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2015 GOLDEN BEACON


CIVIL LAW
Dean
1.

MANUEL

By:
R.

BUSTAMANTE

HUMAN RELATIONS

ARTICLE

19

Every person must,


in
the
exercise
of
performance
of
his
duties,
act
with
justice,
and observe honesty and good
faith.

his
rights
and
give
everyone

in
his

the
due,

DART PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO CALOGCOG


G.R. No. 149241, August 24, 2009, 596 SCRA 614
FACTS: Dart
entered
into
Distributorship
Agreement
with
Spouses
Calogcog .
Following the
expiration
of
the
agreement, Dart
was
only
convinced
to
extend
the
period
of
distributorship
upon
the
written
promise
of
the
Calogcogs
that
they
will
observe and
comply
the
terms
and
conditions
thereof.
Dart
subjected
the
spouses
to
an
audit
review
by
an
auditing
firm.
However,
Spouses
Calogcog
disallowed
the
auditing
firm
from
inspecting
their
books
and
records . As
a
result,
Dart
only
accepted
the
spouses
purchase
order
on
a
prepaid
basis.
ISSUE: Whether
Dart
acted
in
bad
faith
or
intended
to
injure
the
Spouses
Calogcog
when
it
caused
the
auditing
of
the
latters
account
and
when
it
implemented
the
prepaid
basis
in
treating
the
latters
order.
HELD: NO. Bad
faith
cannot
be
attributed
to
the
acts
of
Dart
which
was
supported
by
legitimate
reasons ,
principally
to
protect
its
own
business.
The
exercise
of
its
rights
was
not
impelled
by
any
evil
motive
designed, whimsically
and
capriciously,
to
injure
or
prejudice
the
Calogcogs.

HSBC vs. CATALAN


G.R. No. 159590, October

18,

2004,

440

SCRA

498

FACTS: A
complaint
was
filed
seeking
to
compel
the
bank
to
pay
the
value
of
checks
issued
to
her
by
Thompson
as
it
refused
to
pay
the
same
despite
repeated
directives
of
the
drawer
to
recognize
the
check
he
issued.
The
bank
filed motion
to
dismiss
alleging
that
the
complaint
failed
to
state
a
cause
of
action
under
Section
189
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Law,
a
check
itself
does
not
operate
as
an
assignment
of
any
part
of
the
funds
to
the
credit
of
the
drawer
with
the
bank
and
the
latter
is
not
liable
to
the
holder
unless and
until
it
accepts
or
certifies
it.
ISSUE: Whether
the
bank
inaction
on
the
drawers

is
liable
instructions.

for

damages

on

the

basis

of

its

HELD: YES.
The
bank
can
be
held
liable
for
damages .
It
was
not
a
suit on
the
value
of
the
check
itself ,
but
how
it
acted
in
relation
to
the
claim
for
payment.
The
allegations
in
the
complaint
that
there
was
gross
inaction of
the
bank
on
Thompsons
instructions
as
well
as
its
evident
failure
to
inform
her
of
the
reason
are
insouciance
(lack
of
concern)
on
its
part.
The
complaint
was
anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code .
When a right is
exercised
in
a
manner
which
does
not
conform
with
the
norms
enshrined
in
Article
19
and
results
in
damage
to
another ,
a
legal
wrong
is
thereby
committed
for
which
the
wrongdoer
must
be
held
responsible.
But
a
right ,
though
by
itself
legal
because
recognized
or
granted
by
law
as
such,
may
nevertheless
become
the
source
of
some illegality.
A person should be protected
only
when
he
acts
in
the
legitimate
exercise
of
his
right ,
that
is,
when
he
acts
with
prudence
and
in
good
faith;
but
when
he
acts
with
negligence
or
abuse.

2
Thus, in order to
elements
must
concur,
(a)
(b)
(c)

be
to

liable
wit:

that
there
is
a
legal
which
is
exercised
in
for
the sole intent of

under

the

abuse

of

right
or
duty;
bad
faith; and
prejudicing or injuring

right

principle ,

three

another.

SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA VALMONTE


G.R.

No.

151866,

September

9,

2004, 438 SCRA 38

One is not allowed to exercise his right in


a
manner
which
would
cause unnecessary
prejudice
to
another
or
if
he
would
thereby
offend
morals
or
good
customs.
A
person
should
be
protected
only
when
he
acts
in
the
legitimate
exercise
of
his
right ,
that
is
when
he
acts
with
prudence
and
good
faith,
but
not
when
he
acts
with
negligence
or
abuse.

G.F. EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA


G.R. No. 156841,

June

30,

2005,

462

SCRA

466

FACTS: There
was
a
contract
whereby
Valenzona
was
hired
as
a
coach
of
the
Alaska
Basketball
Team
in
the
PBA
for
a
period
of
two
years.
Paragraph
3 of the
contract
provides
that
if
at
anytime
during
the
contract,
the
Coach,
in
the
sole
opinion
of
the
Corporation,
fails
to
exhibit
sufficient
skills
or
competitive
ability
to
coach
the
time,
the
Corporation
may
terminate
the
contract .
During
his
stint
as
head
coach,
the
team
placed
third
in
both
Open
and
All
Filipino
PBA
Conferences
in
1988.
He
was
later
on
served
with
notice
that
the
management
was
terminating
his
services .
Six
years
thereafter,
he
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
asking
for
payment
of
his
compensation
arising
from
the
arbitrary
and
unilateral
termination
of
his
employment.
ISSUE: Whether
paragraph
3
of
the
the right of petitioner
to
terminate

contract
is
respondents

a
legitimate
employment.

exercise

of

HELD:
NO.
The
assailed
condition
clearly
transgressed
the
principle
mutuality
of
contracts,
hence,
it
is
null
and
void .
It
leaves
determination
of
whether
Valenzona
failed
to
exhibit
sufficient
skill
competitive
ability
to
coach
Alaska
team
solely
to
the
opinion
GF Equity.

of
the
or
of

When
one
party
in
an
employment
contract
is
given
an
unbridled
prerogative
to
pre-terminate
the
contract
irrespective
of
the
soundness,
fairness,
reasonableness
or
even lack
of
basis
of
its opinion, it must
be
struck
down.
To sustain
the
validity
of
the
assailed
paragraph
would
open
the
gate
of
arbitrary
and
illegal
dismissals ,
for
void
contractual
stipulations
would
be
used
as
justification
therefore.
Consequently,
since
the pre-termination
of
the
contract
was
anchored
on
an
illegal
ground ,
hence,
contrary
to
law
and
GF
Equity
negligently
failed
to
provide
legal
basis
for
such
pre-termination ,
the
latter
failed
to
exercise
in
a
legitimate
manner
its
right
to
pre-terminate
the
contract ,
thereby abusing
the
right
of
Valenzona,
thus,
entitling
the
latter
to
damages
under
Article
19
in
relation
to
Article
20
of
the
Civil
Code.

2.

CIVIL PERSONALITY
CONTINENTAL STEEL MFG. CORP. vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 621

FACTS: Hortillanos
was
in
the
38th
Hortillanos
unborn
ISSUE: Whether
death
of
his

wife,
week
child.

Marife,
had
of
pregnancy

Hortillano
is
unborn
child.

entitled

pre-mature
delivery
while
she
which
resulted
to
the
death
of

to

bereavement

benefits

on

the

HELD: YES.
Even
a
child
inside
the
womb
already
has
life .
No
less
than
the
Constitution
recognizes
the
life of
the
unborn
from
conception,
that
the State
must
protect
equally with
the
life
of
the
mother.
If
the
unborn
already has
life ,
then
the
cessation
thereof
even
prior
to
the
child
being
delivered,
qualifies
as
death.

3
It
was
not
disputed
that
Hortillano
and
his
wife
were
validly
married
and
that
their
child
was
conceived
during
said
marriage ,
hence,
making
said
child
legitimate
upon
her
conception ,
thus,
Hortillano
was
entitled
to
bereavement
benefits.

3. FAMILY
Article

26

CODE

paragraph

REPUBLIC vs. OBRECIDO III


G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005,

472

SCRA 114

FACTS:
Cipriano
and
Lady
Miros
got
married
in
1981
and
thereafter
were
blessed
with two children . Miros
went
to
the
United
States
and
eventually
acquired
American
citizenship .
Later,
she
obtained
a
divorce
decree
of
her
marriage
with
Cipriano
and
got
married
to
Stanley .
By
reason
thereof,
Cipriano
filed
a
petition
for
authority
to
marry invoking
paragraph
2
of
Article
26
of
the
Family
Code .
The
Solicitor
General
opposed
the
petition
on
the
ground
that
paragraph
2
of
Article
26
is
not
applicable
to
Cipriano
because
it
applies
only
to
a
valid
mixed
marriage, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen
and
an
alien.
ISSUE: Whether
the Filipino
spouse is
legally
capacitated
the
other
party
is
naturalized
as
a
foreign
citizen
obtained
a
valid
divorce
decree.

to
re-marry
and
later

after
on

HELD: YES, paragraph


2
of
Article
26
should
be
interpreted
to
include
cases
involving
parties,
who
at
the
time
of
the
celebration
of
the
marriage
were
Filipino
citizens,
but
later
on,
one
of
them
becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The
Filipino
spouse
should
likewise
be
allowed
to
re-marry
as
if
the
other party
was
a
foreigner
at
the
time
of
the
solemnization
of
the
marriage.
- - - To
rule
otherwise
would
be
to
sanction
absurdity
where
the
Filipino
spouse
remains
married
to
the
alien
after
obtaining
a
divorce,
is
no
longer
married
to
spouse.

and
injustice
spouse
who ,
the
Filipino

- - - There
are
two
(2)
elements
for
the
application
of
paragraph
2
of
Article
26,
namely,: (1)
a
valid
marriage
that
has
been
celebrated
between
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
foreigner ;
and
(2)
a
valid
divorce
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
remarry. The
reckoning
point
is
not
the
citizenship
of the parties at the
time
of
the
celebration
of
marriage ,
but
rather,
their
citizenship
at
the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
the
latter
to
re-marry.
- - - Moreover,
it
is
necessary
that
the
naturalization
of
the
other
spouse
and
the
foreign
divorce
decree
be
proven.
The
party
pleading
it
must
prove
the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate
its
conformity to the
foreign law
allowing
it .
Likewise,
it
must
be
shown
that
the
divorce
decree
allows
the
former
spouse
to
re-marry
as
specifically
required
in
Article
26.
Otherwise,
there
would
be
no
evidence
sufficient
to
declare
that
he
is
capacitated
to
enter
into
another
marriage.

Article 40

LUCIO MORIGO

vs. PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376


FACTS:
When
Lucio
and
Lucia
got
married,
they
merely
signed
the
marriage contract without
the
presence
of
solemnizing
officer. Since Lucia
has been working in Canada for many years , she was able to obtain a
divorce
decree in
1991
from
Canadian
Court.
The
following
year,
Lucio
contracted
a
second
marriage
with
Maria .
On
September
21,
1993,
Lucio
filed
a
complaint
for
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
of
the
first
marriage
on
the
ground
that
no
marriage
ceremony
actually
took
place .
In
October 1993, he was charged
with
bigamy
and
was
later
on
convicted
by
the
lower court. The first marriage
was
nullified
by
the
court
after
the
celebration
of
the
second
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether
necessary before

judicial
declaration
the spouse
may

of
nullity
of
validly
contract

the
first
a
second

marriage is
marriage.

4
HELD: NO. In
this
case,
it
was
found
out
that
the
first
marriage
is
void
ab
initio
in
accordance
with
Articles
3
and
4
of
the
Family
Code. This
simply
means
that
there
was
no
marriage
to
begin
with
and
such
declaration
of
nullity
retroacts
to
the
date
of
the
first
marriage.
In
other
words,
for
all
intents
and
purposes ,
reckoned
from
the
date
of
the
declaration
of
the
first
marriage
as
void
as
initio
to
the
date
of
the
celebration
of
the
first
marriage ,
the
accused
was,
under
the
eyes
of
the
law,
never
married.
The
first
element
of
bigamy
requires
that
the
accused
must
be
legally married.
But
in
this
case ,
legally
speaking,
the
accused
was
never
married.
Thus,
there
is
no
first
marriage
to
speak
of.
Under
the
principle
of
retroactivity
of
a
marriage
being
declared
void
ab
initio,
the
two
were
never
married
from
the
beginning .
Accordingly,
accused
was
not
married
to
his
wife
at
the
time
he
contracted
the
second
marriage
with
another
woman.
The
mere
private
act
of
signing
a
marriage
contract
bears
no
semblance
to
a
valid
marriage
and
thus,
needs
no
judicial
declaration
of
nullity.
Such
act
alone,
without
more,
cannot
be
deemed
to
constitute
an
ostensibly
valid
marriage
for
which
accused
might
be
held
liable
for
bigamy
unless
he
secures
a
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
before
he
contracts
a
subsequent
marriage.
What
is
contemplated
by
Article
40
void
marriage
that
must
be
declared
contract
a
subsequent
marriage
is
one
is
void.

of
the
Family
Code
as
the
void
before
a
party
may
that
must
exist
although,
it

Article 41

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G. R. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461
ISSUE:
before

Whether
the other

a
judicial
declaration
spouse
may
legally

of
presumptive
re-marry.

death

is

necessary

HELD: YES. There


must
be a
judicial
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
the
absent
spouse.
Otherwise,
the
spouse
who
contracted
the
second
marriage
may
be
convicted
of
the
crime
of
bigamy.
Such
judicial
declaration
constitutes
proof
that
he
acted
in
good
faith
and
would
negate
criminal
intention
on
his
part
when
he
married
the
complainant .
According
to
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code ,
there
is
a
need
for
judicial
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
the
absent
spouse
to
enable
the
present
spouse
to
remarry .
Parties
should
not
be
permitted
to
judge
for
themselves
such
matter .
The
latter
should
be
submitted
to
the
proper
court
for
resolution.
The
requirement
for
a
judicial
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
the
absent
spouse
is
for
the
benefit
of
the
spouse
present
as
protection
from
the
pains
and
the
consequences
of
a
second
marriage
precisely
because
he
or
she
could
be
charged
and
convicted
of
bigamy
if
the
defense
of
good
faith
based
on
mere
testimony
is
found
incredible.
It
is
also
for
the
benefit
of
the
State .
Marriage
is
a
social
institution
of
the
highest
importance .
Public
policy,
good
morals
and
the
interest
of
society
require
that
the
marital
relation
should
be
surrounded
with
every
safeguard
and
its
severance
in
the
manner
prescribed
and
the
causes
specified
by
law.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON


G.R. No. 165545,

March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 376

FACTS: On
April
25,
1955,
Clemente
G.
Bailon,
who
was
a
member
of
SSS
and
Alice
P.
Diaz
contracted
marriage .
More
than
15
years
later,
Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively
dead.
The
CFI
granted
the
petition .
Close
to
13
years
after
his
wife
Alice
was
declared
presumptively
dead ,
Bailon
contracted
marriage
with
respondent
Teresita
Jarque.
Upon
Bailons
death,
respondent
thereupon
filed
a
claim
for
funeral
benefits
and
was
granted
P12,000
by
the
SSS .
Cecilia
Bailon-Yap,
who
claimed
to
be
a
daughter
of
Bailon
and
one
Elisa
Jayona ,
contested
before
the
SSS
the
release
to
respondent
of
the
death
and
funeral
benefits.
She
claimed
that
Bailon
contracted
three
marriages
in
his
lifetime,
the
first
with
Alice
Diaz,
the
second
with
her
mother
Elisa
Jayona
and
the
third
with
respondent,
all
of
whom
are
still

5
alive.
In
the
meantime,
a
certain
Hermes
P.
Diaz ,
claiming
the
brother
and
guardian
of
Aliz P. Diaz, filed
before
the
claim
for
death
benefits
accruing
from
Bailons
death.
ISSUE:
Who
between
Alice
to
the
death
benefits?

