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1.

Digest of reports on Operation "HUSKY"

Combined Operations IHeacdqarters,

la, Riclbmond Terrace,
Whitehall,
Loncion, S.W. 1.

CT/6
1 Nov.

e 19/43.
1943.

'.j

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47

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Copy No:,

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B I IT E D

'

O F E RATIO N S

DIGEST OF SOME NOTES AD REPORTS Y.ROM OPERATION

t

tt

HiJSJ

.(Alied laidings in SICILY in July, 1943. )

Prop?'eId
Octobe-r,

r the d-icction of thoe

C ifof ClomlinorT O1DcOLia

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CO0MtINED OPERATIONS E-ADQUASRTERS

MOLITIL---Y Tint~'0PiiATION SUT',"1~i kR

cuad 33L.LETINSO CF UNZPEAL

l-DTLSTlh-"'ITTOIN 11S)T.
Copy No.

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LU.

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-..-..

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(I.

ADiZALTY.

Deputy First Sea Lord

2
A. C., ti?. .
DI of P.
D. XTS. D.
1, in

35
4

5
6
7

C.

D.N.C.
D. S. PX

D.N.E.*(C. O.)

10

D.H,0.W.D,
Assistant Con+roller (R & D)
0. ('C. 0.)
D.
D.D.. ao. (CO..)
*D.C.O.M.
Sect 'Ion 2.

12

13
14

0tFFICE.

iKA,

tG.SO
AI. I.
D.I.L0*

D..0o. (.O.I. (sP.)) through Z.M.L.(C.,

D. M.O. (I.0.5. )
D.x.T.(M.T.6(c.o.))
Scientific Adviser
D.S.D. (S.D.5(a))
D.,R.A,.*C.
D. R.*
D. S igs
D, Int.
D. W.V.
Brig. Q Ops
D,. bov.
D. Tn.
D.S.T.
E. in C.
E. inc
.

D.M..
Col,

.)

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

27
28

29
30
31

D. Mb:v(Q. M.6)
DTn (Tn

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15
16
17
18
19

1)

Zx
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33
(E.Ops)

(D.D.a..
Abriamza.

34

(w ))
Q Ops.

35
36

kiTIrTRY.
Section 3.jAiR

D. of OpS (T.A.C.)

37
38

D. A.-T.

DD.T.C.*0.

39
40

A.C.A.S. (P

41
42

D,CG- of S.
D. W. 0.
D, of Nov.

43
45
4.5

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Section 4

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Copy No.

O.O.S. S .C,

H.Q. CO.SS. A.C.

and for distribution as follows

54

46

Naval Branch (DR)

Atny Qps Dranch (MR)
Air Branch (cr)
ADM Branch (3R)

D,LD.(KMov,Tn)
M.1'ajor-General Intelligence
xrry Ops Branch (U.S.)
C.M.S.F. (Room 516)
Section 5.

C.C Op.

C.C.0.R. Washington
aind for distribution to follovwing
Authorities :-

55

69

Operations Division, War Department

General St f,.
G* 3, War Dcplpatrtent, Goneral Staff.
Cor.- mm'inig Gane al, Army Ground
Forces.
Co3lmanding Geoneral, lr:;-y Air Forcos.
lnphib ious Sect ion, Readiness Div.
Office of COMIiNCH, U.S. Navy,
Comamnding General, Ainr.-,y Service Forcos,
War Departnert,
Con-ramdant, U. S. Marine Corps,
Headcluartors, U.S.M.C0., Arlington, Va,
Cormancdins Gencral,
Corimand & General Staff School,
Fort Leavemvorth, KJNSAS,
Cozinander, Pacific Floeet u-phibious Force,
San Diego, Cal.
Comamanding General,
Officer of Strategic Services,
vWashington, D. C.
ComrmIadant. Army & Navy Combinod School,
New War Department,
Washington D.C.
B. A.S.

D.C.E.(

I.A.S)

Section 6., U.S. FORCES.

Coindr. Atlxintic Floot kLphibious Force.
(to U.S.NJ.0. for foxw-arding)
Military Attache, American Embassy.
Grrosvenor SCquare
Section 7
.Q. T.

70 -

73

74-

H.Q- ETOUSA.
H.
ETOUSSA

and for distribution to follod.ng

75

(G 3)
Ordnance Dopartment
LbtCol. Norton/.. *

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Lt.Col. Norton, U.S. assault Training Contro

IAp: lo doro.
Chief Intolligoece Division,
Publications Division.
Soction-8

TJNiI-

PROYI^L

& UNITS ,;'\

OP&TIONS
FO UA.
TLK.CTIC-L .,AIR FORCE

21 An y Glroup (C.(OpS)) Branch for internal

distribution :

883

H.Q. Soeconc Ar-,

C. O.C. I Corps

90 - 91
92 -95

H.Q. 8 Corps
HQ. 12 Corps

3 Div.
4.9 Div.
79 Arnd. Div.
101 Sub Area (Boach)
t"
102

G.O.C.
G.0.0C
G.O.C.
Comldr.
"i

tl

"

104

PRM1. Military School, Thurlostono.

rrclt. Obstacle Assault Contro, Alldershot.
T.A.P. H.Q,
No.33 Group Main i.Q. C-atton Park, Roigato.
No.83 Group ROat. H.Q. lPL? Station, Oatvrick, Surroy.
No.84 Comi-posito CGroup.
G.S.O. Kilbride Day, Trg Area, Tiglmiabruaich
C.0. Royal Marines, Tovwya, Taltes,
S.S. Group H.Q., c/o G.H.Q. Home Foroos..
1 Special Sorvice IDrigado
0

24..
3

tt

tt

It

tiit
"

"

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
10o5
104

105
106

107
108

109
110

It

111
112
113
114
115

116

89

Set ion 9. . COOfv.,DI~D OP.;.TIO1NS YAVAL

AUT HORITIES ,.ad -3ASES.
)
(f;. LA.
S.O*L.S.U.
Coimlodore C.*GO.).

R. A. C. O. :z.

Cap tain 1,.L.C.

S.O. Forco J.
Captain J 1.
Captain J 2.
Captain J 3.
Captain J 4.
SE ! INTGHLi2,'
H. M.S.
LOCHQLILORT
STOPPORD
IRLADILLO
'PASCO

JA]LSS COOK
'1J
ILDER

NORTLTh EY
TOI,/ONTOR

FOLIOT
WViESTCLIPF
TURTLE
LIZARD
SEISEPDPETT
Z\:VT

117
118

119
120
121
122

123
124
125

126
127
128
129 - 130
131
132
1336
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
IH.M.S. SQUIID/..

-4-

To

H.,TI.oS.

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Copy No.

142
143
1 44.
, ...,... ........
.,.........
145

METLODON
' LDPIRE III

*. : *

146 '
.147
148

ROBPETSON
RODJ0TS0N

' 149

COomaancler J, H.IM.S. TO:P.ETOR

R.N. Unit, Calshot.
H.M, S. PAULIME

150
', , .-,.51 -.- _ . 152
153
.' .; ''
154.
:
'.
155

. .. .....

i'PEDINA

MArSNTATEE
SJILOOCl3E
MASTODON
C.0. C.O.P.P.
Depot,
IfHayling Island.
H./M. S. CIEICIET
Sect ion 10.

156 '
157 "

C0,0,3IIDED TTRlIN!fG EJSTDLISIHSI3NTS.

C.T.C. Lars

' .1.61

'

C. 0.X.E.

i,

1:62

QUEB30
.
""
Armay Wing C.T.C.

H. M.S.

Coadt.

'15

.160

C0.O. H.M. S. J*PLEDOR3.

C.O.

158

163

'

'164

165
166

C*0. Armay Tank Wing,

AD Tn C..T , C,

'
' '

Dumdonaldc.

167,
168
169
... .. '170 171
172

-Coamnanding Officer, H.M. S. DUNDONAID

Comdt. C.T.C.
C.R.E. C.T.C.
G.S.O.1 T.T. Wing. ..
..
C0. No,1 Loi.barchent Unit.
,
tI
Comraanding Officer H.,. S. DUNDONZILD
0.0. R.Sigs Wing.

