesentence,thenaturalizationcertificate,andotherpertinentdatatotheDepartmentoftheinterior,theBureau
ofJustice,theprovincialInspectorofthePhilippineConstabularyoftheprovinceanddiejusticeofthepeaceofthemunicipality
whereinthepetitionerresides.

SeealsoSections1and2ofRANo.530amendingSections9and10ofCANo.473.Theyread:

SECTION I. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts
until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application
becomeexecutoryuntilaftertwoyearsfromitspromulgationandafterthecourt,onproperhearing,withtheattendanceofthe
SolicitorGeneralonhisrepresentative,issatisfied,andsofinds,thatduringtheinterveningtimetheapplicanthas(I)notleft
the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrarytoanyGovernmentannouncedpolicies.
SEC.2.Afterthefindingmentionedinsectionone,theorderofthecourtgrantingcitizenshipshallberegisteredandtheoath
providedbyexistinglawsshallbetakenbytheapplicant,whereupon,andnotbefore,hewillbeentitledtoalltheprivilegesof
aFilipinocitizen.

AndSection4ofCANo.473whichstates:
Sec.4.WhoaredisqualifiedThefollowingcannotbenaturalizedasPhilippinecitizens:

1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrinesopposingallorganizedgovernments
2.Personsdefendingorteachingthenecessityorproprietyofviolence,personalassault,orassassinationforthesuccessand
predominanceoftheirideas
3.Polygamistsorbelieversinthepracticeofpolygamy
4.Personsconvictedofcrimesinvolvingmoralturpitude
5.Personssufferingfrommentalalienationorincurablecontagiousdiseases
6.Personswho,duringtheperiodoftheirresidenceinthePhilippines,havenotmingledsociallywiththeFilipinos,orwhohave
notevincedasinceredesiretolearnandembracethecustoms,traditions,andidealsoftheFilipinos
7.CitizensorsubjectsofnationswithwhomtheUnitedStatesandthePhilippinesareatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwar
8.CitizensorsubjectsofaforeigncountryotherthantheUnitedStateswhoselawsdonotgrantFilipinostherighttobecome
naturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.

[305]G.R.No.L22041,May19,1966,17SCRA147.
[306]434Phil.861,873875(2002).
[307]434Phil.861,873(2002).
[308]596Phil.354,369370(2009).
[309]G.R.No.209835,September22,2015.
[310] Sec. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. Citizenship may be reacquired: (1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant

possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twentynine hundred and twentyseven (2) By
repatriationofdesertersoftheArmy,NavyorAirCorp:Provided,Thatawomanwholosthercitizenshipbyreasonofhermarriagetoan
alienmayberepatriatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisActaftertheterminationofthemaritalstatusand(3)Bydirectactof
theNationalAssembly.
[311]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.23andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,pp.2829.SeePoe'sU.S.passport,Annex"Mseries",

Exhibit"5"(ofTatadcase)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibit"5"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[312]R.A.6768,asamendedbyR.A.9174,Section2(a).
[313]Id.atSection3(c).

This visa is issued under the government's "Balikbayan" program instituted under the administration of the Department of
Tourism to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. in addition to the oneyear visafree
stay, the program also provides for a kabuhayan shopping privilege allowing taxexempt purchase of livelihood tools and
providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically selfreliant
members of society upon their return to the country. The program also intends to showcase competitive and outstanding
Filipinomadeproducts.
TheprogramalsoprovidestaxexemptmaximumpurchasesintheamountofUSOI,500,ortheequivalentinPhilippineand
othercurrency,atPhilippineGovernmentoperateddutyfreeshops,andexemptionfromTravelTax,providedthattheirstayin
thePhilippinesisoneyearorless.IftheirstayinthePhilippinesexceedsoneyear,Traveltaxwillapplytothem.

[314]Coquillav.Comelec,434Phil.861(2002).
[315] Bureau of Immigration, Visa Inquiry Temporary Visitor's Visa. Available at http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa

inQuiry/temporaryvisitorsvisa.
[316]Ibid.
[317]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.20andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.25.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"22"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "16" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[318]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.17andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.21.SeealsoAnnex"Mseries",Exhibits"7"to"7F"

(ofTatadcase)andExhibits"3"to"3F"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"7"to"7F"
(ofElamparocase),inG.R.No.221697.
[319]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.22.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"11"and"12"inG.R.

No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"5"and"6"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[320]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.24.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"18"(ofTatadcase)

Exhibit "12" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "18" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[321]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"13and14"(ofTatad

case),Exhibits"7"and"8"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries",Exhibits"13"and"14"(ofElamparo
case)inG.R.No.221697.
[322]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.19andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"17''(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "11" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[323]SeeAnnex"Mseries",Exhibit"6series"(ofTatadcase),Exhibit"2series"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700and

Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "2series" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697. See also petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16 and petition in
G.R.No.221698700,p.20.Also,seepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.2.Annex"Iseries",

Exhibits"6series","15",and"15A"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697Annex"Mseries",Exhibits"6series","15",and"15A"(of
Tatadcase),Exhibits"2series","9"and"9A"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700.
[324]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.18andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.23.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"16"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit "JO" (of Contreras Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698700 and Annex "Iseries", Exhibit "16" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[325]SeepetitioninG.R.No.221697,p.17andpetitioninG.R.No.221698700,p.22.Annex"Mseries",Exhibit"8"(ofTatadcase),

Exhibit"4"(ofContreras/Valdezcases)inG.R.No.221698700andAnnex"Iseries'',Exhibit"8"(ofElamparocase)inG.R.No.221697.
[326]"AnActtoDefineCondominium,EstablishRequirementsForItsCreation,AndGovernItsIncidents'',enactedonJune18,1966.

Section5ofRANo.4726reads:

Sec.5.Anytransferorconveyanceofaunitoranapartment,officeorstoreorotherspacetherein,shallincludethetransferor
conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the
condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the
ownersofseparateunitsascoownersthereof,nocondominiumunitthereinshallbeconveyedortransferredtopersonsother
than Filipino citizens. or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in
cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or
conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the
corporationwillcausethealieninterestinsuchcorporationtoexceedthelimitsimposedbyexistinglaws.

SeealsoHulstv.PRBuilders,Inc.,588Phil.23(2008).
[327]"AnActAmendingSectionFourAndSectionSixteenofRepublicActNumberedFourThousandSevenHundredTwentySix,Otherwise

KnownAsTheCondominiumAct'',approvedonFebruary23,1995.
[328]"ANACTTOPROMOTEFOREIGNINVESTMENTS,PRESCRIBETHEPROCEDURESFORREGISTERINGENTERPRISES!JOINGBUSINESS

INTHEPHILIPPINES,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES",enactedonMarch28,1996.
[329]SeeSection10ofRANo.7042,asamendedbyR.A.8179.
[330]SeeSection9(t)ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,ExecutiveOrdersNo.423(signedinJune1997)andExecutiveOrderNo.

285(signedinSeptember4,2000).

In 2011, the Bureau of Immigration records show that the Philippines had more than 26,000 foreign students enrolled in
various Philippine schools more than 7,000 of these are college enrollees while the rest were either in elementary and high
school or taking shortterm language courses (see http://globalnation.inquirer.net/978l/philippineshas26kforeignstudents
lasaccessedonFebruary12,2016).
See also The International Mobility of Students in Asia and the Pacific, published in 2013 by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization http://www.uis.unesco.org/Libraiy/Documents/internationalstudentmobilityasia
pacificeducation2013en.pdf (last accessed on February 12, 2016) and Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning
OverseasFilipinos
http://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/handbook/Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning Oversea s FilipinoschapterIV .pdf (last
accessedonFebruary12,2016).

[331]SeeSections25and28(8)oftheNIRC.
[332]SeeComelec'senbanc'sDecember23,2015resolutioninSPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC)and15139(DC),Annex"B"ofGRNos.

221698700(Tatadcase).
[333] In her Memorandum, Poe admitted to owning two (2) houses in the U.S. up to this day, one purchased in 1992 and the other in

2008.She,however,claimstonolongerresideinthem.Petitioner'sMemorandum,pp.278279.
[334]Seepage19oftheComelecenbanc'sDecember23,2015resolutioninSPANo.15001(DC)(Elamparocase),Annex"B"ofG.R.

No.221697.

DISSENTINGOPINION
DELCASTILLO,J.:

Apersonwhoaspirestooccupythehighestpositioninthelandmustobeythehighestlawoftheland.[1]
SincethesecondMondayofMayof1992andeverysixyearsthereafter,[2]theFilipinopeoplehavebeenexercisingtheirsacredrightto
choosetheleaderwhowouldsteerthecountrytowardsafuturethatisinaccordancewiththeaspirationsofthemajorityasexpressedin
thefundamentallawoftheland.AtstakeisthePresidency,thehighestpositionintheland.
ThePresidentwieldsavastarrayofpowerswhichincludes"controlofalltheexecutivedepartn1ents,bureausandoffices."[3]He/sheis
also the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the Philippines[4] and can "grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
finesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment,"[5]aswellasamnesty,subjecttotheconcurrenceofCongress.[6]Fortherestof
theworld,he/sheistherepresentationandtherepresentativeoftheFilipinopeople.
PetitionerMaryGraceNatividadPoeLlamanzares(petitioner)aspirestooccupytheexaltedpositionofthePresidentoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines so that on October 15, 2015, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (2015 CoC) attesting that she is a naturalborn Filipino
citizen and a resident of this country for 10 years and 11 months immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections. However, several
sectorswerenotconvincedofpetitioner'srepresentations,promptingthemtofilepetitionstodenyduecoursetoandcancelher2015CoC
andfordisqualification.
Thecases
Before us are petitioner's consolidated Petitions for Certiorari assailing the Commission on Elections' (Comelec) Resolutions which
cancelledher2015CoC.InGR.No.221697,thePetitionforCertiorar[7]assailstheSecondDivision'sDecember1,2015Resolution[8]and
the En banc's December 23, 2015 Resolution[9] in SPA No. 15001 (DC) which granted private respondent Estrella C. Elamparo's
(Elamparo)Petitionandcancelledpetitioner's2015CoCforPresident.InGR.Nos.221698700,thePetitionforCertiorari[10] assails the
FirstDivision'sDecember11,2015Resolution[11]andtheEnbanc'sDecember23,2015Resolution[12]whichgrantedprivaterespondents
FranciscoS.Tatad(Tatad),AntonioP.Contreras(Contreras)andAmadoD.Valdez's(Valdez)petitionsinSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.
15007(DC),andSPANo.15139(DC),respectively,andlikewisecancelledpetitioner's2015CoCforPresident.
FactualAntecedents
OnSeptember3,1968,petitioner,whowasthenstillaninfant,wasfoundabandonedinJaro,IloiloCity.[13]Herbiologicalparentswere
unknown. Five years later, petitioner was adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. In 1991, petitioner
graduatedfromBostonCollegeinMassachusetts,withadegreeofBachelorofArtsinPoliticalStudies.
On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the United States of
America(U.S.A.orU.S.)frombirth,attheSantuariodeSanJoseParishinSanJuan.[14]OnJuly29,1991,thecoupleleftthePhilippines,
settledintheU.S.,andstartedafamilythere.OnOctober18,2001,petitionerbecameanaturalizedU.S.citizen.[15]
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance[16] to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225[17](RA
9225).OnJuly18,2006,theBureauofImmigrationandDeportation(BID)issuedanOrder[18]grantingherpetitionforreacquisitionof
Filipinocitizenshipunderthesaidlaw.
OnAugust31,2006,petitionerregisteredasavoterinBarangaySta.Lucia,SanJuan.[19]Aftermorethanthreeyears,petitionersecured
aPhilippinepassportvaliduntilOctober12,2014.[20]
OnOctober6,2010,petitionerwasappointedasChairpersonoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoard(MTRCB).
OnOctober20,2010,petitionerexecutedanAffidavitofRenunciationofAllegiancetotheUnitedStatesofAmericaandRenunciationof
American Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation).[21] The following day, October 21, 2010, petitioner took her Oath of Office as MTRCB
ChairpersonbeforePresidentBenignoS.AquinoIII.[22]
OnJuly12,2011,petitionerexecutedadocumententitledOath/AffirmationofRenunciationofNationalityoftheUnitedStates[23]before
theU.S.ViceConsul.Thus,onDecember9,2011,thelatterissuedheraCertificateofLossofNationalityoftheUnitedStates.[24]
InabidforaSenateseat,petitionersecuredandaccomplishedaCoCforSenator[25]onSeptember27,2012(2012CoC).Tothequestion
"PERIODOFRESIDENCEINTHEPHILIPPINESBEFOREMAY13,2013,"sheansweredsixyearsandsixmonths.ThenonOctober2,2012,
petitionerfiledsaidCoCwiththeComelec.
PetitionerwonandwasproclaimedSenatorofthePhilippinesonMay16,2013.
InJune2015,NavotasRep.TobiasM.Tiangcopointedoutthroughthemediathatbasedonpetitioner'sentryinher2012CoC,shedoes
notmeetthe10yearresidencyrequirementforpurposesofthe2016presidentialelection.
Desirous of furthering her political career in the Philippines, and notwithstanding the looming issue on her period of residency in the
Philippines,petitionernextfocusedonthePresidencyandfiledherCoCthereforonOctober15,2015.
ThePetitionsbeforetheComelec:
1)SPANo.15001(DC)(ElamparoPetition,nowGR.No.221697)

On October 21, 2015, Elamparo filed before the Come lee a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.[26]
ElamparoassertedthatpetitionerfalselyrepresentedtotheFilipinopeoplethatshehadbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodof
10yearsand11monthsimmediatelypriortotheMay9,2016electionsandthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Elamparoadvanced
thefollowingargumentsinsupportofherpositionthatpetitionerisnotanaturalbornFilipino:
a)Underthe1935Constitutionwhichwasinforceatthetimeofpetitioner'sbirth,"thestatusofnaturalborncitizencouldbedetermined
only by descent from a known Filipino father or mother."[27] Since petitioner's biological parents were unknown, she could not
categoricallydeclarethatshedescendedfromFilipinoparents.
b)Petitioner'ssubsequentadoptionbyFilipinocitizensdidnotvestuponheranaturalbornstatus.Adoptionmerely"establishedajuridical
relationshipbetweenherandheradoptiveparents"[28]butdidnotconferuponherthecitizenshipofheradoptiveparents.[29]Moreover,
adoptionlawsarecivilinnaturetheydonotdetem1inecitizenshipwhichisapoliticalmatter.[30]
c)Nointernationalagreementortreatysupportspetitioner'sclaimofnaturalborncitizenship.
c1)The1930HagueConventiononCertainQuestionsRelatingtotheConflictofNationalityLawsprovidesthatStatelawsdeterminewho
areitsnationals.[31]
c2) Petitioner could not rely on the presumption provided in Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness that a
"foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State" is born to "parents possessing the nationality of that State" for the following
reasons:One,thePhilippinescouldnotbeconsideredasa"ContractingState"sinceitdidnotratifyoraccedetothe1961Conventionon
theReductionofStatelessness.[32]Two,evenontheassun1ptionthatthePhilippineswillratifythe1961ConventionontheReductionof
Statelessness, it will not have any retroactive application on the case of petitioner pursuant to Section 2, Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law on Treaties[33] and Section 12(3) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Three, while
admittedly, nonsignatories to international agreements may be bound by such agreements if such agreements are transformed into
customarylaws,[34]thepresumptionunderArticle2ofthe1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessnesshasnotyetripenedinto
customaryinternationallawastobindthePhilippines.[35]
c3)The1959UnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsoftheChildandthe1989ConventionontheRightsoftheChildhavenobinding
force.[36]Theprinciplestatedthereinthatachildisentitledtoanationalityismerely"anauthoritativestatement"withnocorresponding
"demandableright."[37]Inanycase,whatisconferredbythesedeclarationsisnationality,notnaturalbornstatus.Moreover,municipal
lawgovernsmattersofnationality.[38]
d) Mere presumption of naturalborn citizenship does not comply with the strict constitutional requirement.[39] No uncertainty on the
qualificationofthePresidentmustbeentertained.[40]
e)"Placeofbirthisnotarecognizedmeansofacquiringsuchcitizenship,muchlessareasontoclaimthatoneisanaturalbornFilipino."
[41]Petitionerhastheburdenofprovinghernaturalbornstatus.[42]

f)RA9225appliesonlytoformernaturalbornFilipinos.SincepetitionerisnotanaturalbornFilipino,thensheisnotqualifiedtoapplyfor
reacquisitionorretentionofcitizenshipunderRA9225.[43]
g)EvenassumingthatpetitionerisanaturalbornFilipino,shelostsuchstatusbybecominganaturalizedU.S.citizen.[44]Andassuming
thatshecouldavailherselfofthebenefitsofRA9225,herstatusasFilipinocitizenisconsidered"notfrombirth"butfromJuly18,2006
whentheBIDapprovedherapplicationforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.[45]
h)"WhensheappliedforreacquisitionofherPhilippinecitizenshipandtookheroathofallegiance,shehadtoperformanacttoacquire
herPhilippinecitizenship"[46]whichisanathemaorantitheticaltotheconceptofnaturalborncitizenship.
i)TheusebythepetitionerofherU.S.passportevenaftersherenouncedherAmericancitizenshipistantamounttorecantationofthe
renunciationofherU.S.citizenship[47]pursuanttotherulingsinMaquilingv.CommissiononElections[48]andAmadov.Commissionon
Elections.[49]DuringoralargumentsbeforetheSenateElectoralTribunal(SET),Atty.ManuelitoLunaarguedthattherecordsoftheU.S.
Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs showed that petitioner still used her U.S. passport in September 2011 or after her
renunciationofU.S.citizenship.
Asregardsresidency,Elamparoputforththat,atmost,petitioner'sresidencyinthePhilippinesisonlynineyearsand10months,orshort
oftwomonthstocomplywiththeresidencyrequirementforPresidency.Insupportofhercontention,shearguedthat:
a) Petitioner abandoned her domicile of origin in the Philippines when she became a naturalized U.S. citizen and established her new
domicileofchoiceintheU.S.[50]
b) Petitioner "did not go to the U.S. and be naturalized as a U.S. citizen to pursue any calling, profession or business" but with the
intention of starting a family there.[51] Thus, her trips back/visits to the Philippines prior to July 2006 (when she took the oath of
allegiancetothePhilippinesandappliedtoreacquireherPhilippinecitizenshipwiththeBID)shouldbeconsideredtemporaryinnatureand
foraspecificpurposeonly"[52]i.e.,tovisitfamilyandfriendsandnottoestablishanewdomicileorresidence.
c) Having established her domicile of choice in the U.S., the burden of proof rests upon petitioner to prove that she is abandoning her
domicileintheU.S.andestablishinganewdomicileinthePhilippines.[53]

d) Petitioner's status as a naturalized U.S. citizen and her continued use of her U.S. passport from 2006 to 2011 are indicative of her
intentiontoretainherdomicileintheU.S.[54]
e) Not being a naturalborn Filipino, petitioner is not eligible to apply for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
Consequently,shecouldnothaveestablishedherdomicileofchoiceinthePhilippines.[55]
f)EvenontheargumentthatpetitionerreacquiredherPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingtheoathofallegiance,itcannotbesaidthatshe
automaticallyregainedorreestablishedhernewdomicile,Atmost,whatshehadwastheoptiontochooseorestablishanewdomicile.[56]
Thus,theearliestdatethatshecouldhavereestablishedherlegalresidenceinthePhilippineswasonJuly18,2006whenshereacquired
her status as a Filipino citizen.[57] Reckoned from July 18, 2006, petitioner's residence in the country by May 2016 would only be nine
yearsand10months,ortwomonthsshyofthe10yearresidencyrequirementforpresidentialcandidates.[58]
g)PetitionerisestoppedfromdenyingthatherresidencyinthePhilippinespriortotheMay13,2013electionsissixyearsandsixmonths
asstatedinher2012senatorialCoC.[59]
h)Theperiodofresidencystatedinpetitioner's2012CoCcannotbeconsideredasanhonestmistake.[60]
2)SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC)and15139(DC),(theTatadPetition,ContrerasPetition,andValdezPetition,nowGR.
Nos.221698700)
Valdez and Contreras also filed petitions seeking to cancel or deny due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC while Tatad filed a petition for
disqualification.
Invoking Section 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,[61] Tatad, in his Petition, echoed most of Elamparo's arguments that petitioner
miserably lacked the residency and citizenship requirements. In addition, he contended that in case of conflict between international
conventions and treaties on one hand, and the Constitution on the other, the latter prevails. Moreover, since petitioner has no jus
sanguinis citizenship she could not be considered a naturalborn Filipino and would not be permitted to run for President.[62] Citing the
Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, he argued that any question relating to nationality must be resolved in
accordancewiththelawofthestate.[63]Healsopointedoutthatthe1930ProtocolinRelationtoCertainCaseofStatelessness,the1930
Hague Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, do not have binding effect.[64] He explained that international rules are at par only with
congressionalactsandcouldnotinanymannersupplantorprevailovertheConstitution.[65]
Anent the issue of residency, Tatad noted that in the 2012 senatorial CoC, petitioner's period of residence in the country immediately
beforetheMay13,2013electionsissixyearsandsixmonths.AddingtheperiodfromMay13,2013uptoMay9,2016,petitioner'speriod
ofresidenceinthePhilippineswouldonlybenineyearsandfivemonths,whichisshortofthe10yearrequirement.[66] Tatad likewise
allegedthatpetitioner'sintentiontoabandontheU.S.domicileandestablishanewdomicileinthecountrycouldnotbeinferredfromher
acts.Atmost,petitioner'svisitsherewereonlyforthepurposeofconsolingheradoptivemotherandparticipatinginthesettlementofthe
estateofheradoptivefathersinceherhusbandremainedintheU.S.duringthisperiod.Infact,petitionerrenouncedherU.S.citizenship
onlyonOctober20,2010,[67]orlongafterthedeathofheradoptivefather.
TatadmaintainedthatpetitionerisnotqualifiedtoavailherselfofRA9225becausesheisnotanaturalbornFilipino.Thereisnoshowing
thatshedescendedfromparentswhoareFilipinocitizens.[68]HefurtherpositedthattheOrderoftheBIDgrantingpetitioner'sapplication
forreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipwasnotsignedbyImmigrationCommissionerAlipioF.Fernandez,Jr.hence,itisnullandvoid.
[69]Finally,Tatadassertedthatpetitioner'stravelstotheU.S.afterrenouncingherU.S.citizenshipareequivalenttoarepudiationofher

earlierrenunciation.[70]
The Petition[71] filed by Contreras focused only on the failure of petitioner to comply with the residency requirement and her false
representationthatbyMay9,2016shewouldhaveresidedinthecountryfor10yearsand11months.[72]ForContreras,it"isablatant
attempttounderminetheruleoflawandtheConstitutionwhenonesubmitsacertificateofcandidacyfalselyclaimingthepossessionofa
qualificationthatisspecifiedintheConstitutionasarequirementtorunforPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines."[73]Accordingto
Contreras, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her domicile in the Philippines when she became a naturalized U.S. citizen. And, in
orderforhertohaveatleast10yearsofresidencyinthecountry,sheshouldhavereacquiredherPhilippinedomicileatthelatestbyMay
9, 2006. However, since she reacquired her Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006, petitioner failed to comply with the 10 year
residencyrequirement.HervisitsinthecountrybeforeJuly18,2006shouldnotinuretoherbenefitsinceatthattimeshewastraveling
notasaFilipinobutasaU.S.citizen.[74]Byhisreckoning,petitioner'sresidencyinthecountrybyMay9,2016wouldonlybenineyears,
ninemonthsand22days.[75]
ContreraspostulatedthathadpetitionerreallyintendedtoestablishanewdomicileinthePhilippinesandtoabandonherU.S.domicile,
sheshouldhaveappliedforanimmigrantstatusbeforetheBIDwhichwillinturnissueanImmigrantCertificateofResidence(ICR).[76]
Contreras noted that in her application to reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, petitioner did not indicate an ICR or an Alien
CertificateofRegistration,unlikeonthepartofherthreechildren,which"wouldhavebeenrelevantinformationxxxontheissueofher
residence."[77]
For his part, Valdez, in his Petition[78] to cancel or deny due course to petitioner's CoC, argued that since petitioner had to perform an
overt act to reacquire her citizenship, then she is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen as defined in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.[79]ValdezassertedthatitisnotpossibleforpetitionertoreacquireanaturalbornstatusonJuly18,2006sinceatthattime

shehaddualallegiancetothePhilippinesandtheU.S.whichisprohibitedunderArticleIV,Section5oftheConstitution.[80]Neitherdid
RA9225bestowanaturalbornstatusuponheratmost,shewas"only'deemed'nottohavelostherPhilippinecitizenship."[81]
Valdez also contended that petitioner lacked the residency requirement or misrepresented her period of residency. He pointed out that
petitionercitedvaryingdatesregardingtheestablishmentofherresidencyinthePhilippines.[82]Inher2015CoC,petitionerclaimedthat
by May 9, 2016 she would have resided in the country for a period of 10 years and 11 months. By simple mathematical computation,
petitionerwasclaimingthatshestartedresidinginthePhilippinesinJune2005.Instarkcontrast,petitionerstatedinher2012CoCthat
her residency in the country prior to May 13, 2013 is six years and six months, which means that she has been a resident of the
PhilippinesonlysinceNovember13,2006.[83]ForValdez,the"conflictingadmissionsxxx[petitioner]voluntarily,willingly,andknowingly
executed as to when she established her residency in the Philippines [demonstrate] a deliberate attempt on her part to mislead,
misinform,orhideafactthatwouldrenderherineligibleforthepositionofPresidentofthePhilippines."[84]
ValdezreckonedthatJuly18,2006wouldbetheearliestdatethatpetitionercouldhaveestablishedhernewdomicileofchoiceasthiswas
thetimeshereacquiredherPhilippinecitizenship.ValdezinsistedthatherstayinthePhilippinespriortoreacquiringPhilippinecitizenship
couldnotbefavorablyconsideredforpurposesoftheresidencyrequirement.[85]Heemphasizedthatatthattime,petitionerdidnoteven
secureapermanentresidentvisaconsequently,shecouldonlybeconsideredasaforeignertemporarilyresidinginthecountry.[86]He
elaboratedthatpetitioner'sreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipdidnotaffectherdomicilewhatpetitionerhadatthetimewasonlyan
optiontochangeorestablishanewdomicileofchoice.[87]
Valdezaverredthatpetitionercouldnotclaim"honestmistakemadeingoodfaith"[88]especially"whenonerunsforpublicofficeandfora
nationalpostxxx[as]naturalhumanexperienceandlogicdictatethatoneshouldbeverywellawareofthequalificationsrequiredfor
that position and whether x x x one possesses those qualifications. x x x More importantly, one is highly expected to give accurate
informationasregardshis/herqualifications."[89]
Finally, Valdez opined that petitioner failed to prove that she intended to permanently reside in the Philippines for a period of 10 years
priortotheMay9,2016elections.HavingalreadyabandonedherdomicileinthePhilippinesuponhernaturalizationasaU.S.citizen,it
can only be construed that her subsequent trips to the Philippines were temporary in nature. More importantly, petitioner's 2014
StatementofAssets,LiabilitiesandNetWorth(SALN)showedthatshestillmaintainstwohousesintheU.S.[90]whichsheboughtin1992
andin2008.
TheAnswersofPetitionerbeforetheComelec:
1)SPANo.15001(DC)(ElamparoPetition)
PetitionerclaimedthatElamparo'sPetitionfailedtostateacauseofactionforitdidnotaverthattherewasafalserepresentationinher
2015CoCamountingtoadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactthatwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligibleor
thatitwasintendedtodeceivetheelectorateasregardsthecandidate'squalifications.[91]Shealsopositedthattheburdenofproofrests
uponElamparotoshowthatherrepresentationsintheCoCarefalse.[92]Sheallegedthatthepronouncementinthe1967caseofPaav.
Chan[93]totheeffectthatthereisnopresumptionofPhilippinecitizenshiphadalreadybeensupersededbylaterrulings.[94]
Petitioner also assailed the jurisdiction of the Comelec. She claimed that it is the Department of Justice (DOJ) which has the primacy
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the June 18, 2006 Order of the BID granting her naturalborn status[95] and pending this
determination, the Comelec must refrain from ruling on whether she could avail herself of the benefits of RA 9225.[96] In addition, she
averredthattheElamparoPetitionisessentiallyoneforquowarrantosinceitseeksarulingonhereligibilityorlackofqualificationsand
thereforemustbelodgedwiththePresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET).However,sincethereisnoelectionyetandnowinnerhadbeen
proclaimed,thePetitionispremature.[97]
PetitionerassertedthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinobasedontheintentoftheframersofthe1935Constitution[98]andtreatiessuchas
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[99] and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right.[100] She
averred that although these treaties were not yet in force at the time of her birth, they could be given retroactive application.[101] In
addition,generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawandcustomaryinternationallawsupportherthesisthatsheisanaturalborn
Filipino. She also cited the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws[102] and the 1961
ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness.[103]
Petitionerinsistedthat"thenaturalborncitizenshipofapersonmaybeestablishedusingpresumptions."[104]Shemaintainedthat"there
isnothingunconstitutionalaboutpresumingthat[she]wasbornofFilipinosorthatsheisanaturalbornFilipino,eventhoughshecannot,
asyet,provethatsheisrelatedbybloodtocitizensofthePhilippines."[105] Petitioner claimed that by the official acts of the Philippine
Government,shehadbeenrepeatedlyandconsistentlyrecognizedasanaturalbornFilipinotherebygivingrisetothepresumptionthat
sheisanaturalbornFilipino.[106]Moreover,shesurmisedthatsinceshewasnotnaturalized,thensheisnaturalborn.[107]
PetitionerconcededthatsheabandonedherPhilippinecitizenshipbybecominganaturalizedU.S.citizenonOctober18,2001.However,
she claimed that she reacquired her naturalborn Filipino status by virtue of RA 9225[108] particularly when she took her oath of
allegiance[109]onJuly7,2006.Thereafter,sherenouncedherU.S.citizenship.Sheinsistedthatsheneverrepudiatedtherenunciationof
herU.S.citizenship.[110]
Asregardstheissueofresidency,petitionermaintainedthatbyMay9,2016,shewouldhaveresidedinthePhilippinesfor10yearsand
11months.SheassertedthatsinceMay24,2005[111]shehadbeenbodilypresentinthePhilippinesandthathersubsequentacts,which

"mustbeviewed'collectively'andnot'separately'orinisolation,"[112]wereindicativeofherintentiontopermanentlystayinthecountry.
[113] Otherwise stated, on May 24, 2005, she left the U.S. for good[114] without intention of returning there.[115] She opined that her

occasionaltripstoU.S.didnotnegateherintenttoresidepermanentlyinthePhilippines.[116]NeitherwouldpossessionofaU.S.passport
beconsideredindicativeofherintenttoreturntotheU.S.SheexplainedthatshekeptherU.S.passport"inthemeantimebecauseitwas
plainlyconvenientfortravelpurposes."[117]
PetitioneralsocontendedthatshecouldlegallyestablishherdomicileinthePhilippinesevenbeforereacquiringherPhilippinecitizenship.
[118]Shesurmisedthatdomicileorresidencerequiredonlyphysicalpresenceandintent,andnotnecessarilyFilipinocitizenship.[119]She

posited that "residency is independent of, or not dependent on, citizenship."[120] In fact, RA 9225 by which she reacquired her Filipino
citizenship"treatscitizenshipindependentlyofresidence."[121]ShearguedthatifonlyFilipinoscouldestablishresidenceinthePhilippines,
"thennoalienwouldeverqualifytobenaturalizedasaFilipino,foraliensmustberesidentsbeforetheycanbenaturalized."[122]
Finally,petitioneradmittedthatshecommittedamistake,albeitanhonestoneandingoodfaith,whensheclaimedinher2012senatorial
CoCthatherperiodofresidencewassixyearsandsixmonths.[123]Sheinsistedthatdespitesaidmistake,shestillcompliedwiththetwo
yearresidencyrequirementforsenatorialcandidatesthatshemisinterpretedthephrase"periodofresidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay
13,2013"andthatshereckonedherperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesfromMarchApril2006asthiswasthetimethatherfamilyhad
substantiallywrappeduptheiraffairsintheU.S.[124]SheclaimedthatherperiodofresidenceshouldbereckonedfromMay24,2005,as
statedinher2015presidentialCoC.[125]Sheassertedthatsheisnotestoppedfromcorrectinghermistake,whichinfactshedidwhen
sheexecutedher2015CoC.[126]
2)SPANo.15002(DC)(TatadPetition)
Petitioner'sAnswer[127]toTatad'sPetitionisalmostarestatementoftheargumentssheraisedinherAnswertotheElamparoPetition.In
addition, she averred that although Tatad's Petition was filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code[128] (OEC) in relation to
Section 1, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules, it failed to allege grounds for disqualification as enumerated thereunder.[129] Instead, it cited
lack of citizenship and residency requirements which are not grounds for a petition filed under Section 68 of the OEC. According to
petitioner,ifTatad'sPetitionweretobeconsideredaquowarrantopetition,itshouldbefiledwiththePETandonlyifpetitioner"iselected
andproclaimedPresident,andnotbeforethen."[130]Assuch,theTatadPetitionmustbedismissedforfailuretostateacauseofaction.
[131] Moreover, the Tatad Petition could not be considered as a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC as it did not allege as

groundmaterialmisrepresentationintheCoCneitherdiditprayforthecancellationofordenialofduecoursetopetitioner'sCoC.[132]
3)SPANo.15139(DC)ValdezPetition
Likewise,petitioner'sAnswer[133] to the Petition of Valdez repleads the arguments in her Answer to the Elamparo Petition. At the same
time,shestressedthatconsideringthather"representationinher[CoC]onhercitizenshipisbasedonprevailinglawandjurisprudenceon
theeffectsofrepatriationand[RA9225]xxxsaidrepresentationinher[CoC]cannotbeconsidered'false."'[134]Asregardstheissueof
residency,particularlyonValdez'spostulationthatpetitioner'speriodofresidencemustbecountedonlyfromOctober20,2010orupon
renunciationofherU.S.citizenship,petitionercounteredthatsuchargument"wouldbetantamounttoaddingafourthrequisite"[135]in
establishing a new domicile of choice, that is, possession of permanent resident visa/possession of Philippine citizenship and/or prior
renunciationofU.S.citizenship.[136]PetitionerreiteratedthatshecouldlegallyreestablishherPhilippinedomicileevenbeforerenouncing
herU.S.citizenshipin2010.[137]AsregardsValdez'sallegationthatpetitionerstillmaintainstwohousesintheU.S.(aftershetookher
oath of allegiance to the Philippines, and even purchased one of the houses in 2008 after she took her oath in 2006, and after they
supposedlysoldtheirfamilyhomeintheU.S.in2006),petitionercouchedherdenialasfollows:

2.13.Theallegationinparagraph98ofthePetitionisDENIEDinsofarasitismadetoappearthatRespondent"resides"inthe2
housesmentionedinsaidparagraph.ThetruthisthatRespondentdoesnot"reside"inthesehouses,butinherfamilyhomein
CorinthianHills,QuezonCity(whereshehaslivedwithherfamilyforalmostadecade).[138]

4)SPANo.15007(DC)(ContrerasPetition)
Petitioner's Answer[139] to the Petition filed by Contreras is likewise a reiteration of her contentions in the Answer she filed to the
ElamparoPetition.Shemaintainedthatshedidnotcommitanymaterialmisrepresentationinher2015CoCwhenshestatedthatbyMay
9,2016,shewouldhaveresidedinthePhilippinesfor10yearsand11months.[140]Shealsoaverredthatshecouldlegallyreestablishher
domicileinthePhilippinesevenbeforeshereacquiredhernaturalborncitizenship.[141]
RulingsoftheCommissiononElections
A.SPANo.15001(DC)ElamparoPetition
On December 1, 2015, the Second Division of the Comelec issued its Resolution[142] granting Elamparo's Petition and cancelling
petitioner's 2015 CoC. It held that petitioner's representations in her CoC with regard to her citizenship and residency are material
becausetheypertaintoqualificationsforanelectiveoffice.[143]Next,itruledthatpetitioner'srepresentationthatshewouldhaveresided
inthePhilippinesfor10yearsand11monthsimmediatelyprecedingtheMay9,2016electionsisfalsevisavistheadmissionshemade
inthe2012CoCthatherresidenceinthePhilippinespriortoMay13,2013wasonlysixyearsandsixmonths.Itcharacterizedpetitioner's
claimofhonestmistakeasselfserving.Besides,therewasnoshowingofanyattempttocorrecttheallegedhonestmistake.TheSecond

Divisionalsonotedthattheearliestpointfromwhichtoreckonpetitioner'sresidencywouldbeonJuly18,2006whentheBIDgrantedher
applicationforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipunderRA9225.Thus,herperiodofresidencepriortoMay2016wouldonlybenine
years and 10 months, or two months short of the required period of residence. The Second Division opined that prior to July 2006,
petitionerwasanalienwithoutanyrighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveasourimmigrationlawsmayhaveallowedhertostayasavisitor
orasaresidentalien.[144]
TheComelec'sSecondDivisionrejectedpetitioner'sclaimthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Itheldthattheprovisionsofthe1935
Constitution on citizenship clearly showed that only children born of Filipino fathers are considered n.atu. ralb.orn. As such, the
representation in the 2015 CoC that she is a naturalborn Filipino is false.[145] The Second Division also ruled that as a welleducated
Senator, petitioner ought to know that she is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen since our country has consistently adhered to the jus
sanguinis principle.[146] It likewise rejected petitioner's argument that the members of the 1934 Constitutional Convention intended to
include children of unknown parents as naturalborn citizens, reasoning out that a critical reading of the entire records of the 1934
ConstitutionalConventiondisclosesnosuchintent.[147]Italsogaveshortshrifttopetitioner'sinvocationofinternationallaw,particularly
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,the1961ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness,andthe1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,because
thePhilippinesisnotasignatorytheretobesides,theseinternationallaws/conventionsdonotcategoricallystatethatchildrenofunknown
parentsmustbecategorizedasnaturalborn.Furthermore,evenassumingthattheseconventionsortreatiesclassifiedthesechildrenas
naturalborn,thesamecouldnotsupplantoraltertheprovisionsofthe1935Constitutiononcitizenship.[148]
TheComelec'sSecondDivisionfoundthatpetitionerdeliberatelyattemptedtomislead,misinform,orhideafact,whenshedeclaredinher
2015CoCthatherperiodofresidencyimmediatelypriortoMay9,2016wouldbe10yearsand11months.[149]However,asregardsher
citizenship, it ruled that there was no conclusive evidence of any deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the
electorate.Itratiocinatedthatthecitizenshipissueregardingfoundlingsisoneoffirstimpressionandthuspetitionercouldbepresumedto
haveactedingoodfaithinmakingsuchadeclaration.[150]
BothpetitionerandElamparomovedforreconsideration.WhilepetitionerprayedforacompletereversaloftheComelec'sSecondDivision
ruling, Elamparo prayed for partial reconsideration,[151] that is, for the Comelec to pronounce petitioner as likewise guilty of
misrepresentinghercitizenshipstatus.Shepointedoutthatthereisapatternofmisrepresentationonthepartofpetitionerregardingher
citizenship.Sheclaimedthatinthreecertificatesoftitle[152]issuedpriortoJuly2006,petitionerdeclaredthatshewasaFilipinowhenin
factshewasnotand,thatinherPetitionforRetentionand/orReacquisitionofPhilippineCitizenshipUnderRA9225,petitioneralsofalsely
representedthatshe"isaformernaturalbornPhilippinecitizenbornxxxtoRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,aFilipinocitizenandJesusaSonora
Poe,aFilipinocitizen."
On December 23, 2015, the Comelec En Banc issued its Resolution[153] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granting
Elamparo'smotionforpartialreconsideration.Accordingly,itdeclaredthatpetitionerislikewiseguiltyofmisrepresentinghercitizenshipin
her2015CoC,viz.:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theVerifiedMotionforReconsiderationof[petitioner]isherebyDENIEDandtheMotionfor
PartialReconsiderationof[Elamparo]isherebyGRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution dated 1 December 2015 of the COMELEC Second Division is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. [Petitioner's] Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 9 May 2016 National, Local and ARMM Elections
containsmaterialmisrepresentationsastobothhercitizenshipandresidency.
THEREFORE, the Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 9 May 2016 National, Local and ARMM elections filed by
[petitioner]MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoeLlamanzaresisherebyCANCELLED.
FURTHER,theUrgentMotiontoExcludeof[Elamparo]isherebyDENIED.
SOORDERED.[154]

TheComelecEnBancdebunkedpetitioner'sallegationinhermotionforreconsiderationthattheSecondDivisionbaseditsResolutionon
the2012CoCalone.ItclarifiedthattheSecondDivision,muchliketrialcourts,isnotobligedtoitemizealltheevidencepresentedbythe
parties, but only that it should duly evaluate such evidence.[155] In any event, the Comelec En Banc again scrutinized the evidence
presented by the petitioner and concluded that they all pertained to events that transpired before July 2006,[156] or prior to her
reacquisitionofherPhilippinecitizenship.Thus,thesamehadnoprobativevalueinlightofsettledjurisprudencethat"theearliestpossible
datethatpetitionercouldreestablishherresidenceinthePhilippinesiswhenshereacquiredherFilipinocitizenship[in]July2006."[157]
TheComelecEnBancheldthatpetitioner'sstatementinher2012CoCwasproperlyconsideredasanadmissionagainstinterestandbeing
a notarial document is presumed to be regular.[158] It also held that the burden rests upon petitioner to prove that the 2015 CoC
containeduuestatementsandthatthedeclarationsmadeinthe2012CoCwerenotdoneinbadfaith.[159]
TheComelecEnBancwasnotconvincedthatpetitioner"statedtruthfullyherperiodofresidenceinthe[2015]CoC"andthat"suchfalse
statement was made without a deliberate attempt to mislead."[160] It considered petitioner's socalled public acknowledgment of her
mistakesascontrivedsincetheyweredeliveredatthetimewhenthepossibilityofherrunningforPresidentwasalreadyamatterofpublic
knowledge.[161]TheComelecEnBancheldthat:

Indeed,thisCommissionfindsithardtobelievethatawomanaswelleducatedas[petitioner],whowasthenalreadyahigh
ranking public official with, no doubt, a competent staff and a band of legal advisers, and who is not herself entirely
unacquaintedwithPhilippinepoliticsbeingthedaughterofaformerhighprofilepresidentialaspirant,wouldnotknowhowto
correctlyfillup[sic]aproformaCOCin2013.Wearenotconvincedthatthesubjectentrythereinwas[an]honestmistake.
[162]

On the issue of citizenship, the Comelec EnBanc ruled that petitioner cannot rely on presumptions to prove her status as naturalborn
citizen.[163] It concurred with the Second Division that the cited international laws/conventions have no binding force.[164] It also held
thatitisnotboundbytheNovember17,2015DecisionoftheSETinaquowarrantoproceedingquestioningpetitioner'squalificationasa
SenatorwhereshewasdeclaredasanaturalbornFilipino.TheComelecEnBancratiocinatedthatitisanindependentconstitutionalbody
whichdoesnottakeitsbearingsfromtheSEToranyotheragencyofthegovernmentandthatinanycase,theSET'sDecisionhasbeen
elevatedtoandisstillpendingwiththisCourt.[165]
Inaddition,theComelecEnBanclentcredencetoElamparo'sclaimthatthereissubstantialevidence,borneoutbypublicdocuments,
showingpetitioner'spatternofmisrepresentationasregardshercitizenship.[166]TheComelecEnBancopinedthatpetitioner'seducational
attainment and other prevailing circumstances, coupled with the simplicity and clarity of the terms of the Constitution, lead to no other
conclusion than that she made the false material representation in her 2015 CoC to mislead the electorate into thinking that she is a
FilipinoandeligibletorunforPresident.[167]Thus,theComelecEnBancmodifiedtheResolutionoftheSecondDivisionbyholdingthat
petitionercommittedmaterialfalserepresentationinhercitizenshipaswell.
B.OntheTatad,Contreras,andValdezPetitions
TheComelec'sFirstDivision,initsDecember11,2015Resolution,[168]arrivedatthesameconclusionthatpetitionerfalselyrepresented
hercitizenshipandperiodofresidency.Henceitorderedthecancellationofpetitioner's2015CoC.Apartfromtheratiocinationssimilarto
thosemadeintheresolutionofElamparo'sPetition,theComelec'sFirstDivisionmadesomeadditionalpoints.
On the procedural aspect, the Comelec 's First Division held that although the Petition of Tatad was denominated as a petition for
disqualification, it is not barred from taking cognizance of the same since it "impugns the citizenship and residency of [petitioner], and
therefore generally questions the truthfulness of her CoC stating that she has the qualification and eligibility to run for and be elected
President x x x."[169] And since the said Petition raised proper grounds for cancellation of a CoC under Section 1,[170] Rule 23 of the
ComelecRulesofProcedure,itfallswithintheComelec'sjurisdictionpursuanttoSection78oftheOEC.
AstotheComelec'sjurisdictionoverthequestionedcitizenship,theComelec'sFirstDivisionheldthatitisnotboundbytheBIDOrder
otherwise,itwouldbedeprivedofitsconstitutionallygrantedpowertoinquireintotheaspiringcandidate'squalificationsandtodetermine
whetherthereiscommissionofmaterialmisrepresentation.[171]
Lastly,theComelec'sFirstDivisionthumbeddownpetitioner'sclain1sthatthepetitionsareprematureandthattheissuesraisedtherein
are appropriate in a quo warranto proceeding. The Comelec's First Division pointed out that the petitions raised the issue of material
misrepresentation[172]italsodeclaredthatpetitioner'sCoCisriddledwithinconsistencieswithregardtoherperiodofresidency,whichis
indicative of her deliberate attempt to mislead and that the Comelec has Jurisdiction over the petitions since they were filed before
proclamation.[173]
Onthesubstantiveaspect,theComelec'sFirstDivision,withregardtopetitioner'scitizenshipstatus,heldthatthosepersonswhoarenot'
includedintheenumerationofFilipinocitizensinthe1935Constitution,suchaspetitioner,shouldnotbeconsideredasFilipinocitizens.
[174]Itopinedthat"[e]xtendingitsapplicationtothosewhoarenotexpresslyincludedintheenumerationanddefinitionofnaturalborn

citizensisadisservicetotheruleoflawandanaffronttotheConstitution."[175]Itruledthatone'scitizenshipmustnotbeanchoredon
merepresumptionsandthatanydoubtthereonmustberesolvedagainsttheclaimantwhobearstheburdenofproof.[176]
TheComelec'sFirstDivisionalsoheldthatnointernationallawsupportspetitioner'sclaimofnaturalborncitizenship.[177]Inanyevent,
thestatusofinternationallawsisequivalenttooratparwithlegislativeenactmentsonlyandcouldnotinanymannersupplantorprevail
over the Constitution.[178] Neither can petitioner find solace in generally accepted principles of international law and customary
internationallawasthereisnoshowingthatrecognitionofpersonswithunknownparentageasnaturalborncitizensofthecountrywhere
they are found has become established, widespread and consistently practiced among states.[179] The Comelec's First Division posited
that, if at all, persons with no known parents may be considered Filipino citizens, but not naturalborn Filipino citizens.[180] Ergo,
petitionercouldnothavevalidlyavailedofthebenefitsofrepatriationunderRA9225.Evenontheassumptionthatsheisanaturalborn
Filipino citizen, it could not be said that she reacquired such status by virtue of RA 9225 what she reacquired was merely Philippine
citizenship,notherpurportednaturalbornstatus.[181]
As regards petitioner's residency, the Comelec's First Division pointed out that petitioner can only start counting her residency, at the
earliest, from July 2006 when she reacquired her Philippine citizenship and that from that point, her intent to permanently reside here
becamemanifestonlywhensheregisteredasavoterofBarangaySta.Lucia,SanJuanCityonAugust31,2006.Hence,sheisdeemedto
havereestablishedherPhilippinedomicileonlyfromsaiddate.[182]
The Comelec En Banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[183] and affirmed the First Division in a Resolution[184] dated
December23,2015.
AsidefromupholdingthereasonsunderlyingtheComelec'sFirstDivision'sResolution,theComelecEnBancstressedthatassuming,for
the sake of argument, that petitioner may invoke the presumption that she is a naturalborn citizen, establishing this presumption by

solid,incontrovertibleevidenceisaburdenthatshiftedtoherwhensheadmittedthatshedoesnotknowwhoherbiologicalparentsare.
[185]

ThedispositiveportionoftheComelecEnBancResolutionintheTatad,ContrerasandValdezPetitionsreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for
ReconsiderationofSENATORMARYGRACENATNIDADSONORAPOELLAMANZARES.TheResolutiondated11December2015
oftheCommissionFirstDivisionisaffirmed.
SOORDERED.[186]

Hence, these Petitions for Certiorari brought via Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[187] In both Petitions, petitioner
"seekstonullify,forhavingbeenissuedwithoutjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction"
[188]theassailedComelecResolutions.

OnDecember28,2015,thisCourtissuedTemporaryRestrainingOrders[189]enjoiningtheComelecfromcancellingpetitioner's2015CoC
duetotimeconstraintsbeforethesepetitionscouldberesolvedandsoasnottorenderthesamemootandacademicshouldthisCourt
ruleinpetitioner'sfavor.Then,inaResolution[190]datedJanuary12,2016,thepetitionswereconsolidated.
IfindthattheComelecdidnotgravelyabuseitsdiscretionorexerciseitsjudgmentinawhimsicalorcapriciousmannerastoamountto
lackorexcessofjurisdictioninorderingthecancellationofanddenyingduecoursetopetitioner's2015CoC.
ThepowerofthisCourttoreviewthe
assailedResolutionsislimitedtothe
determinationofwhethertheComelec
committedgraveabuseofdiscretion
theburdenliesonthepetitionerto
indubitablyshowthattheComelec
whimsicallyorcapriciouslyexercised
itsjudgmentorwas"sogrossly
unreasonable"astoexceedthelimits
ofitsjurisdictionintheappreciation
andevaluationoftheevidence.
ItbearsstressingattheoutsetthatthesepetitionswerebroughtbeforethisCourtviaRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
Therefore, as held in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, [191] this Court's review power is based on a very limited ground the
jurisdictionalissueofwhethertheComelecactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackorexcessofjurisdiction.
WeexplainedinMitrathat:

As a concept, 'grave abuse of discretion' defies exact definition generally, it refers to 'capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction'theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasion
ofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethe
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enoughitmustbegrave.Wehaveheld,too,thattheuseofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissueissufficient
totaintadecisionmaker'sactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Closelyrelatedwiththelimitedfocusofthepresentpetitionisthecondition,underSection5,Rule64oftheRulesofCourt,
thatfindingsoffactoftheCOMELEC,supportedbysubstantialevidence,shallbefinalandnonreviewable.Substantialevidence
isthatdegreeofevidencethatareasonablemindmightaccepttosupportaconclusion.
In the light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarilyreviewinacertiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciationandevaluationofevidence.AnymisstepbytheCOMELECinthisregardgenerallyinvolvesanerrorofjudgment,
notofjurisdiction.
Inexceptionalcases,however,whentheCOMELEC'sactionontheappreciationandevaluationofevidenceoverstepsthelimits
of its jurisdiction to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
inter1vene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgmenttooneofjurisdiction.[192]

In fine, there is grave abuse of discretion when the exercise of judgment is capricious, whimsical, despotic or arbitrary, engendered by
reasonofpassionandhostility.Also,theabuseofdiscretionmustbesogrossandsopatentastoamounttoanevasionofpositivedutyor
virtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw.
InSabili v. Commission on Elections, [193] this Court spoke, through Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, that there is an error of

jurisdictionwhentheComelec'sappreciationandevaluationofevidenceissogrosslyunreasonable.[194]
Pursuantthereto,itisincumbentuponpetitionertoclearlydemonstrateviathesepetitionsthattheComelecwassogrosslyunreasonable
intheappreciationandevaluationofthepiecesofevidencesubmittedthatitoversteppedthelimitsofitsjurisdiction.
Inshort,petitionermustsatisfactorilyhurdlethishighbarsetinSabiliandcompanioncasesinorderforthepetitionstobegranted.
In these petitions, the Comelec found that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her 2015 CoC that her
period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 is 10 years, 11 months and that she is a naturalborn Filipino
citizen. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that her evidence, which the Comelec allegedly disregarded, negates any false material
representationonherpart.
Butfirstoff,theproceduralquestions.
I.PROCEDURALISSUES
Therespectivepetitionsfiled
byrespondentswiththeComelecwere
properlycharacterizedaspetitions
forcancellationand/ordenialofdue
coursetopetitioner's2015CoC
Section2(1),ArticleIX(C)ofthe1987ConstitutionvestsupontheComelecthepowerandfunctionto"[e]nforceandadministeralllaws
andregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,andrecall."Thisconstitutionalgrantofpoweris
echoedinSection52oftheOECwhichemphasizesthattheComelechas"exclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofall
lawsrelativetotheconductofelections."Also,inBedolv.CommissiononElections, [195]thisCourtexplainedthattheComelec'squasi
judicialfunctionspertaintoitspower"toresolvecontroversiesarisingfromtheenforcementofelectionlaws,andtobethesolejudgeof
allpreproclamationcontroversiesxxx.[196]
Inlinewiththispower,Section78[197]oftheOEC,inrelationtoSection74[198]thereof,providesforamechanismforthecancellationor
denialofduecoursetoaCoCbasedontheexclusivegroundofmaterialmisrepresentation.Themisrepresentationmustrefertoamaterial
fact,suchasone'scitizenshiporresidence.[199]
Tobesufficient,aSection78petitionmustcontainthefollowingultimatefacts:"(1)thecandidatemadearepresentationinhiscertificate
(2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the
electivepositionforwhichhefiledhiscertificate)and(3)thecandidatemadethefalserepresentationwiththeintentiontodeceivethe
electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
renderhimineligible."[200]
I find that the Petitions filed by Elamparo, Contreras, and Valdez with the Comelec distinctly and sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts
constituting the cause/s of action for a Section 78 petition.[201] The Petitions of Elamparo and Valdez both alleged that petitioner made
materialmisrepresentationsinherCoCinstatingthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizenandthatsheisaresidentofthePhilippinesfor
atleast10years.ThePetitionofContrerasallegedthesamecommissionbypetitionerofmaterialmisrepresentationwithrespecttoher
periodofresidency.Allthreepetitionssoughtthecancellationordenialofduecourseto
petitioner's 2015 CoC based on the said material misrepresentations which were allegedly made with the intention to deceive the
electorateastoherqualificationsforPresident.
With respect to Tatad's Petition, petitioner points out that the same was fatally infirm because while captioned as a "Petition for
Disqualification"underSection68oftheOECinrelationtoRule25oftheComelecRules,theallegationsthereindidnotmakeoutacase
fordisqualification.PetitionerpositsthatTatadclearlyresortedtoawrongremedy,hence,theComelecshouldhavedismissedhispetition
outrightandshouldnothavetakencognizanceofitasapetitionforcancellationordenialofduecoursetoaCoC.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, I believe that the Comelec acted correctly in not outrightly dismissing Tatacl's Petition. In Spouses
Munsaludv.NationalHousingAuthority,[202]thisCourtheldthatthedismissalofacomplaint"shouldnotbebasedonthetitleorcaption,
especiallywhentheallegationsofthepleadingsupportanaction."[203]"Thecaptionofthepleadingshouldnotbethegoverningfactor,
but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the
courts[ortribunal]mayneverthelessgranttheproperreliefasmaybewarrantedbythefactsallegedinthecomplaintandtheevidence
introduced."[204]Here,IagreewiththeComelecthattheessentialfactsallegedbyTatadinhisPetitiondo.reallyestablishaclearcase
forthecancellationofordenialofduecoursetopetitioner's2015COC.Hence,theComelecproperlytreatedthesameasaSection78
petition.
InFerminv.CommissiononElections,[205]thisCourtdeclaredapetitionfordisqualificationfiledwiththeComelecasoneforcancellation
of or denial of due course to therein petitioner Mike A. Fermin's CoC. This was after it found that although captioned as a petition for
disqualification,theallegationscontainedthereinmadeoutacaseforcancellationand/ordenialofduecoursetoaCoCunderSection78
oftheOEC.
Anent the contention that the Comelec lacks jurisdiction over candidates for national positions, suffice it to state that Section 78 of the
OEC does not distinguish between CoCs of candidates running for local and those running for national positions. It simply mentions
"certificate of candidacy." Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus when the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish.Thisisabasicruleinstatutoryconstructionthatisapplicableinthesecases.Hence,theComelechasthepowertodetermine

iftheCoCofcandidates,whetherrunningforalocalorforanationalposition,containsfalsematerialrepresentation.Inotherwords,any
person may avail himself/herself of Section 78 of the OEC to assail the CoC of candidates regardless of the position for which they are
aspiring.
Petitionerfurtherarguesthattheissuesraisedbyrespondentsintheirpetitionsproperlypertaintoaquowarrantoproceedingwhichcan
onlybeinitiatedaftersheshouldhavewontheelectionforandproclaimedasPresident.
ThisCourtinFerminhadalreadyexplained,viz:

Lestitbemisunderstood,thedenialofduecoursetoorthecancellationoftheCoCisnotbasedonthelackofqualificationsbut
onafindingthatthecandidatemadeamaterialrepresentationthatisfalse,whichmayrelatetothequalificationsrequiredof
thepublicofficehe/sheisrunningfor.Itisnotedthatthecandidatestatesinhis/herCoCthathe/sheiseligiblefortheoffice
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false,theCOMELEC,followingthelaw,isempoweredtodenyduecoursetoorcancelsuchcertificate.Indeed,theCourtbas
alreadylikenedaproceedingunderSection78toaquowarrantoproceedingunderSection253oftheOECsince
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
"Section78"petitionisfiledbeforeproclamation,whileapetitionforquowarrantoisfiledafterproclamationof
thewinningcandidate.[206](Emphasissupplied.Italicsintheoriginal.)

WhileitisadmittedthatthereisasimilaritybetweenapetitionunderSection78oftheOECandaquowarrantoproceedinginthatthey
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, what sets them apart is the time when the action is filed, that is, before or
afteranelectionandproclamation.Astheelectionsubjectofthesepetitionsisyettobeheld,therecanbenodoubtthattheissuesraised
byrespondentswereproperlysetforthintheirrespectivepetitionsforcancellationand/ordenialofduecoursetopetitioner'sCoC.
Therefore, the Comelec was not so grossly unreasonable that it exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction when it duly characterized the
petitionsasonesforcancellationand/ordeniaiofduecoursetopetitioner's2015CoC.Indeed,inthesecasestheComelecdidnotexercise
its judgment in a whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, or despotic manner. Othe1wise stated, petitioner failed to show that the Comelec
committedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninholdingthatthepetitionsbeforeitareforcancellation
and/ordenialofduecoursetopetitioner's2015CoC.
TheComelecdidnotusurpthe
jurisdictionofthePresidential
ElectoralTribunal.
Apropostotheabovediscussionispetitioner'sargumentthattheComelecusurpedthePET'sjurisdiction.
Asheretoforestated,apetitionunderSection78seekstocancelacandidate'sCoCbeforetherehasbeenanelectionandproclamation.
SuchapetitioniswithintheComelec'sjurisdictionasitis''thesolejudgeofallpreproclamationcontroversies."[207]
Ontheotherhand,thePETis"thesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVice
PresidentofthePhilippines."[208]Particularly,thePEThasjurisdictionoveranelectioncontestinitiatedthroughanelectionprotestora
petitionforquowarrantoagainstthePresidentorVicePresident.[209]ThePET'sadjudicativepowerscomeintoplayafterthePresidentor
theVicePresidentconcernedhadbeenelectedandproclaimed.UnderthePETRulesanelectionprotestmaybefiledonlywithin30days
afterproclamationofthewinner,[210]whileaquowarrantopetitionmaybeinitiatedwithin10daysaftertheproclamationofthewinner.
[211]Inotherwords,itisthedateofproclamationofthecandidateconcernedthatisdeterminativeofthetimewhenthePET'sjurisdiction

attaches.
Pertinently,inTecsonv.CommissiononElections,[212]thisCourtheldthatordinarily,theterm"contest"refersto"postelectionscenario"
andthatelectioncontestshaveoneobjective,whichistounseatthewinningcandidate.HenceitstressedthatthePET'sjurisdictioncovers
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthe"President"or"VicePresident,"andnotof"candidates"forPresidentor
VicePresident.
Againstthisbackdrop,itisbeyondcavilthattheComelechasthepowerandjurisdictiontoruleonapetitiontodenyduecoursetoorto
cancel the CoC of a candidate, whether for a local or national position, who may have committed material misrepresentation in his/her
CoC.
Verily,theComelecdidnotusurp,asindeeditcouldnothaveusurped,thePET'sjurisdictionifonlybecausethehereinpetitionerremains
amerecandidateforPresidentandhasnotyetbeenelectedandproclaimedPresident.Therefore,thepetitionerfailedtoprovethatthe
Comelecactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionequivalenttolackorexcessofjurisdictionwhenittookcognizanceofthesecases.
ThevalidityofSection8,Rule23
oftheComelecRulesisupheld.
PetitionerchallengesthevalidityofSection8,Rule23oftheComelecRuleswhichreadsasfollows:

Section8.EffectifPetitionUnresolvedIfaPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCancelaCertificateofCandidacyisunresolved
byfinaljudgmentonthedayofelections,thepetitionermayfileamotionwiththeDivisionorCommissionEnBancasmaybe
applicable,tosuspendtheproclamationofthecandidateconcerned,providedthattheevidenceforthegroundsfordenialtoor

cancel certificate of candidacy is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the
CommissionshallpreparealistofpendingcasesandfurnishallCommissionerscopiesofthesaidlist.
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed
withinthereglementaryperiod,orincasesofrulingsoftheCommissionEnBanc,norestrainingorderisissuedbytheSupreme
Courtwithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofthedecisionorresolution.(Emphasissupplied)

Petitionerarguesthatparagraph2ofSection8above,whichdeclaresthatrulingsoftheComelecEnBancshallbefinalwithinfivedays
from receipt of the resolution or decision sans any temporary restraining order from this Court, is invalid because it violates Section 7,
ArticleIXAofthe1987Constitutionwhichgivestheaggrievedparty30daysfromreceiptoftheassailedComelecResolutionwithinwhich
tochallengeitbeforetheSupremeCourt.Section7reads:

EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,anycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfrom
thedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthe
filingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.Unless
otherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughtto
theSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof.(Emphasissupplied)

Iam,however,unabletoperceiveanyconflictbetweenthetwoprovisions.
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Rule 23 emanates from the Comelec 's rulemaking power under Section 3 of Article IXC of the 1987
Constitution,towit:

Section3.TheCommissiononElectionsmaysitenbancorintwodivisions,andshallpromulgateitsrulesofprocedureinorder
to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decidedindivision,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

Attheriskofbelaboringapoint,the1987ConstitutionexplicitlygrantstheComelecrulemakingpowersindecidingelectioncases.Thus,
infulfilmentofitsConstitutionalmandateofdecidingelectioncaseswithreasonabledispatch,theComelecpromulgatedrulesofprocedure
toprovideforanorderlymeans,waysorprocessofdecidingelectioncases.TheinsertionintheabovequotedSection7,ArticleIXofthe
1987 Constitution of the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or law," makes it abundantly clear that the
ConstitutionitselfrecognizestherulemakingpoweroftheComelecand,asanecessarycorollary,investsitwithauthoritytodetermine
thereasonableperiodwithinwhichitsdecisionorresolutionshallbeconsideredfinalandexecutory.
Thus,farfrominvalidatingparagraph2,Section8ofRule23oftheComelecRulesforbeingcontrarytoSection7,ArticleIXAofthe1987
Constitution, the two provisions in fact do work in harmony. Under the principle of interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandimodus,everystatutemustbesoconstruedinharmonywithotherstatutesastoformauniformsystemofjurisprudence.
[213]

TherebeingnoconflictbetweenSection8,Rule23oftheComelecRulesandSection7,ArticleIXAofthe1987Constitutionandgiven
thatthisSection8,Rule23recognizestheComelec'srulemakingpower,thevalidityofthesubjectComelecrulemustbesustained.
TheComelecisnotprecludedbythe
SET'sDecisionfromdetermining
petitioner'scitizenship.
DespitetheNovember17,2015DecisionoftheSETdeclaringpetitioneranaturalbornFilipinocitizen,theComelecisnotprecludedfrom
rulingonpetitioner'scitizenship.
Asearlierexplained,theComelec,underSection78oftheOEC,hasthepowertodeterminewhetheracandidatecommittedanymaterial
misrepresentationinhisorherCoC.Inviewthereof,theComeleccanalsoproperlydeterminethecandidate'scitizenshiporresidencyas
anadjuncttoorasanecessaryconsequenceofitsassessmentonwhethertheCoCcontainsmaterialmisrepresentation.Tomymind,this
doesnotamounttoausurpationoftheSET'spowertodeterminethequalificationsoreligibilityofacandidateneitherdoesitamounttoa
usurpation of this Court's prerogative to resolve constitutional issues. Rather, I view it as part of the Comelec's duty to examine a
candidate'srepresentationsinhis/herCoCpursuanttotheaforementionedSection78.Clearly,fortheComelectoshirkorevadefrom,or
torefusetoperform,orabandonthispositivedutywouldamounttograveabuseofdiscretion.
Furthermore,theComelecisanindependentconstitutionalbodyseparateanddistinctfromtheSET.WhiletheSETisthesolejudgeofall
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the Senate,[214] its decisions do not have any doctrinal or
binding effect on the Comelec. It is settled that there is "only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts [or tribunals]
should take their bearings."[215] Here, the November 17, 2015 SET Decision is the subject of a Petition for Certiorari entitled David v.
SenateElectoralTribunal,anddocketedasGR.No.221538,thatisstillpendingbeforethisCourt.Untilsaidpetitionisdecidedwithfinality
bythisCourt,anyrulingonpetitioner'scitizenshipdoesnot,subjecttotheconditionsthatwillbediscussedlater,constituteresjudicata.
Consequently, the Comelec correctly held that it is not precluded from determining petitioner's citizenship insofar as it impacts on its
determinationofwhetherthepetitioner'sCoCcontainsmaterialfalserepresentation.Converselystated,petitionerfailedtoprovethatthe

Comelecactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionintakingcognizanceofthesecases.
TheJuly18,2006OrderoftheBureau
ofImmigrationandDeportationisnot
bindingontheComelec
Petitioner argues that it is only the DOJ which can revoke the BID's Order presumptively finding her a naturalborn Filipino citizen and
approvingherpetitionforreacquisitionofFilipinocitizenship.[216]
Theargumentisspecious.Itissettledthatwheneverthecitizenshipofapersonismaterialorindispensableinajudicialoradministrative
case, the decision of the court or tribunal on the issue of citizenship is generally not considered as resjudicata. This is so because the
issueoncitizenshipmaybe"threshedoutagainandagainastheoccasionmaydemand."[217]Toacceptpetitioner'scontentionthatitis
theDOJthathasjurisdictiontorevokethegrantofherpetitionforreacquisitionofFilipinocitizenshipwouldbetoveerawayfromthesaid
settledrulebecausethisimpliesthatnosubsequentcontraryfindingsmaybearrivedatbyotherbodiesortribunals.
InGo,Sr.v.Ramos,[218]thisCourtheldthatresjudicatamayapplyincitizenshipcasesonlyifthefollowingconditionsorcircumstances
concur:

1.aperson'scitizenshipmustberaisedasamaterialissueinacontroversywheresaidpersonisaparty
2.theSolicitorGeneralorhisauthorizedrepresentativetookactivepartintheresolutionthereofand
3.thefindingo[f]citizenshipisaffirmedbythisCourt.

Sincetheforegoingconditionsorcircumstancesarenotpresentinthesecases,theBID'spreviousfindingonpetitioner'scitizenshipcannot
bebindingontheComelec.
Moreover,whiletheBIDstatedinitsJuly18,2006Orderthat"petitionerwasaformercitizenoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbeingborn
to Filipino parents,"[219] this is contrary to petitioner's own assertion that she had no known blood relatives the very reason why her
citizenshipisnowbeingquestioned.Notably,too,theBIDdidnotcategoricallydeclarethatpetitionerisanaturalbornFilipino,butmerely
presumedhertobeone.[220]Beingmerelypresumed,thatpresumptioncanbeoverturnedatanytimebyevidencetothecontrary.Most
importantly and as correctly held by the Comelec, it cannot be bound by the BID Order because a contrary view will deprive it of its
constitutional mandate to inquire into and examine the qualifications of candidates, and determine whether they committed material
misrepresentationintheirCoC.[221].Clearly,thus,petitioner'spurportednaturalbornFilipinocitizenshipmaybecorrectlydeterminedby
theComelec,asitinfactalreadydid,despitetheaforesaidBIDOrder.
Insum,petitionerfailedtoprovethattheComeleccapriciouslyandwhimsicallyexerciseditsjudgment,orthatitactedinanarbitraryor
despoticmannerbyreasonofpassionandhostility,orwassogrosslyunreasonablewhenittookcognizanceofthecasesindeed,inthese
cases,theComeleccommittednoerrorofjurisdiction.
II.SUBSTANTIVEISSUES
Materialmisrepresentation
UnderSection74[222]oftheOEC,apersonrunningforpublicofficeisrequiredtostateinhisCoCthefollowingdetails:

(1)ifrunningforMemberofthe[HouseofRepresentatives],theprovince,includingitscomponentcities,highlyurbanizedcity
ordistrictorsectorwhichheseekstorepresent
(2)thepoliticalpartytowhichhebelongs
(3)civilstatus
(4)hisdateofbirth
(5)residence
(6)hispostofficeaddressforallelectionpurposesand
(7)hisprofessionoroccupation.

Inaddition,theaspirantisrequiredtostateunderoaththat:

(1)he/sheisannouncinghis/hercandidacyfortheofficestatedthereinandthathe/sheiseligibleforthesaidoffice
(2)he/shewillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancethereto

(3)he/shewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthorities
(4)he/sheisnotapermanentresidentorimmigranttoaforeigncountry
(5)theobligationimposedbyhis/heroathisassumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionand
(6)thefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretruetothebestofhis/herknowledge.

As previously discussed, Section 78 of the OEC provides that within 25 days from the time of filing of the CoC, any person may file a
petitiontodenyduecoursetoand/ortocancelitontheexclusivegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationstatedthereinasrequiredby
Section74oftheOEC,isfalse.Inthesamevein,SectionI,Rule23oftheComelecRulesofProcedurestatesthataCoCmaybedenied
duecourseorcancelled"ontheexclusivegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredbylawisfalse."
InMarcos v. Commission on Elections, [223] this Court declared that there is material misrepresentation when a statement in a CoC is
madewiththeintenttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.
InSalcedoIIv.CommissiononElections,[224] it was explained that to constitute a material misrepresentation, the false representation
mustnotonlypertaintoamaterialfactwhichwouldaffectthesubstantiverightofacandidatetorunforthepositionstatedintheCoC,
butmustalsoconsistofa"deliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible."
[225]Simplyput,thefalserepresentationmusthavebeendone"withanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastoone'squalificationsfor

publicoffice."[226]
Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections[227] reiterated the pronouncement that a material misrepresentation is not just the falsity of the
information declared in the CoC but also consists in the very materiality of the said information, and the deliberate attempt by the
candidatetomisleadordeceivetheelectorateastothatcandidate'squalificationforpublicoffice.
Stated differently, before the Comelec may deny due course to and/or cancel a CoC, it must be shown: (a) that the representation
pertainstoamaterialfact(b)thatitisinfactfalseand(c)thattherewasadeliberateattempttodeceive,mislead,misinform,orhidea
fact,whichwouldotherwiserenderthecandidateineligibletorunfortheposition.Underthethirdelement,thedeceptionmustbesuchas
toleadtheelectoratetobelievethatthecandidatepossessesthequalificationsforthepositionhe/sheisrunningfor,whenintruththe
candidatedoesnotpossesssuchqualifications,thusmakinghim/herineligibletorun.
Here,petitionerwantstorunforthePresidencyinthe2016electionsandclaimsinher2015CoCthatshepossessesthefivequalifications
setforthinSection2,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionwhichstates:

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleastten
yearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.(Emphasessupplied)

Respondents, however, insist that petitioner committed false material representation when she declared in her 2015 CoC that she is a
naturalborn Filipino and that she is a resident of this country for more than 10 years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections.
(Emphasissupplied.)
InitsassailedResolutions,theComelecfoundpetitionertohavefalselyrepresentedmaterialfactsinher2015CoC.
Residency
Thecontroversywithrespecttopetitioner'sresidencyqualificationarosewhenitwasobservedthatshemadethefollowingentryinItem
11ofher2012CoCforSenator:

PERIODOFRESIDENCEINTHEPHILIPPINESBEFOREMAY13,2013:
06No.ofYears06No.ofMonths

Basedonthesaidentry,itcouldbededucedthatbyherownreckoning,petitionerstartedresidinginthePhilippinesinNovember2006.
ThusbyMay8,2016,orthedayimmediatelyprecedingtheelectionsonMay9,2016,herperiodofresidencyinthePhilippineswouldonly
benineyearsandsixmonths,orshortofthemandatory10yearresidencyrequirementforthepresidentialpost.Incontrast,petitioner
attestedinher2015CoCthatherperiodofresidencyinthePhilippinesonthedaybeforetheMay9,2016electionsis"10yearsand11
months."Clearly,thesearecontrastingdeclarationswhichgivetheimpressionthatpetitioneradjustedtheperiodofherresidencyinher
2015CoCtoshowthatsheiseligibletorunforthePresidency.Thisrenderedhervulnerabletothechargethatshecommittedmaterial
misrepresentationsinher2015CoC.
Section 2 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as reproduced above, requires, among others, that a person aspiring to become a
President must be a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. This requirement is mandatory
and must be complied with strictly. For one, no less than our Constitution itself imposes it. For another, Section 2 was couched in a
negative form an indication of the intention of the framers of our Constitution to make it mandatory. "A statute or provision which

containswordsofpositiveprohibition,suchas'shallnot,''cannotor'oughtnot,'orwhichiscouchedinnegativetermsimportingthatthe
actshallnotbedoneotherwisethandesignated,ismandatory."[228]Moreover,Section63[229]ofArticleIXoftheOECimposesthesame
10yearresidencyrequirement.
Forpurposesofelectionlaws,thisCourt,asearlyas1928,[230]heldthatthetermresidenceissynonymouswithdomicile.[231]Domicile
denotestheplace"'whereapartyactuallyorconstructivelyhashispermanenthome,'wherehe,nomatterwherehemaybefoundatany
giventime,eventuallyintendstoreturnandremain"[232](animusmanendi).
In deviating from the usual concepts of residency, the framers of our Constitutions intended "'to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliarwiththeconditionsandneedsofthecommunity'fromtakingadvantageoffavorablecircumstancesexistinginthatcommunity
forelectoralgain."[233]Theirdecisiontoadopttheconceptofdomicile"isrootedintherecognitionthat[elective]officialsxxxshouldnot
onlybeacquaintedwiththemetesandboundsoftheirconstituenciesmoreimportantly,theyshouldknowtheirconstituenciesandthe
uniquecircumstancesoftheirconstituentstheirneeds,difficulties,aspirations,potentialsforgrowthanddevelopment,andallmatters
vitaltotheircommonwelfare.Familiarity,ortheopportunitytobefamiliar,withthesecircumstancescanonlycomewithresidencyxxx."
[234]Atthesametime,theresidencyrequirementgivestheelectoratesufficienttimetoknow,familiarizethemselveswith,andassessthe

truecharacterofthecandidates.
Domicileisclassifiedintothreetypesaccordingonitssource,namely:(1)domicileoforigin,whichanindividualacquiresatbirthorhis
firstdomicile(2)domicileofchoice,whichtheindividualfreelychoosesafterabandoningtheolddomicileand(3)domicilebyoperation
oflaw,whichthelawassignstoanindividualindependentlyofhisorherintention.[235]Apersoncanonlyhaveasingledomicileatany
giventime.[236]
Toacquireanewdomicileofchoice,onemustdemonstrate:

1.Residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality
2.Anintentiontoremainthere(animusmanendi)and
3.Anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile(animusnonrevertendi).[237]

"To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile a bona fide
intentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneanddefiniteactswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose."
[238] In the absence of clear and positive proof of the above mentioned requisites, the current domicile should be deemed to continue.

Onlywithclearevidenceshowingconcurrenceofallthreerequirementscanthepresumptionofcontinuityofresidenceberebutted,fora
change of legal residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old domicile.[239] Elsewise put, if any of the above
requisitesisabsent,nochangeofdomicilewillresult.[240]
Having dispensed with the above preliminaries, I shall now discuss whether petitioner satisfactorily proved that the Comelec acted with
grave abuse of discretion an1ounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there was material misrepresentation when she
declared in her 2015 CoC that on the day immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, she would have been a resident of this
country for 10 years and 11 months. Otherwise stated, was there substantial evidence showing that petitioner committed material
misrepresentationasregardsherperiodofresidency?

Elements of material misrepresentation in

relation to Petitioner's claimed period of
residenceinthePhilippines:a)materiality
b) falsity, and c) deliberate attempt to
deceive, mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
whichwouldotherwiserenderherineligible
torunforthepositionofPresident.

A.Residencyasamaterialfact.
As to the first element, it is jurisprudentially settled that residence is a material fact because it involves the candidate's eligibility or
qualificationtorunforpublicoffice.[241]Inviewofthisandconsideringthatthepartiesdonotdisputethatthematterofacandidate's
residencyinthePhilippinesisamaterialfact,thereisnoneedtodwellfurtheruponthiselement.
B.Falsityofpetitioner's
declarationastotheperiod
ofherresidencyinher
2015CoC
Atthisjuncture,itmustbestressedthatonOctober18,2001,petitionernotonlyformallyabandonedthePhilippinesasherdomicile,but
shealsorenouncedherPhilippinecitizenshipbybecominganaturalizedAmericancitizen.Shepreferredandchosetobedomiciledinthe
U.S.thaninthePhilippines.Andshedidsonotoutofnecessityorfurtemporaryleisureorexerciseofprofessionbuttopermanentlylive
there with her family. Fifteen years later, petitioner is before this Court claiming that she had decided to abandon and had in fact
abandonedherU.S.domicileandthatshehaddecidedtoestablishandhadinfactestablishedanewdomicileofchoiceinthePhilippines.
Shewouldwantustobelievethatshehadcompliedwithalltherequirementsinestablishinganewdomicileofchoice.

The question now is: As a U.S. citizen who was domiciled in the U.S., how can petitioner reestablish her domicile in the Philippines?
Obviously,petitionermustabandonorloseherdomicileintheU.S.Also,shehastosatisfactorilyproveintenttopermanentlystayinthe
countryandmakethePhilippineshernewdomicileofchoice.
Foreasyreference,Iherebyreiteratetherequirementsinestablishinganewdomicileofchoice,towit:a)residenceorbodilypresencein
the new locality b) an intention to remain there (animus manendi) and c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi).

Petitioners evidence of animus manendi

earliest possible date that her physical
presence in the Philippines can be
characterized as coupled with animus
manendi.

In support of her claim that from the time she arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 her physical presence here was imbued with
animusmanendi,petitionerofferedthefollowingevidence:

a.travelrecordswhichshowthatshewouldconsistentlyreturntothePhilippinesfromhertripsabroad
b.the affidavit of her adoptive mother attesting to the fact that after petitioner and her children's arrival in the Philippines in early
2005,theyfirstlivedwithherinGreenhills,SanJuan
c.schoolrecordswhichshowthatherchildrenhadbeenattendingPhilippineschoolscontinuouslysinceJune2005
d.TINwhichshowsthatshortlyafterherreturntothePhilippinesinMay2005,sheconsideredherselfataxableresidentandasubject
ofthecountry'staxjurisdiction
e.Condominium Certificate of Title for Unit 7F and a parking lot at One Wilson Place purchased in early 2005 and its corresponding
DeclarationsofRealPropertyforrealpropertytaxpurposes
f.reacquisitionofhernaturalbornFilipinocitizenshipandapplicationsforderivativecitizenshipforherminorchildren
g.registrationasavoteronAugust31,2006
h.renunciationofherU.S.citizenshiponOctober20,2010
i.acceptanceofherappointmentasMTRCBChairpersononOctober21,2010
j.QuestionnaireInformationforDeterminingPossibleLossofU.S.Citizenshipwhereinpetitionerindicatedthatsheconsideredherself
aresidentofthePhilippinesstartingMay2005.

Petitioner claims that had the Comelec considered her evidence in its totality and not in isolation, it would have concluded that she
intendedtoremaininthePhilippinessinceMay24,2005.
Idonotagree.
WhatmustnotbeoverlookedisthatthesepiecesofevidenceflyinthefaceofthefactthatfromMay24,2005toJuly18,2006petitioner
was an alien on temporary sojourn here. It should be emphasized that after petitioner abandoned the Philippines as her domicile and
became a naturalized U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001, the U.S. became her domicile of choice. In Coquilla v. Commission on
Elections[242]andreiteratedinJapzonv.CommissiononElections,[243]thisCourtheldthataFilipinowhoappliesfornaturalizationasan
AmericancitizenhastoestablishlegalresidenceintheU.S.whichwouldconsequentlyresultintheabandonmentofPhilippinedomicileas
nopersoncanhavetwodomicilesatanygiventime.Hence,beginningOctober18,2001,petitionerwasdomiciledintheU.S.[244]
WhenpetitionerarrivedinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005,sheinfactdidsoasaforeignerbalikbayanasshewasthenstillaU.S.citizen.
Normally,foreignnationalsarerequiredtoobtainavisabeforetheycanvisitthePhilippines.ButunderRA6768,[245]asamendedbyRA
9174,[246]foreignerbalikbayans[247]areaccordedtheprivilegeofvisafreeentrytothePhilippines.Thisvisafreeprivilegeis,however,
notwithoutconditionsforitallowssuchbalikbayanstostayinthePhilippinesforalimitedperiodofoneyearonly.Thus:

SEC. 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following
benefitsandprivileges:
xxxx
(c)VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexceptionofrestricted
nationals.

SincepetitioneravailedherselfofRA6768,herstayinthePhilippinesfromthetimeshearrivedhereasaforeignerbalikbayanonMay24,
2005 was not permanent in character or for an indefinite period of time. It was merely temporary. At most, her stay in the Philippines
wouldonlybeforoneyear.Thisonlyprovesthatherstaywasnotimpressedwithanimusmanendi,i.e.,theintenttoremaininoratthe
domicileofchoiceforanindefiniteperiodoftime.[248]ThusinCoquilla,wedidnotincludetheperiodofthecandidate'sphysicalpresence
in the Philippines while he was still an alien. In that case, Teodulo M. Coquilla (Coquilla) was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1965. He
returned to the Philippines in 1998 and was repatriated under RA 8171 on November 7, 2000. He took his oath as a citizen of the
PhilippinesonNovember10,2000.Subsequently,hefiledhisCoCforMayorofOras,EasternSamar.ApetitiontocancelCoquilla'sCoC
wasfiledonthegroundofmaterialmisrepresentationbasedonhisrepresentationthathemettheoneyearresidencyrequirement.This
CourtaffirmedtheComelecfindingthatCoquillalackedtherequiredresidency.WhileCoquillaarrivedinthePhilippinesasearlyas1998,
hispresenceherefromthatpointuntilhisnaturalizationonNovember10,2000wasexcludedincountingthelengthofhisresidencyin
thePhilippinesbecauseduringthattimehehadnorighttoresidepermanentlyhere.Thus:

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in
1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without
anyrighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveasourimmigrationlawsmayhaveallowedhimtostayasavisitororasaresident
alien.[249]

Also,inthe1966caseofUjanov.Republic,[250]thetrialcourtdeniedMelecioClarinioUjano's(Ujano)petitiontoreacquirecitizenshipfor
failuretomeetthesixmonthsresidencyrequirement.Insoruling,itreasonedoutthatUjano,"whoispresentlyacitizenoftheUnited
StatesofAmerica,wasadmittedintothiscountryasatemporaryvisitor,astatushehasmaintainedatthetimeofthefilingofthepresent
petitionforreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipandwhichcontinuesuptothepresent."[251]ThisCourtadoptedandsustainedthetrial
court'sratiocinationandaddedthat"[t]heonlywaybywhich[Ujano]canreacquirehislostPhilippinecitizenshipisbysecuringaquotafor
permanentresidencesothathemaycomewithinthepurviewoftheresidencerequirementofCommonwealthActNo.63."[252]Clearly,as
early as 1966, jurisprudence has unrelentingly and consistently applied the rule that the law does not include temporary visits in the
determinationofthelengthoflegalresidencyordomicileinthiscountry.Indeeditisillogicalandabsurdtoconsideraforeignnationalto
havecompliedwiththerequirementsofanimusmanendi,orintenttopermanentlystayinthiscountry,ifhe/shewasonlyonatemporary
sojournhere.
Petitioner'sclaimthatshehadestablished animus manendi upon setting foot in this country on May 24, 2005 has, therefore, no leg to
standon.Thepiecesofevidenceshepresentedinsupportofthispropositionareirrelevant,andarenegatedbytheundisputedfactthat
shewasthenaforeignertemporarilystayinghereasabalikbayan.Inthiscontext,petitioner'simputationofgraveabuseofdiscretionfalls
flatonitsface.
Ialsosubjectedpetitioner'sevidenceofanimusmanenditoutmostjudicialscrutiny,particularlyinrelationtoherclaimthatsuchintent
concurswithherphysicalpresenceinthePhilippinesbeginningMay24,2005.However,Ifindthemwantingandinsufficient.
Istartoffwiththefundamentalpreceptthatifapersonallegesthathe/shehasabandonedherdomicile,itisincumbentuponthatperson
to prove that he/she was able to reestablish a new domicile of choice.[253] Applied to this case, this means that it is upon the intrinsic
meritsofpetitioner'sownevidencethatherclaimofreestablishmentofdomicileinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005mustriseorfall.
After a critical review, I am satisfied that the Comelec correctly found petitioner's evidence relative to her claim of animus manendi
beginning May 24, 2005 both wanting and insufficient. For instance, securing a TIN is not conclusive proof of intent to remain in the
Philippines considering that under the country's tax laws, any person, whether a citizen, noncitizen, resident or nonresident of the
Philippines, is required to secure a TIN for purposes of tax payment. If at all, procurement of a TIN merely suggests or indicates an
intentiontocomplywiththeobligationtopaytaxeswhichmaybeimposeduponanyperson,whetheracitizenoranalien.Infact,byher
ownadmission,petitionersecuredaTINpreciselyforthepurposeof"settlingherlatefather'sestate."[254]Atanyrate,aTINwasissued
topetitioneronJuly22,2005,[255]oralmosttwomonthsafterherclaimedstartingpointofresidencyinthePhilippines.
Underthesameparityofreasoning,petitioner'sacquisitionofacondominiumunitandparkinglotatOneWilsonPlaceinSanJuanCity,as
well as her acquisition of a parcel of land in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and the subsequent construction of a house thereon, do not
evinceanintenttoremaininthePhilippinesforgood.SpeakingfortheCourtinSvetlanaJalosjosv.CommissiononElections,[256]Chief
JusticeMariaLourdesP.A.Serenodeclaredthat"ownershipofahouseorsomeotherpropertydoesnotestablishdomicile."[257]Afterall,
acquisition of properties may also very well be for investment purposes only. Besides, it bears emphasis that by petitioner's own
allegation,thecondominiumunitandparkinglotwereacquiredinthesecondhalfof2005,thelotinCorinthianHillswasboughtin2006,
andthehousestandingthereonwasconstructedthatsameyear(2006)allafterMay24,2005.
Theclaimedintentalsobecomesshroudedindoubtinlightofpetitioner'smaintainingahouseintheU.S.whichsheboughtin1992and
thesubsequentacquisitionofaresidentialhouseintheU.S.in2008.
ItmustbestressedthatinthePetitionofValdezbeforetheComelec,particularlypar.98thereof,hepointedoutthat:"perrespondent's
[hereinpetitioner]ownStatementofAssets,LiabilitiesandNetWorthfor2014,shestillmaintainstwo(2)residentialhousesintheU.S.,
onepurchasedin1992,andtheotherin2008."[258]Petitionerhadtheopportunitytocategoricallydeny,refuteordiscussheadonthis
contention of Valdez in her Verified Answer. Unfortunately, she did not seize the chance. Instead, in paragraph 2.13 of her Verified
Answer,petitionercouchedher"'denial"thatshestillownstwohousesintheU.S.asfollows:

2.13.Theallegationinparagraph98ofthePetitionisDENIEDinsofarasitismadetoappearthat[Petitioner]"resides"inthe2
housesmentionedinsaidparagraph.Thetruthisthat[Petitioner]doesnot"reside"inthesehouses,butinherfamilyhomein
CorinthianHills,QuezonCity(whereshehaslivedwithherfamilyforalmostadecade).[259]

From the foregoing, petitioner in effect admitted the veracity and truthfulness of Valdez's assertion regarding the acquisition of the two
residentialhousesherdenialpe11ainedonlytothefactthatshewasresidingthereat.Thereafter,nofurthermentionofthismatterwas
made.
The care by which petitioner crafted her Answer regarding the sale of her family's real property in the U.S. is also obvious. In her four
VerifiedAnswers,sheaverredthus:

xxxThefamilyhomeintheU.S.A.waseventuallysoldon27April2006.[260]

By adverting solely and exclusively to the "family home" as the real property that had been sold in April 2006, petitioner effectively
avoided, and withheld, mentioning and discussing her family's other remaining real properties in the U.S., such as the two other
residentialhouses.
Also,inValdez'sComment/OppositiontothePetitionforCertiorari,[261]particularlyinparagraphs11.14and174,hemanifestedthatthe
existenceofthesetwohousesintheU.S.wasinfactadmitted,notatalldenied,bypetitioner.Thus:

11.14.xxxIn2014,petitionerindicatedinherStatementofAssetsandLiabilitiesthatshehastwo(2)residentialpropertiesin
theU.S.A.,afactthatshealsoconfirmedduringtheclarificatoryhearingon25November2015ashereinprovided.[262]
174. Her counsel also admitted in the clarificatory hearing that PETITIONER still own[s] two properties in the US, one
purchasedin1992,andtheotherin2008,uptothepresenttime.Thisisinconsistentwithanimusnonrevertendi.Infact,the
propertiesremainasaphysicallinkwiththeUSwhichisherdomicileofchoiceformanyyears,whichisinconsistentwithher
claimthatshecompletelyabandoned.[263]

Furthermore, during the oral argument on January 19, 2016, the undersigned inquired if petitioner's family still owns prope1ties of
whateverkindintheU.S.Hercounseldeniedanyknowledge.[264]WhenitwastheturnofValdeztobeinterpellatedandtheundersigned
again brought up the alleged ownership of petitioner's family of two or more properties in the U.S., Valdez affirmed the allegation.[265]
Constrainedtodiscussthematter,petitionernowadmitsinher
Memorandum[266]thatsheandherfamilyindeeddoowntwohousesintheU.S.
Thesehousesareobviouslynotconsideredbypetitionerastheirfamilyhomenonetheless,consideringthecircumstancesprevailinginthe
case,theiracquisitionandmaintenancearerelevanttothedeterminationofwhetherpetitionerhadindeedabandonedherU.S.domicile
andwhethershehadeffectivelyreestablishedherdomicileinthePhilippines.
Thus,tofollowpetitioner'spropositionthatacquisitionofresidentialpropertiesisanindiciaofaminusmanendiisactuallydetrimentalto
hercauseconsideringthatsubsequenttoherpurchaseofacondominiumunitandaresidentiallotinthePhilippinesin2006,shelateron
acquired a residential property in the U.S. in 2008. In addition, she maintained one other residential property in the U.S. which was
boughtin1992.
IalsoagreewiththeobservationofrespondentContrerasregardingthefailureofpetitionertosecureanICRforherselfasshedidwith
herchildren.ForContreras,thisnotonlyshowsthatpetitionerwasfullycognizantofthenatureofherresidencystatusandtheapplicable
laws/rules regarding the same more significantly, it was clear and positive evidence of her intention or ambivalence not to become a
permanentresidentofthePhilippinesatthattime.Thus:

xxxForforeignnationals,ofwhichpetitionerwasonepriortoherreacquisitionofherFilipinocitizenship,intenttoremainfor
goodcouldnotjustrestonbeingphysicallypresent,andperformingactssuchasbuyingacondominiumunitandenrollingher
children here, for such are also the acts of expatriates who are working in the country. As foreign nationals, to be even
consideredasresidentaliens,theseexpatsandtheirdependentshavetoobtaintheappropriatevisasfortheirstaytobelegal.
Petitionerfullyknewthiswell,whensheregisteredherchildren,whowerealsoforeignnationalslikeher,withtheBItoobtain
anACRforeachofthem,assuchwouldhavebeenarequirementforenrolmentinschools.Itisforthisthatshecouldnotfeign
ignoranceoftherealnatureofherresidencystatusinthecountryfrom24May2005untilJuly2006,whenshedidnotpossess
anACRsinceshefailedtoregisterwiththeBI,andhencedidnotacquirethestatusofapermanentresidentinthecountry.As
such,shedidnotloseherdomicileintheUSduringthatperiod,andcouldthereforenotrightfullyclaimtohavereestablished
herdomicileinthePhilippines.[267]
x x x [T]he fact that she obtained immigration documents for her three (3) children in the form of Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR), even if she failed to obtain one for herself, is an incontrovertible proof that she could not claim total
ignoranceaboutthelimitationsimposedonanonresidentalieninthecountry.[268]

Finally,itismyopinionthattheComeleccorrectlyconsideredpetitioner'sdeclarationsinher2012CoCasanadmissionagainstinterest.
Anadmissionisanystatementoffactmadebyapartyagainsthis/herinterestorisinconsistentwiththefactsallegedbyhim/her.[269]It

isgovernedbySection26ofRule130oftheRulesofCourt,whichstates:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
againsthim.

"Tobeadmissible,anadmissionmust:(a)involvemattersoffact,andnotoflaw(b)becategoricalanddefinite(c)beknowinglyand
voluntarilymadeand(d)beadversetotheadmitter'sinterests,otherwiseitwouldbeselfservingandinadmissible."[270]
Alltheserequisitesarepresentinthesecases.Theentryinpetitioner's2012CoC,i.e.,sixyearsandsixmonths,referstoherperiodof
residenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013amatterwhichwithoutadoubtinvolvesaquestionoffact.Thesameiscategoricaland
definite,andwasmadeunderoath.Theentryisadversetopetitioner'sinterest,specificallyinrespecttoherpresentclaiminher2015
CoCthatshehasbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesfor10yearsand11monthsuptothedaybeforetheMay9,2016elections.Clearly,
thequestionedentryinpetitioner's2012CoCisadmissibleasanadmissionagainstherinterest.
"Admissibility,however,isonething,weightisanother."[271]Indeed,whentheadmissioniscontainedinadocumentasinthiscase,the
document is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the
presumptionthatnomanwoulddeclareanythingagainsthimself/herselfunlesssuchdeclarationwastrue.Thus,itisfairtopresumethat
the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his/her fault if it does not.[272] It bears emphasizing, though, that this does not
preclude a declarant from refuting his/her admission.[273] In this case, petitioner must show clear, convincing, and more than
preponderantevidenceinordertorefutethefactsstatedinher2012CoCconsideringthatitisasworndocumentwhichtheRulesofCourt
presumeshadbeenexecutedintheregularcourseoflaw.[274]
Petitionerthusassertsthatthestatementinthe2012CoCaboutherperiodofresidencewasaresultofanhonestmistakeandnotbinding
onher.SheinvokesMarcosv.CommissiononElectionswhereweheldthat"itisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateof
candidacy,whichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheConstitution'sresidencyqualification
requirement."
However, I am not convinced with petitioner's invocation of honest mistake. Among other reasons, the defense of honest mistake
interposedinMarcoswasfoundtenablebecausethereinpetitionerImeldaRomualdezMarcos(Imelda)wroteinherCoC"seven"months
asherperiodofresidenceanentrywhichwasobviouslyshortoftheoneyearresidencyrequirementforthepositionforwhichshefiled
herCoC.Hence,theCourtstatedthatitwouldbeplainlyridiculousforacandidatetodeliberatelyandknowinglymakeastatementina
CoC which would lead to her disqualification. It can be concluded, therefore, that the defense of honest mistake is available only if the
mistake in the CoC would make a qualified candidate ineligible for the position. It cannot be invoked when the mistake would make an
ineligible candidate qualified for the position. For in the first case, no candidate in his/her right mind would prevaricate or make the
electoratebelievethathe/sheisnotqualifiedforthepositionhe/sheisaspiringfor.Hence,therecouldbenootherconclusionthanthat
themistakewascommittedhonestly.Whereasinthesecondcase,theintentiontomisleadcanbededucedfromthefactthatanaspirant,
although not qualified, makes it appear in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible to run for public office when in truth he/she is not. Here,
petitionermadeitappearthatshedidmeetthe10yearresidencyrequirementwheninfact,shedidnot.
Andevenassumingthatshecommittedanhonestmistake,still,thesamecannotoutweighhercategorical,definite,voluntary,andsworn
declarationinher2012CoC,whichisfavoredbytheprimafaciepresumptionofregularity.[275]Saidentryinpetitioner's2012CoCwhich,
aspreviouslydiscussedisanadmissionagainstinterest,tendstoprovethatsheintendedtostaypermanentlyinthePhilippinesstarting
onlyinNovember2006(orinApril2006assumingherclaimofhonestmistakeistn1e,butstillfarfromherclaimofMay24,2005).In
otherwords,petitionerhasmiserablyfailedtopresentevidencesufficienttooverthrowthefactssheherselfsuppliedinher2012CoC.She
cannot now, therefore, adjust or readjust the dates from which to reckon her reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines in order to
meet the 10year constitutional residency requirement. As correctly observed by the Comelec, petitioner's actions only highlight her
ambivalenceinreestablishingdomicile,viz.:

4.149.PetitionerclaimstohavereestablishedherdomicileinthePhilippineson24May2005.xxx
4.150.Itisincorrectbasedonpetitioner'sownsubmissionswhichareconflicting.
4.151.InherCOCforSenatorintheMay2013electionfiledinOctober2012,[petitioner]stated:

"PERIODOFRESIDENCEINTHEPHILIPPINESBEFOREMAY13,20136YEARSAND6MONTHS".

TheaboveswornentryinherCOCforSenatormeantthat[petitioner]hadbeenaPhilippineresidentonly since November

2006.
4.152.ShelaterclaimedthattheComelecformconfusedher,thatactuallythatentryof"6yearsand6months"wasmeantto
beuptothedateoffilingsaidCOCinOctober2012.Assumingthistobecorrect,andapplyingthe"6yearsand6months"as
uptoOctober2012,thismeansthat[petitioner]hadbeenaPhilippineresidentonlysinceApril2006.
4.153.InherpresentCOCforPresidentintheMay2016elections,herswornentryonresidencyis"10yearsand11months"
uptothedaybeforeMay9,2016whichwouldbearesidencysinceJune2005.

4.154.Sowhichiswhich?
May24,2005asthedatesheclaimstohavereestablishedherPhilippinedomicile?
OrisitApril2006asshealsoclaimsrelativetoher2012senatorialCOCreckoneduptothedateofitsfilinginOctober2012?
OrisitNovember2006whichistheplainimportofherswornentryinhersenatorialCOC?
OrisitJune2005whichwouldbethereckoningdateperher2015COCforPresidentintheMay2016elections?[276]

In fine, even if it be conceded that petitioner's evidence (i.e., TIN, acquisition of residential properties, enrollment of her children in
Philippine schools), taken singly or collectively, somehow evinces her claimed intent to remain in the Philippines, the same cannot
outweightheevidenceonrecordthatherpresenceinthecountryasofMay24,2005wastemporaryinnature."Evidenceisassessedin
termsofquality,notquantity.Itistobeweighed,notcounted."[277]
Atthispoint,Iwishtomakeitabundantlyclearthatitisnotmypositionthatpetitionercouldnotreestablishherdomicileinthecountry
prior to taking the oath of allegiance to the country. In retrospect, petitioner could have made her stay in the Philippines permanent in
characterbeginningMay24,2005orthereaboutshadsheappliedforanimmigrantstatusasprovidedinCommonwealthActNo.613or
ThePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamendedbyRA4376,[278]whichallowsanaturalbornFilipinocitizen(assumingthatsheis)
who was naturalized abroad to return as a nonquota immigrant entitled to permanent residence. As correctly argued by respondent
Contreras, "[t]he possession of a permanent resident visa is not an added element, but is simply evidence that sufficiently proves the
presence of an act that would indicate the element of animus manendi that applies to foreign nationals who would like to make the
Philippines as their new domicile of choice."[279] But for some reason petitioner did not apply for an immigrant status, and there is no
indicationthatshewassubsequentlygrantedanimmigrantvisa,orapermanentresidentstatus.
AsaU.S.citizen,petitionerfailedtoperformanactnecessarytoshowthatasofMay24,2005sheintendedtopermanentlyremaininthe
Philippines.SuchintentionmaybeinferredfromherwaiverofnonresidentstatusbyobtainingapermanentresidentvisaoranACRorby
takinganoathofallegiancetothePhilippines,whichpetitionerneitheravailedofonorbeforeMay24,2005.
Nevertheless,whilepetitionerenteredthePhilippinesonMay24,2005asaforeignerbalikbayanwithalimitedperiodofstay,herstatus
changed when she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic under RA 9225 on July 18, 2006. This conferred upon her not only
PhilippinecitizenshipbutalsotherighttostayinthePhilippinesforanunlimitedperiodoftime.Section5ofthesaidlawprovides:

SEC.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities,ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoy
fullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbesubjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsofthePhilippines
xxx

Thus,itisfromthisdate,July18,2006,thatpetitionercanrightfullyclaimthatherphysicalpresenceinthePhilippineswaswithanimus
manendi.HerbecomingaFilipino,albeitstilladualcitizen,onsaiddate,allowedhertothenceforthstaypermanentlyhere.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship neither automatically resulted in the
reestablishment of her Philippine domicile nor in the abandonment of her U.S. domicile. It is settled that RA 9225 treats citizenship
independentlyofresidence.[280]Itdoesnotprovideforamodeofreestablishingdomicileandhasnoeffectonthelegalresidenceofthose
availingofit."Thisisonlylogicalandconsistentwiththegeneralintentofthelawfordualcitizenship.SinceanaturalbornFilipinomay
hold,atthesametime,bothPhilippineandforeigncitizenships,he[/she]mayestablishresidenceeitherinthePhilippinesorintheforeign
countryofwhichhe[/she]isalsoacitizen."[281]
AcaseinpointisCaballerov.CommissiononElections. [282]Inthatcase,RogelioBatinCaballero(Caballero)ranforMayorofUyugan,
BatanesintheMay13,2013elections,Hisrivalcandidate,however,filedapetitiontocancelhisCoConthegroundoffalserepresentation
as Caballero declared in his CoC that he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and not a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately before the elections. Caballero argued that Uyugan has always been his domicile because he
wasbornandbaptizedtherethathestudied,worked,andbuilthishouseinUyuganthathewasaregisteredvoterofsaidmunicipality
and used to vote there and, that he availed herself of RA 9225 on September 13, 2012 and renounced his Canadian citizenship on
October1,2012.
IndenyingCaballero'spetition,theCourtEnBancspeakingthroughJusticeDiosdadoP.Peraltaandwithnomemberdissenting,ruledthat
Caballero's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not enable him to automatically regain his domicile in Uyugan. He
muststillprovethatafterreacquiringhisPhilippinecitizenship,hehadreestablishedhisdomicileinUyugan,Batanesforatleastoneyear
immediatelyprecedingtheMay13,2013elections.Thus:

Petitioner was a naturalborn Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v.
Comelec,we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holdstrueinpetitioner'scaseaspermanentresidencestatusinCanadaisrequiredfortheacquisitionofCanadiancitizenship.
Hence,petitionerhadeffectivelyabandonedhisdomicileinthePhilippinesandtransferredhisdomicileofchoiceinCanadaHis
frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.

Thenextquestioniswhatistheeffectofpetitioner'sretentionofhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderRANo.9225onhisresidence
ordomicile?
InJapzonv.Comelec,whereinrespondent[JaimeS.]TyreacquiredhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderRA.No.9225and[ran]for
Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to
state,thus:

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarilyregainhisdomicileintheMunicipalityofGeneralMacarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines.Tymerelyhad
theoptiontoagainestablishhisdomicileintheMunicipalityofGeneralMacarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines,said
placebecominghisnewdomicileofchoice.Thelengthofhisresidencethereinshallbedeterminedfromthetimehe
madeithisdomicileofchoice,anditshallnotretroacttothetimeofhisbirth.

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablishedUyugan,Batanesashisnewdomicileofchoicewhichisreckonedfromthetimehemadeitassuch.
TheCOMELECfoundthatpetitionerfailedtopresentcompetentevidencetoprovethathewasabletoreestablishhisresidence
in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after
reacquiringhisFilipinocitizenshipbyvirtueofRANo.9225onSeptember13,2012thatpetitionercanrightfullyclaimthathe
reestablishedhisdomicileinUyugan,Batanes,ifsuchwasaccompaniedbyphysicalpresencethereat,coupledwithanactual
intenttoreestablishhisdomicilethere.However,theperiodfromSeptember13,2012toMay12,2013wasevenlessthanthe
oneyearresidencyrequiredbylaw.
xxxx
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year
immediatelyprecedingthedayofelectionsasrequiredunderSection39oftheLocalGovernmentCode.[283](Underliningours)

Contrarytopetitioner'sinterpretation,wedidnotreckontheperiodofresidencyinCaballerofromthetimeCaballeroreacquiredPhilippine
citizenshipunderRA9225.WethereheldthatsinceCaballeroabandonedhisPhilippinedomicilewhenhewasnaturalizedabroad,hehas
toprovethathehadreestablishedhisdomicileinUyugan.Helikewisehadtoprovethedatewhenhereestablishedhisdomiciletherefor
purposesofdeterminingwhetherhemettheoneyearresidencyrequirement.However,therebeingnootherevidenceshowinghisintent
toreestablishhisdomicileinthePhilippinesandabandonhisformerdomicileabroad,andsinceCaballerotookhisoathofallegianceunder
RA 9225 only on September 13, 2012 or less than one year prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, he could no longer possibly prove
compliancewiththeoneyearresidencyrequirement.
Similarly,IfindnosufficientevidenceshowingthatpetitionerintendedtoreestablishanewdomicileinthePhilippinespriortotakingher
OathofAllegianceonJuly7,2006assuchpetitionerstillhastoprovethataftertakingsaidoathshehasreestablishedthePhilippinesas
her new domicile by demonstrating that her physical presence here is coupled with animus manendi and an undeniable and definite
intention to abandon her old domicile. However, since petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance in July 2006 and renounced her U.S.
citizenshipinOctober2010,botheventshavingoccurredlessthan10yearspriortotheMay9,2016elections,theconclusionbecomes
inexorablethatshecouldnolongerpossiblyprovecompliancewiththe10yearresidencyrequirement.

Petitioners evidence of animus non

revertendi earliest possible date that
petitioners physical presence in the
Philippines can be said to be coupled with
animusnonrevertendi.

Theelementofintentiontoabandonanolddomicileisasimportantasinthecaseofacquisitionofnewdomicile.[284]Thus,ifaperson
establishesanewdwellingplace,butneverabandonstheintentionofreturningtotheolddwellingplace,thedomicileremainsattheold
dwellingplace.[285]
Uponthisscore,petitionerofferedthefollowingpiecesofevidence:

1.theaffidavitofheradoptivemotherattestingtothereasonswhichpromptedpetitionertoleavetheU.S.andreturnpermanentlyto
thePhilippines
2.the affidavit of Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, corroborating her adoptive mother's statement and narrating how he and
petitionerwereactivelyattendingtothelogisticsoftheirpermanentrelocationtothePhilippines
3.the documented communication between petitioner or her husband with the property movers regarding the relocation of their
householdgoods,furniture,andcarsfromVirginia,U.S.A.tothePhilippines

4.relocation of their household goods, furniture, cars and other personal property from Viginia, U.S.A. to the Philippines which were
packed,collectedforstorage,andtransportedinFebruaryandApril2006
5.herhusband'sactofinformingtheU.S.PostalServiceoftheabandonmentoftheirformerU.S.addressonMarch2006
6.theiractofsellingtheirfamilyhomeintheU.S.onApril27,2006
7.herhusband'sresignationfromhisworkintheU.S.inApril2006andhisreturntothePhilippinesonMay4,2006
8.Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship wherein petitioner indicated that she no longer
consideredherselfaresidentoftheU.S.sinceMay2005untilthepresent.

At first blush, it would seem that petitioner's evidence did tend to prove her claimed intent to abandon her old domicile in the U.S.
However,whatpreventsmefromlendingunqualifiedsupporttothispostureisthatallthesepiecesofevidencerefertodatesafterMay
24,2005.Suchevidencecouldnot,therefore,beofmuchhelpinestablishingherclaimthatshechangeddomicileasofMay24,2005.
Furthermore, petitioner's evidence cannot prove animus non revertendi prior to her renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20,
2010. This is so because prior thereto, petitioner could return anytime to the U.S., stay there as its citizen and enjoy all the rights,
privilegesandprotectiontheU.S.governmentextendstoitsnationals,includingtherighttoalegalresidence.Infact,fromMay24,2005
to October 20, 2010, petitioner did go back to the U.S. no less than five times: February 14, 2006, April 20, 2009, October 19, 2009,
December27,2009andMarch27,2010.[286]AndwhenshewenttotheU.S.onthosedates,sheusedherU.S.passportandstayedthere
notasanalienbutasitscitizen,.Itshouldalsoberecalledthatpetitionerandherfamilystillownandmaintaintworesidentialhousesin
theU.S.whichtheypurchasedin1992andin2008,ortwoyearsafterpetitionerhadtakenheroathofallegiancetothePhilippines.Hence
the only clear and positive proof that petitioner abandoned her U.S. domicile was when she executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of
AllegiancetotheUnitedStatesofAmericaandRenunciationofAmericanCitizenship[287]onOctober20,2010becausethatwasthepoint
whensheconcretizedandexteriorizedherintentiontoabandonherU.S.domicile.Itisthisactthatunequivocallyandirremissiblysealed
offanyintentofherretainingherU.S.domicile.Priortothat,itcannotbesaidthatshehascompliedwiththethirdrequirement.
ThisisnottosaythatIamaddingafourthrequirementforrelinquishingforeigncitizenshipasaconditiontoreestablishingdomicile.My
discussion is still premised on compliance with the third requirement of bona fide intent to abandon the former domicile. To be sure,
petitionercouldhaveestablishedheranimusnonrevertenditotheU.S.hadsheappliedforaPhilippineresidentvisaonMay24,2005or
thereabouts,asearlierdiscussed.Butsinceshedidnot,theonlyfactorcircumstancethatcanbeconsideredasindicativeofherclearand
positiveactofabandoningU.S.domicilewaswhensherenouncedherU.S.citizenship.Thisconclusionisconsistentwithourrulinginthe
2013caseofReyesv.CommissiononElections[288]wherethisCourt,speakingthroughJusticeJoseP.Perez,said:

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her naturalborn status, we quote with
approvaltherulingoftheCOMELECFirstDivisionthatpetitionercannotbeconsideredaresidentofMarinduque:

"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re
acquisitionofFilipinocitizenshippursuanttoRA9225,hemuststillshowthathechosetoestablishhis
domicileinthePhilippinesthroughpositiveacts,andtheperiodofhisresidencyshallbecountedfrom
thetimehemadeithisdomicileofchoice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already reacquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuanttoRA9225soastoconcludethatshehasregainedherdomicileinthePhilippines.Therebeingnoproof
that [petitioner] had re119unced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choiceintheUSA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the oneyear residency requirement of the law
and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her oneyear residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her domicile in Marindugue as she
remainstobeanAmericancitizen.Noamountofherstayinthesaidlocalitycansubstitutethefactthat
shehasnotabandonedherdomicileofchoiceintheUSA."[289](Underliningours)

Againstthisbackdrop,petitioner'sevidencerelativetoanimusnonrevertendibecomesirrelevantforsuchevidencedoesnotatallprove
that she had in fact abandoned her U.S. domicile on May 24, 2005. Nonetheless, I still tried to evaluate the pieces of evidence that
petitionerhadsubmitted.However,Istillfindthemwantingandinsufficient.
Aspartoftheevidencetoproveherintenttoabandonherolddomicile,petitionerputsforwardherhusband'sactofinformingtheU.S.
PostalServiceinMarch2006oftheabandonmentoftheirformerU.S.address.Icarefullystudiedthecopyoftheonlineacknowledgement
fromtheU.S.PostalServiceregardingthis[290]anddeducedtherefromthatwhatpetitioner'shusbanddidwasactuallytorequesttheU.S.
PostalServiceforachangeofaddressandnottonotifyitoftheirabandonmentoftheirU.S.addressperse.Atanyrate,therewasno
showingthatthechangeofaddresswasfromtheiroldU.S.addresstotheirnewPhilippineaddress.And,again,itmustbementionedthat
thiswasdoneonlyinMarch2006.
Likewise submitted to prove animus non revertendi was the series of electronic correspondence between petitioner/her husband on one

hand, and the Victory Van Corporation (Victory)/National Veterinary Quarantine Service of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the
Philippines,ontheother,regardingthelogisticsforthetransportoftheirpersonalpropertiesandpetdog,respectively,fromtheU.S.to
the Philippines. The first in the series of electronic mails (emails) from Victory was dated March 18, 2005.[291] Apparently, the
communicationwasareplytopetitioner'sinquiryabouttheratesforthepacking,loadingandtransportoftheirhouseholdgoodsandtwo
vehiclestoManila.Petitioner'sanimusnonrevertenditotheU.S.atleastasofdateofthesaidemail(March18,2005)cannot,however,
bededucedfromhermereactofmakingsuchinquiry.Itmustbestressedthattheintenttoabandonanolddomicilemustbeestablished
byclearandpositiveproof[292]Whilemakingsuchaninquirymaybeconstruedastheinitialsteptotheactualtransportortransportation
ofthegoods,thatbyitself,isshortoftheclearandpositiveproofrequiredtoestablishanimusnonrevertendi.Atthemost,allthatcanbe
inferred from the said email is petitioner's mere "interest" at that point but not yet the "intent" or the resolve to have her family's
personalpropertiesshippedtothePhilippinesforpurposesofrelocation.Itistruethatpetitioner'sinquiryledtonegotiationsbetweenher
and/orherhusbandandVictoryuntilthegoodsandeffectswerefinallytransportedtothePhilippinesstartingFebruary2006asshownby
thesucceedingexchangeofcommunicationhowever,thesenegotiations,basedontheotheremailssubmitted,didnotstartimmediately
afterMarch18,2005oronorbeforeMay24,2005.Thenegotiationsonlyactuallystartedthefollowingyear,orinJanuary2006,months
afterMay.24,2005.ThesameistruewithrespecttotheemailrelativetothetransportoftheirpetdogwhichbearsthedateAugust3,
2005.
Notably,evenpetitionerdidnotreckonthisdate,March18,2005,asthestartingpointofheranimusnonrevertendi.Hence,itcouldbe
saidthatevenpetitionerherselfcouldnotcategoricallystatethatbyMarch18,2005,shealreadyhadtheintentiontoabandonherU.S.
domicile.

Petitionersconducttendingtoshowanimus
manendiandanimusnonrevertendicannot

betakenaspartofanincrementalprocess
of/forchangingdomicile.

Petitioner invokes the cases of Mitra and of Sabili where this Court held that relocation to a new domicile is basically an incremental
process.Thus,petitioner'scounselmaintainedduringtheoralargumentsthattheirevidenceconsistedofdocumentsthatwereexecuted,
eventsthattookplace,andactsdone,afterMay24,2005preciselybecausetheyallformpartofaprocesswhichbeganonMay24,2005
andcontinuedtobeinprogressthereafter.
Petitioner'scaseisnowherenearlycongruenttoMitraandSabilibecauseinthosecases,theevidenceofthereinpetitionerswereplainly
viewed by the Court as positive acts that formed part of the incremental process of changing domicile. That same perspective cannot,
however,beappliedtopetitioner'scasebecause,unlikeinMitraandSabili,herchangeofdomicile,aspreviouslydiscussed,wasinevitably
andinextricablyintertwinedwithhercitizenship.ItbearsreiteratingthatasanaturalizedU.S.citizen,petitionerisdutyboundtocomply
withourimmigrationlawsbeforeherstayinthiscountrycouldbeconsideredforpurposesoftheelections.Justbecauseshethoughtof
permanentlystayinginthePhilippinesdoesnotmeanthatuponsettingfootonthiscountryshehasinstantlyreestablisheddomicilehere.
Asanalienwantingtoreestablishadomicilehere,petitionermustfirstreacquirePhilippinecitizenship(oratleastoughttohavesecureda
permanentresidentvisa)beforethetotalityofheractsoractionstendingtoshowanimusmanendicanberegardedpartofanincremental
process of establishing domicile. The same is true with respect to animus non revertendi: she must have first renounced her U.S.
citizenship(orappliedforaPhilippineimmigrantvisa).
TherecordsalsoshowthatpetitionerhasnotonlyprocrastinatedinrenouncingherU.S.citizenshipinfactshealsodiditunwittingly.It
shouldberecalledthatthePresidentappointedherChairpersonoftheMTRCBonOctober6,2010.Atthattime,petitionerwasstilladual
citizenowingallegiancebothtothePhilippinesandtotheU.S.Henceshecouldnotacceptthesaidappointmentwithoutrenouncingher
U.S.citizenshipfirst,conformablywithSection5(3)ofRA9225,whichreads:

SEC.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoy
fullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbesubjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsofthePhilippines
andthefollowingconditions:

xxxx
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippinesanditsdulyconstitutedauthoritiespriortotheirassumptionofoffice:Provided,Thattheyrenouncetheir
oathofallegiancetothecountrywheretheytookthatoath.

WhenpetitionerthusexecutedherAffidavitofRenunciationofAllegianceonOctober20,2010,therecouldbenotwoopinionsaboutthe
factthatherprimarypurposewastomeettherequirementforherappointmentasMTRCBChairperson.Thisisbuttressedbythefactthat
sheassumedofficethefollowingdayandbytheanswersshewroteintheQuestionnaire/InformationforDeterminingPossibleLossofU.S.
Citizenship that she submitted with the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. There she explicitly stated that she
wasrelinquishingherU.S.citizenshipbecauseshewasappointedChairpersonoftheMTRCBandshewantedtocomplywithbothU.S.and
Philippinelaws.Eventhen,itbearsnoticethatinthatdocumentshemadenocategoricaldeclarationatallthatshewasrelinquishingher
U.S.citizenshiptotransferdomicilehere.Inotherwords,petitionerdidnotrenounceherU.S.citizenshipuponherownvolitionwiththe
deliberateintentorintentionofreestablishinglegalresidencehere.Itonlyincidentallyaroseasaninevitableconsequenceofherhavingto
comply with the requirements of Section 5(3) of RA 9225. Be that as it may, I consider her act of renouncing her foreign allegiance on
October20,2010asamountingtosufficientcompliancewiththethirdrequirementinreestablishingdomicileforitcarriedwithitawaiver
of her right to permanently reside in the U.S. Regrettably, this date does not jibe with what petitioner declared in her 2015 CoC for
President.

Strongerproofisrequired
inreestablishmentofnational
domicile.
Petitioner protests that in Perez v. Commission on Elections[293] and Jalover v. Osmea[294] the candidates were deemed to have
transferredtheirdomicilesbasedonsignificantlylessevidencecomparedtowhatshehaspresented.
Butthereisamarkeddistinctionbetweenthepresentcaseandthecasescited.PerezandJaloverinvolvedtransferofdomicilewithinthe
same province or within the confines of our country. InPerez, a petition to disqualify Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) as candidate for
Congressman of the third district of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections was filed on the ground that he, allegedly, is a resident of
Gattaran which is in the first (not third) district of Cagayan. What was in question was Aguinaldo's residence in the third district of
Cagayan,hisresidencyinsaidprovincehavingbeenestablishedbeyonddoubt.Jalover,ontheotherhand,emanatedfromapetitionto
denyduecourseand/ortocancelJohnHenryR.Osmea's(Osmea)CoCforMayorofToledoCityonthegroundthathemadeafalse
declarationinhisCoCwhenhestatedthathehadbeenaresidentofsaidcityfor15yearspriortotheMay13,2013elections.Notably,
OsmeapreviouslyservedasCongressmanofthethirddistrictofCebuwhichincludesToledoCity.
Thepresentcase,however,involvesapersonalitywhoformerlyabandonedthePhilippinesasherdomicile,andrenouncedherPhilippine
citizenshipbybecominganaturalizedU.S.citizen.Thus,whatisinvolvedhereisatransferofdomicilefromonecountrytoanotherbya
naturalized U.S. citizen. Petitioner now tries to convince this Court that she had abandoned her U.S. domicile and had successfully
reestablishedhernewdomicileofchoiceinthiscountry.Tostress,thiscaseinvolvesrelocationbyanalienofthenationaldomicilefrom
theU.S.tothePhilippines,whichrequiresmuchstrongerproof,bothastofactandintent,thaninthecaseofachangeofdomicilefrom
onemunicipality,orsubordinatesubdivisionofacountry,toanother,byaFilipinocitizenwhoneverrenouncedsuchcitizenship.[295]"[I]t
requires stronger and more conclusive evidence to justify the court in deciding that a man has acquired a new domicile in a foreign
country,thanwouldsufficetowarranttheconclusionthathehasacquiredanewdomicileinacountrywhereheisnotaforeigner."[296]In
Perez and Jalover, for instance, it was no longer necessary for this Court to determine whether the candidates had the legal right to
permanentlyresideintheirchosendomicilebecause,beingFilipinos,theycanresideanywhereinthePhilippines.Inthecaseoftheherein
petitioner,however,itisnotonlythelengthofherstayinthePhilippinesthatmustbedetermined,butalsothelegalityandnaturethereof
for,asheretoforediscussed,theperiodofherphysicalpresencehere,asanalien,shouldnotbeincludedinthecomputationofthelength
ofherresidencyasthesamewastemporaryincharacterornotpermittedbyourimmigrationlaws.Also,whilecitizenshipandresidency
are different from and independent of each other, one may invariably affect the other. For instance, petitioner had to abandon her
Philippine domicile when she applied for U.S. naturalization in 2001. Corollarily, she cannot reestablish domicile here unless she first
reacquires her Philippine citizenship (or enter the Philippines as an immigrant). Thus, unlike in Perez and Jalover, the petitioner in this
casehastheaddedburdenofproving,amongothers,thecharacterandlegitimacyofherpresenceheresincesheearlierabandonedher
FilipinocitizenshipandPhilippinedomiciletobecomeaU.S.citizenanditsdomiciliary.
Anotherimportantreasonforthedistinctionisthatdemandedbythepurposeoftheresidencyrequirementofelectionlaws.Thoselivingin
thesameprovincealbeitinanotherdistrictasinPerezandJalover,canstillmaintainfamiliaritywiththeconditionsandneedsofnearby
communities.Theyandthepeoplethereareexposedtothesameenvironment,speakthesamelanguage,aresimilarlyaffectedbythe
growth or fluctuation of local economy, and must brave and suffer the same natural calamities. These are beyond the immediate and
directsensesandperceptionsofforeignersoralienslivingabroad.
Likewise misplaced is petitioner's reliance on the cases of Japzon and Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, [297]
consideringthatsaidcasesarenotonallfourswithhercase.Insaidcases,thecandidateswhowerechargedwithmakingfalsematerial
representationintheirCoCtooktheiroathofallegiancemorethanoneyearbeforetheelections,therebymakingitpossibleforthemto
prove compliance with the oneyear residency requirement of the Local Government Code. Thus, in Japzon, Jaime S. Ty reacquired his
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 on October 2, 2005 and ran for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2007
election.WhileRommelApolinarioJalosjosreacquiredhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderRA9225onNovember26,2008,orfourdaysafter
arrivalinthePhilippines,andranforGovernorofZamboangaSibugayintheMay10,2010elections.
Inthecaseofpetitioner,however,shetookheroathofallegianceonlyonJuly7,2006.Therefore,shecouldnotpossiblyprovethatshe
hasbeenresidinginthePhilippinesforatleast10yearsimmediatelyprecedingtheMay9,2016elections.July7,2006toMay9,2016is
abouttwomonthsshortof10years.
Under these circumstances, the entry in petitioner's 2015 CoC for President that her period of residency in the Philippines as of May 9,
2016is10yearsand11monthsis,false,asindeeditis.
C.Petitionersdeliberate
attempttodeceive,mislead,
misinform,orhideafactwhich
wouldotherwiserenderher
ineligibletorunforthe
positionofPresident
It was pointed out to petitioner as early as June 2015 that the period of residence she entered in her 2012 CoC was six years and six
months before May 13, 2013. Notwithstanding that her attention was called to such fact, petitioner never bothered to correct her 2012
CoC.Instead,shefiledher2015CoCforPresidentdeclaringthereinaperiodofresidencythatismarkedlydifferentfromanddoesnotjibe
withwhatshedeclaredunderoathinher2012CoC.
Petitionerthenproceededtomakethepointthatthedeclarationaboutherperiodofresidenceinher2015CoCiscorrect.Explainingthe
discrepancybetweenher2012and2015CoCs,sheassertsthatherentryofsixyearsandsixmonthsinher2012CoCwastheresultofan
honestmistake.Sheclaimsthatsheaccomplishedher2012CoCwithouttheassistanceofcounselandthatshedidnotknowthatwhat
wasrequiredbythephrase"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013"istheperiodofherresidenceonthedayright

beforetheMay13,2013electionsthatinstead,sheinterpretedittomeanasherperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesasofherfilingof
the2012CoConOctober2,2012,whichtechnicallyisalsoaperiod"beforeMay13,2013."ToconvincetheCourtthattheaforementioned
phraseissusceptibleofcausingconfusion,petitionercallsattentiontothefactthattheComelec,afterapparentlyrealizingthesame,had
revisedtheCoCformsfortheMay9,2016elections.TheamendedphrasewhichcannowbefoundunderItemNo.7ofthelatestCoC
formreadsasfollows:

PERIODOFRESIDENCEINTHEPHILIPPINESUPTOTHEDAYBEFOREMAY09,2016:
Iamnotpersuaded.

Theimportofthephrase"PeriodofResidenceinthePhilippinesbeforeMay13,2013"asfoundinpetitioner's2012CoCistooplaintobe
mistakenandtoocategoricaltobemisinterpreted.Ascanbeobserved,afixeddatewasgivenasareferencepoint,i.e.,May13,4013.
Indeed,evenanaveragepersonwouldbeabletotellthatwhatcomesbeforeMay13,2013isMay12,2013.Fromaplainreadingofthe
saidphrase,therefore,itcanreadilybediscernedorunderstoodthatwhatwasbeingrequiredbyItemNo.11isacandidate'speriodof
residenceinthePhilippinesuntilMay12,2013.
ToarguethatanyperiodwhichisnotuntilMay12,2013butpriortoMay13,2013istechnicallystillaperiod"beforeMay13,2013"is
likeclutchingatstraws.Toanastutepoliticalaspirantlikepetitioner,filingaCoCnecessarilypresupposesknowledgeonherpartofthe
qualificationsrequiredbytheofficewheresheseekstobeelected.Afterall,itispresumedthatapersontakesordinarycareofhisorher
concerns.[298] For a senatorial candidate, the required qualifications are found under Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution which
provides,viz.:

Section3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,and,onthedayoftheelection,is
at least thirtyfive years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
thantwoyearsimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.(Emphasissupplied)

Thus,readinthelightoftheothermaterialentriesrequiredinthe2012CoCforSenatorsuchasAge(ItemNo.14),thefactofbeinga
NaturalbornFilipinoCitizen(ItemNo.8)and,ofbeingaRegisteredVoter(ItemNo.19),itisobviousthatwhatthefo1mwastryingto
elicit were a senatorial candidate's qualifications in accordance with the abovequoted constitutional provision. And assuming that the
phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" is indeed susceptible of causing confusion as to until what period
before May 13, 2013 was being asked, such confusion can easily be dispelled by a quick reference to the constitutional provision which
statesinnouncertaintermsthataSenatormustbearesidentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyearsimmediatelyprecedingthe
dayoftheelection.Underthispremise,theonlylogicalinterpretationthatshouldhavebeenavailabletopetitioneratthetimeshewas
fillingouther2012CoCisthatwhatwasrequiredbyItemNo.11theperiodofherresidenceinthePhilippinesasofthedayimmediately
precedingMay13,2013,whichisMay12,2013.
Totallyunacceptableistheassertionthatthechangeinthewordingoftheitemrespectingtheperiodofresidenceasfoundinthelatest
CoC form is an acknowledgment by the Comelec that the previous version is indeed unclear. The change is a mere semantic exercise
devoidofanyserioussignificance.
Petitioner'spersonalcircumstancesandthosesurroundingthefilingofher2012CoCprovidelittlesolacetoherclaimofhonestmistake.
Aspetitioneralleges,shepursuedacollegedegreeinDevelopmentStudiesinoneofthecountry'spremiereuniversitiestheUniversityof
thePhilippinesinManila.In1988,shewenttoBostonCollegeintheU.S.where,ascanreasonablybeexpected,shelearnedconceptson
politics after graduating with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies. When she filed her 2012 CoC, she was not technically a
neophyte in the Philippine political arena, she having been on her adoptive father's side during the campaign for his presidential bid in
2004.Atthattime,shewas,fortwoyears,atthehelmofMTRCBwhereherdutiesimpactednotonlymediaandentertainmentculturebut
alsosocietyatlarge.Beingtheeducatedwomanthatsheis,coupledbyherbriefbutmemorablestintinpoliticsandrelevantgovernment
experience, I find it hard to believe that she misinterpreted the clear and simple import of the phrase "Period of Residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013" as pertaining to her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of her 2012 CoC on
October2,2012.Torepeat,thephraseistooplaintobemistakenandtoocategoricaltobemisinterpreted,moreespeciallybyoneofher
educationalandprofessionalstature.
Thatpetitionerwasnotassistedbycounselwhensheaccomplishedher2012CoCisofnomoment.Forone,theplainandsimplelanguage
usedinthesubjectCoCformdoesnotrequirealegalmindtobeunderstood.Foranother,itwasnotasifpetitionerhadnochoicebutto
accomplish the subject CoC without the assistance of counsel. Her own allegations revealed that she accomplished her 2012 CoC on
September27,2012andthatsheonlyfiledthesamefivedaysthereafteroronOctober2,2012.[299]Thisshowsthatpetitionerhad.had
ampletimenotonlytoreflectonthedeclarationsshemadeinher2012CoC,butalsotoconsultalawyerregardingtheentriesthatshe
providedthereinshouldtherebematterswhichwereindeeduncleartoher.Afterall,sheisnotexpectedtohavesimplytakenthefilling
outofherCoClightlysinceasidefromitsbeingasworndocument,aCoCisinthenatureofaformalmanifestationtothewholeworldof
thecandidate'spoliticalcreedorlackthereof.[300]Itisastatementbyapersonseekingtorunforapublicofficecertifyingthathe/she
announces his/her candidacy for the office mentioned and that he/she is eligible for that office.[301] Indeed, a valid CoC, much like the
sacred ballot that a voter casts in a free and honest elections is the bedrock of the electoral process. Its execution or accomplishment
cannotbetakenlightly,becauseitmirrorsthecharacterandintegrityofthecandidatewhoexecutesoraccomplishesitthatcandidate's
uncompromisingfidelitytotruthandrectitude.Yes,indeed,especiallyifthatcandidateisaspiringtobeelectedtothehighestofficeinthe
land: the Presidency, from whom only the best and finest attributes of the truly Filipino character, intellect, patriotism, allegiance and
loyaltyaresoughtafterandexpected.Verily,thisexplainswhythelawprovidesforgroundsforthecancellationanddenialofduecourse
to CoC.[302] Here it appears, however, petitioner's actions evinced unusual regrettable tendency to becloud plain and simple truth

concerning such commonplace things as the real timestretch of her residence in this country. Petitioner chose not to secure a resident
visa. She therefore knew that prior to her taking her oath of allegiance to the Republic and her abandoning her U.S. domicile, her stay
herewasmerelytemporary.ThispresumedknowledgeisimposeduponeveryindividualbyArticle3oftheCivilCodewhichstatesthat"
[i]gnoranceofthelawexcusesnoonefromcompliancetherewith."
Notably, when one runs for an elective public office, it is imperative to first know the qualifications required of the office and then to
assesswhethersuchqualificationshavebeenmet.Hence,petitionerisreasonablyexpectedtoknowtherequirementsoftheofficesheis
runningfor,andtodeterminewhethershesatisfactorilymeetsthoserequirements.Onecannotjustaspiretooccupyapositionwithout
makingsomeselfexaminationwhetherhe/sheisqualified.Inpetitioner'scase,preciselybecauseheradoptivefather'squalificationswere
then under question when he ran for President in 2004, then there is more reason for petitioner to carefully evaluate and assess her
eligibilityandqualificationssothatshewouldnotbetrappedintothesamequagmireheradoptivefatherfellinto.
PetitionerinvokesthecaseofMarcos.There,petitionerImelda,inherCoCforRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeytefortheMay8,
1995 elections, initially answered "seven" months on the space requiring information on her "residence in the constituency where she
seekstobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection."AcoupleofweeksafterherfilingofthesaidCoCandalsofollowingtheinitiation
byherthenwouldbeopponentCiriloRoyMontejo(Montejo)ofaPetitionforCancellationandDisqualificationbeforetheComelec,Imelda
sought to correct the said entry by changing it from "seven" to "since childhood" through an Amended/Corrected CoC. During the
proceedingsrelativetothesaidpetition,Imeldaaverredthattheentryoftheword"seven"inheroriginalCoCwastheresultofan"honest
misinterpretation"whichshesoughttorectifybyaddingthewords"sincechildhood"inherAmended/CorrectedCoC.Althoughdebunked
bytheComelec,Imelda'sclaimofhonestrepresentationwasupheldwhenthecaseeventuallyreachedtheCourt.
To be sure, petitioner cannot rely on Marcos to support her claim of honest mistake. There, what prompted Imelda to jot down the
questionedentryinherCoCwastheconfusioncausedbytheattendantcircumstances,viz.:

[W]hen herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First
District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City.
Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequentlynoteddowninherCertificateofCandidacy.Acloselookatsaidcertificatewouldrevealthepossiblesourceofthe
confusion:theentryforresidence(ItemNo.7)isfollowedimmediatelybytheentryforresidenceintheconstituencywherea
candidateseekselectionthus:

7.RESIDENCE(completeAddress):Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
POSTOFFICEADDRESSFORELECTIONPURPOSES:Brgy.Olot,Tolosa,Leyte
8.RESIDENCEINTHECONSTITUENCYWHEREISEEKTOBEELECTEDIMMEDIATELYPRECEDINGTHEELECTION:_______
YearsandSevenMonths

Havingbeenforcedbyprivaterespondent[Montejo]toregisterinherplaceofactualresidenceinLeyteinsteadofpetitioner's
claimeddomicile,itappearsthatpetitionerhadjotteddownherperiodofstayinheractualresidenceinaspacewhichrequired
herperiodofstayinherlegalresidenceordomicile.ThejuxtapositionofentriesinItem7andItem8thefirstrequiringactual
residenceandthesecondrequiringdomicilecoupledwiththecircumstancessurroundingpetitioner'sregistrationasavoterin
Tolosaobviouslyledtoherwritingdownanunintendedentryforwhichshecouldbedisqualified.[303]

ItwasunderthesaidfactualmilieuthatthisCourtheldthatImeldacommittedanhonestmistakewhensheenteredtheword"seven"in
thespaceforresidenceintheconstituencywheresheseekstobeelectedimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Inthecaseofpetitioner,no
analogous circumstance exists as to justify giving similar credit to her defense of honest mistake. No seemingly related item was
juxtaposedtoItemNo.11ofthe2012COCastocauseconfusiontopetitioner.Andasearlierdiscussed,ItemNo.11isclearandsimple
astoitsmeaningandimport.Moreimportant,thequestionraisedinMarcoswasImelda'slackofeligibilitytorunbecauseshefailedto
complywithresidencyrequirement.Incontrast,thequestionraisedinpetitioner'scaseisherfalsematerialrepresentationsintheentries
shemadeinher2015CoC.WealsohastentoaddthatascorrectlydiscernedbyrespondentContreras:

Andunlikethepetitionerin Romualdez Marcos whose false entry in her COC would disqw:llify her even as the correct period
satisfies the requirement by law and would therefore render her qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives, the false entry in herein petitioner's COC would allow her to be qualified even as the true period of legal
residenceisdeficientaccordingtolawandwouldrenderherunqualifiedforthepositionofPresident.[304]

Itisinthiscontextthatlcannotacceptpetitioner'sclaimofhonestmistake.
True, petitioner did try to correct her alleged mistakes through her public statements. But since her defense of honest mistake is now
debunked,thisbecomesirrelevant.Besides,Icannothelpbutconcludethatthesepublicstatementswereforthepurposeofrepresenting
tothegeneralpublicthatpetitioneriseligibletorunforPresidentsincetheyweremadeatatimewhenshewasalreadycontemplatingon
running for the position. They were not made at the earliest opportunity before the proper forum. These statements could even be
interpretedaspartofpetitioner'scontinuingmisrepresentationregardingherqualificationandeligibilitytorunasPresident.

Basedontheforegoing,itismyconclusionthatpetitionerknowinglymadeafalsematerialrepresentationinher2015CoCsufficientto
misleadtheelectorateintobelievingthatsheiseligibleandqualifiedtobecomeaPresident.

No grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the Comelec in denying due
coursetoand/orcancellingpetitioners

2015 CoC based on petitioner's

material misrepresentation as to her
periodofresidenceinthePhilippines.

Insum,IfindthattheComeleccommittednograveabuseofdiscretion,amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,intakingcognizance
of the petitions and in denying due course to and cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC. To my mind, it properly exercised its power to
determinewhetheracandidate'sCoCcontainsfalsematerialrepresentationitsresolutionwasanchoredonsettledjurisprudenceandfair
appreciation of facts and it accorded the parties ample opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Conversely stated, it is my
opinion that the Comelec did not usurp the jurisdiction of the SET, or the PET, or the DOJ or any other tribunal it did not disregard or
contravene settled jurisprudence and it did not violate the parties' right to due process. Thus, I find that petitioner miserably failed to
hurdlethebarsetbythisCourtinSabili,thatis,toprovethattheComelecwassogrosslyunreasonableinitsappreciationandevaluation
of evidence as to amount to an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner miserably fell short of portraying that the Comelec had whimsically,
arbitrarily,capriciouslyanddespoticallyexerciseditsjudgmentastoamounttograveabuseofdiscretion.
Citizenship
Considering the conclusion I have reached relative to petitioner's material misrepresentation regarding her period of residence in the
Philippines, and considering further that based even only thereon, her 2015 CoC should be cancelled and denied due course, I deem it
wise and prudent to withhold passing judgment at this time regarding petitioner's citizenship. Indeed, it is tempting to seize this
opportunitytositinjudgmentontheissueofcitizenship,whichhasgeneratedsomuchattention,invitedheatedandvigorousdiscussion,
andevokedheightenedemotionsnotonlythat,theissueathandisnovelandoffirstimpression,However,aloftierinterestdictatesthat
wetakepauseandexhaustallpossibleavenuesandopportunitiestostudytheissuemoredispassionately.Afterall,anyjudgmentatthis
time upon this issue might directly impact on GR. No. 221538 (Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal), which is a Quo Warranto
caseseekingtheremovalofpetitionerasaSenatorofthePhilippineswhereinhernaturalborncitizenshipstatusisdirectlyassailed.
Ibelievethattheresolutionoftheissueonpetitioner'scitizenshipmustbecarefullystudiedanddeliberatedupon.Iventuretosaythat
wemaynotonlybedealingwithfoundlingsperse.Anyhastyorillconsideredrulingonthisissuecouldopenthefloodgatestoabuseby
certain groups and individuals looking only after their own interest to the prejudice and undoing of our motherland. NonFilipinos might
usetherulingtoadvancetheirvestedinterestsbysimplyposingasfoundlingssothattheywouldbepresumedorcloakedwithnatural
borncitizenship.TheycouldusethisasanavenuetoobtainFilipinocitizenshipornaturalbornstatuswhichtheycouldnotordinarilygain
throughordinarynaturalizationproceedings.Iamnotpretendingtobeadoomsayer,farfromit,butIprefertotreadcarefully.Afterall,it
isnolessthanthesupremelypreciousinterestofourcountrythatwewishbothtodefendandtoprotect.Ourcountrymustnotonlybe
defendedandprotectedagainstoutsideinvasion,itmustalsobesecuredandsafeguardedfromanyinternalthreatagainstitssovereignty
andsecurity.Idonotwanttowakeupsomedayandseemybelovedcountryteemingwithforeignersandaliensposingasnaturalborn
Filipinoswhiletherealnativesarethrownintooblivionorrelegatedsecondorthirdclasscitizenswhohavebecomestrangersintheirown
homeland. My objective is only to secure, protect and defend the Philippines from being ruled by nonFilipinos. This Court should stand
firmonitsownbearingandnotallowitselftobesweptbythetidesofsentimentalityandemotion.'TheFilipinopeopleexpectnolessfrom
usbuttocarefully,deliberately,objectivelyanddispassionatelyresolvetheissuewithnationalinterestutmostinourheartandmind.
Butthereismore.FornolessconsequentialistheDoctrineofConstitutionalAvoidance,underwhichthisCourtmaychoosetoignoreor
sidestepaconstitutionalquestionifthereissomeothergrounduponwhichthecasecanbedisposedof.[305]Suchisthesituationinthis
case.
Itisnotimprobable,ofcourse,thatpetitionerwasborntoFilipinoparentsyetthefactremainsthattheiridentitiesareunknown.Inshort,
petitioner's citizenship is uncertain. Thus, I feel that we should not overlook altogether her much publicized efforts to obtain
deoxytibonucleicacid(DNA)evidencetoprovehergenealogy.Shecouldusethisbreathertogathersuchevidence.Petitionersurelyhas
biologicalparents.Itisindeedsurprisingthattheseparents,oranycloserelatives,havenotcomeforwardtoclaimtheirtiestosomeone
sohighlyrespectedandsowellrecognizedasoneoftheworthyleadersofthecountry.Whileitdefieshumannaturetoresistthenatural
impulsetoclaimone'sownchild,thesadrealityisthattherearestillmanyparentswhoabandontheirchild,deprivingsaidchildnotonly
of parental love and care, but also identity and pedigree. Every opportunity should thus be given to the innocent child to trace his/her
parentageanddeterminecompliancewiththeConstitution.Thisopportunityandthisprivilegeshouldnotbetimebound,andshouldbe
affordedtoeveryfoundlingatanystageofhis/herlife.Thus,eveniftheCourtrulesonhercitizenshipnow,thatrulingcanbechangedor
alteredanytimewhenthereiscertaintyordefinitenessaboutherbiologicallineagebecausethereisgenerallynoresjudicatainmatters
ofcitizenship.AstheCourthasdeclaredinMoyYaLimYaov.CommissionerofImmigration.[306]wheneverthecitizenshipofapersonis
materialorindispensableinajudicialoradministrativecase,therulingthereinastotheperson'scitizenshipisgenerallynotconsideredas
resjudicata.Thus,itmaybethreshedoutagainandagainastheoccasiondemands,[307]stockbeingtakenofthefactthattherequisites
enumeratedinInrePetitionforNaturalizationofZitaNgoBurcav.Republic,[308]reiteratedinGo,Sr.v.Ramos,[309]areallpresent.
Accordinguntopetitionerampleopportunitytotracehergenealogyisalsobetterthana)creatingapresumptionthatsheisanaturalborn
citizenorfashioninganewspecie/categoryofcitizenshipbasedonstatisticalprobabilitiesorb)denyingherclaimofcitizenshipoutright.
Alienswithknownparentsmayjusttakeadvantageofsuchpresumptionbyrepresentingthemselvesasfoundlingsifonlytobeentitledto
purchaserealproperty,engageinnationalizedbusiness,orevenrunforpublicofficewhereanaturalbornstatusisrequired.Ontheother
hand,wemightunwittinglydenypetitionerherrightfulcitizenshipwhichshecouldverywellestablishviatheexertionoremploymentof
moredeliberate,vigorous,andsustainedefforts.
Indeed,itisimperativefortheCourttocarefullytreadontheissueofcitizenship.AspetitionerpostulatesinherPetitions,"[w]hatisat

stake in this case is not only a foundling's right to run for high public offices, but the enjoyment of a host of even seemingly ordinary
rights or positions which our laws reserve only for naturalborn citizens."[310] After all, the issue of citizenship impacts not solely on
petitionerbutalsoonthosesimilarlysituatedlikeheritalsoinvolvesthesovereigntyandsecurityofourcountry.Wemustnotlosesight
ofthefactthatthecitizensofthecountryarethelivingsoulandspiritofthenation,andtheveryreasonandjustificationforitsexistence
anditspreservation.Ourrights,prerogativesandprivilegesasFilipinocitizensarethebedrockofourConstitution.
Inending,Iwishtoreiteratetheverypreceptandprinciplethatisatoncethecapstoneandthepolestarthathadguidedtheundersigned
indraftinghisopinioninthislandmarkcase:thisstatementfromtheDecember1,2015ResolutionoftheComelec'sSecondDivisionin
SPANo.15001(DC):"Apersonwhoaspirestooccupythehighestpositioninthelandmustobeythehighestlawoftheland."
Thisisasitshouldbe.
Fortheforegoingreasons,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitions.

[1]SeeDecember1,2015ResolutionoftheComelec'sSecondDivisioninSPANo.15001(DC)rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.222.
[2]CONSTITUTION,ArticleXVIII,Section5.
[3]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVII,Section12.
[4]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVII,Section18.
[5]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVII,Section19.
[6]CONSTITUTION,ArticleVII,Section19.
[7]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.3189,
[8]Id.at190223signedbyPresidingCommissionerAlA.ParreoandCommissionersArthurD.LimandSheriffM.Ahas.
[9]Id.at224259signedbyChairmanJ.AndresD.Bautista(withSeparateConcurringandDissentingOpinion),CommissionerChristian

RobertS.Lim(inhibited),CommissionerAlA.Parreo(concurredintheresultbutmaintainedthatthereisnomaterialmisrepresentation
as to citizenship), Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia (with Separate Opinion), Commissioner Arthur D. Lim, Commissioner Ma. Rowena
AmeliaV.Guanzon(concurredintheresult),andCommissionerSheriffM.Abas.
[10]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.3213.
[11]Id.at214264signedbyPresidingCommissionerChristianRobertS.Lim(withDissentingOpinion),CommissionerLuieTitoF.Gi1ia

(withSeparateConcurringOpinion),andCommissionerMa.RowenaAmeliaVGuanzon.
[12]Id.at352381,signedbyChairmanJ.AndresD.Bautista(withSeparateConcurringandDissentingOpinion),CommissionerChristian

Robe1t S. Lim (dissented), Commissioner Al A. Paireo (concurred with the result but maintained that there is no material
misrepresentation as to citizenship), Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia (with Separate Opinion), Commissioner Arthur O. Lim (opined that
the earliest reckoning date as to residency should be July 2006, still short of the 10year residency requirement), Commissioner Ma.
RowenaAmeliaV.GuanzonandCommissionerSheriffM.Abas(joinedtheopinionofCommissionerArthurD.Limthattheearliestpossible
reckoningperiodforresidencyisJuly2006).
[13]SeeFoundlingCertificate,rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.II,p.1138.
[14]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.16.
[15]Id.at17.
[16]ld.at22.
[17] AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRED FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT AMENDING FOR

THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES OR THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND
REACQUISITIONACTOF2003.
[18]Rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.II,p.1269.
[19]Id.at1279.
[20]Id.at12801302.
[21]Id.at1305.

[22]Id.at1308.
[23]Id.at1309.
[24]Id.at1315.
[25]Id.at1316.
[26]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.326397.
[27]Id.at340.
[28]Id.at34I.
[29]Id.at344.
[30]Id.at339.
[31]Id.
[32]Id.at346.
[33]Id.at342.
[34]Id.at347.
[35]Id.at348,350.
[36]Id.at354.
[37]Id.
[38]Id.
[39]Id.
[40]Id.at359.
[41]Id.at363.
[42]Id.at364.
[43]Id.at365.
[44]Id.at366.
[45]Id.at368.
[46]Id.at370.
[47]Id.at372.
[48]GR.No.195649,April16,2013,696SCRA420.
[49]GR.No.210164,August18,2015.
[50]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,p.379.
[51]Id.at384,
[52]Id.
[53]Id.
[54]Id.at385.

[55]Id.at386.
[56]Id.at387.
[57]Id.at388.
[58]Id.
[59]Id.
[60]Id.at389.
[61]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.397399.
[62]Id.at408.
[63]Id.at412.
[64]Id.at412413.
[65]Id.at413.
[66]Id.at415.
[67]Id.
[68]Id.at417.
[69]Id.
[70]Id.
[71]Rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.II,pp.783796.
[72]Id.at784.
[73]Id.at785.
[74]Id.at785786,789.
[75]Id.at786.
[76]Id.at791.
[77]Id.
[78]Id.at882923.
[79]Id.at884.
[80]Id.at897898.
[81]Id.at898.
[82]Id.at913.
[83]Id.at891.
[84]Id.at914.
[85]Id.at903904.
[86]Id.at904.
[87]Id.at910.

[88]Id.at915.
[89]Id.at915916.
[90]Id.at917.
[91]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.II,p.528.
[92]Id.at529.
[93]128Phil.815(1967).
[94]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.II,pp.533534.
[95]Id.at552.
[96]Id.at554.
[97]Id.at558.
[98]Id.at561567.
[99]Id.at572.
[100]Id.at573.
[101]Id.at577580.
[102]Id.at594.
[103]Id.at592.
[104]Id.at606.
[105]Id.at607.
[106]Id.at535.
[107]Id.at607,611.
[108]Id.at622.
[109]Id.at623,627.
[110]Id.at627631.
[111]Id.at636.
[112]Id.at645.
[113]Id.at637.
[114]Id.at642.
[115]Id.at642645.
[116]Id.at645,647.
[117]Id.at648.
[118]Id.
[119]Id.at649.
[120]Id.at650.

