HERMOGENES

vs.
NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant,

N.
Tanopo,
Jr.
and
Millora
for
Manuel Ancheta and Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for defendants-appellees.

plaintiff-appellant.

MAKALINTAL., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City in its Civil Case No. 10485, dated
June 28, 1961. This case was originally brought to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified to
Us on the ground that the issues raised are purely legal.
It appears that on November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant Nieves de
Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court a
quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment, sentencing the defendants herein, Nieves de
Lozano and Pascual Lozano, to pay unto the herein plaintiff, Hermogenes Maramba, the total
sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with legal
interest thereon from date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
With costs against the said defendants.
Not satisfied with the judgment, the defendants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but the
appeal was dismissed on March 30, 1960 for failure of the defendants to file their brief on time. After
the record the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of execution was issued, and on August
18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land covered by transfer certificate title No. 8192 of
Pangasinan in the name of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published in
accordance with law and scheduled for September 16, 1960.
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the judgment in the
amount P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960. On October
17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on November 11, 1952, during
the pendency of the case, defendant Pascual Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her
paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at one-half () of the amount awarded in
the judgment and that pending the resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff
from carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.
On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves de Lozano which has been levied
upon was sold to the judgment creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the
balance of the judgment debt.1wph1.t
On October 27, 1960, plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendant's amended motion dated October
14, 1960. And on June 28, 1961, the trial court issued the questioned order, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby grants the motion of counsel for defendant Nieves de Lozano,
dated October 5, 1960, which was amended on October 14, 1960, and holds that the liability
of the said defendant under the judgment of June 23, 1959, is only joint, or P1,750.04, which

is one-half () of the judgment debt of P3,500.07 awarded to the plaintiff and that the writ of
execution be accordingly modified in the sense that the liability of defendant Nieves de Lozano
be only P1,750.04 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint on November
5, 1948 until fully paid, plus the amount of P21.28 which is also one-half () of the costs
taxed by the Clerk of Court against the defendant spouses. Let the auction sale of the abovementioned property of defendant Nieves de Lozano proceed to satisfy her liability of P1,750.04
with legal interest as above stated and the further sum of P21.28 representing the costs,
unless she voluntarily pays the same to the judgment creditor (herein plaintiff).
Plaintiff interposed an appeal from the above-quoted order and assigned several errors, which present
three major issues, to wit:
(a) whether or not the decision of the lower court dated June 23, 1959 could still be
questioned;
(b) whether or not the judgment was joint or solidary; and
(c) whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties
sold at public auction.
Plaintiff-appellant submits that a "nunc pro tunc" order should have been issued by the trial court
dismissing, as of November 11, 1952, the case against the late Pascual Lozano by reason of his death,
and that the lower court should have corrected its decision of June 23, 1959, by striking out the letter
"s" in the word "defendants" and deleting the words "and Pascual Lozano."
We do not think that the action suggested would be legally justified. It would entail a substantial
amendment of the decision of June 23, 1959, which has long become final and in fact partially
executed. A decision which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes, 1 and however erroneous it may be, cannot be
disobeyed;2 otherwise litigations would be endless and no questions could be considered finally
settled.3 The amendment sought by appellee involves not merely clerical errors but the very substance
of the controversy. And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance of a "nunc pro tunc" order such as
that sought in this case. The purpose of an "nunc pro tunc" is to make a present record of an which
the court made at a previous term, but which not then recorded. It can only be made when the
ordered has previously been made, but by inadvertence not been entered. In the instant case there
was no order previously made by the court and therefore there is no now to be recorded.
Now then, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959 does not specify the extent of the liability of
each defendant. The rule is that when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and
severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in
full. This is in harmony with Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that in any event the entire judgment debt can be satisfied from the
proceeds the property sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it is conjugal in character
although in the of only one of the spouses. The contention is incorrect. The presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the
wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief (p. 17) that the
property in question is paraphernal.

Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were originally paraphernal, it became
conjugal property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon at the expense of the common
fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has been by this Court that
the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses doe
not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal partnership may use both in
the land and the building, but it does so not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The
ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be
demanded in the liquidation of the partnership (Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby
Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla, G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961). The
record does not show that there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between
the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property levied upon, being the
separate property of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the
other defendant.
On May 18, 1967 counsel for defendants-appellees filed with Us a petition alleging, inter alia; that
prior to the expiration of the redemption period and pursuant to an order of the lower court
defendants filed a surety bond in the amount of P3,175.12 as the redemption price, which bond was
duly approved by the lower court; that sometime last September 1966, defendants filed a petition
before the lower court praying that the sheriff of Pangasinan be ordered to execute the corresponding
deed of redemption in favor of defendant Nieves de Lozano represented by her judicial administrator
or that, in the alternative, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City be directed to cancel Entries Nos.
19234 and 20042 at the back of TCT No. 8192; and that said petition was denied by the lower court.
The same prayer made below is reiterated in the said petition of May 18, 1967.
The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred after the perfection of the present
appeal and which should therefore be submitted to and passed upon by the trial court in connection
with the implementation of the order appealed from, which is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
Marasigan vs. Ronquillo, 94 Phil. 237.

Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 33 Phil.
508; Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941.
2

Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913.

G.R. No. L-11621

May 31, 1962

FELICISIMO
RONQUILLO,
deceased,
substituted by ANTONIA DE GUZMAN VDA. DE RONQUILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano
G.
Bustos
and
Angel
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for defendant-appellee.

G.

Ronquillo

for

plaintiffs-appellants.

