Rabuco vs.

Villegas
Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio Villegas
G.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974.
Teehankee, J.

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and
Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and

governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived
without due process and without just compensation.
Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the
Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings.
Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or
repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials from performing any act
constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners possession of Lot No. 21B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila as safeguarded them under
the Courts subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant to RA 3120.
Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process.
Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the
strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State
(although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional
authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or
the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of
the legislatures right of control and power to deal with State property.

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional
because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties
were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites,
and high school playgrounds.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al

L-24440, March 28, 1968

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and
located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the
City of Zamboanga."

ISSUES:

1.
2.

Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

1.
If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for
public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are
patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we
follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the
property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
2.
If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved
are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of
its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be
followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION
would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be
followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be
regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State,
otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd
paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be
defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the
right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal
Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter
quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent
Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment
was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose
before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His
arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the
nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees.
In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly
nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the
qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event
that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the
appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that
the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint
anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state

qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular

No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive
departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local
autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides:
"The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint
only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is
qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets
the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.

BASO VS PAGCOR
197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal
Protection Clause
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned;
that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from
paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies
of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869
for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the
laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should
be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Posted on October 19, 2012
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764

August 10, 1992

Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a
flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved
by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in
the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of
stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag
ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court
upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against
Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the
lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.
Held:
No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads
used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority
to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property
from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary
for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of
the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary
contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are
still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for
another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be considered
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it
imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the
Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact
measures that will enhance the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order
and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the
illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent
municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets
and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its
time.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-14864. November 23, 1960.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffs and appellee, v. JUANITO
SOLON, defendant and Appellant.
Antonio T. Uy for Appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Frin C.
Zaballero for Appellee.

Juanito Solon, a rig driver in the City of Cebu, was prosecuted and convicted, first in the
Municipal Court and on appeal, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and sentenced to pay a
fine of one Peso (P1.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for violation of
a city ordinance 1 requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit
in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any
public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys of the City.
In this appeal, as well as in the other courts, the accused- appellant assails the legality of the

ordinance under which he was convicted, as violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the same being discriminatory, partial and oppressive in the sense that it does
not equally apply to all owners and possessors of animals, but its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals.
The principle is well-recognized that the limited application of a statute, either in the objects
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate, does not necessarily
violate the guaranty of "equal protection of the laws." 2 It is sufficient, for purposes of
complying with this constitutional mandate, that the classification be reasonable, not
arbitrary or capricious. And, for the classification to be considered reasonable, the same must
be based on substantial distinction which make real differences; must be germane to the
purposes of the law; must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class, under similar conditions. 3
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the ordinance in question, seeking to eliminate
animal wastes in the city streets and other public places, is a measure designed to promote
the health and well-being of the residents. It is so stated in the ordinance. Admittedly, the
same is directed only against vehicle-drawing animals passing through said places and
thoroughfares. But it cannot be said that the classification is without reasonable basis.
The danger to the health of the inhabitants, posed by the animal discharges littering the city
streets and other public places, cannot be minimized. Confronted with this unhealthy and
unsightly situation, the Municipal Board of the City of Cebu passed the questioned
legislation. As stated in the resolution of the Board, this condition was principally brought
about by the presence of about 5,000 horses drawing rigs for hire, that ply the city streets day
and night which, in the course of their occupation, naturally make the objectional discharges.
Their stay in these public places must be more or less regular that the Board estimated the
wastes discharged by these animals and deposited therein to be around 5,000 kilos a day.
Appellants objection, however, is against the application of the prohibition only to these
vehicle-drawing animals and in not extending its operation to those animals that, although
not so utilized, similarly pass through the same streets. It is possible that there may be nonvehicle-drawing animals that also traverse these roads, but their number must be negligible
and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community. There is, likewise, no proof that in its
application, the ordinance grants favors or imposes restrictions on certain owners of vehicledrawing animals which are not accorded or enforced on others. In the light of the above