':

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-173'

'174'

"105 Wing.
Toward.

C.0, H.H.S. DRONTOSAiLPUJS

Comacdlt
C. R.S

C.T. C
G..
*.C
C C T .
Livingstjonia THotcel, iRothesay,
Isle of B.uteC

175
1'76
1-77

Dorlin.

178

C0,.
H.M.3S. DORLLIN
Chief Military Instructor C.T.C.
Section 11

179

USTILLIIi.

CA.C,
Austr
alia,
Condt. C.T. CO. Australia.

180
1'83'
Maj. G-on. R.

182
185
.
,I Dowin-n/,s

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Senior Officer U'K, Liaison Staff,
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Australian

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187
188 - 189

House,

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a

Section 12 .

Canaaiian Naval II ,Q,

Sec Navacl _do Nva.

Canmadica. lilitary
G-.0.C. I CWn Corps

H .,.t .
.rvic

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Comdt. C.T.C. C-aada.

.:.'q.HM.G-. C~..::Ladian.m P.S.
Senior Canadia-i Naval Officeor (London),
Na s y Office of Caancda,
10 HPayu0arkot, Lon.on.
S. J
Sect,_.,ion 13. ,

190
191
192 - 194
I195
196
197 - 201
202

203

Xlif:J.,
iiMEDTTJ,
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204 - 213

C. in C.
eoditerranean
C. in C, Levant;

214 - 216

C, Middlo East.

217

D,C.0, Middle Last and for

distribution 'to : -

218 - 222

C,. in

C.T.C. Kabret
H,* . S.
C.T.C. Tripoli etc.
223 - 225
226 - 228

iH,. ,C.T.*'iddlo East.

C.T.C, Midd(e Last,

1HNORTH 1F0RICL.

S ection 1

C.O.S. Allied Force H.q.

Comd-b, CT.C. North Yfrica.
Sect ion 15*.
C.

in

C, in
. G.S.

Co

234
235 - 25,

C, Eastern Fleet.
Warm Sta f.

India Office.

and for distribution

Rear L.uira..l Miles
Naval Force Coj-.inaader
ITQ. I.E.P. India",
o 9
Supre.mte Al lied Co uarader

255
S.E. AsiaL

256 - 262

MISC!: ILN-EOUS.

Port si-louth
Plymouth
Nore
-Lpproaches
Western
S
Rosyth
Q. Planning Schooll
63 St, James St.
D.C.hRS.D. Min of Supply (Addressed
RD
J. ough, C.,.
PL s. )
R.E.7, IMin of Supply.
in C

238 - 235
240 - 25.

(Coib Oild Oprat ions Division)

C,

231 - 233

IIPIA.

India,

Section 16.

229 - 230

263
264
265

266
267

268

269
270
AdOriral Cn.dgj/,*-*-

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A.ctiiral CL:ckg~. Orkneys

LIt.ColOolbeck, SoO.S.
PlaLnehrson
Li out.

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ar-P

Shetlanids,
Oxford.

service

lle~n

m~u~a~u

Lanoss, Orkney.

271

272

overseas.

Sout loy.

-.H.J.
,

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Lt.Co!.

rCr-putrL.r*-

273
274
275
276

a.krstowv

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277

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278
279
280
281
282 - 286
287
288
289
291
292
293

C
.T 0.S D.. .DX.T.

Capta.in L..' ..
D.N.0.S.3
C .N.P.

Q. Pl0a'mers
:.,P
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3)
S.O -P'orte

294
S31.

295

G. 0.0.
..

M.G.C. T.

C.0.J.P.
0 o.
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T.I.A Q.
Lt. ol. Moulton,
T.M.G T 2(i )

T.D.S.

G-.I Liaison..

296
297
*298
299
300 - 302
503
**,;
304
305
306

307
3 08
309
.310
.11
3

S.I.0.
C.P.C,

Air Porce

A.0.0.0

531'2

3. A

313
3514.

3 . 0.

C.A.P.
United_ States*
U. S.A . 0.

315

[Wi
1:)
*1.
Central
File

318 - 319
- 320
321 - 322'
323 ' 350'

Spare

R e-istry

"-

17 .

C. 0, TT-40

HONTIY I
T

RILL.TION. -Sut:d',la~Y
IIlERE
.R ST,
ST>

ISOLO
1'TD ?BU IJETII'T
OF1 Gr3?ULI^I-L
L*T

ADDEIDA TO DISTiRIJITION
IA.}.
LIST.
&..
1

OoIP I.o.
Miiitary Attache, ALmeric'an'Embassy,
I Grosvenor Square, W.I.

324 - 329

D.G. of S, (Air Ministry)

330 -. 331

A.C.A.S. (Ops)

332

%r-Hs
D..013.
0.( fs)

333
334

P.

335

H.Q.

I.C, iilforci Haven

0.
E*.T.O.U.S.A.

336 - 34.1

This Headquarters has received many reports on "HUSKY" whi&

Their circulvary greatly in quality, length, value and interest.

ation would require tons of paper and few people would hlave time to
An attempt has therefore been made to digest them into
read them.
That Digestion has not been entirely successthe following paper.

ful can be sensed by the periodical repetition which cause the paper
But it is not so much intended to be read
to lack continuity.
from cover to cover as to enable officers to glance quickly at any points

noted concerning thle particular aspect in which they are interested.

The paper is
far as possible really
contentious statements
ment and thus possibly

As
based on opinions, not approved lessons.
unsound opinions have been omitted but certain
have been included as likely to provoke arguan agreed solution.

None of the reports from which the paper has been prepared
has any official status.
Lastly, officers concerned in across channel operations should
"HUSKY"|I
bear in mind the fundamental differencesbetween the two problems,
enjoyed tideless waters, fine weather, moderate dQfences and a surprised
j
Such conditions are unlikely to
and half hearted Italian garrison,
obtain in operations against the N.W. coast of Europe.
3'

CONTENT S.

Page
TRAIN'NG

4 *

THE ASSAULT ..

69
44

444 0

44

SUPPORT OF THE ASSAULT ...

ANTI-AIRCRAFT

. 4 4.

0.

44

9I

4
*

*.a 4

.4

a44*

- 9

4 4.

444 .a

.
a

a, a

..

. ..

- 444
44

ROYAL ENGINEERS

44.

IMEDICAL

...

SECUEITY

o..

4O

44

-8
5

4*

... ..4

LANIDING SHIPS AND CRAFT. ..

D. U.K.W's ...

***
.*.
.a.
*,e
,.a
4~.

THE WORKING OF THE BEA.CHES

COvNMMUNICAT IONS

1
2

444

a4 9 4
44

v4

4.

..4
444
444

44
*4

444

O.
444
#Oe

44

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. ..

4..

9-10

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444

12

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4 4*

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.,,

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15

14

-1-

TRAINING,
2*:;.
The .follcovring points arose during tra-iing aind as a result, of the
operation,
..
(a)

Maihn a Fonration is training for' a particular operation a

general directive should be"given at an "early date stating
the broad outline on which training is to be based .::

(b)

It
as ess ntial
for a proportion of Staff Officers
to receive -.nstruction in the staff problems of a cqoibined
operation before formations start detailed planning .and.
training .
- ..

,:

*(c)

*y

Copetent' sinal'
experts fromi the t'three Services are
rcqui.red at' C.T.C's- so -that conuunications may be rehearsed
.an . perfect
...
:.
.
........
. -.
''.

**..,--i

'
....

