A.Venkateswarlu*
I. Introduction
Land tenure as a term suggests the manner and the terms and conditions under
which land is leased out by the owner and leased-in by the actual cultivator or tenant, as
a general description. But, this land tenure assumes different forms in different modes of
production. In feudalism and pre-capitalist modes, the tenancy is linked with the labour
service due to extra-economic coercion. In capitalist mode of production, the tenancy
depends on the market for leasing-out and leasing-in. Chakravarthy (1981) has the
following to say:
Tenancy as an institution has both predated and post-dated feudalism; it has also
coexisted with feudalism both as an integral part of the feudal system as well as an
institution of differing, on vital points, from feudalism. It existed in the antiquity when
the dominant mode of production was slavery; it existed in the medieval period when the
dominant mode of production, in the Western Europe was feudalism; and at least in some
countries it continued into 20th century as an integral part of developed capitalism.
But in all underdeveloped and labour-surplus countries, the demand for leasing-in
arises from the lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture. In such a case, if
the feudal and pre-capitalist relations are not done away with, the land-augmenting and
labour-intensive technologies or capital-intensive technology would not develop in
agriculture.
In India, on the eve of Independence, in almost all the states, there were semi-
feudal relations due to the presence of intermediaries. After independence,
intermediaries were abolished on a large scale. Thereafter, the tenancy began to assume
new extent and forms. To extend certain benefit to the tenants, laws were enacted in
almost all the states, thereby adjusting the tenancy with development of capitalism, as
rightly pointed out again by Chakravarthy (1981):
In India, until recently, tenancy was an institution which was very much part of the pre-
capitalist relations of production that characterized agriculture. But it is getting changed
along with changing conditions to the point of becoming compatible with emerging
capitalist relations.
Tenancy in general is neither good nor bad, so long as the landed property does
not become people’s property (common ownership), as per Marx (1971 / Vol.III). Yet
two forms of rent payment are differentiated, viz., fixed-rent and share-rent. The fixed
rent may be in terms of cash rent or rent-in-kind; and the share cropping tenancy may be
_________________________________
* Fellow at CESS. I thank my teacher Prof. G.K.Chadha, Also express my gratitude to Prof. S. Mahendra Dev and
Prof. S. Galab for their encouragement at CESS. This is presented in Seminar on Agricultural Crisis and
Tenancy in Andhra Pradesh, at Sundaraiah Vijnana Kendram, Hyderabad, on 14 October, 2007.
1
with or without cost-sharing (Chadha, 1976). Fixed rent tenancy has been found to be
efficient and has been treated on par with the owner-cultivation, as the tenant may have
incentives to increase productivity without any transfer of the increased produce. But, the
share crop tenancy is mostly found to be inefficient, as the tenant may not have any
incentive to increase productivity. However, there has been a debate in contravention of
both the approaches. As the fixed rent tenancy is better, tenants demand for
implementation of such rent through enacting suitable laws.
2. Objective
The specific objectives of the study are : (i) to look into the extent and forms of
tenancy in rural Andhra Pradesh at the state level based on the NSS Reports; (ii) to see
the inter-district variations in the extent of tenancy at the district level from the
Agricultural census data; (iii) to examine results on the tenancy situation from some
primary sources; (iv) to briefly analyse the agrarian crisis in India and Andhra Pradesh;
and (v) to deal with the impact of the agrarian crisis on the tenants in Andhra Pradesh.
The data from secondary sources are available from three sources: NSS and
Population and Agricultural Censuses. However, to reflect on the concrete situation, we
also draw from the primary sources on the extent of tenncy.
The tenancy data is available with respect to both household ownership holdings
(HOHs) and operational holdings (OHs). The data on the number of households leasing-
out and area leased-out of area owned are furnished with respect to HOHs, from 1953-54
onwards for six points of time: 1953-54, 1960-61, 1970-71, 1981-82 , 1991-92 and 2002-
03 in 8th, 17th, 26th, 37th, 48th and 59th Rounds respectively. Further, the leasing-in
aspects with respect to HOHs were also covered from 1970-71 onwards. The forms of
tenancy (the terms of lease) in respect of HOHs were furnished in 1970-71 and 1981-82
for leasing-out aspects, whereas for leasing-in aspects, they were covered for 1970-71,
1991-92 and 2002-03.
Leasing-in aspects with respect to operational holdings (OHs) were covered from
1953-54 (except1960-61). However, the forms of tenancy for 1953-54 and 1960-61
were not furnished. In 1970-71 (26th Round) and the latter Rounds (37th, 48th and 59th ),
the terms of lease (forms of tenancy) were furnished in detail.
Though the data for leasing-in/leasing-out aspects are available to suit 11 size-
classes up to 1981-82, such data in 1991-92 are available so as to suit five broad size
classes, because the data for the classes 10.01 ha & above was clubbed together. Thus
the tenancy data are analyzed throughout for five broad size-classes only.
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3.2 Population and Agricultural Censuses: District Level Data
The data on the extent of tenancy at district level is available from two sources,
viz; the Population Census and Agricultural Census. In 1951 and 1961 population
censuses, the share of tenant households was given. From Agricultural Census 1970-71
onwards, Agricultural Census has been providing the tenancy data quinquennially. As
regards the tenancy, this data is inferior to the NSS data in some respect, as per
Laxminarayana and Tyagi (1977):
Between the two estimates, the NSS data are more dependable as they (Agricultural
Census data) are based on land records; while land records are more dependable in
matters of land utilization, crop and irrigation statistics, they are not comparable when it
comes to the question of tenancy.
As the NSS data are not available at district level, we depend on Population
Census for 1951 and 1961 for the share of tenant households and on Agricultural Census
for 1970-71 and 1995-96, for both the shares, i.e., share of tenant holdings and share of
leased-in area.
Tenants are treated equal to the sum of pure tenants and mixed tenants (who
owned some land but leased-in land) and the leased-in area accounts for the land leased-
in by both types of tenants. But, in 1995-96, the tenants are treated equal to the sum of (i)
those who operate land by wholly leasing-in, partly owning, partly leasing-in, and (ii)
those who are otherwise operating land. All such land other than owned is treated as
leased-in area.
The data from primary sources are taken to know the actual position in regard to
the extent of tenancy. The studies are Venkateswarlu (1998), Subrahmanyam (2000),
Reddy and Chandayya (2006), Chadha and Venkateswarlu (2007), and Srinivasulu
(2007).