PAREDES, J.:
On December 1, 1941, Felicisimo Ronquillo and Francisco Marasigan, verbally entered into a contract
of lease for ten (10) years, over a parcel of nipa-land, more particularly described under paragraph 3
of the complaint. Pursuant to said contract, the nipa-land was delivered and Ronquillo took possession
thereof until September 1, 1942, when Marasigan, in conspiracy with the laborers and men under the
employ of Ronquillo, invaded and took over possession of the land. As a result of the dispossession
Ronquillo filed with the CFI of Bulacan, Civil Case No. 80, against Marasigan and on May 19, 1943, he
included as defendants 14 others, praying that judgment be rendered, ordering the return of the nipaland to him, so that he may continue his lease right over it for 9 years and 3 months more and that
defendants be ordered, jointly and severally, to pay him P24,000.00 as yearly income from September
1, 1942 until the land has actually been delivered. The lower court, on September 1, 1947, rendered
judgment, to wit:
That the defendant deliver immediately the possession of the land described in the amended
complaint to the plaintiff Ronquillo; that the defendant Marasigan execute a contract of lease
covering the said land for a period of 10 years in favor of the plaintiff Ronquillo, as of
December 1, 1941, by excluding therefrom the five years period from September 1, 1942 to
August 31, 1947, inclusive, with a consideration of P14,000.00 minus the amount of
P1,200.00, P1,277.70 and P600.00, the amount of P1,227.70 being additional advances
received by the defendant Marasigan and the last amount of P600.00 being a reserve fund for
the payment of the land taxes; and that the defendant Marasigan will assume his former
position as assistant manager with a compensation of P60.00 monthly.
Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals, on April 10, 1950, rendered judgment in the
following manner
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that defendant
Marasigan shall not be compelled to assume his former position as assistant manager in the
business of the plaintiff unless he be willing to serve as such, with compensation at the rate of
P60.00 per month. The decision is affirmed in all other respects, with the understanding,
however, that defendant Marasigan shall pay to the plaintiff the damages that the latter may
prove to have suffered if the provision regarding the execution of a new contract of lease of
and land could not be carried out for any legal impediment. Without pronouncement as to
costs in this instance.
Upon the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 80, as modified by the Court of Appeals, the case
was remanded to the lower court for execution of the judgment. Ronquillo deposited the amount
adjudged for him to pay, in the amount of P10,922.31, as full payment of the rentals of the land for 10
years. A writ of execution was ordered served on Marasigan by the Provincial Sheriff on September 13,
1950. On September 19, 1950, Marasigan thru counsel informed the Sheriff that delivery of the land
to Ronquillo could not be undertaken because the co-defendants of Marasigan were holding the same
as lessees and told said Sheriff that Ronquillo can avail of the alternative provided for in the modified
decision of the Court of Appeals, that is, to prove his damages due to failure to deliver the land.
On October 3, 1950, Ronquillo presented a motion praying the Court to order (1) the immediate
delivery of the land in question and the Sheriff to place Ronquillo in possession; (2) defendant
Marasigan to execute the deed of lease as provided for in the decision of the CFI, and (3) that upon
failure of Marasigan to comply, to order his arrest for contempt.

An opposition to the above motion was presented and on November 10, 1950, the following order was
promulgated
The Court is of the opinion, and so hold that the opposition is groundless so that the Provincial
Sheriff is hereby ordered to place immediately the plaintiff in the possession of the property in
question, and that in view of the deposit made by the plaintiff of the sum of P10,922.30 as
consideration of the lease, said defendant Francisco Marasigan is hereby ordered to execute
said deed of lease in the precise terms specified in the dispositive part of the decision within
ten (10) days from the receipt of a copy thereof, otherwise, and in pursuance of Section 10,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court, Mr. Leopoldo C. Palad, is hereby authorized
to execute said deed of lease in the precise terms as specified in the said decision.
Under date of November 13, 1950, possession of the land was delivered to Ronquillo. A motion for
reconsideration filed by Marasigan on November 17, 1950 was denied on the same date.
A manifestation, with a proposed deed of lease, as called for in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
was filed on November 27, 1950. On December 4, 1950, Marasigan filed a motion asking for authority
to withdraw the P10,922.30 deposited by Ronquillo, since plaintiff has already been placed in
possession of the land in litigation. Plaintiff interposed no objection to the withdrawal, and on
December 12, 1950, defendant Marasigan collected the amount.
An approval of the deed of lease proposed by Marasigan submitted on November 27, was urged by
said Marasigan, in a motion of December 19, 1950. An objection was interposed by plaintiff Ronquillo.
Instead, he asked that Clerk of Court Palad be directed to execute the deed of lease, which he
(plaintiff) attached to the opposition as, Annex A, inserting verbatim the dispositive part of the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 80. The lower court, under date of January 18, 1950, issued the
following order
The Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment provides a deduction of five (5)
years from the ten (10) years contract of lease beginning from December 1, 1941, and that
the five years should be counted from September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947. Therefore, the
period of lease should be, according to the said dispositive part of the judgment, ten years
from the date the plaintiff was recently placed in possession of the land excluding the period
from December 1, 1941 to August 31, 1942 or nine (9) months. It is clear and just that these
five years, which was not enjoyed by the lessee, must be discounted and added to the period
of lease which is to be executed now when the lessee will continue enjoying his right of the
lease. . . .
WHEREFORE, said contract of lease filed by the defendant is hereby disapproved and the form
of contract of lease prepared by the Clerk of Court as authorized in the order dated November
10, 1950, and filed by the plaintiff, attached to his opposition, may be approved by this Court,
it being in conformity with the dispositive part of the judgment. (Exh. "F", Rec. on Appeal, pp.
9-11).
Pursuant to the above order, Clerk of Court Palad and plaintiff Ronquillo executed, on January 22,
1951, the deed of lease in the terms prescribed by the said order and by Urgent Motion of the same
date, plaintiff prayed for the approval of the same. Defendant opposed the urgent motion anchoring
his objection on the allegation that the proposed deed leaves the end or termination of the period of
lease subject to further interpretation of the parties, and that the order, instead of settling an issue,