'

.*

(d;) |To
obtain' r'ilism aiind maintain t'r6oI
in terest a generous
allotment of landing craft for training is re quiroed
If
only a few c-aft are allotted for training the. Naval.
C -,rm .Cmmader
.reponsible will naturally be loth to' risk them
in earrying, ut scratlible landingseto , an
at night or
.'
. .,a'av'. erse weai^'her conditions. The 'tye
f crft
in whichl troops are to
.do. t'he 'actUa;i. assault should be used, whenever possible,
(e)

Few aircraf- were available to co-operate during training,

Th
hese,.
.'
if t. y can be spared,
a
are of 'great hep, in adding
realism and.' mproving 'the standard c
i2rcaircraft recognition..:

(f)

Training in r-ecognition of' aircraft and fire control of A.A,

rc'aqire great consideration and impr vement,

(g)

ZNav' l traini: g of landing craft crew, should if possible be

comrpleted before work is started with. the. Army.
Failure
to o. this wv.L1 resutlt in mistakes' in the early stages of
-.- comx:ined tra.ning which. will tend to diminish the Army's con, .fida.nc' ins. Le Navy s a"bility to get %herm to the right
place at the' ,ight 'time, '

(h) 1 Fur b.her stud, and experiment is required in. gettirg troops
*II[qgcly.
asho: lfrom LC..,I.I(L) and in %etin'g
Anti -tank
::.:f
.I guns and artil lery.. across the' beacheEs
(i)

Beach Groups,hould
be" givren' adequate facilities for trainingr md should be married up with Assaulting Briga..des for
'
the.r
,l]
.le 'vr
e raining and. 'ehero
l. Suffici. nt tsoT'!..
ig
equieipent sho :Ldbe made available to' avoid use of operatioal
O.

equiprme:nt,
h,

,t

(j)

A.MvLtO's, an0. other Beach Group or Naval Officers who -work

on t1 e beach 'equire
training in the capabilities of the
di.fferent ty s of ,Mech-ani.cal Equiprmen t,

(k)

Ui
'
"': sho-ld
,ractice
their'driver' i:'l '.31
stageso of 'r tor-.
-pr<-c fi nvci'
lo.a frequently, The ma n reason
frs. d -od
veoL "'.a
i
;_f'. romains that of bad dx. ing.
-.-

(1)
Training in ho..ndling awkward stores is necessary,
Examples
.: ,. !are B atiley br.dging., 6 feet .packing cases and Sherman tank
e ngia'.s .
e p.
(mj)
The necessity ''or speed in
'- .....
U the. beach dur.-.ag the first
stre ss ed.

disembarkatiolln nd transit through

two or three hours should. be

(n)

In future exercises, it might be advisable intentionally

to land a proportion of key personnel on the wrong beaches,

2*
Certain "rules" for adoption in the plan for landing Regimental
Combat Teams of 3rd U.S. Division and points noted as a result of planning
are given in Annexures "A" and "B",

THE ASSAULT,
3.
The assault was carried out on a moonless night with. zero timed fortwo hours before nautical tmi2i1ht,
No preliminary softening of the
beaches had taken. place,
Defences consisted of wire in one or two rows
immediately behind the beach with, in -some cases, mi.nes laid behind the
front row of wire,
Pillboxes were sited to enfilade the widre
Mortar
and artillery fire, when met vith, were brought down on the water's edge,
The enermy were surlprised and did. not shew determined resistance,
Points Noted.
4,^

(a)

Although the assault was on a moonless night, there is

always a certain amount of light in the IV]DITEkERANEAN and
it is doubtful whether a moonless assault would have been
feasible in the much darker conditions found in the channels

(b)

Routeing of large naval convoys during darkness within a

confined area without collision or confusion was successfully
achieved,

(oe)

Silhouettes produced 'from air photographs gave a false

Lnpression as the photos were taken from too high an
altiiude.
Those cdrawn by subinarines were excellent and
in miany cases put flotillas on the right road,'

(d)

The duty of madking contact with submarines should be

undertaken by several ships in the convoy to ensure against
a technizcal failure in any -cparticular ship.
In this
operation several convoys failed to contact their sibmarines
with the result that their release positions were incorrect,

(')

A navigatimnal leader such as an LC<,P(N.) should be carried in the sane ship as the assault craft,
In th-is operation, due to the bad weather, several MIL s,* arrived too
late or with their navigational aids out of order,

(.)

The necessity for good control of all assaulting crafto

This might be improved by having DSoN'N*L, aboard ide, HQ.
LCII,(L) with wireless c/ommunioation on Landing Wave with the
assault craft,

(g)

CGroups of landing craft working under ea'.N S.N. L, shobutl

be narked with distinctive signs which ca 'be easily
recognised if-they stray outside their sectors,

3L.S.I

Flotilla foriing up on loavin

(lp)

(i)

..
officer should ronainin touch ith
The flotilla
last
the
to
S.I.
L.
the
of
icor
Off
the Co:ixandin
1inuto to Set his position at the 'tino of Ie vigl
and his course to tho risht boachl

(ii)

So:2
usd C
,re u;e
Various :Cthods of foxAinr
oircled their ships, others circled each thuoi- 0:on
side of the ship, others left the ship and just
pidcLed up by
tlhey we:'c
1k_0t head on to thc soa till
KGLITC-L}S drill
d that
It is sugesto
their guide.
ather side cres t ciUrcle until fornod up,
where tlhe
the leo side
then cross the boo.s and arc joined pby
to
aon-s ide, oes
oraft, .trhilh lhaVe boon aiin
w-eathor
have a lot to rocoxi':-ond it in the rxoUvlh
-ettlii; nd teaching
The policy needs
oxpoerioncod.
to all concerned.

shi-T s and L, S. I. should car'r:; boards with code

and uarter t:o
letters on each Te;,
in l are
*;enable landing. craft to find, their ship.

(j)

i-aibeors

(k)

FPlani landincss in

M,T,

followed 1byU an
.are.
c
unexpocted
may
attack on the main beach from thu lraxvard side n
of
:':thod
ofton prove the best and least hazardous
assault.

(1)

Ovrload l the infantryman in -the assaulst ust be

Or clam:oer
o is to v,,ade through cdeep zuate
resisted f 1e

IThe

over difficult places.

(in~)

landin' of tonics vehicles a

Thic
should be further oxained.
lines
i;voe greateor iiiunmity froi

personnel ovur rocs

surprise and
ass
S-, is
;ns.
:':rti-talnk
wire and

(n)

A eiore efficient nothod of water 'roofing ;'ireless sets is

recluired.

(o)

Certain Keoy Off icers directiil

't

initial

assault should

be provided with waterproof watc-es and torches.

SUPPOIR0T OF Th.B &SSAULT.

5, Bomb.ba.rd ent,

i..

Boribrcd1tont viwas carried out by :. Su port Groups

of crCtisors and.'t

merw e,;ad
d~est~royers* Prearanc'd ancld opportunity t'uebs
is results
t
sho'of
fll
observin,
for
used
werec
and Air O. PFs.
satisfactory.
beon
have

F. .:0.'"Q
'-ploar

to

6, Points noted.
(a)

(b)

Du.rinf: the operation

0
FPO.

s sho:ed lac. of a .rociatinn

Instances
ts t'tho fijxe powr required to oenace t-argots.
'
oneii:r
ei:aLo
to
occurred of six inch cruisers boinA asked
adoquate
quite
beeoon
hav
0. P's vwhen 4.. inch gui]ns would
More stress should be laid on this fact durin' 'training
and F. O.O's should learn to consider a-:munition situationi
wear af &uns t Cto
Wlhon targots are boin:g; eongaged by air O.P~s, pilots should
of shot which is the, noral progive corrections to fall
The latter
of shot itself.
fall
report
not
and
cedure
Cappears to-have bcon usem . inothod

%.,0

(c)

P.O0O's which of necessity should be -obile,

(dL)

Doubt arose as to 'ho

should control
PIOe O s in
battle,
It iis sugCeCsted that F. 0.0 s should be
controlled by the
hrxtillery
Senior
officur with. the
fornation concerned and not by the 3.' B. TL 0.

(e)

In plaurniia
the ruyl, did not alay- . :
.)recir'o that
orders Ihave to be circulated to all units of the Fleet
and thoerefore should be available- earlw.