[121]Id.
[122]Id.at65J.
[123]Id.at657.
[124]Id.at658.
[125]Id.at659.
[126]Id.at660.
[127]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.II,pp.613782.
[128]BatasPambansaBlg.881(1985).
[129]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.H,p.640.
[130]Id.
[131]Id.at645.
[132]Id.at646.
[133]Id.at10441102.
[134]Id.at1062.
[135]Id.at1080.
[136]Id.
[137]Id.atI088.
[138]Id.at1055.
[139]Id.at823871.
[140]Id.at835.
[141]Id.at857,860.
[142]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.190223.
[143]Id.at204206.
[144]Id.at207211.
[145]Id.at21l212.
[146]ld.at213.
[147]Id.at214216.
[148]Id.at216219.
[149]Id.at219221.
[150]Id.at219223.
[151]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.III,pp.19451958.
[152]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.II,pp.807810,819822.
[153]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.224259.

[154]Id.at258.
[155]Id.at236.
[156]Id.
[157]Id.
[158]Id.at241.
[159]Id.
[160]Id.at242.
[161]Id.
[162]Id.at243.
[163]Id.at249250.
[164]Id.at250.
[165]Id.at251.
[166]Id.at252253.
[167]Id.at253.
[168]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.216264.
[169]Id.at229.
[170] Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or
coalitionofpoliticalpartiesontheexclusivegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredbylawisfalse.
[171]Rollo(0.RNos.221698700),Vol.I,pp,231232.
[172]AlthoughthesamewasnotexplicitlystatedintheTatadPetition.
[173]Rollo(GR.Nos,221698700),Vol.I,pp.233234citingJalosjos,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,696Phil.601(2012),whichlikewise

citedFerminv.CommissiononElections,595Phil.449(2008).
[174]Id.at238.
[175]Id.at240.
[176]Id.
[177]Id.at24l.
[178]Id.
[179]Id.at244.
[180]Id.at247.
[181]Id.at247248.
[182]Id.at257258.
[183]Rollo(G.R.N(ls.221698700),Vol.IV,pp.22502341.
[184]Rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.352381.
[185]Id.at368.

[186]Id.at381.
[187]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.3189Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.3213.
[188]Id.at8Id.at1213.
[189]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.III,pp.20112013Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.IV,pp.(unpaginated).
[190]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.V,pp.3084A3084CRollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.VI,pp.3930A3930D.
[191]636Phil.753(2010).
[192]Id.at777778.
[193]686Phil.649(2012).
[194]Id.at668.
[195]621Phil.498(2009).
[196]Id.at510.
[197]Section78,Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseorto

cancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedtherein
asrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthe
filingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.
[198]Section74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncinghis

candidacyfortheofficestatedthereinandthatheiseligibleforsaidofficeifforMemberofthe[HouseofRepresentatives],theprovince,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political party to which he
belongscivilstatushisdateofbirthresidencehispostofficeaddressforallelectionpurposeshisprofessionoroccupationthathewill
supportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
countrythattheobligationimposedbyhisoathisassumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthe
factsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretruetothebestofhisknowledge.
[199]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,575Phil.253,261(2008).
[200]Ferminv.CommissiononElections,supranote173at165.
[201]Section1,Rule6oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureprovides:

Sec.I.CommencementofActionorProceedingsbyParties.Anynaturalorjuridicalpersonauthorizedbytheserulestoinitiateanyaction
or proceeding shall file with the Commission a protest or petition alleging therein his personal circumstances as well as those of the
protesteeorrespondent,thejurisdictionalfacts,andaconcisestatementoftheultimatefactsconstitutinghiscauseorcausesofaction
andspecifyingthereliefsought.Hemayaddageneralprayerforsuchfurtherorotherreliefasmaybedeemedjustorequitable.
[202]595Phil.750(2008).
[203]Id.at754.
[204]Id.at765.
[205]Supranote173.
[206]Supranote173at465467.
[207]Bedolv.CommissiononElections,supranote195at510,
[208] 2010 PET Rules, Rule 13. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresidentofthePhilippines.
[209] 2010 PET Rules, Rule 14, How Initiated An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo

warrantv against the President or VicePresident. An election protest shall not include a petition for quv warranto. A petition for quo
warrantoshallnotincludeanelectionprotest.
[210]2010PETRules,Rule15.ElectionProtest,TheregisteredcandidateforPresidentorVicePresidentofthePhilippineswhoreceived

thesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotesmaycontesttheelectionofthePresidentorVicePresident,asthecasemaybe,byfilinga

verifiedelectionprotestwiththeClerkofthePresidentialElectoralTribunalwithinthirtydaysaftertheproclamationofthewinner.
[211] 2010 PET Rules, Rule 16. Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice

Presidentonthegroundofine1igibilityordisloyaltytotheRepublicofthePhilippinesmaybefiledbyanyregisteredvoterwhohasvoted
intheelectionconcernedwithintendaysaftertheproclamationofthewinner,
[212]468Phil.421,461462(2004).
[213]DreamworkConstruction,Inc.v.Janiola,609Phil.245,254(2009)SpousesAlgurav.LocalGovernmentUnitoftheCityofNaga,

536Phil.819,835(2006),citingAgpalo'sLegalWordsandPhrases(1997),480.
[214]1987CONSTITUTION,ArticleVI,Section17.

Section17.TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontests
relatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectiveMembers.
[215]CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.MichelJ.LhuillerPawnshop,Inc.,453Phil.1043,l059(2003).
[216]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,p.4243rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,p.43.
[217]MoyYaLimYaov.CommissionerofImmigration,148BPhil.773,855(1971).
[218]614Phil.451,473(2009).
[219]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.II,p.828.
[220]Id.
[221]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.231232.
[222]Supranote198.
[223]318Phil.329(1995).
[224]371Phil.377(1999).
[225]Id.at390.
[226]Id.
[227]660Phil.225(2011).
[228]SeeRubenAgpalo,StatutoryConstruction,4thed.,1998,p.338,ascitedinOfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.Andutan,Jr.,670Phil.169,

178(2011).
[229] SECTION 63. Qualifications for President and VicePresident of the Philippines. No person may be elected President or Vice

PresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthe
dayofelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.
[230]SeeNuvalv.Guray,52Phil.645(1928).
[231]Id.at651.
[232]Aquinov.CommissiononElections,318Phil.467(1995).
[233]Id.at499,citingGallegov.Verra,73Phil.453(1941).
[234]Mitrav.CommissiononElections,supranote191at764.
[235]25AmJur2dDomicil1215,pp.1213.
[236]Marcosv.CommissiononElections,supranote223at386.
[237]Romualdez v. RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415 Mitra v. Commission on

Elections, supra note 191 at 781 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354, 372 (2009) Papandayan Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,430Phil.754,770.
[238]Dominov.CommissiononElections,369Phil.798,819(1999).

[239]Marcosv.CommissiononElections,supranote223at386387.
[240]Dominov.CommissiononElections,supraat820.
[241]Villafuertev.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.206698,February25,2014,717SCRA312,323.
[242]434Phil.861(2002)
[243]Supranote237.
[244]SeeCoquillav.Comelec,supraat872.
[245]ANACTINSTITUTINGABALIKBAYANPROGRAM.
[246] AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 6768, ENTITLED, "AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM" BY PROVIDING

ADDITIONALBENEFITSANDPRIVILEGESTOBALIKBAYANANDFOROTHERPURPOSES.
[247] A balikbayan is a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino

overseas worker, or a former Filipino citizen and his or her family x x x who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or
returnstothePhilippines.(Section2ofRA6768.)
[248]Romualdezv.RTC,Branch7,TaclobanCity,supranote237at415.
[249]Coquillav.CommissiononElections,supranote242at872.
[250]123Phil.1017(1966).
[251]Id.at1019.
[252]Id.at1020.
[253]Caballerov.CommissiononElections,GR.No.209835,September22,2015.
[254]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.II,p.511rollo(GR.Nos.221698.700),Vol.II,p.618id.at826id.at1048.
[255]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.II,p.804.
[256]GR.No.193314,February26,2013,691SCRA646.
[257]Id.at659,citingFernandezv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,623Phil.628,655(2009).
[258]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.II,pp.917.
[259]Id.atl055.
[260]Id.atI049Id.atI075Id.at827,850Id.at620,761.
[261]Rollo(GR.Nos.221698700),Vol.IV,pp.38523930.
[262]Id.at3859.
[263]Id.at3902.
[264]JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:

What was she doing in the States, xx x was [she] already planning to come back here xxx for good[?] x x x [H]ow come she kept on
returningtotheStates?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
Theywerestilltryingtoselltheirhouse,theyweredisposingoftheirassets,infacttheyhadtodonatemostoftheseassets.Theywere
abletoselltheirhouseonlyinApril2006and...(interrupted).
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
AndwhatotherpropertiesdotheyhavethereintheStates?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
AsfarasIknow...(inte1rnpted)

JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Remembertheystayedthereformorethantenyears,sotheymusthaveacquiredtremendousamountofpropertythere.
ATTY.POBLADOR:
I'mnotawareofanyotherassets,YourHonor,butwhatI'mawareofis...(interrupted)
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Nobankaccounts?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
I'mnotawareofthebankaccounts.
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
DidshevotethereintheStateswhenshewasstayingthere'?Didshevoteforanypublic,foranyofficialrunningforpublicoffice?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
Didshevote,I'mnotaware,YourHonor.
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Didsheacquire,forinstance,aburiallot?Thismaysoundfunnybutallofuswoulddothis,buriallot?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
I'mnotaware...(interrupted)
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
xxx[Y]ou'renotawareofthat.HasshedisposedofallherpropertiesintheStates?
ATTY.POBLADOR:
To our knowledge, Your Honor, in that period as part of her relocation process here, they disposed of all their assets, or most of their
assets.(TSN,January19,2016,pp.2325).
[265]JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:

Good evening, Counsel. Among the four respondents, you are the only one who mentioned about the 2014 assets and liabilities of the
petitioner.Xxx[Y]oumentionedthatthepetitionerxxxmaintainstworesidentialhousesintheU.S.onewhichshepurchasedin1992
andtheotheronein2008,isthatcorrect,Counsel?
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Yes,YourHonor.Ididsomeinternetresearch.
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Andwhatwas....
ATTY.VALDEZ:
AndthiswascontinuedbyherownStatementofAssetsandLiabilities.
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Whatwasyourpurposeinbringingthattolight?
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Well, we thought, Your Honor, please, that because there were two competing domiciles. We are looking at it from the stand point of
private international law. When she reacquired Filipino citizenship without renouncing her American citizenship, during that very critical
period,whereshewas[is]astatusthatisinimicaltotheinterestofthecountry,aspertheConstitution.Therewasacompetinginterest
onthepartoftheU.S.claimingherasadomiciliaryoftheU.S.andthePhilippinesclaimingherasadomiciliaryofthePhilippines,that's
whyit'sverycriticalthatyourDecisionsinCoquilla,inCaballero,inJapzon,and[in]thepreviouscase[of]Jalosjosthatthemostrelevant
datewhenapersonwillbeconsideredtobedomicile[d]inthiscountryiswhenherenounceshisAmericancitizenshipbecausewiththat
...
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Whatwas....
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Becausewiththat....
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Yes,Iunderstandnowwhatyouaredrivingat.WhatI'mtryingtoclarifyfromyouis,whatistherelevanceofyourmentioningtherethat
thePetitionerstillmaintainstworesidentialhousesintheStates,onewhichwaspurchasedin1992andtheotheronein2008?
DoesithavesomethingtodowiththePetitioner?
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Theanimus...
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:

...sellingherfamilyhomeinAprilof2006.Inotherwonjs,areyousayingthat,okay,soshesoldherfamilyhomeinthestatesinAprilof
2006toshowthatherreacquisitionofdomicileinthePhilippinesisimbuedwithanimusrevertendi.lsthatwhatyou....
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Thereisstillthepresenceofanimusnonrevertendibythefactthatshestillmaintain[s]substantialassetandtheseareresidencesinthe
UnitedStatesplusthefactthatsheusedherpassportforfivetimesand....
JUSTICEDELCASTILLO:
Yes,weknowtheothermatters.Ijustwanttofocusontherealpropertythata...becauseshesold,that'swhatshe'ssaying,thatshe
sold the family home in April of 2006, fine. It would really, it would seem that you are abandoning already for good your intention to
remaininthestatesbutthenyoustillbuy,youstillboughtaresidentialhousein2008.
Atty.Valdez:
Precisely.
JUSTlCEDELCASTILLO:
Now,sheismaintainingthesetwo...isityourposition,areyoutryingtotellthatsheisstillmaintainingthesetworealpropertiesinthe
States?
ATTY.VALDEZ:
Precisely,YourHonor,becauseshehasbeenaresidentoftheUSinfactforabout19yearssoitcouldnotbeeasilyunderstandablethatx
xxsellingherpropetiesandestablishingaresidencehereyetleavingsomepropertiesthatcouldbebettersignsofwantingtostillremain
in the US would negate whatever manifestations or acts on her part that she has chosen to stay in the Philippines. (TSN, February 16,
2016,pp.230233).
[266]5264.18.Inpar.98ofhispetitionintheproceedingsaquo,PrivateRespondentValdezallegedthatSen.Poe"stillmaintainstwo

(2) residential houses in the US, one purchased in 1992, and the other in 2008." In her Verified Answer, Sen. Poe "DENIED" par. 98
"insofar as it is made to appear that (she) resides' in the 2 houses mentioned in said paragraph." Sen. Poe further explained that she
"doesnot'reside'inthesehouses,butinherfamilyhomeinCorinthianHills,QuezonCity(whereshehaslivedwithherfamilyforalmosta
decade).PrivateRespondentValdezdidnotpresentanyprooftocontrovertSen.Poe'sresponsetopar.98ofthispetition.
5.264.19.TI1enetresultofthisexchangeisthatSen.PoeownstwohousesintheU.S.A.whichshedoesnotresidein.
xxxx
5.264.21. If a candidate for public office is jurisprudentially allowed to simultaneously maintain several residences in different places
withoutabandoningherdomicileofchoice,itfollowsthatSen.PoecouldsuccessfullyestablishherdomicileinthePhilippinesdespitethe
fact that she continues to own or acquires a house/sin the U.S.A. (which she does not even reside in). Contrary to Private Respondent
Valdez'sstance,themereownershipofthesehousesintheU.S.A.cannot,byitself,provethatSen.Poedoesnotpossessanimusnon
revertenditotheU.S.A.ThetotalityoftheevidenceandcircumstancesshowingSen.Poe'sreestablishmentofdomicileinthePhilippines
since24May2005certainlyoughttooutweighthesingularfactthatshealsoownshousesintheU.S.A.
5.264.22.Lastly,theruleisthatapersoncouldhaveonlyonedomicileatanygiventime.ConsideringthatSen.Poehasbeendomiciledin
thePhilippinessince24May2005,itisalegalimpossibilityforhertosimultaneouslyhaveanyotherdomicileelsewhere.Rollo (GR. No.
221697),Vol.VI,pp.40394041.
[267]Rollo(GR.Nos,221698700),Vol.VI,p,3717.
[268]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.VI,p.3654.
[269]Lacbayanv.Samay,661Phil.306,318(2011).
[270]Id.
[271]OrmocSugarCompany,Inc.v.OscoWorkersFraternitylaborUnion(OWFLU),110Phil.627,632(1961).
[272]ManilaElectricCompanyv.HeirsofSpousesDeloy,710Phil.427,441(2013),citingHeirsofBernardoUlepv.Sps.DucatandKiong,

597Phil.5,16(2009).
[273]RufinaPatisFactoryv.Alusitain,478Phil.544,558(2004).
[274]Id.at559.
[275]Id.
[276]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.VI,p.3775.
[277]Peoplev.Alberto,625Phil.545,556(2010).
[278] AN ACT AMENDING SECTION THIRTEEN OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS

"THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940" SO AS TO INCLUDE AS NONQUOTA IMMIGRANTS WHO MAY BE ADMITTED INTO THE

PHILIPPINES, NATURAL BORN CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN NATURALIZED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND DESIRE TO RETURN FOR
PERMANENTRESIDENCE.
[279]Rollo(G.R.Nos,221698700),Vol.VI,p.3721.
[280]Japzonv.CommissiononElections,supranote237at367Caballerov,CommissiononElections,supranote253.
[281]Japzonv.CommissiononElections,id.
[282]Supranote253.
[283]Caballerov.CommissiononElections,supranote253.
[284] Kossuth Kent Kennan, LL.D., A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, 111e Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, Rochester,

N.Y.,1934,95pp.200201.
[285]25AmJur2d24,p.19.
[286]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.VI,p.3830.
[287]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,p.489.
[288]GR.No.207264,June25,2013,699SCRA522.
[289]Id.at543.
[290]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.II,pp.815816.
[291]Id.at771.
[292]Jalosjosv.CommissiononElections,Supranote256at657.
[293]375Phil.1106(1999).
[294]GRNo.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267.
[295] Kossuth Kent Kennan, I.L.D., A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, 1934, The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company,

Rochester,N.Y.,92,p.195.
[296]Id.
[297]686Phil.563(2012).
[298]RULESOFCOURT,Rule131,Section3(d).
[299]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.27.
[300]Sinacav.Mula,373Phil.896,908(1999).
[301]Id.
[302]Mirandav.Abaya,370Phil.642,658(1999).
[303]Id.at381.
[304]Rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.VIp.3726.
[305] Dissenting Opinion of former Chief Justice Panganiban in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

487Phil.531,630(2004),reads:
IntheUnitedStatesmorethansixtyyearsago,JusticeBrandeisdelineatedthefamouscanonsofavoidanceunderwhichtheirSupreme
Court had refrained from passing upon constitutional questions, One such canon is that the Court must "not anticipate a question of
constitutionallawinadvanceofthenecessityofdecidingitxxx.ItisnotthehabitoftheCourttodecidequestionsofaconstitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." In addition, the Court must not "pass upon a constitutional question
althoughproperlypresentedbytherecord,ifthereisalsopresentsomeothergrounduponwhichthecasemaybedisposedof"
Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the
constitutional question presented by petitioner, since there is indeed some other ground upon which this case can be disposed of its

clearlackofurgency,byreasonofwhichCongressshouldbeallowedtodoitsprimarytaskofreviewingandpossiblyamendingthelaw.
[306]Supranote217at855.
[307]Id.

308151APhil.720.Itwasheldthat
[W]here the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the
controversy, after a fullblown hearing, with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
finding on the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such
person'scitizenship,inanyothercaseorproceeding.Butitismadeclearthatinnoinstancewilladecisiononthequestionofcitizenship
in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure
hereinstated.(Id.at,730731.)
[309]Supranote218.
[310]Rollo(GR.No.221697),Vol.I,p.7.

CONCURRINGOPINION

LEONEN,J.:
I am honored to concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez. I submit this Opinion to
furtherclarifymyposition.
Prefatory

Theruleoflawwesworetoupholdisnothingbuttheruleofjustlaw.Theruleoflawdoesnotrequireinsistenceinelaborate,strained,
irrational,andirrelevanttechnicalinterpretationwhentherecanbeaclearandrationalinterpretationthatismorejustandhumanewhile
equallyboundbythelimitsoflegaltext.
TheConstitution,asfundamentallaw,definesthemmtmumqualificationsforapersontopresenthisorhercandidacytorunforPresident.
ItisthissamefundamentallawwhichprescribesthatitisthePeople,intheirsovereigncapacityaselectorate,todeterminewhoamong
thecandidatesisbestqualifiedforthatposition.
Intheguiseofjudicialreview,thiscourtisnotempoweredtoconstricttheelectorate'schoicebysustainingtheCommissiononElections'
actionsthatshowthatitfailedtodisregarddoctrinalinterpretationofitspowersunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,created
novel jurisprudence in relation to the citizenship of foundlings, misinterpreted and misapplied e"isting jurisprudence relating to the
requirement of residency for election purposes, and declined to appreciate the evidence presented by petitioner as a whole and instead
insisted only on three factual grounds which do not necessarily lead to its inference. The Commission on Elections' actions are a clear
breachofitsconstitutionalcompetence.Itactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofaswellasexcessofjurisdiction.
Itisourlawthatachild,abandonedbyherparentsandleftatthedoorstepsofaruralcathedral,canalsodreamtobecomePresidentof
theRepublicofthePhilippines.TheminimumrequirementsoftheConstitutionisthatshebeanaturalbornFilipinaatthetimeofthefiling
ofherCertificateofCandidacyandhavedomicileinthePhilippinesforatleastten(10)yearspriortotheelections.[1]
Giventhefactsofthiscase,petitionerhascompliedwiththeserequirements.
Whenshefiledhercertificateofcandidacy,thiscourthasyettosquarelyruleontheissueofwhetherafoundlingachildabandonedby
herparentsisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
ThereareearlierrulingsSenateElectoralTribunalDecision[2]andtheBureauofImmigrationOrder[3]thatclearlystatethatpetitionerisa
naturalbornFilipina.ShewaselectedasSenatoroftheRepublic,garneringmorethan20millionvotes.[4]ThepositionofSenatorrequires
thatthepersonbeanaturalbornFilipino.[5]
TheassertionthatpetitionermadeinherCertificateofCandidacyforPresidentthatsheisanaturalborncitizenisagroundedopinion.It
does not constitute a material misrepresentation of fact. In much the same way, a Justice of this court does not commit material
misrepresentationwhenheorsheconstruestheConstitutioninanopinionsubmittedforthiscasethatafoundlingisanaturalborncitizen
absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the first place, this is an interpretation of lawnot a statement of material
fact.
DoingjusticeanddischargingourdutytoupholdtheruleoflawrequirethatweconcludethatfoundlingsarenaturalbornFilipinocitizens
absentanyevidencethatprovesthecontrary.Thisistheinescapableconclusionwhenwereadtheprovisionsoncitizenshipinthecontext
oftheentireConstitution,whichlikewisemandatesequality,humandignity,socialjustice,andcareforabandonedchildren.

TheConstitutionrequiresthateitherthefatherorthemotherisaFilipinocitizen.[6]Itdoesnotrequireanabandonedchildorafoundling
toidentifyhisorherbiologicalparents.[7]ItisenoughtoshowthatthereisaconvincinglikelihoodthatoneoftheparentsisaFilipino.
Contrarytotherespondents'submissions,itisnotbloodlinethatisrequired.OneoftheparentscanbeanaturalizedFilipinocitizen.[8]
The reference is only one ascendant generation. The constitutional provision does not absolutely require being born to an indigenous
ethnicity.
Thereisnorationalbasistoconcludethattheloyaltytothiscountryofafoundling,discoveredinaruralareaandadoptedbywelltodo
parents,willbemoresuspectthanachildborntonaturalizedFilipinoparents.
ThatafoundlingisanaturalbornFilipino,unlessclearandconvincingevidenceisshownotherwise,isalsothedefinitiveinferencefrom
contemporaneousactsofCongress[9]andtheExecutive.[10]Thisisalsotheavailingconclusionconsideringourbindingcommitmentsin
internationallaw.[11]ThereisclearandconvincingevidencefromthehistoryoftheactualtextoftheentireConstitution.
In the case at bar, petitioner discharged her burden to prove that she is naturalborn when the parties stipulated as to her status as a
foundlingfoundinfrontofachurchinJaro,Iloilo.[12]Whentheyardsticksofcommonsenseandstatisticsareused,[13]itbordersonthe
absurdtostartwiththepresumptionthatshewasborntobothaforeignfatherandaforeignmother.Inalllikelihood,shewasborntoat
leastaFilipinofatherortoaFilipinomother,orboth.
Foundlings present the only ambiguous situation in our Constitution. There is no slippery slope. Malevolent actors that wish to avail
themselves of this doctrine will have to prove that they are foundlings. They will have to do so with the requisite quantum of proof for
immigrationpurposes.Theywillhavetodosoifitisalsonecessaryforthemforpurposesofbeingcandidatesinarelevantelection.
TheCommissiononElectionscommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictionwhenitwentbeyonditscompetence
under Section 78[14] of the Omnibus Election Code and the Constitution by not ruling exclusively on whether there was material
misrepresentation. The questioned Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc in these cases create a new and erroneous
doctrineonthispointoflaw.ItiscontrarytothetextandspiritoftheConstitution.
Likewise, this court has yet to decide on a case that squarely raises the issue as to whether the period of residency required by the
ConstitutionofacandidaterunningforpublicofficecanonlycommenceafterheorshereacquireshisorherFilipinocitizenship.Neither
hasthiscourtexpressedtheratiodecidendithatonlywhenheorshehasaresidentvisacanwecommencetocounthisorherperiodof
residencyforelectionpurposes.Noratiodecidendiexistsfortheserulesbecausetherehasnotyetbeenacasethatsquarelyraisedthese
asissues.Noratiodecidendiexistsbecausethisisnotrelevantnororganictothepurposeofresidencyasarequirementforelectivepublic
offices.
Ourstandingdoctrinesarethat:(a)residencyisaquestionoffact[15](b)residency,forelectionpurposes,isequivalenttodomicile[16]
and (c) domicile requires physical presence and animus manendi.[17] Animus manendi is negated by the absence of animus non
revertendi.
To require a new element for establishing residency in order to deny petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy is not only unfair it
communicatesasuspiciousanimusagainsther.Itmaygiverisetoafairimplicationthatthereispartialityforoneoranothercandidate
runningfortheOfficeofPresident.Itisadangerousmoveonthepartofthiscourt.Itwillaffectthecredibilityofthenextadministration
andwillundermineourstandingasasentinelfortheprotectionofwhatisjustandwhatisprescribedbytheruleoflaw.
However,thegraveabuseofdiscretionbytheCommissiononElectionsdoesnotendthere.TheCommissiononElectionsobviouslydidnot
appreciate all of the evidence presented by the parties in inferring when the residency of petitioner for the purpose of this election
commenced. They relied on only three points: (a) a prior statement in an earlier Certificate of Candidacy for Senator submitted by
petitioner[18](b)inferencesfromsomeoftheactionsofpetitioner'shusband[19]and(c)theuseofherUnitedStatespassports.[20]
Petitioner has asserted that her statement in her present Certificate of Candidacy for President is accurate. She explains that her prior
statementinher2012CertificateofCandidacyforSenatorwasamistakecommittedingoodfaith.TheCommissiononElectionsrejects
thesestatementswithoutvalidevidence.Itinsiststhatitisthe2012CertificateofCandidacythatistrueand,thus,thepresentCertificate
of Candidacy that is falsely represented. In doing so, the Commission on Elections acts arbitrarily and disregards the doctrine in
RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections.[21]Ineffect,itproposestooverturntheprecedentpronouncedbythiscourt.
Itistruethatpetitionerisapoliticalstudiesgraduate.[22]However,itislikewisetruethatthiscourtshouldnotexpectpetitionertohave
been thoroughly familiar with the precise interpretation of the legal concept of residence and to correctly apply it when she filed her
CertificateofCandidacyforSenator.Wedonotexpectthatmuchevenfromourlawyers.Weacceptthattherecanbehonestmistakesin
interpretationandapplication.Otherwise,weshoulddisciplineanylawyerwholosesacasewithfinalityinanycourtfiledinthiscountry.
To imply petitioner's lack of intent to establish domicile from the actions of her husband is a willful misappreciation of the evidence
presented by petitioner with the Commission on Elections. The Commission on Elections infers that the wife cannot establish domicile
separatedfromthehusband.ThisisclearlynotthestateofPhilippinelaw,whichrequiresfundamentalequalitybetweenmenandwomen.
TheCommissiononElectionsisolatesthefactofherhusband'scontinuedalbeitshort presenceintheUnitedStateswhenpetitionerand
herchildrenreturnedtothePhilippines.Fromthere,theCommissiononElectionsinfersthatwhenpetitionerandherchildrenreturnedto
thePhilippines,theydidnotintendtoestablishtheirnewpermanenthome.
The Commission on Elections did not appreciate the following established facts that established the context of petitioner's return to the
PhilippinesonMay24,2005:
First,thehusbandwasbothaFilipinoandAmericancitizen.[23]

Second, the husband and the wife uprooted their children, removed them from their schools in the United States, and enrolled them in
schoolsinthePhilippines.[24]
Third,oneoftheirchildren,ababy,waslikewiseuprootedandbroughttothePhilippinestostayherepermanently.[25]
Fourth, arrangements were made to transfer their household belongings in several container vans from the United States to the
Philippines.[26]
Fifth,petitionerdidnotseekfurtheremploymentabroad.[27]
Sixth,petitioner'shusbandresignedfromhisworkandmovedtothePhilippines.[28]
Seventh,petitioner'shusbandwasemployedinthePhilippines.[29]
Eighth,theysoldtheplacewheretheystayedintheUnitedStates.[30]
Ninth,theyboughtpropertyinthePhilippinesandbuiltanewfamilyhome.[31]
Tenth,petitionerregisteredasavoteragaininthePhilippinesandactuallyvoted.[32]
Eleventh,petitionerregisteredasataxpayerinthePhilippinesandpaidtaxes.[33]
Lastly,petitionerandherhusbandformallymadeannouncementswithrespecttotheirchangeofpostaladdress.[34]
NoneofthesefactssuggestedbytheDissentingOpinionscannegatetheinevitableconclusionoftheintentattendanttotheestablishment
ofpetitioner'spresenceinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005.
That she had properties in the United States is not inconsistent with establishing permanent residence in the Philippines. One who is
domiciledinthePhilippinesisnotprohibitedfromowningpropertiesinanothercountry.Besides,petitioner'sassertionthattheproperties
theyhaveintheUnitedStatesarenottheirresidencewasnotsuccessfullyrefutedbyprivaterespondents.
Petitioner's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship in July 2006 does not negate physical presence and her intention to establish permanent
residenceinthecountry.ItisnotimprobablethataforeignermayestablishdomicileinthePhilippines.Sheisareturningbalikbayanwith
rootsinthePhilippineswhowentthroughaprocesstoestablishherresidencyinthePhilippinesandthenappliedfortherecognitionofher
dualcitizenship.
Manyofthe47yearsthatpetitionerhaslivedwasspentinthePhilippines.Exceptforthe16yearsthatshewasintheUnitedStates,the
other 31 years of her life were spent here in the Philippines. The person who became her mother is of advanced age and is in the
Philippines. She went to school in this country and made friendships as well as memories. She, together with her husband, now has
significant property here in the Philippines. That she intended to come back to take care of her recognized mother is a tendency so
culturallyFilipino,butwhichmayhavebeenforgottenbytheCommissiononElections.
SomeoftheDissentingOpinionssuggestanewdoctrine:thefailureofabalikbayanwhoisallowedtoenterthePhilippinesvisafreeto
accomplishanapplicationtogetaresidentvisaisarequirementtoestablishresidencyforelectionpurposes.Thisisanewelementnot
contemplatedinourcurrentdoctrinesondomicile.
Residencyforelectionpurposesisdifferentfromresidencyforimmigrationpurposes.Applyingforanalienresidentvisawasnotrequired
ofpetitioner.ShewaslegallyallowedvisafreeentryasabalikbayanpursuanttoRepublicActNo.6768,asamended.Withintheoneyear
period of her visafree stay, there is no prohibition for a balikbayan to apply to reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.Thisshedid.AtnotimewasherstayinthePhilippinesillegal.
Moreimportantly,thepurposeoftheresidencyrequirementisalreadydoctrinallyestablished.Torayno,Sr.v.CommissiononElections[35]
explainedthatitismeant"togivecandidatestheopportunitytobefamiliarwiththeneeds,difficulties,aspirations,potentialsforgrowth
andallmattersvitaltothewelfareoftheirconstituencieslikewise,itenablestheelectoratetoevaluatetheofficeseekers'qualifications
andfitnessforthejobtheyaspirefor."[36]
The requirement to procure a resident visa has no rational relation to this stated purpose. It is a stretch to create a new doctrine. To
requireitnowinthiscasewillhaveconsiderablerepercussionstothefutureofourcountry.
There is no evidence that can challenge the conclusion that on May 24, 2005, petitioner physically came back with the intention to
establish her permanent home in the Philippines. In truth, the entire process of establishing petitioner's permanent residence here was
completedinApril2006,wellbeforeMay9,2006,10yearspriortotheupcomingelections.
NeitherwoulditbelogicaltoassertthatuntilJuly2006,petitionerhadnotlegallyestablisheddomicileinthePhilippines.BeforeMay2006,
petitioner and her husband were already in the Philippines. Neither of them were employed in the United States. They had their family
homehere.TheirchildrenwereenrolledinschoolsinthePhilippines.
TheCommissiononElections'proposedconclusionissimplytooabsurd.
Giventheevidenceonwhichpetitionerreckonedherresidency,shedidnotcommitmaterialmisrepresentation.Thus,itwasnotonlyan
errorbutgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCommissiononElectionstotrivializethepiecesofevidencepresentedbypetitioner

inordertojustifyitsconclusion.
In a proceeding under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Commission on Elections is neither constitutionally nor statutorily
empoweredtoenunciatenewlegaldoctrineortoreversedoctrineslaiddownbythiscourt.Itcannot,onthebasisofnewdoctrinesnot
knowntothecandidate,declarethathisorhercertificateofcandidacyisinfectedwithmaterialmisrepresentation.
TheCommissiononElectionsismandatedbytheConstitutiontoenforceandadministerelectionlaws.Itcannotdischargethisdutywhen
thereisanysuspicionthatitfavorsordisfavorsacandidate.WhenitgoesbeyonditscompetencyunderSection78todenyacertificateof
candidacy"exclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedtherein...isfalse,"itdoesnotonlydisplayatendencyto
abuseitspoweritseriouslyunderminesitsneutrality.Thisisquintessentiallygraveabuseofdiscretion.
No effort should be spared so as to ensure that our political preferences for or against any present candidate for the Presidency do not
infect our reading of the law and its present doctrines. We should surmount every real or imagined pressure, communicated directly or
indirectlybyreadingtheentireConstitutionandjurisprudenceastheyactuallyexist.
The propositions of respondents require acceptance of doctrines not yet enunciated and inferences that do not arise from the evidence
presented.Thiswillhavenothingtodowithreality.Itwillbeunfairtopetitioner,andwillamounttomisusingourpowerofjudicialreview
with an attitude less deferential to the sovereign People's choices expressed both in the Constitution and in elections. Upholding the
Commission on Elections' Resolutions, which stand on shaky legal grounds, amounts to multiplying each of our individual political
preferencesmorethanamillionfold.
TheFacts

BeforethiscourtareconsolidatedPetitionsforCertiorariunderRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesofCourtfiledbypetitionerMary
GraceNatividadS.PoeLlamanzares.ShepraysforthenullificationoftheResolutionsoftheCommissiononElections,whichcancelledher
CertificateofCandidacyforPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinconnectionwiththeMay9,2016NationalandLocalElections.
ThePetitiondocketedasG.R.No.221697assailstheDecember1,2015ResolutionoftheCommissiononElectionsSecondDivision,which
grantedthePetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCancelCertificateofCandidacyfiledbyprivaterespondentEstrellaC.Elamparo(Elamparo)
andtheCommissiononElectionsEnBanc'sDecember23,2015Resolution,[27]whichdeniedpetitioner'sMotionforReconsideration.[38]
On the other hand, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 221698700 assails the December 11, 2015 Resolution[39] of the Commission on
Elections First Division, which granted the Petitions filed by private respondents Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras),andAmadoT.Valdez(Valdez)andtheCommissiononElectionsEnBanc'sDecember23,2015Resolution,[40]whichdenied
petitioner'sMotionforReconsideration.[41]
The facts of the case are generally stipulated and wellknown. Petitioner is a foundling. Her biological parents are unknown. All that is
knownaboutheroriginisthatatabout9:30a.m.onSeptember3,1968,shewasfoundintheparishchurchofJaro,IloilobyoneEdgardo
Militar.EdgardoMilitaroptedtoplacepetitionerinthecareandcustodyofhisrelativeEmilianoMilitarandthelatter'swife.[42]
Emiliano Militar reported the discovery to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar in Jaro, Iloilo on September 6, 1968.[43] A Foundling
Certificatewasissued.ThisCertificateindicatedpetitioner'sdateofbirthtobeSeptember3,1968.Petitioner'sfullnamewasrecordedas
"MaryGraceNatividadContrerasMilitar."[44]
Whenpetitionerwasfive(5)yearsold,shewaslegallyadoptedbyspousesRonaldAllanPoe(FernandoPoe,Jr.)andJesusaSonoraPoe
(SusanRoces).TheDecisiondatedMay13,1974bytheMunicipalTrialCourtofSanJuan,RizalgrantedthePetitionforAdoptionfiledby
FernandoPoe,Jr.andSusanRoces.[45]Thecourtorderedthatpetitioner'snamebechanged"fromMaryGraceNatividadContrerasMilitar
toMaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoe."[46]
OnApril11,1980,theOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofIloiloCityreceivedacopyoftheMay13,1974DecisionoftheMunicipalTrialCourtof
SanJuan.Itinscribedonpetitioner'sFoundlingCertificatethatshewasadoptedbyFernandoPoe,Jr.andSusanRocesonMay13,1974.
[47]Ahandwrittennotationwasmadeontherighthandsideofpetitioner'sFoundlingCertificate,asfollows:

NOTE:AdoptedchildbytheSpousesRonaldAllanPoeandJesusaSonoraPoeasperCourtOrder,Mun.Court,SanJuan,Rizal,
byHon.JudgeAlfredoM.GorgoniodatedMay13,1974,underSp.Proc.No.138.[48]

InaccordancewiththeMay13,1974Decision,theOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofIloiloCityamendedpetitioner'sFoundlingCertificateso
that her middle name ("Contreras") and last name ("Militar") were to be replaced with "Sonora" and "Poe," respectively. Further, the
names "Ronald Allan Poe" and "Jesusa Sonora Poe" were entered into petitioner's Foundling Certificate in the spaces reserved for the
namesoftheindividualswhoarelegallyconsideredaspetitioner'sparents.[49]
On December 13, 1986, when petitioner was 18 years old, the Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for
PrecinctNo.196,Greenhills,SanJuan,MetroManila.[50]
On April 4, 1988, petitioner was issued a Philippine passport by the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This passport stated that "(t)he
GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesrequestsallconcernedtopermitthebearer,acitizenofthePhilippinestopasssafelyand
freelyand,incaseofneed,togive(her)lawfulaidandprotection."[51]

Thispassportwasvalidforaperiodoffive(5)years.[52]ItwasrenewedonApril5,1993,andsubsequentlyonMay19,1998,October13,
2009,December19,2013,andMarch18,2014.[53]
Petitioner initially enrolled in the Development Studies Program of the University of the Philippines. However, in 1988, petitioner
transferredtotheBostonCollegeinChestnutHill,Massachusetts,USA,wheresheobtainedherBachelorofArtsdegreeinPoliticalStudies
in1991.[54]
OnJuly27,1991,petitionermarriedTeodoroMisaelV.Llamanzares(TeodoroLlamanzares),acitizenfrombirth[55]ofboththePhilippines
and the United States.[56] Teodoro Llamanzares was then based in the United States. On July 29, 1991, petitioner went to the United
Statestolivewithherhusband.[57]
Petitionerandherhusbandborethree(3)children.BrianDaniel(Brian)wasbornintheUnitedStatesonApril16,1992,HannaMacKenzie
(Hanna)inthePhilippinesonJuly10,1998,andJesusaAnika(Anika)inthePhilippinesonJune5,2004.[58]
TenyearsafterhavingbeenbasedintheUnitedStates,[59]petitionerbecameanaturalizedAmericancitizenonOctober18,2001.[60]On
December19,2001,shewasissuedUnitedStatesPassportNo.017037793.[61]
On April 8, 2004, petitioner, who was then pregnant with her third child, returned to the Philippines.[62] She was accompanied by her
daughter Hanna.[63] Petitioner asserted that her return had two purposes: first, to support her parents as Fernando Poe, Jr. was then
runningforPresidentofthePhilippinesandsecond,togivebirthtoherthirdchild,Anika,inthePhilippines.[64]
ItwasonlyonJuly8,2004,afterAnikawasbornonJune5,2004,thatpetitionerreturnedtotheUnitedStates.[65]
OnDecember11,2004,petitioner'sfatherFernandoPoe,Jr.slippedintoacomaandwasconfinedatSt.Luke'sMedicalCenterinQuezon
City.RushingtoreturntothePhilippines,petitionerarrivedonDecember13,2004.Unfortunately,FernandoPoe,Jr.diedbeforepetitioner
couldreachthehospital.[66]PetitionerstayeduntilFebruary3,2005toallegedly"comforthergrievingmotherandtoassist[her]intaking
careofthefuneralarrangementsand...thesettlementofherfather'sestate."[67]
In2004,petitionerresignedfromherworkintheUnitedStates.[68]Followingherresignation,shedidnotseekemploymentthereagain.
[69]

Petitionerclaimsthatinthefirstquarterof2005,afterherfather'suntimelydeathandtogivemoralsupporttohermother,sheandher
husbanddecidedtoreturntothePhilippinesforgood.[70]
Early in 2005, Brian and Hanna's schools in the United States were informed of their family's intention to transfer them to Philippine
schoolsforthefollowingsemester.[71]
BeginningMarch2005,petitionerandherhusbandbeganreceivingcostestimatesfrompropertymoversasregardstherelocationoftheir
propertiesfromtheUnitedStatestothePhilippines.AmongthesewerethosefromVictoryVanInternational(VictoryVan).[72]Petitioner
notedthatemailsbetweenherandherhusband,ononehand,andVictoryVan,ontheother,"showtheprocessthat[she]andherfamily
wentthroughtopermanentlyrelocateandreestablishthemselvesinPhilippines[.]"[73]Asrecalledbypetitioner:

2.22.1.On18March2005,withsubjectheading"RelocationtoManilaEstimate",arepresentativeofVictoryVanrepliedtoan
inquirymadebyPetitioner,andinformedherthattheywouldneedatleastthree(3)fortyfootcontainerstotransportallofthe
family'shouseholdgoods,furniture,andtwo(2)vehiclesfromVirginia,U.S.A.toManila,Philippines.Theservicewouldinclude
"packing, export wrapping, custom crating for chandeliers, marble top and glass tops, loading of containers ..., US customs
export inspection for the vehicles, transportation to Baltimore, ocean freight and documentation to arrival Manila, customs
clearance, delivery, ... unwrapping and placement of furniture, assisted unpacking, normal assembly ..., container return to
portandsamedaydebrisremovalbasedonthree40'containers."
2.22.2.PetitionerandherhusbandeventuallyengagedtheservicesofVictoryVan,andscheduledtwo(2)movingphasesfor
the packing, collection and storage of their household goods for eventual transport to the Philippines. The "first phase" was
scheduledsometimeinFebruary2006,withPetitionerflyingintotheU.S.A.tosupervisethepacking,storage,anddisposalof
their household goods in Virginia. The "second phase" was supervised by Petitioner's husband and completed sometime in
April2006.[74](Citationsomitted)

Apartfrommakingarrangementsforthetransferoftheirproperties,petitionerandherhusbandalsoaskedPhilippineauthoritiesaboutthe
procedure for bringing their dogs into the country.[75] They processed an application for import permit from the Bureau of Animal
IndustryNationalVeterinaryandQuarantineService.[76]
Petitionerandherthree(3)childrenreturnedtothePhilippinesonMay24,2005.[77] Petitioner's husband was unable to join them and
hadtostayintheUnitedStatesas,accordingtopetitioner,hestillhad"tofinishpendingprojectsandtoarrangeforthesaleofthefamily
homethere."[78]
InreturningtothePhilippines,petitionerandherchildrendidnotobtainvisas.Petitioneremphasizedthatavisawasnotlegallyrequired

sincesheandherchildrenavailedthemselvesofthebenefitallowedundertheBalikbayanProgramofoneyearvisafreeentry.[79]
UponarrivalinthePhilippines,petitionerandherchildreninitiallylivedwithpetitioner'smotherSusanRocesat23LincolnSt.,Greenhills
West, San Juan City.[80] Petitioner emphasized that the living arrangements at her mother's house were modified to accommodate her
andherchildren.[81]Further,herfather'slongtimedriverwaspermanentlyassignedtoher.[82]
Fortheacademicyear20052006,petitionerenrolledBrianandHannainPhilippineschools.BrianwasenrolledatBeaconSchoolinTaguig
City,[83]whileHannaatAssumptionCollegeinMakatiCity.[84]In2007,whenshewasoldenoughtogotoschool,Anikawasenrolledin
LearningConnectioninSanJuanCity.[85]BriansubsequentlytransferredtoLaSalleGreenhillsin2006,wherehefinishedhishighschool
educationin2009.[86]HannafinishedhergradeschoolandhighschooleducationatAssumptionCollege,[87]whereAnikaalsocompleted
Kindergarten.[88]Sheisnowasixthgraderinthesameschool.[89]
ShortlyafterherarrivalinthePhilippines,petitioneralsoregisteredasataxpayerwiththeBureauofInternalRevenue.[90]Shewasissued
aTaxIdentificationNumberbytheBureauofInternalRevenueonJuly22,2005.[91]
Petitionerassertedthatsometimeinthelatterpartof2005,SusanRocesdiscoveredthatthelawyerinchargeofpetitioner'sadoptionin
1974failedtosecurefromtheOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofIloiloCityanewCertificateofLiveBirthindicatingpetitioner'sadoptedname
andthenamesofheradoptiveparents.[92]Thus,onNovember8,2005,sheexecutedanaffidavitattestingtothelawyer'somissionand
submittedittotheOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofIloiloCity.OnMay4,2006,theOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofIloiloCityissuedanew
CertificateofLiveBirthindicatingpetitioner'snametobe"MaryGraceNatividadSonoraPoe."[93]
Inaddition,aroundthattime,petitionerandherhusband"acquiredUnit7FofOneWilsonPlaceCondominiuminSanJuan"[94](alongwith
a corresponding parking slot).[95] According to petitioner, this was to serve as their temporary residence until the completion of their
familyhomeinCorinthianHills,QuezonCity.[96]
On February 14, 2006, petitioner left for the United States allegedly to supervise the disposal her family's remaining belongings. She
returnedtothePhilippinesonMarch11,2006.[97]
On March 28, 2006, as the disposal of their remaining properties had been completed, petitioner's husband informed the United States
PostalServiceoftheirfamily'sabandonmentoftheiraddressintheUnitedStates.[98]
InApril2006,petitioner'shusbandresignedfromhisworkintheUnitedStates.[99]Thepackingofpetitioner'sfamily'sproperties,which
weretobetransportedtothePhilippines,wasalsocompletedonoraboutApril25to26,2006.TheirhomeintheUnitedStateswassold
onApril27,2006.[100]
Petitioner'shusbandthenreturnedtothePhilippinesonMay4,2006.ByJuly2006,hefoundemploymentinthePhilippines.[101]
Inthemeantime,inearly2006,petitionerandherhusbandacquireda509squaremeterlotinCorinthianHills,BarangayUgongNorte,
QuezonCity.Theybuiltahouseonthislot,which,aspetitionerpointsout,remainstobetheirfamilyhometothisday.[102]
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines[103] pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225,otherwiseknownastheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003.Threedayslater,onJuly10,2006,shelikewisefiled
beforetheBureauofImmigrationaPetitionforReacquisitionofFilipinoCitizenship.[104]ShealsofiledPetitionsforDerivateCitizenshipon
behalfofherthreechildrenwhowereatthattimeallbelow18yearsold.[105]
OnJuly18,2006,theBureauofImmigrationissuedtheOrdergrantingallthesePetitions.[106]TheOrderstated:

Acarefulreviewofthedocumentssubmittedinsupportoftheinstantpetitionindicatethatthepetitionerwasaformercitizen
of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen
thereafter,becameanAmericancitizenandisnowaholderofanAmericanpassportwasissuedanACTandICRandhastaken
her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have reacquired her
PhilippineCitizenship.[107]

TheBureauofImmigrationissuedIdentificationCertificatesforpetitionerandherthreechildren.[108]Petitioner'sIdentificationCertificate
statesthatsheisa"citizenofthePhilippinespursuanttotheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003(RA9225)inrelationto
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF2005 per Office Order No. AFF069133 signed by
AssociateCommissionerRoyM.AlmorodatedJuly18,2006."[109]
OnAugust31,2006,petitionerregisteredasavoterofBarangaySantaLucia,SanJuanCity.[110]
OnOctober13,2009,theDepartmentofForeignAffairissuedtopetitioneraPhilippinepassportwithPassportNumberXX4731999.[111]
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
ClassificationBoard.[112]PetitionerassertsthatshedidnotimmediatelyacceptthisappointmentasshewasadvisedthatSection5(3)of
theCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003requiredtwothingsofherbeforeassuminganyappointivepublicoffice:first,to

taketheOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandsecond,torenounceherAmericancitizenship.[113]
Thus, on October 20, 2010, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the [United States of America] and
RenunciationofAmericanCitizenship,[114]stating:

I, MARY GRACE POELLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills,
QuezonCity,Philippines,afterhavingbeendulysworntoinaccordancewiththelaw,doherebydeposeandstatethatwiththis
affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/ American citizenship, together with all
rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally,
voluntarily,andofmyownfreewill,freeofanyduressorundueinfluence.
INWITNESSWHEREOF,Ihavehereuntoaffixedmysignaturethis20thdayofOctober2010atPasigCity,Philippines.[115]

AnoriginalcopyoftheAffidavitwassubmittedtotheBureauofImmigrationonthesameday.[116]
PetitionertookherOathofOfficeasChairpersonoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoardonOctober21,2010.[117]
SheformallyassumedofficeasChairpersononOctober26,2010.[118]
InadditiontoherAffidavitrenouncingherAmericancitizenship,petitionerexecutedonJuly12,2011anOath/AffirmationofRenunciation
of Nationality of the United States before Somer E. BessireBriers, Vice Consul ofthe Embassy ofthe United States of America in Manila.
[119]

Onthesameday,sheaccomplishedaQuestionnaireInformationforDeterminingPossibleLossofU.S.Citizenship,[120]whereshestated
that on October 21, 2010 she had taken her oath as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board with the
intentofrelinquishingherAmericancitizenship.[121]ShefurtherstatedthatshehadbeenlivinginthePhilippinesfromSeptember3,1968
toJuly29,1991andfromMay2005tothispresentday.[122]Onpage4ofthisQuestionnaire,petitionerassertedthat:

IbecamearesidentofthePhilippinesonceagainsince2005.MymotherstillresidesinthePhilippines.MyhusbandandIare
both employed and own properties in the Philippines. As a dual citizen (FilipinoAmerican) since 2006, I've voted in two
Philippinenationalelections.MythreechildrenstudyandresideinthePhilippinesatthetimeIperformedtheactasdescribed
inPartIitem6.[123]

OnDecember9,2011,petitionerwasissuedaCertificateofLossofNationalitybyJasonGalian,ViceConsuloftheEmbassyoftheUnited
States of America.[124] The Certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service of the United States' Department of State on
February3,2012.[125]
PetitionerranforSenatorofthePhilippinesintheMay2013elections.[126]SheexecutedherCertificateofCandidacyonSeptember27,
2012andfileditbeforetheCommissiononElectionsonOctober2,2012.[127]Petitioner"declaredthatshehadbeenaresidentofthe
Philippinesforsix(6)yearsandsix(6)monthsimmediatelybeforethe13May2013elections."[128]
On May 16, 2013, petitioner's election as Senator was formally proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.[129] Petitioner is currently
servinghertermasSenator.[130]
OnDecember19,2013,theDepartmentofForeignAffairsissuedpetitioneraDiplomaticpassportwithPassportNumberDE0004530valid
untilDecember18,2018.PetitionerwasalsoissuedaPhilippinepassportwithPassportNo.EC0588861validuntilMarch17,2019.[131]
On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the
May9,2016Elections. [132]ShestatedthatsheisanaturalhomFilipinocitizenandthather"residenceinthePhilippinesuptotheday
beforeMay9,2016"wastobe"10"yearsand"11"months.[133]
PetitionerattachedtoherCertificateofCandidacytheAffidavitAffirmingRenunciationofU.S.A.Citizenship,[134]inwhichsheemphasized
that she never recanted the Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
CitizenshipthatsheexecutedonOctober20,2010.Further,shestatedthateffectiveOctober21,2010,shewasnolongeranAmerican
citizen,evenwithinthecontemplationofthelawsoftheUnitedStates.[135]Shefurtherstated:

Although I have long ceased to be a U.S.A. citizen, and without implying that my previous renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship
was in any manner ineffective or recanted, but solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements for filing my
CertificateofCandidacy('COC')forPresidentinthe9May2016election(specifically.Item10oftheCOC)andinlightofthe
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Amado vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015) that '(t)here is no law
prohibiting(me)fromexecutinganAffidavitofRenunciationeveryelectionperiodifonlyavertpossiblequestionsabout(my)
qualifications."IherebyaffinnandreiteratethatIpersonallyrenouncemypreviousU.S.A.citizenship,togetherwithallrights,
privileges, duties, allegiance and fidelity pertaining thereto. I likewise declare that, aside from that renounced U.S.A.
citizenship,Ihaveneverpossessedanyotherforeigncitizenship.[136](Citationomitted)

OnOctober16,2015,ElamparofiledaPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCanceltheCertificateofCandidacyofpetitioner.[137]Thecase
was raffled to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections.[138] On October 19, 2015, Tatad filed a Verified Petition for
Disqualificationagainstpetitioner.[139]OnOctober20,2015,ContrerasfiledaPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoorCanceltheCertificateof
Candidacy of petitioner.[140] On November 9, 2015, Valdez also filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacyofpetitioner.[141]ThePetitionsofTatad,Contreras,andValdezwereraffledtotheCommissiononElectionsFirstDivision.[142]
On November 25, 2015, a clarificatory hearing was conducted on the three Petitions before the Commission on Elections First Division.
[143] The parties were directed to file their respective memoranda until December 3, 2015, 10 days from the date of the preliminary

conference.[144] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 3, 2015, when the parties had submitted their respective
Memoranda.[145]
ThePetitionfiledbyElamparowaslikewisesubmittedforresolutionafterthepartieshadsubmittedtheirrespectivememoranda.[146]
IntheOrderdatedDecember1,2015,theSecondDivisionoftheCommissiononElectionsgrantedthePetitionofElamparo.[147]
OnDecember2,2015,ElamparofiledanUrgentMotiontoExcludepetitionerfromthelistofcandidatesfortheOfficeofPresidentinthe
officialballotstobeprintedfortheMay2016NationalElections.[148]
PetitionerfiledherPartialMotionforReconsiderationbeforetheCommissiononElectionsEnBanconDecember7,2015.[149]
Meanwhile,intheOrderdatedDecember11,2015,theCommissiononElectionsFirstDivisiongrantedthePetitionsofTatad,Contreras,
and Valdez and ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines.[150]
OnDecember16,2015,petitionermovedforreconsiderationbeforetheCommissiononElectionsEnBanc.[151]
IntheresolutionsdatedDecember23,2015,theCommissiononElectionsEnBancdeniedpetitioner'smotionsforreconsideration.[152]
OnDecember28,2015,petitionerfiledbeforethiscourtthepresentPetitionswithanaccompanyingExtremelyUrgentApplicationforan
ExParteTemporaryRestrainingOrder/StatusQuoAnteOrderand/orWritofPreliminaryInjunction.[153]
On December 28, 2015, this court issued a temporary restraining order.[154] Respondents were similarly ordered to comment on the
presentPetitions.[155]ThePetitionswerelaterconsolidated.[156]
OralargumentswereconductedfromJanuary19,2016toFebruary16,2016.Thereafter,thepartiessubmittedtheirmemorandaandthe
casewasdeemedsubmittedforresolution.
TheIssues

Forresolutionarethefollowingissues:

A.WhetherareviewoftheCommissiononElections'assailedResolutionsviatheconsolidatedPetitionsforcertiorariunderRule64,in
relationtoRule65ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedureiswarranted
B.WhetherRule23,Section8oftheCommissiononElections'RulesofProcedureisvalid
(1) Whether Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Election's Rules of Procedure violates Article IXA, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution
(2) Whether the Commission on Elections may promulgate a rulestipulating a period within which its decisions shall become final
andexecutorythatisinconsistentwiththerulespromulgatedbythiscourtwithrespecttothereviewofjudgmentsandfinalorders
orresolutionsoftheCommissiononElections
C.WhethertheCommissiononElectionsshouldhavedismissedandnotentertainedthePetitionfiledbyprivaterespondentFranciscoS.
TatadagainstpetitionerMaryGraceNatividadS.PoeLlamanzares:
(1)Onthegroundoffailuretostatethecauseofaction
(2)ForinvokinggroundsforapetitiontocancelordenyduecoursetoacertificateofcandidacyunderSection78oftheOmnibus
ElectionCode,inrelationtoRule23oftheCommissiononElection'sRulesofProcedure.
D.WhethertheCommissiononElectionshasjurisdictionoverthePetitionsfiledbyprivaterespondentsEstrellaC.Elamparo,Francisco
S.Tatad,AntonioP.Contreras,andAmadoD.Valdez
(1) Whether the Commission on Elections acted with grave abuse of jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction in ruling on

petitioner'sintrinsiceligibility,specificallywithrespecttohercitizenshipandresidency
E.Whethergroundsexistforthecancellationofpetitioner's
CertificateofCandidacyforPresident
(1)WhetherpetitionermadeanymaterialmisrepresentationinherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident
(a) Whether petitioner's statement that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen constitutes material misrepresentation warranting the
cancellationofherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident
i.Whether the Commission on Elections' conclusion that petitioner, being a foundling, is not a Filipino citizen under Article IV,
Section1ofthe1935Constitution,iswarrantedandsustainsthecancellationofherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident
Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner has the burden of provmg her
naturalborncitizenshipinproceedingsunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodeinrelationtoRule23oftheCommission
onElections'Rules
ii.WhethertheCommissiononElections'conclusionthatpetitionerdidnotvalidlyreacquirenaturalbornPhilippinecitizenshipis
warrantedandsustainsthecancellationofherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident

(b)Whetherpetitioner'sstatementinherCertificateofCandidacythatherperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesisten(10)yearsand
eleven (11) months until May 9, 2016 constitutes material misrepresentation warranting the cancellation of her Certificate of
CandidacyforPresident
Whether the Commission on Elections' conclusion that petitioner did not meet the required period of residence is warranted and
sustainsthecancellationofherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident
(2)WhetherpetitionerintendedtomisleadtheelectorateinthestatementsshemadeinherCertificateofCandidacyforPresident
(1)WhetherpetitionerintendedtomisleadtheelectoratebystatinginherCertificateofCandidacythatsheisanaturalbornFilipino
Citizenand
(2) Whether petitioner's statement in her Certificate of Candidacy that her period of residence by May 9, 2016 would be ten (10)
yearsandeleven(11)monthsconstitutesconcealmentof"ineligibility"forthePresidencyandanattempttomisleadordeceivethe
Philippineelectorate.

ThePetitionsshouldbegranted.
I

Weclarifythemodeofreviewanditsparameters.
Thiscourt'spowerofjudicialreviewisinvokedthroughpetitionsforcertiorariseekingtoannultheCommissiononElections'resolutions
whichcontainconclusionsregardingpetitionerPoe'scitizenship,residency,andpurportedmisrepresentation.
UnderRule64,Section2oftheRulesofCourt,ajudgmentorfinalorderorresolutionoftheCommissiononElectionsmaybebroughtto
this court on certiorari under Rule 65.[157] For a writ of certiorari to be issued under Rule 65, the respondent tribunal must have acted
withoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.[158]
Theconceptofjudicialpowerunderthe1987Constitutionrecognizesthiscourt'sjurisdictiontosettleactualcasesorcontroversies.Italso
underscoresthiscourt'sjurisdictiontodeterminewhetheragovernmentagencyorinstrumentalitycommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionin
the fulfillment of its actions. Judicial review grants this court authority to invalidate actsof the legislative, the executive, constitutional
bodies,andadministrativeagencieswhentheseactsarecontrarytotheConstitution.[159]
Theterm"graveabuseofdiscretion,"whiledefyingexactdefinition,generallyreferstosucharbitrary,capricious,orwhimsicalexerciseof
judgmentthatisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction:

[T]heabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperform
adutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespotic
mannerbyreasonofpassionandhostility.Mereabuseofdiscretionisnotenough:itmustbegrave.[160]

In other words: arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of any constitutionally mandated power has never been sanctioned by the
sovereigntoanyconstitutionaldepartment,agency,ororganofgovernment.
The Commission on Elections argues that alleged errors in its conclusions regarding petitioner's citizenship, residency, and purported
misrepresentationwerebasedonitsfindingsandtheevidencesubmittedbytheparties.Itemphasizesthatevenifitsconclusionsmight

havebeenerroneous,itneverthelessbasedtheseonitsownappreciationoftheevidenceinrelationtothelawandtheConstitution.It
claims to have only exercised its constitutionally bounded discretion. Consequently, in its view, the Commission on Elections cannot be
deemedtohaveactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction.[161]
Grave abuse of discretion exists when a constitutional body makes patently gross errors in making factual inferences such that critical
pieces of evidence presented by a party not traversed or even stipulated by the other parties are ignored.[162] Furthermore a
misinterpretationofthetextoftheConstitutionorprovisionsoflaw,orotherwiseamisreadingormisapplicationofthecurrentstateof
jurisprudence,alsoamountstograveabuseofdiscretion.[163]Insuchcases,decisionsarearbitraryinthattheydonotrelatetothewhole
corpusofevidencepresented.Theyarearbitraryinthattheywillnotbebasedonthecurrentstateofourlaw.Necessarily,thesegivethe
strongestsuspicionofeithercapriciousnessorpartialitybeyondtheimaginationofourpresentConstitution.
Thus,writsofcertiorariareissued:(a)wherethetribunal'sapproachtoanissueistaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,aswhereituses
wrongconsiderationsandgrosslymisreadstheevidenceatarrivingatitsconclusion[164](b)whereatribunal'sassessmentis"farfrom
reasonable[,][and]basedsolelyonverypersonalandsubjectiveassessmentstandardswhenthelawisrepletewithstandardsthatcanbe
used[]"[165] "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the
pointofbeinggrosslyunreasonable[]"[166]and(d)wherethetribunaluseswrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissue.[167]
ArticleVIII,Section1oftheConstitutionisdesignedtoensurethatthiscourtwillnotabdicateitsdutyasguardianoftheConstitution's
substantivepreceptsinfavorofallegedproceduraldeviceswithlesservalue.[168]Givenanactualcaseorcontroversyandinthefaceof
grave abuse, this court is not rendered impotent by an overgenerous application of the political question doctrine.[169] In general, the
presentmodeofanalysiswilloftenrequireexaminationofthepotentialbreachoftheConstitutionmajusticiablecontroversy.
II

Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, insofar as it states that the Commission on Elections' decisions
becomefinalandexecutorfive(5)daysafterreceipt,isvalid.ItdoesnotviolateArticleIX,Section7oftheConstitution.
ArticleIXofthe1987Constitutionprovidesthatanydecision,order,orrulingoftheCommissiononElectionsmaybebroughttothiscourt
oncertiorariwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofacopy:

Section7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,anycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixty
daysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolution
uponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.
UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof (Emphasis
supplied)

Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, provides that decisions and rulings of the
CommissiononElectionsEnBancaredeemedfinalandexecutoryifnorestrainingorderisissuedbythiscourtwithinfive(5)daysfrom
receiptofsuchadecisionorresolution,thus:

Section8.EffectifPetitionUnresolved.
....
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed
withinthereglementaryperiod,orincasesofrulingsoftheCommissionEnBanc,norestrainingorderisissuedbytheSupreme
Courtwithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofthedecisionorresolution.

Underthe1987Constitution,theCommissiononElectionshasthepowertopromulgateitsownrulesofprocedure.ArticleIXAprovides:

Section6.EachCommissionenbancmaypromulgateitsownrulesconcerningpleadingsandpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyof
itsoffices.Suchrules,however,shallnotdiminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights.

Similarly,inArticleIXC:

Section3.TheCommissiononElectionsmaysitenbancorintwodivisions,andshallpromulgateitsrulesofprocedureinorder
to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decidedindivision,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

The interpretation of any legal provtston should be one that is in harmony with other laws on the same subject matter so as to form a
complete, coherent, and intelligible system. "Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretand," or every statute must be so
construedandharmonizedwithotherstatutesastoformauniformsystemofjurisprudence.[170]AssessingthevalidityoftheCommission

onElections'RulesofProcedureincludesadeterminationofwhethertheserulescanco existwiththeremedyofcertiorariasprovidedby
ArticleIX,Section7oftheConstitution.
Awidebreadthofdiscretionisgrantedacourtofjusticeincertiorariproceedings.[171]Inexercisingthispower,thiscourtistobeguided
byallthecircumstancesofeachparticularcase"astheendsofjusticemayrequire."[172]Thus,awritofcertiorariwillbegrantedwhere
necessaryinordertopreventasubstantialwrongortodosubstantialjustice.[173]
The Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure are evidently procedural rules they are remedial in nature. They cover only rules on
pleadingsandpractice.Theyarethemeansbywhichitspowerorauthoritytohearanddecideaclassofcasesisputintoaction.[174]Rule
23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure refers only to the pleadings and practice before the Commission on
Electionsitself,anddoesnotaffectthejurisdictionofthiscourt.
Accordingly, that the Commission on Elections may deem a resolution final and executory under its rules of procedure does not
automaticallyrendersuchresolutionbeyondthescopeofjudicialreviewunderArticleIXofthe1987Constitution.Rule23,Section8of
the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure merely guides the Commission as to the status of a decision for its own operations it
doesnotpreventthiscourtfromactingonthesamedecisionviacertiorariproceedings.Inanyevent,whileitistruethatcertioraridoes
notimmediatelystayadecisionofaconstitutionalcommission,atemporaryrestrainingordercanstillbeissued,asinthiscase.
Finally, it should be noted that in promulgating this rule, the Commission on Elections was simply fulfilling its constitutional duty to
"promulgateitsrulesofprocedureinordertoexpeditedispositionofelectioncases."[175]CasesbeforetheCommissiononElections
mustbedisposedofwithoutdelay,asthedateoftheelectionsisconstitutionallyandstatutorilyfixed.[176]Thefivedayruleisbasedona
reasonableground:thenecessitytopreparefortheelections.
III

AnyinterpretationofthescopeofthestatutorypowergrantedtotheCommissiononElectionsmustconsideralltherelevantconstitutional
provisionsallocatingpowertothedifferentorgansofgovernment.
Reading the entirety of the Constitution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Commission on Elections' jurisdiction, statutorily
grantedinSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,withrespecttocandidatesfortheOfficesofPresidentandVicePresident,isonlywith
respecttodeterminingwhetheramaterialmatterassertedinacandidate'scertificateofcandidacyisfalse.ForpurposesofSection78,a
mattermaybetrueorfalseonlywhenitisverifiable.Hence,thesectiononlyreferstoamatteroffact.Itcannotrefertoalegaldoctrine
orlegalinterpretation.Furthermore,thefalserepresentationonamaterialfactmustbeshowntohavebeendonewithintent.Itmustbe
accompaniedwithintenttodeceive.Itcannotrefertoanhonestmistakeorerrormadebythecandidate.
III.A

Acertificateofcandidacyisfiledtoannounceaperson'scandidacyandtodeclarehisorhereligibilityforelectiveoffice.Section74ofthe
OmnibusElectionCodeenumeratestheitemsthatmustbeincludedmacertificateofcandidacy:

Sec.74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncing
hiscandidacyfortheofficestatedthereinandthatheiseligibleforsaidofficeifforMemberoftheBatasangPambansa,the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post office address for all election purposes his
profession or occupation that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesthat
he is not a pennanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretrue
tothebestofhisknowledge.
Unlessacandidatehasofficiallychangedhisnamethroughacourtapprovedproceeding,acandidateshalluseinacertificateof
candidacythenamebywhichhehasbeenbaptized,orifhasnotbeenbaptizedinanychurchorreligion,thenameregistered
in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a
Muslim, his Hadji name after perfonning the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more
candidatesforanofficewiththesamenameandsurname,eachcandidate,uponbeingmadeawareorsuchfact,shallstatehis
paternalandmaternalsurname,excepttheincumbentwhomaycontinuetousethenameandsurnamestatedinhiscertificate
of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly
knowninthelocality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size a statement in duplicate
containinghisbiodataandprogramofgovernmentnotexceedingonehundredwords,ifhesodesires.

Generally,theCommissiononElectionshastheministerialdutytoreceiveandacknowledgereceiptofcertificatesofcandidacy. [177]The
Commission on Elections has the competence to deny acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a candidate's lack of qualifications
appearspatentonthefaceofthecertificateofcandidacyandisindubitable.[178]Thisisinlinewithitspowerto"[e]nforceand
administeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection."[179]

Forinstance,ifthedateofbirthinthecertificateofcandidacyclearlyandpatentlyshowsthatthecandidatehasnotmettherequiredage
requirementfortheofficeforwhichheorsheisrunning,theCommissiononElectionsmaymotupropriodenyacceptance.Specifically,in
suchcases,thecandidatehaseffectivelymadeanadmissionbyswearingtothecertificateofcandidacy.Therefore,intheinterestofan
orderlyelection,theCommissiononElectionsmaysimplyimplementthelaw.
Thisisnotthesituationinthiscase.Petitioner'sCertificateofCandidacydidnotpatentlyshowanydisqualificationorineligibility.Thus,the
denialofduecourseorcancellationofthecertificatecannotbedonemotuproprio,butonlywhenapetitionisfiled.Thepetitionmustbe
verifiedandbasedontheexclusivegroundthatamaterialrepresentationinthecertificateofcandidacyisfalse.
Section78oftheOmnibusElectionCodeprovides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof isfalse. The petition may be filed at any time
notlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyadshallbedecided,afterduenotice
andhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasissupplied)

III.B

TheCommissiononElections'discretionwithrespecttoSection78islimitedinscope.
The constitutional powers and functions of the Commission on Elections are enumerated in Article IXC, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:

SECTION2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:

(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum,andrecall.
Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,andqualificationsof
allelectiveregional,provincial,andcityofficials,andappellatejurisdictionoverallcontestsinvolvingelective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.
Decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,allquestionsaffectingelections,includingdeterminationof
thenumberandlocationofpollingplaces,appointmentofelectionofficialsandinspectors,andregistrationof
voters.
Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Anned Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.
Register,aftersufficientpublication,politicalparties,organizations,orcoalitionswhich,inadditiontoother
requirements, must present their platform or program of government and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans,orrefusetoupholdandadheretothisConstitution,
orwhicharesupportedbyanyforeigngovernmentshalllikewiseberefusedregistration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions,orcandidatesrelatedtoelectionsconstituteinterferenceinnationalaffairs,and,whenaccepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
otherpenaltiesthatmaybeprescribedbylaw.
File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionorexclusionofvoters
investigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutecasesofviolationsofelectionlaws,includingactsoromissions
constitutingelectionfrauds,offenses,andmalpractices.
RecommendtotheCongresseffectivemeasurestominimizeelectionspending,includinglimitationofplaces
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses,malpractices,andnuisancecandidacies.
Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of
anyotherdisciplinaryaction,forviolationordisregardof,ordisobediencetoitsdirective,order,ordecision.
SubmittothePresidentandtheCongressacomprehensivereportontheconductofeachelection,plebiscite,
initiative,referendum,orrecall.

Except for item (2), all the powers enumerated in Article IXC, Section 2 are administrative in nature.[180] These powers relate to the
Commission's general mandate to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The
Commission on Elections' adjudicatory powers are limited to having "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials" and "appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involvingelectivemunicipalofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,orinvolvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedbytrial
courtsoflimitedjurisdiction."

TheCommissiononElectionshasnojurisdictionovertheelections,returns,andqualificationsofthosewhoarecandidatesfortheOfficeof
President.Theyalsodonothavejurisdictiontodecideissues"involvingtherighttovote[.]"[181]
The Commission on Elections was originally only an administrative agency.[182] Under Commonwealth Act No. 607, it took over the
President'sfunctiontoenforceelectionlaws.
Pursuant to amendments made to the 1935 Constitution, the Commission on Elections was transformed into a constitutional body "
[having]exclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativetotheconductofelections[.]"[183]
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the Commission on Elections was granted quasijudicial powers in addition to its administrative
powers.TheCommissiononElectionsbecamethesolejudgeofallelectioncontestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,andqualificationsof
membersofthenationallegislatureandelectiveprovincialandcityofficials.Thus,inArticleXIIC,Section2(2)ofthe1973Constitution,
theCommissiononElectionswasgrantedthepowerto:

SEC.2....
....
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang
Pambansaandelectiveprovincialandcityofficials.(Emphasissupplied)

Atpresent,thequasijudicialpoweroftheCommissiononElectionsisfoundinitem(2)ofArticleIXC,Section2oftheConstitution.
"Contests"arepostelectionscenarios.[184]ArticleIXC,Section2(2)oftheConstitutionspeaksof"electiveofficials,"not"candidatesfor
an elective position." This means that the Commission on Elections may take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications for public
officeonlyafterelection,andthisisonlywithrespecttoelectiveregional,provincial,city,municipal,andbarangayofficials.
With respect to candidates for President and Vice President, the Constitution reserved adjudicatory power with this court. Article VII,
Section4ofthe1987ConstitutionoutlinesthedynamicrelationshipofthevariousconstitutionalorgansinelectionsforPresidentandVice
President,thus:

SECTION4....
....
ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovinceorcity,
shallberansmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Upon
receiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentofSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayoftheelection,open
allcertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upon
detenninationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvassthevotes.
Thepersonhavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequaland
highestnumberofvotes,oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCongress,
votingseparately.
TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.
TheSupremeCourt,sittingEnBanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqtalificationsof
thePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.(Emphasissupplied)

Reading the text of similar provisions[185] relating to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[186] Former Associate Justice
VicenteV.MendozaobservedinhisSeparateOpinioninRomualdezMarcosthatthereareno"authorizedproceedingsfordetermininga
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election."[187] He proposed that the Commission on Elections cannot remedy the
perceivedlacunabydecidingpetitionsquestioningthequalificationsofcandidatesbeforetheelectionunderitspowertoenforceelection
laws.[188]
Thisreadingwaslateronqualified.
In Tecson v. Commission on Elections,[189] the petitions filed by Maria Jeanette Tecson and Zoilo Velez were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.Thepetitionsquestioneddirectlybeforethiscourt,beforetheelectionswereheld,thequalificationsofFernandoPoe,Jr.asa
presidentialcandidate.Withunanimityonthispoint,thiscourtstated:

Therulescategoricallyspeakofthejurisdictionofthetribunalovercontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualifications
ofthe"President"or"VicePresident",ofthePhilippines,andnotof"candidatesforPresidentorVicePresident.Aquowarranto
proceedingisgenerallydefinedasbeinganactionagainstapersonwhousurps,intrudesinto,orunlawfullyholdsorexercisesa
publicoffice.Insuchcontext,theelectioncontestcanonlycontemplateapostelectionscenario.InRule14,onlyaregistered

candidatewhowouldhavereceivedeitherthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotescouldfileanelectionprotest.Thisrule
againpresupposesapostelectionscenario.
ItisfairtoconcludethatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,definedbySection4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice
presidencybeforetheelectionsareheld.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G.R. No.
161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioVelezvs.RonaldAllanKelleyPoea.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr."wouldhavetobedismissedforwant
ofjurisdiction.[190]

On the other hand, with respect to the petitions that questioned the resolutions of the Commission on Elections, which in tum were
decided on the basis of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, Tecson clarified, with respect to the Petition docketed as G.R. No.
161824:

InseekingthedisqualificationofthecandidacyofFPJandtohavetheCOMELECdenyduecoursetoorcancelFPJ'scertificateof
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a naturalborn citizen) before the COMELEC,
petitionerFornierinvokedSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode

Section78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodeny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
materialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.

inconsonancewiththegeneralpowersofCOMELECexpressedinSection52oftheOmnibusElectionCode

Section52.PowersandfunctionsoftheCommissiononElections.Inadditiontothepowersandfunctionsconferred
uponitbytheConstitution,theCommissionshallhaveexclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofall
lawsrelativetotheconductofelectionsforthepurposeofensuringfree,orderlyandhonestelections

andinrelationtoArticle69oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichwouldauthorize"anyinterestedparty"tofileaverifiedpetition
todenyorcancelthecertificateofcandidacyofanynuisancecandidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for
certiorariunderRule65oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.Section7,ArticleIX,ofthe1987Constitutionalsoreads

EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixty
daysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionor
resolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandum,requiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorby
theCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeach
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receiptofacopythereof.