The present section deals with the changing pattern of tenancy in Rural Andhra
Pradesh, depending on the NSS data. As has already been pointed out in the
methodology, the changes in the extent of tenancy are examined with reference to both
the operational holdings and ownership holdings. But the changes in the forms of
tenancy are dealt with reference to operational holdings only.
As there is some fear of conferring occupancy rights to the tenants, who are
legally contracted and or openly declared by the land owner, the land owners generally
prefer to underreport the tenancy, even when they engage tenants. Thus, the tenancy
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data, on leased-out area and households leasing-out collected from household ownership
holdings ( HOHs) are underestimates.
However, the NSS collects tenancy data by operational holdings (OHs) and this
also reflects information from the demand side. On the one hand, these data are more
reliable and on the other, they are available for all the points of time (except for 1960-
61) in published form. Therefore, it is preferred to examine the magnitude of tenancy
by operational holdings first and then by ownership holdings.
By operational holdings, the data for the extent of tenancy are available in
published form for 1953-54, 1970-71, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03. However, the
aggregate level data for 1960-61 are obtained from Sanyal (1977).
The operational holdings are divided into three types: (i) Purely owned holdings,
(ii) Pure tenant holdings and (iii) Mixed tenant holdings. Mixed tenant holdings may
have partly owned and partly leased-in area. Thus, purely owned holdings and mixed
tenant holdings report owned area. These two together are referred as operational
holdings reporting owned area. Pure tenant holdings and mixed tenant holdings together
are referred as operational holdings reporting leased-in area. Thus, operational holdings
reporting owned area and operational holdings reporting leased-in area both have mixed
tenant holdings in common. However they are separable conveniently.
As regards the operated area also, in addition to owned area and leased-in area the
other categories are being shown and so they together are again clubbed under the
category “others.”
Table-1 shows important aspects about the tenant holdings. In 1953-54, in the
immediate post-independence period, when the land ceiling measure was not yet on the
agenda of land reform, the total tenant holdings have the share of 32.61 percent, in total
operational holdings; and the leased-in area share assumes 18.60 percent, in total
operated area. Just after the impending ceiling measure was indicated (in 1959 Nagpur
AICC), lot of evictions of tenants took place and as a result, 1960-61 data show a sharp
decline in shares of both the total tenant holdings and leased-in area, as they assume
18.52 percent and 9.15 percent respectively. Both the shares decrease upto 1981-82 and
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by 1991-92 they rise and assume 14.11 percent and 9.57 percent respectively. Again in
2002-03, these shares decrease to 12.89 and 8.95 percent respectively.
It appears as though the tenancy has lost its negative character, as losing of land
under tenancy is no more a reality, because of the fact that land owners have already
reached the limits of ceiling. That is, how the reported tenancy has increased in 1991-92,
and the share of pure tenants has been on the increase since 1981-82.
Further, the share of pure tenants in total tenants shows the same behavior as the
share of pure tenants in total operational holdings; i.e., decreases up to 1970-71 and
thereafter rises. But, the share of mixed tenants in total tenant holdings first rises from
65.62 percent in 1953-54; shows rising trend till 1970-71, reaching maximum in 1970-
71 (96.72 percent) and continuously decreases thereafter. In fact, this share behaves in
opposite direction, compared with the share of pure tenants (in total tenants), because
both shares together form 100, at each point of time. That is, upto 1970-71, the tenants,
who have some own land only, have retained the rights of tenancy, because of some
bargaining position during the period of tenancy and ceiling legislations.
Table-2 shows the shares of operational holdings having pure owners, pure
tenants and mixed tenants along with others; and the shares of owned area, leased-in area
and others’ area, by farm-size, for 1953-54, 1970-71, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03.
If we look at the share of leased-in area, in 1953-54, 1981-82 and 2002-03, there
is a systematic inverse relation with farm size. In other years no systematic relation
seems to exist. But, in 1970-71, the medium farms and in 1991-92 the large farms show
higher shares.
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Thus, in 1991-92, the shares of mixed tenant holdings (both in the number and
area) are the highest among the large farms (22.0 and 13.6 percent respectively). In 2002-
03 also, the share of mixed tenants among large farms is as highas 30.00 percent, with
leased-in area share of 7.31 percent; and these shares are higher than those among the
medium farms. It is an indication for the symptoms of the so called reverse tenancy.
Table-3 shows the distribution of tenant holdings (mixed +pure) and leased-in
area among the broad size-classes for 1953-54, 1970-71, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03.
Considering the entire period, for the total tenant holdings, the marginal and small
farms together account for 62.69 percent in 1953-54 and 79.76 percent in 2002-03, with
leased-in area shares of 16.82 percent and 50.86 percent respectively. Thus, over the
total period, the marginal and small farms enhance their shares in terms of both tenant
holdings and leased-in area. Again, between the marginal and the small farms, the small
farms have gained more effectively, both in tenant holdings and leased-in area over the
period.
Further, in 1953-54, the large farms have large share of leased-in area i.e., 38.74
percent, while having only 7.15 percent of tenant holdings; and thereafter decrease is
there in the share of tenant holdings up to 1991-92 And again rising by 2002-03 from
1.26 percent to 2.60 percent. However, the share of leased-in area lies between 12.60 and
13.40 percent from 1970-71 onwards. Interestingly, the medium and large farms together
account for 18.50 percent tenant holdings and 63.30 percent leased-in area in 1953-54
and those shares decrease to 6.10 percent and 23.44 percent respectively by 2002-03.
Table-4 gives the number of households leasing-out and their share in the
households leasing-out; the owned area leased-out and its share in the total area owned.
In 1953-54, the number of households leasing-out is 5,604 hundred. By1960-61 it falls to
4,300 hundred, but it reaches peak level, rising to 7,800 hundred in 1970-71. Thereafter
it falls to 4553 hundred in 2002-03. If their share is considered in the total households
(excluding the landless), in 1953-54 it forms 14.89 percent and then decreases to 6.95
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percent in 1960-61. But it rises to 12.05 percent in 1970-71, just as the increase in
absolute number, and thereafter decreases, reaching 3.73 percent in 2002-03.
Now, the turn is towards the farm-size variations. Table-5 furnishes broad size-
class wise information on the extent of leasing-out in terms of the percentage of
households leasing-out in the total households and the percentage of leased-out area in
the total owned area; and also the shares in the distribution of leasing-out households and
area leased-out.
