Torres v Comelec

Facts: Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
the Winning Candidates for Municipal Councilors. Petitioner was proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for councilor
with 12,055 votes.
The same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the number of votes garnered by
petitioner. The letter-request from the former stated that the votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in the sub-total as
reflected in the Statement of Votes by precinct was erroneously added to Mr. Torres for a total of 934 votes. Mr. Torres
should have been number 10 in the winning column with 11,121 votes while Mr. de Peralta should have been number 5
with 11,610 votes.
In an En Banc resolution, COMELEC granted the letter-request for the correction. It ordered the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has the power to order the correction.
Held: Yes.
1.

Under Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the board may motu proprio or upon verified
petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, correct the errors
committed, (a) where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (3) there
was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of
votes by precinct.

2.

The above provision applies even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already been
made as in the case at bar in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in question.

Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul
the proclamation.

3.

4.

Since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any
error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation.
An election protest over which the RTC has original jurisdiction presupposes a valid proclamation.

The making of the correction in their computation is an administrative capacity of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Statement of Votes is merely tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as
reflected in the election returns.
HENCE, the COMELEC En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec
Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chatos election protest against Unico regarding canvassing of
returns and alleged invalidity of Unicos proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC.
Issue: WON the court should take cognizance of Chatos election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to?
WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper.
Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chatos election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the
constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office
and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. Reason: it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the peoples mandate.
-Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur:

o
Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction
o
There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify
the proceeding.
-In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost
jurisdiction upon Unicos proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET.
Guieb vs. Fontanilla,
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent Manuel Asuncion, were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of May 9, 1994. The former was
proclaimed as the winning candidate then the latter filed an election protest with the MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1994, the MTC confirmed the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissed the protest of the private
respondent. The private respondent then appealed the decision to the RTC of Dagupan City.
In its decision of August 31, 1994, RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. On November 25, 1994, the private
respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
RTC declared that the motion should be properly filed with the court of origin and that the decision of August 31, 1994
had already become final.
On December 12, 1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
oncertiorari which was denied because of his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that motion. On February 8,
1995, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on December 20, 1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. MTC deferred action on the said motion and required the petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the
status of his petition with this Court but the latter failed to comply with the said order, so the court issued an order on
granting the issuance of a writ of execution.
However, the court received the said counsel's Compliance later on, wherein he informed the court of the petitioner's
motion to reconsider this Court's resolution denying the motion for extension of time to file his petition. In a resolution
the Court required the respondent to comment on the petition.
The petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend Execution which was denied on the ground
that the writ must have already been implemented and, therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same has
become moot and academic. The sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that he enforced the writ
and proclaimed the private respondent as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Issue: Whether or not RTC has a jurisdiction over this case.
Held: No. Under Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph 2-C of the Constitution, it is the COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial
Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited
jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Santiago vs Ramos
Facts: The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on
the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the
revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective
memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.

Held: YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as
a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who
is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to
the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation
during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the
revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal
of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (a.k.a. the SC) resolved to:
DISMISS the election protest because it has been rendered MOOT and ACADEMIC by the abandonment/withdrawal of
Miriam as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator;
DISMISS as a consequence, Ramos' counter-protest;
GRANT Miriam's Motion to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election documents in the remaining
precincts of the pilot areas
Sanchez vs COMELEC
Facts: Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be directed to conduct a recount of
the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed
further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four (4) winning senatorial
candidates on the ground that votes intended for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his
surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec
election returns and other election forms.
On July 16, 1987, the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing petitioner Sanchez
petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, reversed its order of
dismissal and granted Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots.
Issue: Whether his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a
summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest.
Held: The Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial
elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and
exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or
contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election
(sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the
preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petition must fail. The complete election
returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the
same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the
Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided.
Arao vs COMELEC
Facts: Benjamin Arao and Warlito Pulmones were candidates for mayor of Pagadian City in the 1988 local elections.
After canvass, Arao was shown to have garnered 12,447 votes while Pulmones got only 12,030 or a margin of 417

votes in favor of Arao. Pulmones filed his protest alleging fraud and anomalies in the voting centers which were glaring
and notably perpetrated in specified districts.
A resolution was issued denying Pulmones amended protest and finally, after revision of ballots and hearing ruled that
arao is the winner with a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the 417 votes formerly proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.
Upon Pulmones motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC, en banc, declared Pulmones as the duly elected mayor with
a margin of 516 votes against arao and ordered Arao to vacate the office.
Issue: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it examined ballots not included in the original
protest but only in the amended protest which was submitted beyond the required period?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the extraordinary power of the Supreme Court to pass upon an order or decision
of the COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution while giving it the regard and respect due to a
constitutional body.
The abuse of discretion must be grave. Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern. The
rights of the contending parties must yield to the far greater interest of the citizens for the sanctity of the electoral
process.
This being the case, the choice of the people to represent them may not be bargained away by sheer negligence of a
party to raise the question of identical handwriting in the ballots. There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC.
De Mesa vs Mencias
Facts: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963
elections. De Mesa won the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Meanwhile, the defeated
candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De Mesa charging him of the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and
other irregularities in certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand filed a counter-protest and sought to shift
responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his followers. However, while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa
was assassinated.
Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. Accordingly, the court a quo
required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said
protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however, comply. Proceeding ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant
Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots.
And so, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative as indeed none had thus far been named
the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in which,
incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner for the deceased protestee,
the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964 adjudged the protestant Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor
of Muntinlupa, in the 1963 elections.
De Mesas widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was member filed a petition which include among others
for the reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision upon the ground that, for failure to order the protestant to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after his widow and
children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for
the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case
RTC denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order stricken from the record
their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. The movants elevated the case to
CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
Issue: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory or mandatory compliance.
Held: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him,
it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the
death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa, however, contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised
Election Code was ushered in.

Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of Court, said rules, though not generally
applicable to election cases, may however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient."
SEC. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the widow and children of the deceased protestee
to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case. But when they failed to
comply at the instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children nonsuited, proceeded with the case ex
parte, and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee.
It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to election contests to the same extent
and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the
procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly
appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken down as null and void.
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased protestee after the latter's widow and children had failed to comply with the court
order requiring their appearance to be substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but instead in derogation of the
precepts of the Rule in question and in the total absence of a legal representative of the deceased protestee. It is no
argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a
deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall."
While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the
mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast
areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as
mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.
Labo vs COMELEC
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage
with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was
found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country,
all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
The Doctrine of Statistical Improbabilities occurs when there is a unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor
of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing
parties appear in the election return.
Lagumbay vs COMELEC
FACTS: The election returns of certain precincts of some municipalities were being questioned because in these
certain precincts no single vote was received by any of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. The Commission
on Elections declined to reject the said election returns. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a block voting or a zero vote is probable to be achieved in one precinct?
HELD: No. A block voting or zero voting is not probable.

The Supreme Court has held that election result showing no vote to any candidate was utterly improbable and clearly
incredible. It is not likely, in the ordinary course of things that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote
for all the candidates of one party, without giving a single vote to one of the candidates of the contending party.
Here, it is clearly impossible and improbable that no one from the eight candidates of the Nationalist Party received
any vote from any voter in the said precincts.
Doctrine of Statistical Improbabilities - occurs when there is a unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of
all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties
appear in the election return.