Introductions
The Tax Lawyer Board
Erica, Rob, Katharine, Danielle, Kirsten, Lauren
Procedures
Packet Purchase & Availability
Dates of Competition: 5/18-5/29
Turning in Submissions
Carefully read the Write On packet instructions
Upload the completed materials & supplemental materials
to the competition website early
Procedures
Restrictions DURING the Competition:
- You may only use the materials provided in the
packet, a dictionary, legal dictionary, thesaurus,
and your Bluebook.
- You may not consult any additional materials
during the competition.
- You are NOT allowed to do any outside
research.
- You may not discuss and/or receive any
assistance during competition.
In order of importance
Also makes sense, but you will not have a very good idea of
the order of importance until you read a few cases.
A Few Examples
This Comment will argue that the Fourth
Circuit should have relied on Virginia state law
to dispose of the publicity element in Sciolino
v. City of Newport News.
This Comment will argue that the Eighth
Circuit should have applied a balancing test in
analyzing the endorsement clause in Wersal v.
Sexton.
Statement of Facts
1-2 pages
Relay any facts that are interesting and are
essential to your argument, just like LRW.
Objective, academic tone
Holding
- 1 page
Analogous to the Statement of the Case in a
brief.
Explain the courts reasoning behind the
outcome
Roadmap
page
Provide the Reader with your Thesis Statement
Lay out the different aspects of your argument,
corresponding with your headings
Convince the reader why this issue is
important and how your argument
demonstrates the optimum outcome
Should be introduced with language like This
Comment will argue
Analysis
Constitutes the majority of your comment
Should be organized around headings &
subheadings
Remember, you only have 7 pages, so keep it
relevant and concise
Outlining will be your best friend!
Conclusion
Page
Sum up the different prongs of your argument.
Mirror your roadmap!
Briefly restate the underlying reasoning for
your argument and what outcome you are
advocating for
39 The
41
36
See In re Vincent, 172 P.3d at 608 (citing In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (N.Y. 2003)).
44
36
37
Id. at 1232.
38 Id.
39 The
courts finding . . .
40 Johnson,
46 129
47 See
id. at 2257.
48 See
id. at 2257-58.
49 See
id. at 2265.
50 See
11 See
26 Id.
at 1217 (citing Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.
2003), vacated 377 F.3d 1163).
27 Id.
56
NOT: 3 See, e.g. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986).
52 Compare
Roadmap Examples
Example 1:
This comment will argue that, instead of relying on a strict scrutiny standard,
the Eighth Circuit should have adopted a more deferential balancing test when
analyzing the constitutionality of Minnesotas endorsement clause. This
approach would have allowed the court to uphold the endorsement clause and
brought the Eighth Circuit in line with the unanimous authority of state and
federal courts upholding the constitutionality of judicial endorsement
prohibitions. First, in summarily applying strict scrutiny review to the clause at
issue, the Eighth Circuit ignored the underlying rationale for the strict scrutiny
standard set forth in White I. Second, any argument that the balancing test
employed in other jurisdictions is inapplicable because Wersal was a judicial
candidate rather than a sitting judge fails, as the original logic justifying
application of a balancing test to speech restrictions requires no such distinction
between the two categories. Finally, recusal alone is not a sufficiently strong
safeguard for Minnesotas interest in maintaining an impartial judiciary. The
Wersal decision therefore significantly undermined this interest when it struck
the Minnesota endorsement clause.
Roadmap Examples
Example 2:
This comment will argue that the Eighth Circuits strict
scrutiny analysis in Wersal fails to properly consider litigants
right to due process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. In cases that pit two competing constitutional
rights against each other, courts have recognized that limited
deference should be shown to the legislature that may not
necessarily be warranted when only one constitutional issue is
at stake. Instead of limited deference, the Wersal decision
seems almost willful in its failure to recognize the competing
constitutional principles of free speech and due process. In
addition, this comment will argue that the due process analysis
in Wersal is insufficient in light of the Supreme Courts
decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company.
Analysis Examples
Example 1:
A. The Wersal Courts Application of Strict Scrutiny Misapplies the Rationale of White I.
In failing to consider a balancing test as an alternative to strict scrutiny review when
analyzing Minnesotas endorsement clause, the Eighth Circuit stripped the White I holding of
its original rationale. It is undisputed that the freedom of speech has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. However, the
White I Court emphasized that the protected speech at issue necessitated strict scrutiny review
because it prevented judicial candidates from speaking about their own qualifications for
public office. While the announce clause struck down in White I, which prohibited judicial
candidates from speaking about legal or political issues, plainly prevented candidates from
discussing their qualifications for office, the judicial endorsement prohibition at issue in
Wersal does not. A judicial candidates endorsement of another candidate is primarily an effort
to affect a separate political campaign, rather than a communication of the judicial candidates
own qualifications. Before applying strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit should have recognized
the distinction between the need to allow judges to speak freely on the issues of the day, and
the states interest in maintaining a judiciary uninvolved in the political machinations that
accompany political endorsements. Because Minnesotas endorsement clause is aimed at
prohibiting judicial candidates from becoming caught up in political machinations, rather than
at prohibiting candidates from speaking freely on the issues of the day, White I did not require
the Wersal court to apply strict scrutiny.
Analysis Examples
Example 2:
When the court is weighing competing constitutional interests, courts have said
that there is a place for limited deference within the framework of strict
scrutiny. Because competing constitutional concerns require legislators to
engage in a balancing of interests, there is a greater likelihood that laws may be
either overinclusive or underinclusive, and therefore the courts should be less
exacting in applying the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Perhaps the majoritys awareness of the limited deference exception explains
why the Wersal decision seems to go to great lengths to avoid acknowledging
that the judicial bias is more than an ordinary policy concern, but is in fact a
constitutional concern of the highest order. Wersal focuses instead almost
exclusively on the impact of the judicial regulations on speech. Tellingly, the
Court utters the phrase due process (as it relates to judicial bias) only five
times across three paragraphs, and at no point does the Court note that the
impartiality guaranteed to litigants through the Due Process Clause is a basic
concept of the United States Constitution. As another Eighth Circuit judge
wrote in White II: Referring to constitutional rights [in judicial election
context], without even mentioning due process is stunning shallowness.
Other Resources
EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING
(3d ed. 2007).
ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK,
SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW STUDENTS (3d
ed. 2005)
YOU CANNOT CONSULT THESE ONCE
WRITE ON HAS STARTED!!!
Ask A Judge!