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4.3 Forms of Tenancy of Tenant Holdings by Operational Holdings
The data on forms of tenancy, i.e., terms of lease, has been published by NSS
for 1970-71, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03. The terms of lease for each round have
been expanded and they are given in the following statement.
Terms of Lease for Leased-in Area in 26th, 37th and 48th Rounds
1991-92 (48th Round) and
1970-71 (26th Round) 1981-82 ( 37th Round)
2002-03 (59th Round)
1. Fixed money 1. Fixed money 1. Fixed money
2. Fixed produce 2. Fixed produce 2. Fixed produce
3. Share of produce 3. Share of produce 3. Share of produce
4. Usufructuary mortgage 4. Usufructuary mortgage 4. Usufructuary mortgage
5. Other terms 5. Share of produce withother terms 5. Share of produce with other terms
6. Other terms 6. Service contract
7. Not recorded (n.r.) 7. From relatives: no specified terms
8. Neither owned nor leased 8. Other terms
in (but occupied) 9. Not recorded (n.r.)
Looking at the statement, it is clear that “other terms” in each round are different.
For easy grasp and comparative purpose, it is preferred to keep the first three terms
separately while the remaining terms in each round (except item 8 in 1981-82) are
clubbed together under category “other terms” as a hybrid category. Item 8 in 1981-82
is not taken because it was shown separately from the actual leased-in area (Chadha and
Sharma, 1992).
Table-6 portrays the terms of lease. If we look at the shares of tenant holdings
under different terms of tenancy; at the aggregate level, the holdings under share of
produce assume the highest share, 8.03 percent, followed by fixed money terms with 4.32
percent and fixed produce terms with 3.50 percent in 1970-71. However, other terms
also assume dominant position with a share of 7.60 percent. By 1981-82 only other
terms (which includes “n.r.” terms) assumes 10.01 percent of tenant holdings, while
fixed money, fixed produce and share of produce terms together account for only 3.88
percent. Very important point to be noted is that the “n.r.” terms account for 9.16
percent in 10.01 percent of “other terms”. In 1991-92 again the tenant holdings under
share produce terms rise to dominant position with a share 4.69 percent, followed by
fixed produce and fixed money terms having shares of 4.35 percent and 4.20 percent
respectively. But, by 2002-03, the fixed produce and money terms become dominant..
Thus, though as a single source, the share produce terms dominate among the
tenant holdings, in 1970-71 and 1991-92; the percent of holdings under the share
produce terms gets halved. However, the terms under fixed rent (fixed money and fixed
produce terms together) account for 7.82 percent and 7.55 percent respectively in 1970-
71 and 1991-92. That is, by 1991-92 tenants under fixed rent terms have become
dominant, compared with the share produce terms, whereas in 1970-71, the percentage of
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share produce terms (8.03 percent) exceeds the combined fixed rent terms share (7.82
percent). However, by 2002-03, the fixed produce and fixed money terms both occupy
dominant position. This is a signal to say that the share produce terms is losing
importance over the period
4.3.2 Distribution of Tenant Holdings and Leased-in Area by Terms of Lease and
Farm-size
As regards the leased-in area under different terms it has 42.50 percent area
under fixed rent terms in 1970-71, increasing to 69.49 percent by 2002-03. But in 1981-
82 other terms assumes dominance (67.10 percent) as at the tenant holdings. However,
in 1981-82 also, the leased-in area under fixed rent terms is nearly three times the terms
under share produce.
If we look at the distribution of terms of lease among broad size classes, in all
points of time on farm-size ladder, it is observed that the tenant holdings under fixed
money terms seem to maintain a positive relation with farm size while those under fixed
produce have a negative relation. Similar is the behavior of percentage shares of leased-
9
in area under those two types of terms of lease respectively. In 1981-82 other terms
assume dominance for both area and holdings, on all farm-size groups.
Tenant holdings under the terms of share produce have nearly 31.00 to 40.00
percent among all farm size groups in 1953-54, just as the shares of area leased-in lie
between 32.70 and 43.20 percent. In 1991-92 and 2002-03, the fixed money and
produce terms put together have gained prominence among all the farm-size groups
(except large ones), in both holdings and leased-in area, having nearly 50.00 percent or
more. In 1991-92 and 2002-03, the large farms have higher shares in share produce terms
in respect of both tenant holdings and leased-in area.
The figures for 1951 and 1961 are taken from Parthasarathy and Prasada Rao
(1969, p.42 and p.48). For 1951, Andhra Pradesh figures are not there, because it was
prior to reorganisation of states. By 1961, the tenant households were of the order of
21.02 percent. As per Agricultural Census, the tenant holdings formed 12.25 percent in
1970-71. Thus the trend in tenancy was towards decline. The area leased-in 1970-71
was 7.03 percent. It is quite surprising to note that by 1995-96, the tenant holdings and
the area under tenancy decreased substantially, as seen from their shares 0.07 and 0.08
percent respectively.
This is not believable that the tenancy had declined so much; and it happens so
because the data collected in Agricultural Census is based on land records, which are not
updated, on the one hand; and on the other, the tenancy is not being recorded in the land
records, as the tenancy in practice is unreported and concealed, due to fear of conferment
of rights on the tenants.
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5.3 District Level
In 1951, the share of tenant households was the highest in Hyderabad district,
with 40.28 percent and Nizamabad had the lowest share (6.23 percent). In Telangana,
after Hyderabad, three districts - Mahbubnagar, Adilabad and Warangal - had the higher
shares crossing 20 percent. In Coastal Andhra, West Godavari and East Godavari districts
showed higher shares, with 26.53 and 27.95 percent respectively. In Rayalasima, two
districts – Chittore and Anantapur – exhibited higher shares with 13.42 and 13.83 percent
respectively.
In 1961, East Godavari showed the highest share of tenant households, with
38.53 percent and Nizamabad had the lowest share (11.89 percent). Among other
districts, eight districts crossed 20 percent; and other ten districts showed more than 14.0
percent.
In 1970-71, in regard to the share of tenant holdings, ten districts showed higher
than state level share. They are Prakasam and Nellore in Coastal Andhra; and Chittore
and Anantapur in Rayalasima; whereas from Telangana, six districts crossed state level
share and they are Mahbubnagar, Hyderabad, Medak, Nizamabad, Adilabad and
Khammam. Looking at the share of leased-in area, it is clear that only one district from
coastal Andhra, two districts from Rayalasima and five districts from Telangana crossed
the state level share. In Telangana and Rayalasima, all those districts that showed higher
shares of tenant holdings also showed higher shares of leased-in area. But in Coastal
Andhra, the district (East Godavari) that showed higher share of leased-in area is not
from the districts that showed higher shares of tenant holdings i.e: on comparison with
state share in holdings and area.