(f)

If

had to
rely on transport bein- loeaned to thoul byw f or:ations already
landed,
This proved unsatisfactory.
In order to
remeldy this it is susosted that each P.O 0.
p0arty,
should be given an cartoured O.Po or :hito scout carP
This wrould have an added advanta. e in that it would
.be possible to Ocarry. ireless sets of rCrater rLane
and duration than the prosent sets, , hich are dosir;ned
for :^ia handlini,
and a tti nes failed owinS to
their short duration and rane,,c

PO..Os
0

.are to enoal

speed they should

e tar;oets

study.i

' ps

ith

accuracy and.

and n o dels of the area

of opera.tions and Kno; the battaltin plan at an early

sta:.o
(S)

Provision for the supply of noew a.ir

ss blattries
for FP.O.
0
afte.r the assault shou.ld be made,.

(h)

:'iadtinistrativo arral;emonts should be ,ade for the

::aintenance of P.OoO parties waho arrive at .. y as
individual and unco-ordinated b odie s

Closes'ogr

t.

7,

In Iaddition to bonbarc)Clnt by tSupport Groups' of Cruisers

and destroyers every other possible provision was nade for giving
naval support,
oMtethods included:-.
(a)

L.C.S on opportunity trgcts.

(b)

The .ncerican
of the first

(c)

L C.G. decontralised under Support Groups,

(ci)

1iL1 possible infantry woepons

:lerican
'
assault battalions,

use of L.C S, firing Grapnels in advanc30

assault wvavo, which was succoessful

:ounted
in L. C.V.

of

t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I
The
.cricans sacri()ficed loac,.ding:. space in L. C T. so
that 'ta'reks and S3P,,:ins
could fire dturingI the apprc)ach,

(f:) 'The
ountin of the r.axi.iu possible nQtboIr of /;,,
guns
4Im, 37 :::, and 20
m
:1m:,
- on tho upper deck of
L. ST. which were thereby converted
yinto auxiliary
fl
ships,
.akt
(S)

The dcontralisation to Support (Groups of L.C0P.

(h),

The use of L.C*T. (i).

.nr.

of

Vtulnerablfi.oas

8. of90<^
o
yir

ach
a B tas
iof
ahp e
atta~cs vwoi

diroctocd on shippztIyniG-

vth-

in two ilos of. the vwaterfront.

Very fowv attac's ve.re iadcl on
beached craft or on vehicles inraediatoly in roar of vehicle landiz
beaches.
In the Beach Mlaintenance rea dispersed dunps offered diffS
icult targets which werea attacked unsuccossfullyt,

9.

For this reason gs

to tthe

should be sitedd to

l
otan''dt
zShi'pping of

ao

shore,

ie

ILaa

ro

tetio

Beach Maintane^

rotat

roqu.rzes. light cover

-'
at exit ,roads ad Vehicle
assezbly areas-...
en forad,
It night hero be streascd .that more
casualtiewos .vre suffoerd by 'Beach Groups from A, .. fire than fron
.ay othor cmse., the. Na".aerlikon being a ajQr offendemLr ov-i
to ts *non-sClfa destroying shell, The .fina
policy. adopted was .-for Naval A.LX
to- fironly
to,.s-a^rd-..
.
9

^x

91

.......

. . ..

'

^ *'"^ ^' '^'^"''

KwxSSSS^

.............

Beach' A. A.

10,
Unit-.::for beach defnce wmro -iuioer conmand- of. Beach .IGr=ups
Planninwas on a divsio.nal loevel and in most "casos Boach..Group
Comi-anders. a-ttended .divi.sional conferomces wAthout their ,A,
.C.iand.zrs,
This..systeor.
.ajsed~, bad ,rsults for- th .fol<loizig.. reasons tf.
(a)
Jis.uffteient priority was
"......ost. ,iiortant'boacbes..

v-v.n. o

.on on .-

'th .
'f

RlBeach
pGrc~> Ceneanders attcte&td tR dictato the
.oquipi.xt"to be tzaken by.bch . u
:nits'.

{b). -$nS

There wa
(d)--.aro

Aeitah-on wih the[L P

layout".,
An

for,^Q-ac.ybojdoinin

.....

ALn area layout for n-arby,aeionin'bo~ws,.

not

considered4
..-

.The co

lusi-nhs

the.-.fro,
abovo.-aro:'

(a)

.Bach .AA. should 'boe in suport- of and ..not unaer

aco'and of Beach Sub Aroas.
A.
CoaL
.
Ianders should
take part in divisional planing azaisted by Corps
andl iony directives,- laying dovm for-.exLple, that a
proportion of L.A. A guns rust be landed in the first
fligit of- vwhoeled vehicles and that H&,:A. nust be
landed so as to be in action by nichtfall.

(b)

One A '.

Coinander should be appointed for every

area in. viich the fire of Ht. A.

-portocting one VP,.
can support, H*.,A.
protecting anot'her V.P*
This Coi-w
iander should land early on D day in order that the
whole layout' is snade to vwork on D day
(c)

Sinilarly Regimental Headquarters should land on D*

day and not days later,

12.

The action to be tclcen by landing croft actualll; discharing4

vwhen an air--;raid.oc=u.
should be liaid don in.. orders.

WO R
T H^E^.E

OF T E..BE.C.

.G

.. .

General.
-13
intnice over the. beaches was..- ell.,and specdiy'-o rried out,
Conditions f or the buildp were good, Vwith little enry interferonce .
fine weath-er -and .caln soea,
Both 7th and 8th arAies 'proved. that
under th se, conditions and with adequateo szmal.-craft and IDUKs
Ws,
aintenance of large, forces -over captured beaches is not only possible

but .undw -oQZiditicon

..'14.--

pertiJning ixn t

tdierianeaeasir tha

.
Figo's...of
.....
stores handlel .overT. beaches are given.
niVn"Cn

ecd
-

"6 .-. 4

*15.

T-xrwee t ypoe

of Be ach Orfanisa ion wore used

((a)

Tho Miiddl

(b)

Tho -North

'"'

East Brick
ica Beach Grou.
-

:~o.~~~~~~~~

(baod o:

.. i...

"

t...

(a) and (b) worv basud on an infantry battalon, .strungth about

2700, with 3 I' inal, 2nzixiu
soxi$rVJO 'ZOrsolO
a
o
L

.
.
() n-' basud oL'thro^Q

Thho
op'ratod
on oneh boach'
.s~f:onsna
rabdu . nd
inoor battaliois
h; roin brod
c nth .
.r-d

X&UiInC4doan,
H.

SijnoIl and 3e"rvico *or.:oxnnlinu':/udin . naval..

oUn
co-.xa,
.
In the cQasoC" of (a) and
n
yf(b)
-a1'rdomel VOrkQd ., with th
o'.
ach
Porsonnul but not undo-r oi..nid.
'Iuroi
h"
r "
or
'
battalion., w. h.ico,.*
2 orwod -:'Enin noozhor
o
oR'uorint c
l worko threcbe
"boahooS
Strun.4h wos% ol ut L500 porsonnul,

l6

ach of' thos.

'rk -o'r[y
or.-an.isatin

woll,
''I

. of I

COO

Middle
oast Bricks and thd
h
jorit:
of observCXr S arc,^ of t
that thu pruosxot orranisntions of both (a) and ()ro
L
that
-.
no `1as tIc'e
ani at i on i
oL;,h (a
(b
o
Point.

17

z.". 'ot

'';

(a)

.. ;,

''

,-,

'".

..

':

oach.. oraniations
..
whih at p

.K,

NORT-H

a ,.C!,,th.:

ioll
alInd

'

...-

, sent d.iff r in th
.

should b

stz andardized,

,(b)
It is nost dIsirable'that thoorsonnet of buach
anisations should not be chanhod, thcroby le-,uniinj thu
.sohancu:
n
of
mbuildi'Id
up os;:rit dor coXrps. and a"roup
.boach
"
wha'iIo:.Ltanikatons.
a, considr..blotu
' '0 :to

tUEcthr anod ltrainsandth:rof

unlss circuzistanc sS fu :

(*)

Thuo sor^
,sh.uld
naval petn.i:s

boach partis
(d)

,'

'

ore sh.ould n,t be brokon u:p

'I
.
.
ju'tifid

work vth tho s(o.