Diaz

and

the

herein

respondent

is

to
SSS

be
a

entitled

HELD: Respondent
is
entitled
to
the
death
benefits .
The
two
marriages
involved
herein
having
been
solemnized
prior
to
the
effectivity
on
August
3,
1988
of
the
Family Code ,
the
applicable
law
to
determine
their
validity
is
the
Civil
Code
which
was
the
law
in
effect
at
the
time
of
their
celebration.
Under
Art.
83
of
the Civil Code, a
subsequent
marriage
contracted
during
the
lifetime
of
the
first
spouse
is
illegal
and
void
ab
initio
unless
the
prior
marriage
is
first
annulled
or
dissolved
or
contracted
under
any
of
the
three
exceptional
circumstances.
It
bears
noting
that
the
marriage
under
any
of
these
exceptional
cases
is
deemed
valid
until
declared
null
and
void
by
competent
court .
If
follows
that
the
onus
probandi
in
these
cases
rests
on
the
party
assailing
the
second
marriage.
In the case
at
bar,
as
found
by
the
CFI,
Alice
has
been
absent
for
15
consecutive
years
when
Bailon
sought
declaration
of
her
presumptive
death ,
which
judicial
declaration
was
not
even
a
requirement
then
for
purposes
of
remarriage.
Under
the
Civil
Code,
a
subsequent
marriage
being
voidable ,
it
is
terminated
by
final
judgment
of
annulment
in
a
case
instituted
by
the
absent
spouse
who
reappears
or
by
either
of
the
spouses
in
the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code,
specifically Art.
42,
no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary .
If
the
absentee
reappears ,
but
no
step
is
taken
to
terminate
the
subsequent
marriage,
either
by
affidavit
or
by
court
action,
such
absentees
mere
reappearance
even
if
made
known
to
the
spouses
in
the
subsequent
marriage,
will
not
terminate
such
marriage.
Since
the
second
marriage
has
been
contracted
because
of
the
presumption
that
the
former
spouse
is
dead ,
such
presumption
continues
in
spite
of
the
spouses
physical
reappearance
and
by
fiction
of law ,
he
or
she
still be
regarded
as
legally
an
absentee
until
the
subsequent
marriage
is
terminated
as
provided
by
law.
In
the
case
at
bar,
as
no
step
was
taken
to
nullify
in
accordance
with
law,
Bailons
and
respondents
marriage
prior
to
the
formers
death
in
1998 ,
respondent
rightfully
the
defendant
spouse beneficiary
of
Bailon.

Article

36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO


G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422
Psychological
incapacity
refers
to
no
less
than
a
mental
physical) incapacity
that
causes
a
party
to
be
truly
incognitive
of
basic
marital
covenants
that
concomitantly
must
be
assumed
discharged
by
the
parties
to
the
marriage.

(not
the
and

Sexual
infidelity,
per
se,
however,
does
not
constitute
psychological
incapacity
within
the
contemplation
of
the
Family
Code .
It
must
be
shown
that
the
unfaithfulness
is
a
manifestation
of
a
disordered
personality
which
makes
him
completely
unable
to
discharge
the
essential
obligations
of
the
marital
state
and
not
merely
due
to
his
ardent
wish
to
have
a
child
of
his
own
flesh
and
blood.

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ - FERRARIZ vs. BRIX FERRARIZ


G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396
Respondents
alleged
mixed
personality
disorder,
the
leaving-the-house
attitude
whenever
they
quarreled,
the
violent
tendencies
during
epileptics
attacks,
the sexual infidelity,
the
abandonment
and
lack of support ,
and
his
preference
to
spend
more
time
with
this
band
mates
than
his
family,
are
not
rooted on some debilitating
psychological
condition
but
a
mere
refusal
or
unwillingness
to
assume
the
essential
obligations
of
marriage.

6
REPUBLIC vs. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE
G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123
There
is
of
course
no
requirement
that
the person
sought
to be
declared
psychologically
incapacitated
should
be
examined
by
a
physician
or
psychologist
as
a
condition
sine
qua
non
to
arrive
at
such
declaration.
If
it
can
be
proven by
independent
means
that
one
is
psychologically incapacitated,
there is no reason
why
the
same
should
not
be
credited.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL SING BUENAVENTURA


G. R. No. 127449, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 261
FACTS: Petitioner
Noel
Buenaventura
filed a petition for the declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
on
the
ground
that
he
and
his
wife
were
psychologically
incapacitated
to
comply
with
the
essential
obligations
of
marriage.
The
trial court decreed the
marriage null and void ab initio . It
likewise
ordered
petitioner
to
pay
private
respondent
moral
damages
in
the
amount
of
2.5
million pesos
and exemplary damages
of
1
million
pesos
with
6%
interest
from
the
date
of
this
decision
plus
attorneys
fees
of
P100,000.00.
ISSUES: 1. Whether
proper.
2. Whether
attorneys

the

award

of

moral

petitioners
acts
and
fees
and
litigation

and

exemplary

omissions
expenses.

justify

damages
the

award

are
of

HELD: 1. NO. Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances
when moral damages may be recovered . It must be noted that
Article 21
states
that
the
individual
must
willfully
cause
loss
or
injury
to
another.
There
is
a
need
that
the
act
is
willful
and
hence
done
in
complete
freedom.
However,
the
marriage was
declared
void
ab
initio
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity .
The
latter is confined to the
most
serious
cases
of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative
of
an
utter
insensitivity
or
inability
to
give
meaning
and
significance
to
the
marriage.
It
is
contradictory
to
characterize
acts
as
a
product
of
psychological incapacity,
and
hence
beyond
the
control
of
the
party
because
an
innate
inability,
while
at
the
same
time
considering
the
same
set
of
acts
as
willful .
By
declaring
the
petitioner
as
psychologically
incapacitated,
the possibility of awarding
moral
damages
on
the
same
facts
was
negated.
The
award
of
moral
damages
should
be
predicated,
not
on
the
mere
act
of
entering
into
the
marriage ,
but
on
specific
evidence
that
it
was
done
deliberately
and
with
malice
by
a
party
who
had
knowledge
of
his
or
her
disability
and
yet
willfully
concealed
the
same .
No
such
evidence
appears
to
have
been
adduced
in
this
case.
2. NO.
The
acts
or
omissions
of
petitioner
which
led
the
lower
court
to
deduce
his
psychological
incapacity ,
and
his
act
of
filing
the
complaint
for
the
annulment
of
his
marriage
cannot
be
considered
as
unduly
compelling
the
private
respondent
to
litigate,
since
both
are
grounded
on
petitioners
psychological
incapacity,
which
as
explained
above
is
a
mental
incapacity
causing
an
utter
inability
to
comply
with
the
obligations
of
marriage. Hence,
neither
can
be
a
ground
for
attorneys
fees
and
litigation
expenses.
Furthermore,
since
the
award
of
moral
and
exemplary
damages
is
no
longer
justified ,
the
award
of
attorneys
fees
and
expenses
of
litigation
is
left
without
basis.

Art. 45 - VITIATED CONSENT - Ground for Annulment of Marriage


ORLANDO

VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955,

October

vs.
27,

COURT

OF

2006,

SCRA

505

APPEALS
564

FACTS: Orlando married


Lilia.
The
former filed a petition
for annulment of
their
marriage
stating
that
he
was
under
threat
and
duress
when
he
contracted
the
said
marriage
since
Lilia
was
already
pregnant .
In
her
answer with compulsory counterclaim,
she prayed
for the dismissal of the
petition
contending
that
the
petitioner
married
her
voluntarily
and
he
even
wrote
letters
to
her
to
check
on
the
progress
of
her
pregnancy.
ISSUE: Whether
the
of vitiated
consent.

subject

marriage

may

be

annulled

on

the

ground

7
HELD: NO.
To
begin
with,
it
was
only
on
November
17,
1992
or
after
a
span
of
not
less
than
four
(4)
years
and
eight
(8)
months
when
Orlando
took
a
serious step to have
the same marriage
annulled.
Unexplained,
the
prolonged
inaction
evidently
finds
basis
in
Lilias
allegation
that
this
annulment
suit
was
filed
by
Orlando
solely
in
the
hope
that
a
favorable
judgment
thereon
would
bolster
his
defense
in
the
criminal
case
for
bigamy.
Viewed
in
this
perspective,
the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit,
the recourse must have fail. The Court
is
not
convinced
that
appellants
apprehension
of
danger
to
his
person
is
so
overwhelmingly
at
that
time, being a
security guard,
it
is
reasonable
to
assume
that
appellant
knew
the
rudiments
of
self-defense.
Orlandos
excuse
that
he
could
not
have
impregnated
Lilia
because
he
did
not
have
an
erection
during
their
tryst
is
flimsy
at
best
and
an
outright
lie
at
worst.
The
complaint
is
bereft
of
any
reference
to
his
inability
to
copulate
with
Lilia.
His
counsel
also
conceded
before
the
lower
court
that
his
client
had
a
sexual
relationship
with
Lilia.

Article 120 - CONJUGAL


JOSEFA

PARTNERSHIP

FERRER

G.R. No. 166496,

vs.

PROPERTY

SPOUSES

MANUEL FERRER

November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 570

FACTS: The late Alfredo Ferrer acquired a


piece of
land . Through a loan
he
introduced
several
improvements
including
a
residential
house
and
a
2-door
apartment
building.
However,
it
was
only
during
his
marriage
with
petitioner
Josefa
that
he
was
only
able
to
pay
the
loan
using
the
couples
conjugal
funds.
From
their
conjugal
funds,
Josefa
claimed,
they
constructed
a
warehouse
on
the
lot .
Moreover,
petitioner
averred
that
respondent
Manuel
Ferrer
occupied
one
door
of
the
apartment
building,
as well
as
the warehouse ;
however,
he stopped
paying
rentals ,
alleging
that
he
had
acquired
ownership
over
the
property
by
virtue
of Deed
of
Sale
executed
by
Alfredo
in
favor of respondents ,
Manuel
and
Ismael
and
their
spouses.
It
is
petitioners
contention
that
when
her
husband
was
already
bedridden,
respondents
Ismael
and
Flora
Ferrer
made
him
sign
a
document,
purportedly
to
be
his
last
will
and
testament . The
document,
however,
was
a
Deed
of
Sale
covering
Alfredos
lot
and
the
improvement
thereon.
Learning
of
this
development,
Alfredo
filed
a
Complaint
for
Annulment
of
the
said
sale
against
respondents .
The
RTC
dismissed
the
same
and ruled
that
the
terms
and
conditions
of
the
Deed
of
Sale
are
not
contrary
to
law ,
morals,
good
customs,
and
public
policy,
and
should
be
complied
with
by
the
parties
in
good
faith,
there
being
no
compelling
reason
under
the
law
to
do
otherwise.
The
dismissal
was
affirmed
by
the
Court
of
Appeals .
Although
the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the CAs
decision ,
herein
petitioner
filed
another
case
claiming
that,
based
on
the
RTC
decision,
when
Alfredo
died
on
29
September
1999,
or
at
the
time
of the liquidation
of
the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the
cost of
the
improvements on Alfredos lot . She alleged that the cost of
the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be
reimbursed
and
paid
by
respondents
as
they
are
now
the
registered
owners of Alfredos lot.
ISSUE:
Whether
petitioner.

or

not

respondents

have

the

obligation

to

reimburse

HELD:
YES.
Article
120 provides the solution in determining
the ownership
of
the
improvements
that
are
made
on
the
separate
property
of
the
spouses
at
the
expense
of
the
partnership
or
through
the
acts
or
efforts
of
either
or
both
spouses.
Thus,
when
the
cost
of
the
improvement
and
any
resulting
increase
in
value
are
more
than
the
value
of
the
property
at
the
time
of
the
improvement ,
the
entire
property
of
one
of
the
spouses
shall
belong
to
the
conjugal
partnership,
subject
to
reimbursement
of
the
value
of
the
property
of
the
owner-spouse
at
the
time
of
the
improvement ;
otherwise,
the said
property
shall
be
retained
in
ownership
by
the
owner-spouse ,
likewise
subject
to
reimbursement
of
the
cost
of
the
improvement .
The subject
property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis
of
Article
120
of
the
Family Code.

8
PROPERTY
disposal of

RELATIONS - Consent
their conjugal property

of

the

Spouse

in

the

DAVID AND LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI E. PEREZ


G. R.

No.