By 1995-96, the shares of both holdings and area became negligible. The highest
shares of holdings and area (1.68 and 1.13 percent respectively) could be seen in respect
of Hyderabad district, wherein the absolute figures were quite less.
Thus, the tenancy, in terms of the share of tenant holdings in total holdings and
the share of leased-in area in total operated area, was somewhat high in 1970-71; by
1995-96, it became negligible at state, regional and district levels. The tenancy data of
1970-71 was nearly reliable, but by 1995-96, it became unreliable.
As seen from the NSS Reports, in 2002-03, in rural Andhra Pradesh, the extent
of tenancy was nearly 9.0 percent of the operated area accounted for by 5.0 percent pure
tenants and 7.9 percent mixed tenants. These figures are somewhat reliable when
compared to those of agricultural census. Yet, there are doubts on the NSS data, as there
is scope for under-reporting bias in the information on tenancy. Chandrasekhar and
Ghosh (2004) gave a figure to the extent of 33.33 percent (1/3rd ) of the operated area
being under tenancy in Andhra Pradesh. It is from this estimate of the tenancy area, we
have to look into some of the primary studies which have brought out the figures on
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tenancy area and tenants. The five studies selected are put in the order of period covered
roughly.
Reddy and Chandayya study was based on field trips to 29 villages covering
various districts and different years, as shown in Table-9. There are four sets of villages.
In the first set there are 9 villages which were visited at different times covering the data
for the years 1978-79 to 1986-87. The leased-in area varies between 13.16 and 3.44
percent for which the average leased-in area was only 3.85 percent (in fact, this average
is only for accounting purpose, as it cannot be done so for the information were of
different years). The second set of 9 villages, which were covered for the year 1981-82,
showed the aggregated tenancy 11.98 percent, varying between 6.9 percent and 19.97
percent. The third set of 6 villages showed 17.24 percent tenancy area at the aggregate
level, individually lying between 3.50 percent and 37.21 percent . The fourth set of 5
villages exhibited 21.68 percent area under lease, within the range of 6.30 percent and
33.26 percent. Thus, it clearly shows that though depended on the village records, these
figures show relatively high tenancy.
Venkateswarlu study covered the agricultural year, 1984-85, in two districts, viz.,
West Godavari and Khammam, as in Table-10. He surveyed 240 farming households,
covering 140 in each district by stratifying into three farm-size groups. In the canal
irrigated part of West Godavari, at the aggregate level, the lease area was 23.71 percent
under 27.9 percent mixed tenants and 8.6 percent pure tenants. Against this, in the dry
parts of Khammam district, the leased in area was 11.76 percent, nearly half of that in
other region. In West Godavari, it was the small (upto 5.00acres) and medium farms
(5.00 – 10.00 acres) which dominated in the leased area. Against this, in Khammam
district it was the large farms (>10.00 acres) that dominated scene. In the former region,
the fixed produce system and in the latter region, the fixed money system were
dominant.
Thus, in the irrigated regions, the area under tenancy is high. It was also true at
the macro state level data as was shown by Laxminarayayna and Tyagi (1977, 1982).
Subrahmanyam (2000) also showed significant correlation between area under tenancy
and share of net irrigated area with state level NSS data for 1970-71, 1981-82 and 1991-
92 respectively.
Table-11 shows the figures of area under tenancy and forms of tenancy for three
villages. In Jaladanki (Nellore district) which has nearly 73.0 percent irrigated area
showed the highest leased-in area of 27.10 percent. Madiki (East Godavari district),
though has cent percent irrigated area, showed 27.6 percent leased-in area. Thondangi
(East Godavari district), with 73.0 percent irrigated area, had 22.3 percent area under
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lease. In East Godavari, the terms of lease dominant was fixed rent and in Nellore distict,
it was share produce. Thus, in irrigated areas, the leased area formed 22.0 to 30.0
percent.
In this section we first deal with the agrarian crisis in general and in Andhra
Pradesh in particular; with theoretical basis for the suicides of farmers.
The economic reforms in India were introduced in 1991 under the influence of the
Fund-Bank policies, in the context of changing national and international political
scenario and the impending approval of the Dunkel Draft on the eve of formation of the
WTO. As a part of structural adjustment programme (SAP), the effect of reduction of
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fiscal deficit first fell on fertiliser subsidy, in August 1991, which led to a rise in the
fertiliser prices. The immediate impact fell on fertiliser subsidy and reduction in
fertilisers subsidy particularly for nitrogenous fertlisers, on the one hand, and phosphatic
and potassic fertilisers, on the other, in a disproportionate manner, resulted in the adverse
NPK ratio, leading to environmental disorder (Patnaik, 1993; Rao, 1998). As per the
SAP, neo-liberal policies had to be adopted, leading to (i) state withdrawal from public
irrigation, extension services and many subsidies related to agricultural sector; and (ii)
opening up of the international markets for the agricultural commodities.. The MSP
prices for rice and wheat went up due to political instability during 1996-99; as the
lobbying of rich farmers worked well due to repeated elections.
Farmers suicides occurred in a few states to the extent of some thousands among
the cotton, chilly and groundnut growers, as no systematic extension and credit facilities
were available to them, due to state withdrawal. Jayati Ghosh gave an estimate of 10,000
farmers suicide deaths spanning over a decade from mid-1990s to the end of 2004 in the
entire country (Deccan Chronicle, January 21, 2005).
Andhra Pradesh, being the experimental station of SAP policies, tops in farmer
suicide deaths among the states in India and they are continuing even today in this state.
Only four instances are given here.
(i) Failure of government to invest in public irrigation for following the World
Bank’s agenda of withdrawing state from the public works has really affected the farmers
in the AP. Added to this, continuous failure of rains till 2004 caused a lot of suffering to
the farmers.
(ii) For the farmers suicides the major reason is the failure of extension, “the
squeezing of assistance to the states by the central government for extension services
has led to the virtual breakdown of extension machinery.” As no public extension is
available, the resource-poor and gullible farmers are becoming victims of exploitation by
unscrupulous traders and money lenders in selling spurious materials including
adulterated seeds and pesticides (Rao, 2003). In fact, The Deccan Chrnicle, dated. 04-02-
05 and 05-02-05, in its case studies of Atmakur Mandal, Warangal District in AP,
published exactly the same type of exploitation meted out by the local traders and
dealers in the sale of such spurious seeds.