leaves the matter open to further litigation. On March 13, 1951, the lower court handed down the
following order:
WHEREFORE, the order of January 18, 1951 is hereby modified in the sense that the draft of
the contract of lease therein approved should provide that, in accordance with the terms of the
dispositive part of the decision of this Court, said lease should be for a period of ten (10)
years, starting from December 1, 1941, and running through and including August 31, 1942,
and start to run again from September 1, 1947 up to and ending on December 1, 1956. . .
A motion for a reconsideration of the above order, was denied on April 19, 1951. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals on May 13, 1952, rendered judgment, to wit
WHEREFORE, the orders of March 13, and April 19, 1951, are hereby set aside and the
defendant Francisco Marasigan is hereby ordered to execute a contract of lease embodying the
conditions set forth in the decision of the lower court, with the understanding that the contract
should be for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months more, to begin from November
10, 1950, until said period is covered in full. . . .
Defendant Marasigan in turn brought the above judgment to this Court on certiorari (appeal),
docketed as G.R. No. L-5910 and a judgment was rendered, the pertinent portions of which are
reproduced hereunder:
The change ordered by the Court of Appeals was made when the judgment was already being
executed; and it can not be said to merely correct a clerical error because it provides for a
contract of lease of nine years and three months duration, from November 10, 1950, which is
different from one to ten years from December 1, 1941, excluding the period from September
1, 1942 to Aug. 31, 1947. The modification is, however, sought to be justified by two
circumstances, namely, the withdrawal by the lessor of the amount of P10,922.30, which
amount, together with the other sums previously received, total P14,000.00, and which is the
rental of a full ten-year term, and the injustice caused the lessee because he was not placed in
possession from September 1, 1947 but on November 10, 1950, when the court ordered the
execution of the judgment.1wph1.t
The reason given above are not entirely without value or merit; but while they may entitle the
lessee to some remedy, the one given in the appealed decision flies in the teeth of the
procedural principle of the finality of the judgments. When the decision of the Court of Appeals
on the first appeal was rendered, modification thereof should have been sought by proper
application to the court, in the sense that the period to be excluded from the ten-year period
of the lease (fixed by the judgment of the court of first instance to begin on September 1,
1942 and end on August 31, 1947), be extended up to the date when the land was on be
actually placed in the possession of the lessee. This full period should be excluded in the
computation of the ten-year lease because the delay in lessee's taking possession was
attributable to the lessor's fault. Whether the failure of the lessee to secure this modification in
the original judgment as above indicated is due to the oversight of the party, of the court, or
of both, the omission or mistake certainly could no longer be remedied by modification of the
judgment after it bad become final and executory.
As to the acceptance by the lessor of the full amount of the price of the lease for a full tenyear period, from which acceptance the judgment infers an acquiescence in a lease for fully
ten years from November 10, 1950 (the date when lessee was placed in possession after

judgment), it must be stated that such act of acceptance was made after the date of the final
judgment, it may not be permitted to justify its modification, or change, or correction. Said act
of acceptance may create new rights in relation to the judgment, but the remedy to enforce
such rights is not a modification of the judgment, or its correction, but a new suit or action in
which the new issue of its (acceptance) supposed existence and effects shall be tried and
decided. (Exh. "I", pp. 6-8, Rec. on Appeal pp. 14-17).
Because of the observations of this Court in the above judgment, Ronquillo filed the present case (Civ.
Case No. 977), against the defendant Marasigan over the same parcel of nipa-land, subject matter of
the previous case between them (Civ. Case No. 80). He prays that judgment be rendered:
(a) Under the first cause of action, declaring the plaintiff to be entitled to a continuation of the
lease now existing between the parties over the nipa-land in litigation for a period of three (3)
years, two (2) months and nine (9) days more, and ordering the defendant to execute the
corresponding deed of lease in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) Under the second cause of action, sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs such
moral, actual and compensatory damages which may be proved in court plus reasonable
attorney's fees and the costs of this action; and
(c) Granting unto the plaintiff any other just and equitable relief in the premises.
Defendant Marasigan presented a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on two grounds: Lack of cause of
action andres judicata, and/or estoppel by judgment. In argument, supporting the above contention,
defendant claims that the period within which the lease should commence to run and end has squarely
been decided not only by the CFI of Bulacan, but also the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. An
opposition to the motion to dismiss was registered by plaintiff Ronquillo, arguing that a valid cause of
action exists and the complaint was filed in view of the aforecited observations of the Supreme Court.
With the denial of the motion to dismiss, on March 16, 1955, defendant filed his answer which, after
the customary admissions and denials, interposed Special Defenses and a Counterclaim to wit
"As Special Defenses:
16. That the complaint states no cause of action;
17. That it is barred by the statute of limitations; and
18. That the judgment in Civil Case No. 80 affirmed by the Court of Appeals with slight
modification in CA-G.R. No. 2816-R and finally interpreted and decided by the Supreme Court
in SC-G.R. No. L-5810 is res adjudicata between the parties to the present action, the Court
having taken into account the rental value of the premises at the time of the rendition of the
decision.
After trial, the CFI of Bulacan dismissed the complaint and counterclaim, without costs, stalling
. . . Consequently, it is our sense that this suit is barred by the decision of the Supreme Court
in Civil Case No. 80, affirming the orders of January 18 and March 13, 1951, of this Court.