141323,

June

8,

2005, 459 SCRA 475

FACTS: David
Pelayo,
thru
a
Deed
of
Absolute Sale ,
conveyed
to
Melki
Perez, two parcels of agricultural lands. The sale was witnessed by Davids
wife,
Lorenza,
who
signed
only
on
the
third
page
in
the
space
provided
for
witnesses
of
which
Perez
application
for
registration
of
the
deed
with
the
Office
of
the Register
of
Deeds was
denied.
ISSUE:
marital

Whether
consent.

the

deed

of

sale

was

null

and

void

for

lack

of

HELD: By
affixing
her
signature
to
the
Deed
of
Sale
on
the
space
provided
for
witnesses,
Lorenza
is
deemed
to
have
given
her
implied
consent
to
the
contract
of
sale.
A
wifes
consent
to
the
husbands
disposition
of
conjugal
property
does
not
always
have
to
be
explicit
or
set forth in any particular document,
as
long
it
is
shown by
acts
of
the
wife
that
such
consent
or
approval
was
indeed
given.
In
the present case, although it appears on
the face
of
the deed
of
sale
that
Lorenza
signed
only
as
an
instrumental
witness ,
evidence
shows that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property
and consented to the sale . Under Article 173, in
relation
to
Article
166
of
the
New
Civil
Code,
the lack
of marital consent to the disposition
of
conjugal
property
does
not
make
the
contract
void
ab
initio
but
merely voidable.

HOMEOWNER

AND
G.R. No.

ISSUE: Whether
other
spouse
concerned.

the
is

SAVINGS LOAN BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS


153802,

March

sale
of
conjugal
valid
in
so

11,

2005, 453 SCRA 283

property
far
as

without
the

the
consent
of
husbands
share

the
is

HELD: NO. The sale of a conjugal property requires


the
consent
of
both
the husband and wife.
The
absence
of one renders the entire sale null
and
void,
including
the
portion
of
the
conjugal
property
pertaining
to
the
husband
who
contracted
the
sale.
The
rules
of
co-ownership
do
not
apply
to
the
property
relations
of
the
husband
and
wife
even
in
a
suppletory
manner.
The
regime
of
conjugal
partnership
of
gains
is
a
special
type
of
partnership,
where
the
husband
and
wife
place
in
a
common
fund
the
proceeds ,
products,
fruits
and
income
from
their
separate
properties
and
those
acquired
by
either or both spouses through
their
efforts
or
by
chance.

JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS


G.R. No. 151967,

February

16,

2005,

451

SCRA 494

FACTS: Josefina
Castillo
married
Eduardo
G. Francisco,
who
at
that
time
was already married
to
Carmelita Carpio.
On August
31, 1984,
the
Imus
Rural
Bank,
Inc.
executed
a
deed
of
absolute
sale
in
favor
of
Josefina
Castillo
Francisco,
covering
two
parcels
of
residential
land
with
a
house
thereon.
On
the
basis of
the
said
deed
of
sale , the
Register
of
Deeds
issued
TCT
Nos.
87976
and
87977
in
the
name
of
Josefina
Castillo
Francisco
married
to
Eduardo
G.
Francisco.
On
February
15,
1985,
the
Register
of
Deeds
made
of
record Entry No.
85-18003
at
the
dorsal
portion
of
the
said
titles.
This
referred
to
an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his
marriage
to
Josefina,
the
latter
purchased
two
parcels
of
land ,
including
the house constructed thereon,
with
her
own savings, and
that
he
was
waiving
whatever
claims
he
had
over
the
property.
On
June
11,
1990,
Eduardo,
who
was
then
the
General
Manager
and
President
of
Reach
Out
Trading
International,
bought
bags
of
cement
from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay
the same.
MIWCC filed a complaint
against
him
in
the
court .
After
the
judgment
in
favor
of
MIWCC
has
become
final ,
the
court
issued
a
writ
of
execution
against
the
aforementioned
parcels
of
land.
In
the
light
of this,
Josefina
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Third
Party
Claim
over
the
two
parcels
of
land
in
which
she
claimed
that
they
were
her
paraphernal
properties
and
that
her
husband
Eduardo had no propriety

9
right or
interest
alleged that she
by Sheriff Alejo.
null
and
void.
ISSUE:
Castillo

over them
as evidenced by his Affidavit of Waiver. She
was
the sole owner of the property levied on execution
Hence,
the
levy
on
execution
of
the
property
was

Whether
the
subject
properties
and
Eduardo
Francisco.

are

conjugal

properties

of

Josefina

HELD:
NO.
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
provides :
In
cases
of
cohabitation
not
falling
under
the
preceding
Article ,
only
the
properties
acquired
by
both
of
the
parties
through
their
actual
joint
contribution
of
money,
property,
or
industry
shall
be
owned
in
common
in
proportion
to
their
respective contributions .
In
the
absence
of
proof
to
the
contrary,
their
contributions
and
corresponding shares are presumed to
be
equal.
The
same
rule
and
presumption
shall
apply
to
joint
deposits
of
money
and
evidences
of
credit .
If
one
of
the
parties
is
validly
married
to
another,
his
or
her
share
in
the
co-ownership
shall
accrue
to
the
absolute
community
or
conjugal
partnership
existing
in
such
valid
marriage.
If
the
party
who
acted
in
bad
faith
is
not
validly
married
to
another,
his
or
her
share
shall
be
forfeited
in
the
manner
provided
in
the
last
paragraph
of
the
preceding
Article.
The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply
even if both parties are
in bad faith.
Indeed, the Family Code
has
filled
the
hiatus
in
Article
144
of
the
New
Civil
Code
by
expressly
regulating
in
Article
148
the
property
relations
of
couples
living
in
a
state
of
adultery
or
concubinage.
The
petitioner failed to prove that she had
any vested right over the property
in question. Since the
subject property was acquired during the subsistence
of
marriage
of
Eduardo
and
Carmelita ,
under
normal
circumstances,
the
same
should
be
presumed
to
be
conjugal
property .
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
also
debilitates
against
the
petitioners
claim
since ,
according
to
the
said
article,
a
co-ownership
may
ensue
in
case
of
cohabitation
where,
for
instance,
one
party
has
a
pre-existing
valid
marriage
provided
that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money , property or
industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon.
We
agree
with
the
findings
of
the
appellate
court
that
the
petitioner
failed
to
adduce
preponderance
of
evidence that she contributed money , property
or
industry
in
the
acquisition
of
the
subject
property
and ,
hence,
is
not
a
co-owner
of
the
property.

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY


ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES RONNIE & GINA LAMELA
G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483
FACTS:
Eduardo
and
Elenita
were
married
before
the
enactment
of
the
Family
Code
and
thus
the
New
Civil
Code
governed
their
marital
relations.
They
were
separated-in-fact
because
Elenita
went
to
work
in
California,
USA,
while
Eduardo
stayed
in
Bacolod
City .
On
January
20,
1985,
while
Eduardo
was
driving
the
private
jeep
registered
in
the
name
of
Elenita, hit
Ronnie.
As
a
result,
MTCC
found
Eduardo
guilty
of
reckless
imprudence
and
sentenced
him
to
pay
civil
indemnities.
The
judgment
became
final
and
executory
and
the
sheriff
levied
the
real
property
registered
to
Elenita
married
to
Eduardo.
Elenita
claimed
that
the
said
property
was
her
paraphernal
property
or
exclusive
property
and
could
not be
made
to
answer
for
the
personal
liability
of
her
husband.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
property
of Elenita.

subject

property

is

HELD: NO.
All
property
of
the
marriage
is
the
conjugal
partnership,
unless
it
can
pertains
exclusively to
the
husband
or
to
the
name
of
the
husband
or
the
wife
this
presumption.
The separation-in-fact
between
without
judicial
approval
shall
not
affect
The
lot
retains
its
conjugal nature.

the

paraphernal/exclusive

presumed
to
belong
to
be
proved
that
it
the
wife.
Registration
in
alone
does
not
destroy
the
husband
and
wife
the
conjugal
partnership .

Moreover,
the
presumption
of
conjugal
partnership
applies
even
when
the
manner
in
which
the
property
was
acquired
does
not
appear.
The
use
of
the
conjugal
funds
is
not
an
essential
requirement
for
the
presumption
to
arise .
The
presumption
that
the
property
is
conjugal
property
may
be
rebutted
only
by
strong, clear,
categorical, and
convincing evidence -there
must
be
strict
proof
of

10
the
of

exclusive
ownership
proof
rests
upon

NULL

AND

of
the

one
party

VOID

of
the
asserting

OR

spouses,
it.

INEXISTENT

SALLY GO - BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN

and

the

burden

MARRIAGE

BANGAYAN,

JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 702


FACTS:
Benjamin
married
Azucena
and
they
had
three
(3)
children.
When
Azucena
left
for
USA,
Benjamin
had
romantic
relationship
with
Sally
where they
lived
as
husband
and
wife .
In
order
to
appease
her
father,
Sally
asked
Benjamin
to
sign
purported
marriage
contract
without
marriage
license
knowing
well
that
of
Benjamins
marital
status.
Their
cohabitation
produced
two
(2)
children
and
Benjamin
acquired
several
properties.
As
the
relationship
Canada bringing their two
against
Benjamin
using
In
retaliation,
Benjamin
against
Sally.
ISSUES:

(1)
(2)

HELD:
there
was
initio

What
Sally?

is

of
(2)
the
filed

the

Benjamin
and
Sally
children.
She
then
simulated
marriage
an
annulment
of
nature

of

What
is
the
property
Benjamin and
Sally?

the

ended ,
Sally
left
for
filed
a
bigamy case
contract
as
evidence .
non-existent
marriage

marriage

relations

(1) The
marriage
of
the
parties
is
was
no
marriage
license,
therefore,
not
committed
and
the
marriage
was
and
inexistent.

of

Benjamin

governing

the

and

marriage

not
bigamous
because
the
crime
of
bigamy
null
and
void
ab

(2) Since
Benjamin
and
Sally
cohabitated
without
the
benefit
of
marriage
while
the
first
marriage
is
still existing ,
their
property
relation
is
governed
by
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
where
only
the
properties
acquired
by
both
of
the
parties
through
their
actual
contribution of
money,
property or
industry
shall
be
owned
by
them
in
common
in
proportion to their
respective contribution . Since
there is
no proof of
Sallys
contributions
to
their
cohabitation ,
there
can
be
no
co-ownership
under
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code.

PROPERTY OWNED IN COMMON TO BE DIVIDED


UNDER THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014,
FACTS: In
the
able to acquire

course
of
parcel
of

Eventually,
their
psychological
incapacity.

marriage

their
marriage ,
land.
was

Since
there
was
no
more
over
the
property
over
the
partition, but
the
latter
refused.
ISSUE:

Whether

HELD:
YES.
psychological

the

Leonardo
incapacity

action

for

declared

reason
property ,

partition

is

738 SCRA

510

Leonardo

and

void

on

Marrieta
the

to
maintain
their
Leonardo
asked

ground

were
of

co-ownership
Marietta
for

proper.

and
Marrietas
marriage
had been
declared
under Article 36
of
the
Family Code.

void

for

During their
marriage, however, the
conjugal partnership regime governed
their
property
relations.
Although
Article 129
provides
for
the
procedure
in
case
of
dissolution
of
the
conjugal
partnership
regime ,
however,
Article
147
specifically
covers
the
effects
of
void
marriages
on the
spouses property relations.
This
particular
kind
of
co-ownership under
Article
147
a
man
and
a
woman,
suffering
no
illegal
impediment
to
other,
live
exclusively
with
each
other
as
husband
and
the
benefit
of
marriage or
under
a
void
marriage.

applied when
marry
each
wife
without

11
Here,
the
former
spouses
both
agreed
that
they
acquired
the
subject
property
during
the
subsistence
of
their
marriage .
Thus,
it
shall
be
presumed
to
have
obtained
by
their
joint
effort ,
work
or
industry and shall
be jointly owned
by
them
in
equal shares.
Therefore, the
subject
property
remains
to
be
owned
in
common
Leonardo
and
Marietta,
which
should
be
divided
in
accordance
with
rules on
co-ownership.

by
the

PATERNITY AND FILIATIONS


GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA & MA. TERESA ALMONTE
G.R.

No.

123450,

August

31,

2005,

468

SCRA

438

FACTS: Gerardo
and
Ma.
Theresa
were
married
on
December
29, 1989 .
Almost
a
year
later,
Ma.
Theresa
gave
birth
to
Jose
Gerardo .
Gerardo
and Ma. Theresas
relationship
turned
out
to
be
short-lived , however. On
December
19,
1991, Gerardo
filed
a
petition
to
have
his
marriage
to
Ma. Theresa
annulled
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting
when
she
married
Gerardo
and
annulled
her
marriage
to
the
latter
for
being
bigamous .
It
declared
Jose
Gerardo
to
be
an
illegitimate
child
as
a
result.
The
custody
of
the
child
was
awarded
to
Ma.
Theresa
while
Gerardo was
granted
visitation
rights.
ISSUE: Can a child born during
as an illegitimate
child
on
the

a marriage
basis
of

subsequently annulled be
his mothers statements?

declared

HELD:
NO. The
status
and
filiation
of
a
child
cannot
be
compromised .
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear .
A
child
who
is
conceived
or
born
during
the
marriage
of his parents
is
legitimate .
As
a
guaranty
in
favor
of
the
child
and
to
protect
his
status
of
legitimacy ,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167.
The child shall be
mother
may
have declared against
sentenced as an adulteress.

considered
legitimate although the
his legitimacy or may have been

The import of Ma. Teresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate
son
with
Mario
but
her
illegitimate
son
with
Gerardo .
This
declaration
an
avowal
by
the
mother
that
her
child
is
illegitimate
is
the
very
declaration
that
is
proscribed
by
Article
167
of
the
Family
Code.
Gerardo
invokes
Article
166 (1) (b)
of
the
Family
Code.
He
cannot.
He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo .
Only
Ma. Theresas husband, Mario, or
in
a
proper
case , his heirs,
who can
contest
the
legitimacy
of
the
child
Jose
Gerardo
born
to
his
wife .
Impugning
the
legitimacy
of
a
child
is
a
strictly personal right of the
husband
or,
in
exceptional
cases,
his
heirs.
Since
the
marriage
of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was
void
from
the
very
beginning ,
he
never
became
her
husband
and
thus
never
acquired
any
right
to
impugn
the
legitimacy
of
her child.
The
presumption
of
legitimacy
proceeds
from
the
sexual
union
in
marriage,
particularly
during
the
period
of
conception . To
overthrow
this
presumption on the basis of Article 168 (1) (b)
of
the
Family
Code, it
must
be
shown
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
there
was
no
access
that
could
have
enabled
the
husband
to
father
the
child . Sexual
intercourse
is
to
be presumed where personal
access
is
not
disproved ,
unless
such
presumption
is
rebutted
by
evidence
to
the
contrary .
The
presumption
is
quasi-conclusive
and
may
be
refuted
only
by
the
evidence
of
physical
impossibility
of
coitus
between
husband
and
wife
within
the
first
120
days
of
the
300
days
which
immediately
preceded
the
birth
of
the
child.