considerations, we are convinced that the questioned ordinance does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against class legislation.
Appellant, likewise, contests the validity of the provision of Section 4 of the ordinance
insofar as it imposes, as penalty, the suspension of the rig owners license, it being alleged
that the violation having been committed by the driver, the inclusion of the rig owner in the
penalty constitutes deprivation of his property without due process of law.
The allegation is untenable.
In the first place, there is no basis for raising this question in the instant case. It was never
shown that appellant was not the owner of the rig he was driving at the time the violation was
committed. On the other hand, if he is not the owner, then there is no point in his raising
theissue, because he is not affected. The question, therefore, of whether the penalty of
suspension may be imposed upon the driver without including the owner of the rig as party
defendant, if the driver is not the owner of the rig, is of no moment in this case. In the second
place, the decision appealed from, rendered by the Court of First Instance, does not impose
the suspension of the drivers and the rig-owners licenses, although the Municipal Court
included the same. This issue is, therefore, academic.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.

ISSUE: W/N THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF

THE CONSTITUTION?
W/N THE PENALTY CONSTITUTED UNDER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 4
OF THE ORDINANCE DEPRIVES THE DEFENDANT OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

U.S. v. Pompeya
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

service, and who refuse to render the same.

o
o

police power of the state

"general welfare" clause
FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for
willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on
patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or
otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any
governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for
the maintenance of peace and good government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the
feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient
obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for
being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in
conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the
rights of the persons affected thereby.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Is there a cause of action?

Hence, this appeal.

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality;
(b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55;
nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling
upon him for the services mentioned in the law.

ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said
law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of
their rights therein guaranteed

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with
costs. So ordered."

HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between
the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to
assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending
ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the
locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such

Note:
Highlight yellow : facts of the case
Highlight blue: issue/s of the case

Highlight green: ruling of the case

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 18838

July 25, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEOFILO GABRIEL, defendant-appellant.
Canillas & Cardenas for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
The city of Manila, under section 749, as revised, enacted Ordinance No. 938m as follows:
SEC. 749. Bells and criers at auctions. No bell or crier, or other means of
attracting bidders by the use of noise or show, other than a sign or flag, shall be
employed or suffered or permitted to be used, except between the hours of eight
antemeridian to twelve o'clock noon, and from two to seven o'clock postmeridian,
during working days, at or near any o'clock postmeridian, during working days, at or
near any place for sale or at or near any auction or room or near any auction
whatsoever: Provided, however, That the ringing of bells and the use of any
megaphone, magnavox, and criers or other means of attracting buyers and bidders to
any place of sale or auction shall be prohibited on Calles Escolta, Rosario, and
Echague, and Plaza Santa Cruz and Plaza Goiti.
The defendant was accused for a violation of this ordinance. The Municipal Court found him
guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P10 and costs. On appeal the Court of First Instance
affirmed the decision, from which the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the

court erred in holding the ordinance valid, or that the defendant had violated it, and in the
passing of sentence.
It appear that on September 26, 1921, at about 11:20 a.m., a policeman, William S. Able,
while passing through Rosario Street in the city of Manila, heard a crier of an auction sale in
a place of business numbered 109 and 111 of the street, the voice of the crier to be heard at
quite a little distance from the place, and the complaint in question was filed.
There is but little dispute about the facts.
Defendant's counsel contends that the ordinance discriminates and is void and
unconstitutional. It will be noted that it applies alike to all persons on Calles Escolta, Rosario,
Echague, Plaza Santa Cruz, and Plaza Goiti. There is no discrimination against any person in
business on those particular streets. It is in the nature of a police regulation, and to that extent
is intended as a business regulation. It must be admitted that, under its police power, the City
Council of Manila has authority to regulate and control public auctions within its city
boundaries. For reasons satisfactory to the City Council, between certain hours and on those
particular streets, the ordinance prohibits a crier or the use of a bell to attract bidders or
anything other than a sign or flag.
We must assume that there was some good and sufficient reason why it was enacted, and it is
not the province or this court to say whether or not its enactment was prudent or advisable. It
is nothing more than a regulation of the business, affairs of the city, and is a matter in the
discretion of the council acting under its police power. There is no discrimination in the
ordinance. It applies to all kinds and classes of people alike doing business within the
prohibited area, and no person within the city limits has any legal or constitutional right to
auction his goods without a license from, or the consent of, the city, and it must follow that,
so long as the ordinance is uniform, the city has a legal right to specify how, when, where,
and in what manner goods may be sold at auction within its limits, and to prohibit their sale
in any other manner.
There is no merit in the defense. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