At least, if the decision rendered by this Court in Civil Case No. 80, (Exh. "A") as slightly
modified by the Court of Appeals and its orders of January 18, and March 13, 1951, as
affirmed by the Supreme Court, do not constitute res judicata to the instant case, they
operate as an estoppel by judgment. For indeed there is identity of parties and subject matter
in this case and in Civil Case No. 80 (Paccial v. Palermo, L-April 29, 1950, 47 O.G. 6184).
The acceptance by the defendant (lessor) of the full ,mount of the lease for a full ten-year
period may, as held by the Supreme Court "create new rights in relation to the judgment." But
as it is said, "the remedy to enforce such rights is not a modification of the judgment . . .".
This suit, in effect, seeks to modify the judgment of the Supreme Court holding that the lease
shall end on December 1, 1956. (Exh. "I"). Said court could not have in mind this suit as the
"new suit or action in which the new issue of its (acceptance) supposed existence and effects
shall be tried and decided."
Plaintiff, on May 16, 1956, filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the above findings and conclusions.
Defendant Marasigan filed a motion for reconsideration of the above judgment for failure to award him
the reserve fund of P600.00 claimed in his counterclaim. Plaintiff as appellant urges a reversal of the
decision of the CFI of Bulacan on eight (8) assignments of errors, which can be consolidated into the
following issues:
1. The interpretation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil case No. 80 (CA-G.R. No.
2816-R, April 20,1950 Exh. H);
2. Whether res judicata has set in;
3. The right to damages.
It is manifest that the complaint instituted by Ronquillo in Civil Case No. 997 was principally based
upon the observation of this Court in the Certiorari case, where We stated that the acceptance by
Marasigan of the full amount of the rentals of the land for ten (10) years was an acquiescence that the
lease should be for the whole period of ten (10) years, which act may have created new rights in
relation to the judgment which should be enforced by a new suit. Having accepted the rentals for the
fall ten (10) years period, Marasigan is now estopped from claiming that Ronquillo should be entitled
to the leasehold for less than the said period. Moreover, no one should enrich himself at the expense
of another. After stating that the act of Marasigan created new rights which may be enforced in a new
suit, We can not, and should not, just cross our arms and stand aloft to the predicament of herein
appellant Ronquillo. To deny this appeal on the principles of res judicata and/or estoppel by judgment
would be sacrificing justice to technicality. Their application to the case, under the particular facts
obtaining, would amount to denial of justice and/or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance. In
cases like the one under consideration, a liberal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and
technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules the
proper and just determination of a litigation. There is no vested right in technicalities (Alonzo v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315). Furthermore, We find no application of the doctrine of res judicata in this case.
At the bottom of things, the present complaint seeks merely the implementation of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 80, which ordered appellee Marasigan to deliver the nipa-land to Ronquillo and to
execute a deed of lease for ten (10) years in his favor, to commence from December 1, 1941. And
even if We grant, for purposes of argument, that res judicata is applicable, "it is always in the power of
the Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it" (Cf., Viuda de Ordeveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275). The fact that the
decision which made the deductions on the period of lease has become final, does not preclude a
modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its execution

becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the
same with justice and the facts (Ocampo v. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-6933, Aug. 30, 1955, 51 O.G. 4542).
WHEREFORE, the Order dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 997, is hereby
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of origin, for further proceedings. Without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Padilla,
Bautista
Angelo,
Reyes,
Labrador
and
Concepcion,
Bengzon, C.J., on leave, took no part.

J.B.L.,
JJ.,

Barrera
concur

and

Dizon,
in

JJ.,
the

concur.
result.

[G.R. No. 90215. March 29, 1996]

ERNESTO
ZALDARRIAGA,
JESUS
ZALDARRIAGA,
JR.
and
GUADALUPE
ZALDARRIAGA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA ZALDARRIAGA;
ANTONIA ZALDARRIAGA on her behalf and on behalf of her minor children, namely,
Edgardo, Romeo, Jesus, Ronaldo; William, Miguel and Rebecca, all surnamed
Zaldarriaga; NIDA and JOSE, all surnamed ZALDARRIAGA; JOSE, JR., ALICIA, PEDRO,
MELBA, NELLY and ALFREDO, all surnamed ZALDARRIAGA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.,:
This is the sixth time that an issue or incident spawned by opposing claims of two sets of first
cousins and, earlier, their respective mothers, over the Hacienda Escolastica in Mabini, Cadiz, Negros
Occidental has been elevated to this Court for resolution. We resolve the instant petition for review on
certiorari in the hope that, as one of them [1] says, peace and tranquility to all parties may at last be
attained.
Hacienda Escolastica, consisting of Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941, originally covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539, has an area of 228.54 hectares.
It belonged to the conjugal partnership of Pedro Zaldarriaga and Margarita Iforong. During their
marriage, the couple begot four sons named Jesus, Jose, Manuel and Julio.
On May 17, 1919, Margarita died leaving one-half (1/2) or four-eighths (4/8) of the hacienda to
her husband as his conjugal share and one-eighth (1/8) share to each of her sons. Thereafter, Manuel
and Julio died single and without issue. Their combined two-eighths (2/8) shares therefore passed by
legal succession to their father, Pedro, who consequently became the owner of six-eighths (6/8) or
three-fourths (3/4) share of the hacienda.
In 1944, Jose died survived by his wife, Basilia, and their seven children, named Carlos, [2] Jose,
Alicia, Melba, Nelly, Pedro and Alfredo. Two years later or in 1946, Jesus also died. He was survived by
his wife, Consuelo, and three children: Ernesto, Guadalupe and Jesus, Jr. Hence, Pedro outlived his
four children.
On June 5, 1953, Basilia vda. de Zaldarriaga, acting as the judicial administratrix of the estate of
Jose, filed Civil Case No. 2705 against the said surviving children of Jesus before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the partition of the hacienda and for accounting of its rents,
profits, produce and fruits. During the pendency of the case or on January 14, 1956, Pedro, the