Additionally,Section1,ArticleVIII,ofthesameConstitutionprovidesthatjudicialpowerisvestedinoneSupremeCourtandin
such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
ItissufficientlyclearthatthepetitionbroughtupinG.R.No.161824wasaptlyelevatedto,andcoldwellbetakencognizance
ofby,thisCourt.Acontraryviewwouldbeagrossdenialtoourpeopleoftheirfundamentalrighttobefullyinformed,andto
make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.[191] (Citations
omitted)

A proper reading of the Constitution requires that every provision be given effect. Thus, the absurd situation where "contests" are
entertainedevenifnopetitionforquowarrantowasfiledbeforethePresidentialElectoralTribunal,[192]theSenateElectoralTribunal,[193]
or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [194] must be avoided. This will be the case should the Commission on Elections be
allowedtotakecognizanceofallpetitionsquestioningtheeligibilityofacandidate.TheprovisionsoftheConstitutiononthejurisdictionof
theelectoraltribunalsoverelectioncontestswouldberendereduseless.
More importantly, the Commission on Elections' very existence and effectiveness inherently depend on its neutrality. Scrutiny of the
qualifications of candidates for electoral positions of national importance was intentionally and expressly delegated to special electoral

tribunals. Clearly, the credibilityand perhaps even the legitimacyof those who are elected to these important public offices will be
undermined with the slightest suspicion of bias on the part of the Commission on Elections. This is why the pressure to determine the
qualificationsofcandidatestothesepositionshasbeenpurposelyremovedfromtheCommissiononElections.Afterall,givenArticleIXA,
Section 7 of the Constitution, any "case or matter" decided by a constitutional commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof."[195]TheCommissiononElectionswillfinditselfina
verydifficultsituationshoulditdisqualifyacandidateonreasonsotherthanclearlydemonstrableorfactualgroundsonlyforthiscourtto
eventually overturn its ruling. The Commission on Elections, wittingly or unwittingly, would provide justifiable basis for suspicions of
partiality.
ItisalsothisevilthatwemustguardagainstaswefurthersketchthecontoursofthejurisdictionoftheCommissiononElectionsandof
thiscourt.
Beforeelections,theCommissiononElections,underSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,maytakecognizanceofpetitionsinvolving
qualificationsforpublicofficeregardlessoftheelectivepositioninvolved,butonlyonthelimitedandexclusivegroundthatacertificateof
candidacycontainsamaterialrepresentationthatisfalse.
IntenttodeceiveshouldremainanelementofSection78petitions.Otherwise,theonlyissuetoberesolvedinSection78petitionswould
bewhetherthecandidatepossessesthequalificationsrequiredunderthelaw.IftheCommissionactsonthesepetitions,itactsinexcess
of its jurisdiction. As discussed, the Commission on Elections may validly take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications only if the
petitionswerefiledafterelectionandonlywithrespecttoelectiveregional,provincial,city,municipal,andbarangayofficials.
III.C

Thus,tosuccessfullychallengeacertificateofcandidacyunderSection78,apetitionermustestablishthat:
First,thattheassailedcertificateofcandidacycontainsarepresentationthatisfalse
Second, that the false representation is material, i.e., it involves the candidate's qualifications for elective office,[196] such as
citizenship[197]andresidency[198]and
Third, that the false material representation was made with a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwiserenderacandidateineligible"[199]or"withanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastoone'squalificationsforpublicoffice."[200]
InusingitspowersunderSection78,theCommissiononElectionsmustapplytheserequirementsstrictlyandwithadefaultpreference
for allowing a certificate of candidacy in cases affecting the positions of President, Vice President, Senator, or Member of the House of
Representatives.Section78itselfmentionsthatthegroundofmaterialmisrepresentationisexclusiveofanyotherground.Furthermore,
in the guise of this statutory grant of power, the Commission on Elections cannot usurp the functions of this court sitting as the
PresidentialElectoralTribunalnoroftheSenateElectoralTribunal,andtheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.Likewise,itcannot
keepthemostimportantcollectiveofgovernmentthePeopleactingasanelectoratefromexercisingitsmostpotentpower:theexercise
ofitsrighttochooseitsleadersinaclean,honest,andorderlyelection.
As petitiOner suggests, "the sovereign people, in ratifying the Constitution, intended that questions of a candidate's qualification ... be
submitted directly to them."[201] In the words of Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[202] the
People,oncertainlegalissues,choosetobethe"finalpoweroffinallegaladjustment."[203]
Consistent with this legal order, only questions of fact may be resolved in Section 78 proceedings. Section 78 uses the word "false"
hence,theseproceedingsmustproceedfromdoubtsarisingastothetruthorfalsehoodofarepresentationinacertificateofcandidacy.
[204]Onlyafactisverifiable,andconversely,falsifiable,asopposedtoanopiniononadisputedpointoflawwhereone'spositionisonly

as good as another's. Under Section 78, the Commission on Elections cannot resolve questions of law as when it resolves the issue of
whether a candidate is qualified given a certain set of factsfor it would arrogate upon itself the powers duly reserved to the electoral
tribunalsestablishedbytheConstitution.
RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElectionsarticulatedtherequirementof"deliberateattempttomislead"inorderthatacertificateof
candidacy may be cancelled.[205] In 1995, Imelda RomualdezMarcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the First
District of Leyte, alleging that she resided in the district for seven (7) months. She later amended her Certificate to state that she had
resided in Tacloban City "since childhood,"[206] explaining that her original answer was an "honest mistake."[207] The Commission on
ElectionsnonethelesscancelledherCertificateofCandidacyforherfailuretomeettheoneyearresidencyrequirementforthepositionshe
wasseeking.[208]
AdmittingthedefenseofhonestmistakeandfindingthatImeldaRomualdezMarcossatisfiedtherequiredperiodofresidence,thiscourt
reversedtheCommissiononElections'ruling.Itstatedthat:

[I]tisthefactofresidence,notastatementincertificateofcandidacywhichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornot
anindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement.[Thestatementinthecertificateofcandidacy]
becomesmaterialonlywhenthereisorappearstobeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwould
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statementinacertificateofcandidacywhichwouldleadtohisorherdisqualification.[209]

In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[210] this court affirmed the proclamation of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo
despitethecontentionthathermarriagetoNeptaliSalcedowasvoidandthatshe,therefore,hadmateriallymisrepresentedhersurname
tobe"Salcedo."[211]
ThiscourtruledthattheuseofaspecificsurnameinacertificateofcandidacyisnotthematerialrepresentationcontemplatedinSection
78.[212]
TherewasnointenttodeceiveonthepartofErmelitaCacaoSalcedoasshehasbeenusing"Salcedo"yearsbeforetheelectionhence,
thiscourtrefusedtocancelherCertificateofCandidacy.[213]
Intent to deceive has consistently been required to justify the cancellation of certificates of candidacy.[214] Yet, in 2013, this court in
Tagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal[215]statedthatintenttodeceive"isofbaresignificancetoaSection78petition."
[216]Thisstatementmustbetakenincontext.

In Tagolino, Richard Gomez (Gomez) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte. An opposing
candidate,BuenaventuraJuntilla(Juntilla),filedapetitionbeforetheCommissiononElections,allegingthatGomezresidedinGreenhills,
San Juan City, contrary to his representation in his Certificate of Candidacy that he resided in Ormoc City. Juntilla prayed for the
cancellationofGomez'sCertificateofCandidacy.217
InitsResolutiondatedFebruary17,2010,theFirstDivisionoftheCommissiononElectionsgrantedJuntilla'sPetitionanddeclaredGomez
"disqualifiedasacandidatefortheOfficeofCongressman,FourthDistrictofLeyte,forlackofresidencyrequirement."[218]ThisResolution
wasaffirmedbytheCommissiononElectionsEnBanc,afterwhichGomezmanifestedthatheacceptedthefinalityoftheResolution.[219]
Thereafter, Lucy TorresGomez (TorresGomez) filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her husband. The Liberal
Party,towhichGomezbelonged,endorsedTorresGomez'scandidacy.UponrecommendationofitsLawDepartment,theCommissionon
ElectionsEnBancallowedTorresGomeztosubstituteforGomezinitsResolutiondatedMay8,2010.[220]
Thenextday,onMay9,2010,Juntillamovedforreconsideration.AftertheconductofelectionsonMay10,2010,Gomez,whosename
remainedontheballots,garneredthehighestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesforrepresentative.[221]Inviewofhissubstitution,
the votes were counted in favor of TorresGomez. TorresGomez was then "proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Fourth
DistrictofLeyte."[222]
TooustTorresGomez,SilverioTagolinofiledapetitionforquowarrantobeforetheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.Tagolino
argued,amongothers,thatTorresGomezfailedtovalidlysubstituteGomez,thelatter'sCertificateofCandidacybeingvoid.[223]
TheHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunaldismissedthepetitionforquowarrantoandruledthatTorresGomezvalidlysubstituted
for her husband. According to the tribunal, the Commission on Elections declared Gomez disqualified the Commission did not cancel
Gomez'sCertificateofCandidacy.SinceGomezwasmerelydisqualified,acandidatenominatedbythepoliticalpartytowhichhebelonged
couldvalidlysubstitutehim.[224]
On certiorari, this court reversed and set aside the Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.[225] Juntilla's Petition
prayedforthecancellationofGomez'scertificateofcandidacy.[226]AlthoughtheCommission'sFirstDivisiondeclaredGomez"disqualified"
asacandidateforrepresentative,theCommissionnonethelessgrantedJuntilla'sPetition"withoutanyqualification."[227]
Juntilla's Petition was granted, resulting in the cancellation of Gomez's Certificate of Candidacy. Hence, Gomez was deemed a non
candidateforthe2010ElectionsandcouldnothavebeenvalidlysubstitutedbyTorresGomez.TorresGomezthencouldnothavebeen
validlyelectedasRepresentativeoftheFourthDistrictofLeyte.
IndecidingTagolino,thiscourtdistinguishedapetitionfordisqualificationunderSection68oftheOmnibusElectionCodefromapetition
todenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacyunderSection78.[228]Astowhetherintenttodeceiveshouldbeestablishedina
Section78petition,thiscourtstated:

[I]tmustbenotedthatthedeliberatenessofthemisrepresentation,muchlessone'sintenttodefraud,isofbaresignificancein
aSection78petitionasitisenoughthattheperson'sdeclarationofamaterialqualificationinthe[certificateofcandidacy]be
false.Inthisrelation,jurisprudenceholdsthatanexpressfindingthatthepersoncommittedanydeliberatemisrepresentation
is of little consequence in the detennination of whether one's [certificate of candidacy] should be deemed cancelled or not.
Whatremainsmaterialisthatthepetitionessentiallyseekstodenyduecoursetoand/orcancelthe[certificateofcandidacy]
onthebasisofone'sineligibilityandthatthesamebegrantedwithoutanyqualification.[229](Citationsomitted)

Tagolinonotwithstanding,intenttodeceiveremainsanindispensableelementofapetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateof
candidacy.
Ascorrectlypointedoutbypetitioner,thecontentiousstatementinTagolinoismereobiterdictum.[230]Thatstatementwasnotessential
inresolvingthecoreissueinTagolino:whetherapersonwhosecertificateofcandidacywascancelledmaybevalidlysubstituted.Thishad
nodirectrelationtotheinterpretationoffalsematerialrepresentationsinthecertificateofcandidacy.

Moreover,thiscourtEnBancaffirmedtherequirementafterTagolino.
In Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections,[231] Hayudini v. Commission on Election,[232] Jalover v. Osmea,[233] and Agustin v.
CommissiononElection[234]alldecidedafterTagolinothiscourtreaffirmed"intenttodeceive"asanintegralelementofaSection78
petition.UnlikeTagolino,thiscourt'sDecisionsinVillafuerte,Hayudini,Jalover,andAgustindirectlydealtwithandsquarelyruledonthe
issueofwhethertheCommissiononElectionsgravelyabuseditsdiscretioningrantingordenyingSection78petitions.Theiraffirmationof
intent to deceive as an indispensable requirement was part of their very ratio decidendi and not mere obiter dicta. Since this ratio
decidendi has been repeated, it now partakes of the status of jurisprudential doctrine. Accordingly, the statement in Tagolino that
dispenseswiththerequirementofintenttodeceivecannotbeconsideredbinding.
ItistruethatSection78makesnomentionof"intenttodeceive."Instead,whatSection78usesistheword"representation."Reading
Section 78 in this way creates an apparent absence of textual basis for sustaining the claim that intent to deceive should not be an
elementofSection78petitions.Itisanerrortoreadaprovisionoflaw.
"Representation"isrootedintheword"represent,"averb.Thus,byarepresentation,apersonactivelydoessomething.Thereisoperative
engagementinthatthedoerbringstofruitionwhatheorsheisponderingsomethingthatisabstractandotherwiseknownonlytohimor
her,aproverbial"castleintheair."The"representation"isbutaconcreteproduct,amanifestation,oraperceptibleexpressionofwhat
thedoerhasalreadycognitivelyresolvedtodo.Onewhomakesarepresentationisonewhointendstoarticulatewhat,inhisorhermind,
he or she wishes to represent. He or she actively and intentionally uses signs conventionally understood in the form of speech, text, or
otheracts.
Thus,representationsareassertions.Byasserting,thepersonmakingastatementpushesfor,affirms,orinsistsuponsomething.These
arehardlybadgesofsomethinginwhichintentisimmaterial.Onthecontrary,nosuchassertioncanexistunlessapersonactuallywishes
to,thatis,intends,tofirmlystandforsomething.
InSection78,therequirementisthatthereis"materialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredbySection74hereofisfalse."[235]
A"misrepresentation"ismerelytheobverseof"representation."Theyaretwooppositeconcepts.Thus,aswithmakingarepresentation,a
personwhomisrepresentscannotdosowithoutintendingtodoso.
ThatintenttodeceiveisaninherentelementofaSection78petitionisreflectedbythegraveconsequencesfacingthosewhomakefalse
materialrepresentationsintheircertificatesofcandidacy.[236]Theyaredeprivedofafundamentalpoliticalrighttorunforpublicoffice.
[237] Worse, they may be criminally charged with violating election laws, even with perjury.[238] For these reasons, the false material

representationreferredtoinSection78cannot"just[be]anyinnocuousmistake."[239]
PetitionercorrectlyarguedthatSection78shouldbereadinrelationtoSection74'senumerationofwhatcertificatesofcandidacymust
state.UnderSection74,apersonfilingacertificateofcandidacydeclaresthatthefactsstatedinthecertificate"aretruetothebestofhis
[orher]knowledge."Thelawdoesnotrequire"absolutecertainty"[240]butallowsformistakesinthecertificateofcandidacyifmadein
goodfaith.[241]Thisisconsistentwiththe"summarycharacterofproceedingsrelatingtocertificatesofcandidacy."[242]
IV

From these premises, the Commission on Elections should have dismissed Tatad's Petition for Disqualification. The Commission on
ElectionsshowedbiasandactedarbitrarilywhenitmotuproprioconvertedthePetitionintoonewhichTataddidnotintend,contraryto
the interest of the other party. While the Commission on Elections has the necessary and implied powers concomitant with its
constitutionaltasktoadministerelectionlaws,itcannotdosobyfavoringonepartyovertheother.
Significantly, Tatad was not the only petitioner in those cases. There were three other petitions against one candidate, which already
contained most if not all the arguments on the issues raised by Tatad. There was, thus, no discernable reason for the Commission on
Electionsnottodismissaclearlyerroneouspetition.TheCommissiononElectionsintentionallyputitselfatriskofbeingseennotonlyas
beingpartial,butalsoasafulladvocateofTatad,guidinghimtodothecorrectprocedure.
Onthismatter,theCommissiononElectionsclearlyactedarbitrarily.Section68oftheOmnibusElectionCodegrantstheCommissionon
Electionsjurisdictionoverpetitionsfordisqualification.Section68enumeratesthegroundsforfilingadisqualificationpetition:

Sec.68Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competentcourtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionofhaving(a)givenmoneyorothermaterialconsiderationtoinfluence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy(c)spentinhiselectioncampaignanamountinexcessofthatallowedbythisCode(d)solicited,receivedormade
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and l04 or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphsd,e,k,v,andcc,subparagraph6,shallbedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate,orifhehasbeenelected,
fromholdingtheoffice.Anypersonwhoisapermanentresidentoforanimmigrantofaforeigncountryinaccordancewiththe
residencerequirementprovidedforintheelectionlaws.

Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, the grounds in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code may likewise be raised in a
petitionfordisqualification.[243]Section12oftheOmnibusElectionCodestates:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penaltyofmorethaneighteenmonthsorforacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude,shallbedisqualifiedtobeacandidateandto
holdanyoffice,unlesshehasbeengivenplenarypardonorgrantedamnesty.
Thisdisqualificationstobeacandidatehereinprovidedshallbedeemedremoveduponthedeclarationbycompetentauthority
that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence,unlesswithinthesameperiodheagainbecomesdisqualified.

AlthoughdenominatedasaPetitionforDisqualification,Tatad'sPetitionbeforetheCommissiononElectionsdidnotraiseanygroundfor
disqualificationunderSections12and68oftheOmnibusElectionCode.
Instead,Tatadarguedthatpetitionerlackedtherequiredqualificationsforpresidencyhence,petitionershouldnotbeallowedtorunfor
president.
Thelawdoesnotallowpetitionsdirectlyquestioningthequalificationsofacandidatebeforetheelections.Tatadcouldhaveavailedhimself
ofapetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelpetitioner'scertificateofcandidacyunderSection78onthegroundthatpetitionermadea
false material representation in her certificate of candidacy. However, Tatad's petition before the Commission on Elections did not even
prayforthecancellationofpetitioner'scertificateofcandidacy.
The Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in either implicitly amending the petition or incorrectly interpreting its
procedural device so as to favor Tatad and allow his petition. The Commission should have dismissed Tatad's petition for want of
jurisdiction. In failing to do so, it acted arbitrarily, whimsically, and capriciously. The Commission on Elections on this point acted with
graveabuseofdiscretion.
V

Therewasnomaterialmisrepresentationwithrespecttopetitioner'sconclusionthatshewasanaturalbornFilipina.Herstatementwas
notfalse.
Thefactsuponwhichshebasedherconclusionoflawwaslaidbarethroughherallegations,andasubstantialnumberofthesewerethe
subjectofstipulationoftheparties.NeitherprivaterespondentsnortheCommissiononElectionswasabletodisproveanyofthematerial
factssupportingthelegalconclusionofthepetitioner.Petitionerwasentitledtomakeherownlegalconclusionfromherinterpretationof
therelevantconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisions.Thiscourthasyettoruleonacasethatatthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateof
candidacyuntilthismomentsquarelyraisedtheissueofthecitizenshipandthenatureofcitizenshipofafoundling.
Thus,theCommissiononElectionshadnojurisdictionunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodetoruleonthenatureofcitizenship
ofpetitioner.Evenassumingwithoutgrantingthatithadthatcompetence,theCommissiongravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitcancelled
petitioner'sCertificateofCandidacyonthisground.Therewasnomaterialmisrepresentationastoamatteroffact.Therewasnointentto
deceive.Petitioner,evenasafoundling,presentedenoughfactstomakeareasonableinferencethateitherorbothofherparentswere
Filipinocitizenswhenshewasborn.
V.A

TheCommissiononElectionssubmitsthatsincepetitioneradmittedthatsheisafoundling,theburdenofevidencewaspassedontoher
"to prove that her representation in her [Certificate of Candidacy]that she is eligible to run for Presidentis not false."[244] The
Commissionarguesthatthisdeclarationcarriedanadmissionthatpetitionerisofunknownparentage.Thus,privaterespondentsdonot
need to prove that petitioner's parents are foreigners. Instead, it was petitioner's burden to show evidence that she is a naturalborn
Filipinocitizen.[245]
ElamparoechoedtheCommissiononElections'arguments.Petitioner'sadmissionthatsheisafoundlingwasenoughsubstantialevidence
on the part of private respondents to discharge the burden that rested upon them as petitioners before the Commission on Elections.
Petitioner'sadmissiontrumpedallotherevidencesubmittedtotheCommissiononElectionsofgovernmentrecognitionofhercitizenship.
[246]

Asopposedtoburdenofproof,[247]burdenofevidenceshiftsbetweentheparties.[248]Thepartywhoallegesmustinitiallyprovehisor
herclaims.[249]Onceheorsheisabletoshowaprimafaciecaseinhisorherfavor,theburdenofevidenceshiftstotheotherparty.[250]
Thus,inanactionforcancellationofacertificateofcandidacyunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,thepersonwhofiledthe
petition alleging material misrepresentation has the burden of proving such claim.[251] He or she must establish that there is material
misrepresentationundertherequiredstandardofevidence.Incasesbeforequasijudicialbodies,thestandardofevidenceis"substantial
evidenceorthatamountofrelevantevidencewhichareasonablemindmightacceptasadequatetojustifyaconclusion."[252]
If, during the course of hearing, petitioner shows a prima facie case of material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts. The
opposingpartywillthenneedtocontroverttheclaimsmade.[253]
Private respondents who initiated the action before the Commission on Elections failed to establish a prima facie case of material
misrepresentationtowarrantashiftofburdenofevidencetopetitioner.Basedonthisground,thepetitionsforcancellationofcertificateof

candidacyshouldhavealreadybeendismissedattheleveloftheCommissiononElections.
Even assuming that the burden of proof and evidence shifted to petitioner, the Commission on Elections erred in only considering
petitioner'sstatementthatsheisafoundling.Itcommittedagraveerrorwhenitexcludedalltheotherpiecesofevidencepresentedby
petitionerandisolatedheradmission(andtheotherparties'stipulation)thatshewasafoundlinginordertoconcludethattheburdenof
evidencealreadyshiftedtoher.
Petitioner's admission that she is a foundling merely established that her biological parents were unknown. It did not establish that she
falselymisrepresentedthatshewasbornofFilipinoparents.Itdidnotestablishthatbothherbiologicalparentswereforeigncitizens.
TheCommissiononElectionswasblindtothefollowingevidenceallegedbypetitionerandacceptedbytheotherparties:
(1)ShewasfoundinachurchinJaro,Iloilo
(2)Whenshewasfound,shewasonlyaninfantsufficienttobeconsiderednewborn
(3)ShewasfoundsometimeinSeptember1968(4)Shewasimmediatelyregisteredasafoundling
(5)Jaro,Iloilodidnothaveaninternationalairportand
(6)ThephysicalcharacteristicsofpetitionerareconsistentwithalargemajorityofFilipinos.
AllthesefactscanbeusedtoinferthatatleastoneofherbiologicalparentsisFilipino.Theseshouldbesufficienttoestablishthatsheis
naturalborn in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The Commission on Elections arbitrarily disregarded these
piecesofevidence.Itchosetorelyonlyontheadmittedfactthatshewasafoundlingtoclaimthattheburdenofevidencehasalready
shifted.
V.B

The Commission on Elections was mistaken when it concluded that the burden of evidence shifted upon admission of the status of a
foundling.
ForpurposesofSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,privaterespondentsstillhadtheburdenofshowingthat:(1)bothofpetitioner's
biologicalparentswereforeigncitizens(2)petitionerhadactualknowledgeofbothherbiologicalparents'foreigncitizenshipatthetime
offilingofherCertificateofCandidacyand(3)shehadintenttomisleadtheelectoratewithregardtoherqualifications.
The Commission on Elections cited and relied heavily on Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson. On the
basis of this Dissent, the Commission on Elections concluded that petitioner cannot invoke any presumption of naturalborn citizenship.
[254]TheDissentingOpinionquotedPaav.Chan,[255]inthat"[i]tisincumbentuponapersonwhoclaimsPhilippinecitizenshiptoproveto

thesatisfactionoftheCourtthatheisreallyaFilipino.NopresumptioncanbeindulgedinfavoroftheclaimantofPhilippinecitizenship,
andanydoubtregardingcitizenshipmustberesolvedinfavoroftheState."[256]
Elementary in citing and using jurisprudence is that the main opinion of this court, not the dissent, is controlling. Reliance by the
CommissiononElectionsonthedissentwithoutsufficientlyrelatingittothepronouncementsinthemainopiniondoesnotonlyborderon
contumaciousmisapplicationofcourtdoctrineitisutterlygraveabuseofdiscretion.
Tecson,correctlyread,resolvedtheissueofcitizenshipusingpresumptions.FromthedeathcertificateofFernandoPoe,Jr.'sgrandfather
LorenzoPou,thiscourtassumedthathewasbornsometimein1870orduringtheSpanishregime.[257]LorenzoPou'sdeathcertificate
showsSanCarlos,Pangasinanashisplaceofresidence.Onthisbasis,thiscourtinferredthatSanCarlos,PangasinanwasalsoLorenzo
Pou'sresidencebeforedeathsuchthathewouldhavebenefittedfromthePhilippineBill's"enmasseFilipinization"in1902:[258]

Inascertaining,inG.R.No.161824,whethergraveabuseofdiscretionhasbeencommittedbytheCOMELEC,itisnecessaryto
takeonthematterofwhetherornotrespondentFPJisanaturalborncitizen,which,intum,dependedonwhetherornotthe
fatherofrespondent,AllanF.Poe,wouldhavehimselfbeenaFilipinocitizenand,intheaffirmative,whetherornotthealleged
illegitimacyofrespondentpreventshimfromtakingaftertheFilipinocitizenshipofhisputativefather.Anyconclusiononthe
FilipinocitizenshipofLorenzoPoucouldonlybedrawnfromthepresumptionthathavingdiedin1954at84yearsold,whenthe
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired,wouldtherebyextendtohisson,AllanF.Poe,fatherofrespondentFPJ.The1935Constitution,duringwhichregime
respondentFPJhasseenfirstlight,conferscitizenshiptoallpersonswhosefathersareFilipinocitizensregardlessofwhether
suchchildrenarelegitimateorillegitimate.[259]

The Commission on Elections acted with utter arbitrariness when it chose to disregard this finding and its analogous application to
petitionerand,instead,chosetorelyononeofthedissentingopinions.
Moreover,the1967caseofPaav.ChancitedbythedissentfavoredbytheCommissiononElectionsdoesnotapplytothiscase.

PaainvolvedaquowarrantopetitionquestioningtheeligibilityofanelectedcounciloronthegroundofbeingaChinesecitizen.[260]Itdid
notinvolveapetitionforcancellationofcertificateofcandidacy.
InPaa,thecouncilor'sregistrationasalienbeforetheBureauofImmigrationwasundisputed.Thecouncilor'sfatherwasalsoregisteredas
analienonApril30,1946.[261]
In petitioner's case, private respondents only relied on her foundling status to prove her alleged material misrepresentation of her
qualifications.Theydidnotpresentevidence,directorcircumstantial,tosubstantiatetheirclaimsagainstpetitioner'scandidacy.Inother
words,unlikePaawhereevidenceexistedtosupportaclaimofforeigncitizenship,privaterespondentsinthiscaseshowednone.
Evenassumingthatitcouldapplytothiscase,the2004caseofTecsonhadalreadyoverturnedthe1967pronouncementsinPaa.
The Commission on Elections further submits the 2009 case of Go v. Ramos,[262] which reestablished the ruling against the use of
presumptionsinfavorofclaimantsofFilipinocitizenshipwhenitreiteratedPaa.[263]
Goislikewiseinapplicabletothiscase.ItinvolvedadeportationcomplaintwithallegationsthatapersonGo,thepetitionerwasanillegal
andundesirablealien.[264]Unlikeinthiscase,itinvolvedbirthcertificatesclearlyshowingthatGoandhissiblingswereChinesecitizens.
[265]

Furthermore,GowasalsodecidedbythiscourtsittinginDivision.Thus,itcannotoverturnTecson,whichwasdecidedbythiscourtsitting
EnBanc.
V.C

Tecson v. Commission on Election[266] involved a similar pehhon alleging material misrepresentation in the Certificate of Candidacy of
Fernando Poe, Jr. who claimed to have been a naturalborn Filipino citizen.[267] This court ruled in favor of Fernando Poe, Jr. and
dismissedthepetitionseventhoughhisnaturalborncitizenshipcouldnotbeestablishedconclusively.Thiscourtfoundthatpetitionerin
that case failed to substantiate his claim of material misrepresentation.[268] Former Associate Justice Vitug, speaking for the majority,
discussed:
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalhom citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,mustnotonlybematerial,butalsodeliberateandwillful.[269](Emphasissupplied)
V.D

Evenifweassumethatitwaspetitionerwhohadtheburdenofevidence,acompleteandfaithfulreadingoftheprovisionsoftheentire
Constitution,togetherwiththeevidencethatpetitionerpresented,leadstotheinescapableconclusionthatasanewbornabandonedby
herparentsinJaro,Iloiloin1968,shewasatbirthFilipina.Thus,beingFilipinaatbirth,petitionerdidnothavetodoanythingtoperfect
herFilipinocitizenship.Sheisnaturalhom.
Furthermore, there is no shred of evidence to rebut the circumstances of her birth. There is no shred of evidence that can lead to the
conclusionthatbothherparentswerenotFilipinocitizens.
The whole case of private respondents, as well as the basis of the Commission on Elections' Resolutions, is a presumption that all
newborns abandoned by their parents even in rural areas in the Philippines are presumed not to be Filipinos. Private respondents'
approachrequiresthatthosewhowereabandonedvenbecauseofpovertyorshamemustexertextraordinaryefforttosearchforthe
verysameparentswhoabandonedthemandmightnothavewantedtobeidentifiedinordertohaveachancetobeofpublicservice.
V.E

Constitutionalconstructionmandatesthatwebeginwiththerelevanttextandgiveitswordstheirordinarymeaningwheneverpossible,
consistentwithverbalegis.[270]Asmuchaspossible,thelanguageofthetextmustbeunderstoodinitscommonusageandsensesoas
tomaintainitspresenceinthePeople'sconsciousness.[271]Thelanguageoftheprovisionitselfistheprimarysourcefromwhichthiscourt
determinesconstitutionalintent.[272]
Thus:

Welooktothelanguageofthedocumentitselfinoursearchforitsmeaning.Wedonotofcoursestopthere,butthatiswhere
webegin.Itistobeassumedthatthewordsinwhichconstitutionalprovisionsarecouchedexpresstheobjectivesoughttobe
attained.Theyaretobegiventheirordinarymeaningexceptwheretechnicaltermsareemployedinwhichcasethesignificance
thusattachedtothemprevails.AstheConstitutionisnotprimarilyalawyer'sdocument,itbeingessentialfortheruleoflawto
obtainthatitshouldeverbepresentinthepeople'sconsciousness,itslanguageasmuchaspossibleshouldbeunderstoodin
thesensetheyhaveincommonuse.Whatitsaysaccordingtothetextoftheprovisiontobeconstruedcompelsacceptance

andnegatesthepowerofthecourtstoalterit,basedonthepostulatethattheframersandthepeoplemeanwhattheysay.
Thus,thesearethecaseswheretheneedforconstructionisreducedtoaminimum.[273](Emphasissupplied)

Reading the text of the Constitution requires that its place in the whole context of the entire document must be considered. The
Constitutionshouldbereadasawholeutmagisvaleatquampereat.[274]Thus,inCivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary:[275]

ItisawellestablishedruleinconstitutionalconstructionthatnooneprovisionoftheConstitutionistobeseparatedfromall
theothers,tobeconsideredalone,butthatalltheprovisionsbearinguponaparticularsubjectaretobebroughtintoviewand
tobesointerpretedastoeffectuatethegreatpurposesoftheinstrument.Sectionsbearingonaparticularsubjectshouldbe
consideredandinterpretedtogetherastoeffectuatethewholepurposeoftheConstitutionandonesectionisnottobeallowed
todefeatanother,ifbyanyreasonableconstruction,thetwocanbemadetostandtogether.
Inotherwords,thecourtmusthannonizethem,ifpracticable,andmustleaninfavorofconstructionwhichwillrenderevery
wordoperative,ratherthanonewhichmaymakethewordsidleandnugatory.276(Citationsomitted)

IngrantingreconsiderationinLaBugalB'laanTribalAssociation,Inc.v.Ramos, [277]thiscourtdiscussedthat"[t]heConstitutionshould
bereadinbroad,lifegivingstrokes.Itshouldnotbeusedtostrangulateeconomicgrowthortoservenarrow,parochialinterests."[278]
InSocialWeatherStations,Inc.v.CommissiononElections,[279]thiscourt'sdiscussiononstatutoryconstructionemphasizedtheneedto
adheretoamoreholisticapproachininterpretation:

[T]heassumptionthatthereis,inallcases,auniversalplainlanguageiserroneous.Inreality,universalityanduniformityin
meaningisararity.Acontrarybeliefwronglyassumesthatlanguageisstatic.
Themoreappropriateandmoreeffectiveapproachis,thus,holisticratherthanparochial:toconsidercontextandtheinterplay
ofthehistorical,thecontemporary,andeventheenvisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities
andsocialideals.Thelatteraremeanttobeeffectedbythelegalapparatus,chiefofwhichisthebedrockoftheprevailinglegal
order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution saligan demonstrates this
imperativeofconstitutionalprimacy.
Thus,werefusetoreadSection5.2(a)oftheFairElectionActinisolation.Here,weconsidernotanabstruseprovisionbuta
stipulationthatispartofthewhole,i.e.,thestatuteofwhichitisapart,thatisaimedatrealizingtheidealoffairelections.We
considernotacloisteredprovisionbutanonnthatshouldhaveapresentauthoritativeeffecttoachievetheidealsofthosewho
currentlyread,dependon,anddemandfealtyfromtheConstitution.[280](Emphasissupplied)

Stillfaithfulwiththerelevanttextanditsplaceintheentiredocument,constructionofconstitutionalmeaningallowsahistoricaltraceof
the changes that have been made in the textfrom the choice of language, the additions, the omissions, and the revisions. The present
constitutionaltextcanbecomparedtoourearlierConstitutions.Changesorretentionoflanguageandsyntaxcongealsmeaning.
ArticleIV,Section1oftheConstitutiononwhoarecitizensofthePhilippines,forexample,maybetracedbacktoearlierorganiclaws,[281]
andevenfartherbacktolawsofcolonizersthatweremadeeffectiveinthePhilippineIslandsduringtheiroccupation.[282]Someinfluences
oftheirhistory,asenshrinedintheirlaws,weretakenandreflectedinourfundamentallaw.
Weresorttocontemporaneousconstructionandaidsonlywhenthetextisambiguousorcapableoftwoormorepossiblemeanings.[283]It
isonlywhentheambiguityremainsevenafteraplainandcontemporaryreadingoftherelevantwordsinthetextandwithinthecontext
oftheentiredocumentthatlegalinterpretationrequirescourtstogofurther.Thisincludesexaminingthecontemporaneousconstruction
contained in analogous cases, statutes, and international norms that form part of the law of the land. This also includes discerning the
purpose of the constitutional provision in light of the facts under consideration. For this purpose, the original understanding of the
provisionsbythePeoplethatratifiedthedocument,aswellasthediscussionsofthosethatparticipatedintheconstitutionalconventionor
commissionthatdraftedthedocument,takenintoitscorrecthistoricalcontext,canbeilluminating.
Discerningconstitutionalmeaningisanexerciseindiscoveringthesovereign'spurposesoastojudgethemoreviableamongcompeting
interpretations of the same legal text. The words as they reside in the whole document should primarily provide the clues. Secondarily,
contemporaneous construction may aid in illumination if verba legis fails. Contemporaneous construction may also validate the clear
textualorcontextualmeaningoftheConstitution.
Contemporaneous construction is justified by the idea that the Constitution is not exclusively read by this court. The theory of a
constitutionalorderfoundedondemocracyisthatallorgansofgovernmentanditsPeoplecanreadthefundamentallaw.Onlydifferences
inreasonableinterpretationofthemeaningofitsrelevanttext,occasionedbyanactualcontroversy,willbemediatedbycourtsoflawto
determinewhichinterpretationappliesandwouldbefinal.ThedemocraticcharacterofreadingtheConstitutionprovidestheframework
forthepolicyofdeferenceandconstitutionalavoidanceintheexerciseofjudicialreview.Likewise,thisisimpliedinthecanonicaldoctrine
that this court cannot render advisory opinions. Refining it further, this court decides only constitutional issues that are as narrowly
framed,sufficienttodecideanactualcase.[284]
Contemporaneousconstructionengagesjurisprudenceandrelevantstatutesindeterminingthepurposebehindtherelevanttext.

In the hierarchy of constitutional interpretation, discerning purpose through inference of the original intent of those that participated in
craftingthedraftConstitutionforthePeople'sratification,ordiscerningtheoriginalunderstandingofthepastsocietythatactuallyratified
thebasicdocument,istheweakestapproach.
Notonlydotheseinterpretativemethodologiesallowthegreatestsubjectivityforthiscourt,itmayalsobesubjecttothegreatesterrors.
Forinstance,thosethatweresilentduringconstitutionalconventionsmayhavevotedforapropositionduetotheirownreasonsdifferent
fromthosewhotookthefloortoexpresstheirviews.Itisevenpossiblethatthebeliefsthatinspiredtheframerswerebasedonerroneous
facts.
Moreover,theoriginalintentoftheframersoftheConstitutionisdifferentfromtheoriginalunderstandingofthePeoplewhoratifiedit.
Thus,inCivilLibertiesUnion:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arriveatthereasonandpurposeoftheresultingConstitution,resorttheretomaybehadonlywhenotherguidesfailassaid
proceedings are powerless to vary the tenns of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention"areofvalueasshowingtheviewsoftheindividualmembers,andasindicatingthereasonsfortheirvotes,butthey
giveisnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,muchlessofthemassofourfellowcitizenswhosevotes
atthepollsgavetheinstrumenttheforceoffundamentallaw.Wethinkitsafertoconstruetheconstitutionfromwhatappears
uponitsface."Theproperinterpretationthereforedependsmoreonhowitwasunderstoodbythepeopleadoptingitthanin
theframer'sunderstandingthereof.[285](Emphasissupplied)

WeapplytheseconsiderationsintheinterpretationoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionrelevanttothiscase.
V.F

Petitionerisnaturalbornunderanyoftwopossibleapproaches.
ThefirstapproachistoassumeasamatterofconstitutionalinterpretationthatallfoundlingsfoundinthePhilippines,beingpresumptively
borntoeitheraFilipinobiologicalfatheroraFilipinabiologicalmother,arenaturalborn,unlessthereissubstantialprooftothecontrary.
Theremustbesubstantialevidencetoshowthatthereisareasonableprobabilitythatboth,notjustone,ofthebiologicalparentsarenot
Filipinocitizens.
ThisistheinevitableconclusionreachedwhentheentiretyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionisconsideredalongsidethecontemporary
constructionbasedonstatutesandinternationalnormsthatformpartofthelawoftheland.Itisalsothemostviableconclusiongiventhe
purposeoftherequirementthatcandidatesforPresidentmustbenaturalhom.
ThesecondapproachistoreadthedefinitionofnaturalhominSection2inrelationtoArticleIV,Section1(2).Section1(2)requiresthat
thefatherorthemotherisaFilipinocitizen.[286]
ThereisnorequirementthatthefatherormothershouldbenaturalbornFilipinocitizens.Itispossiblethatoneorbothoftheparentsare
ethnicallyforeign.Thus,physicalfeatureswillnotbedeterminativeofnaturalborncitizenship.
There is no requirement of citizenship beyond the first degree of ascendant relationship. In other words, there is no necessity to prove
indigenousethnicity.ContrarytothestridentargumentsoftheCommissiononElections,thereisnorequirementofFilipinobloodline.
Significantly,thereisalsonorequirementthatthefatherormothershouldbedefinitivelyidentified.Therecanbeproofofareasonable
beliefthatevidencepresentedinarelevantproceedingsubstantiallyshowsthateitherthefatherorthemotherisaFilipinocitizen.
V.G

TheminimumconstitutionalqualificationsforPresidentareclearlyenumeratedinArticleVII,Section2:

Section2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,ableto
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines at least ten years
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.

Parsingtheprovision'sclearmeaningintheorderenumerated,thequalificationsare:
One,heorshemustbe"anaturalborncitizen"Two,heorshemustbe"aregisteredvoter"Three,heorshemustbe"abletoreadand
write"
Four,heorshemustbe"atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection"and
Five,heorshemustbe"aresidentofthePhilippinesatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection."

Petitioner's possession of the second, third, and fourth mmtmum qualifications are not in issue in this case. A closer analysis of this
provisionmakescertainconclusionsapparent.
The phrase, "ten years immediately preceding such election" qualifies "a resident of the Philippines" as part of the fifth minimum
constitutionalrequirement.Itdoesnotqualityanyofthepriorfourrequirements.Thetenyearrequirementdoesnotqualify"abletoread
andwrite."Likewise,itcannottextuallyandlogicallyqualifythephrase,"atleastfortyyearsofage"orthephrase,"aregisteredvoter."
Certainly then, the tenyear requirement also does not qualify "a natural born citizen." Being naturalborn is an inherent characteristic.
Beingacitizen,ontheotherhand,maybelostoracquiredinaccordancewithlaw.Theprovisionclearlyimpliesthat:(a)onemustbea
naturalborncitizenatleastuponelectionintooffice,and(b)onemustbearesidentatleasttenyearspriortotheelection.Citizenship
andresidencyasminimumconstitutionalrequirementsaretwodifferentlegalconcepts.
In other words, there is no constitutional anchor for the added requirement that within the entire tenyear period prior to the election
whenacandidateisaresident,heorshealsohastohavereacquiredhisorhernaturalborncitizenstatus.
Citizenshipreferstopoliticalaffiliation.Itisafictioncreatedbylaw.Residence,ontheotherhand,referstoone'sdomicile.Itiscreated
byone'sacts,whichisindicativeofhisorherintentions.
To require her naturalborn citizenship status in order to legally consider the commencement of her residency is, therefore, to add and
amendtheminimumrequirementsoftheConstitution.
Furthermore,theConstitutionintendsminimumqualificationsforthosewhowishtopresentthemselvestobeconsideredbythePeoplefor
theOfficeofPresident.Noeducationalattainment,profession,orqualityofcharacterisconstitutionallyrequiredasaminimum.Inherent
inthetextoftheConstitutionisanimplieddynamic.Theelectorate,actingcollectivelyduringaspecificelection,choosestheweightof
otherconsiderations.ItisnotfortheCommissiononElectionsorthiscourttodiscreetlyimplantand,therefore,dictateontheelectorate
in the guise of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and declaring what is legal, the political wisdom of considerations. This is
consistentalsowithArticleII,Section1oftheconstitution.[287]
Thus,thatpetitioneroncelostandthenreacquiredhernaturalborncitizenshipisnotpartoftheminimumconstitutionalrequirementsto
beacandidateforPresident.Itisanissuethatmaybeconsideredbytheelectoratewhentheycasttheirballots.
On a second level of constitutional interpretation, a contemporaneous construction of Article VII, Section 2 with Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwiseknownastheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActon2003,[288]supportsthisreading.
The Constitution provides that "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law."[289] On July 7, 2006,
petitionertookherOathofAllegianceunderSection3ofRepublicActNo.9225.OnJuly10,2006,shefiledaPetitionforReacquisitionof
herPhilippinecitizenshipbeforetheBureauofImmigrationandDeportation,andherPetitionwasgranted.[290]
Section3ofRepublicActNo.9225providesfortheOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicthatmaybetakenbynaturalborncitizensofthe
Philippines who lost their Philippine citizenship when they became naturalized citizens of another country, in order to reacquire their
Philippinecitizenship:

Section3.RetentionofPhilippineCitizenship.Anyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,naturalborncitizensofthe
PhilippineswhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonontheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryarehereby
deemedtohavereacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthefollowingoathofallegiancetotheRepublic:

"I_________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines
andIherebydeclarethatIrecognizeandacceptthesupremeauthorityofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaith
and allegiance thereto and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purposeofevasion."

Naturalborn citizens of he Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
theirPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.[291]

Upon taking this Oath, those who became citizens of another country prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire their
Philippine citizenship, while those who became citizens of another country after to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 retain their
Philippinecitizenship.
TakingtheOathenablestheenjoymentoffullcivilandpoliticalrights,subjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexisting
laws and the different solemnities under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225. Different conditions must be complied with depending on
whetheroneintendstoexercisetherighttovote,seekelectivepublicoffice,orassumeanappointivepublicoffice,amongothers:

Sec.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisActshallenjoy
fullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbesubjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsofthePhilippines
andthefollowingconditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution,RepublicActNo.9189,otherwiseknownastheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003'andotherexistinglaws
(2)ThoseseekingelectivepublicofficeinthePhilippinesshallmeetthequalificationsforholdingsuchpublicofficeasrequired
bytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy,makeapersonalandsworn
remmciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeranoath
(3)ThoseappointedtoanypublicofficeshallsubscribeandsweartoanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesand
itsdulyconstitutedauthoritiespriortotheirass11mptionofofficeProvided,Thattheyrenouncetheiroathofallegiancetothe
countrywheretheytookthatoath
(4)ThoseintendingtopracticetheirprofessioninthePhilippinesshallapplywiththeproperauthorityforalicenseorpennitto
engageinsuchpracticeand
(5)ThattherighttovoteorbeelectedorappointedtoanypublicofficeinthePhilippinescannotbeexercisedby,orextended
to,thosewho:

a.arecandidatesfororareoccupyinganypublicofficeinthecountryofwhichtheyarenaturalizedcitizensand/or
b.are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalizedcitizens.(Emphasissupplied)

SobejanaCondonv.CommissiononElection[292]discussedthemandatorynatureoftherequiredswornrenunciationunderSection5of
RepublicActNo.9225.ThisprovisionwasintendedtocomplementArticleXI,Section18oftheConstitutioninthat"[p]ublicofficersand
employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenshiporacquirethestatusofanimmigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw."[293]
RepublicActNo.9225onlyrequiresthatthepersonalandswornrenunciationofforeigncitizenshipbemade"atthetimeofthefilingof
the certificate of candidacy" for those seeking elective public position. It does not require a tenyear period similar to the residency
qualification.
V.H

TheconceptofnaturalborncitizensisinArticleIV,Section2:

Sec.2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyact
toacq11ireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.ThosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithparagraph(3),
SectionIhereofshallbedeemednaturalborncitizens.(Emphasissupplied)

Citizens,ontheotherhand,areenumeratedinSection1ofthesame
Article:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority
and
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.[294]

Thecriticalquestioniswhetherpetitioner,asafoundling,wasFilipinaatbirth.
Citizenship essentially is the "right to have rights."[295] It is one's "personal and more or less permanent membership in a political
community....Thecoreofcitizenshipisthecapacitytoenjoypoliticalrights,thatis,therighttoparticipateingovernmentprincipally
throughtherighttovote,therighttoholdpublicoffice[,]andtherighttopetitionthegovernmentforredressofgrievance."[296]
Citizenship also entails obligations to the community.[297] Because of the rights and protection provided by the state, its citizens are
presumedtobeloyaltoit,andevenmoresoifitisthestatethathasprotectedthemsincebirth.
V.I

Thefirstlevelofconstitutionalinterpretationpermitsareviewoftheevolutionoftheseprovisionsoncitizenshipinthedeterminationofits

purposeandrationale.
ThiscourtinTecsondetailedthehistoricaldevelopmentoftheconceptofPhilippinecitizenship,datingbackfromtheSpanishoccupation.
[298] During the Spanish regime, the native inhabitants of the Islands were denominated as "Spanish subjects" or "subject of Spain" to

indicatetheirpoliticalstatus.[299]TheSpanishConstitutionof1876declaredpersonsborninSpanishterritoryasSpaniards,butthiswas
neverextendedtothePhilippineIslandsduetothemandateofArticle89inthatthePhilippineswouldbegovernedbyspeciallaws.[300]
The Civil Code of Spain became effective in this jurisdiction on December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were
Spanishcitizens,[301]thus:

(a)PersonborninSpanishterritory,
(b)ChildrenofaSpanishfatherormother,eveniftheywerebornoutsideofSpain,
(c)Foreignerswhohaveobtainednaturalizationpapers,
(d)Thosewho,withoutsuchpapers,mayhavebecomedomiciledinhabitantsofanytownoftheMonarchy.[302]

The Philippine Revolution in 1898 marked the end of the Spanish era and the entry of the Americans. Spain was forced to cede the
Philippine colony to the United States. Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris between the two countries on December 10, 1989, the native
inhabitantswerenotautomaticallyconvertedtoAmericancitizens.[303]Sincetheyalsoceasedtobe"Spanishsubjects,"theywere"issued
passportsdescribingthemtobecitizensofthePhilippinesentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnitedStates":[304]

Spanishsubject,nativesofthePeninsula,residingintheterritoryoverwhichSpainbythepresenttreatyrelinquishesorcedes
her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom . . .. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance in
defaultofwhichdeclarationtheyshallbeheldtohaverenounceditandtohaveadoptedthenationalityoftheterritoryinwhich
theymayreside.
Thus
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determinedbyCongress.[305]

The concept of "Philippine citizens" crystallized with the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902,[306] where the term "citizens of the
PhilippineIslands"firstappeared:[307]

Section4.ThatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandscontinuingtoresidetherein,whowereSpanishsubjectsontheeleventh
dayofApril,eighteenhundredandninetynine,andthenresidedinsaidIslands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentthereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
thetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpainsignedatParisDecembertenth,eighteenhundredandninetyeight.
(Emphasissupplied)

TheUnitedStatesCongressamendedthissectiononMarch23,1912toincludeaprovisofortheenactmentbythelegislatureofalawon
acquiringcitizenship.ThiswasrestatedintheJonesLawof1916,otherwiseknownasthePhilippineAutonomyAct.[308]Theprovisointhe
1912amendmentreads:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
PhilippinecitizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithintheforegoingprovisions,thenativesof
theinsularpossessionsoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhoarecitizensofthe
UnitedStates,orwhocouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStatesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStatesifresidingtherein.[309]

Thus,theJonesLawof1916providedthatnativeborninhabitantsofthePhilippinesweredeemedPhilippinecitizensasofApril11,1899if
heorshewas"(1)asubjectofSpainonApril11,1899,(2)residinginthePhilippinesonsaiddate,and(3)sincethatdate,notacitizen
ofsomeothercountry."[310]
While common law used by the United States follows jus soli as the mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution adopted jus
sanguinisorbloodrelationsasbasisforPhilippinecitizenship,[311]thus:

SECTION1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution
(2)ThosebominthePhilippinesIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedto

publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesanduponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.[312]

Subsection (4), when read with then civil law provisions on the automatic loss of Filipino citizenship by women who marry foreign
husbandsandautomaticallyacquirehisforeigncitizenship,posedadiscriminatorysituationforwomenandtheirchildren.[313]Thus,the
1973Constitutionaddressedthisconcernwiththefollowingrevisions:

SECTION1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(3)ThosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshippursuanttotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionofnineteenhundredandthirtyfive.
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
SEC. 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omissionsheisdeemed,underthelaw,tohaverenouncedhercitizenship.[314]

The 1973 Constitution also provided a definition for "naturalborn citizens" since the 1935 Constitution, similar to the United States
Constitution,requiredthePresidenttobea"naturalborncitizen"withoutdefiningtheterm.Priortothe1935Constitution,publicoffices
werefilledthroughappointmentbythecolonizer.315Thus,ArticleIII,Section4ofthe1973Constitutionaddedadefinitionfornatural
borncitizen,asfollows:

SEC.4.AnaturalbornCitizenisonewhoisacttlzenofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquire
orperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.[316]

ThecurrentConstitutionadoptedmostoftheprovisionsofthe1973Constitutiononcitizenship,withfurtheramendmentinsubsection(3)
forpurposesofcorrectingtheirregularsituationcreatedbythe1935Constitution.
V.J

Naturalborn citizenship is an American concept that we adopted in our Constitution. This term appears only once in the United States
Constitutioninthepresidentialqualificationclause[317]andhasnodefinitioninAmericanlaws.Noexplanationontheoriginorpurpose
of the presidential qualification clause can even be found in the Convention's recorded deliberations.[318] Since the United States was
under British rule prior to their independence, some theories suggest that the concept was introduced in the text as a check against
foreigninfiltrationintheadministrationofnationalgovernment,thus:

It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to George
Washington,andprobablytootherdelegates,onJuly25,1787,whichstated:

Permitmetohint,whetheritwouldbewiseandseasonabletoprovideastrongchecktotheadmissionofForeigners
into the administration of our national Government and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the
Americanannyshallnotbegiventonordevolveon,anybutanaturalbornCitizen.

PossiblythisletterwasmotivatedbydistrustofBaronVonSteuben,whohadservedvaliantlyintheRevolutionaryforces,but
whosesubsequentloyaltywassuspectedbyJay.AnothertheoryisthattheJayletter,andtheresultingconstitutionalprovision,
respondedtorumorsthattheConventionwasconcoctingamonarchytoberuledbyaforeignmonarch.[319]

The 1935 Constitution borrowed the term "naturalborn citizen" without defining the concept. It was only the 1973 Constitution that
providedthat"[a]naturalborncitizenisonewhoisacitizenofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireor
perfecthisPhilippinecitizenship."
V.K

Thereareonlytwocategoriesofcitizens:naturalhomandnaturalized.
AnaturalhomcitizenisdefinedinArticleIV,Section2asonewhoisacitizenofthePhilippines"frombirthwithouthavingtoperformany

acttoacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenship."Ontheotherhand,anaturalizedcitizenisonewhoisnotnaturalborn.
InBengsonv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,[320]thiscourtruledthatifapersonisnotnaturalized,heorsheisconsidered
anaturalhomcitizenofthePhilippines:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not naturalborn citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
underthepresentConstitutionthatthereareonlytwoclassesofcitizens:...AcitizenwhoisnotanaturalizedFilipino,i.e.,did
nothavetoundergotheprocessofnaturalizationtoobtainPhilippinecitizenship,necessarilyisanaturalbornFilipino.[321]

FormerAssociateJusticePanganibanclarifiesthisconceptinhisConcurringOpinioninBengson.Naturalizedcitizensare"formeraliensor
foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationsprovidedbylawinordertobecomeFilipinocitizens."[322]
ApersonwhodesirestoacquireFilipinocitizenshipisgenerallyrequiredtofileaverifiedpetition.[323]Theapplicantmustprove,among
others,thatheorsheisoflegalage,withgoodmoralcharacter,andhasthecapacitytoadapttoFilipinoculture,tradition,andprinciples,
or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time.[324] The applicant must prove himself or herself not to be a
threattothestate,thepublic,andtotheFilipinos'corebeliefs.[325]
Petitionerdidnotundergothenaturalizationprocess.ShereacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipthroughRepublicActNo.9225.
TheCommissiononElectionscontendsthatinavailingherselfofthebenefitsunderRepublicActNo.9225,petitionerreacquiredPhilippine
citizenshipbynaturalization,notnaturalborncitizenship,sinceshehadtoperformseveralactstoperfectthiscitizenship.[326]Moreover,
theearliesttimePhilippineresidencycanbereestablishedforthosewhoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderRepublicNo.9225tsupon
reacquisitionofcitizenship.[327]
Our jurisprudence holds otherwise. Those who avail themselves of the benefits under Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire naturalborn
citizenship.Bengsonruledthatrepatriationinvolvestherestorationofformerstatusortherecoveryofone'soriginalnationality:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenshipwillberestoredtohispriorstatusasanaturalizedFilipinocitizen.Ontheotherhand,ifhewasoriginallyanatural
borncitizenbeforehelosthisPhilippinecitizenship,hewillberestoredtohisformerstatusasanaturalbornFilipino.[328]

While Bengson involved Commonwealth Act No. 63, its ruling is still consistent with the declared policy under the current system of
reacquiring Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. One's status as a naturalborn Filipino is immutable: "all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."[329] Republic Act No. 9225 requires certain
solemnities,buttheserequirementsareonlyforthepurposeofeffectingtheincidentsofthecitizenshipthatanaturalizedFilipinonever
lost.Theserequirementsdonotoperatetomakenewcitizenswhosecitizenshipcommencesonlyfromthetimetheyhavebeencomplied
with.
To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not naturalborn will have grave consequences. Naturalization requires that petitioner is of legal
age.Whileitistruethatshecouldexerttimeandextraordinaryexpensetofindtheparentswhomighthaveabandonedher,thiswillnot
applytoallfoundlings.Thus,thisapproachwillconcedethatwewillhaveaclassofcitizenswhoarestatelessduetonofaultoftheirs.
V.L

ThereisnoneedforanexpressstatementintheConstitution'scitizenshipprovisionsthatfoundlingsarenaturalbornFilipinocitizens.A
contraryinterpretationwillbeinconsistentwiththeotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.TheConstitutionshouldbeinterpretedasawhole
to"effectuatethewholepurposeoftheConstitution."[330]
ArticleII,Section13andArticleXV,Section3ofthe1987Constitutionenjointhestatetodefendchildren'swellbeingandprotectthem
fromanyconditionthatisprejudicialtotheirdevelopment.Thisincludespreventingdiscriminatoryconditionsinfactaswellasinlaw:

Article II, SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social wellbeing. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism,andencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivicaffairs.
ArticleXV,SECTION3.TheStateshalldefend:
....
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect,abuse,cruelty,exploitation,andotherconditionsprejudicialtotheirdevelopment[.](Emphasissupplied)

Crucial government positions are exclusive to naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution requires the following

positionstobefilledbynaturalborncitizens:

(1)President[331]
(2)Viveepresident[332]
(3)Senator[333]
(4)MemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives[334]
(5)MemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylowercollegiatecourt[335]
(6)ChairpersonandCommissionersoftheCivilServiceCommission[336]
(7)ChairpersonandCommissionersoftheCommissiononElections[337]
(8)ChairpersonandCommissionersoftheCommissiononAudit[338]
(9)Ombudsmanandhisdeputies339
(10)BoardofGovernorsoftheBangkoSentralngPilipinas[340]and
(11)ChairpersonandMembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights.[341]

Other positions that are required to be filled by naturalborn citizens include, among others, city fiscals,[342] assistant city fiscals,[343]
JudgesandAssociateJudgesoftheSandiganbayan,otherpublicoffices[344]andsomeprofessions.[345]Otherincentivesarealsolimited
tonaturalborncitizens.[346]
An interpretation that foundlings are not naturalborn Filipino citizens would mean that we should teach our foundling citizens to never
aspiretoservethecountryinanyoftheabovecapacities.
ThisisnotonlyinconsistentwiththetextofourConstitution'scitizenshipprovisions,whichrequiredonlyevidenceofcitizenshipandnotof
the identities of the parents. It unnecessarily creates a classification of citizens with limited rights based on the circumstances of their
births.Thisisdiscriminatory.
OurConstitutionprovidesthatcitizensshallhaveequalprotectionofthelawandequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice.Theyare
protectedfromhumanindignitiesandpoliticalinequalities:

ArticleII,SECTION26.TheStateshallguaranteeequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice,andprohibitpolitical
dynastiesasmaybedefinedbylaw.
ArticleIII,SECTION1.Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanyperson
bedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws.
ArticleXIII,SECTIONl.TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthatprotectandenhancethe
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequitiesbyequitablydiffusingwealthandpoliticalpowerforthecommongood.(Emphasissupplied)

Theequalprotectionclauseguaranteesthat"personsunderlikecircumstancesandfallingwithinthesameclassaretreatedalike,interms
of'privilegesconferredandliabilitiesenforced.'Itisaguaranteeagainst'unduefavorandindividualorclassprivilege,aswellashostile
discriminationoroppressionofinequality."'[347]
Apart from the anonymity of their biological parents, there is no substantial distinction` between foundlings and children with known
Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth. The foundlings' fortuitous inability to identify their biological parents
whoabandonedthemcannotbethebasisofalaworaninterpretationthathastheeffectoftreatingthemaslessentitledtotherights
andprotectiongivenbythestate.Tobaseaclassificationonthiscircumstancewouldbetosanctionstatelessnessandthemarginalization
ofaparticularclasswho,byforceofchance,wasalreadymadetostartlifeundertragiccircumstances.
This court, as an agent of the state, is constitutionally mandated to defend the wellbeing and development of children. We have no
competencetoreifyclassesthatdiscriminatechildrenbasedonthecircumstancesoftheirbirths.Theseclassificationsareprejudicialtoa
child'sdevelopment.
Further, inasmuch as foundlings are citizens of the Philippines, they are human beings whose dignity we value and rights we respect.
Thus:

ArticleII,SECTION11.TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespectforhumanrights.
(Emphasissupplied)

V.M

Contemporaneous construction by other constitutional organs deserves consideration in arriving at a correct interpretation of the
Constitution.

Illuminatingguidancefromhowotherconstitutionalorgansinterpretthefundamentallegaldocumentispremisedontheunderstandingof
abasicprinciple:theConstitutionaslawislegibletoallofgovernmentaswellasitsPeople.Itsplainreading,therefore,isaccessibleto
all.Thus,interpretationandapplicationofitsprovisionarenotthesoleprerogativeofthiscourt,althoughthiscourt'sinterpretationisfinal
foreachactualcaseorcontroversyproperlyraised.
ThelegislaturehasprovidedstatutesessentiallybasedonapremisethatfoundlingsareFilipinocitizensatbirth.
Itisalsoourstatepolicytoprotectchildren'sbestinterest.InRepublicActNo.9344,otherwiseknownastheJuvenileJusticeandWelfare
Actof2006:

SEC.2.DeclarationofStatePolicy.ThefollowingStatepoliciesshallbeobservedatalltimes:
....
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before
anyauthorityshallbeconductedinthebestinterestofthechildandinamannerwhichallowsthechildtoparticipateandto
expresshimself/herselffreely.Theparticipationofchildrenintheprogramandpolicyfonnulationandimplementationrelatedto
juvenilejusticeandwelfareshallbeensuredbytheconcernedgovernmentagency.(Emphasissupplied)

The "best interest of the child" is defined as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
[349]

ConsistentwiththislawisthePhilippines'ratification[350]oftheUnited
NationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild.Thistreatyhastheeffectoflawandrequiresthedomesticprotectionofchildren'srightsto
immediate registration and nationality after birth, against statelessness, and against discrimination based on their birth status.[351]
Pertinentprovisionsofthetreatyread:

Preamble
TheStatePartiestothepresentConvention,
Consideringthat,inaccordancewiththeprinciplesproclaimedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations,recognitionoftheinherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justiceandpeaceintheworld,
BearinginmindthatthepeoplesoftheUnitedNationshave,intheCharter,reaffirmedtheirfaithinfundamentalhuman
rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have detennined to promote social progress and better
standardsoflifeinlargerfreedom,
RecognizingthattheUnitedNationshas,intheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandintheInternationalCovenantson
HumanRights,proclaimedandagreedthateveryoneisentitledtoalltherightsandfreedomssetforththerein,without
distinctionofanykind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property,birthorotherstatus,
Recallingthat,intheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theUnitedNationshasproclaimedthatchildhoodisentitledto
specialcareandassistance,
....
Haveagreedasfollows:
....
Article2

1.StatepartiesshallrespectandensuretherightssetforthinthepresentConventiontoeachchildwithintheirjurisdiction
withoutdiscriminationofanykind,irrespectiveofthechild'sorhisorherparent's
or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property,disability,birthorotherstatus.
2.States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's
parents,legalguardians,orfamilymembers.

Article3

1.Inallactionsconcerningchildren, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrativeauthoritiesorlegislativebodies,thebestinterestsofthechildshallbeaprimaryconsideration.
2.StatesPartiesundertaketoensurethechildsuchprotectionandcareasisnecessaryforhisorherwellbeing,
takingintoaccounttherightsanddutiesofhisorherparents,legalguardians,orotherindividualslegallyresponsiblefor
himorher,and,tothisend,shalltakeallappropriatelegislativeandadministrativemeasures.

....
Article7

1.. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquireanationalityandasfaraspossible,therighttoknowandbecaredforbyhisorherparents.
2.States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise
bestateless.(Emphasissupplied)

ThePhilippinesalsoratified[352]the1966InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.Thistreaty,whichhastheeffectoflaw,also
requiresthatchildrenhaveaccesstoimmediateregistrationandnationality,anddefendsthemagainstdiscrimination,thus:

Article24....
1.Everychildshallhave,withoutanydiscriminationastorace,colour,sex,language,religion,nationalorsocialorigin,
propertyorbirth,therighttosuchmeasuresofprotectionasarerequiredbyhisstatusasaminor,onthepartofhisfamily,
societyandtheState.
2.Everychildshallberegisteredimmediatelyafterbirthandshallhaveaname.
3.Everychildhastherighttoacquireanationality.
....
Article26.Allpersonsareequalbeforethelawandareentitledwithoutanydiscriminationtotheequalprotectionof
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationalorsocialorigin,property,birthorotherstatus.(Emphasissupplied)

Treatiesare"internationalagreement[s]concludedbetweenstatesinwrittenformandgovernedbyinternationallaw,whetherembodied
inasingleinstrumentorintwoormorerelatedinstrumentsandwhateveritsparticulardesignation."[353]Theyrequireconcurrencebythe
Senatebeforetheybecomebindinguponthestate.Thus,ArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitutionprovides:

SECTION21.Notreatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofall
theMembersoftheSenate.

Ratification of treaties by the Senate makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It is treated similar to a statute. In
PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DuqueIII,etal.:[354]

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transfonnation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutionaldeclaration,internationallawisdeemedtohavetheforceofdomesticlaw.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate."Thus,treatiesorconventionalinternational
lawmustgothroughaprocessprescribedbytheConstitutionforittobetransformedintomunicipallawthatcan
beappliedtodomesticconflicts.[355](Emphasissupplied)

Nofurtherlegislativeactapartfromratificationisnecessary.Governmentincludingthejudiciaryisobligatedtoabidebythesetreatiesin
accordancewiththeConstitutionandwithourinternationalobligationscapturedinthemaximpactasuntservanda.

Foundlings,bylawandthroughourConstitution,cannotbediscriminatedagainst.Theyarelegallyendowedwithrightstoberegistered
and granted nationality upon birth. Statelessness unduly burdens them, discriminates against them, and is detrimental to their
development.
V.N

RepublicActNo.8552,otherwiseknownastheDomesticAdoptionActof1998,isentitledAnActEstablishingtheRulesandPolicieson
Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a means to "provide alternative protection and
assistancethroughfostercareoradoptionofeverychildwhoisneglected,orphaned,orabandoned."[356]
Abandonedchildrenmayincludefoundlings:[357]

SECTION5.LocationofUnknownParent(s).ItshallbethedutyoftheDepartmentorthechildplacingorchildcaringagency
whichhascustodyofthechildtoexertalleffortstolocatehis/herunknownbiologicalparent(s).Ifsucheffortsfail,thechild
shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declaredabandoned.(Emphasissupplied)

Similarly,RepublicActNo.8043,otherwiseknownastheInter CountryAdoptionActof1995,isentitledAnActestablishingtheRulesto
GovernInterCountryAdoptionofFilipinoChildren,andForOtherPurposes.Itincludesfoundlingsamongthosewhomaybeadopted:

SECTION8.WhoMayBeAdopted.Onlyalegallyfreechildmaybethesubjectofintercountryadoption.Inorderthatsuch
childmaybeconsideredforplacement,thefollowingdocumentsmustbesubmittedtotheBoard:
a)Childstudy
b)Birthcertificate/foundlingcertificate
c)Deedofvoluntarycommitment/decreeofabandonment/deathcertificateofparents
d)Medicalevaluation/history
e)Psychologicalevaluation,asnecessaryand
f)Recentphotoofthechild.(Emphasissupplied)

Further,foundlingcertificatesmaybepresentedinlieuofauthenticatedbirthcertificatesasrequirementfortheissuanceofpassportsto
foundlingstobeadoptedbyforeignparentsunderRepublicActNo.8043:

SECTION5.Iftheapplicantisanadoptedperson,hemustpresentacertifiedtruecopyoftheCourtOrderofAdoption,certified
truecopyofhisoriginalandamendedbirthcertificatesasissuedbytheOCRG.Iftheapplicantisaminor,aClearancefromthe
DSWDshallberequired.IncasetheapplicantisforadoptionbyforeignparentsunderR.A.No.8043,thefollowing,shallbe
required:
a)CertifiedtruecopyoftheCourtDecreeofAbandonmentofChild,theDeathCertificateofthechild'sparents,ortheDeedof
VoluntaryCommitmentexecutedafterthebirthofthechild.
b)EndorsementofchildtotheIntercountryAdoptionBoardbytheDSWD.
c)AuthenticatedBirthorFoundlingCertificate.[358]
(Emphasissupplied)

ThestatutesprovidingforadoptiononlyallowtherecognitionoffiliationforchildrenwhoareFilipinos.Theyallowadoptionoffoundlings.
Therefore,foundlingsare,bylaw,presumedtobeFilipino.
Theexecutivebranchhasalsoassumedpetitioner'snaturalbornstatusasFilipina.
Petitioner'scitizenshipstatuswasneverquestionedthroughoutherentirelifeuntilshefiledherCertificateofCandidacyforPresidentin
2015. Until the proceedings that gave rise to these consolidated cases, her natural born status was affirmed and reaffirmed through
differentgovernmentacts.
PetitionerwasgrantedanorderofreacquisitionofnaturalborncitizenshipunderRepublicActNo.9225bytheBureauofImmigrationon
July18,2006.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesappointedherasChairpersonoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoarda
governmentpositionthatrequiresnaturalborncitizenship[359]onOctober6,2010.TheCommissiononElectionsalsoallowedhertorun

forSenatorinthe2013Electionsdespitepublicknowledgeofherfoundlingstatus.Petitioner'snaturalbornstatuswasrecognizedbythe
Peoplewhenshewaselected,andbytheSenateElectoralTribunalwhenitaffirmedherqualificationstorunforSenatoronNovember17,
2015.
Petitionerwaslikewiseprovidedafoundlingcertificateaftershewasfound.Shewasalsothesubjectofanadoptionprocess.
V.O

Even if there is no legal presumption of naturalborn status for all foundlings, enough evidence was presented by petitioner before the
CommissiononElectionstoprovethatatleastoneifnotbothofherparentswereFilipinocitizens.
Petitioner's Filipino biological lineage cannot be proven easily by direct evidence such as birth certificates or witness testimonies of her
birth.Herstatusasanabandonedchildmakesitimprobable,ifnottooexpensive,toprovehercitizenshipthroughDNAevidence.
Ourrules,however,allowdifferentmannersofprovingwhetheranyoneofherbiologicalparentswereFilipinos.
Asidefromdirectevidence,factsmaybeprovedbyusmgcircumstantialevidence.InSuerteFelipev.People:[360]

Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption (Lack County vs.
Neilon,44Or.14,21,74P.212)whilecircumstantialevidenceistheproofoffactorfactsfromwhich,takeneithersinglyor
collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence (State vs.
Avery,113Mo.475,494,21S.W.193ReynoldsTrialEv.,Sec.4,p.8).[361]

CircumstantialevidenceisfurtherdefinedinPeoplev.Raganas:[362]

Circumstantialevidenceisthatwhichrelatestoaseriesoffactsotherthanthefactinissue,whichbyexperiencehavebeen
foundsoassociatedwithsuchfactthatinarelationofcauseandeffect,theyleadustoasatisfactoryconclusion.[363](Citation
omitted)

Rule133,Section4oftheRulesofCourtprovideswhencircumstantialevidenceissufficientforconviction:

Section4.Circumstantialevidence,whensufficient.Circumstantialevidenceissufficientforconvictionif:
(a)Thereismorethanonecircumstances
(b)Thefactsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedareproven
and
(c)Thecombinationofallthecircumstancesissuchastoproduceaconvictionbeyondreasonabledoubt.

Circumstantial evidence is generally used for criminal cases. This court, however, has not hesitated to use circumstantial evidence in
othercases.[364]Thereisnoreasonnottoconsidercircumstantialfactsasevidenceasamethodofproof.
IfcircumstantialevidencemaybesufficienttosatisfYconvictiononthebasisofthehigheststandardofproof,i.e.beyondproofbeyond
reasonabledoubt,thenitcanalsosatisfYthelessstringentstandardofproofrequiredincasesbeforetheCommissiononElections.Asa
quasijudicial body, the Commission on Elections requires substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
acceptasadequatetosupportaconclusion."[365]
PetitionerwasfoundinJaro,IloiloataparishchurchonSeptember3,1968.[366]Iloilo,asinmostifnotallprovincesofthePhilippines,
had a population composed mostly of Filipinos.[367] Petitioner is described as having "brown almondshafed eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straightblackhairandanovalshapedface."[368]Sheisonly5feetand2inchestall.[369]
Petitioner wants this court to take judicial notice that majority of Filipinos are Roman Catholics. Many Filipinos are poor. Poverty and
shamemaybedominantreasonswhyinfantsareabandoned.[370]
TherewasalsonointernationalairportinJaro,Iloiloatthetimewhenpetitionerwasborn.
These circumstances provide substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her biological parents. Her physical characteristics are
consistentwiththatofmanyFilipinos.HerabandonmentataCatholicChurchisconsistentwiththeexpectedbehaviorofaFilipinoin1968
wholivedinapredominantlyreligiousandCatholicenvironment.ThenonexistenceofaninternationalairportinJaro,Iloilocanreasonably
providecontextthatitisillogicalforaforeignfatherandaforeignmothertovisitaruralarea,givebirthandleavetheiroffspringthere.