BELEN

SAGAD

ANGELES

vs.

ALELI

ANGELES

MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363


ISSUE:
Is
a
child
presumed
legitimate in
the
absence
of
proof of a lawful marriage between her parents?

any

concrete

HELD:
NO.
A
legitimate
child
is
a
product
of,
and
therefore,
implies
a
valid
and
lawful
marriage .
Remove
the
element
of
lawful
union
and
there
is
strictly
no
legitimate filiation
between
parents
and
child .
Article
164
of
the
Family
Code
cannot
be
more
empathic
on
the
matter:
Children
conceived
or
born
during
the
marriage
of
the
parents
are
legitimate,

12
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R.
ISSUE:
Whether
spouses
pending
is
valid.

No. 155409,

the
the

June

8,

2007,

524

SCRA

166

partial
voluntary
separation
of
property
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of

by
the
marriage

HELD: YES.
Under
Article
143
of
the
Family
Code ,
separation
of
property may
be
effected
voluntarily
or
for
sufficient
cause,
subject
to
judicial
approval.
The
questioned
Compromise
Agreement
which
was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed by law .
This conclusion holds true even if
the proceedings for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
was
still
pending.
Finally, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty
of
civil
interdiction.
Article
43
of
the
RPC
enumerates
the
accessory
penalties of
prision correccional
and civil
interdiction
is
not
one
of
them
and
does
not
deprive
the
person
of
the
rights
to
manage
her
property
and
to
dispose
of
such
property inter vivos.

PARENTAL

CONSENT
JOCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005,

FACTS: During
the
pendency
of
of
marriage
of
the
spouses,
that
the
custody
of
their
transferred
to
him.
He alleged
trial
court
awarded
custody
by
the
appellate
court.
ISSUE: Whether
lesbianism
per
custody
of
the
child
below

an
the
child
that
to

461

SCRA

450

action
for
declaration
of
nullity
husband,
Crisanto
Gualberto,
moved
below
age
of
seven
be
his
wife
was
a
lesbian .
The
the
mother ,
but
was
reversed

se
is
a
seven
years

sufficient
ground
old
from
the

to
remove
mother.

HELD: NO.
It
is
not
enough
that
the
woman
is
a
lesbian .
He
must
also
demonstrate
the
she
carried
on
her
purported
relationship
with
a
person
of
the
same
sex
in
the
presence
of
their
son
or
under
circumstances
not
conducive
to
the
childs
proper
moral
development.
Sexual preference
or
moral
laxity
alone
does
not
prove
parental
neglect
or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute
or
has
been
unfaithful
to
her
husband
would
render
her
unfit
to
have
custody
of
her
minor child.
To deprive the wife of custody, the
husband
must
clearly
establish
that
her
moral
lapses
have
an
adverse
effect
on
the
welfare
of
the
child
or
have
distracted
the
offending
spouse
from
exercising
proper
parental
care.
Article
213
of
the
Family
Code
takes
its
bearing
from
Article
363
of
the
Civil
Code
which
prohibits
in
no
uncertain
terms
the
separation
of
a
mother
and
her
child
below
seven
years ,
unless a
separation
is
grounded
upon
compelling
reasons
as
determined
by
a
court.

CONSENT TO

ADOPTION
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006,

ISSUE:
Can
minors
biological mother?

be

adopted

without

493
the

SCRA
written

415
consent

of

their

HELD: NO.
The
general
requirement
of
consent
and
notice
to
the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from
unwarranted
interference
by
interlopers,
and
to
insure
the
opportunity
to
safeguard the best interests of
the
child in the manner of
the proposed
adoption.
Clearly,
the
written
consent
of
the
biological
parents
is
indispensable
for
the
validity
of
a
decree
of adoption.

FAMILY HOME
Article 153

13
JOSE HONRADO vs. COURT
G.R. No. 166333,

November

25,

OF

2005,

476

APPEALS
SCRA

280

FACTS:
The
Family
Home
of
the
petitioner
therein
was
levied
upon
to
answer
for
his
judgment
debt ,
and
the
sale
of
the
said
property
was
set.
Petitioner
was
served
with
a
copy
of
the
notice
of
sale
which
he
opposed.
Petitioner,
however,
allowed
the
sale
at
the
public
auction
to
proceed
and
the
Sheriff
to
execute
a
certificate
of
sale
over
the
property
in
favor
of
the
private
respondent
therein .
The
petitioner
remained
silent
and
failed
to
seek
relief
from
the
Sheriff
or
the
Court
until
one
year
from
the
date
of
the
auction
sale
when
he
filed
his
motion
to
declare
the
property
exempt
from
execution. But
even
in
the
said
motion , petitioner failed did not present
evidence that
the
property
was
a
family
home.
ISSUE:
Whether
execution.

or

not

family

home

may

not

be

exempt

for

HELD: YES. While


it
is
true
that
the
family
home
is
constituted
on
a
house
and
lot
from
the
time
it
is
occupied
as
a
family
residence
and
is
exempt
from execution
or
forced
sale
under
Article
153
of
the
Family
Code,
such
claim
for
exemption
should
be
set
up
and
proved
to
the
Sheriff
before
the
sale
of
the
property
at
public
auction.
Failure
to
do
so
would
estop
the
party
from
later
claiming
the
exemption.

PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G.


G.R. No. 170829, November
ISSUE: Whether the partition of
the co-owners refuse to accede
minor beneficiary still resides in

the
to
the

20,

2006,

DARIO

III

507 SCRA 438

family home is proper


such
partition on
the
said home.

where
ground

one
that

of
a

HELD: NO.
The
family
home
may
be
preserved
for
a
minimum
of
10
years following
the
death
of
the spouses
or
the unmarried family head
who
constituted
the
family
home,
or
of
the
spouse
who
consented
to
the
constitution
of
his
or
her separate property
as
family
home .
After
10
years
and
a
minor
beneficiary
still
lives
therein ,
the
family
home
shall
be
preserved
only
until
the
minor
beneficiary
reaches
the
age
of
majority .
The
intention
of
the
law
is
to
safeguard
and
protect
the
interests
of
the
minor
beneficiary
until
reaches
legal
age
and
would
now
be
capable
of
supporting
himself .
However,
three
(3) requisites must
concur before
a
minor
beneficiary
is
entitled
to
the
benefits
of
Art.
159 : (1)
the relationship
enumerated in
Art. 154 of
the Family Code; (2) they live in
the
family home ; and (3)
they are dependent for legal
support
upon
the
head of the family.

ALBINO

JOSEF

vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 57


FACTS: Albino
was
held
liable
by
the
trial
court
to
pay
to
Otelio
the
sum
of
P400,000
representing
the
shoe
materials
he
bought
on
credit .
Otelio
moved
for
the
issuance
of
writ
of
execution
and
to
satisfy
the
judgment
award,
Albinos
house
and
lot
was
attached ,
auctioned
and
awarded to Otelio as the highest bidder. Albino protested
and claimed that
he
had
no
other
property
to
answer
for
the
judgment
credit
and
the
house
and
lot
in
which
he
was
residing
was
his
family
home
thus
exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
judgment
or
attachment and sale on public auction
judgment award.

judicial
of
the

order
family

is
home

legal
for
to satisfy

the
the

HELD: NO. The


judgment
or
judicial
order
to
attach
and
sell
on
public
auction
of
the
family
home
to
satisfy
the
judgment
award
is
null
and
void and it may be said to be a lawless thing , which can be treated
as
an
outlaw
and
slain
at
sight
or
ignored
wherever
and
whenever
it
exhibits its head.
The family home is a real right which is gratuitous , inalienable and
free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is
situated,
which confers
upon a particular family the right to
enjoy
such
properties,
which
must
remain
with
the
person
constituting
it
and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases under Article 155 of the Family Code.

14
SIMEON

CABANG

vs.

MR. &

MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY

G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172


FACTS: Simeon
had
established
his
family
home
over
the
property
of
registered
owner
Felix
Odong
and
he
had
been
in
continuous ,
open,
peaceful
and
adverse
possession
of
the
same
parcel
of
land
since
1956
up
to
present .
Mr. &
Mrs.
Guillermo
Basay
bought
the
subject
property
from
the
heirs
of
Felix
Odong
and
upon
discovery
that
Simeon
was
actually
occupying
the
lot,
they
filed
a
complaint
for
recovery
of
property.
ISSUE:
Whether
constituted family

the
property
home.

subject

of

the

controversy

is

duly

HELD: NO.
Under
Article
153
of
the
Family
Code , a family
home
is
deemed
constituted
on
a
house
and
a
lot
from
the
time
it
is
occupied
as
a
family
residence . It
is
likewise
a
given fact
that
the
family
home
must
be
constructed
on
property
owned
by
the
persons
constituting
it.
Since
the
property
on
which
the
alleged
family home
stands is owned by the Odongs,
their
continued
stay
on
the
subject
land
is
by
mere
tolerance
of
the late Felix Odong.

SUPPORT

PENDENTE

LITE

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 1
FACTS;
Belen
and
Federico
were
married.
But
the
same
was
later
annulled
because
it
was
solemnized
without
the
required
consent
per
Article
85
of
the
New
Civil
Code.
Seven
(7)
months
after
said
annulment,
petitioner
gave
birth
to
twin
daughters
which
she
later
raised
in
the
U.S.
with
the
help
of
her
second
husband . A petition
for
declaration
of
legitimacy
and
support,
with
application
for
support
pendente
lite
was
filed
by
petitioner
against
Federico
since
they
were
no longer capable
of
paying
the
college
education
of
the
twins.
Because
the
parents
are
no
longer
capable
of
providing
support ,
petitioner
alleges
that
the
twins
grandfather
should
be
ordered
to
provide
the
support.
On the other hand,
respondent
Francisco avers
that
the
order
of
liability
for
support
under
Art.
199
is
not
concurrent
such
that
the
obligation
must
be
borne
by
those
related
to
the
recipient
and
in
this
case petitioner and
her
second
husband . He
also
alleges
that
even
if
he
is
responsible
for
said
support ,
he
could
not
be
made
to
answer
beyond
what
petitioner
and
the father
could
afford.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
grandfather
in default

obligation
to
of
the
financial

give
support
devolves
on
the
capacity
of
twin daughters
parents.

HELD; YES.
Respondent
Francisco
is
liable
for
half
of
the amount
of
school
expenses
incurred
by
twin
daughters
as
support
pendente
lite.
The
petitioner
was able to establish , by
prima
facie
proof,
the
filiation
of
her
twin
daughters
to
private
respondents
and
the
twins
entitlement
to
support
pendente
lite
thus
the
next
question
is
who
should
be
made
liable
for
said
award.
Anent
respondents
Francisco
and
Federicos
claim
that
they have
the
option
under
the
law
as
to
how
they
could
perform
their
obligation
to
support
the
twins. Art. 204
provides that the person obliged to give
support
shall
have
the
option
to
fulfill
the
obligation
either
by
paying
the
allowance
fixed,
or
by
receiving
and
maintaining
in
the
family
dwelling
the
person
who
has
a
right
to
receive
support .
The
latter
alternative
cannot
be
availed
of
in
case
there
is
a
moral
or
legal
obstacle
thereto. Under
the
said
provision , Francisco
could
not
avail
for
himself
of
the second
option.

Articles 175 & 176 - PROOF

OF

FILIATION

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL GARCIA


G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648

FACTS:
without

Jenie
the

and
Dominique
were
benefit
of
marriage

living
together
as
and
resided
with

husband
and
wife
Dominiques
parents .

15
Thereafter,
Dominique
died.
After
almost
two
month, Jenie
gave
birth
to
Christian.
Jenie applied
for
the registration of the childs birth using the
surname of Dominique in
support of which she submitted affidavit to use
the
surname
of
the
father and
affidavit
of
acknowledgement
executed
by
Dominiques
father.
Attached
to
the
affidavit
is
a
document
entitled
Autobiography
which
was
handwritten
by
Dominique.
The
Civil
Registrar
denied
Jenies
application
because the child was born
out
of
wedlock
and
the
father
unfortunately
died
prior
to
his
birth
and
has
no
more
capacity
to
acknowledge
the
paternity
of
the
child.
ISSUE:
father

Whether
can be

the
unsigned
considered
as

handwritten
recognition
of

statement
paternity.

by

the

deceased

HELD: YES. A
father
who
acknowledges
paternity
of
a
child
through a
written
instrument
must
affix
his
signature .
It
is
clearly
implied
in
Article
176
of
the
Family Code .
However,
special
circumstances
exist
to
hold that the unsigned Autobiography of Dominique substantially satisfies the
requirement
of
law.
First,
Dominique
died
about
two
months
prior to
the
childs
birth.
Second,
the
relevant
matters
in
the
Autobiography ,
unquestionably
handwritten
by
Dominique.
Third,
Jenies
testimony
is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father . These
circumstances
indicating
Dominiques
paternity
of
the
child
give
life
to
his
statements in
his
Autobiography.

3. PROPERTY
FEL ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS
G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 186
ISSUE:

Whether

power

barges

are

considered

personal

properties.