Zaldarriaga patriarch, executed a deed of definite sale conveying his 6/8 share in the hacienda to his
grandchildren by Jesus, the defendants in the case. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538
and T-6539 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-20122, T-19141, T-20143 and T-20124 corresponding to
Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941 were issued to said grandchildren. This turn of events also resulted
in the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2705 in order that the nullification of the said sale
would be made an integral part thereof.
On March 30, 1957, the lower court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 2705 (1) declaring as
null and void the order of the intestate court in Special Proceedings No. 483 which approved the
project of partition and declaration of heirs made by Jesus children, and cancelling the sugar quotas
listed in their names in the Sugar Quota Office; (2) declaring null and void the deed of sale of 6/8
portion of the hacienda which was executed by Pedro in favor of Jesus children; (3) ordering Pedro to
account for and pay the intestate estate of Jose the amount of P94,586.00 representing rentals,
profits and other claims, and to pay said estate every crop year P3,794.00 as rentals and P500.00 as
profit, and (4) ordering the partition and distribution of the hacienda consisting of Lots Nos. 936, 937,
940 and 941 as follows: (a) to Pedro, 6/8 of the land or 172.68 hectares, 3/5 of the entire sugar quota
of the hacienda for A sugar or 4479 piculs and 3/5 of the entire sugar quota for the hacienda for B and
C sugar; (b) to the intestate estate of Jose or his heirs 28.78 hectares of the hacienda, 1/5 of the
entire sugar quota for the hacienda for A sugar or 1493 piculs, and 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for B
and C sugar; (c) to the legitimate heirs of Jesus, 28.78 hectares of the hacienda, 1/5 of the entire
sugar quota for the hacienda for A sugar and 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for B and C sugar.
Since the boundaries of the respective shares of the co-owners had not yet been delineated and
marked, the court appointed clerk of court Jose Azcona and Segundo Hipolito as commissioners
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71[3] of the Rules of Court. The court also ordered Pedro to pay the intestate
estate of Jose P15,000 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages and
the heirs of Jesus to pay the same estate P5,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Both Pedro and the heirs of Jesus were ordered to pay the said estate P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. The court also dismissed the defendants counterclaim.
Two months later or on May 29, 1957, Pedro died. Consuelo vda. de Zaldarriaga, the widow of his
son Jesus, was appointed judicial administratrix of his estate. As such administratrix, Consuelo filed a
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal from the said decision of March 30, 1957. Basilia,
Joses widow, opposed the appeal contending that Consuelo had not really filed said requirements for
an appeal but merely a motion asking for leave to adopt her (Basilias) appeal bond and record on
appeal. The lower court sustained Basilias opposition, thereby prompting Consuelo to file a petition for
mandamus before this Court. Docketed as L-13252, the petition was decided on April 29,
1961[4] against petitioner Consuelo with the Court holding that a decision or order directing partition is
not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of
the case. Hence, the Court therein denied the petition but instructed the lower court to proceed in Civil
Case No. 2705 in accordance with this decision and the procedure provided in Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.
For her part, Basilia appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 2705 to this Court. It was docketed
as L-13424. On May 31, 1961, the Court dismissed the appeal[5] on the ground that it was taken
prematurely as, consonant with its ruling in L-13252, the decision appealed from was merely
interlocutory because the lower court still had to go through the proceedings outlined in Rule 71.
Accordingly, the appointed commissioners began to partition the hacienda. On December 1, 1962,
they submitted their report which the court approved on May 3, 1963. The respective shares of the