(iii) The GOI gave encouragement to the oil seed growers between 1989-90 and
1994-95. During this period, domestic production was encouraged by the government
policy, which resulted in higher price for oil seeds and oils (Landes and Gulati, 2003). So
growing of groundnut became important in Rayalasima of AP. Since 1994-95, the
government reduced protection for oils and no effective MSP was there for oil seeds. As
a consequence, oil seed area has declined and yield levels stagnated; and as a
concomitant effect, capacity utilization rates of oil seed processing industry have also
fallen
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(iv) The next problem faced by the farmers, who began to grow commercial
crops, is the remunerative price. The prices of the chilly and cotton are very much
volatile. The price variation is very much high in the case of chilly. For example, chilli
was grown with a view to export during mid-1990s. But the prices were so low that
farmers had to struggle for the rise of prices by government intervention. There was a
large farmers movement of agitation for chilly price during March 1997, and on 10th
March 1997, nearly 500 farmers were arrested in Khammam (district head quarters)
alone. Further, during 2005-06, the price of chilly went upto Rs. 10000 per quintal in
June 2006. But at the end of the 2005, when the crop was taken to the market the rate was
around Rs. 3000 – 4000 per quintal. The price rise started in January 2006. The
beneficiaries of the price rise were the merchants and speculators during the period when
the prices were high during January-June 2006. Seeing this the farmers grew chilly in
2006-07. But again the prices were low. The farmers who grew chilly hoping with high
price put lot of investment on pesticides and seeds of Mahyco company. Though the
chilly was grown from the company seeds , the virus disease attacked the crop causing to
lower the yields in chilly. Thus the farmers were put to loss in double ways: (i) loss of
yield due to virus and (ii) the price going down.
In the post liberalisation scenario, euphoria has been generated among the
middle, small and marginal farmers that they can cultivate and export commercial
agricultural commodities, such as chilly, cotton and groundnut in Andhra Pradesh. The
farmers engaged in growing these crops have to invest more on seeds, chemical fertilisers
and pesticides. For example, some seeds of chilly or tomato cost Rs. 30,000 to 35,000 per
Kg. Untrained pest management, due to lack of proper extension, has led them to use
high quantities of pesticides and chemical fertilisers, due to dependence on local input-
sellers/dealers for advice. As a result, per acre cost goes up, while the yield levels are
falling.
Given a deterioration in the market situation negative quantities (losses), thanks to the mechanism
of the labour calculation, appear much later on the peasant farm than on the capitalist one (hence,
the exceeding viability and stability of peasant farms). Frequently, the family farm’s internal basic
15
equilibrium makes acceptable very low payments per labour unit, and these enable it to exist in
conditions that would doom a capitalist farm to undoubted ruin.
In the subsistence farming, even the small or marginal farmers used to sustain by
overwork and underconsumption, as envisaged by Kautsky. Once the subsistence farming
is given up and market vagaries are bound to take place and kill the farmers of non-
economically viable size. If subsistence farming is there or low cost input is there the
small farmers would survive by maximizing their per acre farm business income (FBI), as
described by Banaji (1976):
But, the small and marginal farmers are growing cash crops, which require
waterings and so they dig borewells by borrowing from private sources at exorbitant rates
of interest and ultimately immerse in the debt burden. As the government provides
electricity at lower rate or free, the digging of borewells picked up. Added to this, highly
costlier inputs are leading to low output-high cost agriculture, culminating in suicides.
Thus, in the present day agriculture, paid out costs absorb nearly completely the
increment in output, as the paid out costs increased in various forms: seed cost, chemical
fertilisers, pesticides, interests on fixed capital for installation of borewell and pumpset
and interest on working capital and so on. As a result, simply increasing the gross output
per unit of land area, which was the goal of the farmer, is not enough. Increasing paid
out costs under the failure of remunerative prices for the output sets in the agrarian
crisis.
16
If we further examine leasing-out and leasing-in aspects of 2002-03 with
reference to household ownership holdings (HOH), as shown in Table-15, it is evident
that though only 4553 hundred households were leasing-out their land, the households
leasing-in land were 9986 hundred. Similarly the areas involved in leasing-out and
leasing-in were 2281 hundred and 8477 hundred hectares respectively. Thus, it is clear
that the difference goes up between figures on leasing-in versus leasing-out. It seems that
the estimates of tenants and leased-in area with reference to the HOHs are reliable.
Thus, banking on leasing-in aspects under HOHs, it is clear that marginal farmer
housheholds (including nil + zero class) account for 86.62 percent of the total households
leasing-in, with 71.55 percent of the total leased-in area. Thus the trend is very clear that
the tenants are of marginal farming households. In fact Table-3, showing distribution of
tenant holdings with reference to Operational holdings, also exhibited the same picture,
though not as sharply as this.
Further, in regard to the recorded tenancy, as per the leased-in area with reference
to HOHs, it showed that more than 95.0 percent households leasing-in were under
‘unrecorded tenancy’, i.e., out of 9986 hundred households leasing-in, 9539 hundred
households did not have recorded lease contracts (GOI, 2006. p.A-203).
Thus, the tenants in Andhra Pradesh suffer from insecurity of tenancy. Even the
burden of rent is abnormally high. Even the law in Andhra Pradesh did not follow the
guidelines stipulated by the GOI. Now we may have a brief look into the tenancy laws
enacted in Andhra Pradesh.
To accomplish this, “The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
was enacted to protect the rights of tenants. The act was intended to (a) regulate the
period of tenure, (b) fix reasonable rent, (c) give the tenant the right to compensation in
case of eviction, and (d) restrict the right of the landlord to evict the tenant.(ibid., p.67).
The Act provided for the creation of protected tenants. In notified areas, the
tenants were declared as owners, if they had owned less than a family holding and the
17
land owner had owned more than two family holdings. The Hyderabad Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1954, defined a family holdings as an area yielding
Rs.800/- of net income from cultivation (Khusro, 1973:41). However, the protected
tenants to be conferred ownership rights had to pay reasonable price of that land either in
lumpsum or in 16 instalments, the purchase price being fixed at 12 times the land
revenue. Altogether, by mid seventies, 33,000 protected tenants became owners of
82,000 hectares of land in Telangana (Appu,1975). In non-notified areas, the purpose
was to provide the tenants with heritable rights, depending on the tenants’s and
landowner’s owned land (in terms of family holdings, such that the tenant should not own
more than one and the landlord should ----- own more than three).