ISSUE: W/N THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

NORBERTO ASUNCION, ET AL. vs. MANUEL DE YRIARTE

[G.R. No. 9321. September 24, 1914.]

FACTS: The proposed incorporators began an action in the CFI to compel the chief of the
division of archives to receive and register said articles of incorporation and to do any and all
acts necessary for the complete incorporation of the persons named in the articles. The court
below found in favor of the defendant and refused to order the registration of the articles
mentioned, maintaining and holding that the defendant, under the Corporation Law, had
authority to determine both the sufficiency of the form of the articles and the legality of the
object of the proposed corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment
The chief of the division of archives, the respondent, refused to file the articles of
incorporation, upon the ground that the object of the corporation, as stated in the articles, was
not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of Act No. 1459, they were not registerable.
Hence, this action to obtain a writ of mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the
Corporation Law, on being presented with articles of incorporation for registration, to decide
not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the
purposes of the proposed corporation.
HELD: YES.
CORPORATION LAW; POWERS AND DUTIES OF CHIEF OF DIVISION OF
ARCHIVES, EXECUTIVE BUREAU. The chief of the division of archives, for and on
behalf of the division, has authority under the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) to determine
the sufficiency of the form of articles of incorporation offered for registration with the
division.
Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows:
Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the
Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the
division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks of the Executive Bureau articles of
incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . .
Simply because the duties of an official happen to be ministerial, it does not necessarily
follow that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of

law. We are of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of
incorporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the
corporation as expressed in the articles are lawful. We do not believe that, simply because
articles of incorporation presented for registration are perfect in form, the division of archives
must accept and register them and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no
matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in the articles. The chief of
the division of archives, on behalf of the division, has also the power and duty to determine
from the articles of incorporation presented for registration the lawfulness of the purposes of
the proposed corporation and whether or not those purposes bring the proposed corporation
within the purview of the law authorizing corporations for given purposes.
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL HIM TO PERFORM DUTIES. The duties of the chief of
the division of archives, so far as relates to the registration of articles of incorporation, are
purely ministerial and not discretional; and mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his
duties under the Corporation Law if, in violation of law, he refuse to perform them
On the contrary, there is no incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are
ministerial and that he has no authority to exercise discretion in receiving and registering
articles of incorporation. He may exercise judgment that is, the judicial function in the
determination of the question of law referred to, but he may not use discretion. The question
whether or not the objects of a proposed corporation are lawful is one that can be decided one
way only. If he err in the determination of that question and refuse to file articles which
should be filed under the law, that decision is subject to review and correction and, upon
proper showing, he will be ordered to file the articles.
Discretion, it may be said generally, is a faculty conferred upon a court or other official
by which he may decide a question either way and still be right. The power conferred
upon the division of archives with respect to the registration of articles of incorporation
is not of that character. It is of the same character as the determination of a lawsuit by a
court upon the merits. It can be decided only one way correctly.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Attorney-General of July 11, 1904; July 25, 1904; October 10, 1905; and September 7, 1911;
also Berriz, Diccionario de la Administracion, p. 35.) If, therefore, we were to restrict our
investigation to those portions of the Administrative Code which authorize a municipal council to
prohibit and penalize gambling, there would exist grave doubt, to say the least, of the validity of
ordinance No. 3 of the municipality of Orion, Bataan.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13678