HELD:
NO.
Power
barges
are
real
property
and
are
thus
subject
to
real
property
tax.
Article
415 (9) of
the
New
Civil
Code
provides
that
docks
and
structures
which,
though
floating,
are
intended
by
their
nature
and
object
to
remain at
a
fixed
place on a
river ,
lake,
or
coast
are
considered
immovable
property.
Thus,
power
barges
are
categorized
as
immovable
property
by
destination,
being
in
the
nature
of
machinery
and
other
implements
intended
by
the
owner
for
an
industry
or
work which
may
be
carried
on
in
a
building
or
on
a
piece
of
land
and
which
tend
directly
to
meet
the
needs
of
said
industry
or
work.

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR


G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, 576 SCRA 108
FACTS: Luis
was
charged
of
the
crime
of
theft
by
stealing
and
using
the
international
long
distance
calls
belonging
to
PLDT
by
conducting
International
Simple
Resale
(ISR)
which
is
a
method
of
routing
and
completing
international
long
distance
calls
using
lines ,
cables,
antennae,
and/or
airwave
frequency
which
connect
directly
to
the
local
or
domestic
exchange
facilities
of
the
country
where
the
call
is
destined.
Luis
claimed
that
international
long
distance
calls
and
the
business
of
the
providing
telecommunications
or
telephone
services
are
not
personal
properties
under
Article
308
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
business
of
providing
telecommunications
telephone
services
are
personal
property
under
Article
308
Revised
Penal Code.

and
of

the
the

HELD: YES.
The
only
requirement
for
a
personal
property
to
be
the
object
of theft
under
the
penal
code
is
that
it
can
be
capable
of
appropriation.
It
need
not
be
capable
of
asportation
which
is
defined
as
carrying
away.
Jurisprudence
is
settled
that
to
take
under
the
theft
provision
of
the
penal
code
does
not
require
asportation
or
carrying
away.
Appropriation
of
forces
of
nature
which
are
brought
under
control
by
science
such
as
electrical
energy
can
be
achieved
by
tampering
with
any
apparatus
used
for
generating
or
measuring
such
forces
of
nature.
Luis
was
charged
with
engaging
in
International
Simple
Resale
(ISR)
or
the
unauthorized
routing
and
completing
of
international
long
distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or
air
wave
frequency
and
connecting
these
calls
directly
to
the
local
or
domestic
exchange
facilities
of
the
country
where
destined.

4. CO-OWNERSHIP

16
Article 487
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
454 SCRA 42, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005
* * * It
ejectment.
- - this
co-owners to

was

held

that

is an unqualified
evict
possessors

anyone

of

479

ADLAWAN

SCRA

275,

co-owners

and categorical
or
lessees.

When
the
action
is
brought
by
of
all, a favorable
decision
will
benefit
decision
cannot
prejudice
their
rights.

ARNELITO

the

vs.

one
the

authority

of

of
them
co-owners ,

EMETERIO

G. R. No. 161916,

may

sue

anyone
for
but

the
an

of

for
the

benefit
adverse

ADLAWAN

January

20,

2006

FACTS: Arnelito
Adlawan
was
acknowledged
illegitimate
son
of
Adlawan
who
died
without
an
issue
and
survived
by
Graciana.
Claiming
to
be
the
sole
heir
of
Dominador,
executed
an
affidavit
adjudicating
to
himself
Lot
7226
and
built
thereon. Arnelito filed
an
unlawful
detainer
suit
to
eject
from
the
property
in
his
own
name
and
as
the
sole
the
property.

Dominador
his
wife
petitioner
the house
respondents
owner
of

ISSUE:
Whether
ejectment.

case

petitioner

can

validly

maintain

the

instant

HELD:
NO.
The
late
Dominador
Adlawan
was
survived
not
only
petitioner
but
also
by
the
legal
wife
of the
decedent ,
Graciana,
died
10
years
after
the
demise
of
Dominador
on
May
28, 1987.
- - - By intestate succession, Graciana
7226
under
Article
998
of
the

and petitioner became


New
Civil
Code.

- - - the death of Graciana on May


absolute owner of Lot 7226 because
relatives
by
consanguinity
and
not
no
blood
relations.

6, 1997, did
the
share of
to
petitioner

- - - Article
487
provides
action in
ejectment.

one

that

any

of

the

co-owners

for
by
who

of

Lot

not make petitioner


Graciana passed to
with
whom
she

the
her
had

co-owners

may

bring

an

- - - this
article
covers
all
kinds
of
actions
for
the
recovery
of
possession: forcible
entry
and
unlawful
detainer
(accion
interdictal),
recovery
of possession
(accion publiciana)
and
recovery
of
ownership
(accion
de
reivindicacion).
A
co-owner
may
bring
such
an
action
without
the
necessity
joining
all
the
other
co-owners
as
co-plaintiffs
because
the
suit
presumed
to have been
filed
to
benefit
his
co-owners.
- - - Where
the
suit
for
the
to
be
the
sole
owner
and
property, the action should be
157767,

September

9,

of
if

benefit
of
the
plaintiff
alone
who
claims
entitled
to
the
possession
of
the
litigated
dismissed. (Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No.

2004).

- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer
in his name alone
and
for
his
own
benefit
to
the
exclusion
of
the
heirs
of
Graciana as
he
even
executed
an
affidavit
of
self-adjudication
over
the
disputed
property.
- - - It
is
clear
therefore
that
petitioner cannot
validly
maintain
the
instant
action
considering
that
he
does
not
recognize
the
co-ownership
that
necessarily
flows
from his
theory
of
succession
to
the
property
of
his
late
father
Dominador.

PUBLIC

DOMINION
DOMALSIN vs. SPOUSES VALENCIANO
G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114

Q:

What

is

the

property

of

public

dominion?

17
A: Property
of
public
Code as follows:

dominion

is

defined

by

(1) Those
intended
for
public
use
such
torrents,
ports and bridges
constructed by
roadsteads and other
of
similar character;

Article

as
the

420

roads,
state,

of

canals,
banks,

the

Civil

rivers,
shores,

(2) Those
which
belong
to
the
State ,
without
being
for
public
use,
and
are
intended
for
some
public
service
or
for
the
development
of
the
national wealth.
Q:

Who

owns

property

of

public

dominion?

A:
Properties
of
public
dominion
are
owned
by
the
general
public .
Public use
is
use
that
is
not confined
to
privileged
individuals ,
but
open
to
the
indefinite
public . As the land in controversy is a portion
of
Kennon
Road
which
is
for
the
use
of
the
people ,
there
can
be
no dispute that same is part of public domain . This being the case, the
parties
cannot
appropriate
the
land
for
themselves .
Thus,
they
cannot
claim
any
right
of
possession
over
it.

5.
IN

SUCCESSION
THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF DELGADO &
RUSTIA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733, January

ISSUE: Are
right
of

grandnephews
representation

27,

2006,

and
grandnieces
in
the
collateral

480

SCRA

entitled
line?

334

to

inherit

by

the

HELD: NO. Under


Article
972
of
the
new
Civil
Code ,
the
right
of
representation
in
the
collateral
line
takes
place
only
in
favor
of
the
children
of
brothers
and
sisters
(nephews
and
nieces),
Consequently,
it
cannot
be
exercised
by
grandnephews
and
grandnieces .
Therefore,
the
only
collateral
relatives
of
Josefa
Delgado
who
are
entitled to
partake
of
her
intestate
estate
are
her
brothers
and
nieces ,
or
their
children
who
were
still
alive
at
the
time
of
her
death
on
September
8,
1972.
They
have
a
vested right
to
participate
in
the
inheritance.

FELIX

AZUELA

vs.

COURT

G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006,

OF
487

APPEALS
SCRA

119

A
will
whose
attestation
clause
does
not
contain
the
number
of
pages
on
which
the
will
is
written
is
fatally
defective.
A
will
whose
attestation
clause
is
not
signed
by
the
instrumental
witnesses
is
fatally
defective.
The
attestation
clause
is
a
memorandum
of
the
facts
attending
the
execution
of
the
will
required
by
law
to
be
made
by
the
attesting
witnesses
and
it
must
necessarily
bear
the
signatures.
An
unsigned
attestation
clause
cannot
be
considered
as
an
act
of
the
witnesses,
since
the
omission
of
their
signatures
at
the
bottom
thereof
negatives
their
participation.
And perhaps most importantly, a will,
which
does
not
contain
an
acknowledgment,
but
a
mere
jurat,
is
fatally
defective. A jurat
is
that
part
of
an
affidavit
where
the
notary
certifies
that
before
him/her ;
the
document
was
subscribed
and
sworn
to
by
the
executor .
Any
one
of
these
defects
is
sufficient
to
deny
probate .
A
notarial
will
with
all
three
defects
is
just
aching
by
judicial
rejection.
There
is
a
distinct
and
consequential
reason
the
Civil
Code
provides
a
comprehensive
catalog
of
imperatives
for
the
proper
execution
of
notarial
will.

CELESTINO
G.R.

No.

BALUS

168970,

vs.

January

SATURNINO

15,

2010, 610

BALUS
SCRA

178

FACTS: Rufo,
the
father
of
Celestino
and
Saturnino,
mortgaged
a
parcel
of
land
he
owns
as
a
security
for
a
loan
with
the
Rural
Bank .
For
his
failure
to
pay
his
loan ,
the
mortgaged
property
was
foreclosed
and
was
subsequently
sold
to
the
Bank
as
the
sole
bidder.
The
property
was
not
redeemed
within
the
period
allowed
by
law
and
a
new
title
was
issued
in
the
name
of
the
bank.
Later,
Celestino
where
they intended
with
the
Bank.

Saturnino
thereafter,
he
Celestino.

and
Saturnino
to
redeem
the

bought
filed
a

the
subject
complaint
for

executed
property

an
Extrajudicial
Settlement
mortgaged
by
their
father

property
recovery

from
of

the
bank
and
possession
against

18

ISSUE:
Whether
there
ever
a
Saturnino
over
the
subject
property

co-ownership
between
at
any
given
point

Celestino
of
time.

and

HELD: NONE. At
the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement ,
the
subject
property
formed
part
of
the
estate
of
their
deceased
father.
The
rights
to
a
persons
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
moment
of
his
death.
In
addition,
the
inheritance
of
a
person
consists
of
the
property
and
transmissible
rights
and
obligations
existing
at
the
time
of
his
death ,
as
well
as
those
which
have
accrued
thereto
since
the
opening
of
the
succession.
Since
Rufo
lost
ownership
of
the
subject
property
during
his
lifetime ,
it
only
follows
that
at
the
time
of
his
death,
the
disputed
parcel
of
land
no
longer
formed
part
of
his
estate.

RESERVA
MARIA

TRONCAL

MENDOZA vs. JULIA P. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013,

694 SCRA

74

FACTS:
Placido
and
Dominga
had
four
(4)
children:
Antonio,
Exequiel
married
to
Leonor,
Apolonio
and
Valentin.
Three
(3)
parcels
of
land
located
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan were registered
in
the
name
of
Exequiel
married
to
Leonor
in
which
Exequiel
was
in
possession
of
the
properties.
After
Exequiels
death,
the
properties
passed
to
his
spouse
Leonor
and
only
daughter
Gregoria.
After
Leonors
death,
her
share
went
to
Gregoria.
In
1992,
Gregoria
died
intestate
and
without
issue
and
these
properties
were adjudicated
to
Julia ,
Leonors
sister,
as
the
sole
surviving
heirs
of
Leonor
and
Gregoria.
On
the
other
hand, the
heirs
of Antonio: Apolonio
and
Valentin
claimed
that
these
properties
should
be
reserved
by
Julia
in
their
behalf
and
must
now
revert
back
to
them
applying
Article
891
of
the
New
Civil
Code
on
reserva
troncal.
ISSUES:

(1)

Who

(2)

Whether
qualifies

(3)

Whether
the
as reservees

HELD: (1) As
persons
are

are

the

person

Julia,
sister
as
reservoir

contemplated in Article
involved
in
reserva

descendant

of
or

or

in

reserve

troncal?

Leonor
and
reservista.

heirs
of
Antonio,
or
reservatarios.

a) the
ascendant
or
property
was
received
gratuitous
title;
b)
the
property;

involved

891 of
troncal:

namely:
the

New

brother
by
the

or
sister
descendant

prepositus

(propositus)

aunt
Apolonio
Civil

from
by
who

of

Gregoria,

and

Valentin

Code, the

following

whom
lucrative
received

the
or
the

c)
the
reservor (reservista), the
other
ascendant
who
obtained
the
property
from
the
prepositus
by
operation
of
law ;
and
d) the
reservee (reservatario)
who
is
within the
third
degree
from
the
prepositus
and
who
belongs
to
the
line
from
which
the
property
came
and
for
whom
the
property
should
be
reserved
by the reservor.
The
ownership
of
the
properties
should
be
reckoned
only
from
Exequiel
as
he
was
the
ascendant
from
where
the
first
transmission
occurred,
or
from
whom
Gregoria
inherited
the
properties
in
dispute
as
the
descendant
who received the properties
by
gratuitous
title.
(2) YES. In
determining
the
collateral
line
of
relationship ,
ascent
is
made
to
the
common
ancestor
and
then
descent
to
the
relative
from
whom
the
computation
is
made.
In
the
case
of
Julias
collateral
relationship
with
Gregoria,
ascent
is
to
be
made
from
Gregoria
to
her
mother
Leonor
(one line/degree),
then
to
the
common
ancestor,
that
is
Julia
and
Leonors
parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,

her
aunt
within
the

(third
third

line/degree).
Thus,
Julia
is
Gregorias
degree
and
not
her
ascendant.

collateral

relative

19
(3) NO. They
cannot
be
not
relatives
within
the
properties
came.
They
are
fourth
degree
relatives
and

considered
reservee/reservatarios
as
they
third
degree
of
Gregoria
from
whom
first
cousins
of
the
propositus
who
are
not
reservees/reservatarios.

are
the
are

COLLATION - Article 1061


CORAZON M. GREGORIO vs. ATTY.
G.R. No. 185226,

February

11,

JOSE

2010,

612

R. MADARANG
SCRA 340

FACTS: During
the
lifetime
of
Casimiro,
he
transferred
one
lot
by
way
of
Deed of
Donation to his
son , Vicente.
Upon
the
death of
Casimiro ,
an
inventory report of the properties of
the
decedent
was
made
before
the probate
court
excluding
the donated
lot
to
Vicente.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
donated
properties of
the
decedent.

lot

be

excluded

from

the

inventory

of

the

HELD: NO. Article


1061
of
the
New
Civil
Code
expressly
provides
that
every compulsory
heir,
who
succeeds
with
other
compulsory
heirs,
must
bring
into
the
mass
of
the
estate
any
property
or
right
which
he
may
have
received
from
the
decedent ,
during
the
lifetime
of
the
latter,
by
way
of
donation, or
any
other gratuitous title,
in order
that
it
may
be
computed
in
the
determination
of
the
legitime
of
each
heir
and
in
the
account
of
partition.
By
by
the
inventory

express
provision
of
law
decedent
to
his
son,
of
the
properties
of
the

AMELIA

P.