The maximum rent fixed in the Act varied between 1/3rd and 1/4th of the gross
produce, depending on the irrigation level and type. By an Amendment in 1954, the rent
was converted into a multiple of land revenue i.e., 3 to 5 times the land revenue.
As regards the period of tenure, all the protected tenants would have heritable
rights so long as they could not default in rent payment to the landlord. Originally
ordinary tenants were not extended rights of secure tenure, though got certain rights after
Amendment in 1953. Original Act prescribed minimum period of lease as 10 yeas. But
it was later cut to 5 years only, with a condition that the tenure would be renewed, if the
land is resumed by the owner.
Compared to Telangana region, in Andhra Region there had been less resentment
among the peasentry. Only in 1956, the question of tenants was taken up by the
government and “The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956” was enacted.
As per Parthasarathy and Prasada Rao (1969:130), this Act provides for:
(a) Fixation of maximum rent, (b) minimum period of lease, (c) procedure for determination of fair rent in case
of disputes and for remission of rent, (d) circumstances under which the landlords could terminate the tenancy,
and (e) the machinery for settlement
But this Act failed to achieve any objective. The maximum rent fixed was greater
than conventional rates in practice, as it was upto 50 per cent of the gross produce. The
minimum period of lease was fixed as 6 years, but the Act gave the landlord the right to
resume the land after the expiry of lease period. As a result, the tenants were in a
precarious position to bargain with the landlords and evictions occurred on large scale.
As regards disputes of rent, the Tahsildars of Revenue Department and the courts did not
favour the tenants, as the burden of proof is on the tenants. The termination of tenancy
by the landlord was easy in view of the Act, as it had many loopholes. Ultimately, there
was no proper machinery for settlement, rendering the provisions of the Act ineffective.
After its failure, the government brought out an Amendment to the Act, viz.,
“Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1970”. It provides for (i)
fixing a fair rent, (ii) automatic renewal of lease and (iii) pre-emptive rights. The rates of
rent were fixed between 30 and 25 per cent of gross produce. Though these rates were
18
not as proposed by planning commission (25 to 20 per cent), the rents fixed were less
than market rates. Automatic renewal of lease was provided, but the landowner was
allowed to take land for personal cultivation, if he had owned less than the ceiling limit
under “The Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1961.” Further, the
Amendment Act provided for pre-emptive rights, without seeking to regulate the price of
land. In view of its weaknesses, Parthasarathy and Suryanarayana (1971) aptly pointed
out long back:
Even to confer limited benefits to a limited class of the rural poor the present Tenancy
(Amendment) Act needs to be modified considerably, redefining personal cultivation,
fixing the price of land along with giving tenants pre-emptive rights, lowering the ceiling
limit for resumption, not allowing resumption in case of non-resident land owners,
enabling tenants to retain some land in the case of resumption by owners; and applying
all provisions of the legislation to temple lands too are essential.
In addition to the general adverse effects of agrarian crisis referred earlier, which
equally affects both owner operators and tenants equally, the tenants have to face worst
situation when they have to involve in the credit market, input supply market and product
market, which operate favourably towards the owner operators and recorded tenants.
Though there may not be semi-feudal relations (a la Bhaduri, 1973), due to interlocking
of markets and that too dominated by the big landowners; yet the conditions of the
tenants are reduced to worse situation due to reinforcement of agrarian crisis.
Though the laws were enacted the government of Andhra Pradesh did not follow
the spirit of GOI guidance in the fixation of fair rent. Further, the farmers also began to
think as though the laws were not there. There are no movements for the recognition of
tenancy. It is because the landless cultivators and many marginal and small farmers
tend to lease in additional land; but they lack bargaining power. On the other hand,
suppliers of land also mostly small land owners and they face problem legally if they
have to take possession for personal cultivation. Thus, both on demand side and supply
side, marginal and small farmer households come into the picture.
But, recognition of tenancy would help the tenants to get benefits provided by the
government on par with other owner operators particularly in respect of subsidised
inputs, compensation for losses, etc. This will require careful separation of owners from
tenants. Further, regulation of rent, either fixed produce or fixed money terms, is
essential as the rents are generally high in AP, depending on the irrigation, the region and
the crops grown. In this connection, Chandrsekhar and Ghosh (2004) have the following
to say:
19
Cash rent rates in rural Andhra Pradesh are typically quite high, ranging from Rs. 3,000
per acres in unirrigated and less fertile areas (such as in parts of Anantapur district) to as
much as Rs. 7,000-9,000 per acre in irrigated areas of higher soil fertility (such as in
Guntur). In the fertile south coastal Andhra region, rents can go up to as much as Rs.
15,000 per acre. These rates are in direct contravention of existing legislation (such as the
AP Tenancy Act of 1956 and its 1974 amendment) under which land rents are controlled.
Of course, such legislation has been so totally ignored that it is now effectively forgotten,
and so neither landlords nor tenants pay much attention to such limits. In actual practice,
tenant farmers are currently paying more than 3 or 4 times the rents stipulated in this Act.
It is a fact that there should be political will to do favour to the tenants, for
recording the tenancy, by providing for the regulation of tenancy so that the tenants may
get their due share in the credit, input and product markets..
9. Conclusion
(i) As regards data on tenancy, the NSS Reports are better than the Agricultural Census.
But the advantage of the Agricultural Census is that these statistics are available at
district level and at intervals of 5-years from 1970-71. As there were doubts even on the
NSS, we also depended on some primary sources, which showed somewhat higher
tenancy in different regions.
(ii) There has been a perceptible decline in the magnitude of tenancy during
1953-54 and 1981-82. By 1991-92, tenants have gained lost ground. Though
significance of the pure tenants - the tenants with no owned land of theirs - decreased
upto 1970-71, their prominence increased since. The pure tenant, who belongs to the
lowest rung among cultivators and therefore who has little bargaining strength, may be
surviving against all odds, by allowing himself to be exploited in the rental market. The
share of pure tenants rose to 5.0 percent in 2002-03.
(iii) The distribution of tenanted area by size-class of farmers shows that the
marginal and small tenants’ control over the area increased appreciably overtime, either
on the basis of Operational Holdings or Hosehold Ownership Holdings..
(iv) Overtime, there appears to be a tendency towards fixed-rental (kind and cash
together) contracts to become prominent. In 1991-92 and 2002-03, the leased-in area
under fixed rental has the share of 50.0 percent or more.