TheSolicitorGeneraladdsthatpetitioneris,intermsofprobability,morelikelybornaFilipinathanaforeignerwiththesubmissionofthis
table:[371]

NUMBEROFFOREIGNANDFILIPINOCHILDRENBORNINTHEPHILIPPINES:19651975AND20102014

YEAR
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

FOREIGNCHILDRENBORNIN
THEPHILIPPINES
1,479
1,437
1,440
1,595
1,728
1,521
1,401
1,784
1,212
1,496
1,493
1,244
1,140
1,454
1,315
1,351

FILIPINOCHILDRENBORNIN
THEPHILIPPINES
795,415
823,342
840,302
898,570
946,753
966,762
963,749
968,385
1,045,290
1,081,873
1,223,837
1,782,877
1,746,685
1,790,367
1,751,523
1,748,782

Source:PhilippineStatisticsAuthority
[illegible]

Basedontheabovedata,outofthe900,165recordedbirthsinthePhilippinesin1968,only1,595or0.18%ofnewbornswereforeign.
Thistranslatestoroughly99.8%chancethatpetitionerwasbornaFilipinaatbirth.
VI

Petitioner committed no material misrepresentation with respect to her residency. The facts that can reasonably be inferred from the
evidencepresentedclearlyshowthatshesatisfiedtherequirementthatshehadresidency10yearsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.
VI.A

Therequirementforresidencyisstatedinthe1987Constitutionas:"[n]opersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheis...aresidentof
thePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection."[372]
Inthisjurisdiction,"residence"doesnotadmitofasingulardefinition.Itsmeaningvariestorelatetothepurpose.The"term'resides,'like
theterms'residing'and'residence,'iselasticandshouldbeinterpretedinlightoftheobjectorpurposeofthestatuteorruleinwhichitis
employed."[373]Residence,thus,isdifferentunderimmigrationlaws,theCivilCodeortheFamilyCode,orelectionlaws.
Article50oftheCivilCodespellsoutadistinctionbetween"residence"and"domicile":

Article50.Fortheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,thedomicileofnaturalpersonsistheplaceof
theirhabitualresidence.

Thisdistinctionhasbeenfurtherexplained,asfollows:

Thereisadifferencebetweendomicileandresidence.'Residence'isusedtoindicatetheplaceofabode,whetherpermanentor
temporary' 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
mayhavearesidenceinoneplaceandadomicileinanother.''Residenceisnotdomicile,butdomicileisresidencecoupledwith
intentiontoremainforanunlimitedtime.Amancanhavebutonedomicileforoneandthesamepurposeatanytime,buthe
may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means
necessarilyso,sincenolengthofresidencewithoutintentionofremainingwillconstitutedomicile.[374]

Procedurallawonvenuefollowsthisconceptionofresidenceas"theplaceofabode,whetherpermanentortemporary"[375]andwhichis
distinct from domicile (also referred to as "legal residence") as "fixed permanent residence."[376] In AngKekChenv.SpousesCalasan:
[311]

Thecrucialdistinctionthatmustbemadeisbetween"actualresidence"and"domicile."ThecaseofGarciaFulev.CourtofAppealshad
alreadymadethedistinctionin1976.Thepertinentportionofthecasereadsasfollows:

But, the farranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? ... We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides"connotesexvitermini"actualresidence"asdistinguishedfrom"legalresidenceordomicile."Thisterm"resides,"like
theterms"residing"and"residence,"iselasticandshouldbeinterpretedinthelightoftheobjectorpurposeofthestatuteor
ruleinwhichitisemployed.Intheapplicationofvenuestatutesandrules...residenceratherthandomicileisthesignificant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technicalsense.Somecasesmakeadistinctionbetweentheterms"residence"and"domicile"butasgenerallyusedinstatutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residenceorplaceofabode.Itsignifiesphysicalpresenceinaplaceandactualstaythereat.Inthispopularsense,theterm
meansmerelyresidence,thatispersonalresidence,notlegalresidenceordomicile.Residencesimplyrequiresbodilypresence
asaninhabitantinagivenplace,whiledomicilerequiresbodilypresenceinthatplaceandalsoanintentiontomakeitone's
domicile.Noparticularlengthoftimeofresidenceisrequiredthoughhowever,theresidencemustbemorethantemporary.
[378]

Itisclearthatingrantingrespondents'MotionforReconsideration,theCAacceptedtheargumentofrespondentAtty.Calasan
that"residence"issynonymouswith"domicile."
InSaludo,Jr.v.AmericanExpressInternational,Inc.,theterm"residence"wasequatedwith"domicile"asfaraselectionlaw
wasconcerned.However,thecasealsostatedthat:

[F]or purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as
"the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personalresidence,notlegalresidenceordomicile.Residencesimplyrequiresbodilypresenceasaninhabitantina
givenplace,whiledomicilerequiresbodilypresenceinthatplaceandalsoanintentiontomakeitone'sdomicile."
[379](Citationsomitted)

Inthisjurisdiction,itissettleddoctrinethatforelectionpurposes,theterm"residence"contemplates"domicile."[380]
Asearlyas1928,whentheJonesLawof1916wasstillineffect,thiscourtnotedinNuval v. Guray[381] that the term residence "is so
usedassynonymouswithdomicile."[382]The1941caseofGallegov.Vera,[383]whichwaspromulgatedwhenthe1935Constitutionwas
ineffect,citedNuval and maintained the same position. Under the auspices of the present 1987 Constitution, this court stated in Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[384] that "the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile not
onlyunderthepreviousConstitutionsbutalsounderthe1987Constitution."[385]
Forthesamepurposeofelectionlaw,thequestionofresidenceismainlyoneofintention.[386]InGallegov.Vera:[387]

Theterm"residence"asusedintheelectionlawissynonymouswith"domicile,"whichimportsnotonlyintentiontoresideina
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a
domicilebychoice,theremustconcur(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,(2)anintentiontoremainthere,and
(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.Inotherwords,theremustbeananimusnonrevertendiandananimusmanendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefmite period of time. The acts of the person must
conformwithhispurpose.Thechangeofresidencemustbevoluntarytheresidenceattheplacechosenforthedomicilemust
beactualandtothefactofresidencetheremustbeaddedtheanimusmanendi.[388]

Jurisprudencehasestablishedthree(3)fundamentalprinciplesgoverningdomicile:"first,thataman[orwoman]musthavearesidence
or domicile somewhere second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired and third, a man [or woman] can
havebutonedomicileatatime."[389]
Domicile may be categorized as: "(1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law, attributes to a person
independentlyofhisresidenceorintention."[390]
Domicileoforiginisacquiredatbirthandcontinuesuntilreplacedbytheacquisitionofanotherdomicile.Ineffect,one'sdomicileoforigin
isthedomicileofone'sparentsorofthepersonsuponwhomoneislegallydependentatbirth.[391]
Buildingonthisconcept,thiscourthasemphasizedthatasarule,"domicileoforiginisnoteasilylostandthatitislostonlywhenthereis
anactualremovalorchangeofdomicile,abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerresidenceandestablishinganewone,andacts
which correspond with such purpose."[392] Consistent with this, it has held that there is a "presumption in favor of a continuance of an
existingdomicile."[393]
Controversiesadvertingtolossofdomicilemustovercomethepresumptionthatdomicileisretained.[394]Theburdenofproofis,thus,on

thepartyaverringitsloss.[395]Thispresumtionis"particularlystrong"[396]whenwhatisinvolvedisdomicileoforigin.[397]
Therationaleforthiswasexplainedinthiscourt'scitationinInreEusebiov.Eusebio:[398]

Itisoftensaid,particularlyintheEnglishcases,thatthereisastrongerpresumptionagainstchangefromadomicileoforigin
than there is against other changes of domicile. 'Domicile of origin ... differs from domicile of choice mainly in this that is
character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off.' The English view was forcibly expressed in a
PennsylvaniacaseinwhichLewis,J.,said:'Theattachmentwhicheveryonefeelsforhisnativelandisthefoundationofthe
rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No
temporary sojourn in a foreign country will work this change.' In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point was
emphasized.[399]

Likewise,inFayponv.Quirino:[400]

Itfindsjustificationinthenaturaldesireandlongingofeverypersontoreturntotheplaceofhisbirth.Thisstrongfeelingof
attachmenttotheplaceofone'sbirthmustbeovercomebypositiveproofofabandonmentforanother.[401]

Domicilemaybelostandreacquired.Domicileofchoice"isadomicilechosenbyapersontoreplacehisorherformerdomicile."[402]Itis
thedomicileacquiredbyapersonthroughtheexerciseofhisorherownfreewillandshownbyhisorherspecificactsandconduct.
Theelectionofanewdomicilemustbeshownbyclearandconvincingevidencethat:one,thereisanactualremovaloranactualchange
ofdomiciletwo,thereisabonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneandthree,there
mustbedefiniteactswhichcorrespondtothepurposeofestablishinganewdomicile.[403]
As mentioned, domicile by operation of law is the "domicile that the law attributes to a person independent of a person's residence or
intention."[404]Thiscourthaspreviouslystatedthat"aminorfollowsthedomicileofhisparents."[405]Thus,aminor'sdomicileoforiginis
replaced(byoperationoflaw)whentheminor'sparentstaketheminoralongwiththeminreestablishingtheirowndomicile.
VI.B

Thisjurisdiction'simpositionofresidencyasaqualificationforelectivepublicofficetracesitsrootsfromtheUnitedStates'owntraditions
relating to elections. These traditions were imparted to the Philippines as it transitioned from Spanish colonial rule to American colonial
rule,evolvingalongsidethePhilippines'passagefromacolonytoacommonwealthoftheUnitedStates,andultimately,toanindependent
state.
ThefifthparagraphofArticleII,Section1oftheUnitedStatesConstitution[406]setsforththeeligibilityrequirementsforPresidentofthe
UnitedStates:

NoPersonexceptanaturalhomCitizen,oraCitizenoftheUnitedStates,atthetimeoftheAdoptionofthisConstitution,shall
beeligibletotheOfficeofPresidentneithershallanyPersonbeeligibletothatOfficewhoshallnothaveattainedtotheAgeof
thirtyfiveYears,andbeenfourteenYearsaResidentwithintheUnitedStates.[407](Emphasissupplied)

The residency requirement was included in order that the People may "have a full opportunity to know [the candidate's] character and
merits,andthathemayhavemingledintheduties,andfelttheinterests,andunderstoodtheprinciplesandnourishedtheattachments,
belongingtoeverycitizeninarepublicangovernment."[408]UndertheframeworkoftheUnitedStatesConstitution,residencewas"tobe
understood as not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States during the whole period but such an inhabitancy, as includes a
permanentdomicileintheUnitedStates."[409]
InthePhilippines,residencyasarequirementforelectivepublicofficewasincorporatedintotheJonesLawof1916,pertinentprovisions
ofwhichprovided:

Section 13.Election and Qualification of Senators. That the members of the Senate of the Philippines, except as herein
provided,shallbeelectedfortermsofsixandthreeyears,ashereinafterprovided,bythequalifiedelectorsofthePhilippines.
Eachofthesenatorialdistrictsdefinedashereinafterprovidedshallhavetherighttoelecttwosenators.Nopersonshallbean
electivememberoftheSenateofthePhilippineswhoisnotaqualifiedelectorandoverthirtyyearsofage,andwhoisnotable
toreadandwriteeithertheSpanishorEnglishlanguage,andwhohasnotbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttwo
consecutive years and an actual resident of the senatorial district from which chosen for a period of at least one year
immediatelypriortohiselection.
Section14.ElectionandQualificationsofRepresentatives.ThatthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshall,exceptas
hereinprovided,beelectedtrienniallybythequalifiedelectorsofthePhilippines.Eachoftherepresentativedistrictshereinafter
provided for shall have the right to elect one representative. No person shall be an elective member of the House of

Representativeswhoisnotaqualifiedelectorandovertwentyfiveyearsofage,andwhoisnotabletoreadandwriteeither
theSpanishorEnglishlanguage,and who has not been an actual resident of the district from which elected for at least one
year immediately prior to his election: Provided, That the members of the present Assembly elected on the first Tuesday in
June,nineteenhundredandsixteen,shallbethemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesfromtheirrespectivedistrictsfor
thetermexpiringinnineteenhundredandnineteen.[410](Emphasissupplied)

UndertheJonesLawof1916,therequirementwasrelevantsolelytomembersoftheLegislatureasitwasonlythepositionsofSenator
and Member of the House of Representatives that were susceptible to popular election. Executive power was vested in the Governor
GeneralwhowasappointedbythePresidentoftheUnitedStateswiththeadviceandtheconsentoftheSenateoftheUnitedStates.[411]
The Independence Act of 1934, otherwise known as the Tydings McDuffie Act, paved the way for the Philippines' transition to
independence.UnderthisAct,the1935Constitutionwasadopted.Theresidencyrequirement,whichundertheJonesLawalreadyapplied
tolegislators,wasextendedtothePresidentandtheVicePresident.Relevantprovisionsofthe1935Constitutionstated:

Article VI. Section 2. No person shall be a Member of the National Assembly unless he has been five years a citizen of the
Philippines,isatleastthirtyyearsofage,and,atthetimeofhiselection,aqualifiedelector,andaresidentoftheprovincein
whichheischosenfornotlessthanoneyearimmediatelypriortohiselection.
ArticleVII.Section3.NopersonmaybeelectedtotheofficeofPresidentorVicePresident,unlesshebeanaturalborncitizen
ofthePhilippines,aqualifiedvoter,fortyyearsofageorover,andhasbeenaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyears
immediatelyprecedingtheelection.(Emphasissupplied)

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, the same residency requirement of 10 years was retained for the position of President. The
1973ConstitutionabolishedthepositionofVicePresident.ArticleVII,Section2ofthe1973Constitutionprovided:

NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalhomcitizenofthePhilippines.aregisteredvoter,abletoreadand
write, at least fifty years of age on the day of election for President, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.(Emphasissupplied)

The1973ConstitutionalsoretainedtheresidencyrequirementforthoseseekingtobecomemembersoftheBatasangPambansa.Article
VIII,Section4ofthe1973Constitutionprovided:

NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheBatasangPambansaasaregionalrepresentativeunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,aregisteredvoterinthe
Regioninwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingtheday
oftheelection.
Asectoralrepresentativeshallbeanaturalborncitizen,abletoreadandwrite,andshallhavesuchotherqualificationsasmay
beprovidedbylaw.(Emphasissupplied)

The present 1987 Constitution retains the residency requirement for elective officials both in the executive (i.e., President and Vice
President)andlegislative(i.e.,SenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives)branches:

ArticleVI.Section3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalhomcitizenofthePhilippines,and,onthedayofthe
election,isatleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,aregisteredvoter,andaresidentofthePhilippinesfornot
lessthantwoyearsimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
ArticleVI.Section6.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthe
Philippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,and,exceptthepartylist
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
thanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
Article VII. Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalhom citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleast
tenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.
ArticleVII.Section3.ThereshallbeaVicePresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandtermofofficeandbeelected
withandinthesamemannerasthePresident.HemayberemovedfromofficeinthesamemannerasthePresident.
The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly,Section39(a)oftheLocalGovernmentCode412providesthat,inordertobeeligibleforlocalelectivepublicoffice,acandidate
must possess the following qualifications: (1) a citizen of the Philippines (2) a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the district
whereheorsheintendstobeelected(3)aresidentthereinforatleastone(1)yearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelectionand
(4)abletoreadandwriteFilipinooranyotherlocallanguageordialect.
VI.C

Thisjurisdiction'srequirementofresidencyforelectivepublicofficeseekstoensurethatacandidateisacquaintedwiththeconditionsof
thecommunitywhereheorsheseekstobeelectedandtoserve.413Itismeant"togivecandidatestheopportunitytobefamiliarwith
theneeds,difficulties,
aspirations,potentialsforgrowthandallmattersvitaltothewelfareoftheirconstituencieslikewise,itenablestheelectoratetoevaluate
the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for."[414] Stated differently, it seeks "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer,unacquaintedwiththeconditionsandneedsofacommunityandnotidentifiedwiththelatter,fromanelectiveofficetoserve
thatcommunity[.]"[415]AsAquinov.CommissiononElection[416]added,itisalsoasafeguardagainstcandidates"fromtakingadvantage
offavorablecircumstancesexistinginthatcommunityforelectoralgain."[417]
The length of residency required for an elective post is commensurate with what is deemed to be the period necessary to acquire
familiaritywithone'sintendedconstituencyandsensitivitytotheirwelfare.
VI.D

Both requirements for elective public office, citizenship and residency, are two distinct concepts. One is not a function of the other the
latterisnotcontingentontheformer.Thus,thelossoracquisitionofonedoesnotnecessarilyresultinthelossoracquisitionoftheother.
Changeofdomicileasaresultofacquiringcitizenshipelsewhereisneitherinevitablenorinexorable.ThisistheclearimportofJapzonv.
CommissiononElections,[418]wherethiscourtdissociateddomicilefromcitizenshipbyexplainingthatthereacquisitionofonedoesnot
ipsofactoresultinthereacquisitionoftheother:

AshasalreadybeenpreviouslydiscussedbythisCourtherein,Ty'sreacquisitionofhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderRepublicAct
No.9225hadnoautomaticimpactoreffectonhisresidenceIdomicile.HecouldstillretainhisdomicileintheUSA,andhedid
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
optiontoagainestablishhisdomicileintheMunicipalityofGeneralMacarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines,saidplacebecoming
his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice,anditshallnotretroacttothetimeofhisbirth.[419]
(Emphasissupplied)

Thoughdistinct,residencyandcitizenshipmaybothconsiderlocus.Theybothhavegeographicalaspects:citizenshipentailsinclusionina
politicalcommunity,whichgenerallyhasestablishedterritoryresidencypertainstoone'splaceofabode.
Thus, in Caballero v. Commission on Elections,[420] citing Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,[421] we noted that the acquisition of
citizenshipinaforeigncountrymayresultinanabandonmentofdomicileinthePhilippines.Thisstatementwaspremisedonthespecific
observationthatinCanada,permanentresidencewasarequirementfornaturalizationasaCanadiancitizen.Caballero'snaturalizationas
aCanadiancitizen,therefore,alsonecessarilymeantthathewasaresidentofCanada:

Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country mayresultinanabandonmentofdomicileinthePhilippines.This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.
Hence,petitionerhadeffectivelyabandonedhisdomicileinthePhilippinesandtransferredhisdomicileofchoiceinCanada.His
frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.[422](Emphasissupplied)

VI.E

Even as this court has acknowledged that citizenship may be associated with residency, the decisive factor in determining whether a
candidatehassatisfiedtheresidencerequirementremainstobetheunique"factofresidence."[423]
Thereisnoshortcuttodeterminingone'sdomicile.Referencetoformalitiesorindicatorsmaybehelpfultheymayserveasguidepostsbut
thesearenotconclusive.Itremainsthatdomicileisamatterofintention.Fordomiciletobelostandreplaced,theremustbeamanifest
intention to abandon one's existing domicile. If one does not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice, his or her (old)
domicileoforiginremains.

Theprimacyofintentionissettled.InLimbonav.CommissiononElections,[424]thiscourtstatedinnouncertaintermsthat"forpuosesof
electionlaw,thequestion[of]residenceismainlyoneofintention."[425]
Thisprimacyisequallyevidentintherequisitesforacquisitionofdomicileofchoice(andconcurrentlossofone'solddomicile):

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, these must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intentiontoremainthere[in],and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.[426]

TheserequisiteswererefinedinRomualdezMarcos:[427]

[D]omicileoforiginisnoteasilylost.Tosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicile,onemustdemonstrate:

1.Anactualremovaloranactualchangeofdomicile
2.Abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneand
3.Actswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose.[428]

Intention,however,isastateofmind.Itcanonlybeascertainedthroughovertacts.Ascertainingthesecondrequirementabonafide
intention to abandon and replace one's domicile with anotherfurther requires an evaluation of the person's "acts, activities and
utterances."[429]RomualdezMarcos'inclusionofthethirdrequirementdemonstratesthisbonafideintentioncannotstandalone,itmust
beaccompaniedbyandattestedtoby"[a]ctswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose."[430]
Examiningaperson's"acts,activitiesandutterances"[431]requiresanuancedapproach.Itdemandsaconsiderationofcontext.Thiscourt
hasmadeiteminentlyclearthatthereisnoexpedientsolutionastohowthisisdetermined:"Thereisnohardandfastrulebywhichto
determinewhereapersonactuallyresides."[432]Domicileisultimatelyafactualmatterandisnotsoeasilyresolvedbymerereferenceto
whetherformalitieshavebeensatisfiedorwhetherpreconceivedaprioriindicatorsareattendant.
Thebetterconsideredcasesdelveddeeplyandanalyticallyintotheovertactsofthepersonwhosedomicileisunderscrutiny.
Forinstance,inCov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,[433]respondentJoseOng,Jr.wasproclaimedbytheCommission
on Elections as the duly elected Representative of the Second Congressional District of Sarna. Petitioner Antonio Co protested Ong's
proclamation, but the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal upheld his election. This court sustained the ruling of the House of
RepresentativesElectoralTribunal.Advertingtotheconceptofanimusrevertendi,thiscourtnotedthatOng'sprolongedstayinManilato
studyandtopracticehisprofessionasanaccountantwasnottantamounttoabandoninghisdomicileoforigininLaoang,Samar.Instead,
thecourtappreciatedhismanytripsbacktoLaoang,Samarasindicativeofanimusrevertendi:

[T]heprivaterespondentstayedinManilaforthepurposeoffinishinghisstudiesandlatertopracticehisprofession.Therewas
no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On thecontrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province
revealthathealwayshadtheanimusrevertendi.[434]

InMitrav.CommissiononElections,[435]thiscourtconsideredasgraveabuseofdiscretiontheCommissiononElections'useof"highly
subjectivenonlegalstandards"indeterminingwhetheranindividualhasestablishedanewdomicile.[436]
To hearken to Japzon, naturalization has no automatic effect on domicile. One who changes his or her citizenship merely acquires an
optiontoestablishhisorhernewdomicileofchoice.[437]
RomualdezMarcos438emphasizedthat"itisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacywhichoughttobedecisive
indeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement."439Asingularstatement
in a prior certificate of candidacy should "not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence . . . if such fact were established by
meansmoreconvincingthanamereentryonapieceofpaper."440
Likewise,thiscourthasheldthatbeingaregisteredvoterinaspecificdistrictdoesnotipsofactomeanthatacandidatemusthavebeen
domiciled in that district, thereby precluding domicile in another district.441 So too, it has been held that the exercise of the right of
suffragedoesnotsufficientlyestablishelectionofresidencyinaspecificplace,althoughitengendersastrongpresumptionofresidence.
[442]

In appropriate cases, this court has not shied away from laboring to scrutinize attendant facts. This court's pronouncements in Dumpit
Michelenav.CommissiononElections[443]hingedontheobservationthatabeachhousecanhardlybeconsideredaplaceofresidenceas
itisatmostaplaceoftemporaryrelaxation.[444]InSabiliv.CommissiononElections,[445]thiscourtnotedthatapartfromthepresence
ofaplace(i.e.,ahouseandlot)whereonecanactuallylivein,actualphysicalpresencemayalsobeestablishedby"affidavitsofvarious
person...andtheCertificationof[the]barangaycaptain."[446]

Evenlessdoestheresidencerequirementjustifyreferencetomisplaced,inordinatestandards.Apersonisnotprohibitedfromtravelling
abroad lest his or her domicile be considered lost. This court has clarified that, if at all, return to the Philippines after travelling abroad
affirms one's animus manendi and animus revertendi.[447] So too, this court has emphasized that the establishment of a new domicile
doesnotrequireonetobeinthatabode24hoursaday,seven(7)daysaweek.[448]Ithasbeenstressedthatultimately,whatmattersis
thecandidate'sdemonstrationofintentiontoestablishdomicilethroughclearacts.
Blanketrelianceonpredeterminedindicatorsofwhatsufficestoestablishorretaindomicileismisguided.Eachcasearisesfromaunique
context.Anuanced,contextbasedexaminationofeachcaseisimperative.
VI.F

Ideally,onecanpointtoasingulardefinitivemomentwhennewresidenceisacquiredandpreviousresidenceissimultaneouslylost.Good
sense, however, dictates that this situation is hardly availing. This is especially true when a person is not acting out of a premeditated
designtoestablishformalisticcompliancewithlegalrequirements.
Thus,thiscourthasacknowledgedthatestablishingresidencemaybean"incrementalprocess"[449]thatmaylastforanextendedperiod.
This highlights the factual nature of residency questions. Acknowledging that establishing residence may be effected through a stepby
stepprocessrequiresacarefulexaminationoftheactsofthepersonwhoseresidenceisinquestion.
This court has expressly acknowledged that "initial"[450] and "preparatory moves"[451] count. Thus, residence is deemed
acquired(orchanged)assoonasthesemovesareestablished.Equallyvitalarethecontextinwhichheorsheaccomplished
suchactionsandevenseeminglyinnocuousnuancesthatcouldhaveactuallytiltedthecourseofthatperson'sactions.
This court's Decision in Mitra[452] illustrates how the acquisition or establishment of residence may transpire through an incremental
process.ThiscourtagreedwiththepositionofgubernatorialcandidateAbrahamMitrathathehadestablishedanewdomicileinAborlan,
Palawanasearlyas2008.Thiscourt,thus,disagreedwiththeCommissiononElections'observationthat"theMaligayaFeedmillbuilding
couldnothavebeenMitra'sresidencebecauseitiscoldandutterlydevoidofanyindicationofMitra'spersonalityandthatitlacksloving
attentionanddetailsinherentineveryhometomakeitone'sresidence."[453]
The following actions of Mitra were instead particularly notable: in January 2008, he "started a pineapple growing project in a rented
farmlandnearMaligayaFeedmillandFarmlocatedinBarangaylsaub,Aborlan"[454]amonthlater,he"leasedtheresidentialportionof
thesaidMaligayaFeedmill."[455]InMarch2008,he"startedtooccupyandresideinsaidpremises."[456]
Holding that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Mitra failed to satisfY the residence
requirementtoqualifYhimasacandidateforGovernorofPalawan,thiscourtexplained:

The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now
arguethatgivenhisstatureasamemberoftheprominentMitraclanofPalawan,andasathreetermcongressman,itishighly
incrediblethatasmallroominafeedmillhasservedashisresidencesince2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELEC's use of subjective nonlegal
standards.Mitra'sfeedmilldwellingcannotbeconsideredinisolationandseparatelyfromthecircumstancesofhistransferof
residence,specifically,hisexpressedintenttotransfertoaresidenceoutsideofPuertoPrincesaCitytomakehimeligibletorun
for a provincial position his preparatory moves starting in early 2008 his initial transfer through a leased dwelling the
purchaseofalotforhispermanenthomeandtheconstructionofahouseinthislotthat,parenthetically,isadjacenttothe
premisesheleasedpendingthecompletionofhishouse.Theseincrementalmovesdonotoffendreasonatall,inthewaythat
theCOMELEC'shighlysubjectivenonlegalstandardsdo.[457](Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)

Sabili v. Commission on Elections[458] similarly acknowledged that establishing residence may be an incremental process. In sustaining
petitionerMeynardoSabili'spositionthathehasbeenaresidentofLipaCityfortwo(2)yearsandeight(8)monthsleadingtotheMay
2010Elections,therebyqualifYinghimtorunforMayorofLipaCity,thiscourtexplained:

[A] transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,
wheretheevidenceshowedthatin2008,petitionerMitrahadleasedasmallroomatMaligayaFeedmillslocatedinAborlanand,
in2009purchasedinthesamelocalityalotwherehebeganconstructinghishouse,werecognizedthatpetitioner"transferred
by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his
residencefromPuertoPrincesaCitytoAborlanwithintheperiodrequiredbylaw.WecannottreatthetransfertothePinagtong
ulanhouseanylessthanwedidMitra'stransfertotheMaligayaFeedmillsroom.[459]

In approaching residence questions, therefore, what is crucial is a comprehensive or holistic, rather than a myopic or isolationist,
appreciation of the facts. Not only must all the pertinent facts be considered, so too must be their relationships and synergies. To do
otherwisewouldbetorenderlipservicetothebasicimperativeofanexactingconsiderationoffactsinresidencecontroversies.
VI.G

Applying these doctrinal principles, petitioner satisfied the residence requirement provided in Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.ItwasgraveabuseofdiscretionfortheCommissiononElectionstoholdthatshecommittedamaterialmisrepresentationin
herCertificateofCandidacyforPresident.
TheCommissiononElectionscommittedagrievouserrorwhenitinvokedthedatepetitioner'sPhilippinecitizenshipwasreacquired(i.e.,
July7,2006)astheearliestpossiblepointwhenshecouldhavereestablishedresidenceinthePhilippines.Thiserroneouspremisewasthe
basis for summarily setting aside all the evidence submitted by petitioner which pointed to the reestablishment of her residence at any
point prior to July 7, 2006. Thus, by this faulty premise, the Commission on Elections justified the evasion of its legally enjoined and
positive duty to treat petitioner's residence controversy as a factual matter and to embark on a meticulous and comprehensive
considerationoftheevidence.
Attheonset,theCommissiononElectionsflatoutprecludedthetimelyreestablishmentofpetitioner'sresidenceinthePhilippinesbecause
it held that "the earliest possible date that the respondent could have reestablished her residence in the Philippines is when she
reacquired her Filipino Citizenship on July 2006."[460] In doing so, it relied on this court's Decisions in Coquillia v. Commission on
Elections,[461]Japzonv.CommissiononElections,[462]andCaballerov.CommissiononElections.[463]
In its assailed December 23, 2015 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the Petition filed by
Elamparo,theCommissiononElectionsexplained:

Foremost,theCommissionisnotconvincedthattheSecondDivision"chosetorelyonasinglepieceofevidence"respondent's
2013COC,totheexclusionofallothers,inresolvingtheissueofresidence.ItdoesnotpersuadeusthatastheSecondDivision
"entirelyomitted"tomentiontheevidenceofrespondentenumeratedinRespondent'sMotion,itdidnotconsiderthematall.A
judgeisnotboundtomentioninhisdecisioneverybitofevidenceonrecord.Heispresumedtohaveregularlydischargedhis
dutytoconsiderandweighallevidenceformallyofferedbythepartieswhichareadmissible.
....
To indulge respondent, however, the Commission now looks, one by one on the pieces of evidence allegedly ignored by the
Second Division which are, along with their purpose for offer, are enumerated in Respondent's Motion. Unfortunately, an
examinationoftheseevidenceleadstobutonecrucialandfatalconclusion:thatallofthemwereexecutedbeforeJuly2006,
and/orareofferedtoprovethatshecanreckonherresidencybeforeJuly2006thedateofreacquisitionbyrespondentofher
Filipino citizenship. This is fatal because, following the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon v. COMELEC, and Caballero v.
COMELEC,theearliestpossibledatethatrespondentcouldhavere establishedherresidenceinthePhilippinesiswhenshere
acquiredherFilipinoCitizenshiponJuly2006.Yes,onthisfinding,weaffirmtheSecondDivisionforthereasonsthatfollow.
[464]

InitsassailedDecember23,2015Resolutiondenyingpetitioner'sMotionforReconsiderationwithrespecttothepetitionsfiledbyTatad,
Contreras,andValdez,theCommissiononElectionsexplained:
As a US citizen and a foreigner, Respondent was allowed only temporary residence in the Philippines, Respondent's alien citizenship
remainedalegalimpedimentwhichpreventedherfromestablishingherdomicileinthePhilippines.Toestablishpermanentresidencein
the Philippines, it was necessary for Respondent to secure prior authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ""BID"),
suchasintheformofapermanentresidentvisaissuedbytheRepublicofthePhilippinesshowingthatshewasauthorizedtopermanently
resideinthePhilippines.Thisistheruleen:.mciatedbytheSupremeCourtinthecaseofCoquillavs.CommissiononElectionsetal.[465]
Itisthisdogmaticrelianceonformalpreconceivedindicatorsthatthiscourthasrepeatedlydecriedisgraveabuseofdiscretion.Worse,
theCommissiononElectionsreliedonthewrongformalindicatorsofresidence.
TheCommissiononElectionsignoredthebasicdistinctionbetweencitizenshipandresidence.Likewise,iterroneouslyconsideredavisaa
mere permission to enteras a badge of residence, and equated an immigrant with one who is domiciled in the Philippines. So too, the
CommissiononElections'indiscriminaterelianceonCoquilla,Japzon,andCaballeroindicatesafailureinproperlyappreciatingthefactual
nuancesofthosecasesasagainstthoseofthiscase.
Citizenship and residency are distinct, mutually exclusive concepts. One is not a function of the other. Residence is not necessarily
contingentoncitizenship.Thelossoracquisitionofonedoesnotmeantheautomaticlossoracquisitionoftheother.Changeofdomicile
asaresultofacquiringcitizenshipelsewhereisneitherinevitablenorinexorable.
Japzonv.CommissiononElections[466]couldnothavebeenmoreemphatic:"[R]eacquisitionof...Philippinecitizenship...[has]no
automaticimpactoreffectonresidence/domicile."[467]
Residence, as does citizenship, entreats a consideration of locus or geography. It is true that they may be related or connected, but
associationisdifferentfromcausation.
Caballero v. Commission on Elections[468] was extremely careful in its syntax: "naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines."[469] The use of the word "may" reveals this court's recognition that citizenship is not
conclusive of domicile. In controversies relating to a candidate's residence, citizenship may be considered and it may engender
implications,buttheseimplicationsarenevertobeconsideredinfallible.

VI.H

Aswithcitizenship,nonpossessionofapermanentresidentorimmigrantvisadoesnotnegateresidencyforelectionpurposes.
A visa is but a travel document given by the issuing country to travelers for purposes of border control.[470] Holders of a visa are
"conditionallyauthorisedtoenterorleaveaterritoryforwhichitwasissued,subjecttopermissionofanimmigrationofficialatthetimeof
actualentry."[471]Conditionsofentryusuallyincludedateofvalidity,periodofstay,numberofallowedentry,andterritorycovered.[472]
Inthisjurisdiction,visasareissuedbyaconsularofficerofthePhilippineEmbassyorConsulateasapermittogotothePhilippinesand
seekpermissiontoenterthecountryatitsportofentry.Thedecisiontoadmitordisallowentryintothecountrybelongstoimmigration
authoritiesattheportofentry.[473]Hence,themereissuanceofavisadoesnotdenoteactualadmissioninto,letaloneprolongedstay,
i.e.,domicile,inthecountry.
The statutory definition of "immigrant," as provided in Section 50 (j) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
ImmigrationActof1940,sustainsthedistinctionbetweenanimmigrantandonewhoisactuallydomiciledinthePhilippines:

SEC.50.AsusedinthisAct:
....
(j)Theterm"immigrant"meansanyaliendepartingfromanyplaceoutsidethePhilippinesdestinedfor the Philippines, other
thananonimmigrant.(Emphasissupplied)

Thedefinition'soperativetermsarecontainedinthephrases"departingfrom"and"destinedfor."Thesephrases,whicharebutdifferent
sidesofthesamecoin,attesttohowanimmigrantisnotnecessarilyonewhoestablishesdomicileinthePhilippines,butmerelyonewho
travelsfromaforeigncountryintothePhilippines.Aswithavisa,thefivotalconsiderationisentryinto,notpermanentstay,in
thePhilippines.[474]
Infact,aformerFilipinomayobtainanimmigrantvisawithoutevenintendingtoresideoractuallyresidinginthePhilippines.Aspetitioner
pointedout:

5.289.5.Thus,aformerFilipinowhohaspreviouslybeenallowedentryintothePhilippinesmaysecurea"nonquotaimmigrant
visa"providedheorshesubmitsthefollowingdocumentaryrequirements:(a)"LetterrequestaddressedtotheCommissioner"
(b)"DulyaccomplishedCGAF(BIFormCGAF001Rev2)"(c)"Photocopyofpassportbiopageandlatestadmissionwithvalid
authorized stay" (d) "Birth Certificate of the applicant" (e) "Valid National Bureau of Investigation [NBI] Clearance, if
applicationisfiledsix(6)monthsormorefromthedateoffirstarrivalinthePhilippines"(f)"BIClearanceCertificate"and(g)
"OriginalorcertifiedtruecopyofBureauofQuarantineMedicalClearance,ifapplicantisanationalofanyofthecountrieslisted
underAnnex'A'ofImmigrationOperationsorderNo.SBM14059AwhoarrivedinthePhilippinesonorafterJune2014."
5.289.6. None of the 7 documentary requirements listed above would indicate whether the applicant intends to make the
Philippineshisorher"permanenthome."Noneofthesedocumentswouldshowwhetherheorshe,indeed,necessarilyintends
toabandonhisorherforeigndomicile.Indeed,aforeignermaywanttobeanpermanentresidenthere,butwouldalwayswant
toreturntohisorherhomecountry,whichintenttoreturnisdeterminativeofwhatdomicileisunderelectionlaw.
5.289.7.Itishighlyprobable,therefore,foraformerFilipinotosecurean"immigrant"visa,withoutreallybeinga"resident"of
thePhilippines,asthetermisunderstoodinelectionlaw.[475](Emphasissupplied)

The Commission on Elections insists that petitioner should have obtained a visa that supposedly evidences permanent resident status.
However,itfailedtoacknowledgethatpetitionerdidnotevenneedavisatoaccomplishthepurposethatavisaserves,thatis,toenter
thePhilippines.
BeginningMay24,2005,petitioner'sentriestothePhilippineswerethroughthevisafreeBalikbayanProgramprovidedforbyRepublicAct
No.6768,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.9174.Section3(c)ofRepublicActNo.6768,asamended,provides:

SEC. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following
benefitsandprivileges:
....
(c)VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexceptionofrestricted
nationals

Petitioner falls within the definition of a balikbayan, under Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 6768, as amended.[476] She is a "Filipino
citizen...whohadbeennaturalizedinaforeigncountry[whocame]orreturn[ed]tothePhilippines."[477]Shewas,thus,wellcapacitated
tobenefitfromtheBalikbayanProgram.

The Balikbayan Program is not only a scheme that dispenses with the need for visas it is a system that affirmatively works to enable
balikbayanstoreintegratethemselvesintothePhilippines.Alternativelystated,itworkstoenablebalikbayanstoreestablishdomicilein
thePhilippines.PertinentprovisionsofRepublicActNo.6768,asamended,spellouta"KabuhayanProgram":

Section1.BalikbayanProgram....
The program shall include a kabuhayan shopping privilege allowing taxexempt purchase of livelihood tools providing the
opportunitytoavailofthenecessarytrainingtoenablethebalikbayantobecomeeconomicallyselfreliantmembersofsociety
upontheirreturntothecountry.TheprogramshalllikewiseshowcasecompetitiveandoutstandingFilipinomadeproducts.
Sec. 6. Training Programs. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) through the OWWA, in coordination with the
TechnologyandLivelihoodResourceCenter(TLRC),TechnicalEducationandSkillsDevelopmentAuthority(TESDA),livelihood
corporationandotherconcernedgovernmentagencies,shallprovidethenecessaryentrepreneurialtrainingandlivelihoodskills
programs and marketing assistance to a balikbayan, including his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of the
kabuhayanprograminaccordancewiththeexistingrulesonthegovernment'sreintegrationprogram.
InthecaseofnonOFWbalikbayan,theDepartmentofTourismshallmakethenecessaryarrangementwiththeTLRCandother
traininginstitutionsforpossiblelivelihoodtraining.

EnablingbalikbayanstoestablishtheirlivelihoodinthePhilippines,RepublicActNo.6768,asamended,canhaveasalogicalresulttheir
reestablishmenthereoftheirpermanentabodes.
VI.I

TheCommissiononElections'erroneousrelianceonCoquilla,Japzon,andCaballerodemonstratesitsevasionofitsdutytoengageinthe
requiredmeticulousfactualanalysis.AcloserexaminationofthesecasesaswellasofasimilarcasethatprivaterespondentsElamparo
andValdezinvokedintheFebruary16,2016oralargumentsReyesv.CommissiononElections[478]revealsthattheconclusionsinthose
caseswerereachednotbecauseofapracticallyspellboundinvocationofcitizenship.
Rather, they were reached because: first, the persons whose residence were in question failed to present any evidence at all of
reestablishing residence of choice in the Philippines before their repatriation was effected (or if they did, their evidence were deemed
negligible)andsecond,thecountervailingevidencepresentedagainstthemdemonstratedthattheyfailedtoreestablishresidenceahead
oftheirrepatriation.
Coquillainvolvedonlytwo(2)piecesofevidenceinfavorofTeoduloCoquilla:[479]first,hisCommunityTaxCertificateandsecond,his
ownverbalstatementsregardinghisintenttorunforpublicoffice.Withonlytheseinsupportofhiscause,themorereasonableconclusion
wasthatCoquilladidnotintendtoreturnforgoodtothePhilippines,butonlytotemporarilyvacation.[480]
Japzon was not even about reestablishing residence ahead of reacquiring naturalborn citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225.
JapzonevenmilitatesagainsttheCommissiononElections'positionasitexpresslystatedthat"reacquisitionofhisPhilippinecitizenship
underRepublicActNo.9225hadnoautomaticimpactoreffecton[thecandidate's]residence/domicile"[481]and,thus,shouldbetaken
asanindicatorofwhenresidencemayormaynotbereckoned.
InReyes,ReginaOngsiakoReyesarguedthatsheneverlostherdomicileoforigin(i.e.,Boac,Marinduque).[482]Astoherclaimthatshe
satisfiedtheresidencerequirement,thiscourtapprovinglyquotedthefollowingobservationsoftheCommissiononElectionsFirstDivision:

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the oneyear residency requirement of the law and never
abandonedherdomicileoforigininBoac,MarinduqueisherclaimthatsheservedasProvincialAdministratoroftheprovince
fromJanuary18,2011toJuly13,201LButsuchfactaloneisnotsufficienttoproveheroneyearresidency.For,[petitioner]
has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
localitycansubstitutethefactthatshehasnotabandonedherdomicileofchoiceintheUSA.[483](Citationsomitted)

Caballero cited Coquilla and, as previously discussed, took pains to dissociate residence from citizenship. In any case, Rogelio Batin
Caballero, candidate for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, himself admitted that he only had an actual stay of nine (9) months in Uyugan,
Batanes prior to the 2013Elections, albeit claiming that it was substantial comgliance with the Local Government Code's oneyear
residencerequirement.[484]
IncontrastwithCoquilla,Japzon,Reyes,andCaballero,petitionerherepresentedaplethoraofevidenceattestingtothereestablishment
ofherdomicilewellaheadofherreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshiponJuly7,2006:

(1)
(2)

UnitedStatesPassportNo.017037793issuedtopetitioneronDecember18,2001,indicatingthatshetravelledback
tothePhilippinesonMay24,2005,consistingof13pages
EmailexchangesonvariousdatesfromMarch18,2005toSeptember29,2006betweenpetitionerandherhusband
and representatives of Victory Van Corporation, and NationalVeterinaryQuarantineServiceoftheBureauofAnimal
IndustryofthePhilippines,consistingof23pages

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)

OfficialTranscriptofRecordsofBrianDanielPoeLlamanzares,issuedbytheBeaconSchool,consistingofone(1)page
CertificationissuedbytheRegistrarofLaSalleGreenHillsdatedApril15,2015,consistingofone(1)page
ElementaryPupil'sPermanentRecordforHannaMackenzieLlamanzares,issuedbyAssumptionCollege,consistingof
two(2)pages
SecondaryStudent'sPermanentRecordforHannaMackenzieLlamanzares,issuedbyAssumptionCollege,consisting
oftwo(2)pages
CertificateofAttendancedatedApril8,2015,issuedbytheDirectressof.theLearningConnection,Ms.JuliePascual
Penaloza,consistingofone(1)page
CertificationdatedApril14,2015issuedbytheDirectressoftheGreenMeadowsLearningCenter,Ms.AnnaVillaluna
Reyes,consistingofone(1)page
ElementaryPupil'sPermanentRecordforJesusaAnikaCarolinaLlamanzares,issuedbyAssumptionCollege,consisting
ofone(1)page
Identification Card, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to petitioner on July 22, 2005, consisting of one (1)
page
CondominiumCertificateofTitleNo.11985RcoveringUnit7FofOneWilsonPlace,issuedbytheRegistryofDeedsof
SanJuanCityonFebruary20,2006,consistingoffour(4)pages
CondominiumCertificateofTitleNo.11986RcoveringtheparkingslotforUnit7FofOneWilsonPlace,issuedbythe
RegistryofDeedsofSanJuanCityonFebruary20,2006,consistingoftwo(2)pages
Declaration ofReal Property No. 9639721 covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Office of the City
AssessorofSanJuanCityonApril25,2006,consistingofone(1)page
Declaration of Real Property No. 9639722 covering the parking slot of Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the
OfficeoftheCityAssessorofSanJuanCityonApril25,2006,consistingofonepage
ReceiptNo.8217172,issuedbytheSalvationArmyonFebruary23,2006,consistingofone(1)page
(16)ReceiptNo.8220421,issuedbytheSalvationArmyonFebruary23,2006,consistingofone(1)page
Email from the U.S.A. Postal Service, sent on March 28, 2006 to petitioner's husband, confirming the latter's
submissionofarequestforchangeofaddresstotheU.S.A.PostalService,consistingofone(1)page
Final Statement issued by the First American Title Insurance Company, which indicates as Settlement Date: "04
27/2006",consistingoftwo(2)pages
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 290260 covering a 509square meter lot at No. 106, Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills,
BarangayUgongNorte,QuezonCity,issuedbytheRegistryofDeedsofQuezonCityonJune1,2006,consistingof
four(4)pages
QuestionnaireInformationforDeterminingPossibleLossofU.S.CitizenshipissuedbytheU.S.DepartmentofState,
BureauofConsularAffairs,accomplishedbypetitioneronJuly12,2011
AffidavitofJesusaSonoraPoedatedNovember8,2015,consistingofthree(3)pages
AffidavitofTeodoroLlamanzaresdatedNovember8,2015,consistingofthree(3)pages[485]

TheCommissiononElectionschosetoignoreallthesepiecesofevidenceshowingreestablishmentofresidencepriortoJuly7,2006by
the mere invocation of petitioner's then status as one who has not yet reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Elections
relied on a manifestly faulty premise to justify its position that all of petitioner's evidence relating to the period before July 7, 2006
deserved no consideration. Clearly, this was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections in two (2) respects:
first,inusingcitizenshipasashortcutandsecond,inevadingitspositivedutytoscrutinizethefactsandevidence.
VI.J

As with Mitra and Sabili, petitioner has shown by substantial evidence that the incremental process of establishing her residence in the
PhilippinescommencedonMay24,2005andwascompletedinthelatterpartofApril2006.TheConstitutionrequiresthatacandidatefor
theMay9,2016[486]PresidentialElectionsmustestablishresidencyatleastbyMay9,2006.
Herevidencesatisfiesthethree(3)requisitesforestablishingdomicileofchoiceinthePhilippines:
First,bodilypresenceinthePhilippinesisdemonstratedbyheractualarrivalinthecountryonMay24,2005.
Second,animusmanendiorintenttoremaminthePhilippinesisdemonstratedby:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Petitioner'stravelrecords,whichindicatethatevenasshecouldmomentarilyleaveforatripabroad,shenevertheless
constantlyreturnedtothePhilippines
AffidavitofJesusaSonoraPoe,whichatteststohow,upontheirarrivalinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005,petitioner
andherchildrenfirstlivedwithherat23LincolnSt.,GreenhillsWest,SanJuanCity,therebyrequiringachangeinthe
livingarrangementsatherownresidence
Theschoolrecordsofpetitioner'schildren,whichprovethattheyhavebeencontinuouslyattendingPhilippineschools
beginninginJune2005
Petitioner'sTaxIdentificationNumberIdentificationCard,whichindicatesthat"shortlyafterherreturninMay2005,
sheconsideredherselfataxableresidentandsubmittedherselftothePhilippines'taxjurisdiction"[487]and
Twocondominiumcertificatesoftitle(oneforUnit7F,OneWilsonPlace,andanotherforacorrespondingparkingslot
which were both purchased in early 2005), and along with corresponding Declarations of Real Property Tax
DeclarationswhichestablishintenttopermanentlyresideinthePhilippines.

Lastly,animusnonrevertendiorintenttoabandondomicileintheUnitedStatesisdemonstratedby:

(1)
(2)

AffidavitofJesusaSonoraPoe,which"atteststo,amongothers,thereasonswhichprompted[petitioner]toleavethe
[UnitedStates]andreturnpermanentlytothePhilippines"[488]

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Affidavit of petitioner's husband, which affirms petitioner's explanations of how they made arrangements for their
relocationtothePhilippinesasearlyasMarch2005
Petitioner and her husband's documented inquiries and exchanges with property movers as regards the transfer of
theireffectsandbelongingsfromtheUnitedStatestothePhilippines,whichaffirmstheirintenttopermanentlyleave
theUnitedStatesasearlyasMarch2005
The actual relocation and transfer of effects and belongings, "which were packed and collected for storage and
transporttothePhilippinesonFebruaryandApril2006"[489]
Petitioner's husband's act of informing the United States Postal Service that he and his family are abandoning their
addressintheUnitedStatesasofMarch2006
Petitionerandherhusband'ssaleoftheirfamilyhomeintheUnitedStatesonApril27,2006
Petitioner'shusband'sresignationfromhisworkintheUnitedStateseffectiveApril2006and
Petitioner'shusband'sactualreturntothePhilippinesonMay4,2006.

Withduerecognitiontopetitioner'sinitialandpreparatorymoves(aswasdoneinMitraandSabili),itisclearthatpetitioner'sresidencein
thePhilippineswasestablishedasearlyasMay24,2005.
Nevertheless, even if we are to depart from Mitra and Sahili and insist on reckoning the reestablishment of residence only at that point
whenallofitsstepshavebeenconsummated,itremainsthatpetitionerhasproventhatshehassatisfiedArticleVII,Section2ofthe1987
Constitution'stenyearresidencerequirement.
VI.K

TheevidencerelieduponbytheCommissiononElectionsfailtocontrovertthetimelyreestablishmentofpetitioner'sdomicile.
Insistingthatpetitionerfailedtotimelyreestablishresidence,theCommissiononElectionsunderscoresthree(3)facts:first,herhusband,
TeodoroLlamanzares,"remainedaresidentoftheUSinMay2005,wherehekeptandretainedhisemployment"[490]second,petitioner,
usingherUnitedStatespassport,supposedlytravelledfrequentlytotheUnitedStatesfromMay2005toJuly2006andthird,astatement
intheCertificateofCandidacyshefiledforSenatorindicatingthatshewasaresidentofthePhilippinesforonlysix(6)yearsandsix(6)
months as of May 13, 2013, which must mean that: first, by May 9, 2016, she shall have been a resident of the Philippines for a
cumulative period of nine (9) years and six (6) months and second, she started to be a resident of the Philippines only in November
2006.
NoneofthesefactssustaintheCommissiononElections'conclusions.Relyingontheresidenceofpetitioner'shusbandissimplymisplaced.
Heisnotapartytothiscase.Noincidentrelatingtohisresidence(orevencitizenship)bindstheconclusionsthataretobearrivedatin
thiscase.Petitionerwasfreetoestablishherownresidence.
The position that the residence of the wife follows that of the husband is antiquated and no longer binding. Article 110 of the Civil
Code[491]usedtoprovidethat"[t]hehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily."ButithaslongbeenreplacedbyArticle152ofthe
FamilyCode,[492]whichplacesthewifeonequalfootingasthehusband.
ToaccepttheCommissiononElections'conclusionsistoacceptaninvitationtoreturntoanantiquatedstateofaffairs.TheCommission's
conclusionsnotonlyruncountertothespecifictextofArticle152oftheFamilyCodeitrenouncestheentirebodyoflawsupholding"the
fundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomenandmen."[493]
Chief of these is Republic Act No. 7192, otherwise known as the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Section 5 of this Act
specificallystatesthat"[w]omenoflegalage,regardlessofcivilstatus,shallhavethecapacitytoact...whichshallineveryrespectbe
equaltothatofmenundersimilarcircumstances."AsunderscoredbyAssociateJusticeLucasP.BersaminintheFebruary9,2016oral
arguments,awifemaychoose"tohaveherowndomicileforpurposesofconductingherownprofessionorbusiness":[494]

JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
Yes.IsthepositionoftheCOMELEClikethis,thatadualcitizencanonlyhaveonedomicileor...
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,definitelybecausethatistherulinginjurisprudence,
"Apersoncanhaveonlyonedomicileatthattime."
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
Alright,whochoosesthatdomicileforher?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Inthe...(interrupted)
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
Atthattimewhenheorshewasadualcitizen.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Inthecontextofmarriage,it'sajointdecisionofhusbandandwife,Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:

Okay,wehavealaw,aprovisionintheCivilCodereiteratedintheFamilyCode...(interrupted)
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes...
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
...thatitisthehusbandwhousuallydefmesthesitusofthedomicile?
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
Exceptifthewifechoosestohaveherowndomicileforpurposesofconductingherownprofessionorbusiness.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.
JUSTICEBERSAMIN:
That'sundertheWomeninNationBuildingAct.
COMMISSIONERLIM:
Yes,YourHonor.[495]

Reliance on petitioner's husband's supposed residence reveals an even more basic flaw. This presupposes that residence as used in the
CivilCodeandtheFamilyCodeistobeequatedwithresidenceasusedinthecontextofelectionlaws.Evenifitistobeassumedthatthe
wifefollowstheresidencefixedbythehusband,itdoesnotmeanthatwhatisreckonedinthissenseasresidence,i.e.,thefamilyhome,
isthatwhichmustbeconsideredasresidenceforelectionpurposes.
Inanycase,petitioneramplydemonstratedthattheirfamilyhomehad,infact,beentimelyrelocatedfromtheUnitedStates.Initially,it
wasinhermother'sresidenceat23LincolnSt.,GreenhillsWest,SanJuanCity.Later,itwastransferredtoUnit7F,OneWilsonPlaceand
finallytoCorinthianHills,QuezonCity.
Apartfromthesheererrorofeveninvokinganonparty'sresidence,petitioner'sevidenceestablishedthepurposeforherhusband'sstay
intheUnitedStatesafterMay24,2005:thatitwas"forthesoleandspecificpurposeof'finishingpendingprojects,andtoarrangeforthe
saleofthefamilyhomethere.'"[496]Thisassertionissupportedbyevidencetoshowthatamereseven(7)daysaftertheirhouseinthe
United States was sold, that is, as soon as his reason for staying in the United States ceased, petitioner's husband returned to the
PhilippinesonMay4,2006.[497]
Equallyunavailingarepetitioner'stravelstotheUnitedStatesfromMay2005toJuly2006.
Inthefirstplace,petitionertravelledtotheUnitedStatesonlytwicewithinthisperiod.Thishardlyqualifiesas"frequent,"whichishow
theCommissiononElectionscharacterizedhertravels.[498]Asexplainedbypetitioner:

HercancelledU.S.A.PassportshowsthatshetravelledtotheU.S.A.onlytwiceduringthisperiod.Moreover,eachtrip(from16
December2005to7January2006andfrom14February2006to11March2006)didnotlastmorethanamonth.[499]

The Commission on Elections' choice to characterize as "frequent" petitioner's two trips, neither of which even extended longer than a
month, is a red flag, a badge of how it gravely abused its discretion in refusing to go about its task of meticulously considering the
evidence.
Moreover,whatispivotalisnotthatpetitionertravelledtotheUnitedStates.Rather,itisthepurposeofthesetrips.Ifatall,thesetrips
attesttotheabandonmentofherdomicileintheUnitedStatesandherhavingreestablisheditinthePhilippines.Aspetitionerexplained,it
wasnotoutofadesiretomaintainherabodeintheUnitedStates,butitwaspreciselytowrapupheraffairsthereandtoconsummate
thereestablishmentofherdomicileinthePhilippines:

5.258.1. In her Verified Answers, Sen. Poe explained why she bad to travel to the U.S.A. on 14 February 2006, and it bad,
again,nothingtodowithsupposedlymaintainingherdomicileintheU.S.A.
5.258.2.Toreiterate,Sen.Poe'striptotheU.S.A.inFebruary2006was"forthepurposeofsupervisingthedisposalofsomeof
thefamily'sremaininghouseholdbelongings."ThecircumstancesthatleadtohertraveltotheU.S.A.werediscussedindetail
in pars. 5.241 to 5.243 above. During this February 2006 trip to the U.S.A., Sen. Poe even donated some of the family's
householdbelongingstotheSalvationArmy.
5.258.3.Ontheotherhand,Sen.Poe'striptotheU.S.A.from16December2005to7January2006wasalsointended,inpart,
to"toattendtoherfamily'songoingrelocation."[500]

TheCommissiononElections'begrudgingattitudetowardspetitioner'stwotripsdemonstratesaninordinatestancetowardswhatanimus
nonrevertendiorintenttoabandondomicileintheUnitedStatesentails.Certainly,reestablishingherdomicileinthePhilippinescannot
meanaprohibitionagainsttravellingtotheUnitedStates.AsthiscourtemphasizedinJaloverv.Osmena,[501]theestablishmentofanew
domiciledoesnotrequireapersontobeinhishome24hoursaday,seven(7)daysaweek.[502]
Toholdotherwiseistosustainaglaringabsurdity.
ThestatementpetitionermadeinherCertificateofCandidacyforSenatorasregardsresidenceisnotfataltohercause.
TheassailedCommissiononElections'ResolutionmG.R.No.221697statedthat:

Respondent cannot fault the Second Division for using her statements in the 2013 COC against her. Indeed, the Second
Division correctly found that this is an admission against her interest. Being such, it is 'the best evidence which affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anythingagainsthimselfunlesssuchdeclarationwastrue.Thus,itisfairtopresumethatthedeclarationcorrespondswiththe
truth,anditishisfaultifitdoesnot.'
Moreover,a[CertificateofCandidacy],beinganotarialdocument,hasinitsfavorthepresumptionofregularity.Tocontradict
thefactsstatedtherein,theremustbeevidencethatisclear,convincingandmorethanmerelypreponderant.Inorderfora
declaranttoimpugnanotarialdocumentwhichhehimselfexecuted,itisnotenoughforhimtomerelyexecuteasubsequent
notarial document. After executing an affidavit voluntarily wherein admissions and declarations against the affiant's own
interestaremadeunderthesolemnityofanoath,theaffiantcannotjustbeallowedtospurnthemandundowhathehasdone.
Yes,thestatementinthe2013COC,albeitanadmissionagainstinterest,maylaterbeimpugnedbyrespondent.However,she
cannot do this by the mere expedient of filing her 2016 COC and claiming that the declarations in the previous one were
"honestmistakes".Theburdenisuponhertoshow,byclear,convincingandmorethanpreponderantevidence,that,indeed,it
isthelatterCOCthatiscorrectandthatthestatementsmadeinthe2013COCweredonewithoutbadfaith.Unfortunatelyfor
respondent,shefailedtodischargethisheavyburden.[503]

UntenableistheCommissiononElections'conclusionthatacertificateofcandidacy,beinganotarizeddocument,mayonlybeimpugned
by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant because it has in its favor a presumption of regularity.
Notarizing a document has nothing to do with the veracity of the statements made in that document. All that notarization does is to
convert a private document into a public document, such that when it is presented as evidence, proof of its genuineness and due
executionneednolongerbeshown.[504]Notarizationdoesnotsustainapresumptionthatthefactsstatedinnotarizeddocumentsaretrue
andcorrect.
Moreimportantly,RomualdezMarcos[505]haslongsettledthat"[i]tisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacy
whichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement."
[506] It further stated that an "honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence ... if such fact were

establishedbymeansmoreconvincingthanamereentryonapieceofpaper."[507]
The factsas established by the evidencewill always prevail over whatever inferences may be drawn from an admittedly mistaken
declaration. Jurisprudence itself admits of the possibility of a mistake. Nevertheless, the mistaken declaration serves neither as a
perpetuallybindingdeclarationnorasestoppel.ThisistheunmistakableimportofRomualdez.
Thisprimacyofthefactofresidence,asestablishedbytheevidence,andhowitprevailsovermereformalisticdeclarations,isillustrated
inPerezv.CommissionElections.[508]
In Perez, the petitioner Marcita Perez insisted that the private respondent Rodolfo Aguinaldo, a congressional candidate in the 1998
Elections,remainedaresidentofGattaran,Cagayan,andthathewasunabletoestablishresidenceinTuguegarao,Cagayan.Insupportof
herclaims,she"presentedprivaterespondent's[previous]certificatesofcandidacyforgovernorofCagayaninthe1988,1992,and1995
electionshisvoter'saffidavitwhichheusedinthe1987,1988,1992,1995,and1997electionsandhisvoterregistrationrecorddated
June22,1997,inallofwhichitisstatedthatheisaresidentofBarangayCalaoaganDackel,MunicipalityofGattaran."[509]
Thiscourtdidnotconsiderasbinding"admissions"thestatementsmadeinthedocumentspresentedbyPerez.Instead,itsustainedthe
Commission on Elections' appreciation of other evidence proving that Aguinaldo managed to establish residence in Tuguegarao. It also
citedRomualdezMarcosandaffirmedtherulethatthefactsandtheevidencewillprevailoverprior(mistakenlymade)declarations:

Inthecaseatbar,theCOMELECfoundthatprivaterespondentchangedhisresidencefromGattarantoTuguegarao,thecapital
ofCagayan,inJuly1990onthebasisofthefollowing:(1)theaffidavitofEngineerAlfredoAblaza,theowneroftheresidential
apartmentat13EMagallanesSt.,Tuguegarao,Cagayan,whereprivaterespondenthadlivedin1990(2)thecontractoflease
between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996 (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998,
betweenprivaterespondentandLennaDumaguit(4)thecertificateoflivebirthofprivaterespondent'sseconddaughterand
(5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of
Tuguegarao,Cagayanforatleastone(1)yearimmediatelyprecedingtheelectionsonMay11,1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of
Cagayanandthereisnothingintherecordtodetractfromthemeritofthisfactualfinding.
....
Moreover,asthisCourtsaidinRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC:
Itisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacy,whichoughttobedecisiveindeterminingwhetheror
notanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement.Thesaidstatementbecomesmaterialonly
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidateineligible.
Inthiscase,althoughprivaterespondentdeclaredinhiscertificatesofcandidacypriortotheMay11,1998electionsthathe
wasaresidentofGattaran,Cagayan,thefactisthathewasactuallyaresidentoftheThirdDistrictnotjustforone(1)year
priortotheMay11,1998electionsbutformorethanseven(7)yearssinceJuly1990.Hisclaimthathehadbeenaresidentof
Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenientforhimtomaintainhisresidenceinTuguegarao,whichisthecapitaloftheprovinceofCagayan.[510]

Evenassumingthatan"admission"isworthconsidering,themereexistenceofanysuchadmissiondoesnotimplyitsconclusiveness."No
doubt,admissionsagainstinterestmayberefutedbythedeclarant."[511]Thisistruebothofadmissionsmadeoutsideoftheproceedings
inagivencaseandof"[a]nadmission,verbalorwritten,madebythepartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthesamecase."[512]As
regardsthelatter,theRevisedRulesonEvidenceexplicitlyprovidesthat"[t]headmissionmaybecontradicted...byshowingthatitwas
madethroughpalpablemistake."Thus,bymistakenly"admitting,"apartyisnotconsideredtohavebroughtuponhimselforherselfan
inescapablecontingency.Onthecontrary,thatpartyisfreetopresentevidenceprovingnotonlyhisorhermistakebutalsoofwhatthe
truthis.
Petitionerherehasestablishedhergoodfaith,thatis,thatshemerelymadeanhonestmistake.Inaddition,sheadducedaplethoraof
evidence, "more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper,"[513]thatprovesthefactofherresidence,whichwasreestablished
throughanincrementalprocesscommencingonMay24,2005.
The fact of petitioner's honest mistake is accounted for. Working in her favor is a seamless, consistent narrative. This controverts any
intenttodeceive.Itisanhonesterrorforalayperson.
Firstly, her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator must be appreciated for what it is: a document filed in relation to her candidacy for
Senator,notforPresident.UnderArticleVI,Section3ofthe1987Constitution,allthatelectiontotheSenaterequiresisresidenceinthe
Philippines for "not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election." For purposes of her Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator, petitioner needed to show residence for only two (2) years and not more. As petitioner explained, she accomplished this
documentwithouttheassistanceofalawyer.[514]Thus,itshouldnotbetakenagainsther(andtakenasabadgeofmisrepresentation)
thatshemerelyfilledininformationthatwasthenapropos,thoughinaccurate.
As Commission on Elections Chairperson Andres Bautista noted in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Commission on
Elections'ResolutioninG.R.No.221697:

[The] residency requirement for Senator is two (2) years. Hence, when [petitioner] stated in her 2013 COC that she was a
resident ... for [6 years and 6 months], it would seem that she did so without really considering the legal or constitutional
requirementascontemplatedbylaw.Afterall,shehadalreadyfullycompliedwiththetwoyearresidencerequirement.[515]

ThestandardformforthecertificateofcandidacythatpetitionerfiledforSenatorrequiredhertospecifyher"PeriodofResidenceinthe
Philippines before May 13, 2013."[516] This syntax lent itselfto some degree of confusion as to what the "period before May 13, 2013"
specificallyentailed.Itwas,thus,quitepossibleforapersonfillingoutablankcertificateofcandidacytohavemerelyindicatedhisorher
period of residence as of the filing of his or her Certificate of Candidacy. This would not have been problematic for as long as the total
periodofresidencerelevanttothepositiononewasrunningforwascompliedwith.
Affirmingtheapparenttendencytoconfuse,theCommissiononElectionsitselfrevisedthetemplateforcertificatesofcandidacyforthe
upcoming 2016 Elections. As petitioner pointed out, the certificate of candidacy prepared for the May 9, 2016 Elections is now more
specific.Itnowrequirescandidatestospecifytheir"PeriodofresidenceinthePhilippinesuptothedaybeforeMay09,2016."[517]
Itistruethatreckoningsix(6)yearsandsix(6)monthsfromOctober2012,whenpetitionerfiledherCertificateofCandidacyforSenator,
wouldindicatethatpetitioner'sresidenceinthePhilippinescommencedonlyinApril2006.Thisseemstobeliewhatpetitionernowclaims:
that her residence in the Philippines commenced on May 24, 2005. This, however, can again be explained by the fact that petitioner, a
layperson,accomplishedherownCertificateofCandidacyforSenatorwithoutthebetteradviceofalegalprofessional.
To recall, jurisprudence appreciates the establishment of domicile as an incrementalfrocess. In this incremental process, even initial,
preparatorymovescount.[518]Residenceisdeemedacquired(orchanged)assoonasthesemovesaredemonstrated.[519]Nevertheless,
the crucial fact about this manner of appreciating the establishment of domicile is that this is a technical nuance in jurisprudence.
Laypersonscanreasonablybeexpectedtonothavetheacumentograspthissubtlety.Thus,aspetitionerexplained,itwasreasonablefor
hertoreckonherresidencyfromApril2006,whenalltheactionsthatsheandherfamilyneededtoundertaketoeffecttheirtransferto

thePhilippineswereconsummated.520Indeed,aspreviouslypointedout,thelatterpartofAprilleadingtoMay2006istheterminalpoint
oftheincrementalprocessofpetitioner'sreestablishingherresidenceinthePhilippines.
InsistingonNovember2006aspetitioner'ssupposedlyselfdeclaredstartofresidenceinthePhilippinesrunsafouloftheentirecorpusof
evidence presented. Neither petitioner's evidence nor the entirety of the assertions advanced by respondents against her manages to
accountforanysignificantoccurrenceinNovember2006thatexplainswhypetitionerwouldchoosetoattachherresidencytothisdate.In
thefaceofamultitudeofcountervailingevidence,nothingsustainsNovember2006asastartingpoint.
Thereweretwodocumentsa2012CertificateofCandidacyforSenatoranda2015CertificateofCandidacyforPresidentthatpresented
twodifferentstartingpointsfortheestablishmentofresidency.Logicdictatesthatifoneistrue,theothermustbefalse.
The Commission on Elections insisted, despite evidence to the contrary, that it was the 2015 Certificate of Candidacy for President that
was false. Petitioner admitted her honest mistake in filling out the 2012 Certificate of Candidacy for Senator. She explained how the
mistakewasmade.Shefurtherpresentedevidencetoshowthatitisthe2015CertificateofCandidacythatmoreaccuratelyreflectswhat
shedidandintended.
By itself, the Commission on Elections' recalcitrance may reasonably raise public suspicion that its conclusions in its Resolutions were
preordaineddespitethecompendiumofevidencepresented.ItwasclearlyunfoundedandarbitraryanotherinstanceoftheCommission
onElections'graveabuseofdiscretion.
Accordingly,theconclusionwarrantedbytheevidencestands.Thefactofpetitioner'sresidenceashavingcommencedonMay24,2005,
completedthroughanincrementalprocessthatextendeduntilApril/May2006,was"establishedbymeansmoreconvincingthanamere
entryonapieceofpaper."[521]
VI.L

Anotherfactcitedagainstpetitionerishercontinuingownershipoftwo(2)realpropertiesintheUnitedStates.Specifically,Valdeznoted
thatpetitioner"stillmaintainstwo(2)residentialhousesintheUS,onepurchasedin1992,andtheotherin2008."[522]
Thisfailstocontrovertthetimelyreestablishmentofpetitioner'sresidenceinthePhilippines.
First, Valdez's characterization of the two properties as "residential" does not mean that petitioner has actually been using them as her
residence. ClassifYing real properties on the basis of utility (e.g., as residential, agricultural, commercial, etc.) is merely a descriptive
exercise.Itdoesnotamounttoanauthoritativelegalspecificationoftherelationshipbetweentherealpropertyownerandtheproperty.
Thus, one may own agricultural land but not till it one may own a commercial property but merely lease it out to other commercial
enterprises.
Tosaythatpetitionerowns"residential"propertydoesnotmeanthatpetitionerisactuallyresidinginit.
IntheAnswer[523]shefiledbeforetheCommissiononElections,petitionerhasevenexplicitlydeniedValdez'sassertion"insofaritismade
toappearthat(she)'resides'inthe2housesmentioned."[524]AsagainstValdez'sallegation,petitionerallegedandpresentedsupporting
evidence that her family's residence has been established in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City. As pointed out by petitioner, all that Valdez
managedtodowastomakeanallegation,consideringthathedidnotpresentproofthatanyofthetwo(2)propertiesintheUnitedStates
hasbeenandisstillbeingusedbypetitioner'sfamilyfortheirresidence.
Second,evenontheassumptionthattheremainingpropertiesintheUnitedStatesmayindeedbecharacterizedaspetitioner'sresidence,
Valdez's assertion fails to appreciate the basic distinction between residence and domicile. It is this distinction that permits a person to
maintainaseparateresidencesimultaneouslywithhisorherdomicile.
Ultimately, it does not matter that petitioner owns residential properties in the United States, or even that she actually uses them as
temporaryplacesofabode.WhatmattersisthatpetitionerhasestablishedandcontinuestomaintaindomicileinthePhilippines.
RomualdezMarcos[525]isonpoint:

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presenceofapersoninagivenarea,communityorcountry.Theessentialdistinctionbetweenresidenceanddomicileinlawis
thatresidenceinvolvestheintenttoleavewhenthepurposeforwhichtheresidenthastakenuphisabodeends.Onemayseek
a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile if his
intentistoleaveassoonashispurposeisestablisheditisresidence.Itisthus,quiteperfectlynonnalforanindividualtohave
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfullyabandonshisdomicileinfavorofanotherdomicileofchoice.InUytengsuvs.Republic,welaidthisdistinctionquite
clearly:

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence['] is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile,butdomicileisresidencecoupledwiththeintentiontoremainforanunlimitedtime.Amancanhavebut
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence

withoutintentionofremainingwillconstitutedomicile."[526]
(Citationsomitted)

ThereisnothingpreventingpetitionerfromowningpropertiesintheUnitedStatesandevenfromutilizingthemforresidentialpurposes.
To hold that mere ownership of these is tantamount to abandonment of domicile is to betray a lack of understanding of the timelessly
establisheddistinctionbetweendomicileandresidence.
VII

It was grave abuse of discretion for the Commission to Elections to cancel petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy on grounds that find no
supportinlawandjurisprudence,andwhicharenotsupportedbyevidence.PetitionermadenofalserepresentationinherCertificateof
Candidacy,whetherinrespectofhercitizenshiporinrespectofherresidence.SheisanaturalhomFilipinaatthetimeofherfilingofher
Certificate of Candidacy. She satisfies the requirement of having been a resident of the Philippines 10 years prior to the upcoming
elections.
Theburdenofevidencerestsonthepersonwhomakestheaffirmativeallegation.Inanactionforcancellationofcertificateofcandidacy
underSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode,itisthepersonwhofiledtheactionwhohastheburdenofshowingthatthecandidate
madefalserepresentationsinhisorhercertificateofcandidacy.
To prove that there is misrepresentation under Section 78, the person claiming it must not only show that the candidate made
representations that are false and material. He or she must also show that the candidate intentionally tried to mislead the electorate
regardinghisorherqualifications.Withoutshowingthese,theburdenofevidencedoesnotshifttothecandidate.
Private respondents failed to show the existence of false and material misrepresentation on the part of petitioner. Instead, it relied on
petitioner'sadmissionthatsheisafoundling.
Relying on the single fact of being an abandoned newborn is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory. It fails to consider all other
piecesofevidencesubmittedbypetitionerforthefairandunbiasedconsiderationoftheCommissiononElections.
The principles of constitutional construction favor an interpretation that foundlings like petitioner are naturalhom citizens of the
Philippines absent proof resulting from evidence to the contrary. Such proof must show that bothnot only oneof petitioner's parents
wereforeignersatthetimeofherbirth.
WithoutconcedingthatfoundlingsarenotevenpresumptivelyjnaturalhomFilipinos,petitionerhaspresentedsubstantialevidencethat
herbiologicalparentsareFilipinos.
TheConstitutionprovidesforonlytwotypesofcitizens:(1)naturalborn,and(2)naturalizedcitizens.Naturalborncitizensarespecifically
definedaspersonswhodonothavetoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirFilipinocitizenship.Theseactsrefertothoserequired
under our naturalization laws. More particularly, it involves the filing of a petition as well as the establishment of the existence of all
qualificationstobecomeaFilipinocitizen.
Petitionerneverhadtogothroughournaturalizationprocesses.Instead,shehasbeentreatedasaFilipinocitizenuponbirth,subjectto
ourlaws.Administrativebodies,theCommissiononElections,thePresident,andmostimportantly,theelectoratehavetreatedherasa
Filipinocitizenandrecognizedhernaturalbornstatus.
Not being a Filipino by naturalization, therefore, petitioner could have acquired Filipino citizenship because her parentis, from her birth,
has/havealwaysbeenconsideredFilipinocitizen/swho,inaccordancewithourjussanguinisprinciple,bestowednaturalborncitizenship
toherunderArticleIV,Section1(1)to(3)oftheConstitution.
OurConstitutionandourdomesticlaws,includingthetreatieswehaveratified,enjoinusfrominterpretingourcitizenshipprovisionsina
mannerthatpromotesexclusivityandananimusagainstthosewhowereabandonedandneglected.
We have adopted and continue to adopt through our laws and practice policies of equal protection, human dignity, and a clear duty to
always seek the child's wellbeing and best interests. We have also obligated ourselves to defend our People against statelessness and
protectandensurethestatusandnationalityofourchildrenimmediatelyuponbirth.
Therefore,aninterpretationthatexcludesfoundlingsfromournatural borncitizensisinconsistentwithourlawsandtreatyobligations.It
necessarily sanctions unequal treatment of a particular class through unnecessary limitation of their rights and capacities based only on
theirbirthstatus.
Petitioner cannot be expected to present the usual evidence of her lineage. It is precisely because she is a foundling that she cannot
produceabirthrecordoratestimonyontheactualcircumstancesandidentityofherbiologicalparents.
However,thecircumstancesofandduringherbirthleadtoherparentis'Filipinocitizenshipasthemostprobableinference.
Petitioner was born in Jaro, Iloilo, the population of which consisted mainly of Filipinos. Her physical features are consistent with the
physicalfeaturesofmanyFilipinos.ShewasleftinfrontofaCatholicChurch,nolessconsistentwiththeexpectationfromacitizenina
predominantlyCatholicenvironment.TherewasalsonointernationalairportinJaro,Iloilotoandfromwhichforeignersmayeasilycome
andgotoabandontheirnewbornchildren.Lastly,statisticsshowthatin1968,petitionerhada99.8%chanceofbeingbornaFilipino.