November 12, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PRUDENCIO SALAVERIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose R. Varela for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on February 28, 1917, an ordinance which,
among other things, prohibited the playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays,
and penalized the violation thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of not less than P10 nor
more than P200, and by jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less than P5 nor more than P200.
The justice of the peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into effect, was Prudencio Salaveria,
now the defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his official station, on the evening of March 8,
1917, not a Sunday or legal holiday, seven persons including the justice of the peace an his wife
were surprised by the police while indulging in a game of panguingue in the house of the justice
of the peace. The chief of police took possession of the cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, an
P2.07 in money, used in the game.
hazard.
The ordinance of Orion, Bataan, merely prohibits the playing of panguingue on certain days,
without describing it. Further, although this court has considered the method by which many
other games are played, it has never as yet authoritatively decided whether panguingue was a
game of skill or hazard. Nor was any evidence on this point introduced in the present case.
However, a reading of the decision of the trial court and of official opinions of two AttorneysGeneral, of which we can take judicial cognizance, warrants the deduction that panguingue is
not a game of chance or hazard and is not prohibited by Act No. 1757. (See Opinions of the

ISSUE: W/N THE ORDINANCE OF THE MMUNICIPILATY OF ORION,

BATAAN VALID?
protection of property therein."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
The ordinance of the municipality of Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious, or
unreasonable or discriminatory. Its purposes evidently are to improve the morals and stimulate
the industry of the people. A person is to be compelled to refrain from private acts injurious both
to himself an his neighbors. These objects, to be attained by limiting the pastime to definite days,
do not infringe any law of the general government.
The constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law
is not violated by this ordinance. Liberty of action by the individual is not unduly circumscribed;
that is, it is not unduly circumscribed if we have in mind the correct notion of this "the greatest of
all rights
The judiciary can very well take notice of the fact that municipalities are accustomed to enacting
ordinances aimed at the regulation of gambling. The executive authorities an the AttorneyGeneral have usually upheld the validity of such ordinances, especially those intended to restrict
the playing of panguingue.
More important still, the courts cannot but realize that gambling, in its larger sense as well as in
its restricted sense, is an act beyond the pale of good morals, which, for the welfare of the
Filipino people, should be exterminated.
Wherefore, although panguingue is not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper subject for
regulation by municipal authorities acting under their delegated police power, whose laudable
intention is to improve the public morals and promote the prosperity of their people, their action
should be upheld by the courts. Ordinance No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3282. January 9, 1908. ]
RICARDO AGUADO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF
MANILA, as administrator of the water supply and
Carriedo funds, Defendant-Appellant.
Modesto Reyes, for Appellant.
Haussermann, Cohn and Williams, for Appellee.
This was an action commenced by the plaintiff, as assignor of
certain claims held by Tomas Luna Muoz against the
defendant, on the 28th day of April, 1903, in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering of
the city of Manila the sum of P5,621.40, with interest and
costs.
The complaint contains three separate causes of action against
the defendant, two of them being for coal sold and delivered to
the predecessor of the present city of Manila, the Ayuntamiento
de Manila, as administrator de las aguas de Carriedo, for which
the plaintiff claims there was due him upon the first cause of
action the sum of P3,116.40 and upon the third cause of action
the sum of P585. The second cause of action alleges that the
plaintiff deposited with the said Ayuntamiento de Manila the
sum of P1,920 as a guaranty for the fulfillment of the contract
sued upon. The plaintiff prayed for judgment for the sum of
P5,621.40, with interest and costs.