(v) It was also clear from the primary studies that in specific regions, the
tenancy is high particularly in the irrigated area, as was also shown from the macro level
data from the NSS.
(vi) The institution of tenancy has the effect of improving the access of land to
the petty cultivators. So it need not be curbed. What is called for at the present juncture
are the efforts to reduce the exploitative nature of the lease contracts. This is possible if
20
tenancies are registered and tenants are made to pay legislated rent to their landlords, as
in West Bengal.
(vii) Due to the agrarian crisis, the tenants, who are also mainly marginal and
small farmers, are facing a lot of troubles in the credit, input and product markets. Only
recognition of tenancy would better the conditions of tenants, as the recorded tenants
would get benefits of subsidies, concessional credit and government aided schemes.
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23
Appendix Tables
Source : 1. GOI (1962) for NSS Report No.66; 2. GOI (1970) for NSS Report No.144,
3. GOI (1975) for NSS Report No.215.1; 4. GOI (1986a) for NSS Report No.331;
5. GOI (1997) for NSS Report No.407 and 6. GOI (2006a) for NSS Report No.492.
Notes :
1. 1953-54 data is adopted from the data of Agricultural Holdings i.e., excluding non-agricultural Holdings
2. 1960-61 data are not directly available and are taken from Sanyal (1977)
3. In 1991-92 and 2002-03, zero-class tenants are excluded.
24
Table 2: Percentage Operational Holdings Leasing-in and Operated Area Leased-in by Farm-size
Operational Holdings having Operated Area
S.
Farm-size Pure Pure Mixed Leased-
No Others Total Owned Others Total
owners tenants tenants in
1 1953-54
i. Marginal 71.78 15.81 12.41 100.0 71.24 28.76 100.0
ii. Small 62.13 8.92 28.95 100.0 75.98 24.02 100.0
iii. Semi-
58.65 5.89 35.46 100.0 76.20 23.80 100.0
medium
iv. Medium 66.59 3.27 30.14 100.0 82.15 17.85 100.0
v. Large 63.86 3.83 32.31 100.0 84.58 15.42 100.0
Total 67.39 11.21 21.40 100.0 81.40 18.60 100.0
2 1970-71
i. Marginal 80.04 0.89 19.07 100.0 85.64 14.36 100.0
ii. Small 77.43 0.92 21.65 100.0 88.97 11.03 100.0
iii. Semi-
75.01 0.27 24.72 100.0 89.40 10.60 100.0
medium
iv. Medium 77.37 0.54 22.09 100.0 80.38 19.62 100.0
v. Large 80.89 0.00 19.11 100.0 95.35 4.65 100.0
Total 78.34 0.71 20.95 100.0 90.99 9.01 100.0
3 1981-82
i. Marginal 86.42 2.09 8.79 2.70 100.0 90.74 7.71 1.55 100.0
ii. Small 80.88 0.12 14.75 4.25 100.0 91.49 6.65 1.86 100.0
iii. Semi-
78.93 0.00 16.35 4.72 100.0 90.22 8.43 1.35 100.0
medium
iv. Medium 82.22 0.02 16.60 1.16 100.0 93.78 6.02 0.20 100.0
v. Large 85.72 0.00 13.87 0.41 100.0 96.44 3.55 0.01 100.0
Total 83.55 1.04 12.28 3.13 100.0 92.98 6.23 0.79 100.0
4 1991-92
i. Marginal 84.79 1.45 8.97 4.79 100.0 88.00 10.72 1.28 100.00
ii. Small 75.56 1.38 19.15 3.91 100.0 86.23 10.22 3.47 100.00
iii. Semi-
72.62 0.00 20.93 6.45 100.0 87.27 10.65 2.08 100.00
medium
iv. Medium 87.90 0.17 11.20 0.73 100.0 93.51 5.26 1.23 100.00
v. Large 78.05 0.00 21.95 0.00 100.0 85.91 13.61 0.58 100.00
Total 81.33 2.32 11.79 4.56 100.0 88.49 9.57 1.94 100.00
5 2002-03
i. Marginal 85.16 6.75 5.11 3.01 100.0 86.91 11.96 1.14 100.0
ii. Small 85.00 2.30 12.60 0.10 100.0 87.81 11.05 1.15 100.0
iii. Semi-
medium 84.69 3.32 11.89 0.08 100.0 88.98 10.10 0.93 100.0
iv. Medium 91.37 0.65 7.53 0.39 100.0 94.48 4.38 1.14 100.0
v. Large 70.04 0.0 30.0 0.0 100.0 92.69 7.31 0.00 100.0
Total 85.24 5.00 7.89 1.88 100.0 90.14 8.95 0.92 100.0
Source : As in Table 1
25
Table 3 : Diastribution of Tenant Holdings and Leased-in Area by Farm-size
S. Farm- 1953-54 1970-71 1981-82 1991-92 2002-03
No size % % % % % % % % % %
No Area No Area No Area No Area No Area
1 Marginal 46.33 7.39 43.57 13.21 39.63 12.69 43.76 19.64 55.83 24.77
2 Small 16.36 9.43 19.94 14.36 24.74 16.4 31.11 24.91 23.93 26.09
Semi-
3 medium 18.81 19.9 21.03 25.74 19.08 28.53 19.54 29.16 14.14 25.70
4 Medium 11.35 24.54 12.4 33.42 13.49 29.2 4.33 12.91 3.50 10.82
5 Large 7.15 38.74 3.06 13.27 3.06 13.18 1.26 13.38 2.60 12.62
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(i) Marginal +
Small 62.69 16.82 63.51 27.57 64.37 29.09 74.87 44.55 79.76 50.86
(ii) Medium +
Large 18.50 63.28 15.46 46.69 16.55 42.38 5.59 26.29 6.10 23.44
Source: As in Table 1
Source : As in Table 1
* Excluded 'nil' and 'zero' class households to make it comparable with other years, as the original
data included those figures to calculate percent in these two classes in the denominator
26
Table 5: Percentage of Households reporting Leased-out Area and Percentage of Area leased-out in HOHs
1953 - 54 1960 -61 1970 - 71 1981 - 82 1991 - 92 2002-03
Sl. Broad
No. Farm-size % % % % % % % % % % % %
No Area No Area No Area No Area No Area No Area
(i) Percentage in Each Size
1 Marginal 11.26 15.23 6.43 10.63 10.13 11.23 6.32* 7.33 5.21* 8.16 3.83* 5.66
2 Small 19.17 15.13 5.12 3.34 17.08 12.67 7.68 5.93 4.94 4.21 3.29 2.90
3 Semi-Medium 16.88 13.16 10.7 7.72 15.30 9.35 7.78 5.80 7.16 5.12 1.71 1.16
4 Medium 19.21 12.16 7.69 4.91 12.28 8.04 8.47 7.01 3.09 0.90 4.43 1.33
5 Large 24.24 14.56 9.01 3.81 14.37 6.83 8.25 5.59 3.30 0.57 17.17 1.38
Total 14.89 13.95 6.95 5.33 12.05 8.93 6.90* 6.31 5.24* 4.18 3.73* 2.59
(ii) Distribution of Households Leasing-out and Area Leased-out
1 Marginal 40.61 5.75 59.08 16.30 52.71 12.47 57.72 13.10 72.71 41.55 81.80 48.05
2 Small 19.25 8.56 9.06 6.07 20.79 18.66 17.73 14.38 13.20 22.61 9.40 22.35
3 Semi-Medium 16.24 14.34 17.43 24.59 15.31 22.18 12.81 19.04 11.55 29.59 2.80 9.69
4 Medium 14.50 24.05 10.24 28.79 8.29 27.12 9.31 33.18 2.26 5.16 3.50 12.16
5 Large 9.40 47.30 4.19 24.25 2.90 19.57 2.43 20.30 0.28 1.09 2.50 7.65
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00
Source : As in Table 1
* Excluded 'nil' and 'zero' class households to make it comparable with other years.