parties were raffled among them and that of the plaintiffs (Basilia and her children) was accordingly
adjudicated to them by the lower court.
Clearly dissatisfied with the final decision of the lower court, Consuelo and her children appealed
to this Court through L-21888. In the decision of June 26, 1967,[6] this Court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the amount in controversy (totalling P156,886.00), remanded the case to the Court of Appeals as
this Court at that time could take jurisdiction only over claims on properties valued at more than
P200,000.00.
Thus, taking jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. No. 39743-R
on September 30, 1971.[7] It found that the hacienda had been partitioned in 1919 among the heirs of
Margarita; that Pedro and his four sons entered into an extrajudicial agreement assigning unto
themselves definite portions of the hacienda; that except for Jose, each of them took possession of his
share and cultivated it; that Jose tilled and planted his portion only in 1942 to 1944 and thereafter it
was left idle; that from 1919 until his death in 1944, Jose never asked for his share in the produce of
his father and brothers; that while the 7/8 portion of the hacienda was tilled and developed, its
southern portion corresponding to the 1/8 share of Jose was left uncultivated; [8] that, by the number
of years that defendants (Consuelo and her children) had been openly and adversely in possession of
the 7/8 portion, they had acquired exclusive ownership thereof and prescription had cured whatever
defects there might have been in title or acquisition; that from 1919 to 1953 or for 34 years, plaintiffs
(Basilia and her children) did not claim the fruits of the hacienda nor demand its partition, and that
Basilia herself was guilty of laches in waiting for almost a decade before bringing an action in court. In
view of these facts, the Court of Appeals resolved to forego discussion of the other errors raised by
defendants which are thereby rendered academic and reversed the decision of the lower court in Civil
Case No. 2705.
However, the finality of said decision on January 4, 1972[9] did not deter Basilia from elevating the
same decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari docketed as L-34557.
[10]
On February 3, 1972, this Court promulgated minute resolution:
L-34557 (Basilia F. Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc. v. Pedro Zaldarriaga, deceased, substituted by Consuelo
Tan Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc., et al.). - Considering the allegations of, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, THE
COURT RESOLVED to deny the petition for being factual (insufficient showing that findings of fact are
unsupported by substantial evidence) and for lack of merit. The manifestation of counsel for petitioner,
dated January 28, 1972, is NOTED.[11]
Basilia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution. On May 8, 1972, this Court
denied it in the following resolution:
Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner in G.R. No. L-34557, Basilia F.
Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc. vs. Pedro Zaldarriaga, etc., et al., and the opposition thereto of respondents,
and it appearing that without considering the offer of evidence, assuming that this should not have
been taken into account by the Court of Appeals (even if its holding that the so-called dead-mans
statute does not apply to this case) is correct, there is substantial evidence to sustain the appellate
courts conclusion that the properties herein involved had already been previously partitioned before
the death of petitioners husband, Jose Zaldarriaga, and that it is clear that neither her deceased
husband during her lifetime, nor the petitioner ever laid claim to the sugar quotas alleged in the
complaint for over 33 years, for which reason, the present action has prescribed, and considering that
it is indisputable, at this stage, that there is a specific 1/8 portion of the Hacienda share belonging to
petitioner in the estate of her husbands mother, and if it has remained uncultivated and unproductive,

it is because petitioner, and her husband before her, have failed to work on the same, and that, as
held by the Court of Appeals, the other causes of action of petitioner have already become academic,
the same being premised on the nonexistence of the partition found by the appellate court as having
been effected during the lifetime of petitioners husband, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for
reconsideration without prejudice to whatever action not yet prescribed, that the children, if any, of
the late Jose Zaldarriaga may have for the recovery of their share in the lands in question as part of
the estate of the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga. (Italics supplied.)[12]
Acting on cue, the following year, or on June 19, 1973, Basilia and her children filed Civil Case No.
117-V against Consuelo and her children before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Claiming three-eighths (3/8) or one-half (1/2) of Pedros six-eighths (6/8) share in the hacienda which
allegedly was fictitiously conveyed to Consuelos children, they prayed that the deed of sale executed
by Pedro as regards said portion of the hacienda be declared void ab initio; that 3/8 or 1/2 of the said
estate of Pedro be reconveyed to them, and that said property be partitioned with accounting of its
produce plus moral damages.[13]
In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the action was barred by res
judicata.[14] They further alleged lack of personality to sue on the part of the plaintiffs, no cause of
action and prescription. Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing under Sec. 5, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court at the same time seeking the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res
judicata.[15] The plaintiffs opposed this motion.
On September 4, 1973, the lower court, through Judge Victoriano C. Teleron, issued a resolution
dismissing the complaint and sustaining the defendants theory of res judicata.[16] On the plaintiffs
contention that assuming that all the requisites for the application of the principle of res judicata were
obtaining in the case, the same principle was nevertheless inapplicable considering the reservation
made by this Court in the May 8, 1972 resolution in G.R. No. 34557 that the heirs of Jose may file
whatever action, not yet prescribed, that they may have for the recovery of their shares in the lands in
question as part of the estate of Pedro, the lower court said the reservation should refer to some
rights of the children of the late Jose Zaldarriaga other than the subject-matter now litigated in instant
case otherwise it would be assumed that the appellate Courts were being deliberately inconsistent in
its judgments and, against its established doctrines, encouraging multiplicity of suits affecting the
same causes of action over the same subject-matter between the same parties.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on the ground that the said lower
court resolution was contrary both to the actual facts of the case and to law. [17] Defendants countered
with a motion to strike off the record and/or to dismiss the said motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the same was a mere scrap of paper which should not be acted upon by the court.
[18]
Acting on said motions of the parties, on April 30, 1974, the court [19] denied defendants motion,
granted plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and reconsidered and set aside its resolution
of September 4, 1973.[20]
As expected, the defendants filed a motion for the reconsideration of the April 30, 1974 order but
the court denied the same. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03164-R, the petition raised as principal issue the applicability of the
principle of res judicata, stressing that the plaintiffs action to nullify the deed of sale dated January 14,
1956 had been barred by the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 39743-R. On the other hand, plaintiffsrespondents invoked once again the significance of the reservation clause in this Courts resolution in
L-34557 which, they believed, defoliates the legal posture of the defendants.