ARELLANO

G.R. No. 189776,

then,
the
lot
which
was
Vicente, should
be
included
decedent.

vs.

December

During
the
settlement
of
estate
Miguel
claimed
that
the
parcel
of
his
lifetime
to
Amelia
is
subject
same
as
advance
legitime.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether
are
entitled

the
to

collateral
legitime.

(2)
Whether
the
property
should be formed part
of
death.
(3)

Whether

the

(4)
Whether
among
the
heirs.

property

the
three

FRANCISCO PASCUAL

15,

FACTS: Angel
died
intestate
and single
siblings: Amelia, Francisco
and
Miguel.

2010,

638

leaving

SCRA 826

as

heirs

his

three

(3)

of
the
decedent ,
Francisco
&
land
donated
by
Angel
during
to
collation
and
considered
the

relatives
donated
his estate

donated

donated
in
the

is

estate
of
Angel
(3)
siblings
as

of
by
at

the

Angel
to
Amelia
the time of
his

subject
be
his

decedent

to

collation.

partitioned
legal
or

equally
intestate

HELD: (1) NO.


The
decedent
was
survived
by
his
siblings ,
collateral
relatives
and
therefore,
are
not
entitled
to
any
the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs.

who
are
his
legitime
which

(2) NO.
The
decedent
not
having
left
any
compulsory
heir
who
is
entitled to any legitime,
he
was at
liberty to donate all
his properties
to anyone,
even if
nothing was
left
for
his
siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to his sister Amelia
is
valid
as
is
deemed
as
donation
to a
stranger.
(3) NO. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs
and one
of
its
purposes
is
to
determine
the
legitime
and
the
free
portion .
There
being
no
compulsory
heir ,
the
donated
property
is
not
subject
to
collation.
(4) YES. The
decedents
remaining
estate
should
be
partitioned
equally
among his
heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives
pursuant
to
Articles
1003
and
1004
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
provides
that
the
collateral
relatives
shall
succeed
to
the
entire
estate
of
the
deceased . . .
and

should
the
only
they shall inherit

survivors
in equal

be
brother
shares.

and

sisters

of

the

full

blood ,

20

NULLITY OF
JUAN

MARRIAGE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION


DE

DIOS

CARLOS

vs.

FELICIDAD

SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116


FACTS: Teofilo
died
intestate
and
was
survived
by
his
compulsory
heirs ,
wife
Felicidad
and
their
son,
Teofilo II.
He
was
predeceased
by
his
parents and he had no other siblings except Juan . Upon
Teofilos
death,
all
his
property,
rights
and
obligations
to
the
extent
of
the
value
of
his
inheritance
are
transmitted
to
his
compulsory
heirs .
Later,
Juan
filed
an
action
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
against
Felicidad
in
view
of
the
absence
of
the
required
marriage
license ;
declaration
of
nullity
of
the
status
of
a
child
as
the
latter
was
neither natural
or
adopted
son
of
his
late
brother ;
and
recovery
and
reconveyance
of
the
property.
The
trial
court
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
Juan
based on summary
judgment,
however,
the
Court
of
Appeals
reversed
the
judgment.
ISSUES:
for

1) Whether
or
not
the
annulment of marriage.

2) Whether or
declaration of nullity

summary

not
the brother
of marriage.

judgment
has

the

is
legal

HELD: 1) NO. Both the rules on judgment on the


judgment
have
no
place
in
cases
of
declaration
marriage and annulment of marriage.

applicable

in

personality

an
to

action

file

the

pleadings and summary


of
absolute
nullity
of

By
issuing
said
summary
judgment ,
the
trial
court
has
divested
the
State
of
its
lawful
right
and
duty
to
intervene
in
the
case .
Both
the
Civil
Code
and
the
Family
Code
ordain
that
the
court
should
order
the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It
is
at
this
stage
when
the
public
prosecutor
sees
to
it
that
there
is
no
suppression
of
evidence and to make sure the evidence
to be presented or
laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
2) Generally, NO, because
the
rule
makes it
the
sole
right
of
the
husband
or
the
wife
to
file
a
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage, however, the compulsory heir
in order to protect his successional
right
has
the
right
to
question
the
validity
of
the
marriage
of
the
spouses in the settlement of estate proceedings filed in regular court.
The
legal
personality
of
Juan
to
bring
is contingent upon
the
final
declaration
that
adopted
or
illegitimate son
of
Teofilo.

the
nullity
Teofilo II

of
is

marriage
case
not
legitimate,

If
Teofilo II
is
proven
to
be
a
legitimate ,
illegitimate
or
legally
adopted
son
of
Teofilo,
then
Juan
has
no
legal
personality
to
ask
for
the
nullity
of
marriage
of
his
deceased
brother
and
Felicidad.
This
is
based
on
the
ground
that
he
has
no
successional
right
to
be
protected .
The
presence
of
descendant ,
illegitimate
or
even
an
adopted
child
excludes
the
collateral
relatives
from
inheriting
from
the
decedent.

6. CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

Article
15 Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal capacity
of
person
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines even though living abroad.
Article
16 the law
of

Real
properties
as
the
country
where

well
as
personal
it
is
situated.

property

is

subject

to

However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary provisions ,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration ,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property and
regardless
of
the
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found.

Article 17 - The forms and solemnities of


instruments
shall
be
governed
by
the
they
are
executed.

contracts,
laws
of

wills
the

and
other
country
in

public
which

21

Article 1039 - Capacity


of
the
decedent.

to

Domiciliary
Theory
posits
person
are governed
by
his
habitual
residence.
Nationality
nationality

is

governed

that
the
personal
the
law
of
his

Theory
postulates
that
governs
such

OBLIGATION OF
NORMA

succeed

by

the

status
domicile

that
it
is
the
status
and
rights.

law

of

and
or

law

the

nation

rights
of
the
place

of

the

a
of

persons

A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT MINOR CHILD

DEL SOCORRO vs. ERST JOHAN BRINKMAN JAN WILSEM


G.R. No. 193707,

FACTS:
Norma
25, 1990 and

and
Brinkman
thereafter
were

December 10, 2014,

744

SCRA

516

contracted
marriage
in
Holland
blessed with a son, Roderigo.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond


issued
by the appropriate
Court
of

ended by
Holland.

virtue

of

on

September

Divorce

Decree

Brinkman
made
a
promise
to
provide
monthly
support
to
their
son
in
the
amount
of
250 Guildene
which
is
equivalent
to
Php17,500.00 .
However,
since
the
arrival
of
Norma
and
her
son
in
the
Philippines ,
Brinkman
never gave his
promised support.
Not
long
thereafter,
Brinkman
Norma sent a
letter
demanding for
receive the letter.

came
to
support ,

the Philippines
and remarried .
however, Brinkman refused to

for

Norma
filed
a
complaint
against
Brinkman
for
the latters unjust refusal to
support his minor

not

According
obliged to

ISSUE:
Whether
under Philippine

violation
child.

of

RA

9262

to
Brinkman,
under
to
the
support his son,
however, he

laws
of
Netherlands ,
he
is
never proved it
in
court.

a
foreign
law.

to

HELD: YES. Under


private
a
foreign
law
applied
proving
the
foreign law.

national

is

obliged

support

international
law, the
party
to
a
dispute
or
case

his

who
has

minor

child

wants
to
have
the
burden
of

In
the
present
case,
Brinkman
hastily
concludes
national
of
the
Netherlands,
he
is
governed
by
such
matter
of
provision of
and
capacity to
support.

that
laws

being
a
on
the

While Brinkman pleaded the laws of Netherlands that parents are not obliged
to support their child after the issuance of a divorce decree , he failed to prove
the same.
In
view
Netherlands
in
govern.

of
Brinkmans
failure
to
his
favor,
the
doctrine

prove
the
national
law
of
of
processual
presumption

the
shall

Under
the
doctrine
of
processual
presumption ,
if
the
foreign
law
involved
is
not
properly
pleaded
and
proved ,
our
courts
will
presume
that
the
foreign
law
is
the
same
as
our
local
or
domestic
or
internal
law.
Thus, since
the
to
support has
not
is
presumed
to
be
obligation
of
parents
compliance therewith.

law
of
the
Netherlands
as
regards
the
obligation
properly pleaded and proved
in the
instant
case , it
the
same
with
Philippine
Law,
which
enforces
the
to
support
their
children
and
penalizing
the
non-

DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD OF


MA.

REBECCA
G.R.

MAKAPUGAY
No. 163979,

BAYOT

November

7,

vs.
2008,

FOREIGN
COURT
570

SCRA

NATIONAL
OF

APPEALS

472

FACTS: Rebecca
was born in Guam, U.S.A.
to
parents
both of
American
citizenship,
married
Vicente
in
the
Philippines.
They
begot
a
daughter
in
1982. In
1996, Rebecca initiated a
divorce proceeding before the Dominican
Republic
court
which
it
granted
ordering
the
dissolution
of
the
couples

22
marriage
and
requirements,

leaving

ISSUE:
Whether
and Vicente.

the

them
divorce

to

remarry

granted

by

after

the

completing

foreign

court

the
binds

legal
Rebecca

HELD:
YES. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca at
the time
she applied
for
and obtained her divorce from Vicente
was an American
citizen. The divorce granted by the foreign court during which Rebecca is
an American citizen is valid and
binds her
and
her
Filipino husband.
In determining whether
or
not a divorce secured
abroad would come
within
the
pale
of
the
countrys
policy
against
absolute
divorce ,
the
reckoning
point
is
the
citizenship
of
the
parties
at
the
time
a
valid
divorce
is
obtained.

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS


G.R. No.

133743,

February

6,

2007,

514

SCRA 294

FACTS: During
his
lifetime,
Felicisimo San Luis
contracted
3
marriages.
His
first
marriage
was
with
Virginia
Sulit
out
of
which
were
born
six
children. Virginia
predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five
years
later,
Felicisimo
married
Merry
Lee
Corwin, an
American
citizen
with
whom
he
had
a
son, Tobias.
However,
Merry
Lee
filed
a
Complaint
for
Divorce
before
the
court
in
the
State
of
Hawaii, U.S.A. ,
which
issued
a
Decree Granting
Absolute
Divorce
and
Awarding
Child Custody.
Felicisimo
married
respondent
Felicidad
then
surnamed
Sagalongos
in
the U.S.A.
He
had
no
children
with
respondent
but
lived with her
for
18
years
from
the
time
of
their
marriage
up
to
his
death .
Thereafter,
respondent
sought
the
dissolution
of
their
conjugal
partnership
assets
and
the
settlement
of
Felicisimos
estate.
She filed
a
petition
for
letters
of
administration .
Petitioner
Rodolfo,
one
of
the
children
of
Felicisimo
by
his
first
marriage ,
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
on
the
ground,
inter
alia,
asserting
that
paragraph
2,
Article
26
of
the
Family
Code
(FC)
cannot
be
given
retroactive
effect
to
validate
respondents
bigamous
marriage
with
Felicisimo
because
this
would impair vested
rights
in
derogation
of
Article
256
of
the
FC.
ISSUE:
Whether
a
Filipino
who
is
divorced
by
his alien
spouse
abroad
may
validly
remarry
in
the
Philippines
considering
that
Felicidads
marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized
before
the
FC took effect.
HELD:
YES.
Firstly,
in
the
case
of
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), the SC held
that after a valid divorce had been obtained by the
foreign husband, the Filipino
wife
should no longer be considered married
to alien
spouse.
Further,
she
should
not
be
required
to
perform
her
marital
duties
and
obligations.
This
principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera where the
Court
recognized
the
validity
of
a
divorce
obtained
abroad . In
the
said case,
it
was held
that the alien
spouse is
not
a
proper party
in
filing
the
adultery
suit
against
his
Filipino
wife .
The
Court
stated
that
the
severance
of
the
marital
bond
had
the
effect
of
disassociating
the
former
spouses
from
each
other,
hence
the
actuations
of
one would
not
affect
or
cast
obloquy
on
the
other.

FELICITAS

AMOR CATALAN vs.

G.R. No. 167109,

February

6,

COURT
2007,

514

FACTS:
Felicitas
married
Orlando.
Thereafter,
they
States of America
and
became
naturalized citizens
of marriage,
Felicitas
and
Orlando
divorced.
Two
Contending
subsisting
declaration
Merope.

APPEALS
607

migrated
thereof .

to the United
After 38 years

months
after
the
divorce,
Orlando
married
respondent
Merope.
that said
marriage
was
bigamous
since
Merope
had
a
prior
marriage with
Eusebio
Bristol ,
petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
of
nullity
of
marriage
with
damages
against
Orlando
and

ISSUE: Whether
or
for
the
declaration
ground
of bigamy.
HELD:
cause

OF
SCRA

not
of

petitioner
nullity
of

YES. Divorce
means
the
arising
after
marriage .

has
the
marriage

personality
to
file
a
petition
of
the
respondents
on
the

legal
dissolution
of
a
But
divorces
are
of

lawful
union
for
a
different
types .
The

23
two
basic
ones
are
(1)
absolute
divorce
or a
vinculo matirmonii
and (2)
limited
divorce
or
a
mensa
et
toro.
The
first
kind
terminates
the
marriage, while the
second
suspends it and
the leaves
the
bond in full
force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be
recognized
in our
jurisdiction, provided such
decree
is
valid
according
to
the national
law
of
the
foreigner. However, before
it
can
be
recognized
by
our
courts ,
the
party
pleading
it
must
prove
the
divorce
as
a
fact
and
demonstrate
its
conformity
to
the
foreign
law
allowing
it ,
which
must
be
proved
considering
that
courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
foreign
laws. If
this
is
done,
the SC
remanded
the
case
to
the
trial
court
for
its
proper
disposition
for
the
determination
of
whether
a
divorce
decree
was
indeed
obtained
in
accordance
with
American
law
and
will
thus,
NOT
restrict
marriage.