'

* ^ '.fVattalion
b**
should *forL

thu nuhmleuo of a Boach Groupo

,::'.,>n."o
...
hi"
G'eula
(7) .() . rsnispa%0:
wai-toonanco
'j~
(.)
Transport should bu

1blo
;i::d
.boo' heol
add d.

:oranisatio
ashould
co'osioz
Ior
for

4,, 4jW.Jdize

sraovidd

(g)
Boeach .roups should not bo r.Onard"ood as a
hnral
'nool fro
bwhich f ornation st:fif o caopn t
.e.otra transport,
f jht
1i2
troops, otc ,C

~~(h)
:}on..used'for Buac-h Gop Provost shoul
'
.Sout typo'used to trIffic
^ass
"'(i)

:'t1wou ic tcc.
BEi.theBucor B

.1,
.

'

aunt rol
.

"'pz'ncn:G

is%-:a1i or :dto
a :o:nt
bo,-0
disposal
part of the Beach Goup,..'".
'I

Beach::ast'bers.

lo of
. 'u,

..'

sh'uL

bo1i,
(j)

nJ,.ap

..

'

be of . thu

trainod. in

,shoudlc:f
foi
'

mThe 'ustabIish iant of the, 0..Bo D.

ohould'
..

:....

ibIa:;cro-u J.
, ,,*

18.
The s.uccas.aful use of beacihes will dopond to a very sruat
oxtent on the ,ability and quLalitieos, of c.urtainkey paoroil
such as
Beach:-arstors, P.Mi. .L Os and iL.03Os,
In nanYi.rctances only very junior
naval]. officers wvroe avail able at the, c)utsot as Boaohmastors,
The,
wero often incapable of handlik; difficult situations .i"ch .rosu as
a result 9f .surf, woll,
I
7ind and crow,s in 'a stao of exhaustion,
T

This operaton showed beyond' doubt that. those. key personnel should

be offi.Ce::.st
and talciln

of outstanding ability, capable of asserting theselves

conrand of the situation in addition to having first
cLas

tecizical knowlJ ed!ge,

19,
%Tcporiencos suggest that the increased .provision and
greater use of -ochanical aids will do nuch to speed up the rate of
discharge particularly in the first few days, Suggestions for
Liprovomnnts .in the use and additions to the sacaeos of prvsent
equipment' are dealt with below,.

(a)

Navnl Pontoon

This equipment proved itself the best for bridging the

The followin points
are stressed with a view to incroasing its future
efficiency*.

w-iteor gap anld was --ost successful.

(i)

Towing sections behind L1.,S.T.(2) (the British

:-:othod) rosulteod in five out of oifht sections
beoing lost dbrin. the storn on D-1/D. As LoS.,T.
(2) is unable to pick up loose sections, in the

future a tug ndight we ll tow the rafts or bo with

the L.S T convoy for use in enereoncye
(ii)

Col-:pressors should be provided for oeuptyin

po

toons.
(iii)

Its use in tidal waters both as a pior, or in

the form of a 175 ft by 30 ft raft as a ferr

should be further oexmined.
(iv)

(b)

Its use during this operation to form small

clocks at which L. S.T. and L.C.T. could discharge
and alongrside which L C. i could dischc^ge. wvas
found to speed up unloacdin; considorably.
sketch is given in
1reoxurc t"D"

Beachn Rov-

S3:I ElLD, OYOYCIE and J2:1f TRACK were used,/

.l
proved g-,ood but of the threeo "skeltonisod SULB.EEt, LD"
with hessian, as used by the A/leroXi can Soeventh A;qy,
will probably give the quickest and iost satisfactory
results eospecially under difficult conditions,
,ATY TRAIK wxas heavier than either CYCLONE or
SlIE.Q.TIFEL-D asnd broke more easily. In adCdition to
wire track a reiIforceeMCnt of "CI-SPaLNG"1 (6wooden
paling in rolls) was used to deal w'ith difficult

places,

corners oetc

Seventh ,rny found that DUiOs (dripCpizT)

water as threy
leave the sea) are excellent beach road preservers
The laying of SIUM,/mPJELD con be speeded up by
Bulldozers towing sledges loaded with 56 ft.
prefabricated packs. 400 yards of track can be
loaded on six sledges.
(c)

Bulldoze.rs

Both D.4 and Do 7 wvre used.

d
The D 7 -was -ore
efficient than tho D.4 which failed to co:r~peto linth
-work such as iovement of stone walls, boulders nad
dragging of JITN trailers in soft sand.
JYl

Bulldoxers should have bulldozer ,or anriodozer blades

and winches. Bulldozers should be the first vohicles
disenharWled fror L C.T.Ts.
D. 4s should if possible be replacoed by DI,7s

(d)

RoSller Rug
This proved extrmoCly useful in astist
the
h discharge
of landing crcaft and L.3. T. In future ovoryy craft
carryingi stores rnight wll carry roller runway..
From
this operation it is thought that 12 longths per L.C. T,
and 24 longths per L. S.T. should be ca..rried,
lftornatively,
as a neans of oconon-y, roller ranvay night be r^mdo a beach
group store on a scale of 3200 foot per beach group,

(o)

Cranoes
Cranes should be increased to the followin scale Vwithin
the Boaoh Group, an increase
four
o
on the present scalo

(f)

(i)

Tvo in 0o.Bo D

(ii)

One in D*.I*D

(iii)

One in petrol depot,

(iv)

Two on beachos for unloading L.C. Ts

Euint.

Loss heavy and nore fire oeuipmont should be provided

for the d2ump areas.
().

Slefi.;hS

The large pattorn sloeih was found to be unxrioelcy:

snail pattern is mnuch moro s atisfactory*
(h)

the

Beach Lights.
The present type are too0wed<.
Lights should be
visible from the Waiting Position.

The ^ftroich tape, 6 inches vwide, iTpresnated i th

lu^inous paint proved excellent and can be seoen 100
yoards av.woy oven on a darc night,
Ma:intenance Tlhrou-h, Boaches.

Point s not ed.

20

(a)

The need -f or still

further exa;intion in tho brik;in
the vateor gap,, in spite of the vwry officient p)trt played
by the :
lerican
Navel Pontoon and the DWSICTs

(b)

The fear that beaches would deteriorate ropidly under

extensive use proved to be sroPrdlcss on this operation,

(c)

Ships should anchor

s close to the beaches as possible

onco coast dOefences have beeon over-colne*

This mrnders
thoen loss likely to sink -vhen bonbed anO.d nore irnmuno
to suba:.rInoe attac.*

It

also brings then" vithin c3loser

protection of the beach A.zA. and has the overzholing

advaita^e of shorteninC the turni rotund,

9pw
(d)

The
usefulness of a quay in a siall POrt sucl as
JICAnTA whirch enabled LS.
3 T to discharge at a far
greator rate than was possible over the beaches.

(e)

utter falso beachos have boon blown avay- the tendency

is for anything except shallow- cuts to silt
up.
It was
found that shallow-'cuts wore autom-iatically kept open
by the propeller action of L*CeTs. going baclanards and

(f)

One vehicle for Beach Group Provost should be landed

early to onCbl!e the Beach Group area to be properly
s i gnp os t ed

(g)

Eff Orts, by Corps3

-etc to have iiaintenance Area well
iinland should be resisted as it lengthenTs turn round
of vehicles and so slows -down discl-r..re,

.(h)

ravo digginS should be planned.

(i)

The tornnages and scales of a-uxoit'ion to be landCed should

be known in advance in order that dap planning and
preparation of stock pro fornac nay proceed.

(j)

Beach groups should be prepared= to rattion Ond aocoa odato

in bivouac area large nwubers of extraneous personnel
survivors fron. suitcon ships ,otc.,

CO AlMNICATIONS.

I21?
U._SLrd

Division.