On July 21, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [21] dismissing the petition for certiorari
and rejecting the res judicata theory. The appellate court reasoned in this wise:
Even assuming, arguendo, that another case, Civil Case No. 2705 between the parties herein, which
case is interrelated with the principal case, Civil Case No. 117-V, had already been decided by the
Supreme Court in L-34557, the ground of res judicata as raised in the motion to dismiss the complaint
cannot be sustained by virtue of the Supreme Courts ruling in L-34557 to the effect that its decision is
without prejudice to whatever action, not yet prescribed, that the children, if any, of the late Jose
Zaldarriaga may have for the recovery of their share in the lands in question as part of the estate of
the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga.
Petitioners therein filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals. Their second motion for reconsideration met the same fate. Undaunted, they
brought the matter to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari docketed as L-42177 and
entitled Ernesto Zaldarriaga v. Court of Appeals, et al. This Court denied the petition for lack of merit
in the minute resolution of February 11, 1976.[22] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on March 31, 1976.[23]
Meanwhile, in the lower court, the plaintiffs (Basilia and her children) filed on July 25, 1975 a
motion for leave to amend their complaint citing as reason therefor oversight in alleging in the
complaint the distribution of the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga. [24] Annexed to the motion was the
amended complaint itself.[25] In due course, the parties filed a partial stipulation of facts and trial on
the merits of the case ensued. On September 9, 1986, the lower court [26] rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 117-V in favor of the plaintiffs.[27] It decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) - declaring null and void the Deed of Definite Sale executed on January 14, 1956 by the late Pedro
Zaldarriaga in favor of defendants Ernesto Zaldarriaga, Guadalupe Zaldarriaga and Jesus Zaldarriaga,
Jr.;
(2) - ordering the cancellation of transfer certificates of title Nos. T-20122, T-19141, T-20123 and T20124 covering Lots 936, 937, 940 and 941 of Cadiz Cadastre, respectively and the reinstatement of
transfer certificates of title Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539 covering aforesaid lots,
respectively;
(3) - ordering the partition of Lots Nos. 936-B, 937 and 941-A of Cadiz Cadastre, constituting the
estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga under the 1919 oral partition, with one-half (1/2) thereof to belong to
plaintiffs and the other one-(half) (1/2) to appertain to defendants and ordering defendants to execute
a formal deed of conveyance in favor of plaintiffs covering their shares in said Lots Nos. 936-B, 937
and 941-A of Cadiz Cadastre. For this purpose, Atty. Fe Las Pias-Gicano and Mr. Edilberto Y. Empestan
are hereby appointed as commissioners (Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court) who, after having qualified
by taking their oath, shall make and effect an equitable separation, delineation and partition of
aforesaid lots in accordance with this decision and, thereafter, shall make a full report to this Court of
the proceedings respecting the partition.
(4) - ordering the defendants to execute a formal deed of conveyance covering Lots Nos. 940 and
941-B in favor of plaintiffs who are now actually possessing said lots;

(5) - ordering the defendants to cause the titles of plaintiffs, after partition, to be free from the liens
particularly the mortgage encumbrances, constituted by the defendants on Hda. Escolastica;
(6) - ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sum of P2,935,693.40 plus
interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until the amount is fully paid and to
pay the plaintiffs the money equivalent of 4,095.95 piculs a year from 1977-1978 crop year up to the
time that the shares of plaintiffs in the estate of the late Pedro Zaldarriaga are delivered to them by
defendants, to be computed on the basis of the price fixed by the PHILSUCOM;
(7) - ordering the defendants to account for all lease rentals paid by Hanil Development Co., Ltd. for
its use of the land for its crusher site and batching plant and to deliver to plaintiffs one-half (1/2) of
said rentals;
(8) - ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount
of P30,000.00 plus P500.00 for every court appearances; and
(9) - ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
Defendants counterclaims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court was barred by prior
judgment as regards the validity of the deed of sale executed by Pedro in their favor and that the
award of damages was without basis in fact and in law (CA-G.R. No. CV No. 14450).
On July 14, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [28] affirming in toto the lower courts
decision of September 9, 1986. In holding that the principle of res judicata was inapplicable, the Court
of Appeals said that (T)he issue of the nullity or validity of the sale by the late Pedro Zaldarriaga to the
herein appellants (his grandchildren), was not resolved by this Court in CA-G.R. No. 39743-R because
what was resolved therein was the issue of partition. As regards the validity of the deed of sale, the
Court of Appeals noted that the defendants-appellants significantly did not present any evidence at all
to show that the deed of sale x x x was not simulated and repeated the lower courts reasons for
finding that the deed of sale was simulated and fictitious. [29] On the reservation clause in this Courts
resolution in L-34557, it said:
Appellants further put forth the thesis that the reservation clause in the SC resolution dated May 8,
1972 encompasses only the reservable property to be inherited by the children of the late Jose
Zaldarriaga; and that it should not be interpreted to include the property of the late Pedro Zaldarriaga
under the deed of sale declared as fictitious by the trial court.
Again, the appellants have misinterpreted the full import and meaning of the reservation clause. The
resolution of the Supreme Court does not say that the reservation clause should be confined to only
the property subject of reserva troncal. As can be gleaned from the reservation clause, it speaks of
the childrens share in the lands in question as part of the estate of the now deceased Pedro
Zaldarriaga. The entire estate of the deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga was sold by him to the appellants
(his other grandchildren). To recover their shares in the estate of their grandfather, appellees
necessarily have to institute proceedings for the nullification of the simulated deed of sale.