7. OBLIGATIONS
Civil Obligation
is
a
juridical
necessity
gives
the creditor
the
legal
right
to
the
performance
of such
obligation.
A natural obligation
is
based
on
legal
right
to
compel
performance
pays
it,
he
cannot
recover
what

to give, to
compel
by

equity
and
thereof
but
was paid.

do and not
an
action

to do. It
in
court

natural
law.
There
is no
if
the
debtor
voluntarily

Article 1182 - When


the
fulfillment
of
the
condition
depends
upon
the
will
of
the debtor,
the
conditional
obligation
shall
be
void .
If
it
depends
upon
chance
or
upon
the
will
of
a
third
person ,
the
obligation
shall
take
effect
in
conformity with
the
provisions
of
this
Code.
Article 1197 - If the obligation does
and the circumstances
it
can
be
the
courts
may
fix
the
duration
The
courts
shall
depends
upon
the
will

also
of

fix
the

not fix
inferred
thereof.

period ,
that
a

the
duration
debtor.

of

but
from
its nature
period
was
intended ,
the

period

when

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may be


the circumstances
have
been
probably
contemplated
by
the
parties .
fixed by the courts,
the period cannot be changed by them.

8.

it

under
Once

DOUBLE SALES

Article 1544 - If
the
same
vendees,
the
ownership
shall
have
first
taken
possession
movable
property.
Should
it
be
person acquiring
it
Registry
of
Property.

immovable
who
in

thing
should
have
been
sold
be
transferred
to
the
person
thereof
in
good
faith ,
if
it
property, the
good
faith

ownership shall
first
recorded

to
different
who
may
should
be

belong to
it
in

Should
there
be
no
inscription,
the
ownership
shall
pertain
to
person
who
in
good
faith
who
in
good
faith
was
first
in
possession;
in
the
absence
thereof ,
to
the
person
who
presents
oldest
title,
provided
there
is
good faith.

RURAL BANK OF

STA. BARBARA vs. MANILA

the
the
the
the
the

MISSION

G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 415


FACTS: Spouses
Soliven
sold
the
subject
property
to
Manila
Mission .
However,
it was
only
on
28
April 1994
when
title
was
transferred
in
the
name
of
Manila
Mission.
In
the
meantime,
on
15
April
1993,
Rural
Bank
of
Sta.
Barbara
filed
an
action
for
sum
of
money
before
the
RTC
against
Spouses
Soliven .
The
RTC
issued
a
writ
of
attachment
on
21
May
1993
attaching
the subject
property
which
was
still
then in
the
name
of
Spouses
Soliven.

ISSUE:
Which
subsequent
but

is
superior,
a
previous
duly
annotated
attachment?

but

unregistered

sale

or

HELD:
The
settled
rule
is
that
levy
on
attachment ,
but
duly
registered,
takes
preference
over
a
prior
unregistered
sale .
This
result
is
a
necessary
consequence
of
the
fact
that
the
property
involved
was
duly
covered
by
the
Torrrens
system
which
works
under
the

24
fundamental
validity
to

principle
that
registration
is
the
operative
the
transferor
creates
a
lien
upon
the
land.

SPOUSES
FACTS:
sale in

SABITSANA

vs.

JUANITO

F.

which

gives

MUERTEGUI

G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013, 703 SCRA 145


On September 2, 1981,
Alberto
executed
an
unnotarized
favor of Juanito over
a parcel of
unregistered land.

deed

of

On
October
17,
1991,
Alberto
sold
the
lot
to
Juanitos
family
lawyer,
Atty.
Sabitsana,
through
a
notarized
deed
of
sale
of
absolute
sale.
The
sale
was
registered
with
the
Register
of
Deeds
and
correspondingly paid
real property taxes and introduced concrete improvements.
In 1998, Juanito applied for registration of the
Land Act
with the DENR ,
however, Atty. Sabitsana
claiming that
he was the true owner of
the lot.

lot
under the Public
opposed the application

On
April
11,
2000,
Juanito
filed
an
action
for
quieting
of
against
Atty.
Sabitsana
claiming
that
the
latter
bought
the
lot
in
faith
and
was
exercising
acts
of
possession
and
ownership
over
same,
which acts
thus
constitute a cloud over his title.
ISSUES:

1) Whether

Article

1544

on

double

sales

is

in

this

case.

2) Whether
Juanito
has
a
better
right
with
unnotarized
sale
over
the
subsequent
notarized
deed
of
sale
Sabitsana.

deed of
of
Atty.

3)

Whether

consent.

4)

Whether
Juanito
is
entitled
and litigation expenses.

the

sale

is

valid

in

the

for

HELD: 1) NO. The provision of Article 1544


apply to sales
involving unregistered land.
the
the

applies

title
bad
the

absence
the
of

of

marital

award
the

of

Civil

attorneys
Code

does

fees
not

The issue of the buyers good


or
bad faith is relevant
only where
subject
of the sale is registered
land,
and the purchaser
is buying
same from the
registered
owner whose title to the land is clean.
The purchaser
protected
if he

who relies on the


is a
purchaser in

2) YES.
The sale
an
unnotarized
deed
made
via
a
notarized
years
thereafter.

clean
good

title
faith

of the registered
for
value.

owner

to
Juanito was
executed on
Septemer 2, 1981 via
of
sale,
while
the
sale
to
Atty.
Sabitsana
was
document
only
on
October
17,
1991
or
ten
(10)

Thus, Juanito who was the


first
lot,
while
the
subsequent
sale
to
because
when
it
was
made,
the
owner of
the
lot.

buyer
Atty.
seller

has
a
better
right
to
Sabitsana
is
null
and
Alberto
was
no
longer

the
void
the

The
fact
that
the
sale
to
Juanito
was
not
notarized
does
not
alter
anything,
since
the
sale
between
him
and
Alberto
remains
valid
nevertheless.
Notarization
or
the
requirement
of
a
public
document
under
the
Civil
Code
is
only
for
convenience
and
not
for
validity
or
enforceability.
3) YES.
Even
admittedly
the
lot
was
a
conjugal
property ,
the
absence
of
the
wifes
signature
and
consent
to
the
deed
did
not
render
the
sale
to
Juanito
absolutely
null
and
void ,
but
merely
voidable.
Since
Alberto
and
his wife were married prior to the effectivity of
the
Family
Code,
Article
173
of
the
Civil
Code
should
apply.
Under
the
said
provision,
the disposition of
conjugal property without the wifes
consent
is not
void but
merely voidable .
In
the absence of
a
decree
annulling
the
deed
of
sale
in
favor
of
Juanito ,
the
same
remains
valid.

to

4) YES. Atty. Sabitsanas


actual
Juanito makes him purchaser in

and
bad

prior
faith.

knowledge

of

the

first

Moreover,
as
Juanitos
family
lawyer,
Atty.
Sabitsana
was
obligation
to
safeguard
his
clients
property
and
not
jeopardize
it .
is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general
agency.

sale
under
Such

25

9.

MACEDA LAW

(Buyers Protection

on

Most

(1)

important

Sales

of

(RA

immovable

6552)
property

on

installments)

features:

After
having
paid installments for
at
is
entitled
to
a
mandatory
grace
every
year
of
installment payments
installments
without
interest.

least
period
made ,

two
of
to

years ,
the
buyer
one
month
for
pay
the
unpaid

If
the
contract
is
cancelled ,
the
seller
shall
refund
to
the
buyer the cash surrender
value
equivalent
to
fifty
percent (50%) of
the total
payments made, and after
five
years
of
installments ,
an
additional
five
percent
(5%)
every
year
but
not
to
exceed
ninety
percent
(90%)
total
payments made.

(2)

In
case
the
installments
paid
were
less
than
2
years ,
the
seller
shall give
the
buyer
period of not less than 60
days .
If
the buyer
fails to pay the installments
due
at
the
expiration
of
the
grace
period,
the
seller
may
cancel
the
contract
after
30
days
from
receipt
by
the
buyer
of
the
notice
of
cancellation
or
demand
for
rescission
by
notarial
act.

MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. FLORA SEBERON


G.R. No. 176289, April 8, 2013, 695
FACTS:
Moldex
entered
with
Metrogate
Cavite
with
Flora
19,
her

a
Contract
despite
of

to
its

SCRA 331

Sell
of
a
certain
property
lack
of
license
to
sell.

at

Flora
had
made
installment
payments
from
March
11,
1992
to
July
1996 in
the
aggregate amount of
P375,295.49 .
She
had defaulted in
succeeding payments.

Moldex
sent
notices
to
Flora
to
update
avail.
Finally,
Moldex
sent
Flora
a
Notarized
Contract to Sell.
ISSUES:

1)

Whether
sell is

2)

What

is

the
valid.
the

contract
right

to
available

sell
to

her
account
but
to
Notice
of
Cancellation

despite

the

lack

Flora

under

the

of

license

Maceda

no
of
to

Law?

HELD: 1) YES. PD 957


provides that
the lack of license to sell on the
part
of
a
subdivision
developer
does
not
result
for
the
nullification
or
invalidation of
the
contract to
sell
it
entered into
with a
buyer.
Thus,
the
contract
to
sell
entered
into
between
remains
valid
despite
the
lack
of
license
to
sell
on
latter at the time the contract was
entered into.

Flora
and
the
part

Moldex
of
the

2) Since
Moldex
had
already
sent
Flora
a
Notarized
Notice
of
Cancellation
of
Contract
to
Sell,
the
only
option
available
is
Section
3
(b)
under
Maceda
Law
or
RA
6552,
whereby
Moldex
shall
refund
to
Flora
the
cash
surrender
value
of
her
payments
on
the
property
equivalent to the 50% of the total payments made or P187,647.75.

GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC. vs. EVELYN


G.R. No. 202358,

FACTS: Angeles purchased a house and lot under


Gatchalian payable
for a period of ten years.
After
48
monthly
monthly installments with

M. ANGELES

November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 163

installment
Gatchalian.

payments ,

Angeles

Several
demands
were
made
by
Gatchalian
continually disregarded by Angeles .
Finally, Gatchalian
Notice of Notarial Rescission thru registered mail.

Contract
failed

to
to

Sell
satisfy

from
her

but
the
same
were
served Angeles with a

Consequently,
Angeles
was
furnished
by
Gatchalian
a
demand
letter
demanding her to pay the outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and
occupation of
the house
and lot to
date and to vacate the same .
She
was
informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount
that she is
entitled
to
has
already
been
deducted
with
the
reasonable
value
for
the
use of the properties.

26

ISSUES:

1) Whether

there

is

2) Whether
Angeles
RA 6552.

is

3) Whether
Angeles
installments.

can

HELD: 1) NO.
A
comply
with
the
cancellation and
a

valid

cancellation

entitled
be

to

of

the

ejected

the

benefit
for

valid
and
effective
cancellation
mandatory
twin
requirements
of
refund of
the
cash surrender

Contract
of

to

Maceda

non-payment

Sell.
Law

of

or

monthly

under
RA
6552
must
a
notarized
notice
of
value.

Although there
was a notarial rescission sent thru registered mail
but
it
was
not
accompanied
by
the
refund
of
the
cash
surrender
value
equivalent to
50% of the total payments made.
For
failure
to
refund
the
cash
surrender
value
to
the
defaulting
buyer
Angeles,
Gatchalian
cannot
deduct
the
same
for
the
amount
of
the
rentals
due
to
Gatchalian
as
there
was
nothing
in
the
contract
to
apply compensation under Art. 1279 of the
New Civil Code.
to
of

2) Angeles
is
entitled
to
50%
of
the
total
payments
RA 6552.

3) In
the
absence
between
Gatchalian
and
Thus
the
complaint
for
mandate of
RA 6552.

OPTIMUM

receive
made

the
as

cash
surrender
value
equivalent
provided
for
by
Section 3 (b)

of
a
valid cancellation of the Contract
Angeles ,
the
contract
remains
valid
and
unlawful
detainer
would
be
a
violation

DEVELOPMENT

BANK

vs.

SPOUSES

to Sell
existing .
of
the

JOVELLANOS

G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013, 711 SCRA 548


FACTS:
Spouses
Jovellanos
entered
into
a
Homes
for
the
purchase
of
a
residential
period of 10 years.
Later, Palmera Homes
Contract to Sell in favor

assigned all its


of
Optimum.

Contract
to
Sell
with
house
and
lot
payable
rights ,

A
year
later,
Optimum
issued
a
Cancellation of Contract to Sell
to
Spouses
pay their monthly installments
despite several

title

and

interest

Palmera
for
a
in

the

Notice
of
Delinquency
and
Jovellanos for
their
failure to
written and verbal demands.

A
month
later,
a
final
Demand
Letter
by
Optimum
required
Spouses
Jovellanos
to vacate and
deliver possession of
the subject
property within
seven (7) days, which however remained
unheeded.
from

Optimum
instituted
the final demand

the
action
to vacate.