Co:xmunicat.tions vrithin this Division, aLthough all steps hadl been

'taken to triplicate Xad quadruplicate thein, vwere for t:L! nest
a-rt a
failuttre.da.. ri
the early stare'os of D day
It is suOgestoda t.e
introauction of vsual r^ethods on a much larger scale for use during
this vital period would bo worth consid-eration,

he] _ iv
_isions

Tt-i

22,
Cor)na.n.ications in 51st (Highland) Division appear in general to
have boon satisfactory.
The success Curing, the assault
was attributed very larrely to exorcises car,.rieCd out on the lines of the operatiorn
These exercises were on a progressive basis -ith the next higher forna
ation always teprosentoed
Pron these exercises nany lessons wore
learnt of which full advantage was taken,

235
Planinis started in
,'l outline signal plan was produced
".aM'.
based on the actual operation, the nu'bors and types of craft and the
distances involved. . joint enoiranidu: on comrunications (in a shore
to shore oporation) had been produced by Headqua%.rters Force 14.1 in ILERCH,
This proved invaluable as a basis for iplmnning and traininrs
The ladck
hovmver of any ?, *.D..
signal .remreosent^tivo during the planning stage
is. worthy of co::.ent.
24.
The nain diTfferelnces between the signal plaT n and the coln^xnications
sot out-in onbined Opera.ti(ns Paph.let wore:
(a)

Ow'ing to the nature of the landing

Signal Unit

an enl-a'ged Beach

.wasrequiredo

(b)

The nunber of htajor Landing Craft involved nece.ssitated

twio naval landil)ng waves being ucwd.
In spite of -this the
operation showed that these nets were very much too larsge

(c)

EBqach. 1avaL A:.dv"ance Pazrty was increased. by one INo, 18 set

and one nan ,, to oenable this party to kcop watch on the two

10

landiin, waves.
(d)

..

. .;

~-

:'

"

: '

OntPs -we.re $eployod sinc it 'had lbeen

No -oiward Jr
agreed that ':.lI'] ir Forces ,houldl..be
-oGntroll'o'd - t iry
Leveo..t

(O.), .n.L

C.'I (L)

vras

used as a Bde..;H

Q.

Shilp

25.
N'Iettiang ot. .group3 t'was .carried out a fortnigEht.teot.re th operation
1
r
t care with whch this whed. dione nust pfrty accoumt
took place.,- Th1e
for the fact that no diffiLdulty was eoxpoeioncod in estohlishin;, comrniaticns on ,iAm-y!Noet s once a Lericc was roken...

in..ter ship. tnd craft

26.
During tha voago I/T sil.ence tas ket
signalling bein; ncarried out' by V/S, of which there wyas very little .
'
Listeninr- watch was o' 'ntd -on all. nets at Hl, hours.
27.
Woiroless silonce w;vs broken, on all nots at .
on thoe J. C I. (L) which conind
sBrigoad Hseaclguarto
nost niets so1 aftCi.

wavOes

tvhis

.exception
being failure on landing

considered to be due 't.o t'he following causes-

These failures wVer

(a)

~Unssa 'isfacto;') equipnent in the L. C I. (L)' and in other...

'
..
:
1Majo'r Landing Crafto

(b)

Insuffirnt

(.c)

Failure:

t.raining

(a)

ldi

operators,

to realiso that up to the tine of landing of Bde-..

ken place from the L,.C I. (L), a--d not frorv- ..

Offixcer peront 'on the'L

NTo Nrval Siru.gL.

......

'.

L
Points noted,,

(a)

'

h-.

e'

'

..,. :..
,

:L..

I.(L)
()
...

...

.;

in the early stagtes

l'es
The mip.ortanco of N.val landing wve,

The non workinr; of these waves resulted in the Brigade ..

Con-ianlder boeir:;g unable to locate certain of his se'rials,
and with heavy opposition this .night well hav:o. affeeted' the
course of the Dattle .
....
'
(b)

The To0
s the :.6sot
only suitabloe set: or use on large noett
wVith tIheo .re Ant s'tandard of training ;of i'anding craft
.
,:
1
signal.. ratig.su s

(c)

The success of an L.C I. fitted as a Bdb. U".Q. ship.: ;'.

(d)

The need for avehicl'

C_

Its cKief use

..

...
,

:l.

Sonr

lne

nd

ould be in

allTal

,.

in the Beach'signal Sect.ion :Unit

landing naintcnanco' pary.stores,

t
the tansferring of
line laying
.'
'.. '
rapzil.y betwdcn{I beaches.'
(e)

'

dprson

wiroeless sets in

the beach

signals
^
-- would be of value. The latter-bosicles their use
on thu be.acohes and aintenance area 'Wqul:d proVido
co-:iunicat on .. cross te' sea gap between beached L. S"Ts.
and the

(f)

Tho need for . seconid'

.int1h

.shore"
.

:C
,

my andc Naval beach Sioa-;

.Officer.

beach Slgn.al Unit to deal wit.h a -re'orsgaisat. ion a's

occurred Jint thL, .51 (Highland)cl Divisin aksanlt '(see p ara.
24) ( ab...e
oe.:...*".'.
)
'".'(l . '
....
b''

(g)

H Q.Qo
nl1 control of craft '-cCying the assault Brigade ....
shou.ld have t

28.

the naLin

hour* Co:ilmnication
wa.s estaljlished on

The p s-sibilit'
f allowing wireless silence tob ,be lcob n
a short tine b- fore Zero hour, .Ne6ts.. cJa then 1.e 'working

'

-11

by Zero hour which will give increased confidence to staffs

anmd sixnal s.
(h)

Pyrotechnic success sim.als are too easily confused with

enony7 signals and it is difficalt to toll fron tho sea frol
It is sucreQsted that coloured flares,
which beach thoy comne
on the lines of a port fireo, should be burnt at -round level.

LAN.JDING SHIPS AND CR1AfT

29.
Landing Ships and. Craft used dwi.rina' this operation included
several types whose lImitations and capabilities were virtually unknown
to sone of their users for exoiamp e L, C T. (R) , L. C. G-, L.C.I. and L S.T
This VVwas in part due to the lack of exchange of technical inforaation
beotveen thoatres which su gosts that a high priority should be given to
this in the future.
Above all this operation showed the ilolnse value of the DU1I0,i
30.
of aiinor landing craft to operate under bad woLa-thor
annd the abitiy
strong wind blew fro- H-14 to Hi-4, reachin', force 6-7 at
conditions, .
In spite of this the assault was not
H-I O, At i force was still
Ts which wre two to three hotus late.
delayed wzith the exception of L, CO.
*)5.

To overcome ti;ms every effort

Seasickness was very prevalent.
shocdl bDe lade to nmak troops as co,-f ortable as possible includisn the
It was found that t.roops who had been acclimatisec
issue of papeTr Ibals.
by living on board for several weeks were copolaratively iYm1une, A seasick cure
has n
..been approved., It should assist in overcoming this difficulty to a
certain extent.
Points noted
352'

31,

(a)

L C*A.
VhMen troops are caxrrying large packs and full battle
equipoenrt eand with the addition of storos in the craft
it is better for the two outsideo sections to sit sideways
In this w'ay more
on the seats instead of astride them1.
troops can be acw.omedated anl with '-ro.ater conf ort

They ground in too dLoeep

The craft 9are not assault craft,
when hit, undero
fireo
easily
catch
to
appoarnd
d
water,
The brows have
traps.
death
Ere
which conditions they
too
slippery for
are
and
descent
too steep an angle of
The first
boots,
hobnailed
in
of
non
quick diseobalrkation
l. -Ai.ho
to
stripped
a
sailor
be
should
romap
each
^an off
the
This
gives
it
ashore.
secures
and
line
in
takes a
loaded soldier sonothi:n; to hoang onto if'he loses his foeet
shore to be
:
it also onables the depth between ramp and
If possible troops should be g iven bunks
ascertained.
instead of seats which would do mnuch to lesson seasickness.

An eoxaination of one beach on which firing took place

showed (good fragolentation fronz which one can assune good
The depth of crater in. this case on hard
blast effect.
The noise of explosions of
stony soil was six inches.
and the ,norale effect of this craft,
terrific
salvoes
JAll reports
quite apart fron the inaterial, vory .reat.
Some rockets landed very close
have nothing but praise.
to soie Italian nines but did not dCetonato then,
rwas

(d)

L.C.P.