With respect to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals held that since the damages claimed
by appellees consist mainly of the fruits of their shares from the time of the death of Pedro Zaldarriaga
(Art. 777 of the Civil Code) until the delivery to them of their respective shares, the lower court
correctly awarded them.
Appellants filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of
merit on September 19, 1989.[30] Thus, the children of Jesus filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in interpreting the so-called reservation
clause as a ground to relitigate issues which should have been barred by established jurisprudence
and doctrines; (b) when it held that the issue of prior judgment had been laid to rest by the Court of
Appeals decision of July 21, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 03164-R which affirmed both orders of June 30, 1974
and June 11, 1974; (c) in not finding that the complaint below lacks cause of action; (d) in declaring
void the deed of definite sale on badges of fraud, and (e) in dismissing their counterclaim.
The several complaints, petitions and appeals arising from the same controversy which were filed
by the parties in the court below, the Court of Appeals and this Court within a span of forty years
creates a dizzying labyrinth of unresolved issues. Considering however, that the cases are centered on
the 6/8 share of Pedro Zaldarriaga in Hacienda Escolastica which appears to be his whole estate, the
core problem to be solved is: who owned said property upon Pedros death - Pedro himself, in which
case the property shall pass by intestacy to his descendants in accordance with the law on succession,
or the children of Jesus by virtue of the deed of sale in their favor, to the exclusion of the heirs of
Jose? Since two complaints had been filed by the heirs of Jose, the ultimate solution to the problem
may be found only upon a close examination of the proceedings had and the issues resolved in said
cases. Thus, delving deeply into the allegations of both parties, the issue for resolution in the instant
petition for review on certiorari is quite simple: may the principle of res judicata be applied vis-a-vis
the reservation clause enunciated by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1972 in L-34557?
At the outset, it should be made clear that the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata had
been ruled upon by this Court in favor of private respondents in L-42 177 in affirming the decision in
CA-G.R. No. 03164-R.
Moreover, considering the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find that res judicata does not
find application in the instant petition as it would not serve the interest of substantial justice. The
principle of res judicata is a fundamental component of our judicial system but, as this Court has time
and again held, it should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality.[31] If the principle should be applied at all, it should be in the context of its less familiar
concept which the Court expounded in Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr.[32] as follows:
(The) less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the
situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters
actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other
admissible and relevant matters which the parties in the second action could properly offer are not
concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to or a ground for dismissal of the second
action.
The issue of the validity of the deed of sale had been offered for resolution in Civil Case No.
2705. But, even after the Court of Appeals had implicitly considered it in CA-G.R. No. 34793-R, this
Court predicated the resolution of May 8, 1972 in L-34557 upon the issue of partition notwithstanding
the private respondents vigorous espousal of the nullity of the deed of sale in their petition before this
Court wherein they correctly contended:

Again, on another cause of action in plaintiffs (sic) the court a quo had held that the sale by defendant
Pedro Zaldarriaga of his entire share (6/8) of the hacienda, including the sugar quota, to his codefendants was fictitious and fraudulent, hence it was annulled and set aside. Certainly, said portion of
the trial courts decision - we humbly submit - cannot be passed over by the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that the matter had become academic because of the finding that there was partition. Indeed,
how could the matter of the annulment of the sale become academic, especially with the death of
Pedro Zaldarriaga his share in the property becomes part of his estate to be inherited by Jesus and
Jose (represented by their children and his surviving spouse) (Art. 986, Civil Code of the Philippines).
In other words, the question as to whether the sale was null and void, on the ground that it was
fictitious and fraudulent, is a material issue which is not resolved by the mere fact that the court had
made a finding that there was already a partition of the property.[33]
Nonetheless, in the same May 8, 1972 resolution, the Court, exercising its discretion, considered
the issue of the validity of the deed of sale as a matter which should be litigated in another action
pertaining to the estate of Pedro. In this regard, it should be underscored that when Civil Case No.
117-V was filed, the action to nullify the deed of sale had not yet prescribed considering that the issue
was raised in Civil Case No. 2705 as soon as the lots involved were sold and registered in petitioners
name.[34] The amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2705 to include the prayer for the nullity
of the deed of sale amounted to the filing of an action thereon which interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period.[35]
Thus, by appending the reservation clause in the resolution of May 8, 1972, this Court in effect
waived the applicability of the principle of res judicata. A reservation for the filing of another action in
a decision which is usually preceded by the phrase without prejudice imports the contemplation of
further proceedings. When said phrase appears in an order or decree, it implies that the judicial act is
not intended to be res judicata on the merits of the controversy.[36] While in Gatus v. Court of
Appeals[37] the Court held that a reservation not falling within the provisions of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court[38] is a mere surplusage, for, whenever the law gives a party the right to bring an action, he may
do so without the necessity of any judicial reservation, the reservation made by this Court in L-34557
in the exercise of its discretion was aimed at giving the private respondents another opportunity to
ventilate their valid claims to Pedros estate.
Worth noting is the fact that in both Civil Cases Nos. 2705 and 1 17-V. the lower court arrived at
the same conclusion regarding the nullity of the deed of sale. That fact, considered with the affirmance
by the Court of Appeals of the decision in Civil Case No. 1 17-V, deters this Court from examining
further the other conclusions of said courts on the merits of the case, which, after all, are sound and
based on law.
The protracted controversy over the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga has gone through an
extraordinary and circuitous route. It is high time the controversy is laid to rest and his descendants
allowed to peacefully enjoy the estate in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The July 14, 1989
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14450 and that of the lower court in Civil Case No.
117-V are AFFIRMED. This decision is immediately executory.Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., on leave.