Forthesereasons,aclaimofmaterialmisrepresentationofnatural bornstatuscannotbebasedsolelyonacandidate'sfoundlingstatus.
Private respondents should have been more diligent in pursuing their claim by presenting evidence other than petitioner's admission of
foundlingstatus.
The conclusion that she is a naturalborn Filipina is based on a fair and reasonable reading of constitutional provisions, statutes, and
internationalnormshavingtheeffectoflaw,andontheevidencepresentedbeforetheCommissiononElections.
Petitioner has shown by a multitude of evidence that she has been domiciled in the Philippines beginning May 24, 2005. Her
reestablishment of residence was not accomplished in a singular, definitive episode but spanned an extended period. Hers was an
incrementalprocessofreestablishingresidence.
ThisincrementalprocesswasterminatedandcompletedbyApril2006withthesaleofherfamily'sformerhomeintheUnitedStatesand
thereturnofherhusbandtothePhilippinesfollowingthissale.Specifically,herhusbandreturnedtothePhilippinesonMay4,2006.
Whicheverwaytheevidenceisappreciated,itisclearthatpetitionerhasdonealltheactsnecessarytobecomearesidentonorbefore
May9,2006,thestartofthetenyearperiodforreckoningcompliancewiththe1987Constitution'sresidencerequirementforpresidential
candidates.
TheCommissiononElectionsdidnotexaminetheevidencedeliberatelyandwiththerequisiteanalyticaldiligencerequiredbyourlawsand
existingjurisprudence.Instead,itarbitrarilyignoredpetitioner'sevidence.Itchosetoanchoritsconclusionsonformalisticrequirements
and technical lapses reacquisition of citizenship, issuance of a permanent resident or immigrant visa, and an inaccuracy in a prior
CertificateofCandidacy.
Misplacedrelianceonpreconceivedindicatorsofwhatsufficestoestablishorretaindomicileavirtualchecklistofwhatoneshould,could,
orwouldhavedoneispreciselywhatthiscourthasrepeatedlywarnedagainst.Thisistantamounttoevasionofthelegallyordainedduty
toengageinameticulousexaminationofthefactsattendanttoresidencycontroversies.
Worse, the Commission on Elections went out of its way to highlight supposedly damning detailsthe circumstances of petitioner's
husband,herinterveningtripstotheUnitedStatestoinsistuponitsconclusions.Thisconjecturalposturingonlymakesmoreevidenthow
theCommissiononElectionsgravelyabuseditsdiscretion.Notonlydiditturnablindeyetotheentirebodyofevidencedemonstrating
therestorationofpetitioner'sdomicileitevenlaboredatsubvertingthem.
Clearly,theCommissiononElections'actionsconstitutedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoutterlackofjurisdiction.Theseactions
beingunjustaswellasunchristian,wehavenochoiceexcepttoannulthisunconstitutionalact.
Admittedly, there is more to democracy than having a wider choice of candidates during periodic elections. The quality of democracy
increasesaspeopleengageinmeaningfuldeliberationoftenmovingthemtovarioustypesofcollectiveactiontoachieveabettersociety.
Elections can retard or aid democracy. It weakens society when these exercises reduce the electorate to subjects of entertainment,
slogans, and empty promises. This kind of elections betrays democracy.They transform the exercise to a contest that puts premium on
imageratherthansubstance.Thepotentialofeveryvotergetswasted.Worse,havingbeenmarginalizedasmerepassivesubjects,voters
arethenmanipulatedbymoneyandpower.
Electionsareattheirbestwhentheyserveasvenuesforconsciousanddeliberateaction.Choicesmadebyeachvotershouldbetheresult
oftheirownreasoneddeliberation.Thesechoicesshouldbepartoftheircollectivedecisiontochoosecandidateswhowillbeaccountable
tothemandfurtherseriousandworkableapproachestothemostpressingandrelevantsocialissues.Electionsareattheirbestwhenthe
electoratearenottreatedsimplyasnumbersinpollingstatistics,butaspartnersinthequestforhumandignityandsocialjustice.
Thiscaseshouldbeunderstoodinthiscontext.Therearenoguaranteesthattheelectionswewillhaveinafewmonthswillleadusto
moremeaningfulfreedoms.Howandwhenthiscomesaboutshouldnotsolelydependonthiscourt.Inaworkingconstitutionaldemocracy
framedbytheruleofjustlaw,howweconceiveandempowerourselvesasapeopleshouldalsomattersignificantly.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari. The assailed Resolutions dated December 1, 2015 of the
CommissiononElectionsSecondDivisionandDecember23,2015oftheCommissiononElectionsEnBancinSPANo.15001(DC),and
the assailed Resolutions dated December 11, 2015 of the Commission on Elections First Division and December 23, 2015 of the
CommissiononElectionsEnBancinSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC),andSPANo.15139(DC)mustbeANNULLEDandSET
ASIDE.
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares made no material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President in
connectionwiththeMay9,2016NationalandLocalElections.ThereisnobasisforthecancellationofherCertificateofCandidacy.

[1]Const.,art.VII,sec.2provides:

ARTICLEVII.ExecutiveDepartment
....
SECTION2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadand
write,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelypreceding
suchelection.
[2]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),pp.27062736.TheDecisionwasconcurredinbySenatorsPaoloBenigno"Bam"A.AquinoIV,PilarJuliana

"Pia"S.Cayetano,CynthiaA.Villar,VicenteC.SottoIII,andLorenB.Legarda,anddissentedfrombySeniorAssociateJusticeAntonioT.
Carpio,AssociateJusticesTeresitaJ.LeonardoDeCastroandArturoD.Brion,andSenatorMariaLourdesNancyS.Binay.

[3]Id.at3827,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[4]COMELECOfficialMay13,2013NationalandLocalElectionsResults

(visitedMarch7,2016).
[5]Const.,art.VI,sec.3provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment
....
SECTION3.SECTION3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,and,onthedayoftheelection,
isatleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,aregisteredvoter,andaresidentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyears
immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
[6]CONST.,art.IV,sec.1provides:ARTICLEIV.Citizenship

SECTIONI.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption ofthis Constitution (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizensofthePhilippines
(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajorityand
(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
[7]CONST.,art.IV,sec.1.
[8]CONST.,art.IV,sec.1.
[9]SeeRep.ActNo.8552(1998)andRep.ActNo.8043(1995).
[10] See Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 2226, Petition. Petitioner was granted an order of reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship under

RepublicActNo.9225bytheBureauoflmmigrationonJuly18,2006.
ThePresidentofthePhilippinesappointedherasChairpersonoftheMovieandTelevisionReviewandClassificationBoardagovernment
positionthatrequiresnaturalborncitizenshiponOctober6,2010.
[11] On August 21, 1990, we ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. We also ratified the 1966 International

CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsonOctober23,1986.
[12]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.5,Petition.
[13]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4566,AnnexCoftheSolicitorGeneral'sMemorandum,CertificationissuedonFebruary9,2016

bythePhilippineStatisticsOffice,signedbyDeputyNationalStatisticianEstelaT.DeGuzman.
[14]BatasBig.881(1985),OmnibusElectionCode,sec.78provides:

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbythepersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedtherein
asrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthe
filingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.
[15]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,318Phil.329,377(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[16]Gallegov.Vera,73Phil.453,455456(1941)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc].
[17]Id.at456.
[18]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.254,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[19]Id.
[20]Id.
[21]318Phil.329,386(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[22]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3816,Petitioner'sMemorandum.

[23]Id.Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15002 (DC), 15007 (DC), and 15139

(DC)).
[24]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),pp.38213822,Petitioner'sMemorandumRollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.218,COMELECFirstDivision

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 38193820 and 3824, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 218, COMELEC

FirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[27]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3819,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[28]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),pp.38243825,Petitioner'sMemorandumRollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.220,COMELECFirstDivision

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3825, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3824, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[31] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3825, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[32] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3816 and 3833, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 220, COMELEC First

DivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[33]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3822,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[34]Id.at3824Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15002(DC), 15007 (DC), and

15139(DC)).
[35]392Phil.342(2000)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[36]Id.at345.
[37]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),pp.224259,COMELECEnBancResolution(SPANos.15001(DC)wassignedbyCommissionersJ.Andres

D.Bautista(Chair),ChristianRobertS.Lim,AIA.Parreo,LuieTitoF.Guia,ArthurD.Lim,Ma.RowenaAmeliaV.Guanzon,andSheriffM.
Abas.
[38]Id.at258.
[39]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),pp.216264,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139

(DC)) was signed by Presiding Commissioner Christian RobertS. Lim, and Commissioners Luie Tito F. Guia, and Ma. Rowena Amelia V.
Guanzon.
[40]Id.at352381.
[41]Id.at381.
[42]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3814,PetitiondsMemorandum.
[43]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.217,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[44]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3814,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[45]Id.at3815.
[46]Id.
[47]Id.
[4s]Id.
[49]Id.

[50]Id.at3816.
[51]Id.Emphasissupplied.
[52]Id.
[53]Id.at2707,SETDecision(SETCaseNo.00115).
[54]Id.at3816,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[55]Id.
[56]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.218,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[57]Id.
[58]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3817,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[59]Id.
[60]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.218,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[61]Id.
[62]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),pp.38173818,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[63]Id.at3817.
[64]Id.at3818.
[65]Id.
[66]Id.
[67]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.218,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[68] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3819, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[69]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3819,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[70]Id.
[71]Id.
[72]Id.Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15002 (DC), 15007 (DC), and 15139

(DC)).
[73]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3819,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[74]Id.at38193820.
[75]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),pp.218219,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139

(DC)).
[76]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3820,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[77]Id.at38203821.
[78]Id.at3821.
[79]Id.Rep.ActNo.6768,sec.3(c),asamendedbyRep.ActNo.9174,sec.3provides:

SEC. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following benefits and
privileges:
....
(c)VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexceptionofrestrictednationals

[80]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3821,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[81]Id.
[82]Id.
[83] Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum Rollo (G.R. No. 221698221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division

Resolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[84]Id.
[85]Id.
[86]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3822,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[87]Id.
[88]Id.
[89]Id.
[90]Id.
[91]Id.at2707,SETDecision(SETCaseNo.00115).
[92]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.219,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[93]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3822,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[94]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.219,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[95]Rollo(G.R.No.221697},p.3822,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[96]Id.
[97]Id.at3824.
[9H]Id.
[99]Id.
[100]Id.
[101]Id.at38243825.
[102]Id.at3825.
[103]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.220,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[104]Id.
[105]Id.
[106]Id.
[107]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3827,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[108]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.220,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[109]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3827,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[110]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.220,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[111]Id.
[112]Id.

[113]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3828,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[114]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.220,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[115]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3828,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[116]Id.at2708,SETDecision(SETCaseNo.00l15).
[117]Id.at23,Petition.
[118]Id.
[119]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.2708,SETDecision{SETCaseNo.00115).
[120]Id.
[121]Id.at3832.
[122]Id.
[123]Id.at3833.
[124]Id.at2708,SETDecision(SETCaseNo.00115).
[125]Id.
[126]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.221,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[127]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3823,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[128]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.221,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[129]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3824,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[130]Id.at2708,SETDecision(SETCaseNo.00115),p.3.
[131]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.221,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[132]Id.
[133]Id.at222.
[134]Id.
[135]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3835,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[136]Id.
[137]Id.at9,Petition.
[138]Id.at4.
[139]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.222,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC))

datedDecember11.
[140]Id.
[141]Id.
[142]Id.at217.
[143]Id.at222.
[144]Id.
[145]Id.

[146]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3556B,SupremeCourtResolutiondatedFebruary16,2016.
[147]Id.at2930,Petition.
[148]Id.at33.
[149]Id.
[150]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.263,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[151]Id.at357,COMELECEnBancResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[152]Id.at381.
[153]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3.
[154]Id.at20112013.
[155]Id.at2012.
[156]Id.at3084P,SupremeCourtAdvisory.
[157]RULESOFCOURT,Rule64provides:

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
broughtbytheaggrievedpartytotheSupremeCourtoncertiorariunderRule65,exceptashereinafterprovided.
[158]RULESOFCOURT,Rule65provides:

Section1.Petitionforcertiorari.Whenanytribunal,boardorofficerexercisingjudicialorquasi judicialfunctionshasactedwithoutorin
excessofitsorhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,andthereisnoappeal,orany
plain,speedy,andadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw,apersonaggrievedtherebymayfileaverifiedpetitionintheproper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
boardorofficer,andgrantingsuchincidentalreliefsaslawandjusticemayrequire.
Thepetitionshallbeaccompaniedbyacertifiedtruecopyofthejudgment,orderorresolution
subjectthereof,copiesofallpleadingsanddocumentsrelevantandpertinentthereto,andasworncertificationofnonforumshoppingas
providedinthethirdparagraphofsection3,Rule46.
[159]Araullov.AquinoIII,G.R.No.209287,February3,2015,

89[PerJ.Bersamin,EnBanc].
[160]Mitrav.CommissiononElections,636Phil.753,777(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[161]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4590,COMELECMemorandum.
[162]AbasiaShipmanagementCorporation,670Phil.136,151(2011)[PerJ.Brion,SecondDivision].
[163]NightowlWatchman&SecurityAgency,Inc.v.Lumahan,G.R.No.212096,October14,2015,

7[PerJ.Brion,SecondDivision].
[164]Mitrav.CommissiononElections,636Phil.753,777778,782(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[165]Id.at787.
[166]Id.at778.
[167]Variasv.CommissiononElections,626Phil.292,314(2010)[Perl.Brion,EnBanc].
[168]Lambinov.CommissiononElections,536Phil.1,I11(2006)[PerJ.Carpio,EnBanc].
[169]DioceseofBacolodv.COMELEC,G.R.No.205728,January21,2015,[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
[170]Limv.Gamosa,G.R.No.193964,December2,2015

15[PerJ.Perez,FirstDivision].

[171]Gutibv.CourtofAppeals,371Phil.293,307(1999)[PerJ.Bellosillo,SecondDivision].
[172]Id.at308.
[173]Id.
[174]DepartmentofAgrarianReformAqjudicationBoardv.Lubrica,497Phil.313,326(2005)[PerJ.Tinga,SecondDivision].
[175]CONST.,art.IXC,sec.3.
[176]CONST.,art.VI,sec.8andart.VII,sec.4.
[177]BatasBlg.881(1985),OmnibusElectionCode,sec.76.
[178]Ciprianov.Comelec,479Phil.677,689(2004)[PerJ.Puno,EnBanc].
[179]CONST.,art.IXC,sec.2(1)provides:

ARTICLEIX.ConstitutionalCommissions
....
C.TheCommissiononElections
SECTION2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1)Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,andrecall.
[Notehoweverparagraph(2),whichlimitsitsquasijudicialpower.]
[180]Baytanv.CommissiononElections,444Phil.812,824(2003)[PerJ.Carpio,EnBanc].
[181]CONST.,art.IXC,sec.2(3).
[182]Loongv.CommissiononElections,365Phil.386,423(1999)[PerJ.Puno,EnBanc].
[183]Id.
[184]SeeTecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,461(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[185]CONST.,art.VI,sec.17.
[186]CONST.,art.VI,sec.17provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representationfromthepoliticalpartiesandthepartiesororganizationsregisteredunderthepartylistsystemrepresentedtherein.The
seniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeitsChairman.
[187] J. Mendoza, Separate Opinion in RomualdezMarcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 457 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En

Banc].
[188]Id.at461462.
[189]468Phil.421(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[190]Id.at462.
[191]Id.at458460.
[192]CONST.,art.VII,sec.4partlyprovides:ARTICLEVII.ExecutiveDepartment

SECTION4....
....
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
PresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.

[193]CONST.,art.VI,sec.17provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representationfromthepoliticalpartiesandthepartiesororganizationsregisteredunderthepartylistsystemrepresentedtherein.The
seniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeitsChairman.
[194]CONST.,art.VI,sec.17.
[195]CONST.,art.IXA,sec.7.SeediscussioninpartII.
[196]SeeJaloverv.Osmeila,G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc]Hayudiniv.Commissionon

Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206698,February25,2014,717SCRA312[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc]Gonzalezv.CommissiononElections,660Phil.225(2011)[PerJ.
Villarama, Jr., En Banc] Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] Maruhom v. Commission on
Elections,611Phil.501(2009)[PerJ.ChieoNazario,EnBanc]Velascov.CommissiononElections,595Phil.1172(2008)[PerJ.Brion,
En Banc] Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 383 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc] Lluz v. Commission on
Elections, 551 Phil. 428 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377,389 (1999) (Per J.
GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[197]SeeGonzalezv.CommissiononElections,660Phil.225(2011)[PerJ.Villarama,EnBanc]Juslimbastev.CommissiononElections,

593Phil.383(2008)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc]
[197]SeeJaloverv.Osmena,G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc]Hayudiniv.Commissionon

Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753
(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc]Velascov.CommissiononElections,595Phil.1172(2008)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc]andUgdoracion.Jr.v.
CommissiononElections,575Phil.253(2008)[PerJ.Naehura,EnBanc].
[199]RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329,380(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[200]SalcedoIIv.CommissiononElections,371Phil.377,390(1999)[PerJ.GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[201]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3871,Petitioner'sMemorandum..
[202]327Phil.521(1996)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[203]J.Puno,ConcurringOpinioninFrivaldov.CommissiononElections,327Phil.521,578(1996)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[204]Guzmanv.CommissiononElections,614Phil.143,153(2009)[PerJ.Bersamin,EnBanc].
[205]RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329,380(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[206]Id.at.366.
[207]Id.at367.
[208]CONST.,art.VI,sec.6provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment
....
SECTION6.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesand,onthe
day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to read and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered
voterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthe
dayoftheelection.
[209]RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329,380(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[210]371Phil.377(1999)[PerJ.GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[211]Id.at381.
[212]Id.at390391.
[213]Id.at391.

[214]SeeTalagav.CommissiononElections,696Phil.786(2012)[PerJ.Bersamin,EnBanc]Gonzalezv.CommissiononElections,660

Phil.225(2011)[PerJ.Villarama,Jr.,EnBanc]Mitrav.CommissiononElections,636Phil.753(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc]Maruhom
v. Commission on Elections, 611 Phil. 501 (2009) [Per J. ChieoNazario, En Banc] Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172
(2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 383 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc] and
Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[215]706Phil.534(2013)[PerJ.PerlasBernabe,EnBanc].
[216]Id.at551.
[217]Id.at542543.
[218]Id.at543.
[219]Id.
[220]Id.at544.
[221]Id.at545.
[222]Id.at546.
[223]Id.at546.
[224]Id.at547.
[225]Id.at561
[226]Id.at543.
[227]Id.
[228]Id.at550551.
[229]Id.at551.
[230]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3860,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[231]G.R.No.206698,February25,2014,717SCRA312,322323[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[232]G.R.No.207900,April22,2014,723SCRA223,246[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[233]G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267,282[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[234]G.R.No.207105,November10,2015

89[PerJ.Bersamin,EnBanc].
[235]BatasPambansaBlg.881(1985),OmnibusElectionCode,sec.78.
[236]SalcedoIIv.CommissiononElections,371Phil.377,389(1999)[PerJ.GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[237]Id.
[238]Id.SeealsoLluzv.CommissiononElections,551Phil.428,445446(2007)[PerJ.Carpio,EnBanc).
[239]SalcedoIIv.CommissiononElections,371Phil.377,389(1999)[PerJ.GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[240]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.3862,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[241]SeeRomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[242] J. Mendoza, Separate Opinion in RomualdezMarcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 463 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En

Banc].
[243]ThegroundsunderSection40oftheLocalGovernmentCodemaylikewiseberaisedagainstacandidateforalocalelectiveposition.

[244]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4619,COMELECMemorandum.
[245]Id.
[246]Id.at50925093,Respondent'sMemorandum.
[247]SeeRULESOFCOURT,Rule131.SeealsoMatugasv.CommissiononElections,465Phil.299,307(2004)[PerJ.Tinga,EnBanc],

citingCortesv.CourtofAppeals, 443 Phil. 42 (2003) [Per J. Austria Martinez, Second Division] in that "one who alleges a fact has the
burdenofprovingit."
[248] See J. Tinga, Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421,612 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], citing

Bautistav.JudgeSarmiento,223Phil.181,185186(1985)[PerJ.Cuevas,SecondDivision].
[249]SeeAdvinculav.Atty.Macabata,546Phil.431,446(2007)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,ThirdDivision],citingUytengsuIIIv.Baduel,514

Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] in that "the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations ei incumbit
probation,quidecit,nonquinegatcumperrerumnaturamfactumnegantisprobationnullasit."
[250]SeeJisonv.CourtofAppeals,350Phil.138(1998)[PerJ.Davide,Jr.,FirstDivision].
[251]See,forexample,SalcedoIIv.CommissiononElections,371Phil.377(1999)[PerJ.GonzagaReyes,EnBanc].
[252]RULESOFCOURT,Rule133,sec.5.
[253]SeeJisonv.CourtofAppeals,350Phil.138(1998)[PerJ.Davide,Jr.,FirstDivision].
[254]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4627,COMELECMemorandum.
[255]128Phil.815(1967)[PerJ.Zaldivar,EnBanc].
[256]J.Carpio,DissentingOpinioninTecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,634(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[257]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,473474(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[258]Id.at473474and488.
[259]Id.at487488.
[260]Paav.Chan,128Phil.815,817(1967)[Perl.Zaldivar,EnBanc].
[261]Id.at823.
[262]614Phil.451,479(2009)[PerJ.Quisumbing,SecondDivision].
[263]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4627,COMELECMemorandum.
[264]Gov.Ramos,614Phil.451,458(2009)[PerJ.Quisumbing,SecondDivision].
[265]Id.at475.
[266]468Phil.421(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].C.J.Davide,Jr.withseparateopinion,concurringJ.

Punowasonleavebutwasallowedtovote,withseparateopinionJ.Panganibanwasonofficialleavewasallowedtovotebutdidnot
sendhisvoteonthematterJ.QuisumbingjoinsthedissentofJusticesTingaandMoralescaseshouldhavebeenremandedJ.Ynares
Santiagoconcurs,andalsowithJ.PunoseparateopinionJ.SandovalGutierrezconcurswithseparateopinionJ.Carpio,withdissenting
opinionJ.AustriaMartinez,concurswithseparateopinionJ.Corona,joinsthedissentingopinionofJusticeMoralesJ.CarpioMorales,
withdissentingopinionJ.Callejo,Sr,withconcurringopinionJ.Azcuna,concursinaseparateopinionJ.Tinga,dissentsperseparate
opinion.
[267]Id.at456.
[268]Id.at488.
[269]Id.
[270]SeeJ.Leonen,DissentingOpinioninChavezv.JudicialandBarCouncil,G.R.No.202242,April16,2013,696SCRA496,530[PerJ.

Mendoza,EnBanc].
[271]SeeAtty.Macalintalv.PresidentialElectoralTribunal,650Phil.326,340(2010)[PerJ.Nachura,EnBanc],citingJ.M.Tuason&Co,

Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,142Phil.393(1970)[PerJ.Fernando,SecondDivision].
[272]AngBagongBayaniOFWLaborPartyv.CommissiononElections,412Phil.308,338(2001)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[273]Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,885(2003)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc],citingJ.MTuason&Co.,Inc.v.

LandTenureAdministration,142Phil.393(1970).ThiswasalsocitedinSaguisagv.Ochoa,G.R.No.212426,January12,2016[PerC.J.
Sereno,EnBanc].
[274]Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,886(2003)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc].
[275]272Phil.147(1991)[PerC.J.Feman,EnBanc].
[276]Id.at162,ascitedinAtty.Macalintalv.PresidentialElectoralTribunal,650Phil.326,341(20I0)[PerJ.Nachura,EnBanc].
[277]486Phil.754(2004)(Resolution)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[278]Id.at773.
[279]G.R.No.208062,April7,2015

[PerJ,Leonen,EnBanc].
[280]Id.at26.
[281] The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of

"Philippinecitizens."SeeTecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,467468(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[282]Forexample,theCivilCodeofSpainbef'ameeffectiveinthejurisdictiononDecetnber18,1889,makingthefirstcategoricallisting

onwhowereSpanishcitizens.SeeTecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,465(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc).
[283]SobejanaCondonv.CommissiononElections,692Phil.407(2012)[PerJ.Reyes,EnBanc]:"Ambiguityisaconditionofadmitting

twoormoremeanings,ofbeingunderstoodinmorethanoneway,orofreferringtotwoormorethingsatthesametime.Forastatuteto
beconsideredambiguous,itmustadmitoftwoormorepossiblemeanings."
[284] See, for example, In the Matter of" Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition

of'JudiciaryDevelopmentFund,UDK15143,January21,2015
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/15143.pdf [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J.
Leonen,ConcurringOpinioninBelgicav.Ochoa,G.R.No.208566,November19,2013,710SCRAI,278279[PerJ.PerlasBernabe,En
Banc].
[185] Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing Civil Liberties Union v.

ExecutiveSecretary,272Phil.147,169170(1991)[PerC.J.Feman,EnBanc].
[286]CONST.,art.IV,sec.1(2)provides:

ARTICLEIV.Citizenship
SECTIONI.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
....
(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines[.]
[287]CONST.,art.II,sec.Iprovides:

ARTICLEII.DeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies
Principles
SECTION I. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and ALL government authority
emanatesfromthem.(Emphasissupplied).
[Asthesourceofallgovernmentalpower,itmustbepresumedthatcertainpowersaretobeexercisedbythepeoplewhenitconflictswith
anycompetenceofaconstitutionalorganlikethejudiciaryortheCOMELEC.)
[288]Rep.ActNo.9225wasapprovedonAugust29,2003.
[289]CONST.art.IV,sec.3.
[290]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4578,COMELECMemorandum.
[291]Rep.ActNo.9225(2003),sec.3.
[292]692Phil.407(2012)[PerJ.Reyes,EnBanc].
[293]SeeSobejanaCondonv.CommissiononElections,692Phil.407(2012)[PerJ.Reyes,EnBanc].

[294]The1935Constitutionwasineffectwhenpetitionerwasborn.However,theprovisionsarenowsubstantiallysimilartothepresent

Constitution, except that the present Constitution provides clarity tbr "natural born" status. For comparison, the 1935 provisions state:
SECTIONI.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2)ThoseborninthePhilippineIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicoffice
inthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.
SECTION2.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
[295]CJ.Warren,DissentingOpinioninPerezv.Brownwe/1,356U.S.44(1958).
[296]Gov.RepublicofthePhilippines,G.R.202809,July2,2014,729SCRA138,149[PerJ.Mendoza,ThirdDivision],citingBERNAS,

THE1987CONSTITUTIONOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,ACOMMENTARY(2009ed.).
[297]Id.
[298]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,464470(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[299]Id.at464.
[300]Id.at465.
[301]Id.
[302]Id.at465466,citingTheCivilCodeofSpain,art.17.
[303]Id.at466467,citingRAMONM.VELAYO,PHILIPPHINECITIZENSHIPANDNATURALIZATION,2223(1965).
[304]Id.at467.
[305]Id.at466,citingRAMONM.VELAYO,PHILIPPINECITIZENSHIPANDNATURALIZATION2223(1965).
[306]ThePhilippineBillof1902isotherwiseknownasthePhilippineOrganicActof1902.
[307]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468PhiL421,467468(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc).
[308]Id.at468.
[309]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[310]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,469(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[311]Id.
[312]CONST.(1935),art.Ill,sec.I.
[313]Tecsonv.CommissiononElections,468Phil.421,469(2004)[PerJ.Vitug,EnBanc].
[314]CONST.(1973),art.III,sees.1and2.
[315]See,forexample,PhilippineBillof1902,sec.I,whichprovidesthatthehighestpositionsweretobefilledthroughappointmentby

theUnitedStatesPresident:
Section1.ThattheactionofthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesincreatingthePhilippineCommissionandauthorizingsaidCommissionto
exercise the powers of government to the extent and in the manner and fonn and subject to the regulation and control set forth in the
instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, dated April seventh, nineteen hundred, and in creating the offices of Civil
Governor and ViceGovernor of the Philippine Islands, and authorizing said Civil Governor and Vice Governor to exercise the powers of
govefllmenttotheextentandinthemannerandtonnsettorthintheExecutiveOrderdatedJunetwentyfirst,nineteenhundredandone,
andinestablishingtourExecutiveDepartmentsofgovernmentinsaidIslandsassetforthintheActofthePhilippineCommission,entitled
"An Act providing an organization for the Departments of the Interior, of Commerce and Police, of Finance and Justice, and of Public
Instruction," enacted September sixth, nineteen hundred and one, is hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed, and until otherwise
provided by law the said Islands shall continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided, and all laws passed hereafter by the
Philippine Commission shall have an enacting clause as follows. "By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission."TheprovisionsofsectioneighteenhundredandninetyoneoftheRevisedStatutesofeighteenhundredandseventyeight

shallnotapplytothePhilippineIslands.
FutureappointmentsofCivilGovernor,ViceGovernor,membersofsaidCommissionandheadsofExecutiveDepartmentsshallbemade
bythePresident,byandwiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate.
[316]CONST.(1973),art.Ill,sec.4.
[317]SeeCharlesGordon,WhoCanBePresidentoftheUnitedStates:TheUnresolvedEnigma,28Md.L.Rev.1,5(1968).
[318]Id.at34.
[319]Id.at5.
[320]409Phil.633(200I)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[321]Id.at651.
[322]Id.at656.
[323]SeeRep.ActNo.9139(2000),sec.5provides:

SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. (I) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hcrcot: a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and
verifiedbyhim/her,withthelatter'spassportsizedphotographattachedtoeachcopyofthepetition,andsettingforththefollowing:
....
Com.ActNo.473,sec.7provides:
SECTION7.PetitionforCitizenship.AnypersondesiringtoacquirePhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththecompetentcourt,apetitionin
triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname his present and former places of
residence his occupation the place and date of his birth whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age,
birthplaceandresidenceofthewifeandofthechildrentheapproximatedateofhisorherarrivalinthePhilippines,thenameoftheport
ofdebarkation,and,ifheremembersit,thenameoftheshiponwhichhecameadeclarationthathehasthequalificationsrequiredby
thisAct,specifyingthesame,andthatheisnotdisqualifiedfornaturalizationundertheprovisionsofthisActthathehascompliedwith
therequirementsofsectionfiveofthisActandthathewillresidecontinuouslyinthePhilippinesfromthedateofthetilingofthepetition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they arc citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable,andthatsaidpetitionerhasintheiropinionallthequalificationsnecessarytobecomeacitizenofthePhilippinesandisnot
in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and postoffice addresses of such
witnessesasthepetitionermaydesiretointroduceatthehearingofthecase.Thecertificateofarrival,andthedeclarationofintention
mustbemadepartofthepetition.
[324]SeeRep.ActNo.9139(2000),sec.3provides:

SECTION 3. Qualifications. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act
mustmeetthefollowingqualifications:
(a)TheapplicantmustbeborninthePhilippinesandresidingthereinsincebirth
(b)Theapplicantmustnotbelessthaneighteen(18)yearsofage,atthetimeoftilingofhis/herpetition
(c)TheapplicantmustbeofgoodmoralcharacterandbelievesintheunderlyingprinciplesoftheConstitution,andmusthaveconducted
himself/herselfinaproperandirreproachablemannerduringhis/herentireperiodofresidenceinthePhilippinesinhisrelationwiththe
dulyconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityinwhichhe/sheisliving
(d)Theapplicantmusthavereceivedhis/herprimaryandsecondaryeducationinanypublicschoolorprivateeducationalinstitutionduly
recognizedbytheDepartmentofEducation,CultureandSports,wherePhilippinehistory,governmentandcivicsarctaughtandprescribed
aspartoftheschoolcurriculumandwhereenrollmentisnotlimitedtoanyraceornationality:Provided,Thatshouldhe/shehaveminor
childrenofschoolage,he/shemusthaveenrolledtheminsimilarschools
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for
his/hersupportandifhe/sheismarriedand/orhasdependents,alsothatofhis/herfamily:Provided,however,Thatthisshallnotapplyto
applicantswhoarecollegedegreeholdersbutarcunabletopracticetheirprofessionbecausetheyarcdisqualifiedtodosobyreasonof
theircitizenship
(f)Theapplicantmustbeabletoread,writeandspeakFilipinooranyofthedialectsofthePhilippines
and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
idealsoftheFilipinopeople.
Comm.ActNo.473,scc.2provides:
SECTION2.Qualifications.SubjecttosectionfourofthisAct,anypersonhavingthefollowingqualificationsmaybecomeacitizenofthe
Philippinesbynaturalization:
First.Hemustbenotlessthantwentyoneyearsofageonthedayofthehearingofthepetition
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years / Third. He must be of good moral

character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachablemannerduringtheentireperiodofhisresidenceinthePhilippinesinhisrelationwiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellas
withthecommunityinwhichheisliving.
Fourth.HemustownrealestateinthePhilippinesworthnotlessthanfivethousandpesos,Philippinecurrency,ormusthavesomeknown
lucrativetrade,profession,orlawfuloccupation
Fifth.HemustbeabletospeakandwriteEnglishorSpanishandanyoftheprincipalPhilippinelanguages
Sixth.Hemusthaveenrolledhisminorchildrenofschoolage,inanyofthepublicschoolsorprivateschoolsrecognizedbytheOfficeof
Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidenceinthePhilippinesrequiredofhimpriortothehearingofhispetitionfornaturalization
asPhilippinecitizen.
[325]Rep.ActNo.9139(2000),sec.4provides:

SECTION4.Disqualifications.ThefollowingarenotqualifiedtobenaturalizedasFilipinocitizensunderthisAct:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposingallorganizedgovernments
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominanceoftheirideas
(c)Polygamistsorbelieversinthepracticeofpolygamy(d)Thoseconvictedofcrimesinvolvingmoralturpitude
(c)Thosesufferingfrommentalalienationorincurablecontagiousdiseases
(t)Thosewho,duringtheperiodoftheirresidenceinthePhilippines,havenotmingledsociallywithFilipinos,orwhohavenotevinceda
sinceredesiretolearnandembracethecustoms,traditionsandidealsoftheFilipinos
(g)CitizensorsubjectswithwhomthePhilippinesisatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwarand
(h)CitizensorsubjectsofaforeigncountrywhoselawsdonotgrantFilipinostherighttobenaturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.
Com.ActNo.473(1939),sec.4provides:
SECTION4.WhoareDisqualified.ThefollowingcannotbenaturalizedasPhilippinecitizens:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposingallorganizedgovernments
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominanceoftheirideas
(c)Polygamistsorbelieversinthepracticeofpolygamy
(d)Personsconvictedofcrimesinvolvingmoralturpitude
(e)Personssufferingfrommentalalienationorincurablecontagiousdiseases
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evincedasinceredesiretolearnandembracethecustoms,traditions,andidealsoftheFilipinos
(g)CitizensorsubjectsofnationswithwhomtheUnitedStatesandthePhilippinesareatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwar
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.
[326]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4627,COMELECMemorandum.
[327]Id.at4636.
[328]Bengsonv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,409Phil.633(2001)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[329]Rep.ActNo.9225(2003),sec.2.
[330]CivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary,272Phil.147,162(1991)[PerC.J.Fernan,EnBanc].
[331]CONST.,art.VII,sec.2provides:

ARTICLEVII.ExecutiveDepartment
....
SECTION2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadand
write,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelypreceding
suchelection.
[332]CONST.,art.VII,sec.3.
[333]CONST.,art.VI,sec.3provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment
....
SECTION3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,and,onthedayoftheelection,isatleast
thirtyfive years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.
[334]CONST.,art.VI,sec.6provides:

ARTICLEVI.TheLegislativeDepartment

....
SECTION6.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesand,onthe
day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to read and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered
voterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthe
dayoftheelection.
[335]CONST.,art.VIII,sec.7(1)provides:

ARTICLEVIII.JudicialDepartment
....
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn
citizenofthePhilippines.AMemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsor
moreajudgeofalowercourtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
[336]CONST.,art.IXB,sec.1(1)provides:

ARTICLEIX.ConstitutionalCommissions
....
B.TheCivilServiceCommission
SECTIONl.(I)TheCivilServiceshallbeadministeredbytheCivilServiceCommissioncomposedofaChairmanandtwoCommissioners
whoshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippinesand,atthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,withproven
capacity tor public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
theirappointment.
[337]CONST.,art.IXC,sec.1(1)provides:

ARTICLEIX.ConstitutionalCommissions
....
C.TheCommissiononElections
SECTION 1. (I) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn
citizensofthePhilippinesand,atthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,holdersofacollegedegree,andmustnot
have been candidates tor any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereot:including the
Chairman,shallbeMembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawforatleasttenyears.
[338]CONST.,art.IXD,sec.1(1)provides:

ARTICLEIX.ConstitutionalCommissions
....
D.CommissiononAudit
SECTION1.(1)ThereshallbeaCommissiononAuditcomposedofaChairmanandtwoCommissioners,whoshallbenaturalborncitizens
ofthePhilippinesand,atthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastthirtytiveyearsofage,certifiedpublicaccountantswithnotlessthanten
yearsofauditingexperience,ormembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawtoratleasttenyears,and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
MembersoftheCommissionbelongtothesameprofession.
[339]CoNST.,art.XI,sec.8provides:

ARTICLEXI.AccountabilityofPublicOfficers
....
SECTION8.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,andatthetimeoftheirappointment,at
leastfortyyearsold,ofrecognizedprobityandindependence,andmembersofthePhilippineBar,andmustnothavebeencandidatesfor
anyelectiveofficeintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.TheOmbudsmanmusthavetortenyearsormorebeenajudgeorengagedin
thepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
[340]CONST.,art.XII,sec.20provides:

ARTICLEXII.NationalEconomyandPatrimony
....
SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be
naturalbornFilipinocitizens,ofknownprobity,integrity,andpatriotism,themajorityofwhomshallcomefromtheprivatesector.They
shallalsobesubjecttosuchotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.Theauthorityshallprovidepolicydirectionin
theareasofmoney,banking,andcredit.Itshallhavesupervisionovertheoperationsofbanksandexercisesuchregulatorypowersas
maybeprovidedbylawovertheoperationsoffinancecompaniesandotherinstitutionsperformingsimilarfunctions.
[341]CONST.,art.XIII,sec.17(2)provides:

ARTICLEXIII.SocialJusticeandHumanRights
....
HumanRights
SECTION17....
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chainnan and four Members who must be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and a
majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
Commissionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

[342]Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirtyeight of Republic Act Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act

NumberedEighteenhundredsixtyandRepublicActNumberedThreethousandten,isfurtheramendedtoreadasfollows:
Sec.38.TheCityFiscalandAssistantCityFiscals.ThereshallbeintheOfticeoftheCityFiscalonechieftobeknownastheCityFiscal
withtherank,salaryandprivilegesofaJudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstance,anassistantchieftobeknownasthefirstassistantcityfiscal,
three second assistant city tiscals who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fiftyseven assistant fiscals, who shall discharge their duties
underthegeneralsupervisionoftheSecretaryofJustice.TobeeligibleforappointmentasCityFiscalonemustbeanaturalborncitizenof
thePhilippines and must have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of not less than ten years or held during a like period of an
officeinthePhilippineGovernmentrequiringadmissiontothepracticeoflawasanindispensablerequisite.Tobeeligibleforappointment
as assistant fiscal one must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years prior to his
appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensablerequisite.(Emphasissupplied)
[343]Rep.ActNo.3537(1963).
[344] Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive

Director of Bicol River Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the National Youth Commissioner, among
others.
[345]ExamplesofthesearepharmacistsandofficersofthePhilippineCoastGuard,amongothers.
[346]Amongtheseincentivesarestatescholarshipsinscienceandcertaininvestmentrights.
[347]Sameerv.Cabiles,G.R.No.170139,August5,2014

18[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
[348]Peoplev.Cayat,68Phil.12,18(1939)[PerJ.Moran,FirstDivision].
[349]Section4(b).
[350]RatifiedonAugust21,2000.
[351]SeeUnitedNationsTreatyCollection,ConventionontheRights(JltheChild

(visitedMarch7,2016).
[351]RatifiedonOctober23,1986.
[353]SeeBayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,657660(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc],citingtheViennaConventionontheLawsofTreaties.
[354]561Phil.386(2007)[PerJ.AustriaMartinez,EnBanc].
[355]Id.at397398.
[356]Rep.ActNo.8552(1998),sec.2(b)provides:

Section2(b).Inallmattersrelatingtothecare,custodyandadoptionofachild,his/herinterestshallbetheparamountconsiderationin
accordancewiththetenetssetforthintheUnitedNations(UN)ConventionontheRightsoftheChildUNDeclarationonSocialandLegal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and
InternationallyandtheHagueConventionontheProtectionofChildrenandCooperationinRespectofIntercountryAdoption.Towardthis
end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected,
orphaned,orabandoned.
[357]SeealsoRep.ActNo.9523(2009),AnActRequiringtheCertificationoftheDepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment(DSWD)

toDeclarea"ChildLegallyAvailabletorAdoption"asaPrerequisiteforAdoptionProceedings,AmendingforthisPurposeCertainProvision
ofRep.ActNo.8552,otherwiseknownastheIntercountryAdoptionActof1995,Pres.Dec.No.603,otherwiseknownastheChildand
YouthWelfareCode,andforOtherPurposes.
SECTION2.DefinitionofTerms.AsusedinthisAct,thefollowingtermsshallmean:
(1)DepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment(DSWD)istheagencychargedtoimplementtheprovisionsofthisActandshallhave
thesoleauthoritytoissuethecertificationdeclaringachildlegallyavailableforadoption.
....
(3)AbandonedChildreferstoachildwhohasnoproperparentalcareorguardianship,orwhoseparent(s)havedesertedhim/herfora
periodofatleastthree(3)continuousmonths,whichincludesafoundling.
[358]DFAOrderNo.1197,ImplementingRulesandRegulationsforRep.ActNo.9239(1997),PhilippinePassportAct.
[359]Pres.DecreeNo.1986,sec.2provides:

Section 2. Composition qualifications benefits. The BOARD shall be composed of a Chairman, a ViceChairman and thirty (30)

members, who shall all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the ViceChairman, and the members of the
BOARD,shallholdofficeforatermofone(1)year,unlesssoonerremovedbythePresidentforanycauseProvided,Thattheyshallbe
eligibleforreappointmentaftertheexpirationoftheirterm.IftheChairman,ortheViceChairmanoranymemberoftheBOARDfailsto
completehisterm,anypersonappointedtofillthevacancyshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredportionofthetermoftheBOARDmember
whomhesucceeds.
NopersonshallbeappointedtotheBOARD,unlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,notlessthantwentyone(21)yearsof
age, and of good moral character and standing in the community Provided, That in the selection of the members of the BOARD due
consideration shall be given to such qualifications as would produce a multisectoral combination of expertise in the various areas of
motion picture and television Provided, further, That at least five (5) members of the BOARD shall be members of the Philippine Bar.
Provided,finallyThatatleastfifteen(15)membersoftheBOARDmaycomefromthemovieandtelevisionindustrytobenominatedby
legitimateassociationsrepresentingthevarioussectorsofsaidindustry.
The Chairman, the ViceChairman and the other members of the BOARD shall be entitled to transportation, representation and other
allowanceswhichshallinnocaseexceedFIVETHOUSANDPESOS(P5,000.00)permonth.
[360]571Phil.170(2008)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,ThirdDivision].
[361]Id.at189190.
[362]374Phil.810(1999)[PerJ.Quisumbing,SecondDivision].
[363]Id.at822.
[364]SeeLuav.O'Brien,etal.,55Phil.53(1930)[PerJ.Street,EnBanc]Vda.DeLaig,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,172Phil.283(1978)

[Per J. Makasiar, First Division] Baloloy v. Huller, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division] and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of Celestial, G.R. No. 142691, August 5, 2003, 408 SCRA 291 [Per J. YnaresSantiago, First
Division].
[365]AngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,69Phil.635(1940)[PerJ.Laurel,EnBanc].
[366]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.5,Petition.
[367]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4874,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[368]Id.
[369]Id.
[370]Id.
[371]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.4566,AnnexCoftheSolicitorGeneral'sMemorandum,CertificationissuedonFebruary9,2016

bythePhilippineStatisticsOffice,signedbyDeputyNationalStatisticianEstelaT.DeGuzman.
[372]CONST.,art.VII,sec.2.
[373]Fulev.CourtofAppeals,165Phil.785,797(1976)[PerJ.Martin,FirstDivision].
[374]KENNANONRESIDENCEANDDOMICILE26,3135,as cited in In re: Wilfred Uytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines,95Phil.890

(1954)[PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc].
[375]Id.
[376]Id.
[377]555Phil.115(2007)[PerJ.Velasco,Jr,SecondDivision].
[378]Id.at123124.
[379]Id.at601.
[380]Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 455456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc] RomualdezMarcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil.

329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc]andCov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,276Phil.758(1991)[PerJ.
Gutierrez,Jr.,EnBanc].
[381]52Phil.645(1928)[PerJ.Villareal,EnBanc].
[382]Idat651.

[383]Gallegov.Vera,73Phil.453(1941)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc).
[384]Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,276Phil.758(1991)[PerJ.Gutierrez,Jr.,EnBanc].
[385]Idat792.
[386]Limbonav.CommissiononElections,578Phil.364,374(2008)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc].
[387]73Phil.453(1941)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc].
[388]Id.at455456,citingNuvalvs.Guray,52PhiL645(1928)[PerJ.Villareal,EnBanc]and17Am.Jur.,section16,pp.599601.
[389]Limbonav.CommissiononElections,578Phil.364,374(2008)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc].Genderbiascorrected.
[390]Ugroracion,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,515Phil.253,263(2008)[Per.J.Nachura,EnBanc].
[391]Macalintalv.CommissiononElections,453Phil.586,634635(2003)[PerJ.AustriaMartinez,EnBanc].
[392]Ugroracionv.CommissiononElections,575Phil.253,264(2008)[PerJ.Nachura,EnBanc].
[393]Sabiliv.CommissiononElections,686Phil.649,701(2012)[PerJ.Sereno,EnBanc].
[394]InreEusebiov.Eusebio,100Phil.593,598(1956)[PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc].
[395]Id.
[396]Id.at598.
[397]Id.SeealsoRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan.EnBanc].
[398]100Phil.593(1956)[PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc].
[399]Id.at598599,citingIBEALE,THECONFLICTSOFLAW129.
[400]96Phil.294(1956)[PerJ.Padilla,SecondDivision].
[401]Id.at300.
[402] J. Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 719 (2003) [Per J. Austria

Martinez,EnBanc].
[403]RomualdezMarcosv.Commissio!lonElections,318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[404]Macalintalv.CommissiononElections,453Phil.586(2003)[PerJ.AustriaMartinez,EnBanc].
[405]RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318PhiL329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[406]U.S.CONST,art.2,sec.1:"...Nopersonexceptanaturalborncitizen,oracitizenoftheUnitedStates,atthetimeoftheadoption

ofthisConstitution,shallbeeligibletotheofficeofPresidentneithershallanypersonbeeligibletothatofficewhoshallnothaveattained
totheageofthirtyfiveyears,andbeenfourteenYearsaresidentwithintheUnitedStates[.]"
[407]U.S.CONST,art.2,sec.1:"...Nopersonexceptanaturalborncitizen,oracitizenoftheUnitedStates,atthetimeoftheadoption

ofthisConstitution,shallbeeligibletotheofficeofPresidentneithershallanypersonbeeligibletothatofficewhoshallnothaveattained
totheageofthirtyfiveyears,andbeenfourteenYearsaresidentwithintheUnitedStates[.]"
[408]3JOSEPHSTORY,COMMENTARIESONTHECONSTITUTION14721473(1833).
[409]Id.
[410] Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, Sections 13 Election and Qualification of Senators.That the members of the Senate of the

Philippines,exceptashereinprovided,shallbeelectedfortermsofsixandthreeyears,ashereinafterprovided,bythequalifiedelectors
ofthePhilippines.Eachofthesenatorialdistrictsdefinedashereinafterprovidedshallhavetherighttoelecttwosenators.Nopersonshall
beanelectivememberoftheSenateofthePhilippineswhoisnotaqualifiedelectorandoverthirtyyearsofage,andwhoisnotableto
read and write either the Spanish or English language, and who has not been a resident of the Philippines for at least two consecutive
yearsandanactualresidentofthesenatorialdistrictfromwhichchosenforaperiodofatleastoneyearimmediatelypriortohiselection
and14ElectionandQualificationsofRepresentatives.ThatthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshall,exceptashereinprovided,
beelectedtrienniallybythequalifiedelectorsofthePhilippines.Eachoftherepresentativedistrictshereinafterprovidedforshallhavethe
righttoelectonerepresentative.NopersonshallbeanelectivememberoftheHouseofRepresentativeswhoisnotaqualifiedelectorand

over twentyfive years of age, and who is not able to read and write either the Spanish or English language, and who has not been an
actualresidentofthedistrictfromwhichelectedforatleastoneyearimmediatelypriortohiselection:Provided,Thatthemembersofthe
present Assembly elected on the first Tuesday in June, nineteen hundred and sixteen, shall be the members of the House of
Representativesfromtheirrespectivedistrictsforthetermexpiringinnineteenhundredandnineteen.
[411]PhilippineAutonomyActof1916,Section21(a).Title,appointment,residence.Thatthesupremeexecutivepowershallbevestedin

anexecutiveofficer,whoseofficialtitleshallbe"TheGovernorGeneralofthePhilippineIslands."HeshallbeappointedbythePresident,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ofthe United States, and hold his office at the pleasure ofthe President and until his
successorischosenandqualified.TheGovernorGeneralshallresideinthePhilippineIslandsduringhisofficialincumbency,andmaintain
hisofficeattheseatofGovernment.
[412]Loc.Gov.CODE,sec.39provides:

SECTION 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
electionandabletoreadandwriteFilipinooranyotherlocallanguageordialect.
(b)Candidatesforthepositionofgovernor,vicegovernor,ormemberofthesangguniangpanlalawigan,ormayor,vicemayorormember
ofthesangguniangpanlungsodofhighlyurbanizedcitiesmustbeatleasttwentythree(23)yearsofageonelectionday.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vicemayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at
leasttwentyone(21)yearsofageonelectionday.
(d)Candidatesforthepositionofmemberofthesangguniangpanlungsodorsangguniangbayanmustbeatleasteighteen(18)yearsof
ageonelectionday.
(e)Candidatesforthepositionofpunongbarangayormemberofthesangguniangbarangaymustbeatleasteighteen(18)yearsofage
onelectionday.
(f)Candidatesforthesangguniangkabataanmustbeatleastfifteen(15)yearsofagebutnotmorethantwentyone(21)yearsofageon
electionday.
[413]Gallegov.Vera,73Phil.453,459(1941)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc].
[414]Torayno,Sr.v.CommissiononElections,392Phil.342,345(2000)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBanc].
[415]Gallegov.Vera,73Phil.453,459(2000)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc].
[416]Aquinov.CommissiononElections,318Phil.467(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[417]Id.at449.
[418]596Phil.354(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].
[419]Japzonv.CommissiononElections,596Phil.354,369370(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].
[420]Caballerov.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.209835,September22,2015

[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[421]Coquillav.CommissiononElections,434Phil.861(2002)[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
[422]Caballerov.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.209835,September22,2015

[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[423]RomualdezMarcosv.CommissiononElections,318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[424]578Phil.364(2008)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc].
[425]Limbonav.COMELEC,518Phil.364,374(2008)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc].
[426]Gallegov.Vera,13Phil.453,456(1941)[PerJ.Ozaeta,EnBanc].
[427]318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[428]Id.
[429]Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.294,298(1956)[PerJ.Padilla,SecondDivision].

[430]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[431]Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.294,298(1956)[PerJ.Padilla,SecondDivision].
[432]Limbonav.COMELEC,578Phil.364,374(2008)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc]
[433]276Phil.758(1991)[PerJ.Gutierrez,Jr.,EnBanc].
[434]Id.at794.
[435]636Phil.753(20I0)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[436]SeeMitrav.COMELEC,636Phil.753(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[437]596Phil.354(2009)[PerJ.ChieoNazario,EnBanc].
[438]318Phil.329(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[439]Id
[440]Id.
[441]SeePerezv.COMELEC,375Phil.1106(1999)[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
[442]SeePundaodayav.COMELEC,616Phil.167(2009)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,EnBanc].
[443]SeeDumpitMichelenav.COMELEC,511Phil.720(2005)[PerJ.Carpio,EnBanc].
[444]SeeDumpitMichelenav.COMELEC,511Phil.720(2005)[PerJ.Carpio,EnBanc].
[445]Sabiliv.CommissiononElections,686Phil.649(2012)[PerJ.Sereno,EnBanc].
[446]Id.
[447]SeeJapzonv.COMELEC,596Phil.354(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].
[448]Jaloverv.Osmea,G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267,284[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc],citingFernandezv.HRET,

G.R.No.187478,December21,2009,608SCRA733.
[449]Mitrav.CommissiononElections,636Phil.753815(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[450]Id.
[451]Id.
[452]Id.
[453]Id.
[454]Id.at772.
[455]Id.
[456]Id.
[457]Id.at789.
[458]Sabiliv.CommissiononElections,686Phil.649(2012)[PerJ.Sereno,EnBanc].
[459]Id.at685.
[460]Rollo(G.R.No.221697,Vol.V)p.3667,COMELECComment.
[461]434Phil.861(2002)[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
[462]SeeJapzonv.COMELEC,596Phil.354(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].

[463]Caballerov.COMELEC,G.R.No.209835,September22,2015

[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[464]Rollo(G.R.No.221697,Vol.I),pp.236237,ResolutionoftheCOMELECEnBancdatedDecember23,2015.
[465]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700,Vol.I),pp.372373,ResolutionoftheCOMELECEnBancdatedDecember23,2015.
[466]596Phil.354(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].
[467]Id.at369370.
[468] Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?

file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf
[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].
[469]Id.
[470]SeeDepartmentofForeignAffairs,VisaGuidelines/Requirements{visitedMarch7,2016).
[471]RONGXINGGUO,CROSSBORDERMANAGEMENT:THEORY,METHOD,ANDAPPLICATION368(2015).
[472]Id.
[473] See Department of Foreign Affairs, Visa Guidelines/Requirements http://www.dfa.gov.ph/guidelinesrequirements (visited March 7,

2016).
[474] Section 50(j) references or distinguishes an "immigrant" from a "nonimmigrant." This may tempt one into concluding that an

"immigrant" must be exclusively or wholly equated with a "permanent resident." However, the concept of a nonimmigrant, provided in
Section 9, also encompasses returning permanent residents. Thus, a line cannot be drawn between "immigrants" and "nonimmigrants"
thatexclusivelyandwhollyequatesan"immigrant"witha"permanentresident."Section9(e)ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1940
states:

SEC.9.AliensdepartingfromanyplaceoutsidethePhilippines,whoareotherwiseadmissibleandwhoqualifYwithinoneofthe
followingcategories,maybeadmittedasnonimmigrants:
(e)ApersonpreviouslylawfullyadmittedintothePhilippinesforpermanentresidence,whoisreturningfromatemporaryvisit
abroadtoanunrelinquishedresidenceinthePhilippinesand

[475]Rollo(G.R.No.221697,Vol.VI),pp.40644065,Petitioner'sMemorandum,citingBJFormVI011Rev,ConversiontoNonQuota

ImmigrantVisaofaFormerFilipinoCitizenNaturalizeinaForeignCountry(takenfromwww.immigration.gov.ph).
[476]Rep.ActNo.6768(1989),sec.2provides:

SEC.2.DefinitionofTerms.ForpurposesofthisAct:
(a)Theterm"balikbayan"shallmeanaFilipinocitizenwhohasbeencontinuouslyoutofthePhilippinesforaperiodofatleastone(1)
year, a Filipino overseas worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as this term is defined hereunder, who had been
naturalizedinaforeigncountryandcomesorreturnstothePhilippines
[477]Rep.ActNo.6768(1989),sec.2(a),asamended.
[478]G.R.No.207264,October22,2013,708SCRA197[PerJ.Perez,EnBanc].
[479]Coquillav.COMELEC,434Phil.861,875(2002)[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
[480]Id.
[481]Japzonv.COMELEC,596Phil.354,369370(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,EnBanc].
[482]Reyesv.COMELEC,G.R.No.207264,June25,2013,699SCRA522[PerJ.Perez,EnBanc].
[483]Id.at543.
[484]Caballerov.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.209835,September22,2015

[PerJ.Peralta,EnBanc].

[485]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),pp.151157,Petition.
[486]CONST.,art.VII,sec.4,par.3states:"Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionorPresidentandVicePresidentshall

beheldonthesecondMondayofMay."
[487]Rollo(G.R.No.221697,Vol.VI),p.4016,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[488]Id.at4017.
[489]Id.
[490]Rollo(G.R.No.221698221700),p.254,COMELECFirstDivisionResolution(SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC)).
[491]Article110.Thehusbandshallfixtheresidenceofthefamily.Butthecourtmayexemptthewifefromlivingwiththehusbandifhe

shouldliveabroadunlessintheserviceoftheRepublic.
[492]Art.152.Thefamilyhome,constitutedjointlybythehusbandandthewifeorbyanunmarriedheadofafamily,isthedwellinghouse

wheretheyandtheirfamilyreside,andthelandonwhichitissituated.
[493]CONST.,art.II,sec.14.
[494]TSN,February9,2016OralArguments,pp.101102.
[495]Id.
[496]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.4026,Petitioner'sMemorandum.
[497]Id.at21.
[498]Rollo(G.R.No.221698700),p.254.
[499]Id.at4027.
[500]Id.at4028.
[501]G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[502]Id.at284.
[503]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.241,COMELECResolutiondatedDecember23,2015.
[504]SeeElenaLeonesvda.deMillerv.Atty.RolandoMiranda,A.C.8507,November10,2015

(PerJ.PerlasBemabe,FirstDivision].
[505]318Phil.329{1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[506]Id.at380.
[507]Id.
[508]375Phil.1106(1999)[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
[509]Id.
[510]Id.at11171119.
[511]RufinaPatisFactoryv.Alusitain,478Phil.544,558(2004)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,ThirdDivision}.
[512]RULESOFCOURT,Rule129,sec.4.
[513]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,318Phil.329,382(1995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[514]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.29,Petition.
[515]Id.at290.

[516]Id.
[517]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.4037,Petitioner'sMemorandum.Emphasissupplied.
[518]Mitrav.COMELEC,636Phil.753,786(2010)[PerJ.Brion,EnBanc].
[519]Id.at788.
[520]Rollo(G.R.No.221697),p.40474048.
[521]Id.
[522]Id.
[523]Id.
[524]Id.
[525]318Phil.329(I995)[PerJ.Kapunan,EnBanc].
[526]Id.at377378.

DISSENTINGOPINION

PERLASBERNABE,J.:
Idissent.
Amidthecomple"ityofthelegalissuesandpoliticalimplicationsinvolved,thisCourt,inrulingonthismatterasineveryothersimilar
matterbeforeitmustalwaysharkenbacktoitsparametersofreviewoverrulingsoftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC).Itison
thisbasicbutresolutepremisethatIsubmitthisdissent.
I.

InMitrav.COMELEC[1](Mitra),itwasexplainedthat"[t]hebasisfortheCourt'sreviewofCOMELECrulingsunderthestandardsofRule
65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IXA of the [1987] Constitution which provides that '[u]nless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari by the
aggrievedpartywithinthirty[(30)]daysfromreceiptofacopythereof.'Forthisreason,theRulesofCourtprovideforaseparaterule
(Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule e"pressly refers to the
applicationofRule65inthefilingofapetitionforcertiorari,subjecttotheexceptionclause'exceptashereinafterprovided.'"[2]
"Thepurposeofapetitionforcertiorariistodeterminewhetherthechallengedtribunalhasactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdictionor
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relationtoRule65ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedureislimitedtotheresolutionofjurisdictionalissues."[3]
InMirandav.Abaya,[4]thisCourtheldthat"anactofacourtortribunalmayonlybeconsideredtohavebeendoneingraveabuseof
discretionwhenthesamewasperformedinacapriciousorwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentwhichisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction.The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoinedortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassion
or personal hostility x x x. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as
'graveabuseofdiscretion.'Anabuseofdiscretionisnotsufficientbyitselftojustifytheissuanceofawritofcertiorari.The
abusemustbegraveandpatent,anditmustbeshownthatthediscretionwasexercisedarbitrarilyanddespoticallyxxx."
[5]

In this case, the COMELEC held that petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares (petitioner) made false representations in her
certificateofcandidacy(CoC)forPresidentfiledonOctober15,2015[6](2015CoC)whenshedeclaredunderoaththatsheisanatural
borncitizenofthiscountryandwouldbearesidentthereofforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthsonthedayimmediatelypreceding
theMay9,2016Elections.[7]Accordingly,theCOMELECcancelledpetitioner'sCoC.[8]
Finding the verdict to be "deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits,"[9] the ponencia nullifies the COMELEC's
assailedrulings,[10]andevengoestotheextentofdeclaringpetitionerasaneligiblecandidate.[11]
Astoitsfirstreason,theponenciapositsthattheCOMELEC,inrulingonapetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelaCoC,isrestrained

"from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority."[12] Consequently, "(t]he COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualificationorlackthereofofthecandidate."[13]
Idisagree.
TheCOMELEC'spowertodenyduecoursetoorcancelacandidate'sCoCstemsfromSection2,ArticleIXCofthe1987Constitutionwhich
grantsittheauthorityto"[e]nforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,
initiative,referendum,andrecall"andto"[d]ecide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,allquestionsaffectingelections
xxx."InLoongv.COMELEC,[14]itwaselucidatedthat:

Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) ofthe Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum[,] and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and
intentofthisprovisionistogiveCOMELECallthenecessaryandincidentalpowersforittoachievetheobjectiveofholdingfree,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the
parametersofpowersofCOMELECintheconductofourelections.15(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Likewise,inBedolv.COMELEC(Bedol):[16]

ThequasijudicialpoweroftheCOMELECembracesthepowertoresolvecontroversiesarisingfromtheenforcementofelection
laws,andtobethesolejudgeofallpreproclamationcontroversiesxxx.[17](Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Based on the text of the Constitution, and bearing in mind the import of cases on the matter, there is no perceivable restriction which
qualifiestheexerciseoftheCOMELEC'sadjudicatorypowertodeclareacandidateineligibleandthus,cancelhis/herCoCwiththeneedof
apriordeterminationcomingfroma"properauthority."
Contrary to the ponencia's interpretation, the COMELEC, under Rule 25 of its Resolution No. 952318 dated September 25, 2012, may
disqualify any candidate found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution:

Rule25DisqualificationofCandidates

Section 1. Grounds. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competentcourt,guiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissiontobesufferingfromanydisqualificationprovidedbylawor
theConstitution.
xxxx(Emphasissupplied)

Itisconfoundingthattheponenciaignoresthesecondprongoftheprovisionandmyopicallyzeroesinonthefirstwhichbutprocedurally
reflects the COMELEC's power to disqualify a candidate already declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of any
disqualification,suchasthoseaccessorytoacriminalconviction.[19]
AsedifiedinBedol,itistheCOMELECwhichisthe"solejudgeofallpreproclamationcontroversies."[20]Thus,itwouldgreatlyemasculate
the COMELEC's constitutionallyconferred powers by treating it as a mere administrative organ relegated to the task of conducting
perfunctoryreviewsonlytospotfalsitiesonthefaceofCoCsorministeriallyenforcedeclarationsfromapriorauthority.
Asinthiscase,a"preproclamationcontroversy"mayarisefromapetitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelaCoC.Thisremedywhichis
filedbeforeandfallsundertheadjudicatoryjurisdictionoftheCOMELECisgovernedbySection78,ArticleIXofBatasPambansaBilang
881,otherwiseknownasthe"OmnibusElectionCodeofthePhilippines"[21](OEC):

Section78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourse
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74[22] hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
timenotlaterthantwentyfivedaysfromthetimeofthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterdue
noticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

As worded, a Section 78 petition is based exclusively on the ground that a CoC contains a material representation that is
false. "The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the [OEC] pertains to [a] material fact, and is not simply an innocuous
mistake.Amaterialfactreferstoacandidate'squalificationforelectiveofficesuchasone'scitizenshipandresidence."[23]

While there are decided cases wherein this Court has stated that "a false representation under Section 78 must consist of 'a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible,"'[24] nowhere does the proviSion
mentionthisrequirement.InTagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTri?unal(Tagolino),[25]thisCourtenunciatedthat:

[T]hedeliberatenessofthemisrepresentation,muchlessone'sintenttodefraud,isofbaresignificanceinaSection78petition
asitisenoughthattheperson'sdeclarationofamaterialqualificationintheCoCbefalse.Inthisrelation,jurisprudenceholds
that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determinationofwhetherone'sCoCshouldbedeemedcancelledornot.Whatremainsmaterialisthatthepetitionessentially
seekstodenyduecoursetoand/orcanceltheCoConthebasisofone'sineligibilityandthatthesamebegrantedwithoutany
qualification.[26](Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Albeitincorporatingtheintentrequirementintotheirrespectivediscussions,asurveyofcertaincasesdecidedafterTagolinoonlyproveto
demonstratethe"baresignificance"ofthesaidrequisite.
For instance, in Villafuerte v. COMELEC,[27] this Court echoed precedent, when it stated that "a false representation under Section 78"
mustbemade"withanintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastoone'squalificationsforpublicoffice."[28]However,thisCourtneverlooked
into the circumstances that surrounded the candidate's representation. Instead, it equated deliberateness of representation with the
materialityofthefactbeingrepresentedintheCoC.Thus,itheldthereinthat"respondent'snickname'LRAYJR.MIGZ'writteninhisCOC
is[not]amaterialmisrepresentation,"reasoningthatthenickname"cannotbeconsideredamaterialfactwhichpertainstohiseligibility
andthusqualificationtorunforpublicoffice."[29]
InHayudiniv.COMELEC,[30]thisCourt,whiledealingwithacasethatinvolvedmaterialrepresentationspertainingtoresidencyandvoter
registration, did not discuss the circumstances which would demonstrate the intent of the candidate behind his CoC representations. It
againparrotedprecedentwithoutanydevoteddiscussiononthematterofintent.[31]
Similarly, in Jalover v. Osmea[32] (Jalover) this Court just repeated precedent when it said that "[s]eparate from the requirement of
materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a 'deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible,"[33] but did not apply the same. In fact, a closer scrutiny of Jalover, which cited Mitra,
wouldleadtothereasonableconclusionthatjurisprudencehasallthewhilepresumeddeliberatenessofintentfromthematerialityofthe
falsity.ThequotedpassagefromMitrareads:"[t]hedeliberatecharacterofthemisrepresentationnecessarilyfollowsfromaconsideration
oftheconsequencesofanymaterialfalsityxxx."[34]The"separateness"oftherequirementofintentfromtherequisiteofmaterialityis
hence,moreapparentthanreal.ThebottomlineaccordingtoJalover,citingMitra,isthat"acandidatewhofalsifiesamaterialfactcannot
run."[35]
Thisstatementthereforedemonstratesthattheintentrequirementisbutafictionalsuperfluity,ifnotanomaly,whichisactuallydevoidof
itsownconceptualrelevance.Assuch,itsexistenceinjurisprudenceonlyservesasaperplexing,ifnot,hazardous,mirage.
InthemorerecentcaseofAgustinv.COMELEC,[36]thisCourt,whileagainquotingthesamepassagesfromMitra,upheld"thedeclaration
bytheCOMELECEnBanc"whichwas,bytheway,actingonaSection78petition"that[therein]petitionerwasineligibletorunandbe
votedforasMayoroftheMunicpalityofMarcos,IlocosNorte"onthegroundthathe"effectivelyrepudiatedhisoathofrenunciation"by
theuseofhisUSpassportand,thus,"revertedhimtohisearlierstatusasadualcitizcn."[37]Interestingly,thisCourt,consistentwiththe
abovecited passage from Tagolino, stated that "[e]ven if it made no finding that the petitioner deliberately attempted to mislead or
misinformastowarrantthecancellationofhisCoC,theCOMELECcouldstilldeclarehimdisqualifiedfornotmeetingtherequiredeligibility
undertheLocalGovernmentCode."[38]
Again,theplaintextofSection78readsthattheremedyisbased"onthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinas
requiredunderSection74hereofisfalse."Itpertainstoamaterialrepresentationthatisfalseandnota"materialmisrepresentation."In
myview,thelatterisasemanticbutimpactfulmisnomerwhichtendstoobfuscatethesenseoftheprovisionasitsuggestsbyemploying
the word "misrepresent," ordinarily understood to mean as "to give a false or misleading representation of usually with an intent to
deceiveorbeunfair"[39]thatintentiscrucialinaSection78petition,when,infact,itisnot.
Notably, the Dissenting Opinion of former Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (Justice Tinga) in Tecson v. COMELE[40]
(Tecson)explainstheirrelevanceofthecandidate'sintentionorbeliefinrulingonaSection78petition.There,heevenpointedoutthe
jurisprudentialmisstepsinthecasesofRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC[41](RomualdezMarcos)andSalcedoIIv.COMELEC[42](Salcedo
II)whereinthephantomrequirementof"deliberateintentiontomislead"wasfirstfoisted:

[I]naccordancewithSection78,supra,thepetitionerinapetitiontodenyduecourse(toor]cancelacertificateofcandidacy
need only prove three elements. First, there is a representation contained in the certificate of candidacy. Second, the
representation is required under Section 74. Third, the representation must be "material," which, according to jurisprudence,
meansthatitpertainstotheeligibilityofthecandidatetotheoffice.Fourth,therepresentationisfalse.
AssertingthatproofofintenttoconcealisalsonecessaryforapetitionunderSection78toprosper,Mr.JusticeKapunanwrote
inRomualdezMarcosv.[COMELEC],thus:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's residency qualification requirement. The said

statementbecomesmaterialonlywhenthereisorappearstobeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhide
a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.[Italicsintheoriginal]

TheCourt,reiteratedtheKapunanpronouncementinSalcedoIIv.[COMELEC].
AdvertingtoRomualdezMarcos and SalcedoII, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that while the element of materiality was not in
questiontheintenttodeceivewasnotestablished,noteventheknowledgeoffalsity,thus:

Undeniably,thequestiononthecitizenship[of]respondentfallswithintherequirementofmaterialityunderSection
78. However, proof of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt to mislead must still be established. In other
words,directandsubstantialevidenceshowingthatthepersonwhosecertificateofcandidacyisbeingsoughttobe
cancelled or denied due course, must have known or have been aware of the falsehood as appearing on his
certificate.[Italicsintheoriginal]

ThepronouncementsinRomualdezMarcosand Salcedo II, however, are clearly not supported by a plain reading of the law.
NowhereinSection78isitstatedorimpliedthattherebeanintentiontodeceiveforacertificateofcandidacyto
bedeniedduecourseorbecancelled.Allthelawrequiresisthatthe"materialrepresentationcontained[inthecertificate
ofcandidacy]asrequiredunderSection74xxxisfalse."BeitnotedthatahearingunderSection78andRule23isaquasi
judicialproceedingwheretheintentoftherespondentisirrelevant.Alsodrawingontheprinciplesofcriminallawforanalogy,
the "offense" of material representation is malum prohibitum not malum in se. Intent is irrelevant. When the law speaks in
clearandcategoricallanguage,thereisnoreasonforinterpretationorconstruction,butonlyforapplication.
The reason for the irrelevance of intent or belief is not difficult to divine. Even if a candidate believes that he is
eligibleandpurportstobesoinhiscertificateofcandidacy,butissubsequentlyproveninaRule23proceedingto
be, in fact or in law, not eligible, it would be utterly foolish to allow him to proceed with his candidacy. The
electoratewouldbemerelysquanderingitsvotesforandtheCOMELEC,itsresourcesincountingtheballotscast
infavorofacandidatewhoisnot,inanycase,qualifiedtoholdpublicoffice.
The Kapunan pronouncement in the RomualdezMarcos case did not establish a doctrine. It is not supported bv
law,anditsmacksofjudiciallegislation.Moreover,suchjudiciallegislationbecomesevenmoreegregious[,]considering
that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6% of a Supreme Court. While several other Justices joined
Justice Kapunan in upholding the residence qualification of Rep. Imelda RomualdezMarcos, they did not share his dictum. It
was his by his lonesome. Justice Puno had a separate opinion, concurred in by Justices Bellosillo and Melo. Justice Mendoza
filed a separate opinion too, in which Chief Justice Narvasa concurred. Justices Romero and Francisco each had separate
opinions. Except for Chief Justice Narvasa and Justice Mendoza, the Justices in the majority voted to grant Rep. [Marcos's]
petition on the ground that she reestablished her domicile in Leyte upon being widowed by the death of former President
Marcos.
Ontheotherhand,thereiterationoftheKapunanpronouncementinSalcedoisamereobiterdictum.TheCourtdismissedthe
disqualificationcaseonthegroundthattherespondent'suseofthesurname"Salcedo"inhercertificateofcandidacyisnota
materialrepresentationsincetheentrydoesnotrefertoherqualificationforelectiveoffice.Beingwhatitis,theSalcedoobiter
cannot elevate the Kapunan pronouncement to the level of a doctrine regardless of how many Justices voted for Salcedo.
Significantly,JusticePunoconcurredintheresultonly.
Thus,inthiscase,itdoesnotmatterthatrespondentknowsthathewasnotanaturalbornFilipinocitizenand,knowingsuch
fact, proceeded to state otherwise in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate. A candidate's
citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith. It was, therefore, improper for the
COMELECtodismissthepetitiononthegroundthatpetitionerfailedtoproveintenttomisleadonthepartofrespondent.[43]
(Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)

IcouldnotagreemorewithJusticeTinga'sexposition.Truly,"[n]owhereinSection78isitstatedorimpliedthattherebeanintentionto
deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled."[44] At the risk of belaboring the point, the candidate's
intenttomisleadormisinformonamaterialfactstatedinhis/herCoCisofnoconsequenceinrulingonaSection78petition.Topremise
aSection78petitiononafindingofintentorbeliefwouldcreatealegalvacuumwhereintheCOMELECbecomespowerlessundertheOEC
toenjointhecandidacyofineligiblepresidentialcandidatesuponamereshowingthatthematerialrepresentationsinhis/herCoCwereall
madeingoodfaith.Itshouldbeemphasizedthat"[a]candidate'scitizenshipeligibilityinparticularisdeterminedbylaw,notby
his good faith."[45] With this, the Romulaldez Marcos and Salcedo II rulings which "judicially legislated" this requirement should,
therefore,beabandonedaslegalaberrations.
Neitherisitacceptabletothinkthatthematterofeligibilityparticularly,thatofacandidateforPresidentcanonlybetakenupbeforethe
PresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET)afteracandidatehasalreadybeenvotedfor.TheCOMELEC'sconstitutionalmandatecannotbeany
clearer:itisempoweredto"[e]nforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,
referendum,andrecall"andto"[d]ecide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,allquestionsaffectingelectionsxxx."[46]Asobserved

bySeniorAssociateJusticeAntonioT.CarpioinhisownopinioninTecson:

This broad constitutional power and function vested in the COMELEC is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a
dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a naturalborn Philippine citizen, like
Arnold[Schwarzenegger],runsforPresident,theCOMELECiscertainlynotpowerlesstocancelthecertificateofcandidacyof
suchcandidate.Thereisnoneedtowaituntilaftertheelectionsbeforesuchcandidatemaybedisqualified.[47]

Verily, we cannot tolerate an absurd situation wherein a presidential candidate, who has already been determined by the COMELEC to
have missed a particular eligibility requirement and, thus, had made a false representation in his/her CoC by declaring that he/she is
eligible,isstillallowedtocontinuehis/hercandidacy,andeventuallybevotedfor.Theproposition[48]thatthematterofeligibilityshould
belefttothePETtodecideonlyaftertheelectionsisadangerousonefornotonlydoesitdebasetheCOMELEC'sconstitutionalpowers,it
alsoeffectivelyresultsinamockeryoftheelectoralprocess,nottomentionthedisenfranchisementofthevoters.Clearly,thevotesofthe
Filipino people would be put to waste if we imprudently take away from the COMELEC its capability to avert the fielding of ineligible
candidates whose votes therefor shall be only considered stray. The Filipino people deserve to know prior to the elections if the person
theyintendtovoteforisineligible.Inallreasonablelikelihood,theywouldnothavecasttheirvotesforaparticularcandidatewhowould
justbeoustedfromofficelateron.
Atanyrate,thejurisdictionalboundarieshavealreadybeenset:theCOMELEC'sjurisdictionends,andthatofthePETbegins,onlywhena
candidate therefor has already been elected, and thereafter, proclaimed.[49] In Tecson, this Court explained that the PET's jurisdiction
underSection4,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionislimitedonlytoapostelectionscenano:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.
xxxx

Ordinaryusagewouldcharacterizea"contest"inreferencetoapostelectionscenario.Electioncontestsconsistofeitheran
electionprotestoraquowarrantowhich,althoughtwodistinctremedies,wouldhaveoneobjectiveinview,i.e.,todislodgethe
winningcandidatefromoffice.AperusalofthephraseologyinRule12,Rule13,andRule14ofthe"RulesofthePresidential
ElectoralTribunal,"promulgatedbytheSupremeCourtenbancon18April1992,wouldsupportthispremise

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresidentofthePhilippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warrantoagainstthePresidentorVicePresident.Anelectionprotestshallnotincludeapetitionforquowarranto.A
petitionforquowarrantoshallnotincludeanelectionprotest.
Rule14.ElectionProtest.OnlytheregisteredcandidateforPresidentorforVicePresidentofthePhilippineswho
receivedthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotesmaycontesttheelectionofthePresidentortheVicePresident,
asthecasemaybe,byfilingaverifiedpetitionwiththeClerkofthePresidentialElectoralTribunalwithinthirty(30)
daysaftertheproclamationofthewinner.