12
Al'though no operational use was made of then a fevw are
invaluable dumping an operation for use as wvater tais
for
officers and messengers going ashoreo

(e)

L.C,

(L)

These croaft were used on several. occasions,

Reports differ

as to their efficiency. One indicates that craft wvre slow

in engaging targets vrith the result that destroyers closing
the beach had engaged the targets 'before the LC,
.G (L) wOre
in action, An.other conS..cirs direct fire satisfactory but

that

'Signals
between craft need kiprcvinrg for controlling

indirect fire. It seems however apparent that faults were

largely due to lack of eoperience and training.
(f)

L. C. T

(g)

Modifications a.rc necessary before L.C.T. can carry sco:rpions,

L. C. To VI, vdth unloading romaps at both ends would have been
a great asset for helping to bridge the wator gap^in this
'
operation where there was no tide,and no current offshore.
sto 0isht
Holds used for petrol should .o lined with bullet proof
plastic or if this is not possible with a wall t o s.and
bags thick.

(h)

i
s.
Red, lights should be fitted in all asseomfbly points and at
gangways to accustom eyes to the darkness.
Blue lights do
not have this effect.
Personnel should embark by units but should be accozmodatod
by landing serials.

(i)

All minor landing craft should have a small red mark 1buoy
attached which will float clear if the craft is sunk, and
mark its position in shallow water.

DUKWs*

335

This azmphibian proved itself to be of imxonse value , enabling

stores and equipment far exceeding the quantity eoxpected to be handled
over the beaches.

54,

The follawing points regardig their use should be borne in mi.nd(a)

DUK.s were overloaded which resulted in. somr sinking, To

favoid this stanrcLd loads should be laid down and an officer
should be apiointed on each ship to control the load.
The
load should not exceed. three tons,

(b)

Ships being unloaded should be inshore as close as possible

thereby reducing the turn round. Their position along the
shore line should be as near as possible to the beach landinpoints Each mile ...of- nneeas y-war travel is throe hundred
*pouda of-material lost for that trip.

(c)

One DUKWn should be loaded with one type of store only if

time is not to be wasted in unloading at depots"-

"t

-1-~)

(d)

DUKVIs workin- from landing craft r eLuiLr two drivers

nd from .A.T store ships two drivers
plus two croew,
This will allow 100i relief.
plus four crew.

(o)

of ;uest vwar-ps and

Due to lacd of proper ri.;inspring line and oor.inl hooks vith hand lines on ships
be-in^. unloaded, the officioency of DPKYWs oaongside
To correct this a ri sflin_ crcr f roi.
was handicapped.
ship before
each DUKVW misht go abDoard and ri tl'
The crow shouldI have the no cess cry
unloadiinS is berun,
lines and hooks with then-.

(f)

-xadunlod to DUThus
If LC.T. are to carry stores
.ofloat, methods should eCdevlol'pod'
while still
so that. DUJ~s can bo loecadoed overside L. C.T as well
as by thoe rmp? in order- to save unlooading time.
Such L.,C*T, "iight be fi-tteod wi.-.h pow.r 4ope)rated
derricks one port, anot her starlboard-.
() The use of ccaro nets with base pltes shapod to
fit

hlo]Ws
hold ni-,'ht be e.xploit od.

the D

,(h)' DJIOg-s' should not be used for lona

(i)

A percoentag

!ains inland.

should be fittod with 'A)

frames.

The DUKi miniht ,,voell be used for the .early landin[; of

Aut present reliance is placed on the L. C. T.
su];-p'ootins ajms.
CT were frecquontly deayed in beaching
Du.rin this operation L. 0
In
which resulted in'lack of support for the initial landin,;.
to
day,
D
on
-2.llOeFians
the
byDUITOs
16
this respiect the use of
D + 2 cday for unloadCin artillery' up to and including 105 "m

35.

proved most successful,

artillery

1ueing

asho.u and ready to

fire very quickly.

Owving to the weakness of the dofonoes~, the Royal Engineers

36,
weFre not as busy as oxpected,.
37,
in

poxra

Points noted in connection with equipment are contained

19
,

Other points ar'e:-

(a)

A thorouah andl e0arly reconnaissance of the Beach

Maintonance, area for nines ansd booby traps., and
for road work in. the depot areas, is essential.
U/itil this has been done the ,key plan cmannot becormeo
tiine miay be wasted at
ith -the result thae
firmn ,
a later stageo

(b)

Further training in handling bulldozers at night

is roquired.

(c)

which wateor can be pumped fro L..S. Ts.

The extont to -to I'S tank:s in tidal waters should be invostisateod.

(d)

The limitations of "sleletca<ed Cumoerfold" should

be determined,

(o)

The best method of usinr bulldozers with explosives

for removingirocks should be investigated.

MEDICi.
38.

Purther rescarch is

required f'or the prevention of soasieclness.

59/3 0

390
casoo

Hospital slip s should caIrr?, cro.ft fitt d to ta!:o

Ciand hich can bo hoisted irnboard fullyrlad on.

i
n-) t-o
0O. R.N. poi soaol w-ho-^;
in hyiono ano. how- to live ashor.o
1,

ost

Trans:.)ort aircraft :wcuo

stroCtchr

t rainin;
ashoro noquiro
qb

tsofCul for

vacucttin" casual

oriccuirc
tics , tnhus roucir; nusIbors of :c.ico! I)npoonnol

ashoro.

SzjCURITY.
42*

To aspocts of sccurit

(a)

.'

T-The ncod for sealed

bri efin

c n tak

which morit particular

ro,
a in w;hich -nountins ond

pl c e

requirenent whion brief ins

and
.
h
.rith
1a-s
boe rilsk t,.

otor iaphs

(b)

t.
totntion

This is

an ilnportant

tro ops

if

3uiyn, tohe

^s

sOcurity i

not to

s a'nd 'is.truc ti ons

The necossity fo.r detoiled o2
Ia. the brelinr
ro.rdinS 'tho issue of :i.p s in. Lull
of bul:k for diostribution to the users.

A N N E A URU

'A'

Rules laid dowm by Force Colsan.ders for adoption in the plan

for the landing of Regimental Coribat -Teams of the U.S, 3rd Division.

1,

one i ttalion as a IBeach

Each Regimental CoaLbat Tea should urain
|Assa.ult Bat talion"* Their primaryr task ini'tiall wou d bo the
destruction, or at least en.gagement, of 'bea.ch defenCe.us, so thi.at the
second, and third batt.alions could bipasSs resistance and cletrat
inland.
.pam.
ties

trained to o-urate Until daylight in

These battalions werec

parties of 55

(i.e. boa.

in which they werc put asor-.

tthe

oen

including engineers)
2,

.l
lland simulta'nousl at K hour,
would
battalion
second
preceded by a wrav of LCS firing graLpnel1s, the
RCTs would.
land at H plus )4_. minutes, axid the third at H plus 60.

All be ch Assault Battali

os

would

retain NO floating reseIrve, .

3.

Each Beach Assault' Battalion w'ould tkeo pas'sage in 6 LO T each of

Each Beach Assault BattalAon would
whiach hoisted, 5 LOT and 1 IL S.
ta'ke

ashore one Force

Cor-tnard.ers personal Liaison off icer equip ed

with a jeep and a SC 193 wireless set.

2-.

5.

| The Regimental- Comiandor w'ould land personally

third battalions and -would take passage in

was specially fitted. for that purpose.
Shore and Beach Grou

;rith the second or

the Hccaquarters LCI vdlich

connaissance pzarties

.ould

landed partly

:with Assault canld p2artly w'ith follow-up battal ions,

6.

of IDTs would bachd a t:' Hi pu31u. 90 (with oner particular,

The firsrt wav
m-anly Beacl Group pe:sone l ad vehiclcs
would car
.exception), ,nand
gSuns only) in 7 LCT, 5 mor/.;; LCT
(S.P
and tuwo Light AA batteries

towing 57 m- A/Teank guns aid

a coCpanty of m diu. tans
vwere
tt:talks
l LeT carryinr
follo -(d by 'the la.tter S prime movers.
to the
on
fire
could
possible
to be loaded so that as mrany tanks as
;Ould cCarr

beach

auring

the final

approach,.

