FACTS:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape
case against the latter.
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to
have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident
because Oblena threatened to kill her family.
As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong
had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently
removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong
before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a
sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the
incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and
deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a
person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous
relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also
has a legal husband in the province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged
are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the
court overruled his petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used
his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any
criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously
cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a
lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character
in his application to take the bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation
with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause
Oblenas disbarment
HELD:
YES!
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction
or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment
enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the
enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude
unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident
to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even
December 7, 1920
In re CARLOS S. BASA
Pedro Guevara for respondent.
Attorney-General Feria for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and
the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of
Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by
the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of
the Supreme Court. 1
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is
whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpitude.
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.)
Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of
doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins
[1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185;
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by
the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal
law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are
willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a
career may not be utterly ruined.
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.
lawphi1.net
therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was
provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it
is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
xxx
xxx
Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. The attention of the Solicitor General
is invited to decision herein for the purpose of instituting disbarment proceedings
against the appellant Isidro P. Vinzon, who, it appears from the record, is a member
of the Philippine Bar.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The evidence on record reveals that Felicidad M. Bagtas was found to be mentally
incompetent, suffering from schizophrenic reaction, hebephrenic type, upon
examination by a psychiatrist of the U.S. Veterans Administration (U.S.V.A.) in the
course of the investigation conducted in connection with her application for benefits
as the unremarried widow of the late veteran Maximino C. Bagtas (Exh. E). In the
same application Felicidad M. Bagtas was assisted by the herein appellant Atty.
Isidro P. Vinzon, who on various occasions had asked her to thumbmark serial
papers in connection with the application. On April 22, 1955, the appellant above
named, as attorney for the widow Bagtas and through a letter which he had
thumbmarked by the latter, caused the alteration of the applicant widow's address on
record with the U.S.V.A., from San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, to 41 Interior, P.
Burgos St., Cavite City (Exh. A-2). Actually, Bagtas continued to reside in Paraaque,
the new recorded address was really that of the herein appellants.
Sometime in June, 1955 the appellant Filomena B. Vinzon fetched the widow Bagtas
and her mother, Susana Osio, together with one Juliet Oliva, from their abode in
Paraaque and brought them to the appellants' residence in Cavite where they were
supposed to meet an investigator of the U.S.V.A. While there, Osio and Bagtas were
asked to sign several papers, the contents of which they did not know, but which the
appellants said were in connection with the widow's benefit claim. Then Osio and
Oliva were invited by, the appellant Isidro P. Vinzon to go to the municipal building,
leaving Bagtas in the company of Mrs. Vinzon. From their tour of the municipal
building, Osio and Oliva were brought by Isidro P. Vinzon to a restaurant before they
returned to the Vinzon residence. Upon their arrival thereat Osio and Oliva noticed
Felicidad Bagtas wiping ink from her thumb, and upon their inquiry, the widow
informed them that Mrs. Vinzon had asked her (Bagtas) to thumbprint several times.
Shortly thereafter, Bagtas and her companions went home, because the alleged,
investigator did not arrive.
Later in that same day Mrs. Vinzon reappeared at Paraaque, and told Osio that they
would proceed to Manila in order to "get the benefits as early as possible." So once
again, Osio and Bagtas went out with Mrs. Vinzon, and in front of the U.S.V.A.
building on the Escolta they met a man whom Osio and the widow took to be an
agent of the U.S.V.A. This man inquired of Mrs. Vinzon if Felicidad Bagtas was "the
one," and upon an affirmative answer the same person brought them to an eatery
where Osio was asked to sign something, after which the amount of P2,421.00 and
some centavos' were delivered to her. Upon Vinzon's suggestion Osio gave that
unnamed man P50.00, and when they were already at the bus terminal on their way
home, Osio gave Mrs. Vinzon another amount, making her total disbursement for
that afternoon P200.00.
In his answer filed on April 22, 1963, respondent alleges the following:
1. That he admits that there is a final decision of the Court of Appeals, a portion of
which is quoted in the letter of the Solicitor General dated Dec. 28, 1962;
2. That he, however denies, that a conviction for any crime per se is sufficient ground
following suspension or disbarment:
3. That while the decision of the Court of Appeals became final for lack of appeal to
the Supreme Court, it does not necessarily follow that the said conviction is
absolutely binding on this Hon. Supreme Court if upon hearing of the instant
proceedings, turns out to be not legal nor valid under the law and facts, for, in
parenthesis, we state that the records of the Hon. Supreme Court can attest to the
fact that there is quite a number of Court of Appeals decisions which have been
reversed for being illegal and contrary to law by the Supreme Court, which is the
highest Tribunal;
4. That the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and its stand on the legal
questions raised, are not in accordance with the doctrines cited in Appellant's Brief;
5. That the testimonies of prosecution witnesses viewed in their proper light do not
prove any estafa, for nowhere in their evidence to the effect that this respondent had
ever cashed the check in question, on the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution
simply pointed to an unknown person who delivered certain sum of money to the
offended party in the presence of the wife of respondent, and there is even no proof
that respondent and said unknown person knew each other at anytime before or after
the alleged delivery;
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question
that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral
turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In
re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt can not now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable.
Wherefore, respondent Isidro P. Vinzon is hereby disbarred.
VILLASANTA
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests,
because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under
oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
of desistance made by complainant) which was granted by the Court on August 20, 1982.
However, on February 14, 1983, complainant filed an Administrative case and prayed for
respondents disbarment on the grounds that: Respondent used his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage; he mirepresented himself in his application to take the bar
exam; lack of good moral character; and that complainant was deceived into signing the
affidavit of desistance and that the only reason why he reconciled with her is so that she
would withdraw the complaint against him. Complainant also claimed that respondent sent
her a letter which proves all of her allegations where the respondent states that their
marriage was actually void form the beginning. Respondent denied that he had sent such
letter. On March 26, 1984, the Bar Confidants report recommended indefinite suspension of
respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Trebonian Tabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The court held that Atty. Trebonia nTabangis guilty of violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is thus suspended from the practice of law until further
notice.The Court held that respondents declaration in his application for Admission to the
1981Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact
made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7,
Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been
known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and
as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was
not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the
moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and
for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private
and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy
applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like
the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having
had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid
in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is
more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling
a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless
it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any
evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission
to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that
entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission
to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath
of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student
to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Footnotes
1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of permission
to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of this Court
dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof: