112.

NOLLORA VS REPUBLIC
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard
rumors that her husband of two years has another wife. She
returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena
Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for
bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she
declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P
50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He
presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion,
proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992.
And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives
as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know Jesusa and only
came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she
is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to
be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their
marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband,
she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that
Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got married in
accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:

Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous

under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the
second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article
35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case:
that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage
has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted
in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that
any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not
in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim
that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them
in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission of
the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a
second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy
to the wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said council fails to
secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court

shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her

objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his
civil status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts do not state
that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential
requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his
liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is
thus further compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent
attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can
no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been
violated.
73.
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and
THE COURT OFAPPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz
filed anadministrative charge against defendant-appelle Encarnacion Ucol,
a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the
charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get
back to her because of a case filed by Ucols husband against Ruiz. She was
also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and
fabricated the charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided
to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on thealleged libelous
portions of Ucols answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case,
Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion to

dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then granted by the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court
of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a
separate civil action for damages.
Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case since the
decision of the trial court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of
defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from the
criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The court found that
the appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest
that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit on the following
grounds.
1. Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint
2. Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer in
the administrativecase after the administrative cases dismissal.
3. Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling
as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant.
4. After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a
civil action for damages.

379. In Re Bernas
In Re BERNAS (GR NO L-10010 AUG 1, 1916)
FACTS:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match,
defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of
P160 before the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided that bout was a
draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First Instance praying judgment and ordering
defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights ,to
pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas
Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court
of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff'smotion, an order ordering provincial
treasurer and if possible,
Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to
plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of
the proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since
grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has
always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules
governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to
find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff
and defendants concerning cockfights.
Held:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law
applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are not reasons
that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the
issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a
case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil
Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of
the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof, the general
principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed
from are reversed and to record of the proceedings
shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made
with regard to cost.
130.
Lavadia v. Heirs of LunaG.R. No. 171914July 23, 2014
Facts:
Luna and Eugenia initially married in a civil ceremony, and later in a church
ceremony.Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia in the

Dominican Republic. On thesame date, Luna contracted another marriage,

this time with Soledad. Thereafter, Luna andSoledad returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.In 1977, Luna
organized a new law firm, LUPSICON. LUPSICON through Luna purchased
the6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project, to be used as their law
office. In 1992,LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners.
After his death, his share in the condominium unit including the law books,
office furniture andequipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Luna, his son from the first marriage. Thisbecame the subject of the
complaint filed by Soledad against the heirs of Luna. The complaintalleged
that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage betweenLuna and Soledad, and that Soledad became co-owner of
said properties.The RTC ruled that Soledad has no right over the
condominium unit. On appeal, the CA ruledthat the absolute divorce decree
obtained in the Dominican Republic did not terminate Lunasprior marriage
with Eugenia because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognizedin our jurisdiction.
Held: The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court
approval Ratio: The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and
executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise. The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted. Considering that Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then
in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses
in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time
of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit: Article 119. The
future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife. Article 142 of the Civil Code
has defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly: Article 142. By means of the conjugal
partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. The conjugal partnership of gains
subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article
175 of the Civil Code, viz: Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: (1)
Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3)
When the marriage is annulled; (4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191. The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per

se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of
the Civil Code, as follows: Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a) Article 191. The husband
or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted
433
Go Kim Huy v Go Kim
Facts
On May 1, 1933 petitioner came to Manila at the age of six (6) using the name Gaw Piak.
Upon arrival, he stayed with Bonifacio Go Kim until he left sometime in 1946 to study in
Shanghai, China. He returned in 1949 and pursued college education in Far Eastern University.
Prior to his arrival, Bonifacio Go Kim was already engaged in selling bakery supplies and
grocery items. According to him, respondent Santiago Go Kim Tian came to Manila in 1923 at
the age of 11. Both he and respondent Santiago helped in the business. In 1947, Bonifacio Go
Kim & Son partnership was formed. The partnership name was later amended to Bonifacio Go
Kim & Sons to conform to the registered business name. All those years, the business prospered
resulting into accumulation of several properties. He testified that Bonifacio Go Kim, being an
alien, was disqualified to own real properties. Hence respondent Santiago, who became a
naturalized Filipino citizen on September 24, 1957, was entrusted with the properties purchased
by his father. Several properties accumulated were transferred under the partnership name and
others were named under certain persons who acted as dummies.
[3]

[4]

[5]

When petitioner left his job at the bakery in 1956, he worked in a stock brokerage business.
Subsequently, he organized his own import business and later on put up a manufacturing firm for
plastic containers. On April 20, 1964, the trial court granted his petition for change of name from
Gaw Piak to Go Kim Huy or William Go. His naturalization came in September 1978. He
explained that when he entered the Philippines, he used the name Gaw Piak as appearing in the
landing certificate. Such landing certificate was bought by his father in the open market for his
easy access to Manila. He came to the Philippines with his mother Chua Yiak and respondent
Santiagos wife. Both he and respondents wife used different names. He testified that he is known
by his name Go Kim Huy or William Go. He added that his schooling, sustenance and everyday
needs were shouldered by the decedent. He asserts that he was forced to file the case in court
because respondent Santiago refused to give him his just share in the estate of his father.
Respondent Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that
petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated as a family member because

petitioners real father was a close friend of the decedent. His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng
Kee as appearing in his landing certificate. He denied any relation with petitioner and declares
that the grant of petition for change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not
make petitioner a member of the family of Bonifacio Go Kim. Respondents declare that
petitioner has received a part of the assets of the decedent and that whatever claims he has,
if any, against the estate of the decedent were fully settled by respondent Santiago and
acknowledged by petitioner after the death of Bonifacio Go Kim.
[6]