Therulescategoricallyspeakofthejurisdictionofthetribunalovercontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualifications
ofthe"President"or"VicePresident,"ofthePhilippines,andnotof"candidates"forPresidentorVicePresident.Aquo
warrantoproceedingisgenerallydefinedasbeinganactionagainstapersonwhousurps,intrudesinto,orunlawfullyholdsor
exercisesapublicoffice.Insuchcontext,theelectioncontestcanonlycontemplateapostelectionscenario.InRule14,
onlyaregisteredcandidatewhowouldhavereceivedeitherthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotescouldfileanelection
protest.Thisruleagainpresupposesapostelectionscenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, [Article VII] of the 1987
Constitution,wouldnotincludecasesdirectlybroughtbeforeit,questioningthequalificationsofacandidateforthe
presidencyorvicepresidencybeforetheelectionsareheld.[50](Emphasessupplied)

Thus,Irespectfullyobjecttotheponencia'senfeeblingtakeontheCOMELEC'spowertodeterminetheeligibilityofacandidatepriortothe
elections.
In fact, the ponencia's view is also inconsistent with its declaration that petitioner is "QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
NationalandLocalElectionsof9May2016."[51]IftheCOMELEChadnopowertodeterminetheeligibilityofpetitioner,thenthisCourt
whichisonlytaskedtoexerciseitspowerofreviewundertheparametersofapetitionforcertiorariand,thus,shouldhaveeithernullified
oraffirmedtheassailedrulingscouldnotproceedandassumejurisdictionoutsideofthecontextofthecasebeforeitandmakethisad
hocpronouncement.ThedeclarationnotonlyservestoconfusethetruepowersoftheCOMELEC,italsodistortsthemannerofourreview.

II.

The central question in this case, to which the analysis of grave abuse of discretion is applied, is whether or not the representations of
petitionerregardingherresidencyparticularly,thatshewouldbearesidentofthiscountryforten(10)yearsandeleven(11)monthson
the day immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections and her citizenship particdarly, that she is a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippinesinher2015CoCarefalse.Notably,afindingoffalsityevenastoonerepresentationwouldalreadybeenoughfortheCOMELEC
todenyduecoursetoorcancelher2015CoC.Torecount,Section74towhichthefalserepresentationgroundunderSection78ofthe
OECrelatestoprovidesthat"[t]hecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncinghiscandidacyfortheoffice
statedthereinandthatheiseligibleforsaidofficexxx."AcandidateiseligibletorunforthepostofPresidentforaslongasheorshe
isanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesandaresidentthereofforatleastten(10)yearsimmediatelyprecedingtheelections,among
otherrequirements.ThesecitizenshipandresidencyrequirementsaredelineatedinSection2,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution:

Section2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,ableto
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.

All of the requirements must concur. Otherwise, the candidate is ineligible to run for President and, hence, a contrary declaration
therefor,alreadyamountstoafalsematerialrepresentationwithintheambitofSection78oftheOEC.
On the issue of residency, the ponencia claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in concluding that petitioner falsely
represented in her 2015 CoC that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months immediately
precedingtheMay9,2016Electionsas,infact,itfoundherrepresentationtobetrue.[52]Insofinding,theponenciagavecredencetothe
voluminous and undisputed evidence which petitioner presented showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good, which began on her arrival on May 24, 2005.[53] It also pointed out that petitioner's entry in the
Philippines visafree as a balikbayan should not be taken against her since, consistent with the purpose of the law, she actually
reestablishedlifehere.[54]Finally,theponenciadisregardedpetitioner'spriorstatementinher2012CoCforSenatorwhereinshedeclared
tobearesidentofthePhilippinsforsixyears(6)yearsandsix(6)monthsbeforeMay13,2013,thusimplyingthatshestartedbeinga
PhilippineresidentonlyinNovember2006.[55]
Ibegtodiffer.
"To successfully effect a change of domicile[,] one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile a bona fide
intentionofabandoningtheformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewoneanddefiniteactswhichcorrespondwiththepurpose.In
otherwords,theremustbasicallybeanimusmanendicoupledwithanimusnonrevertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthe
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time the change of residence must be voluntary and the residence at the place
chosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual."[56]
In ruling that petitioner failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 as she claimed, the COMELEC primarily
observedthatalloftheevidencepresentedbypetitionerwereexecutedbeforeJuly2006,whichisthedateofreacquisitionofherFilipino
citizenship. Citing the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC (Coquilla),[51] Jafzon v. COMELEC (Japzon),[58 ]and Caballero v. COMELEC
(Caballero),[59]theCOMELECpronouncedthattheearliestpossibledatethatshecouldhavereestablishedherresidenceinthePhilippines
waswhenshereacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipinJuly2006.
InCoquilla,theCourtruledthatanalien,suchaspetitioner,maywaivehis/herstatusasanonresidentandthus,becomearesidentalien
by obtaining an immigrant visa under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence. Prior to this
waiver,he/sheisavisitor,anonresidentalien.[60]Hence,withoutthiswaiver,petitionerremainedtobeavisitororanonresidentalien
untilJuly2006.
On the other hand, in Japzon, the Court declared that reacquisition under Republic Act No. (RA) 9225,[61] otherwise known as the
"CitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003,"hasnoautomaticimpactonacandidate'sdomicileashe/sheonlyhadtheoptionto
againestablishhis/herdomicile.[62]
Meanwhile,inCaballero,thisCourtheldthatacandidatemuststillprovethatafterbecomingaPhilippinecitizen,he/shehadreestablished
hisnewdomicileofchoice.[63]
Tomymind,theCOMELEC'srelianceonCoquilla is apt. As the records disclose, petitioner returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005
undertheBalikbayanProgram,[64]andtherefore,onlyobtainedthestatusofatemporaryresident.Specifically,Section3ofRA6768,[65]
asamendedbyRA9174,[66]merelyaccordedherthebenefitofvisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)year:

Section 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following
benefitsandprivileges:

xxxx
(c)VisafreeentrytothePhilippinesforaperiodofone(1)yearforforeignpassportholders,withtheexception
ofrestrictednationals[.](Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

As such, since she did not waive her status of being a nonresident alien, her stay here upon her return on May 24, 2005 up until she
reacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipinJuly2006shouldonlybeconsideredastemporary.
Whileitisnotentirelyindispensablethatonefirstacquiresthestatusofapermanentresidentinordertoreestablishhis/herdomicilein
the Philippines, it is, nonetheless, highly indicative of his/her animus manendi and animus non revertendi. While it is undisputed that
petitionerresignedfromherworkintheUSin2004acquired,togetherwithherhusband,quotationsandestimatesfrompropertymovers
regardingtherelocationofalltheirgoods,furniture,andcarsfromtheUStothePhilippinesasearlyasMarch2005enrolledtwo(2)of
herchildreninPhilippineSchoolsfortheschoolyear2005to2006andpurchasedacondominiumunitinthePhilippinesinthesecondhalf
of2005,[67] petitioner never bothered applying for permanent residency up until July 2006,[68] which is the date when she reacquired
FilipinocitizenshipunderRA9225,andconsequently,waivedherstatusasanonresidentalien.ThismeansthatfromherreturnonMay
24,2005upuntilJuly2006,she,despitetheabovementionedovertacts,stayedinthePhilippinesonlyasatemporaryresident.Ifatall,
her inattention to legitimize her socalled "permanent residence" in the Philippines in accordance with our Immigration Laws stamps a
significantquestionmarkonheranimusmanendiandanimusnonrevertendionMay24,2005.Thus,theCOMELECcanhardlybeblamed
fromreachingitsrulingaspetitioner'sintentiontopermanentlyresideinthePhilippinesandtoabandontheUSasherdomicileonMay24,
2005were,basedonreasonablepremises,shroudedindoubt.
At any rate, the overt acts on which petitioner premises her claims are insufficient to prove her animus manendi and animus non
revertendi.Infact,sameasherfailuretopromptlyaddressherpermanentresidencystatus,someoftheseovertactsmightevenexhibit
herambivalencetoreestablishherdomicileinthePhilippinesonMay24,2005.Forinstance,whileshepurchasedacondominiumunitin
the Philippines in the second half of 2005 (which period is even past May 24, 2005), records unveil that petitioner had other real
propertiesintheUS,oneofwhichwaspurchasedin1992andanotherin2008.[69]Relevantly,thesedatesarebeforeandafterMay24,
2005.Likewise,petitioner'scorrespondencewiththepropertymoversintheUSinthefirsthalfof2005falters,inlightofthefactthatshe
andherhusbandcommencedactualnegotiationsfortheirtransferonlyinthefollowingyear,orinJanuary2006,monthsafterMay24,
2005.[70] Similarly, after this date, it was only in March 2006 when petitioner's husband informed the US Postal Service of a change of
address,withoutevenspecifyingtheirnewaddressinthePhilippines.[71]Whileitistruethatthevisafreeentryofpetitionerunderthe
BalikbayanProgramshouldnotautomaticallyhinderherabilitytoastheponenciawouldsay"reestablishherlifehere,"itremainsthat
theparametersofdomicilereestablishmentundertheauspicesofpoliticallawhavenotbeenclearlyproven.Hence,becausealltheovert
actspriortothattimehadnoimpactinestablishingheranimusmanendiandanimusnonrevertendi,theearliestdatethatpetitionercould
havereestablishedherresidencewasinJuly2006.TheoverallconclusionoftheCOMELECwasthereforecorrect.
Atthisjuncture,letmeexpressmyassenttotheviewthat"[s]trongerproofisrequiredinthereestablishmentofnationaldomicile."[72]
Thisisbecauseapersonwhohasbeendomiciledinanothercountryhasalreadyestablishedeffectivelegaltieswiththatcountrythatare
substantially distinct and separate from ours. Such a situation hardly obtains when what is involved is the change of domicile between
localitieswithinthesamecountry.
I further observe that the need for stronger proof becomes more apparent when the person involved is one who has been domiciled in
another country as part of his/her naturalization as a citizen therein. As such, while citizenship and residency are different from and
independent of each other this, being the key premise in the Court's rulings in Japzon and Caballero I do believe that "one may
invariably affect the other."[73] Being still a citizen of the US at the time of her return to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner
remainedentitledtotherights,privileges,andtheprotectiontheUSgovernmentextendstoitsnationals,includingtherighttoresidence.
In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, 2010, petitioner availed of this privilege when she returned to the US, on separate dates,
significantly, for no less than five times.[74] To my mind, the ability to enjoy the privileges of foreign citizenship at any time, while
remainingunderthatstatus,conjuresareasonablepresumptionthatthelattercontinuestoavailoftheseprivileges,which,amongothers,
includetheprivilegetoresideinthatforeigncountry.Hence,absentcompellingevidencetoshowthathe/shehadreestablisheddomicile
inanothercountry,itshouldthereforebepresumedthathe/shecontinuestobedomiciledinthecountryhe/sheisacitizenof.
Moreover, the necessity of presenting stronger proof as herein discussed is impelled by the very reason underlying the residency
requirement.[75] The discernment of pervading realities in the place where one seeks to be elected is objectively farther from a person
whohasbeendomiciledinaforeigncountry.Thus,ahigherstandardofproofshouldbeappliedtoacandidatepreviouslydomiciledina
foreigncountryforhe/shehasbeenoutoftouchwiththeneedsoftheelectoralconstituencyhe/sheseekstorepresent.
Foranother,theCOMELECcannotbefaultedforrelyingonpetitioner'sadmissioninher2012CoCforSenatorthatherperiodofresidence
fromMay13,2013is"6yearsand6months,"which,hence,impliesthatshestartedbeingaPhilippineresidentonlyinNovember2006.
Whileitistruethat"[i]tisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacywhichoughttobedecisiveindetermining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's residency qualification requirement,"[76] the COMELEC cannot be said to
gravelyabuseitsdiscretionwhenitconsideredpetitioner'sadmissionagainstinterestasanothercircumstancewhichmilitatesagainsther
claim'slegitimacy.ItiscertainlynotpatentandgraveerrorfortheCOMELECtoregardaCoCasanotarizeddocumentandaccorditthe
presumption of regularity.[77] Also, while petitioner may later impugn an admission against interest, the COMELEC found that her
residencydeclarationinher2012CoCcouldnotbeborneoutofan"honestmistake,"inlightofthefollowingconsiderations:(a)thebulk,
ifnotall,oftheevidenceshepresentedwereexecutedbeforeshereacquiredherPhilippinecitizenship,whichcannotbedoneinlightof
Coquilla,amongothers(b)whileshemadestatementsacknowledgingthattherewasamistakeinher2015CoC,theywerenonetheless
deliveredatatimewhen,attheveryleast,thepossibilityofherrunningforPresidentwasalreadyamatterofpublicknowledgeand(c)
petitionerwasawelleducatedwomanandahighrankingofficialwithacompetentstaffandabandoflegaladvisersandisnotentirely
unacquainted with Philippine politics, and thus, would know how to fillup a proforma CoC in 2012. As I see it, these reasons are not
barrenofanyconsiderablemerit.Attheveryleast,theyareplausibleenoughtonegatethefindingthattheconclusionamountedtograve
abuseofdiscretion.Besides,Ibelievethatthefalsityofthematerialrepresentationalreadyjustifiesthecancellationofpetitioner'sCoC.
Asaboveintimated,acandidate'sintentisimmaterialtoaSection78analysis.
III.

NeitherdidtheCOMELECgravelyabuseitsdiscretioninrulingthatpetitionermadeafalsematerialrepresentationinher2015CoCwhen
shedeclaredthatshewasanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.
I depart from the ponencia's stand that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable on account of statistical
probability,andothercircumstantialevidence,namely,herabandonmentasaninfantinaRomanCatholicChurchinIloiloCity,aswellas
hertypicalFilipinofeatures.[78]
Arunthroughofthebasictenetsoncitizenshipisapropros.
"Therearetwowaysofacquiringcitizenship:(1)bybirth,and(2)bynaturalization.Thesewaysofacquiringcitizenshipcorrespondtothe
twokindsofcitizens:thenaturalborncitizen,andthenaturalizedcitizen."[79]
"Apersonwhoatthetimeofhisbirthisacitizenofaparticularcountry,isanaturalborncitizenthereof."80Asdefinedunderthepresent
Constitution,"[n]aturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavintoperformanyact
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." 1 "On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizensthroughnaturalizationXXX."[82]
"[I]tistheinherentrightofeveryindependentnationtodetermineforitselfandaccordingtoitsownconstitutionandlawswhatclassesof
personsshallbeentitledtoitscitizenshipxxx."[83]Withrespecttocitizenshipbybirth,aparticularjurisdictiongenerallysubscribesto
eithertheprincipleofjussanguinisortheprincipleofjussoli,althoughitmayadoptamixedsystemwithfeaturesofboth.
"The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenshiponthebasisofplaceofbirth."[84]InVallesv.COMELEC,thisCourtheldthat"[t]hesigningintolawofthe1935Philippine
ConstitutionhasestablishedtheprincipleofjussanguinisasbasisfortheacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipxxx.Soalso,
the principle of jussanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
1973and1987Constitutions."[85]Followingthisprinciple,proofofbloodrelationtoaFilipinoparentisthereforenecessarytoshowthat
oneisaFilipinocitizenbybirth.
Inthiscase,petitionerhasshownnoevidenceofbloodrelationtoaFilipinoparenttoprovethatsheacquiredFilipinocitizenshipbybirth
underthejussanguinisprinciple.Whilepetitionerdidnotbeartheinitialburdenofprovingthatshemadeafalsematerialrepresentation
on her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, as that burden belonged to those who filed the petitions to deny due course to or cancel her CoC
beforetheCOMELEC,[86]theburdenofevidenceshiftedtoher[87]whenshevoluntarilyadmittedherstatusasafoundling.UnderSection
1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which governs petitioner's case,88 foundlings are not included in the enumeration of who are
consideredasFilipinocitizens:
Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
publicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.
(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.
(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.
(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

A'"foundling'referstoadesertedorabandonedinfantorchildwhoseparents,guardianorrelativesareunknownorachildcommittedto
anorphanageorcharitableorsimilarinstitutionwithunknownfactsofbirthandparentageandregisteredintheCivilRegisterasa
'foundling."'[89] The fact that a candidate's parents are unknown directly puts into question his/her Filipino citizenship because the
candidatehasnoprimafacielinktoaFilipinoparentfromwhichhe/shecouldhavetracedherFilipinocitizenship.Thisiswhytheburden
ofevidenceshiftedtopetitioner.
WithoutanyproofofbloodrelationtoaFilipinoparent,andwithoutanymentioninthe1935Constitutionthatfoundlingsareconsideredor
areevenpresumedtobeFilipinocitizensbybirth,theCOMELEC'sfindingthatpetitionerwasnotanaturalborncitizencannotbetakenas
patently unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. As it is apparent, the COMELEC, with good
reason, relied on the plain text of the 1935 Constitution based on the statutory construction axioms of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius[90]andverbalegisnonestrecedendum,[91] as well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle which, as repeatedly stated,
necessitatesproofofbloodrelation,ofwhichpetitionerpresentednone.Accordingly,itsanalysiswasgroundedonsoundlegalbasisand
thereforeunreflectiveofgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Further, while petitioner argues that foundlings should be considered as naturalborn Filipinos based on the intent of the framers of the
1935 Constitution,[92] it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its final form, never carried over any
proposed provision on foundlings being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of the
framers'prevailingintent.Besides,inCivilLibertiesUnionv.TheExecutiveSecretary,[93]thisCourtremarkedthat:

Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicatingthereasonsfortheirvotes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,much

lessofthemassofourfellowcitizenswhosevotesatthepollsgavethatinstrumenttheforceoffundamentallaw.Wethinkit
[is]safertoconstruetheconstitutionfromwhatappearsuponitsface."[94](Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)

I also find no merit in petitioner's invocation of international covenants[95] which purportedly evince a generally accepted principle in
internationallawthatfoundlingsarepresumedtobecitizensofthecountrywheretheyarefound.Sincethe1935Constitution,andthe
1973 and 1987 Constitutions thereafter, consistently subscribe to the jus sanguinis principle, it is axiomatic that no international
agreement or generallyaccepted principle of international law even assuming that there is a binding one which supports petitioner's
averred presumption could contravene the same. "Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domesticlaweitherbytransformationorincorporation."[96]Thus,inourlegalhierarchy,treatiesandinternationalprinciplesbelongto
thesameplaneasdomesticlawsand,hence,cannotprevailovertheConstitution.
Finally,Iopposepetitioner'sresorttostatisticalprobabilityasbasistopresumenaturalborncitizenshipinthiscase.Allowmetopointout
that these statistics surfaced only in the proceedings before this Court and hence, could not have been weighed and assessed by the
COMELECEnBancatthetimeitrendereditsruling.Bethatasitmay,theconstitutionalrequirementsforoffice,especiallyforthehighest
office in the land, cannot be based on mere probability. "[M]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly
complied with."[97] The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a candidate's qualifications must therefore be solid. We cannot
make a definitive pronouncement on a candidate's citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino. Also, the
circumstancessurroundingpetitioner'sabandonment,aswellasherphysicalcharacteristics,hardlyassuagethispossibility.Byparityof
reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling
status, while her physical features only tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain if their
citizenshipwasFilipino.
For all of these reasons, I dissent to the majority's ruling that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. In the final analysis, my
conscience reminds me that the high duty demanded of me to apply the law according to the parameters set by our previous rulings
transcends politics or controversy, popularity or personality. It is a public trust which values nothing higher than fidelity to the
Constitution.I,therefore,votetoDISMISSthepetitions.

[1]648Phil.165(2010).
[2]Id.at182,citingPatesv.COMELEC,609Phil.260,265(2009)emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.
[3]Ocatev.COMELEC,537Phil.584,594595(2006)emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.
[4]Mirandav.Abaya,370Phil.642(1999).
[5]Id.at663emphasesandunderscoringsupplied,citationsomitted.
[6]SeeCOMELECEnBanc'sResolutionsdatedDecember23,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.229andin

SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC),rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,p.356.
[7]SeediscussionsinCOMELECSecondDivision'sResolutiondatedDecember1,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.No.221697),

Vol.I,!'P206211andinCOMELECFirstDivision'sResolutiondatedDecember11,2015inSPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15
139(DC),rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.251258.
[8]SeeCOMELECEnBanc'sResolutionsdatedDecember23,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.258andin

SPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC),rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,p.381.
[9]Ponencia,p.44.
[10]Theassailedrulingsareasfollows:(a)COMELECSecondDivision'sResolutiondatedDecember1,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),rollo

(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.190223(b)COMELECEnBanc'sResolutiondatedDecember23,2015inSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.
No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 224259 (c) COMELEC First Division's Resolution dated December 11,2015 in SPA Nos. 15002 (DC), 15007
(DC), and 15139 (DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698700), Vol. I, pp. 216264 and (d) COMELEC En Banc's Resolution dated December
23,2015inSPANos.15002(DC),15007(DC),and15139(DC),rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.352381.
[11]Seeponencia,p.45.
[12]Id.at16.
[13]Id.
[14]365Phil.386(1999).
[15]Id.at419420.
[16]621Phil.498(2009).

[17]Id.at510.
[18]Entitled"INTHEMATTEROFTHEAMENDMENTTORULES23,24AND25OFTHECOMELECRULESOFPROCEDUREFORPURPOSESOF

THE13MAY2013NATIONAL,LOCALANDARMMELECTIONSANDSUBSEQUENTELECTIONS."
[19] "Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local

GovernmentCode,theCOMELECisunderalegaldutytocancelthecertificateofcandidacyofanyonesufferingfromtheaccessorypenalty
ofperpetualspecialdisqualificationtorunforpublicofficebyvirtueofafinaljudgmentofconviction.Thefinaljudgmentofconvictionis
noticetotheCOMELECofthedisqualificationoftheconvictfromrunningforpublicoffice.Thelawitselfbarstheconvictfromrunningfor
publicoffice,andthedisqualificationispartofthefinaljudgmentofconviction.Thefinaljudgmentofthecourtisaddressednotonlytothe
Executivebranch,butalsotoothergovernmentagenciestaskedtoimplementthefinaljudgmentunderthelaw.
WhetherornottheCOMELECisexpresslymentionedinthejudgmenttoimplementthedisqualification,itisassumedthattheportionof
the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELECisdutyboundto'[e]nforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection.'24Thedisqualification
of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcementandadministrationof'alllaws'relatingtotheconductofelections."(Jalosjos,Jr.v.COMELEC,696Phil.601,634[2012].)
[20]Bedolv.COMELEC,supranote16,at510.
[21](December3,1985).
[22] Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his

candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political party to which he
belongscivilstatushisdateofbirthresidencehispostofficeaddressforallelectionpurposeshisprofessionoroccupationthathewill
supportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
countrythattheobligationimposedbyhisoathisassumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthe
factsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretruetothebestofhisknowledge.
Unlessacandidatehasofficiallychangedhisnamethroughacourtapprovedproceeding,acertificateshalluseinacertificateofcandidacy
thenamebywhichhehasbeenbaptized,orifhasnotbeenbaptizedinanychurchorreligion,thenameregisteredintheofficeofthe
local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after
performingtheprescribedreligiouspilgrimage:Provided,Thatwhentherearetwoormorecandidatesforanofficewiththesamename
and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or (sic) such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the
incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
includeonenicknameorstagenamebywhichheisgenerallyorpopularlyknowninthelocality.
Thepersonfilingacertificateofcandidacyshallalsoaffixhislatestphotograph,passportsizeastatementinduplicatecontaininghisbio
dataandprogramofgovernmentnotexceedingonehundredwords,ifhesodesires.
[23]Ugdoracion,Jr.v.COMELEC,575Phil.258,261(2008).
[24] Jalover v. Osmea, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, 282, citing Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 1172, 1185

(2008).
[25]G.R.No.202202,March19,2013,693SCRA574.
[26]Id.at592.
[27]SeeG.R.No.206698,February25,2014,717SCRA312.
[28]Id.at320321,citingSalcedoIIv.COMELEC,371Phil.390,389390(1999).
[29]SeeId.at323.
[30]G.R.No.207900,April22,2014,723SCRA223.
[31]Seeid.at246,citingVelascov.COMELEC(supranote24,at1185),which,inturncited,amongothers,SalcedoIIv.COMELEC(supra

note28,at390).
[32]Supranote24.
[33] Id. at 282, citing Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC (supra note 23, at 261262), further citing, among others, Salcedo II v. COMELEC

(supranote28,385390).
[34]Id.,citingMitrav.COMELEC,636Phil.753,780(2010).

[35]Id.
[36]SeeG.R.No.207105,November10,2015.
[37]Id.
[38]Id.
[39](lastvisitedMarch5,2016).
[40]468Phil.421(2004).
[41]G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300,326.
[42]Supranote28.
[43]Tecsonv.COMELEC,supranote40,at606609citationsomitted.
[44]Id.at607.
[45]ld.at608609.
[46]Seeparagraphs(1)and(2),Section2,ArticleIXCofthe1987Constitution.
[47]Tecsonv.COMELEC,supranote40,at626.
[48]SeeSeparateConcurringOpinionofAssociateJusticeAlfredoBenjaminS.Caguioa,joinedbyAssociateJusticeDiosdadoM.Peralta,p.

3.
[49]SeeRules15and16ofthe2010RULESOFTHEPRESIDENTIALELECTORALTRIBUNAL,A.M.No.10429SCdatedMay4,2010.See

alsoDissentingOpinionofAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo(JusticeDelCastillo),p.28.
[50]Tecsonv.COMELEC,supranote40,at460462.
[51]Ponencia,p.45.
[52]Ponencia,pp.3738.
[53]Id.
[54]Seeid.at3940.
[55]Seeid.at4041.
[56]Dominov.COMELEC,369Phil.798,819(1999).
[57]434Phil.861(2002).
[58]596Phil.354(2009).
[59]SeeG.R.No.209835,September22,2015.
[60]SeeCoquillav.COMELEC,supranote57,at873874.
[61] Entitled "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.

AMENDINGFORTHEPURPOSECOMMONWEALTHACT.NO.63,AsAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES,"approvedonAugust29,2003.
[62]Japzonv.COMELEC,supranote58,at369.
[63]SeeCaballerov.COMELEC.supranote59.
[64]Seeponencia,pp.3940.SeealsoAssociateJusticeArturoD.Brion'sDissentingOpinion,p.5.
[65]Entitled"ANACTINSTITUTINGABALIKBAYANPROGRAM,"approvedonNovember3,1989.
[66] Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 6768, ENTITLED, 'AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM, BY

PROVIDINGADDITIONALBENEPITSANDPRIVILEGESTOBALIKBAYANANDFOROTHERPURPOSES,'"approvedonNovember7,2002.

[67]SeePetitionsinG.R.No.221697,rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.1820andinG.R.Nos.221698700,rollo(G.R.Nos.221698

700),Vol.I,pp.2224.
[68]SeePetitionsinG.R.No.221697,rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.22andinG.R.Nos.221698700,rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),

Vol.I,p.27.
[69]Seerollo(G.R.No.221698700),Vol.II,p.917.
[70]Seerollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.II,pp.778794.
[71]Id.at815816.
[72]SeeDissentingOpinionofJusticeDelCastillo,p.59.
[73]Id.at60.
[74]"Infact,fromMay24,2005toOctober20,20l0,petitionerdidgobacktotheUSnolessthanfivetimes:February14,2006,April20,

2009,October19,2009,December27,2009,andMarch27,2010."Seeid.at55.Seealsorollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,pp.30
31.
[75]Thepurposeis"toensurethatthepersonelectedisfamiliarwiththeneedsandproblemsofhisconstituencyxxx."(See Perez v.

COMELEC,375Phil.1106,1119[1999].)
[76]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,supranote41,at326.
[77]"[G]enerally,anotarizeddocumentcarriestheevidentiaryweightconferreduponitwithrespecttoitsdueexecution,anddocuments

acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. In other words, absent any clear and convincing
prooftothecontrary,anotarizeddocumentenjoysthepresumptionofregularityandisconclusiveastothetruthfulnessofitscontents.
(SeeVda.deRojalesv.Dime,G.R.No.194548,February10,2016.)
[78]Seeponencia,pp.2223.
[79]BengsonIIIv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,409Phil.633,646(2001).
[80]Id.
[81]SeeSection2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutionemphasesandunderscoringsupplied.
[82]BengsonIIIv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,supranote79,at646.
[83]Roav.CollectorofCustoms,23Phil.315,320321(1912).
[84]Vallesv.COMELEC,392Phil.327,335(2000)emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.
[85]ld.at336337emphasesandunderscoringsupplied.
[86]"[T]heburdenofproofis,inthefirstinstance,withtheplaintiffwhoinitiatedtheaction."(Republicv.Vda.deNeri,468Phil.842,862

[2004].)
[87]"[H]ewhoallegestheaffirmativeoftheissuehastheburdenofproof,andupontheplaintiffinacivilcase,theburdenofproofnever

parts.However,inthecourseoftrialinacivilcase,onceplaintiffmakesoutaprimafaciecaseinhis[favour],thedutyortheburdenof
evidenceshiftstodefendanttocontrovertplaintiff'sprimafaciecase,otherwise,averdictmustbereturnedinfavorofplaintiff."(Vitarich
Corporationv.Locsin,649PhiL164,173(2010],citingJisonv.CourtofAppeals,350Phil.138,173[1998].)
[88]PetitionerwasbornonSeptember3,1968.SeePetitionsinG.R.No.221697,rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.14andinG.R.Nos.

221698700,rollo(G.R.Nos.221698700),Vol.I,p.17.
[89]SeeSection3(e)of"RULEONADOPTION,"A.M.No.02602SC(August22,2002)emphasissupplied.
[90]SeeCOMELECSecondDivision'sDecember1,2015ResolutioninSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.213214.
[91]SeeCOMELECSecondDivision'sDecember1,2015ResolutioninSPANo.15001(DC),rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,p.393.See

alsoCOMELECEnBanc'sDecember23,2015ResolutioninSPANo.15001(DC),id.at254.
[92] See Petitions in G.R. No. 221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 114116 and in G.R. Nos. 221698700, rollo (G.R. Nos.

221698700),Vol.I,pp.8486.

[93]272Phil.147(1991).
[94]Id.at169170.
[95] Particularly, the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law (1930 Hague Convention), and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (UNCRS), among others, positing that it is a generally accepted principle in international law. (See discussions in the
PetitionsinG.R.No.221697,rollo(G.R.No.221697),Vol.I,pp.137144and151152andinG.R.Nos.221698700,rollo (G.R. Nos.
221698700),Vol.I,pp.109117and124125.
[96]PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationofthePhilippinesv.HealthSecretaryDuqueIII,561Phil.386,397398(2007).
[97]SeeArnadov.COMELEC,G.R.No.210164,August18,2015.

CONCURRINGOPINION

JARDELEZA,J.:
ThePhilippineConstitutionrequiresthatapersonaspiringforthepresidencymustbeanaturalbornFilipinocitizenzmdaresidentofthe
Philippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.[1]Thequestioniswhetherthepetitioner,asafoundlingandformer
residentcitizenoftheUnitedStates(US),satisliestheserequirements.
I

Ifirstconsidertheissueofjurisdictionraisedbytheparties.
A

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares (Poe) contends that in the absence of any matterial misrepresentation in her
certificateofcandidacy(COC),thepublicrespondentCommissiononElections(COMELEC)hadnojurisdictiontoruleonhereligibility.She
positsthattheCOMELECcanonlyruleonwhethersheintendedtodeceivetheelectoratewhensheindicatedthatshewasanaturalborn
Filipino and that she has been a resident for 10 years and 11 months. For the petitioner, absent such intent, all other attacks on her
citizenshipandresidencyareprematuresinceherqualificationscanonlybechallengedthroughthepostelectionremedyofapetitionfor
quo warranto. On the other hand, the COMELEC argues that since citizenship and residency are material representations in the COC
affectingthequalificationsfortheofficeofPresident,itnecessarilyhadtoruleonwhetherPoe'sstatementsweretrue.Iagreewiththe
COMELEC that it has jurisdiction over the petitions to cancel or deny due course to a COC. As a consequence, it has the authority to
determinethereinthetruthorfalsityofthequestionedreprestatationsinPoe'sCOC.
Section78[2]oftheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC)allowsapersontofileaverifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecoursetoorcancelaCOC
exclusively on the ground that any of the material representations it contains, as required under Section 74,[3] is false. The
representationscontemplatedbySection78generallyrefertoqualificationsforelectiveoffice,[4]suchasage,residenceandcitizenship,or
possessionofnaturalbornFilipinostatus.[5]ItisbeyondquestionthattheissuesaffectingthecitizenshipandresidenceofPoearewithin
the purview of Section 78. There is also no dispute that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Section 78 petitions. Where the parties
disagree is on whether intent to deceive is a constitutive element for the cancellation of a COC on the ground of false material
representation.
ThedividemaybeattributedtothetwotracksofcasesinterpretingSection78.Ontheonehand,thereisthelineoriginatingfromSalcedo
IIv.COMELEC,decidedin1999,whereitwasheldthat"[a]sidefromtherequirementofmateriality,afalserepresentationundersection
78mustconsistofadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible."[6]On
theotherhand,inthemorerecentcaseofTagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,westatedthat"thedeliberatenessof
themisrepresentation,muchlessone'sintenttodefraud,isofbaresignificanceinaSection78petitionasitisenoughthattheperson's
declarationofamaterialqualificationintheCOCbefalse."[7]
To reconcile these two cases, it is important to first understand the coverage of Section 78. The provision refers to material
representationsrequiredbySection74toappearintheCOC.Inturn,Section74providesforthecontentsoftheCOC,whichincludesnot
onlyeligibilityrequirementssuchascitizenship,residence,andage,butalsootherinformationsuchasthecandidate'sname,civilstatus,
profession,andpoliticalpartyaffiliation.Section78hastypicallybeenappliedtorepresentationsinvolvingeligibilityrequirements,which
wehavelikenedtoaquowarrantopetitionunderSection253oftheOEC.[8]
Understatedinourjurisprudence,however,arerepresentationsmentionedinSection74thatdonotinvolveacandidate'seligibility.Inthis
regard,thereappearstobeaprevailingmisconceptionthatthe"materialrepresentations"underSection78arelimitedonlytostatements
in the COC affecting eligibility.[9] Such interpretation, however, runs counter to the clear language of Section 78, which covers "any
materialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredunderSection74."Aplainreadingofthisphraserevealsnodecipherableintentto

categorize the information required by Section 74 between material and nonmaterial, much less to exclude certain items explicitly
enumerated therein from the coverage of Section 78. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, neither should the court.[10] The more accurate interpretation, one that is faithful to the text, is that the word "material"
describesnotqualifiestherepresentationsrequiredbySection74.Therefore,thedeclarationsrequiredofthecandidatebySection74are
allmaterial.[11] In enumerating the contents of the COC, Section 74 uses the word "shall" in reference to noneligibilityrelated matters,
including "the political party to which he belongs," "civil status," "his post office address for all election purposes," "his profession or
occupation," and "the name by which he has been baptized, or ... registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name
allowedundertheprovisionsofexistinglawor...hisHadjinameafterperformingtheprescribedreligiouspilgrimage."Thepresumptionis
that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense.[12] The mandatory character of the provision,
coupled with the requirement that the COC be executed under oath,[13] strongly suggests that the law itself considers certain non
eligibilityrelatedinformationasmaterialotherwise,thelawcouldhavesimplydoneawaywiththem.WhatthismeansrelativetoSection
78isthattherearematerialrepresentationswhichmaypertaintomattersnotinvolvingacandidate'seligibility.[14]
ItisapparentthattheinterestssoughttobeadvancedbySection78aretwofold.Thefirstistoprotectthesanctityoftheelectorate's
votes by ensuring that the candidates whose names appear in the ballots are qualified and thus mitigate the risk or votes being
squanderedonanineligiblecandidate.Thesecondistopenalizecandidateswhocommitaperjuriousactbypreventingthemfromrunning
forpublicoffice.Thisisapolicyjudgmentbythelegislaturethatthosewillingtoperjurethemselvesarenotfittoholdanelectiveoffice,
presumablywiththeultimateaimofprotectingtheconstituentsfromacandidakwhocommittedanactinvolvingmoralturpitude.[15]Ina
way,thisprotectionistpolicyisnotdissimilartotheunderlyingprincipleforallowingapetitionfordisqualificationbasedonthecommission
ofprohibitedactsandelectionoffensesunderSection68.Thesetwoconsiderations,seeminglyoverlookedinSalcedo,arepreciselywhy
the "consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to
preventthecandidatefromrunningor,ifelected,fromserving,ortoprosecutehimforviolationoftheelectionlaws."[16]
Therefore,therearetwoclassesofmaterialrepresentationscontemplatedbySection78:(1)thosethatconcerneligibilityforpublicoffice
and(2)thoseerstwhilenumeratedinSection74whichdonotaffecteligibility.TagolinoappliestotheformerSalcedotothelatter.Thisis
alogicaldistinctiononceweconnectthefactualsettingsofthetwocaseswiththeaforementionedstateinterests.Ironically,Salcedo,oft
citedinSection78casesasauthorityforrequiringintentincasesinvolvingeligibilityrelatedrepresentations,actuallydidnotconcerna
representation in the COC affecting the candidate's eligibility. Salcedo involved a candidate who used the surname of her husband of a
voidmarriage.HerCOCwaschallengedonthegroundthatshehadnorighttousesuchsurnamebecausethepersonshemarriedhada
subsisting marriage with another person. We held that petitioner therein failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged
misrepresentationregardingthecandidate'ssurnamepertainstoamaterialmatter,andthatitmustequallybeprovedthattherewasan
intentiontodeceivetheelectorateastothewouldbecandidate'squalificationsforpublicofficetojustifythecancellationoftheCOC. [17]
Therationaleisthatthepenaltyofremovalfromthelistofcandidatesisnotcommensuratetoanhonestmistakeinrespectofamatter
notaffectingone'seligibilitytorunforpublicoffice."Itcouldnothavebeentheintentionofthelawtodepriveapersonofsuchabasic
andsub:lantivepoliticalrighttobevotedforapublicofficeuponjustanyinnocuousmistake."[18]Notably,afindinginSalcedothatthe
candidate had no intention to deceive the electorate when she used her married name, notwithstanding the apparent invalidity of the
marriage,wouldhavebeensufficienttoarriveatthesameconclusion(thatis,allowinghertorun)withoutmakingasweepingrulethat
onlymatterspertainingtoeligibilityarematerial.
Bycontrast,Tagolinoinyolvedafalserepresentationwithrespecttoacandidate'sresidenceanditssubsequenteffectonthesubstitution
by a replacement candidate. The false representation affected the oneyear residency requirement impostd by the Constitution on
membersoftheHouseofRepresentatives[19]inotherwords,itwentintotheeligibilityofthecandidate."[A]nexpressfindingthatthe
personcommittedanydeliberatemisrepresentationisoflittleconsequenceinthedeterminationofwhetherone'sCOCshouldbedeemed
cancelled or not."[20] It is the fact of eligibility, not the intent to deleive, that should be decisive in determining compliance with
constitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsonqualificationsforpublicoffice.ThisreadingismoreinaccordwiththetextofSection78,which
does not specify intent as an element for a petition to prosper. In this context, the term "material misrepresentation" is a misnomer
because it implies that the candidate consciously misrepresented himself. But all Section 78 textually provides is that "any material
representation...isfalse."Thus,inresolvingaSection78petition,truthorfalsityoughttobethedefinitivetest.TheCOMELEC'sduty,
then,istomakefindingsoffactwithrespecttothematerialrepresentationsclaimedtobefalse.
The need to apply Tagolino to the first class is highlighted by an inherent gap in Salcedo's analysis, which failed to take into account a
situation where a candidate indicated in good faith that he is eligible when he is in fact not. It is not inconceivable that a child, for
example,bornin1977,butwhoseparentssimubtedthebirthcertificatetomakeitappearthathewasbornin1976,wouldbelievehimself
to be qualified to run for president in the 2016 elections. However, if the simulation of birth is proved, and hospital records and family
historyshowthathewasindeedbornin1977,thenhewouldfallshortoftheminimumagerequirementprescribedbytheConstitution.If
Salcedo is to be followed to a tee, the COMELEC cannot cancel his COC because he acted in good faith. This would lead to a situation
wheretheportionoftheelectoratewhovotedfortheineligiblecandidatewouldfacethethreatofdisenfranchisementshouldthelatterwin
the elections and face a quo warranto challenge. In the latter proceeding, not even good faith can cure the inherent defect in his
qualifications.Tagolinoisthereforepreferableininstancesinvolvingeligibilityrelatedrepresentationsbecauseitfillsthisgap.Indeed,the
lawshouldnotbeinterpretedtoallowforsuchdisastrousconsequences.
In fact, in cases involving eligibilityrelated representations, the Court has never considered intent to deceive as the decisive element,
eveninthosethatreliedonSalcedo.InTecsunv.COMELEC,[21]whichinvolvedaquestionontheeligibilityofFernandoPoe,Jr.forthe
2004presidentialelectionsbywayofaSection78petition,theCourtdeterminedwhetherhewasanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippine.
Intenttodeceivetheelectoratewasneverdiscussed.InUgdoracionv.COMELEC,[22]whichinvolvedresidency,theCourtdeterminedthat
thecandidatelosthisresidencywhenhebecameaUSgreencardholderdespitehismistakenbeliefthatheretainedhisdomicileinthe
Philippines.Thecandidate,invokingthelegaldefinitionofdomicile,claimedthatevenifhewasphysicallyintheUS,healwaysintendedto
returnthePhilippines.TheCourt,placingemphasisonhispermanentresidentstatusintheUS,merelyinferredhisintenttodeceivewhen
hefailedtodeclarethathewasagreencardholder.TheninJalosjosv.COMELEC,[23]alsoinvolvingresidency,theCourtfoundthatthe
claimofdomicilewascontradictedbythetemporarynatureofthecandidate'sstay.Thistime,theCourtsimplydeemedthat"[w]henthe

candidate'sclaimofeligibilityisprovenfalse,aswhenthecandidatefailedtosubstantiatemeetingtherequiredresidertcyinthelocality,
therepresentationofeligibilityintheCOCconstitutesa'deliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhidethefact'ofineligibility."[24]
TheCourtowescandortothepublic.Inferringordeemingintenttodeceivefromthefactoffalsityis,tome,justapretensetogetaround
thegapleftbySalcedo,i.e.,anindigiblecandidatewhoactedingoodfaith.IbelievethemoreprincipledapproachistoadoptTagolinoas
thecontrollingrule.ThedecisioninAgustinv.COMELEC[25] is a step towards that direction: "[e]ven if [the COMELEC] made no finding
thatthepetitionerhaddeliberatelyattemptedtomisleadortomisinformastowarrantthecancellationofhisCOC,theCOMELECcould
stilldeclarehimdisqualifiedfornotmeetingtherequisiteeligibility...."Ofcourse,Salcedoremainsapplicabletocaseswherethematerial
representation required by Section 74 oes not relate to eligibility, sttch as in Villafuerte v. COMELEC,[26] which, similar to Salcedo,
involvedacandidate'sname.[27]
B

The1987ConstitutiondesignatedtheSupremeCourtenbanc,actingasthePresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET),asthe"solejudgeofall
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident."[28]PoearguethatallowingtheCOMELEC
toruleontheeligibilityofthecandidateregardlessofintentwouldbetantamounttotheusurpationofthePET'sauthority(andthatofthe
electoraltribunalsofboththeSenateandtheHouse,ofRepresentatives)asthesolejudgeofqualifications.This,however,isanincorrect
readingoftheprovision.Thephrase"contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualifications"isalegaltermofatithatissynonymous
to "election contests." "As used in constitutional provisions, electi, m contest relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant
seeksno!onlytoousttheintruder,butalsotohavehimselfinductedintotheoflice."[29]Thus,anelectioncontestcanonlycontemplatea
postelection,[30]postproclamationsituation.[31]Whilethepowerofelectoraltribunalsisexclusive,[32]full,clear,andcomplete,[33]itis
nonethelesssubjecttoatemporallimitationtheirjurisdictionmayonlybeinvokedaftertheelectionisheldandthewinningcandidateis
proclaimed.[34]
Notably,theConstitutionneitherallocatesjurisdictionoverpre electioncontroversiesinvolvingtheeligibilityofcandidatesnorforecloses
legislativeprovisionforsuchremedy.Absentsuchconstitutionalproscription,itiswellwithintheplenarypowersofthelegislaturetoenact
alawprovidingforthistypeofpreelectionremedy,asitdidthroughSection78.[35]Inthisregard,Poe'sstatementthattheCOMELEC
essentiallyarrogateduntoitselfthejurisdictiontodecideuponthequalificationsofcandidatesisinaccurate.ItisCongressthatgranted
the COMELEC such jurisdiction the COMELEC only exercised the jurisdiction so conferred. When the COMELEC takes cognizance of a
Section78petition,itsactionsarenotrepugnantto,butareactuallyinaccordwith,itsconstitutionalmandatetoenforceandadminister
alllawsrelativetotheconductofanelection.[36] To be clear, the proceeding under Section 78 is not an election contest and therefore
doesnotencroachuponPET'sjurisdictionoverelectioncontestsinvolvingthePresidentandVicePresident.
WehavealreadyrecognizedthataSection78petitionisoneinstancetheonlyinstancewherethequalificationsofacandidateforelective
officecanbechallengedbeforeanelection.[37]AlthoughthedenialofduecoursetoorthecancellationoftheCOCisostensiblybasedona
finding that the candidate made a rnaterial representation that is false,[38] the determination of the factual Correctness of the
representation necessarily affects eligibility. Essentially, the ground is lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisionsonqualificationsoreligibilityforpublicoffice,[39]similartoapetitionforquowarranto which is a species of election contest.
"Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwoproceedingsisthat,underSection78,thequalificationsforelectiveofficearemisrepresentedinthe
COCandtheproceedingsmustbeinitiatedbeforetheelections,whereasapetitionforquowarrantounderSection253maybebroughton
thebasisoftwogrounds(1)ineligibilityor(2)disloyaltytotheRepublicofthePhilippines,andmustbeinitiatedwithintendaysafterthe
proclamationoftheelectionresults."[40]Putsimply,themaindistinctionisthetimetheactionisfiled.[41]IfaplrsonfailstofileaSection
78 petition within the 25day period prescribed in the OEC, the election laws afford him another chance to raise the ineligibility of the
candidatebyfilingapetitionforquowarranto.[42]
ThereasonwhytheCOMELEC,pursuanttoavalidlaw,isallowedtodetermineacandidate'sconstitutionalandstatutoryeligibilitypriorto
theelectionisnotdifficulttofathom.Asearlieralludedto,thereislegitimatevalueinshieldingtheelectoraiefromanineligiblecandidate.
In addition, there are sound fiscal considerations supporting this remedy. These include the more efficient allocation or COMELEC's
resources, ultimately funded by taxpayers' money, and a check on unnecessary campaign spending, an activity with minimal economic
utility. A contrary ruling could lead to the de facto disenfranchisement of those who voted for a popular but ineligible candidate. The
possibilityofaconstitutionalandpoliticalcrisisarisingfromsucharesultisonewedarenotrisk.
II

ArticleVII,Section2ofthe1987ConstitutionlaysdowntheeligibilityrequirementsfortheofficeofPresident:

NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenorthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadand
write,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediately
precedingsuchelection.

Citizenshipisdeterminedbytheorganiclawinforceatthetimeofbirth.[43]WhenPoewasfoundin1968,the1935Constitutionwasstill
ineffect.ItenumeratedthefollowingascitizensofthePhilippines:(1)thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoption
ofthe1935Constitution(2)thoseborninthePhilippinesofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthe1935Constitution,hadbeen
elected to public office (3) those whose fathers are citizen of the Philippines (4) those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
md, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship and (5) those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[44] For

obviousreasons,thefirsttwoclassesarenotapplicabletothepresentcontroversy.Ithereforelimitmydiscussiontotheremainingthree
classes.
The1987Constitutiondefines"naturalborncitizens"asthosewhoareFilipinocitizens"frombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyactto
acquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."[45]ChildrenbornofFilipinofathersunderthe1935Constitutionfallunderthiscategory.By
express declaration, the 1987 Constitution also considered those born of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship by age of
majority as naturalborn citizens.[46] On the other hand, those who become Filipino citizens through the naturalization process are
evidentlyexcludedfromtheconstitutionaldefinition.Therefore,therearetwokindsofFilipinocitizensrecognizedundertheConstitution:
naturalborncitizensandnaturalizedcitizens.[47]OnlytheformerareeligibletobePresidentofthePhilippines.
Poecontendsthatsheisanaturalborncitizenbecausethereisapresumptionunderintemationallawthatafoundlingisacitizenofthe
placewherehewasborn.Shefurthtrarguesthatthedeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionrevealanintentbytheframers
toconsiderfoundlingsasFilipinocitizensfrombirth.Inanycase,shebelievesthatshehasproved,bysubstantialevidence,thatsheisa
naturalborncitizen.TheSolicitorGeneralsupportsthescondandthirdargumentsofPoe.
On the other hand, the COMELEC and private respondents maintain that because she is a foundling whose parentage is unknown, she
couldnotdefinitivelyprovethateitherherfatherormotherisaFilipino.Theydisputetheapplicabilityofinternationalconventionswhich
thePhilippinesisnotapartyto,whilethosewhichhavebeenratifiedrequireimplementinglegislation.Assumingarguendothatshewasa
naturalborn citizen, respondents are unanimous that she lost such status when she became a naturalized American citizen. Her
subsequentrepatriationunderRA9225onlyconferreduponherFilipinocitizenshipbutnotnaturalbornstatus.
Itaketheirargumentsinturn.
A

The power of a state to confer its citizenship is derived from its sovereignty. It is an attribute of its territorial supremacy.[48] As a
sovereign nation, the Philippines has tlw inherent right to determine for itself, and according to its own Constitution and laws, who its
citizensare.[49]Internationallaw,asamatterofprinciple,respectssuchsovereigndeterminationandrecognizesthattheacquisitionand
loss of citizenship fall within the domestic jurisdiction of each state.[50] Domestic rules on citizenship vary greatly from sovereign to
sovereign,[51]anecessaryconsequenceofdivergentdemography,geography,history,andcultureamongthemanystates.Asexplained
intheNottebohmCase:
[T]hediversityofdemographicconditionshasthusfarmadeitimpossibleforanygeneralagreementtobereachedontherulesrelatingto
nationality,althoughthelatterbyitsverynatureaffectsinternationalrelations.Ithasbeenconsideredthatthebestwayofmakingsuch
rulesaccordwiththevaryingdemographicconditionsindifferentcountriesistoleavethefixingofsuchrulestothecompetenceofeach
State.[52]
Thus,"[t]hereisnoruleofinternationallaw,whethercustomaryorwritten,whichmightberegardedasconstitutinganyrestrictionof:or
exceptionto,thejurisdictionor[individualstatestodeterminequestionsofcitizenship]."[53]Theforegoingconsiderationsmilitateagainst
theformationofcustomarylawinmattersconcerningcitizenship,atleastnotonedirectlyenforceableonparticularstatesasadvocatedby
Poe. Accordingly, the provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness purpmiedly
conferringbirthcitizenshipuponfoundlings,orcreatingapresumptionthereof,cannotbeconsideredcustomary.
Atthisjuncture,itmaynotbeamisstoexplainthatanotherreasonwhywejudiciouslyscrutinizeaninvocationofcustomaryinternational
lawbasedontreatiesthePhilippinehasnotaccededtoisoutofdeferencetothePresident'streatyratificationpower[54]andtheSenate's
treatyconcurring power.[55] The doctrine of separation of powers dictates that, unless the existence of customary international law is
convincinglyshown,courtsoflawshouldnotpreempttheexecutiveandlegislativebranches'authorityoverthecountry'sforeignrdations
policy,includingthenegotiation,ratification,andapprovaloftreaties.[56]
In respect of international covenants that the Philippines is a party to, Poe invokes the following which allegedly recognize her right to
naturalborncitizenship:theConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC),theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),
andtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).TheCRCandtheICCPRbothspeakofachild's"righttoacquireanationality."A
plainreadingindicatesthattherightsimplymeansthatachildshallbegiventheopportunitytobecomeaFilipinocitizen.[57]Itdoesnot
byitselfcreateanenforceablerighttobirthcitizenship.Theobligationimposeduponstatespartiesisforthemtoeitherenactcitizenship
statutes specifically for children or to equally extend to children the benefits of existing citizenship laws. In the Philippines' case, the
Constitution grants birth citizenship to those born of Filipino parents and our naturalization statutes provide for derivative citizenship of
childrenbornofnonFilipinoparents.[58]ThePhilippinesis,therefore,compliantwiththisspecificobligationundertheCRCandtheICCPR.
The same can be said about the UDHR, even though it uses a slightly different wording.[59] Preliminarily, it must be clarified that the
UDHR is technically not a treaty and therefore, it has no obligatory character. Nonetheless, over time, it has become an international
normative standard with binding character as part nf the law of nations. In other words, it has acquired the force of customary
international law.[60] The "right to a nationality" under the UDHR must be interpreted as being subject to the conditions imposed by
domesticlaw,giventhebroadscopeofthedeclaration,i.e.,itcovers"everyone."Acontraryinterpretationwouldeffectivelyamounttoan
unqualifiedadoptionofthejussoliprinciple,whichwouldberepugnanttoourconstitutionalstructure.Suchinterpretationwould,infact,
becontrarytotheintentoftheUDHRitself.ThecorrelativestateobligationundertheUDHRisforastatenottowithdraworwithholdthe
benefits of citizenship from whole sections of the population who can demonstrate a genuine and ef[ective link with the country.[61] It
does not purport to indiscriminately grant citizenship to any person. Taking into consideration the historical context of the UDHR,[62] it
may be said that the right, really, is one against statelessness and the obligation is a negative duty not to create or perpetuate

statelessness.[63]Itproscribesanarbitrarydeprivationofcitizenshipandanunreasonablediscriminationintheoperationofnaturalization
lawagainststatelesspersons.
Finally,theCRC,ICCPR,andUDHRallrefrainedfromimposingadirectobligationtoconfercitizenshipatbirth.Thismustbeunderstoodas
a deliberate recognition of sovaeign supremacy over matters relating to citizenship. It bears emphasis that none of the instruments
concernthemselveswithnaturalbornandnaturalizedclassifications.Thisisbecausethisdistinctionfindsapplicationonlyindomesticlegal
regimes.Ergo,itisoneforeachsovereigntomake..
B

The1935Constitutiondidnotexplicitlyaddressthecitizenshipoffoundlings.FortheCOMELECandprivaterespondents,thesilencemeans
exclusion,followingthemaximexpressiouniusestexclusioalterius.TheypointtothejussanguinisprincipleadoptedbytheConstitution
toconcludethatafoundlingwhocannotestablishadefinitebloodrelationtoaFilipinoparentisnotnaturalborn.ForPoeandtheSolicitor
General,thedeliberationsofthe1934ConstitutionalConventionindicatetheintentiontocategorizefoundlingsascitizensandthetextual
silence"doesnotindicateanydiscriminatoryanimusagainstthem."TheyarguethattheConstitutiondoesnotprecludethepossibilitythat
theparentsofafoundlingareinfactFilipinos.
In interpreting the silence of the Constitution, the best guide is none other than the Constitution itself.[64] As Prof. Laurence Tribe
suggests,givingmeaningtoconstitutionalsilenceinvolvesthetwintasksofarticulatingtherelevantconstitutionalnormsthatdetermine
howthesilenceoughttobeinterpretedandpropoundingprinciplesofstatutoryconstructionconsistentwiththesenorms.[65]Thereisno
questionthatsince1935,thePhilippineshasadheredtothejussanguinisprincipleastheprimarybasisfordeterminingcitizenship.Under
the 1935 Constitution, a child follows the citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of birth, although there was a caveat that if
onlythemotherisFilipino,thechildhastoelectPhilippinecitizenshipbyageofmajority.Determiningaperson'sparentage,ofcourse,
requiresadeterminationoffactsinanappropriateproceeding.Consequently,toarriveatacorrectjudgment,thefuwlamentalprinciples
ofdueprocessandequalprotection[66]demandthatthepartiesbeallowedtoadduceevidenceinsupportoftheircontentions,andforthe
decisionmakertomakearulingbasedontheapplicablequantumofevidence.
1

The appropriate due pn)cess standards that apply to the COMELEC, as a quasijudicial tribunal, anthose outlined in the seminal case of
AngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations.[67]Commonlyreferredtoasthe"cardinalprimaryrights"inadministrativeproceedings,these
include:(1)therighttoahearing,whichmcludestherightofthepartyinterestedoraffectedtopresenthisowncaseandsubmitevidence
insupportthereat(2)notonlymustthepartybegivenanopportunitytopresenthiscaseandtoadduceevidencetendingtoestablish
therightswhichheasserts,butthetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented(3)whilethedutytodeliberatedoesnotimposethe
obligationtodecideright,itdoesimplyanecessitywhichcannotbedisngarded,namely,thatofhavingsomethingtosupportitsdecision
(4) not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial" (5) the decision
mustberenderedontheevidencepresentedatthehearing,oratleastcontainedintherecordanddisclosedtothepartiesaffected(6)
the tribunal must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and (7) the tribunal should
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered.[68] The COMELEC failed to comply with the third and fourth requirements when it first, decided the question of
foundlingsonapurequestionoflaw,i.e.,whetherfoundlingsarenaturalborn,withoutmakingadeterminationbasedontheevidenceon
recordandadmissionsofthepartiesoftheprobabilityorimprobabilitythatPoewasbornofFilipinoparentsandsecond, by concluding
that Poe can only prove her parentage through DNA or other definitive evidence, set a higher evidentiary hurdle than mere substantial
evidence.
The COMELEC's starting position is that foundlings are not natural born citizens[69] unless they prove by DNA or some other definitive
evidence[70] that either of their biological parents are Filipino citizens. Thus, it limited its inquiry to the question of whether the 1935
Constitutionconsideredfoundlingsasnaturdborncitizens.Ineffect,theCOMELEChascreatedaconclusiveorirrebuttablepresumption
againstfoundlings,i.e.,theyarenotnaturalborncitizens.Thisistruenotwithstandingtheapparentlybenignbutemptyopeningallowed
by the COMELEC. By definition, foundlings are either "deserted or abandoned ... whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown," or
"committedtoanorphanageorcharitableorsimilarinstitutionwithunknownfactsofbirthandparentage."[71]Consideringtheseunusual
circumstances common to all foundlings, DNA or other definitive evidence would, more often than not, not be available. A presumption
disputableonlybyanimpossible,evencruel,conditionis,inreality,aconclusivepresumption.
Inthisjurisdiction,conclusivepresumptionsarelookeduponwithdisfavorondueprocessgrounds.InDycaicov.SocialSecuritySystem,
theCourtstruckdownaprovisioninRepublicActNo.8282ortheSocialSecurityLaw"becauseitpnsumesafactwhichisnotnecessarily
or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttabk presumption and statutes creating
permanentandirrebutablerresumptionshavelongbeendisfavoredunderthedueprocessclause."[72]Thecaseinvolvedaprovisointhe
Social Security Law which disqualified the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the
latter's retirement. The Court found that this created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS
members were sham and therefore entered into for the sole purpose of securing the benefits under the Social Security Law. This
conclusive presumption violated the due process clause because it deprived the surviving spouses of the opportunity to disprove the
presenceoftheillicitpurpose.
In the earlier case of Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the Court similarly found as unconstitutional a proviso in
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Govemment Service Insurance Act of 1977 that prohibits the dependent spouse from
receivingsurvivorshippensionifsuchdependentspctisemarriedthepensionerwithinthreeyearsbeforethepensionerqualified:forthe
pension. In finding that the proviso violated the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court stated that "[t]he proviso is
undulyoppressiveinoutrightlydenyingadependentspousesclaimforsurvivorshippensionifthedependentspousecontractedmarriage

tothepensionerwithinthethreeyearprohibitedperiod,"and"[t]hereisoutrightconfiscationofbenefitsduethesurvivingspousewithout
givingthesurvivingspouseanopportunitytobeheard."[73]
Thesameconsiderationsobtainhere.TheCOMELEC'sapproachpresumesafactwhichisnotnecessarilyoruniversallytrue.Althoughthe
possibilitythattheparentsofafoundlingareforeignerscanneverbediscounted,thisisnotalwaysthecase.Itappearsthatbecauseofits
inordinatefocusontryingtointerprettheConstitution,theCOMELECdisregardedtheincontrovertiblefactthatPoe,likeanyotherhuman
being,hasbiologicalparents.LogictellsusthattherearefourpossibilitieswithrespecttothebiologicalparentageofPoe:(1)bothher
parentsareFilipinos(2)herfatherisaFilipinoandhermotherisaforeigner(3)hermotherisaFilipinoandherfatherisafordgnerand
(4)bothherparentsareforeigners.Inthreeofthefourpossibilities,Poewouldbeconsideredasanaturalhomcitizen.[74]Infact,data
from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) suggest that, in 1968, there was a 99.86% statistical probability that her parents were
Filipinos.[75]ThatPoe'sparentsareunknowndoesnotautomaticallydiscountthepossibilitythateitherherfatherormotherisacitizenof
thePhilippines.Indeed,theverbalegisinterpretationoftheconstitutionalprovisiononcitizenshipasappliedtofoundlingsisthattheymay
be born of a Filipino father or mother. There is no presumption for or against them. The COMELEC's duty under a Section 78 petition
questioning a candidate's citizenship qualification is to determine the probability that her father or mother is a Filipino citizen using
substantial evidence. And there lies the second fault of the COMELEC: regardless of who had the burden of proof, by requiring DNA or
otherdefinitiveevidence,itimposedaquantumofevidencehigherthansubstantialevidence.
InproceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC,theevidentiarybaragainstwhichtheevidencepresentedismeasuredissubstantialevidence,which
is defined as such relevant evidt nce as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[76] This is the least
demandinginthehierarchyofevidence,ascomparedtothehighest,proofbeyondreasonabledoubtapplicabletocriminalcases,andthe
intermediate, preponderance of evidence applicable to civil cases.[77] When the COMELEC insisted that Poe must present DNA or other
definitive evidence, it effectively subjected her to a higher standard of proof, that of absolute certainty. This is even higher than proof
beyond reasonable doubt, which requires only moral certainty in criminal cases, neither DNA evidence[78] nor direct evidence[79] are
alwaysnecessarytosustainaconviction.TheCOMELEC'sprimaryjustificationistheliteralmeaningofjussanguinis,i.e.,rightofblood.
This,however,isanerroneousunderstandingbecausejussanguinisisaprincipleofnationalitylaw,notaruleofevidence.Neitherisitto
be understood in a scientific sense. Certainly, the 1935 Constitution could not have intended that citizenship must be proved by DNA
evidenceforthesimplereasonthatDNAprofilingwasnotintroduceduntil1985.
SincetheCOMELECcreatedapresumptionagainstPoethatshewasnotanaturalborncitizenandthensetanunreasonablyhighburden
to overcome such presumption, it unduly deprived her of citizenship, which has been described as "the right to have rights,"[80] from
whichtheenjoymentofallotherrightsemanates.TheCommissiononHumanRights(CHR),initsamicussubmission,accuratelydescribed
the bundle of rights that flow from the possession of citizenship: "[it is] oftentimes the precursor to other human rights, such as the
freedom of movement, right to work, right to vote and be voted for, access to civil service, right to education, right to social security,
freedomfromdiscrimination,andrecognitionasapersonbeforethelaw."[81]
The purpose of evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact.[82] Evidence is relevant when it induces belief in the
existence or non existence of a fact in issue or fends in any reasonable degree to establish its probability or improbability.[83] It is a
fundamental requirement in our legal system that questions of fact must be resolved according to the proof.[84] Under the due process
clause,asexpoundedinAngTibay,theCOMELECwasdutyboundtoconsiderallrelevantevidencebeforearrivingataconclusion.Inthe
proceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC,Poepresentedevidencethatsheis5feet2inchestall,hasbrowneyes,lownasalbridge,blackhairand
anovalshapedface,andthatshewasfoundabandonedintheParishChurchofJaro,Iloilo.Therearealsoadmissionsbythepartiesthat
shewasabandonedasaninfant,thatthepopulationofIloiloin1968wasFilipino,andthattherewerenointernationalairportsinIloiloat
that time. Poe's physical features, which are consistent with those of an ordinary Filipino, together with the circumstances of when and
where she was found are all relevant evidence tending to establish the probability that her parents are Filipinos. Thus, the COMELEC
gravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitfailedorrefusedtoconsiderthese.Ontheotherhand,theprivaterespondentspresentedabsolutely
noevidencebeforetheCOMELECthatwouldtendtoestablishtheimprobabilitythatbothofPoe'sparentsareFilipinocitizens,andinstead
chosetorelysolelyontheundisputedfactthatPoeisafoundling.TheCOMFLEC'sstancethat"theprobabilitythat[Poe]mightbebornof
a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove her case"[85] is a blatant misunderstanding of the purpose of evidence. Tribunals, whether
judicial or quasijudicial, do not deal in absolutes, which is why we lay down rules of evidence. The determination of facts in legal
proceedingsisbutaweighingofprobabilities.[86]"[Ajudge]mustreasonaccordingtoprobabilities,drawinganinferencethatthemain
factinissueexistedfromcollateralfactsnotdirectlyproving,butstronglytendingtoprove,itsexistence.Thevitalquestioninsuchcases
is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if
certainsecondaryfactsexist?"[87]Thisisdifferentfromamere"possibility"thatisborneoutofpureconjecturewithoutproof.
To my mind, the foregoing evidence, admissions on record, data from the PSA, which we may take judicial notice of,[88] showing that
99.55% of the population of Iloilo province 111 1970 were Filipinos[89] and that 99.82% of children born in the Philippines in 1968 are
naturalbornFilipinos,[90]andabsenceofcontraryevidenceadequatelysupporttheconclusionthatPoe'sparentsareFilipinosand,consl
quently,thatsheisanaturalborncitizen.Ifcircumstantialevidenceissuflicienttoestablishproofbeyondreasonabledoubt,[91] then it
shouldalsobesufficienttohurdlethelowerthresholdofsubstantialevidence,particuldrlyinthepresentcasewherethereareanumberof
circumstancesinfavorofPoe.
2

TheCOMELEC'sunwarrantedpresumptionagainstPoe,andfoundlingsingeneral,likewiseviolatestheequalprotectionclause.InDycaico,
the Court ruled that the proviso in the Social Security Law disqualifying spouses who contracted marriage after the SSS members'
retirementwereundulydiscriminatedagainst,andfoundthatthe"nexusoftheclassificationtothepolicyobjectiveisvagueandflimsy."
[92]InMontesclaros,theCourtconsideredas"discriminatoryandarbitrary"thequestionedprovisooftheGSISActthatcreatedacategory

forspouseswhocontractedmarriagetoGSISmemberswithinthreeyearsbeforetheyqualifiedforthepension.[93]

TheCOMELEC'sdefactoconclusivepresumptionthatfoundlingsarenotnaturalbornsuffersfronTthesamevice.Inplacingfoundlingsat
a disadvantaged evidentiary position at the start of the hearing then imposing a higher quantum of evidence upon them, the COMELEC
effectively created two classes of children: (1) those who know their biological parents and (2) those whose biological parents are
unknown.AstheCOMELECwouldhaveit,thosebelongingtothefirstclassfacenopresumptionthattheyarenotnaturalbornand,iftheir
citizenshipischallenged,theymayprovetheircitizenshipbysubstantialevidence.Ontheotherhand,thosebelongingtothesecondclass,
suchasPoe,arepresumednotnaturalbornattheoutsetandmustprovetheircitizenshipwithnearabsolutecertainty.Toillustratehow
thetwoclassesaretreateddifferently,inTecson,[94]whichinvolvedPoe'sadoptivefather,theCOMELECdidnotmakeapresumptionthat
Fernando Poe was not a naturalborn citizen. Instead, it considered the evidence presented by both parties and ruled that the petition
beforeitfailedtoprovebysubstantialevidencethatFernandoPoewasnotnaturalborn.Oncertiorari,theCourtsustainedtheCOMELEC.
Inthiscase,theCOMELECpresumedthatPoewasnotnaturalbornandfailedorrefusedtoconsiderrelevantpiecesofevidencepresented
by Poe. Evidently, the COMELEC's only justification for the different treatment is that Fernando Poe knew his biological parents, while
hereinpetitionerdoesnot.
IfindtheCOMELEC'sclassificationobjectionableonequalprotectiongroundsbecause,inthefirstplace,itisnotwarrantedbythetextof
the Constitution. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is just one of the various rules of interpretation that courts use to
construetheConstitutionitisnotthebeallandendallofconstitutionalinterpretation.Wehavealreadyheldthatthismaximshouldnot
beappliedifitwouldresultinincongruitiesandinaviolationoftheequalprotectionguarantee.[95]Themoreappropriateinterpreiive
ruletoapplyisthedoctrineofnecessaryimplication,whichholdsthat

Nostatutecanbeenactedthatcanprovideallthedetailsinvolvedinitsapplication.Thereisalwaysanomissionthatmaynot
meetaparticularsituation.Whatisthought,atthetimeofenactment,tobeanallembracinglegislationmaybeinadequateto
Provide for the unfolding events of the future. Socalled gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutoryconstructionusedtofillinthegapisthedoctrineofnecessaryimplication.Thedoctrinestatesthatwhatisimpliedin
astatuteisasmuchapartthereofasthatwhichisexpressed.[96]

When the 1935 Constitution referred to "those whose fathers [or mothers] are citizens of the Philippines," it necessarily included
foundlings whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. As previously discussed, the parentage of foundlings may be proved by
substantialevidence.Conversely,foundlingswhoseparentsarebothforeignersareexcludedfromtheconstitutionalprovision.Thiswould
bethecaseifinanappropriateproceedingthereisdeficientrelevantevidencetoadequatelyestablishthateitheroftheparentsisaFilipi
uocitizen.
AnotherusefulinterpretiveruleincaseswithequalprotectionimplicationsistheoneembodiedinArticle10oftheCivilCode:"Incaseof
doubtintheinterpretationorapplicationoflaws,itispresumedthatthelawmakingbodyintendedrightandjusticetoprevail.""Whenthe
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience."[97]
Indeed,itwouldbemostunkindtothedelegatesofthe1934ConstitutionalConventiontoascribeuponthemanydiscriminatoryanimus
againstfoundlingsintheabsenceofanypositiveshowingofsuchintent.ItisconcededthattheexactreasonwhytheConventionvoted
downSr.Rafols'proposaltoexplicitlyinclude"childrenofunknownparents"mayneverfullybesettled.Srs.Montinola,Bulson,andRoxas
allhadtheirrespectiveviewsonwhytheamendmentwasnotnecessary.[98]Thepartieshereinhavediametricallyopposedinterpretations
on the proposal: the respondents argue that the fact that the amendment is defeated should be conclusiveafter all, not all delegates
expressed their viewsand that the deliberations were not submitted to the people for ratification Poe contends that the deliberations
revealthatrulesofinternationallawalreadyconsidersfoundlingsascitizensoftheplacewheretheyarefound,thusmakingtheinclusion
unnecessary and finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the silence may be fully explained in tenns of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidanceofredundancy.Theseareallvalidpoints,butIbelievetheonlythingwecanunquestionablytakeawayfromthedeliberationsis
thattherewasatleastnointenttoconsiderfoundlingsasstateless,andconsequentlydeprivethemoftheconcomitantcivilandpolitical
rightsassociatedwithcitizenship.
MysecondobjectionisthatastheSolicitorGeneralpointsoutfoundlingsarea"discreteandinsular"[99]minoritywhoareentitledto
utmostprotectionagainstunreasonablediscriminationapplyingthestrictscrutinystandard.Accordingtothisstandard,governmentaction
thatimpermissiblyinterfereswiththeexerciseofa"fundamentalright"oroperatestothepeculiarclassdisadvantageofa"suspectclass"
ispresumedunconstitutional.Theburdenisonthegovernmenttoprovethattheclassificationisnecessarytoachieveacompellingstate
interestandthatitistheleastrestrictivemeansroprotectsuchinterest.[100]Theunderlyingrationalefortheheightenedjudicialscrutiny
isthatthepoliticalprocessesordinarilyreliedupontoprotectminoritiesmayhavebrokendown.[101]Thus,oneaspectofthejudiciary's
roleundertheequalprotectionclauseistoprotectdiscreteandinsularminoritiesfrommajoritarianprejudiceorindifference.[102]
The fundamental right warranting the application of the strict scrutiny standard is the right to a nal ionality embodied in the UDHR
properlyunderstoodinthecontextofpreventingstatelessnessandarbitrarydenialofcitizenship.Citizenshiphasbeendescribedas"man's
basicrightforitisnothinglessthantherighttohaverights,"andtheeffectsofitslossjustlyhavebeencalled"moreseriousthanataking
ofone'sproperty,ortheimpositionofafineorotherpenalty."[103]Itistheindividual's"legalbond[withthestate]havingasitsbasisa
socialfactofattachment,agenuineconnectionofexistence,interestsandsentiments,togetherwiththeexistenceofreciprocalrightsand
duties."[104]AlthoughtheCOMELECprimarilyarguesthatPoeisnotnaturalborn,itsrigidexclusionaryapproach,[105]takentoitslogical
conclusion,wouldactuallyhavedeprivedPoeofherFilipinocitizenshipnaturalbornorotherwise.Thisisaninfringementofafundamental
rightthatthreatenstodeprivefoundlingsnotonlyoftheircivilandpoliticalrightsunderdomesticlawbutalsodenythemofthestate's
protectiononaninternationallevel.
Foundlings also comprise a suspect class under the strict scrutiny analysis. The traditional indicia of "suspectness" are (1) if the class
possesses an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident ofbirth,"[106] or (2) when the class is "saddled with such
disabilities,orsubjectedtosuchahistoryofpurposefulunequaltreatment,orrelegatedtosuchapositionofpoliticalpowerlessnessasto

command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."[107] Thus, in the US, suspect classes for equal protection
purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry.[108] In the Philippines, the Comt has
extendedthescopetoincludedistinctionsbasedoneconomicclassandstatus, [109]andperiodofemploymentcontract.[110] Here, the
COMELEC'sclassificationisbasedsolely'onthehappenstancethatfoundlingswereabandonedbytheirbiologicalparentsatbirthandwho,
asaclass,possesspracticallynopoliticalpower.[111]Theclassificationisthereforesuspectandodioustoanationcommittedtoaregime
ofequality.[112]
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the COMELEC failed to identify a compelling state interest to justify the suspect classification and
infringementofthefoundling'fundamentalright. [113]Indeed,theSolicitorGeneral,appearingasTribuneofthePeople, [114]disagrees
with the COMELEC's position. When the Solicitor General acts as the People's Tribune, it is incumbent upon ltim to present to the court
what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to the position of lhe affected
governmentoffice.[115]Insuchinstances,theCourthascousideredhisopinionandrecommendations"invaluableaid[s]inthedisposition
of the case."[116] His opinion that there is no compelling state interest to justify discrimination against foundlings, while in no way
conclusiveupontheCourt,mustbeaffordedweight.
It may nonetheless be deduced that the interest sought to be protected by the COMELEC is the same as the concern of John Jay, the
future first US Chief Justice, when he suggested to George Washington that it would be wise "to provide a ... strong check into the
admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government and to declare expressly that the Command in chief of the
american(sic)armyshallnotbegivento,nordevolveon,anybutanaturalbornCitizen."[117]Therationalebehindrequiringthatonly
naturalborncitizensmayholdcertainhighpublicofficesistoinsurethattheholdersorthesehighpublicofficesgrewupknowingthey
wereatbirthcitizensofthePhilippines.Itflowsfromthepresumptionthat,intheirformativeyears,theyknewtheyowedfrombirththeir
allegiancetothePhilippinesandthatincaseanyothercountryclaimstheirallegiance,theywouldbefaithfulandloyaltothePhilippines.
ThisisparticularlytruetothePresidentwhoisthecommanderinchiefofthearmedforces.[118] To be sure, this interest is compelling
becausetheConstitutionitselfdemandsit.Nonetheless,itcanonlybeusedwheretheissueinvolvesthebrightlinebetweennaturalborn
and naturalized citizens. It cannot be used as justification in a case where no clear constitutional line has been drawn, i.e., betwevn
foundlingsandpersonswhoknowtheirparents.Itfindsnoapplicationinthiscasewheretherewasabsolutelynoevidence,notevenan
allegation, that Poe's parents were foreign nationals. I simply find the risk that a Matichurian candidate[119] was planted by a foreign
sovereignintheformofafoundlingtooremotetojustifYanenmassediscriminationagainstallfoundlings.Iftheunderlyingpremisefor
thenaturalbornrequirementisthatnaturalborncitizensconsiderthemselvesasFilipinocitizenssincebirth,thenfoundlingssurelyfitinto
thiscategoryaswell.
Inanycase,theCOMELECfailedtoadopttheleastrestrictivemeanstoprotectsuchinterest.[120] By imposing heavy burden upon Poe
justbecauseshewasabandonedasaninfantwithunknownfactsofbirthandparentage,theCOMELEChaphazardlyactedwithoutregard
to the farreaching consequences to a discrete and insular minority. Needless to say, a more narrowly tailored approach would avoid
makingasweepingpresumption.TheCOMELEC'sfixationwithascientificapplicationofthejussanguinisprinciple,asopposedtoalegal
oneguidedbyrulesofevidence,ledtoitsdiscriminatoryinterpretationoftheConstitution.Itactedwith"anevileyeandunequalhand,"
[121]denyingfoundlingsequaljusticeguaranteedbythesamefundamentallaw.Thisisgraveabuseofdiscretion.