27
Table 6: Terms of Lease of Tenant Holdings and Leased-in Area among Op. Holdings by Farm size -
1970-71 to 1991-92.
1 1970-71
1. Marginal 2.71 3.39 7.06 7.91 2.05 2.43 5.21 3.15
2. Small 3.55 3.83 8.22 10.01 1.25 1.96 3.77 4.05
3. Semi-
6.04 4.18 10.63 6.01 3.05 2.05 3.47 2.03
medium
4. Medium 8.52 2.75 7.68 5.86 3.42 1.08 3.14 1.98
5. Large 7.02 2.02 7.80 4.43 1.88 0.16 2.01 0.60
Total 4.32 3.50 8.03 7.60 2.55 1.28 3.18 2.00
2 1981-82
1. Marginal 0.58 1.49 0.67 8.73 0.16 1.33 0.64 5.58
2. Small 0.80 2.02 1.91 10.59 0.57 1.01 1.45 3.61
3. Semi-
2.75 2.24 0.16 1.51 0.92 0.02 5.98
medium 12.50
4. Medium 2.74 1.63 1.41 10.86 1.28 0.52 0.47 3.75
5. Large 0.00 1.34 1.58 11.37 0.00 0.21 0.48 2.86
Total 1.18 1.73 0.97 10.01 0.81 0.69 0.55 4.18
3 1991-92
1. Marginal 3.03 3.04 3.17 3.22 2.04 3.06 3.19 2.43
2. Small 4.52 6.46 9.48 0.45 2.12 3.04 4.46 0.60
3. Semi-
8.22 7.66 3.91 3.80 3.54 1.81 1.50
medium 2.39
4. Medium 5.88 2.72 2.50 2.55 2.11 0.97 0.89 1.28
5. Large 4.20 1.13 16.62 4.29 2.18 0.58 8.62 2.23
Total 4.20 4.35 4.69 2.49 2.47 2.56 2.77 1.77
4 2002-03
1. Marginal 3.55 4.93 2.16 2.50 3.32 5.37 2.13 1.12
2. Small 6.49 7.02 4.05 2.44 2.78 5.51 1.97 0.77
3. Semi-
medium 6.92 6.32 2.65 2.36 4.28 3.81 1.27 0.75
4. Medium 4.84 3.06 1.45 0.71 2.38 1.04 0.80 0.17
5. Large 12.91 3.93 13.08 0.41 0.85 0.82 5.64 0.00
Total 4.74 5.42 2.69 2.35 2.83 3.38 2.15 0.58
Source : As in table 4
Note: For 1991-92 and 2002-03, the total of holdings under different terms does not tally with
the percent of No. of tenant holdings for each size class, because here a single holding may be
involving in more than one type of lease terms. So the former value would be greater than the latter
28
Table 7: Distribution of Tenant Holdings and Leased-in Area under different Terms of Lease-by Farm size, 1970-71 to 1991-92
Source : As in Table-1
29
Table-8: Tenant Holdings and Leased-in Area
% Tenant Holdings % Leased-in Area
1951 1961 1970-71 1995-96 1970-71 1995-96
30
Table-9: Tenancy in 29 Villages from the Records 1978-79to 1986-87
% of
%
Area Area tenants
leased- Cultiv- Ten-
S.No. Village District Year Oper- leased- in total
in ators ants
ated in Cultiv-
area
ators
Source: Reddy and M. Chandayya (2006). The data were collected from the records maintained at the village level,
from field trips during 1979-2004 organised by the University of Hyderabad.
31
Table-10: Tenurial Structure of Sample Households in Two Disricts: 1984-85
% Households Reporting as % Area
1 West Godavari
Small 63.64 24.67 11.69 69.58 30.42
Medium 56.25 34.38 9.37 66.99 33.01
Large 70.97 29.03 0.00 82.43 17.57
Total 63.57 27.86 8.57 76.29 23.71
2 Khammam
Small 88.33 10.00 1.67 94.49 5.51
Medium 86.67 11.11 2.22 91.78 8.22
Large 68.57 31.43 0.00 84.14 15.86
Total 82.86 15.71 1.43 88.24 11.76
32
Table-12: Tenancy from the Recent Field Survey
% Oper- % % Oper- %
S.No. Category % %
ated Leased- ated Leased-
Owned Owned
House- Area in House- Area in
Area Area
holds (acres) Area holds (acres) Area
33
Table-14: Household Ownership and Operational Holdings - Some Aspects, 1953-54 to 2002-03
1953- 1960- 1970- 1981- 1991- 2002-
S.No. Item 54 61 71 82 92 03
1 Landed HHs excluding Landless (00) 37640 61870 64726 75652 99563 122001
3 Total HHs (including Landless (00) 51234 66410 69557 85897 112954 142409
4 Landless HHs in Total (%) 26.53 6.84 6.95 11.93 11.86 14.33
5 Percentage of HHs Operating No Land 22.92 37.95 36.05 40.47 37.49 53.20
34