[7]

[8]

While the case before the trial court was pending, respondents counsel filed a lettercomplaint dated May 23, 1983 with the Ministry of Justice [Department of Justice] attacking
the certification dated May 27, 1974, issued by the Commission on Immigration [Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, hereinafter referred to as BID] stating that the records filed in the
said office showed that the late Bonifacio Go Kim registered petitioner as one of his children.
[9]

[10]

[11]

In connection with the filing of the instant case, petitioner caused the issuance of notice
of lis pendens on the Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned in the complaint. Consequent to
such issuance, annotations were made by the Register of Deeds of Manila, Quezon City and
Caloocan. Respondents opposed the annotation and moved to cancel the lis pendens. On June
2, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City issued an Order canceling the annotation on the
titles. On April 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the lower court
Order.
[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

In the interim, the BID issued a resolution, dated May 15, 1985, canceling its earlier
certification and declared that petitioner is not a son of spouses Bonifacio Go Kim and Chua
Yiak and accordingly ordered the correction of immigration records of both petitioner and the
late Bonifacio Go Kim. Petitioner appealed the foregoing resolution with the Ministry of
Justice [Department of Justice]. He argued that while the BID is authorized to make an inquiry or
investigation, the resolution ordering the correction of its records affected petitioners status,
paternity and filiation that has remained undisturbed in the public records for more than 33 years,
since Bonifacio Go Kim, during his lifetime, acknowledged petitioner as his son by registering
him as one of his children. In a letter dated February 24, 1987, the undersecretary of
justice rendered his opinion, thus
[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

While it is to be conceded that the correction of entries in the immigration records of

William Go Kim Huy might affect his status, paternity and filiation, matters which
are sub judice in Civil Case No. 30154 of the CFI ofQuezon City, the said corrections
will not be binding upon the court. The court will have to base its findings and
decision on the evidence to be presented before it.

This Ministry is thus making its position clear that while it upholds the authority of
the CID to correct entries in its records pertaining to the personal circumstance of
William Go Kim Huy, it does not in any manner pass judgment on the validity or
correctness of the CIDs findings and conclusions on the status of the above-named
person.
Issue :
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to produce his official record or birth
certificate, a judicial decree or an instrument handwritten by the decedent to prove his filiation.
The provisions of the Family Code were relied upon by the Court of Appeals in dismissing
petitioners appeal. When the case was filed, the applicable law was the pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code and not the provisions of the Family Code.
In resolving the issues presented, we must take into account that this is the second time that
we will decide the issues respecting this case. As early as 1988, this Court upheld the authority of
the BID to correct its own records. Now, petitioner once more insists that we disregard the
actions taken by the BID and consider the documents previously cancelled by the said office to
support his claim that he is a legitimate son of Bonifacio Go Kim. The documents petitioner
wants us to give weight and credence refer to Exhibits B, EEE, FFF, K and M. Exhibit B is the
application for alien registration of the late Bonifacio Go Kim dated July 17, 1950 stating therein
that he has two children- petitioner and respondent Santiago. Exhibit EEE refers to the Alien
Certificate of Registration of Gaw Piak registering Go Kim Huy as his other name, accomplished
on December 3, 1945. Exhibit FFF is the Landing Certificate of Residence of Chua Yiak
indicating May 4, 1933 as date of entry. Exhibit K is the borrowers receipt from the BID
Records Section showing that the records of Chua Yiak with the said office were borrowed and
Exhibit M refers to the Landing Certificate of Residence of Gaw Piak issued in 1933. The
foregoing exhibits have been cancelled by the BID by virtue of Exhibit I, which is the BID
resolution ordering the correction of records of petitioner and decedent.
[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.
Exhibit I was considered both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in deciding the issue of
filiation that defeats petitioners imputation of relation with the decedent and the respondents.
Petitioner posits that we disregard Exhibit I. What petitioner wants us to do is to disturb our
pronouncement on August 22, 1988 where we upheld the authority of BID to correct its own
records which effectively upheld Exhibit I. We have repeatedly emphasized in a plethora of cases
that judgments which had already attained finality cannot again be subject of review, otherwise,
there will be no end to litigation. The documents petitioner wants us to reconsider were already

cancelled by the BID, which cancellation has been affirmed by this Court thirteen (13) years ago.
Once a judgment or an order of a court has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid
to rest. Petitioner cannot now demand that we calibrate anew the documents previously
cancelled and give it weight and credence, and worst, reverse our earlier pronouncement, which
has long become final and executory since 1988. In fact, petitioners alleged filiation was merely
dependent upon the certification issued by the BID in 1974 and he has failed to show by
convincing evidence, other than the certification issued by the BID which was later on cancelled,
that indeed he was related to the decedent. Petitioner failed to raise any substantial issue that
demands consideration. In the voluminous records presented, it all boils down to a
reconsideration of the BID findings which cannot now be disturbed.
[38]