TheCOMELECandprivaterespondentAmadoValdezbotharguethatevenassumingthatPoewasanaturalborncitizen,sheforeverlost
suchstatuswhenshebecameanaturalizedAmericanin2001.Herrepatriationin2006onlyrestoredherFilipinocitizenship,butnother
naturalborn status. They cite as legal basis the Constitutional definition of naturalborn citizens, i.e., those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.[122] Poe and the Solicitor General refute this by
invokingtheCourt'srulinginBengsonIIIv.HRET,[123]whereitwasheldthattheactofrepatriationallowsaformernaturalborncitizen
torecover,orreturnto,hisoriginalstatusbeforehelosthisPhilippinecitizenship.
The COMELEC and Valdez, without stating it directly, are asking for a reexamination of Bengson. Valdez, on the one hand, frames his
argument by differentiating RA 9225 from Republic Act No. 2630 (RA 2630), the old repatriation law in effect at the time Bengsonwas
decided. He argues that RA 9225 had a more tedious process than RA 2630. On the other hand, the COMELEC points to the text of RA
9225notingthatitonlymentionedreacquisitionofcitizenship,notreacquisitionofnaturalbornstatus.Theseare,ofcourse,thinattempts
todifferentiatethiscasefromBengson.ButtheproblemisthattheyneverdiredlyquestionthelegalsoundnessofBengson.And,tome,
thishalfheartedchallengeisinsufficientjustificationtodepmifromstaredecisis.
Timeandagain,theCourthasheldthatitisaverydesirableandnecessaryjudicialpracticethatwhenacourthaslaiddownaprincipleof
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantiallythesame.Absentanypowerfulcountervailingconsiderations,likecasesoughttobedecidedalike.[124]Thereasonwhy
weadheretojudicialprecedentsisnotonlyforcertaintyandpredictabilityinourlegalorderbutequallytohaveaninstitutionalsafeguard
forthejudicialbranch.AsarticulatedbytheUSSupremeCourtinPlannedParenthoodv.Casey,

There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts. If that limit should be exceeded,
disturbanceofpriorrulingswouldbetakenasevidencethatjustifiablereexaminationofprinciplehadgivenwaytodrivesfor
particularresultsintheshortterm.ThelegitimacyoftheComtwouldfadewiththefrequencyofitsvacillation.[125]

In the Philippines, using as reference the cited US case, we have adopted a fourpoint test to justify deviation from precedent, which
include the determination of: (1) whether the older doctrine retained the requirements of "practical workability" (2) whether the older

doctrinehadattractedthekindofreliancethatwouldaddaspecialhardshiptotheconsequencesofoverrulingitand"addinequitytothe
cost of repudiation" (3) whether the related principles of law have developed in a different direction so as to render the older rule "no
more than the remnant of an abandoned doctrine" and, (4) whether the contextual facts of the older doctrine have so changed as to
deprive the old rule of "significant application or justification."[126] Thus, before we could venture into a fullblown reexamination of
Bengson,itwasnecessaryforrespondentstohaveshown,atthefirstinstance,thattheircasehurdledtheforegoingtest.
III

Itiswellsettledinelectionlawthatresidenceissynonymouswithdomicile. [127]Domiciledenotesafixedpermanentresidencewhere,
whenabsentforbusinessorpleasure,orforlikereasons,oneintendstoreturn. [128]Toestablishdomicile,threeelementsmustconcur:
(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality(2)anintentiontoremainthere(animusmanendi)and(3)anintentiontoabandon
theolddomicile(animusnonrevertendi).[129]
ThereisnoquestionthatPoehascompliedwiththefirstrequirement.ShehasbeenresidinginthePhilippinestogetherwithherchildren
since May 24, 2005, save for brief travels abroad. The point of contention between the parties is whether Poe satistied the concurrent
requisites of animus manendi et non revertendi. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Poe presented evidence that: she and her
husbandenrolledtheirUSbasedchildreninPhilippineschoolsinJune2005theypurchasedacondominiuminthesecondhalf2005which
was intended to be used as the family abode they made inquiries with property movers as early as March 2005 and actually relocated
household goods, furniture, cars, and other personal properties to the Philippines during the first half of 2006 she secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue in July 2005 her husband notified the US Postal Service that they will no
longerbeusingtheirformerUSaddressinMarch2006theysoldtheirfamilyhomeintheUSinApril2006herhusbandresignedfrom
his work in the US to join the family in May 2006 and her application for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship and her application for
derivativecitizenshipofherminorchildren,whichweresubsequentlyapprovedonJuly18,2006.TheCOMELEC,however,reliedonthe
declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, where she stated that she was a resident for 6 years and 6 months, which would peg her
residency in November 2006. Even if the previous COC was not controlling, the COMELEC determined that the earliest Poe could have
establisheddomicileherewaswhentheBIapprovedherapplicationtoreacquireherFilipinocitizenshiponJuly18,2006.Itemphasized
thatwhenPoeenleredthePhilippinesinMay2005,shedidsoasaforeignnationalavailingofabalikbayanvisafreeentrtyprivilegevalid
for one year. In other words, she was a temporary visitor. Citing Coquilla v. COMELEC,[130] the COMELEC ruled that Poe should have
eithersecuredanImmigrantCertificateofResidenceorreacquiredFilipinocitizenshiptobeabletowaivehernonresidentstatus.
Unlike residence which. may be proved by mere physical presence, animus manendi et non revertendi refers to a state of mind. Thus,
thereisnohardandfastruletodetermineacandidate'scompliancewiththeresidencyrequirement.[131]Itsdeterminationisessentially
dependentonevidenceofcontemporaryandsubsequentactsthatwouldtendtoestablishthefactofintention.Althoughtheappreriation
of evidence is made on a casetocase basis, there are three basic postulates to consider: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere second, that where once established it remains until a new one is arquired and third, a man can have but one
domicileatatime.[132]Inaddition,theCourthasdevisedreasonablestandardstoguidetribunalsinevaluatingtheevidence.
In Mitra v. COMELEC,[133] the Court recognized that the establishment of domicile may be incremental. The Court considered the
following"incrementalmoves"undertakenbyMitraassufficienttoestablishhisdomicile:(1)hisexpressedinknttotransfertoaresidence
outsideofPuertoPrincesaCitytomakehimeligibleforaprovincialposition(2)hispreparatorymoves(3)thetransferofregistrationas
avoter(4)hisinitialtransferthroughaleaseddwelling(5)thepurchaseofalotforhispermanenthomeand(6)thecunstructionofa
houseonthesaidlotwhichisadjacenttothepremiseshewasleasingpendingthecompletionofhishouse.
In Fernandez v. HRET,[134] the Court held that the transfer of domicile must be bona fide. In ruling in favor of the petitioner whose
residency was challenged in a quo warranto proceeding, the Court found that there are real and substantial seasons for Fernandez to
establish a new domicile in Sta. Rosa, Laguna for purposes of qualifying for the May 2007 elections. The ruling was based on a finding
that:(a)FernandezandhiswifeownedandoperatedbusinessesinSta.Hosasince2003(b)theirchildrenattendedschoolsinSta.Rosa
atleastsince2005(c)althoughownershipofpropertyshouldneverbeconsideredarequirementforanycandidacy,Fernandezpurchased
residentialpropertiesinthatcityevenpriortotheMay2007electionand(d)Fernandezandhisspousesubsequentlypurchasedanother
lotinApril2007,aboutamonthbeforeelectionday,wheretheyhaveconstructedahomefortheirfamily'suseasaresidence.
InJapzon v. COMELEC,[135] also involving residency, the Court ruled that residence is independent of citizenship. The Court found
thatalthoughrespondentTydidnotautomaticallyreestablishdomicileinthePhilippinesuponreacquisitionofcitizenshipunderRA9225,
his subsequent acts proved his intent to establish new domicile in the Philippines. The Court based its finding on the following
circumstances: (a) he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was in General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar (b) for the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of General
Macarthur by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his local address (c) thereafter, Ty
appliedforandwasregisteredasavoterinthesamemunicipalityand(d)TyhadalsobeenbodilypresentinGeneralMacarthurexcept
forshorttripsabroad.
InRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,[136]oneoftheissuespresentedwasanapparentmistakewithregardtotheperiodofresidencystated
intheCOCofImeldaMarcos,whichwouldhavemadeherineligible.InfindingthatMarcoswaseligible,theCourtheldthat"[i]tisthefact
of residence, not a statement in a certificatof candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfiedthe[C]onstitution'sresidencyqualificationrequirement."[137]
Guided by the foregoing, it is clear to me that Poe has adequately established her animus manendi et non revertendi by substantial
evidence.Therearerealandsubstantial.reasonsforherestablishmentofdomicileinthePhilippines.HerfatherdiedonDecember2004,
whichPoeclaims,wascrucialinherdecisiontoresdtleinthePhilippinesforgood.Sheandherfamilythenbegantheincrementalprocess
ofrelocatingbymakingpreparatoryinquirieswithpropertymoversasearlyasMarch2005.ShethenenteredthePhilippinesinMay2005
andenrolledherchildreninPhilippineschoolsfortheacademicyearstartinginJune2005.Itcannotbeoveremphasizedthatitdefieslogic

thatonewoulduprootherchildrenfromUSschoolsandtransferthemtoschoolsinadifferentcountryiftheintentwasonlytostayhere
temporarily.TheintenttostayinthePhilippinespermanentlyisfurtherreinforcedbythepurchaseofrealpropertytoserveasthefamily
abodeandrelocationofhouseholdgoods,furniture,cars,andotherpersonalpropertiesfromtheUS.Thesaleoftheirfamilyresidencein
theUSandherhusband'sarrivalinthePhilippinestojointhefamilyallbutconfirmedherabandonmentofherUSdomicileandadefinitive
intenttoremaininthePhilippines.PoehasalsobeenphysicallypresentinthePhilippinessinceMay2005,andthefactthatshereturned
aftershorttripsabroadisstronglyindicativethatsheconsidersthePhilippinesasherdomicile.HersubsequentaceofacquiringFilipino
citizenship for herself and her minor children, renouncing her US citizenship, and holding public office are all consistent with the intent
formedasearlyas2005.AlthoughtheseactsaresubsequenttoMay2005,theyarerelevantbecausetheytendtoproveaspecificintent
formedatanearliertime.[138]Takentogether,thesefactstrumpaninnocuousstatementinher2013COC.
The facts that Poe did not renounce her US citizenship until 2010 and used her US passport between 2006 and 2010 do not affect her
establishment of domicile in the Philippines. The circumstance that Poe, after leaving the US and fixing her residence in the Philippines,
mayhavehadwhatiscalleda"floatingintention"toreturntoherformerdomicileuponsomeindefiniteoccasion,doesnotgiveherthe
righttoclaimsuchformerdomicileasherresidence.ItisherestablishmentofdomicileinthePhilippineswiththeintentionofremaining
hereforanindefinitetimethatseveredtherespondent'sdomiciliaryrelatinnwithherformerhome.[139]Thisisconsistentwiththebasic
rulethatshecouidhaveonlyonedomicileatatime.
I now discuss the effect of the fact that Poe entered the country in May 2005 as an American cil izen under the balikbayan visafree
program. There is no dispute among the parties that citizenship and residence are distinct concepts. A foreign national can establish
domicileherewithoutundergoingnaturalization.WherethereisdisagreementiswhetherPoecouldhaveestablishedherdomicileinthe
PhilippinesinMay2005consideringthatherentrywasthroughthebalikbayanprogram,whichisvalidforoneyear.Respondents,onthe
onthand,believeitwasnotpossiblebecauseofthetemporarynatureofhersLty.Forthem,PoeshouldhavefirstsecuredanImmigrant
CertificateofResidenceorrepatriatedearlierthanJuly2006.Ontheotherhand,Poecontendsthattorequireeitherwouldbetoadda
fourthrequisitetotheestablishmentHfdomicile.
Inprinciple,IagreewiththeCOMELEC'spropositionthat"aforeigner'scapacitytoestablishherdomicileinthePhilippinesis...limitedby
and subject to regulations and prior authorization by the BID." [140] This appears to be based on rulings of US federal courts, which
distinguish"lawful"from"unlawful"domicile. [141]Therequisitesfordomicileremainthesame,i.e.,physicalpnsence,animusmanendi,
andanimusnonrevertendi.But"[i]nordertohavea'lawfuldomicile,'then,analienmusthavetheability,undertheimmigrationlaws,to
form the intent to remain in the [country] indefinitely.[142] The basis for this is the sovereign's inherent power to regulate the entry of
immigrantsseekingtoestablishdomicilewithinitsterritory.Itisnotanadditionalrequisitefortheestablishmentofdomicilerather,itis
apreconditionthatcapacitatesaforeignertolawfullyestablishdomicile.ThisisthtimportofthestatementinCoquillathat"analien[is]
withoutanyrighttoresideinthePhilippinessaveasourimmigrationlawsmayhaveallowedhimtostay."[143]
Thepointofinquiry,therefore,isif,underourimmigrationlaws,Poehastheabilitytoformtheintenttoestablishdomicile.Inresolving
this issue, the analysis in the US case Elkins v. Moreno[144] is instructive. In Elkins, the US Supreme Court resolvtd the question of
whetheraholderofa"G4visa"(anonimmigrantvisagr:mtedtoofficersoremployeesofinternationaltreatyorganizationsandmembers
of their immediate families) cannot acquire Maryland domicile because such a visa holder is incapable of demonstrating an essential
element of domicilethe intent to live permanently or indefinitely in Maryland (a "legal disability"). In resolving the issue, the US Court
analyzed federal immigration laws and found that where the US Congress intended to restrict a nonimmigrant's capacity to establish
domicile,itdidsoexpressly.SincetherewasnosimilarrestrictionimposedonG4aliens,theUSCourtconsideredthelegislature'ssilence
aspregnant,andconcludedthattheUSCongress,whileanticipatingthatpermanentimmigrationwouldnormallyoccurthroughimmigrant
channels,waswillingtoallownonrestrictednonimmigrantalienstoadopttheUSastheirdomicile.[145]
In the Philippines, the primary immigration law is Commonwealth Act No. 613 (CA 613) or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. In
definingcertainnonimmigrantclasses,CongressexplicitlylimitedthepurposetorentryintothePhilippines.Forexample,anonimmigrant
student's entry is "solely for the purpose of study." [146] In other instances, it uses language that identifies t specific purpose and the
transient nature of the nonimmigrant's entry. [147] Hy including such restrictions on intent, it may be deduced that Congress :limed to
excludealiensbelongingtotheserestrictedclassesiftheirrealpurposeincomingtothePhilippineswastoimmigratepermanently.This.
isfurthersupportedbySection37(d)oftheActwhichprovidesasgroundfordeportationthenonimmigrant'sviolationofanylimitationor
conditiontmderwhichhewasadmitted.
ButCongressmadenosuchclearrestrictionsinRepublicActNo.9174(RA9174),whichamendedRepublicActNo.6768(RA6768).[148]
The law allows balikbayans who hold foreign passports to enter the Philippines visafree for a period of one year, except for those
consideredasrestrictednationals.[149]Itdefinesabalikbayanas"aFilipinocitizenwhohasbeencontinuouslyoutofthePhilippinesfora
period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as this term is defined
hereunder,whohadbeennaturalizedinaforeigncountryandcomesorreturnstothePhilippines." [150]Unliketherestrictedclassesof
nonimmigrants under the Immigration Act, there was no definite restriction on intent or purpose imposed upon balikbayans, although
there was a temporal restriction on the validity of the visafree entry. Taken alone, the oneyear limit may be interprded as an implied
limitation. However, RA 9174 expressly declared that one of the purposes of establishing a balikbayan program is to "to enable the
balikbayantobecomeeconomicallyselfreliantmembersofsocietyupontheirreturntothecountry."[151] To this end, the law instructs
government agencies to "provide the necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance to a
balikbayan, including his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of the kabuhuvan program in accordance with the existing
rulesonthegovernment'sreintegrationprogram."[152]ThisisaclearacknowledgementbyCongressthatitispossibleforabalikbayanto
formtheintentneededtoestablishhisdomicileinthePhilippines.Notably,therearenoqualifications,suchasacquisitionofpennanent
resident status or reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, before a balikbayan may avail of the kabuhayan program. Applying the well
establishedinterpretiverulethatastatutemustbesoconstruedastoharmonizeandgiveeffecttoallitsprovisionswheneverpossible,
[153]theoneyearvisafreeentrydoesnotcreatealegaldisabilitywhichwouldpreventbalikbayansfromdevelopinganimusmanendi.

The amendments introduced by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate the present case from Coquilla. In that case, decided prior to the

enactmentofRA9174,theCourtconcludedthatavisafreebalikbayanvisitorcouldnothaveestablisheddomicileinthePhilippinesprior
toawaiverofhisnonresidentstatus.ThisisbecauseunderRA6768,theonlydeclaredpurposewas"toattractandencourageoverseas
Filipinostocomeandvisittheirmotherland."Coupledwiththtoneyearvisafreelimit,thismostlikelyledtotheCourt'sinterpretationthat
abalikbayan'sentrywasmerelytemporary.However,withtheamendmeutsintroducingthereintegrationprovisions,abalikbayanis no
longerprecludedfromdevelopinganintenttostaypermanentlyinthePhilippines.Therefore,Poe,whoenteredthePhilippinesafterthe
effectivityofRA9174,hadtheabilitytoestablishalawfuldomicileinthePhilippinesevenpriortoherreacquisitionofFilipinocitizenship.
Fortheforegoingreasons,IvotetoGRANTthepetitions.

[1]CONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregistered

yoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyears
immediatelyprecedingsuchelection.
[2]OMNIBUSELECTIONCODE,Sec.78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingto

deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that anv material
representationcontainedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledatanytimenotlaterthantwenty
fivedaysfromthetimeofthetilingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterduenoticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteen
daysbetoretheelection.
[3]OMNIBUSELECTIONCODE,Sec.74par.l.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethattheperson

filin it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa,theprovince,includingitscomponentcities,highlyurbanizedcitymdistrictorsectorwhichheseekstorepresentthepolitical
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post office address for all election purposes his profession or
occupationthathewillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiant,theretothathe
will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities that he is not a pennanent resident or
immigranttoaforeigncountrythattheobligationimposnlbyhisoathisassumedvoluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeof
evasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretruetothebestofhisknowledge.
[4]SalcedoIIv.COMELEC,G.R.No.135886,August16,1999,312SCRA447,458Ugdoracion,Jr.v.COMELEC,G.R.No.179851,April

18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231, 239 Lluz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456, 471 Tala, v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
196804&197015,October9,2012,683SCRA197,234.
[5]Tagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElcdoralTribunal,G.R.No.202202,March19,2013,693SCRA574,596Gonzalezv.COMELEC,

(G.R.No.192856,March8,2011,644SCRA761,781SalcedoIIv.COMELEC,supraat457459.
[6]Supraat459.
[7]Supraat592.
[8]Ferminv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos.179695&182369,December18,2008,574SCRA782,792794
[9] This can also be traced to Salcedo, supra at 458: "the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to

qualifications for elective office." Yet, Salcedo left open the possibility that a candidate's stated name in the COC may fall within the
coverage of Section 78, supra at 459: "The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead of deceive the public as to one's
identity,isnotwithinthescopeoftheprovision."(Emphasisadded)
[10]Ejercitov.COMELEC,G.R.No.212398,November25,2014,742SCRA210,299Yuv.SamsonTatad,G.R.No.170979,February9,

2011,642SCRA421,428Peoplev.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.164185,July23,2008,559SCRA449,459).
[11]TheformoftheCOCprescribedbytheCOMELECcontainsitemsnotenumeratedinSection74,suchas"nicknameorstagename,"

"name to appear in the ballot," and "gender." It is with respect to these items that a distinction between material and nonmaterial is
proper.
[12]Codoyv.Calugay, G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999, 31 SCRA 333, 342 Gonzales v. Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, Pebruary 4, 1992,

205SCRA816,837Lacsonv.SanJoseLacson,G.R.Nos.L23482,L23767&L24259,August30,1968,24SCRA837,848.
[13]OMNIBUSELECTIONCODE,Sec.73par.(I).Certificateofcandidacy.Nopersonshallbeeligibleforanyelectivepublicofficeunless

hefilesasworncertificateofcandidacywithintheperiodfixedherein.(Emphasisadded)
[14]ThestatementoftheJawinFerminv.COMELEC,supraat792,isthusmoreaccurate:

[T]hedenialofduecowetoorthecancellationoftheCOCisnotbasedonthelackofqualificationsbutonafindingthatthe
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may [or may not] relate to the qualifications required of the
publicofficehe/sheisrunningfor.

[15]"Thecrimeofperjuryundisputedlyinvolvesmoralturpitude."Republicv.Guy,G.R.No.L41399,July20,1982,115SCRA244,254.

[16]SalcedoIIv.COMELEC,supraat458.
[17]Idat458460.
[18]Id.at458.
[19]CONSTITUTION,Art.VI,Sec.6.
[20]Tagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,G.R.No.202202,March19,2013,693SCRA574,592.
[21]G.R.Nos.161434,161634,161824,March3,2004,424SCRA277.
[22]G.R.No.179851,April18,2008,552SCRA231.
[23]G.R.No.193314,June25,2013,699SCRA507.
[24]Id.at516517.
[25]G.R.No.207105,November10,2015.
[26]G.R.No.206698,February25,2014,717SCRA312.
[27]TheforegoinganalysisislimitedtotheinterpretationofSection78inrelationtoSection74.Itisnotintendedtoaffecttheexisting

doctrineinvolvingthepenalprovisionsoftheOEC,specificallySection262visavisSection74,asenunciatedinLluz r. COMELEC,G.R.
No.172840,June7,2007,523SCRA456.
[28]CONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.4par.(7).
[29]Verav.Avelino,G.R.No.L543,August11,1946,77Phil.192,209.
[30]Tecsonv.COMELEC,supraat325.
[31]Limkaichongv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos.DX83132,179120,17913233,April,2009,583SCRAI,33.
[32]Gonzalezv.COMELEC,G.R.No.192851,March8,2011,644SCRA761,790791.
[33]Velosov.Board()(Canvassers,G.R.No.15620,July10,1919,39Phil.886,888.
[34]Theword"sole"wasoriginallyusedtoliareitherHouseofCongress(andthecourts)frominterferingwiththejudgmentoftheother

House(Angarav.ElectoralCommission,G.R.No.45081,July15,1936,63Phil.139,162):

TheoriginalprovisionregardingthissubjectintheActofCongressofJuly1,1902(sec.7,par.5)layingdowntherulethat
"theassemblyshallbethejudgeoftheelections,returns,andqualificationsofitsmembers",wastakenfromclauseIofsection
5,ArticleIoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesprovidingthat"EachHouseshallbetheJudgeoftheElections,Returns,and
QualificationsofitsownMembers,...."TheActofCongressofAugust29,1916(sec.18,par.1)modifiedthisprovisiunbythe
insertionoftheword"sole"asfollows:"ThattheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives,respectively,shallbethesolejudgesof
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, ... " apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
characterofthejurisdictionconferreduponeaouseoftheLegislatureovertheparticularcasesthereinspecified.

[35]CONSTITUTION,Art.VI,Sec.1.SeealsoOcceav.COMELEC,G.R.No.L52265,January28,1980,95SCRA755.
[36]CONSTITUTION,Art.IX(C),Sec.2(1).
[37]Gonzalezv.COMELEC,supraat777Aznarv.COMELEC,G.R.No.83820,May25,1990,185SCRA703,708.
[38]Ferminv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos.179695&182369,December18,2008,574SCRA782,792.
[39] Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237, 193536, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1, 45 (Brion, J., dissenting) citing Fermin v.

COMELEC,supra.
[40]SalcedoIIv.COMELEC,G.R.No.1358gb,August16,1999,312SCRA447,457.
[41]Ferminv.COMELEC,supraat794.

[42]Loongv.COMELEC,G.R.No.93986,December22,1992,216SCRA760,768769.
[43]TanChongv.SecretaryofLabor,G.R.Nos.47616&47623,September16,1947,79Phil.249,258.
[44]1935CONSTITUTION,Art.IV,Sec.I.
[45]CONSTITUTION,Art.IV,Sec.2.
[47]BengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,357SCRA545557558
[48]PAULWEIS,NATIONALITYANDSTATELESSNESSININTERNATIONALLAW,101(1979).
[49] Roa v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. 1011, October 30, 1912, 23 Phil., 315, 320321, citing US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649

(1898).
[50]HANSKELSEN,PRINCIPLESOFINTERNATIONALLAW374375(2nded.1979,Tuckerrev.ed.1967)IANBROWNLIE,PRINCIPLESOF

PUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW385(5thed.1998).
[51]GERHARDVONGLAHN,LAWAMONGNATIONS:INTRODUCTIONTOPUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW177(1965).
[52]NottehohmCase(SecondPhase)(Liechtensteinv.Guatemala).Judgment,1955I.C.J.,4,23(April6).
[53]LeagueofNationsCommitteeofExpertsfortheProgressiveCodificationofInternationalLaw,Nationality,20AJIL21,23(1926).
[54]Bayan(BagongAlyansangMakabayan)v.Zamora,G.R.No.138570,October10,2000,342SCRA449,494495.
[55]CONSTITUTION,Art.VI,Sec.21.
[56]ForanincisiveanalysisontheconstitutionalstatusofinternationallawprinciplesasinterpretedbytheSupremeCourt,seeMERLINM.

MAGALLONA,TlfESUPREMECOURTANDINTERNATIONALLAW(2010).
DeanMagallonaarguesthat"...incaseswhereStatesovereigntyisatstake,theCourtcouldhavebeenadecisivefactorinreshapingit
alongthecontoursofintegrityoftheFilipinonation."Id.atiii."Theheavyburdenofjudicialinterpretationinproblentsofinternationallaw
liesintheinvolvementofthesovereignintegrityofthePhilippineRepublicandinthemodalitybywhichthewillofthenationalcommunity
findsjuridicalexpression."Id.at119.
[57] Notably, both the CRC and ICCPR speak of children in general, not just foundlings they apply to Filipino children, foreign children

domicilnlinthePhilippines,andfoundlingsalike.Thisonlyhighlightsthattheconventionscouldnothavecontemplatedanautomaticgrant
ofcitizenshipwithoutimposingthejussoliprincipleonallstateparties.
[58]SeeCommonwealthActNo.473,Sec.15RepublicActNo.9225.Sec.4.
[59]UDHR,Art.15(1).Everyonehastherighttoanationality.
[60]MERLINM.MAGALLONA,FUNDAMENTALSOFPUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW255258(2005).
[61] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, available at

http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba7d4.pdf.
[61]Id.TheUDHRwasprecipitatedbycitizenshipissuesarisingfromlargescalepopulationmovementsandformationofnewstatesafter

WorldWarI.Itisinthiscontextthatthe"righttoanationality"shouldbeunderstood.Notableeventsincludethedisintegrationofthe
AustroHungarian, German, and Ottoman empires leading to the establishment of new states, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Yugoslavia, the restoration of the former state of Poland, and the simultaneous adjustment of many international borders in the area
directlyorindirectlyaffectedbytheconflict."Somefivemillionpeopleweremoved,...whichevidentlyrequiredthestatesconcernedand
theinternationalcommunityasawholetoaddresssomecomplexcitizenshipquestions."Theninthe1940s,therewasthedecolonization
and partition of India in 1947 and the subsequent movement of Hindus and Muslims between India and Pakistan the conflict over
PalestineandthecreationofIsraelin1948.creatingaPalestiniandiasporaintheMiddleEastandbeyondandtheChineserevolutionof
1949,whichledtotheestablishmentofacommunistgovernmentonthemainlandandanationalistgovernmentontheislandofTaiwan.
[63]CommissiononHumanRights,Memorandum(AsAmicusCuriaeSubmission),p.10,citingReportsofSpecialRapporteursandOther

DocumentsConsideredDuringthe48thSession,[1996]2Y.B.Int'lL.Comm'n126,UNDoc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1(Part1).

Therighttoanationalityasahumanright,isconceivableasarightofanindividualvisavisacertainState,deriving,under
certainconditions,frominternationallaw.Asthecasemaybe,itistherighttobegrantedthenationalityofthesuccessorState
ornottobedeprivedthenationalityofthepredecessorState.Theobligationnottocreatestatelessness,however,isaState
toState erga omnes obligation, conceivable either as a corollary of the above right to a nationality or as an autonomous
obligation existing in the sphere of interState relations only and having no direct legal consequences in the relationship
betweenStatesandindividuals.(Emphasisadded)

[64]Optimastatutiinterpretatrixestipsumstatufum(Thebestinterpreterofastatuteisthestatuteitself).Seranav.Sandiganbayan,G.R.

No.162059,January2008,542SCRA224,245.
[65]LaurenceTribe,TowardaSyntaxoftheUnsaid:ConstruingtheSoundsofCongressionalandConstitutionalSilence,57IND.L.J.515,

531(1982).
[66]CONSTITUTION,Art.III,Sec.1.
[67]G.R.No.46496,February27,1940,69Phil.635.
[68]Id.at642644.
[69]COMELECEnBancResolution,SPANos.15002,15007&15139,p.17:

ThefactthatRespondentwasafoundlingwithnoknownparentageorbloodrelativeeffectivelyexcludedherfromthecoverage
of the definition of a naturalborn citizen" (at p. 15). "To reiterate, naturalborn citizenship is founded on the principle of jus
sanguinis. Respondent is a foundling. Her parentage is unknown. There is thus no basis to hold that respondent has blood
relationship with a Filipino parent. This Commission therefore cannot rule or presume that Respondent possesses bluod
relationshipwithaFilipinocitizenwhenitiscertainthatsuchrelationshipisindemonstrable.

[70]COMELECFirstDivisionResolution,SPANos.15002,15007&15139,p.25:

TobeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,however,Respondentmustbeabletodefinitivelyshowherdirectbloodrelationshipwitha
FilipinoparentandconsistentwithSection2,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitutiondemonstratethatnootheractwasnecessaryforherto
completeorperfectherFilipinocitizenship.
TSN,February9,2016,pp.6465:
J. JARDELEZA: Now, [] when you say that the petitioner has only one type of evidence that can prove her pacentage and that's only
DNA[?]

COMM.LIM:Seeminglyfornow...
J.JARDELEZA:Andwhatisthemeaningof"seeminglyfornow"?
COMM. LIM: That is what a reasonable mind could possibly approximate, because we have a situation where a child is of unknown
biologicalparents.Fromthepremisethattheparentsarebiologicallyunknownitcannotadmitofproofthatparentageexists,identitywise
thatisotherwisethepanitswouldbeknown.Soinasituationsuchasthis,YourHonor,itisourrespectfulsubmissionthatsomeother
modality other than the surfacing of the parents, other than evidence of family relations, one plausible evidence would be what Justice
Carpiosuggested,DNA.Andalthoughwedidnotdiscussthatinourdecisionsnotbeingnecessaryanyllloretoadispositionoftheissues
before us, this humble representation accepts that suggestion to be very sound. Because in all fairness, foundling status need not be
attachedtoapersonforever.
[71]RuleonAdoption,A.M.No.02602St(2002),Sec.3(e).
[72]Dycaicov.SSS,G.R.No.161357,November30,2005,476SCRA538,558559citingJimenezv.Weinberger,417US628(1974)

US.DepartmentofAgriculturev.Murry,413US508,37(1973):Vlandisv.Kline,412US441(1973).SeeClevelondBoardofEducation
v.Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) which involved school board rules that mandated maternity leaves for teachers beginning their fifth or
sixthmonthofpregnancyandprohibitedreemploymentpriortoasemesteratleast3monthsafterdelivery.TheUSSupremeCourtfound
that the mandatory leave requirement conclusively presumed "that every pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of
pregnancyisincapableofcontinuing,"whilethe3monthdelayconclusivelypresumedtheteacher'suntitnesstoworkduringthatperiod.
Thisconclusivepresumptionis"neither'necessarily[nor]universallytrue,'andisviolativeoftheDueProcessClause."Inhisconcurring
opinion. Justice Powell applied an equal protection analysis and found the school board rules "either counterproductive or irrationaly
overinclusive" and therefore violative of equal protection. See also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
888897(1975).
[73]GSISv.Montesclaros,G.R.No.146494July14,2004,434SCRA441,449.
[74] If she tails under the third category, her acts of obtaining a Philippine passport and registering as a voter may be considered as

election of Filipino citizenship. (In re FlorencioMallare, A.C. No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 45, 52. Art IV, Sec. 2 of the 1987
ConstitutionprovidesthatthosewhoelectFilipinocitizenshiparedeemednaturalborn.)
[75]OSGMemorandum,ExhibitsC&D.
[76]Sabiliv.COMELEC,G.R.No.193261,April24,2012,670SCRA664,683.

[77]Salvadorv.PhilippineMiningServiceCorp.,G.R.No.148766,January22,2003,395SCRA729,738.
[78]Peoplev.Cabigquez,G.R.No.185708,September29,2010,631SCRA653,671.
[79]Zabalav.People,G.R.No.210760,January26,2015,748SCRA246,253.
[80]Gov.BureauofImmigration,G.R.No.191810,June22,2015,(Velasco,J.,dissenting)citingCJWarren'sdissentingopinioninPerez

v.Brownell,356U.S.44,64(1958).
[81]CommissiononHumanRights,Memorandum(AsAmicusCuriaeSubmission),p.12.
[82]RULESOFCOURT,Rule128,Sec.1.
[83]RULESOFCOURT,Rule128,Sec.4.
[84]US.v.ProvidentTrustCo.,291U.S.272(1934).
[85]Rollo,p.180.
[86]SeeRULESOFCOURT,Rule128,Sec.4Rule130,Sec.51,par.(a)(3)Rule133,Sec.I.

Infiliationcases,Sec.3(f)oftheRuleonPNAEvidence(A.M.No.06115SC)referstothe"ProbabilityofParentage".Itis"thenumerical
estimateforthelikelihoodofparentageofaputativeparentcomparedwiththeprobabilityofarandommatchoftwounrelatedindividuals
inagivenpopulation."
"Preponderanceofevidenceisaphrasewhich,inthelastanalysis,meansprobabilityofthetruth."Sevillav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.
150284,November22,2010,635SCRA508,515516.(Emphasisadded)
"Probability, and not mere possibility, is required otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs." Sea Power
ShippingEnterprises,Inc.v.Salazar,G.R.No.188595,August28,2013,704SCRA233,251.
[87]Joaquinv.Navarro,G.R.Nos.L542628,May29,1953,93Phil.257,269citing1MooreonFacts,Sec.596.
[88]RULESOFCOURT,Rule129,Section2.Judicialnotice,whendiscretionary.Acourtmaytakejudicialnoticeofmatterswhichareof

publicknowledge,orarecapableofunquestionabledemonstration,oroughttobeknowntojudgesbecauseoftheirjudicialfunctions.See
Bagabuyov.COMELEC,G.R.No.176970,December8,2008,573SCRA309.
[89]PoeMemorandum,p.205.
[90]OSGMemorandum,Exh.C
[91]RULESOFCOURT,Rule133,Sec.4.
[92]Dycaicuv.SSS,G.R.No.161357,November30,2005,476SCRA538,553.
[93]GSISv.Monlesclaros,G.R.No.146494.July14,2004,434SCRA441,453
[94]G.R.Nos.161434,161634&161824,March3,2004,424SCRA277.
[95]Chuav.CivilServiceCommission,G.R.No.88979,February7,1992,206SCRA65,77.
[96]Id.DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesv.UnitedPlannersConsultants,Inc.,G.R.No.212081,February23,2015.
[97]Padillav.Padilla,G.R.No.48137,October3,1947,74Phil.377,387.
[98]Sr.MontinolasawnoneedfortheamendmentbecausehebelievedthatthiswasalreadycoveredbytheSpanishCode.Sr.thought

that it would be best to leave the matter to the hands of the legislature. Sr. Roxas believed that foundlings are rarcc cases and that it
wouldbesuperfluoustoincludethemintheConstitutionbecause,inhisview,thiswasalreadycoveredbyinternationallaw.
[99] First coined by Justice Stone in the famous "Footnote Four" in U.S v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 ( 1938), where the US

Supreme Court established that statesanctioned discriminatory practices against discrete and insular minorities are entitkd to a
diminishedpresumptionofconstitutionality.CitedinCentralBankEmployeesAss'n,Inc.v.BaugkoSentralngPilipinas,G.R.No.148208,
December15,2004,446SCRA299,488(CarprioMorales,J,dissenting)WhiteLightCorp.v.CityofManila,G.R.No.122846,January
20,2009, 576 SCRA 416, 436 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32,8799 (Puno C.J,
concurring)Garciav.Drilon,G.R.No.179267,June25,2013,699SCRA352,447451(LeonardoDeCastro,J,concurring).
[100]Disini,Jr.v.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.203335,February18,2014,716SCRA237,301.

[101] Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 ( 1974) In one article, Justice Powell, although not in entire agreement with the theory of

FootnoteFour,summarizedmanyscholars'formulationofthetheoryasfollows:

Thefundamentalcharacterofourgovernmentisdemocratic.Ourconstitutionassumesthatmajoritiesshouldruleandthatthe
governmentshouldbeabletogovern.Therefore,forthemostpart,Congressandthestatelegislaturesshouldbeallowedtodo
astheychoose.Buttherearecertaingroupsthatcannotparticipateeffectivelyinthepoliticalprocess.Andthepoliticalprocess
therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us. Consistent with these premises, the
theorycontinues,theSupremeCourthastwospecialmissionsinourschemeofgovernment:
First,toclearawayimpedimentstoparticipation,andensurethatallgroupscanengageequallyintheprocessand
Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect
themselvesinthelegislativeprocess.LewisF.Powell,Jr.,"CaroleneProducts"Revisited,82COLUM.L.REV.1087,10881089.

[102]Richmondv.J.A.CrosonCo.,488U.S.169(1989).
[103]Fedorenkov.U.S.,449U.S.490,522523(1981),
[104]NottebohmCase(SecondPhase)(Liechtensteinv.Guatemala),Judgment,1955I.C.J.,4,23(April6).
[105]"Neitherwillpetitioner(Poe)fallunderSectionI,paragraphs3,4,and5."COMELECMemorandum,p.56.
[106]Frontierov.Richardson,411U.S.677686(1973).
[107]SanAntonioIndependentSchoolDistrictv.Rodriguez,411U.S.1,28(1973)
[108]AngLadladLGBTPartyv.COMELEC,supraat93,(Puno,C..J.,concurring).
[109]CentralBankEmployeesAssociation,Inc.v.BangkoSentralngPilipinas,supraat391.
[110]Serranov.GallantMaritimeServices,Inc.,G.R.No.167614,March24,2009,582SCRA255,282.
[111]Only4,483individualswereregisteredsince1950.PoeMemorndum,AnnexB.
[112]CONSTITUTION,PreambleArt.II,Sec.26:Art.XIII,Sec.1.
[113]TSN,February16,2016,p.29:

J. JARDELEZA: x x x Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government has to meet a compelling interest test. Meaning, the
governmenthastoarticulateacompellingStateinterestwhyyouarediscriminatingagainstthefoundling....So,stateforme
inyourmemowhatisthecompellingStateinteresttomakeadiscriminationagainstthefoundling."COMELECdidnotaddress
thisinitsmemorandum.

[114]TheSolicitorGeneral'sdiscretiontoappearasTribuneofthePeopleisoneundoubtedlyrecognizedinPhilippinejurisprudence.See

Orbosv.CivilServiceCommission,G.R.No.92561,September12,1990,189SCRA459Gonzalesv.Chavez,G.R.ro.97351,February
4,1992,205SCRA816Martinezv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L112387,October11,1994,237SCRA575Pimentel,Jr.v.COMELEC,
G.R.No.126394,April24,1998,289SCRA586CityWardenofManilav.Estrella,G.R.No.141211,August31,2001ConstantinpDavid
v.PangandamanGania,G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003, 409 SCRA 80 Salenga v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.174941,February1,
2012,664SCRA635.
[115]Orbosv.CivilServiceCommission,supraat466.Indeed,theOSGisexpectedtolookbeyondthenarrowinterestofthegovernment

in a particular case and take the long view of what will best benefit the Filipino people in the long run. As we explained in Gonzales v.
Chavez,"itistheFilipinopeopleasacollectivitythatconstitutestheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thus,thedistinguishedclientoftheOSG
is the people themselves x x x." This is but an affirmation that the privilege, and at times, even the duty, to appear as Tribune of the
Peoplespringsfromtheconstitutionalpreceptthatsovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthority,includingthatofthe
SolicitorGeneral,emanatesfromthem.
[116]Id.
[117] Neal Katyal & Paul Clement, On the Meaning of "Natural Born Citizen," 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161, available at

http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/onthemeaningofnaturalborncitizen/.
[118]Tecsonv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos.111434,161634,161824,March3,2004,424SCRA277,422(Carpio,J,dissenting).

[119]RICHARDCONDON,THEMANCHURIANCANDIDATE(1959).ApoliticalthrillernovelaboutthesonofaprominentUSpoliticalfamily,

whowasbrainwashedaspartofaCommunistconspiracy.Itwastwiceadaptedintoafeaturefilm(1962and2004).
[120]Serranov.GallantMaritimeServices,Inc.,supraat278.
[121]YickWov.Hopkins,118US356(1886)citedinPeoplev.DelaPiedra,G.R.No.121777,January24,2001,350SCRA163,181.
[122]CONSTITUTION,Art.IV,Sec.2.
[123]G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,357SCRA545.
[124]Tyv.BancoFilipinoSavings&MortgageBank,G.R.No.144705,November15,2005,475SCRA65,7576.
[125]505U.S.833(1992).
[126]Tingv.VelezTing,G.R.No.166562,March31,2009,582SCRA694,707708.
[127]Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 2015 Umbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA

210,246RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300,323.
[128]Asistiov.Aguirre,G.R.No.191124,April27,2010,619SCRA518,529530.
[129]Caballerov.COMELEC,supra.
[130]G.R.No.151914,July31,2002,385SCRA607.
[131]Jalosjosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.19197u.April24,2012,670SCRA572,576.
[131]Id.
[132]G.R.No.191938,July2,2010,622SCRA744.
[134]G.R.No.187478,December21,2009,608SCRA733.
[135]G.R.No.180088,January19,2009,576SCRA331.
[136]RomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300.
[137]Id.at326.
[138]RULESOFCOURT,Rule130,Sec.34.Similaractsasevidence.Evidencethatonedidordidnotdoacertainthingatonetimeisnot

admissibletoprovethathedidordidnotdothesameorsimilarthingatanothertimebutitmaybereceivedtoproveaspecificintent
orknowledgeidentity,plan,system,scheme,habit,customorusage,andthelike.(Emphasisadded)
[139]Tansecov.Arteche,G.R.No.36300,s,ptember13,1932,57PhiL235.
[140]COMELECResolutiondatedDecember23,2015,p.23
[141]CastellonContrerasv.ImmigrationandNaturalizationService,45F.3d149(7thCir.1995)Melianv.ImmigrationandNaturalization

Service,987F.2d1521(11thCir.1993)Lokv.ImmigrationandNaturalizationService,681F.2d107,109(2ndCir.1982).
[142]CastellonContrerasv.ImmigrationandNaturalizationService,supra.
[143]G.R.No.151914,July31,2002,385SCRA607,616.
[144]435u.s.647(1978).
[145]Id.
[146] CA 613, Sec. 9(1). See also 9(c) "A seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port of the Philippines and seeking to enter

temporarily and solely in the pursuit of his calling as a seaman" and 9(d) "A person seeking to enter the Philippines solely to
carryontradebetweenthePhilippinesandtheforeignstateofwhichheisanational,hi'wife,andhisunmarriedchildrenunder
twentyone years of age, if accompanying or following to join hilli, subject to the condition that citizen of the Philippines under similar
conditionsareaccordedlikeprivilegesintheforeignstateofwhichsuchpersonisanational."(Emphasisadded)
[147]Id.,Sec.9(a)"Atemporaryvisitorcotningforbusinessorforpleasureorforreasonsorhealth"(b)"Apersonintransittoa

destinationoutsidethePhilippines."(Emphasisadded)

[148]AnActInstitutingaBalikbayanProgram(1989).
[149]RA6768,asamendedbyRA9174,Sec.3(c).
[150]Id,Sec.2(a).
[151]Id.,Sec.1.
[152]Id.,Sec.6.
[153]Uyv.Sandiganhayan,G.R.Nos.10596570,March20,2001,354SCRA651,672673

SEPARATECONCURRINGOPINION

CAGUIOA,J.:
I concur. The Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
whenitcancelledthepetitioner'scertificateofcandidacy.
At the outset, this discussion is necessarily framed in the context of the nature of the petitions brought before the COMELEC and the
resultantscopeofthisCourt'sreview.
TheOmnibusElectionCode("OEC")positivelyrequiresanaspiringcandidatetoformallymanifesthisorherintentiontorunthroughthe
filingofacertificateofcandidacy.1Section74oftheOECenumeratestheinformationrequiredtobestatedbyacandidateinhisorher
certificateofcandidacy,thus:

Sec.74.Contentsofcertificateofcandidacy.Thecertificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingitisannouncinghis
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized cit:f or district or sector which he seeks to represent the political
party to which he belongs civil status his date of birth residence his post orfice address for all election purposes his
profession or occupation thai he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiancetheretothathewillobeythelaws,legalorders,anddecreespromulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthoritiesthat
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily,withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasionandthatthefactsstatedinthecertificatyofcandidacyaretrue
tothebestofhisknowledge.
xxxx

UnderSection78,actrtificateofcandidacycanbedeniedduecourseorcancelledincaseoffalsematerialrepresentationtherein.The
jurisprudential requirements for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC are clear: (1) that a
representation is made with respect to a material fact, (2) that the representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to deceive or
misleadtheelectorate.[2]
The Assailed Resolutions were issued by the COMELEC disposing of Petitions for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacyfiledbytherespondentsagainstthepetitioner.TreatingallpetitionsfiledasSection78Petitions,theAssailedResolutionsheld
that (1) the representations made by the petitioner with respect to her citizenship and residence were false, and (2) she intended to
deceiveormisleadtheelectorateastoherqualificationstorunforoffice.Indeterminingtheexistenceoffalsematerialrepresentation,
theCOMELECdeclaredthatthepetitionercannotclaimthatNlay24,2005wasthestartingpointofherperiodofresidence,andthatsheis
notanaturalborncitizen.Consequently,hercertificateofcandidacywascancelled.
IntheseConsolidatedPetitionsforcertiorari,thepetitionerascribesgraveabuseofdiscretiontotheCOMELECfor,amongothers,rulingon
herqualificationsinaSection78petition.Inotherwords,theextentoftheCOMELEC'sjurisdictioninaSection78petitionshouldhave
beentochecktheaccuracyofthematerialrepresentationsmadeinacertificateofcandidacyandtodeterminetheexistenceofanintent
tomisleadonlyforthepurposeofdecidingwhetherthecertificateofcandidacyshouldbedeniedduecourseorcancelled.
ThelimitedscopeofthisCourt'sreviewoncertiorariofajudgment,finalorderorresolutionoftheCOMELECunderRule64iswelldefined.
Timeandagain,thisCourthasheldthattheextentofitsreviewislimitedtothedeterminationofwhethertheCOMELECactedwithout
jurisdiction,orcommittedgraveabuseofdi,scretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.[3]
"Graveabuseofdiscretion,"underRule65,hasbeendescribedinanumberofcasesasthearbitraryordespoticexerciseofpowerdueto
passion,prejudiceorpersonalhostilityorthewhimsical,arbitrary,orcapriciousexerciseofpowerthatamountstoanevasionorarefusal
toperformapositivedutyenjointdbylawortoactatallincontemplationoflaw.Foranacttobestruckdownashavingbeendonewith
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discreti(m must be patent and gross.[4] This Court has also previously held that wrong or

irrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissueissufficienttotaintCOMELEC'sactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,andthatinexceptic)nal
cases, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
beinggrosslyunreasonable,thisCourtisnotonlyobliged,buthastheconstitutionaldutytointervene.[5]
ThequestionintheseCnsolidatedPetitionsiswhetherornottheAssailedResolutionsoftheCOMELECaretaintedwithgraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.IftheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuse,thenitbecomesthisCourt'sboundenduty
to strike down the assailed judgment. Moreso in this case, when the right of an individual to run and be voted for public office and the
rightoftheelectoratetochoosetheirleaderareatstake.
Necessarily, therefore, this Court's jurisdiction and its exercise neither hinge on nor require a final determination of the petitioner's
qualifications.KeepinginmindthenarrowconfinesofthisCourt'scertiorarijurisdictionasinvoked,andtheprincipleofjudicialrestraint,I
confinemyviewsonlytothosemattersthatareabsolutelynecessarytoresolvethePetitions,andaccordinglyleavetheresolutio11ofthe
questionsofherqualificationstothePresidentialElectoralTribunalifandwhensuchapetitionisfiledbeforeit.
With this framework, I proceed to examine whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdictionwhenitcancelledpetitioner'scertificateofcandidacy.
TheCOMELECactedwithgrave
abuseofdiscretionwhenitcancelled
thepetitioner'scertificateof
candidacy.
IbelievethattheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionby(1)misinterpretingthejurisprudentialrequirementsofcancellationof
acertificateofcandidacyunderSection78,and(2)forplacingtheburdenofproofuponthepetitionertoshowthatshecomplieswiththe
residencyandcitizenshipqualificationsforthepositionofPresident.
TheCOMELECgrosslymisinterpretedthelawinthemannerittreatedthejurisprudentialrequirementsofcancellationunderSection78.
Specifically, it gravely abused its discretion by failing to determine the existence of petitioner's intent to deceive separate from the
determinationofwhethertherewerefalsematerialrepresentationsinhercertificateofcandidacy.
InMitrav.COMELEC,[6]thisCourtelucidatedonthenatureoftheelementofintenttodeceive,thus:

[T]he misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. The deliberate
character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a
candidatewhofalsifiesamaterialfactcannotrunxxx.

Proceedingfromthisstatement,thisCourtfoundinthatcasethatMitradidnotcommitanydeliberatematerialmisrepresentationinhis
certificateofcandidacy.Moreover,thisCourtheldthattheCOMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninitsappreciationoftheevidencewhich
led it to conclude that Mitra was not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor
ofPalawan.
InJaloverv.Osmea,[7]therequirementofintenttodeceivewasrestated,thus:

Separatefromtherequirementofmateriality,afalserepresentationunderSection78mustconsistofa"deliberateattemptto
mislead,misinform,orhideafact,whichwouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible."Inotherwords,ifmustbemadewith
theintentiontodeceivetheelectorateastothewot1ldbecandidate'squalificationsforpublicoffice.xxx

Thesecasesshowthattheremustbeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhichwouldotherwiserenderacandidate
ineligible.Therefore,.therequirementofintentcannotbedisposedofbyasimplefindingthattherewasfalserepresentationofamaterial
fact to be sure, there must also be a showing of the candidate's intent to deceive as animating the making of the false material
representation.[8]
Inthecaseofpetitioner:apartfromthefindingthattherewerefalsematerialrepresentationsinthepetitioner'scertificateofcandidacy,
theCOMELECreliedmainlyontherepresentationpreviouslymadebythepetitionerinher2012certificateofcandidacyforthepositionof
Senator,andthatsheisafoundling,tosupporttheinferencethatthepetitionerintendedtomisleadtheelectorateintobelievingthatshe
has the requisite residency and naturalborn status. The existence of intent to mislead is not a question of law and I find that the
petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show, contrary to any intent to mislead, that she honestly believed herself to have the
req_uisitequalificationstorunforPresident.Herevidenceshouldhavebeendirectlymetbytherespondents.Asitwas,herevidencewas
notconsideredbytheCOMELEC.Onthisground,itsjudgmentwastaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Moreover, contrary to the rules of evidence, the COMELEC shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner, ascribing to her the onus of
showingthatshehadthequalificationstorunforPresident,insteadofrequiringtherespondentstoprovethethreeelementsthatfurnish
thegroundsfordenialofduecourseorcancellationofcertificateofcandidacy.
Burdenofproofisthedutyofapartytopresentevidenceonthefactsinissuenecessarytoestablishhisclaimordefensebytheamount

of evidence required by law.[9] This Court has consistently held, and it is an established rule, that the burden of evidence may shift
dependingupontheexigenciesofthecaseinthecourseoftrial[10]however,theburdenofproofremainswiththepartyuponwhomitis
originallyimposed[11]hewhoseekstheaffirmativeofanissue.Inthiscase,aswithotherelectioncases,theburdenofproofisplaced
uponthepartiesseekingthedenialofduecourseorcancellationofacertificateofcandidacy.[12]
In this case, this shifting of burden of proof to the petitioner unfairly skewed the analysis and resulting conclusions reached by the
COMELECinthepetitionsforcancellationagainstthepetitioner.ItwouldappearthattheCOMELECreliedmerelyonitsjudgmentbeing
based on substantial evidence, without considering the effect upon the petitions for cancellation of the: (1) respondents' claims and
evidencebeingmetbythoseofthepetitioner,and(2)evidenceorbothpartiesatequipoise.Thiserroneousconsiderationsimilarlytaints
thejudgmentwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Consequent to the finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, this case falls within the exception whereby this Court can
examinethefactualconclusionsoftheCOMELEC.
Therewasnointenttodeceive.
A.Withrespecttoresidency
Mitra,whileadmittedlynotonallfourswiththiscase,sharesenoughsimilaritiestothiscaseonaconceptuallevelthattheanalysisused
therein can be applied by parity of reasoning. Inasmuch as we held in Mitra that the establishment of a new domicile may be an
incremental process and that the totality of the evidence should he considered in determining whether or not a new domicile was
established,thesamedisquisitionappliestotheinstantcase.
ThetotalityofevidencepresentedbythepetitionerpointstoadecisionandactiontoestablishanewdomicileofchoiceinthePhilippines
asearlyas2005.Stateddifl.erently,myconsideredappreciationofthetotalityofalltheseovertactsdonebythepetitioneristhatshe
hadbelievedingoodfaiththatwhenshefilleduphercertificateofcandidacyshewascorrectlyreckoningtheperiodofherresidencyfrom
thetimethatshehadtakenconcretestepstotransferherdomicile.UsingthestandardofSection74oftheOEC,petitionerfilledinthe
certificateofcandidacyto"thebestofherknowledge".Toimputeintenttomisleaduponapersonwhorepresentswhatsheknowstothe
bestofherknowledgeandbelieftobetrue,assupportedbytheevidence,istocommitgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Thepetitionerdidnotfabelyrepresentherlengthofresidence.

All told, the evidence of petitioner preponderantly shows that she (1) has been physically present in the country from 2005 (2) had
intendedtoremaininthePhilippines,and(3)abandonedherdomicileintheUnitedStates.
Actualphysicalpresence
The petitioner sufficiently established that after she came to the Philippines in 2004 to support her father's campaign, she returned in
2005withamorepermanentstayinmindandhadbeenphysicallypresentinthecountrysincethatshehadbroughtherchildrentothe
Philippinesinmid2005.
Animusmanendiandanimusnonrevertendi
Similar to evidence showing physical presence, the petitioner sufficiently showed that since 2005, she and her entire family had taken
stepstopermanentlyrelocateInthePhilippines.PetitionershowedthatasearlyasMarch2005,herhusbandhadbeguntheprocessof
transportinganddisposingoftheirhouseholdbelongingsintheUnitedStates.Bythemiddleof2005,thepetitionerandherhildrenhad
arrivedinthePhilippinesthechildren,enrolledinPhilippineschoolsbyJune2005.Thenextyear,theybegantheconstructionofahome
andacquiredacondominiumunittostayinuntiltheconstructioniscompleted.
Hertraveldocumentsalsoshowthatwheneversheleftthecountry,shereturnedtothePhilippines.ByJuly2006,shehadtakenherOath
ofAllegiancetotheRepublicofrhePhilippinespursuanttotheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.9225.Herhusbandhadalsoformallynotified
theUnitedStatesPostalServiceoftheirchangeofaddress.TheentireprocessculminatedinheracceptanceoftheMovieandTelevision
ReviewandClassificationBoard("MTRCB")ChairmanshipandherrenunciationofherAmericancitizenshipin2010.
Toanunbiasedmind,alltheseovertactswouldshowthattheintentanddemonstrativeactstotransfertoorestablishanewdomicileof
choice began in 2005. The evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the petitioner's physical presence, animus
manendi and animus non revertendi had concurred by clear overt acts obtaining as early as 2005. While admittedly, the last acts that
forecloseanyotherconclusionweredonein2010,morethansubstantialevidenceispresenttosupportherclaimthatshehadestablished
a new domicile of choice in the Philippines from May 24, 2005. As inMitra,[13] the transfer was an incremental process, nowhere near
completedin2005,butalreadyexistingthen.Isubmitthatthesefactsleadtonootherconclusionthanthatthepetitionerhadalready
determinedtopermanentlyresideinthePhilippines.
Onthispoint,IquotewithapprovaltheSeparateOpinion[14]ofCommissionerLuieTitoF.Guia:

To prove her claims, Respondent presented, among others, the following: a) Email exchanges from 18 March 2005 to 29
September 2006 with Victory Van Corporation and National Veterinary Quarantine Service Bureau of Animal Industry of the
Philippinesindicatingrespondentandherhusband'splanofrelocatingalltheirmovablepropertiesfromtheUnitedStatestothe
Philippinesb)OfficialTranscripts,PermanentSchoolRecordsandRegistrarCertiJicationshowingtheenrolmentofherschool
aged children in Philippine schools before June 2005 c) her Philippine Bureau of Internal Records [sic] or Tax Identification
Number 239290513000 and d) Condominium Certificate Titles, Declarations of Real Property and a Transfer Certificate of

Titleindicatingacquisitionsofdifferentrealpropertiesinthecountry.
It is clear from the foregoing that Respondent was physically and actually present in the Philippines sint:e May 2005. This is
oneoftherequisitesforaneffectivechangeofdomicile.Itisalsoevidentthat,independentofherstillbeingaUScitizenat
that time, Respondent had already intended to change her domicile from the US to the Philippines. All her acts and conduct
pointstoherintentiontotransferherresidencetothePhilippines.
xxxx
Fromthesubstantialevidenceonrecord,IfindthatthereisnomisrepresentationinRespondent'sCoCinsofarasherperiodof
residencyinthePhilippinesisconcerned.ItisanerrorfortheCommissiontocancelRespondent'sCoConthisground.
xxxx

To my mind, there can be no clearer manifestation of the earlier concurrence of the petitioner's animus manendi and animus non
revertendi with her physical presence in the country than when she brought her children to the Philippines in the middle of 2005 and
enrolledtheminthesameyearinPhilippineschools.Toanyparent,thisisaverybigdecisionthatisnotlightlymade.Touprootteens
from the world they know, and to displace them from the environment in which they grew up, is, to say the least, a very significant
decisionforanyparenttomake.Indeed,asaparent,thepetitionerispresumedtobeactinginthebestinterestofherchildren.Andthat
petitionerdidthisconvincesmethatpetitioner'sdecisiontopermanentlyresideinthePhilippineswasalreadymadeatthetime,orjust
before,thechildrenwerebroughttothePhilippinestostaywithherandtostudy,inthemiddleof2005.
Giventhetotalityofevidencepresentedbypetitioner,theinaccuracieswithrespecttotheperiodofherresidencycanbeconsideredan
honestmistake.Thepetitionerhadadmittedtomakingamistakeindeterminingtheprecisedateofthestartofherresidencywhenshe
filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator in 2012. The filing of the 2015 certificate of candidacy is the earliest
opportunitythatthepetitionerhadtocorrectherpreviousrepresentationtheveryfactthatshechangedherperiodofresidence,onits
own,cannotbethebasisofafindingthattherewasdeliberateintenttomisleadastoherresidency.
As for the 2015 certificate of candidacy, even assuming that the representation that her period of residence began on May 24, 2005 is
false, the petitioner had sufficiently shown that the effective transfer of domicile occurred in 2005. Even in an effectbased analysis,
therefore, there should not have been a finding that there was intent to mislead. By fact and law, she complies with the residency
requirement,andnodeceptionoftheelectorateastoherqualificationensuesbyvirtueofherrepresentation.
What is more, she has in her favor substantial evidence to show that she had been physically present and had taken overt actions
demonstrativeofheranimusmanendiandanimusnonrevertendifromthetimeofherclaimedperiodofresidenceonMay24,2005.[15]In
fine,theevidencepresentedpreponderatedinfavorofthepetitioner.Andevenifweweretoassumearguendothattheevidenceofthe
partiesisatequipoise,still,theCOMELECshouldhaveruledagainstthepartywiththeburdenofprooftherespondents.
ThisapplicationofburdenofproofcanbeseeninoneoftheholdingsinTecsonv.COMELEC,thus:

[B]ut while the totality of theevidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalhom citizen of the
Philippines,theevidenceonhandstillwouldpreponderateinhisfavorenoughtoholdthathecannotbeheldguiltyofhaving
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not ther(has been material
misrepresentation,which,assoruledinRomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful."[16]

B.Withrespecttocitizenship
OnthispointIdeviatefromthemajorityopinionwhenitproceededtoruleonthequestionofthepetitioner'scitizenship.Keepinginmind
thenatureofthisCourt'slimitedcertiorarireview,IbelievethatthisCourtneednothavemadeadefinitivendingonpetitioner'sstatusas
anaturalbornFilipinocitizen.
I concur, however, that the COMELEC grossly misappreciated the evidence when it found that tle petitioner deliberately intended to
misleadtheelectoratewhenshestatedthatsheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,knowingfullwellthatsheisafoundling.TheCOMELEC
would have us believe that the petitioner knew that she was not a naturalborn citizen at the time that she accomplished and filed her
certificateofcandidacy,andknowingthis,deliberatelyattemptedtodeceivetheelectoratebyclaimingthatsheisanaturalbornFilipino
citizen.
Thequestionofpetitioner'scitizenshipasafoundlingissubjecttolegalinterpretation.Anyconclusionreachedonthispointisnecessarily
alegalconclusion.Ifoneneedsprooftoshowhowintricateandsusceptibletoseveralinterpretationsherrealstatusisasafoundling,one
needsonlytolookatthedifferentinterpretationsadvancedbythemembersoftheCOMELECandofthisCourt.
Theruleisthatanymistakeonadoubtfulordifficultquestionoflawmaybethebasisofgoodfaith.[17]InKasilagv.Rodriguez,[18]this
Court,citingManresa,recognizedthepossibilityofanexcusableignoranceoforerroroflawbeingabasisforgoodfaith:

Wedonotbelievethatinreallifetherearenotmanycasesofgoodfaithfoundeduponanerroroflaw.Whentheacquisition
appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and even
establishedbyappealstakenfromfinaljudgmentsandadministrativeremediesagainstthequalificationofregistrars,andthe
possibilityoferrorisremoteundersuchcircumstancesbut,unfortunately,privatedocumentsandevenverbalagreementsfar
exceedpublicdocumentsinnumber,andwhilenooneshouldbeignorantofthelaw,thetruthisthatevenwewhoarecalled
upontoknowandapplyitfallintoerrornotinfrequently.However,aclear,manifest,andtrulyunexcusableignoranctisone
thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from
complexlegalprinciplesandfromtheinterpretationofconflictingdoctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the
capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of
certainacts,andanerroroflawispossibleintheinterpretationofdoubtfuldoctrines.

If indeed a mistake was made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be considered a mistake on a difficult question of law that
couldbethebasisforgoodfaith.Inthisregard,goodfaithispresumed.[19]Inthesamevein,itispresumedthatapersonisinnocentofa
crime or wrong, and that the law was obeyed.[20] Without more, the legal conclusion alleged by the respondents in the petitions for
cancellation,andthereafterreachedbytheCOMELEC,thatthepetitionerwasnotanaturalborncitizensimplybecausesheisafoundling
isnotsufficienttoovercomethepresumptionthatthepetitionermadetherepresentationastohercitizenshipingoodfaith.
Evenassumingthatthesepresumptionscannotbeconsideredinthepetitioner'sfavor,thelackofil.tenttodeceiveisfullysupportedby
evidencetendingtoshowthatshefullydischargedtheburdenofheroathinthecertificateofcandidacythatherstatusasanaturalborn
Filipinoistrueandcorrecttothebestofherknowledge.Theevidencesubmittedbythepetitionertendstomoretitanadequatelyestablish
thatbeforehernaturalizationasanAmericancitizen,sheconsistentlycomportedherselfas,andwasdeemed,aFilipinocitizen,evenby
the government. Though this by no means determines her real status, it cannot be gainsaid that any reasonable person can be led m
believethatheishowhewasdeemedortreated,i.e.,anaturalborncitizen.Givenwhatthepetitionerbelievedofherstatus,theclaim
that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen is far from groundless or deceptive. It is credible that she believed in good faith that she is a
naturalborn Filipino citizen, and that this fact is true and correct to the best of her knowledgeas she so swore in her certificate of
candidacy.
Inthefinalanalysis,evenassumingfalsityinherrepresentationastohercitizenshipsimilartoherresidency,thisfactaloneshouldnot
have led to an automatic finding of intent to mislead and deceive the electorate, and ultimately to the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacyunderRule78.
A final word. The function of this Court's review in this Petition does not absolutely require an examination of the petitioner's
qualifications,butonlytodeterminewhethertheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction
whenitcancelledthepetitioner'sCertificateofCandidacy.Thisisinkeepingwiththelimitedscopeofreviewinthiscertioraripetition.By
applyingthestandardsthathavebeenpreviouslyset,thisCourtcandispensejusticewithoutpresumingtomakethatdetermination.
Forthesereasons,IvotetoGRANTtheconsolidatedPetitions.

[1]OMNIBUSELECTIONCODE,Sec.73.
[2]Caballerov.COMELEC,G.R.No.209835,September22,2015SeealsoVillafuertev.COMELEC,G.R.No.206698,February25,2014,

717SCRA312,citingSalcedoIIv.COMELEC,371Phil.377(1999).
[3]DelaCruzv.COMELEC,698Phil.548,559(2012)Laurena,Jr.v.COMELEC,553Phil.210,217(2007),citingManzalav.COMELEC,

551Phil.28,35(2007).
[4]AllianceforNationalismandDemocrucy(ANAD)v.COMELEC,G.R.No.206987,September10,2013,705SCRA340,344,citingBeluso

v. COMELEC, 635 Phil. 436, 443 (2010) Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 1172, 1183 (2003), citing Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,252Phil.253,262(1989)Lalicanv.Vergara,342Phil.485,495(1997).
[5]Sabiliv.COMELEC,686Phil.649(2012),andJaloverv.Osmena,G.R.No.209286,September23,2014,736SCRA267,citingMitra

v.COMELEC,648Phil.165(2010).
[6]636Phil.753,780(2010).
[7]Supranote5,at282.
[8]InTagolinov.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,706Phil.534,551(2013),acasethatdealtwiththequestionofwhethera

disqualifiedcandidatewhosecertificateofcandidacywasnotcancelledcouldbesubstituted,theCounratiocinated:

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is
ofbaresignificanceinaSection78petitionasitisenoughthattheperson'sdeclarationofamaterialqualificationintheCoCbe
false.Inthisrelation,jurisprudenceholdsthatanexpressfindingthatthepersoncommittedanydeliberatemisrepresentation
isoflittleconsequenceinthedeterminationofwhetherone'sCoCshouldbedeemedcancelledornot.Whatremainsmaterialis
thatthepetitionessentiallyseekstodeny"duecoursetoand/orcanceltheCoConthebasisofone'sineligibilityandthatthe
samebegrantedwithoutanyqualification.

However,casesoncancellationofcertilicateofcandidacyunderSection78(whichwerepromulgatedafterTagolino)retainedtheelement
ofintent:Villafuertev.COMELEC,supranote2andHayudiniv.COMELEC,G.R.No.207900,April22,2014,723SCRA223.
[9]RULESOFCOURT,Rule131,Sec.l.
[10]Bautistav.Sarmiento,223Phil.181,186(1985)SeealsoDeLeonv.BankofthePhilippineIslands,G.R.No.184565,November20,

2013,710SCRA443VitarichCorporationv.Losin,649Phil.164(2010).
[11]Bautistav.Sarmiento,id.at185.
[12]Reyesv.COMELEC,G.R.No.207264,June25,2013,699SCRA522thesamediscussionrepeatedintheResolutiondatedOctober22,

2013Tecsonv.COMELEC,468Phil.421(2004).
[13]Supranote5.
[14]IntheConsolidatedPetitionsdocketedasSPANo.15002(DC),SPANo.15007(DC),andSPANo.15139(DC).
[15] The amount of evidence presented by the petitioner sufficiently distinguishes her case from the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC, 434

Phil.861(2002),Caballerov.COMELEC,supranote2andReyesv.COMELEC,supranote12,whereinthisCourtwasconstrainedtoeither
closelylinkorreckontheperiodofresidencetothereacquisitionofcitizenshipforsheerdearthofevidence.
[16]Supranote12,at488citationsomitted.
[17]Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan,364Phil.890(1999)Kasilagv.Rodriguez,G.R.No.46623,69Phil.217(1939).
[18]Id.at230231,citingManresa,CommentariesontheSpanishCivilCode,VolumeIV,pp.100,101and102.
[19]GSISv.Sps.LabungDeang,417Phil.(,62(2001)Bermudezv.Gonzales,401Phil.38,47(2000).
[20]RULESOFCOURT,Rule131,Sec.3,pars.(a)and(ff).

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