7.

oif suDsequ.nt LAT waves was similarly

The coirposit;ion and tirin
Hloadquarters.
Force
laid' dowom by

8.

Except 1in particular cases which had to bc refer-red to the Joint

Force Ceomm.ianders,

all

landing craft

normarel formations 0of either 6,

of ten infrin

9)

10,

would approaoch. t

12 or 1

craft,

their

ed.)

No wvhee led veohiclus, c-ceopt certain. specjif ied com.uUnications anL

chc
intil c Group person ul and
unl thidt
c edcd
jeeps, ;oul
artillery
LCT wave had been ashore fo:r a
equipment, carried in the first
o alllo-htime for the lay':ing of beacih roadw'ay.
tao
hourst:
.twlo
*clear
units ashore on e ach beachl would be a ba'ttalion'i
artilleoy/
The first
r
guns) on a very
with SP luns (i2
dquipped
of thu Divisional Artillcr

reduced scale. of tralnspor-t

carried omnplete with pe -rsornel in

timed t, beach two hours afteSr the ohore C-rou.ps.

wrave s,
parties wrould b'3- carried. in earlier

11,

beach in

(This rule was fairly

4,+ IDlT

Artill.ery r ecorna)SLzaco-

tlan one batter

Alkl units w-ere to 'be tactically lo.aded witUh ne'o't maro
of gums, or one comparny of takcs (etc.) in .a.y one ship or craft.

AN 1N E X U 'R E

"B".

PLth.TNG, B3Y UjS* .3rd.D!VSION

(a)

Plaznners should be divorced from all other duties in connection with tra ining nd ilountirn
the operation until such
time as the Landing and LoadinS tables
e.ca
firm.
To ohablec
this to be done, staffs shoulld be augented for the planning
period, and the increase should corne as far' as possibleo
fromn. within the formation concerned.

(1b)

Landingc a1nd Loadiang tables should be prepared simultaneously

and graphically from the start of plm3.riing.

(c)

AZrmy plannintg would be siimplifiJd if ships and craft could

be givenl serial numblers indicative of their roleo, beach and
"wave in the Landins Table
At present one set of serialnuimbers is used during the early stages of planning which
is t.eon altered to the serial numbers of the craft allotted
These num;bers should be painted on the
for the operat.ionl
for
actual ships cand craft - when finally' sub-allotted
the period of the operation,

(d)

A preliminary Appreciation made by a P ,/L* 0. and a naval

staff officer, both of vwhom should be primarily "epoerts"
in theo technicalities of acuphibious assaults, is an essential
.pr liCinary to the Force Commander s final appreciation and
selection of a Plaxn

(c)

One of th.e eost important roles of ther P..L0.O is that of

t
very earliest phases of
advisor on assault technique uin
plan1nig,
Primarily h should be a tactical or "CG" staff
officer and not a "0Q" Qxport-b
The "Q" movements dutieos which
a Pi-ILO* is someltimes e-pocted to peorfotrm could be better
unmdrtalcon by the ordinarty "Q"i staff ,aumeontod by a Grade II
or -Grade III "Q" 1movemen1ts specialist.

(f)

in joint
ir planneors should be appointed to par'ticipa t
of sub -Task
level
to
the
dowv
very
start,
the
froam
planning
Forco or Divisional Headquarteors.
The lack of air represontiation during., planning was keenly fo:elt 'both1in this nd
the PAlTTLILX'LdT operation a 8,neccssity w-7hich even }1ivo does
not appoear to havy,} been recognised in vioew of the conti-nued
absonce of air rer,c sentat ievos durinsg the S J.-O !?lanning.

(g)

photographic covrage of the enti're cuastline to

^-inc.chcir
i31d %beprovided ,-ith initial
intelligence,
be assaulted
s
This is required as much for its topographic:al inf'aorr:,-ation as
foxr its disclosureo of prepared dcefenccs

(h)

An air photograph interpreteor is

plaseing team,.

{ii)

The comp Let period of planning for a Division empioyed in a

shoro--to-shoro assault, fro t'he tlin when the Commande,'ors are
first
cornfrontcd with the Corps or A.r y Outline Plan, and 'iath
full, int llienco and phDot ographs, up to the final proluction
and Loading diagra.ms, could
Tables
Loadi
of Landing Ta.bls.
vwll be reduced, in oemergency to i6 days.

an essential member of a

B
TiAE "CON
SANENES
STORES IHNDLED ON BEACHES,
1*

OVERALL FIGURES.
56,747 1tons

Eight Army D to D + 17 (inclusive) over beaches -

(a)

6 Beach Groups were working during this period, and one extra
This gives an overall average of
for the first four days
per day.
Group
about 500 tons per Beach

79-,531 tcons.

Seventh Army D to D + 14 (inclusive)

(b)

This includes stores handled through ports.

Throe Beach Groups (ME.)working on beaches between CASSIBILE
and AVOLA by rmidday D + 27 had landed 40,163 tons of stores, an
overall average of 500 tons per Beach Group per day,

(c)

.'

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2*

TWO ENGINEEE SHORE BiTTALIONS WITH ONE l 1DDI)ITIOITL BATTALION D TO D + I

WORKING ON 1ST USBDIVISION BEACHES AT GIA.O

DAY

STORES (TONS)

PERSONMEL.

'
VEHICLES

UIgwV's
in

SERVICE.
D

1,200

21 204

1,000

128

D +1

3,000

9,041

1,000

119

D + 2

1,351

428

458

164

924

2,174

457

174

D + 4

1,096

1,844

116

174.

+5

2,288

5,030

216

173

+6

2,558

196

602

175

+7

2,927

122

666

166

+8

3,026

1,817

457

206

+ 9

2,528

1,258

284

204

+ 10

2,756

1,047

296

203

+ 11

2,488

93

203

B +-12

2,506

10

204

+3

D
D
D
D
D

P.T ,O

._ ..
TI

3.

USj

BoC.H
3G
G

O.j..

r;^________7_OU
ST OEL

.1
OUT

120 DUiI-.s.

A..

"C" (cont 'a)

OIJMG OillL-;CiJ~iZ~
OH
-IstCJ-

I SOlS
ID-kI\I D7~,_
:DIIJON

OP ?.,CHIITO.

( TOir )

VLUOICLES
~ -E
Az1I';T- - 1-ci
W

7,060

D +* 1

500

250

D + 2

C-0,

520

D + 3

150

D + 4.

1,014

260

9,020

340

1) + 5

559

1)D + 6

1,638

D + 7

2,220

ID ,- 8

2,752

I) + 9

2,805

D + 10

4, 049

950

552

D + 11

4,376

290

155

D + 12

2,638

D i 13

1,782

201

50

NOTES:
(a)

Rates of dischlarge varied rith the arirval of convoys;

on some day's
.ittle
vior could be; done as earlier convoys had been cleared ahead
of programme,

(b) On most of the beaches re ferred to in pras

Italian prisoners per beach. ere: helpi:n.

(C)
(d.)

to 700

IHold-ups somoetiaies occur-rcd througha insuf'ficient laS'bour in thle

de0ot
areas to unload DUI:/s
.oa,.e fi:Cr.....s f.{ive
in para,:
2:''re
b ase. "c
tey
p.e, d theC checkcr station,

JDUiVA
load a
(e)

and53

l(

t;ons pe

tCruic

or

ID3ach 57 referred to in para, 3 was used for unloading

all stores until
D
35.
? TnhiX
each 7-as foemd to bo unsatisfactory, and :rom ID + 4
stores weree un oaded on beach 56.

A i lT"N E X U R E IDI

SkeCtc I of
i Pontoon Doc k

L.S.T

or L.LC. T, B.3rt hs

L. C.M. Bert1hs

Bert hs.

Boach.

-failf

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