That on or about the 11th day of June, 1897, Tomas Luna

Muoz made and entered into a certain contract with the said
Ayuntamiento of Manila, said contract being in the terms and
figures appearing in the copy thereof annexed to the complaint
That prior to the 1st day of April, 1898, under and in pursuance
of the terms of said contract, the said Tomas Luna Muoz sold
and delivered unto the said Ayuntamiento of Manila 1,340.30
tons of coal and received and collected therefor, of and from
the said Ayuntamiento of Manila, the sum of 16,083.60 pesos,
Mexican currency, the contract price thereof; that between the
1st day of April, 1898, and the 30th day of April, 1898, under
and in pursuance of the terms of the said contract, the said
Tomas Luna Muoz sold and delivered unto the said
Ayuntamiento of Manila, 259.70 tons of coal of the value of
3,116.40 pesos, Mexican currency, at the contract price of 12
pesos, Mexican currency, per ton.
That at various times since the said 6th day of August, 1901,
plaintiff has made due demand upon the defendant in the
manner required by law and by the terms of said contract for
the payment of said sum of 3,116.40 pesos, Mexican currency,
and the said defendant has failed and refused to pay said sum
or any part thereof and the same remains due and wholly
unpaid.
That the city of Manila at the present time and ever since the
organization of said city on the 6th day of August, 1901, has
been in possession of the water system known as the "Carriedo
waterworks" and of the lands belonging and pertaining to said
water works, and of 94 shares of the capital stock of the Banco
Espanol-Filipino of the value of about 18,400 pesos, Philippine

currency, which said shares of stock constituted a part of the

Carriedo Funds in the hands of the Ayuntamiento of Manila
prior to August 13, 1898; that the dividends and income
accruing to said shares have been received and collected at all
times since the 6th day of August, 1901, by the defendant, the
city of Manila. That said defendant, the city of Manila, has
exclusive charge of the maintenance and operation of said
water system, collects and receives the moneys due and
payable for the consumption of the water supplied thereby, and
disburses the money necessary for salaries, supplies, repairs,
and improvements according to the terms and conditions of its
Charter, Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission.
ISSUE: (1) whether or not the present city of Manila is liable
under the contracts referred to in the agreed statement of
facts, for the obligations created therein by the old city of
Manila (Ayuntamiento de Manila) as its successor, and (2) if it
is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a writ of execution against
any of the property of the present city for the purpose of
satisfying that liability when the same has been reduced to a
judgment.
The lower court held that the present city of Manila was liable
upon such contracts, upon the theory that it was the successor
of the old city of Manila (Ayuntamiento de Manila) as it existed
under the Spanish Government. The lower court held that the
old city of Manila (Ayuntamiento de Manila) was the trustee and
administrator of the Carriedo waterworks, and as such trustee
was responsible for all the debts created or contracted in the
administration of such works. This fact is neither admitted nor
denied in the agreed statement of facts; neither is there

anything in the record which justifies that conclusion. The

contract upon which the plaintiff relies for recovery in no way
indicate that the Ayuntamiento de Manila made said contracts
as trustee, nor in a representative capacity, but, upon the
contrary, the contracts themselves show that they were made
by the Ayuntamiento de Manila with the assignor of the present
plaintiff simply as the Ayuntamiento de Manila and not as
trustee or agent. Our conclusion is, then, upon this question,
that the contract which the assignor of the present plaintiff
made with the Ayuntamiento de Manila was made with the old
city in its corporate capacity simply and not in a representative
capacity as trustee or agent. If there has been a violation of the
terms of the contract such violation was made by the
Ayuntamiento de Manila and not by the present city of Manila.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to discuss the
relation of trust so ably presented in the briefs of the different
attorneys.
The city of Manila is in no way the successor of the
Ayuntamiento de Manila in law. The mere fact that the present
authority in these Islands has given to the present city powers
like those exercised by the Ayuntamiento de Manila in no way
makes the former the successor of the latter. It is an entirely
new organization, a new agent of a new principal, and only has
such authority, such powers, and such obligations and
responsibilities as the new principal has seen fit to grant and
impose. The grant of powers (the Charter of Manila) has been
examined in vain to find anything which would make the
present city of Manila liable in any way to comply, even though
it desired to do so, with the obligations contracted by the

Ayuntamiento de Manila, and therefore we must hold, as we do

hereby, that the present city of Manila is in no wise responsible
to the plaintiff upon the contracts made between its assignor
and the old city of Manila.
These conclusions make it unnecessary for us to discuss the
second question above suggested, for the reason that the city
not being liable upon the contract, no question as to the right

to take out a writ of execution against the property of said city

can arise in the present case.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the lower court is
hereby revoked, and, without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.