ISSUE: Whether
the
validity
of
under
RA
6552
lies
within
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

for

unlawful

detainer

within

the
cancellation
of
the
Contract
the
competence or
jurisdiction

HELD: YES.
Under
RA
6552,
the
mechanics
of
cancellation
of
to
Sell
is
based
on
the
amount
of
installments
already
paid
buyer under
the said
contract.

one

year

to
of

Sell
the

Contract
by
the

Since
Jovellanos
had
paid
less
than
two
years
in
installments ,
Section 4 of RA 6552 provides for
three
(3) requisites
before
the
seller
may
actually
cancel
the
subject
contract :
first,
the
buyer
shall
give
the
buyer
a
60-day
grace
period
to
be
reckoned
from
the
date
the
installment
became
due;
second,
the
seller
must
give
the
buyer
a
notice
of
cancellation/demand
for
rescission
by
notarial
act
if
the
buyer
fails
to
pay
the
installments due
at the expiration of the said grace period; and

third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after 30 days from
the
buyers
receipt
of the
said
notice
of
cancellation/demand
for
rescission
by notarial act.
There was
a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell
in
accordance
with
Section
4
of
RA
6552
and
since
Spouses
Jovellanos
had
already
lost
their
right
to
retain
possession of
the
subject
property
as
a
consequence
of
such
cancellation ,
their
refusal
to
vacate
and
turn
over possession to Optimum makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer.

27
10. PRESCRIPTION AND RECONVEYANCE
SPOUSES

SOFRONIO
G.R.

SANTOS

No. 151016,

vs. HEIRS

August

6,

2008,

OF
561

DOMINGA

SCRA

LUSTRE

120

FACTS:
Dominga
Lustre
mortgaged
her
residential
lot
to
Spouses
Santos .
She then sold
the
property
to
Natividad Santos. The cancellation of the
mortgage
and
the
sale of
the
property
were
both
inscribed
in
the
title .
Thereafter, the Spouses Santos transferred the property , by way of sale, to
their
son,
Froilan.
The
heirs
of
Dominga Lustre
filed
a
complaint
for
Declaration
of
inexistence
of
contract,
annulment
of
title and
reconveyance,
averring
that
the
sale
to
Natividad
was
simulated as
Domingas
signature
was
forged
and
that
the
spouses
Santos
also
simulated
the
Deed
of
Sale
transferring
the
property
to
their
son ,
Froilan.
The
Santoses
allege
that the heirs of Dominga Lustres right of action had
prescribed.
ISSUE:
barred

Whether
or
not
by prescription.

the

action

of

the

heirs

of

Dominga

HELD: NO. The action for reconveyance on the


ground
of
title
was
obtained
by
means
of
a
fictitious
deed
action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not

Lustre

is

that the certificate


of
sale
is
an
prescribe.

A
person
acquiring
property
through
fraud
becomes ,
by
operation
of
law,
a trustee
of
an
implied trust
for
the
benefit
of
the
real
owner
of
the
property.
An
action
for
reconveyance
based
on
implied
trust
prescribes
in ten (10) years.
The
prescriptive
to
reconvey
the
possession
of
the
of
the
property,
him.
When
an
action
be
in
a
nature
of
imprescriptible.

period
applies
only
if
there
is
an
actual
need
property
as
when
the
plaintiff
is
not
in
property .
Otherwise,
if
plaintiff
is
in
possession
prescription
does
not
commence
to
run
against
for
reconveyance
is
a
suit
for
quieting

nonetheless
filed ,
it
would
of
title ,
an
action
that
is

LUCIA CARLOS ALIO vs. HEIRS OF ANGELICA LORENZO


G.R. No. 159550,

June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 139

An action for reconveyance prescribes


is the date of registration of the deed
certificate of title over the property.
If
the
person
claiming
thereof,
the
right
to
seek
not
prescribe.
One
be
the
or
his
right.

to
to

be
the
quiet

in
actual
possession
of
owner
thereof
may
wait
title
is
attacked
before

in
or

10 years, the reckoning point


the date of issuance of the

owner
is
title
to

in
the

actual
possession
property ,
does

a
piece
of
land
until
his
possession
taking
steps
to

claiming
to
is
disturbed
vindicate
his

RECONVEYANCE NOT INDIRECT ATTACK


ON VALIDITY OF TITLE
MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA
G.R. No. 205867, February

vs. GREGORIA

TAGUFA

23, 2015, 751 SCRA 371

FACTS: Spouses
Epifanio Tagufa
owned an
untitled
property
containing
area of
539
square meters.
They
mortgaged
the
property
to
DBP.

sold

For
it

failure to
redeem
the
property,
to Atty.
Romulo Marquez.

DBP

foreclosed

On
April
4,
2002,
Mariflor,
the
daughter
of
American
citizen,
purchased
the
subject
property
from
executing
a
SPA
in
favor
of her brother , Runsted,
that
the
latter
will
reconvey
the
said
property
to
demanded.

the

same

an

and

Epifanio
and
an
Atty.
Marquez
by
with
an
agreement
his
sister
when

Mariflor
discovered that
the
same unregistered property
was
titled
the
name
of
Gregoria,
wife
of
Runsted,
under
OCT
No.
P-84609
virtue
of
a free
patent application before
the
DENR.

in
by

28

Because of
fraud,
recovery of property of
Gregoria
a
collateral
principle
of

claimed
that
the
attack
on
the
indefeasibility
of
a

ISSUE:
Whether
collateral attack
HELD: NO. In
respected
as
An
personam,
registered
or
the

Mariflor
instituted
an
the
subject
property.

action

action
for
available
under the

reconveyance

action for
reconveyance
would
title ,
which
was
proscribed
Torrens title.

the
action
for
reconveyance
on
the
validity
of
the
title.
a
complaint
incontrovertible

for

constitutes

for
reconveyance , the
and
is not
being

amount
under

to
the

indirect

or

registration

is

an

decree of
questioned.

reconveyance
is a
recognized
remedy ,
an
to
a
person
whose
property
has
been
Torrens system
in
anothers
name.

What
is
being
sought
is
the
erroneously
registered
in anothers
one with a better right.

The
fact
that
Gregoria
was
able to secure
not operate
to vest
ownership upon
her
of

Registration
not
create
or
ownership.

action
in
wrongfully

transfer
of
the
property
wrongfully
name
to its
rightful
owner
or to

If
the registration of
the
land
is
fraudulent , the
person
name
the
land
is
registered
holds
it
as
a
mere
trustee ,
real
owner
is
entitled
to
file
an
action
for
reconveyance
property.
does

and

of
a
piece
of
land
vest
title,
because
it

a
title
in
the
subject

under
the
Torrens
is
not
a
mode

in whose
and
the
of
the
her name
land.

System
does
of
acquiring

A
certificate of
title
is
merely
an
evidence
of
ownership
or
title
over
the
particular
property
described
thereon.
It
cannot
be
used
to
protect
a
usurper
from the true
owner,
nor
can it
be
used
as
a
shield
for
the
commission
of
fraud ,
neither
it
permits
one
to
enrich
himself
at the
expense of
others.
Its
issuance
in
favor
of
a
particular
person
does
not
foreclose
the
possibility that
the
real property
may be co-owned
with
person
not
named
in
the
certificate
or
that
it
may
be
held
in
trust
for
another
person by
the
registered owner.

11.

ADVERSE
SPOUSES
G.R.

CLAIM

JESUS
No.

CHING

156076,

vs.

September

SPOUSES
17,

2008,

ADOLFO
565

SCRA

ENRILE
402

FACTS:
Spouses Jesus Ching purchased from Raymunda a
property in Las
Pias
City.
The
sale
was
perfected
upon
delivery
of
a
duly
notarized
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
with
the
owners
duplicate copy
of
the
TCT
and
they
immediately
took
physical
possession of
the
subject
property .
The
couple
failed
to
register
the
sale
and
instead
they
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Adverse
Claim
and the same was
annotated at the back
of
the
title.
Three
years
after
the
sale,
Spouses
Ching
received a
Notice
of
Levy
on
Attachment
and
Writ
of
Execution
on
account
of
court
decision
in
favor
of
Spouses
Adolfo
against
the
vendor
Raymunda .
Spouses
Jesus
Ching
filed
a
petition
to
remove
cloud
or
quiet
title
to
real
property,
however,
it
was
countered
by
Spouses
Adolfo
that
the
Annotated
Adverse
Claim
had
already
prescribed
after
a
lapse
of
thirty
(30) days
from
the
date
of
registration.

ISSUE: Whether
or
not
the
levy
on
prevail over
the
Adverse
Claim
earlier
the
title
by
the
mere
lapse
of
30
petition
in
court for its cancellation.

attachment
later
annotated
shall
annotated
at
the
back
of
days
and
even
without
any

HELD. NO.
A
notice
of
Adverse
Claim
remains
valid
even
after
the
lapse
of
the
30-day
period
as
provided
by
Section
70
of
PD
1529.
As
long
as
there
is
yet
no
petition
for
cancellation
for
its
cancellation,
the
notice
of
adverse
claim
remains
subsisting.
After
the
lapse
of
30
days ,
the
annotation
of
the
adverse
claim
may
be
cancelled
upon
filing
of
a
verified
petition
by
the
party
in
interest.

29
The
law
does
not
require
a
person
dealing
with
the
owner
of
registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on
the
notices
of
the
encumbrances
on
the
property
annotated
on
the
certificate
of
title
or
absence of
any
annotation .
Here,
the
adverse
claim
is
annotated
at
the
back
of
title
coupled
with
the
fact
that
the
Spouses
Ching
are
in
possession
of
the
disputed
property.
Spouses
Adolfo
should
have
put
in
guard
and
required
them to ascertain the property offered to them has already been sold to
another
to
prevent
injury
to
prior
innocent
buyers.

NAVOTAS

INDUSTRIAL

G.R.

No.

159212,

CORPORATION
September

12,

vs.

GERMAN

2005,

469

D.

SCRA

CRUZ

530

The annotation of an adverse claim is


a measure designed to protect
the
interest
of
a
person
over
a
part
of
real
property ,
and
serves
as
a
notice
and
warning
to
third
parties
dealing
with
the
said
property
that
someone
is
claiming
an
interest
over
it
or
has
a
better
right
than
the
registered owner.

ROGELIA

P. DIAZ - DUARTE vs. SPOUSES


G.R.

No.

130352,

November

3, 1998,

BEN &
298

ESTHER ONG

SCRA

388

In a petition for cancellation


of adverse claim ,
a hearing must first
be conducted.
The
hearing
will
afford
the
parties
an
opportunity
to
prove
the
propriety
or
impropriety
of
the
adverse
claim .
Petitioner
was
unlawfully
denied
this
opportunity
when
the
Register
of
Deeds
automatically
cancelled
the
adverse
claim.
Needless
to
state,
the
cancellation
of
adverse
claim
in
ineffective.

ALFREDO
G.R.

SAJONAS
No. 102377,

vs.

COURT

July 5, 1996,

OF

258

APPEALS

SCRA 79

The
general
rule
it
that
a
person
dealing
with
registered
land
is
not
required
to
go
behind
the
register
to
determine
the
condition
of
the
property .
However,
such
person
is
charged
with
notice
on
the
face
of
the
register
or
certificate
of
title.
A person who deals with
encumbrances
including
adverse

12.

RIGHT

registered land is bound


claim
annotated
therein.

by

the

liens

and

OF FIRST REFUSAL

PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO vs. SPOUSES NORMA & DAMIANO GUDITO


G.R. No. 173166,
FACTS: Estanislao family
by Gaspar
since
1934.
in
accordance with the

March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 330

have
been
renting
and
occupying the lot owned
The former built the
house
on
the
subject
lot
lease agreement
with
Gaspar.

When
Gaspar
died,
the
Victorino married to
Esther.

subject

property

was

inherited

by

his

son,

In
the
1980s,
Victorino
wanted
the
Estanislao
family
to
vacate
the
said property, but the tenants refused because of laws
allegedly prohibited
their ejectment therefrom. Resultantly,
Estanislao, with due notice to Victorino,
deposited the amount of monthly rentals
at
Allied Bank under the savings
account in
the name of Victorino.
In
couple
Hence,
remove

the interim, a
Deed of
Donation
was
executed by the Victorino
in
favor
of
their
daughter
Norma
married
to
Damiano
Gudito.
in
October
1994,
Spouses
Gudito
notified
Estanislao
family
to
their house
and vacate the premises within 3 months.

When
Estanislao
the Spouses
Gudito
them.
ISSUES:

family
failed
to
comply
with
filed a
complaint for unlawful

1)

Whether
the
the
Deed of

2)

Whether

the

right
of
Donation.
right

of

possession
first

refusal

is

the
demand
to
detainer/ejectment
established

applies

to

by

vacate,
against

virtue

of

Estanislao.

HELD:
1)
YES.
The
Deed
of
Donation
had
been
prepared
and
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
is
vested
with
public
interest ,
the
sanctity
of
which
deserves
to
be
upheld
unless
overwhelmed
by
clear
and convincing evidence.

30
Thus, the donation made by
of their
right as owner of the
are
legally
entitled to the said
the

2) NO.
The
owner of the

the Victorino couple


is
a valid
exercise
subject property
and the Spouses
Gudito
property as
donees.

right
of
first
property intends

refusal
applies
to sell
it to

only
to
a
third

a
case
party.

where

Since
the
subject
property
was
donated
by
the
Victorino
couple
to
their
daughter
Norma
and
her
husband ,
Damiano
Gudito,
their
right
to
possess
the
subject
property
for
their
own
use
as
family
residence
cannot be
denied.

13.

QUIETING
SEVERINO

OF

TITLE

BARICUATRO, JR. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA


FACTS:
On
October
16,
1968,
installment
basis
from
Galeos .
Subdivision.

Severino
The
two

137

bought
two
(2)
lots
are
part
of

After
the
sale,
Severino introduced
certain
improvements
and
started
to
reside
therein
in
1970 .
Since
then
he
actual and physical possession of the
said
two (2) lots.
However,
on
December
7,
1968,
two
months
sold
the
entire
subdivision
including
the
two
Subsequently,
Galeos
informed
Severino
about
the
advised him to pay the
balance of the purchase
lots
directly to
Amores.

lots
on
an
Spring
Village
on
has

said
been

after
the
sale ,
Galeos
(2)
lots
to
Amores.
sale
to
Amores
and
price of the
two
(2)

On December 27, 1974,


Amores
sold
the
two
(2)
lots
to
Prior to the sale, Amores informed Severino about
the impending
the
two (2)
lots, but the latter
failed to
respond.
Before
Nemenio
caused
the
transfer
lots
and
issuance
of
tax
declaration
residence
of
Severino.
but

Thereafter,
the latter

Nemenio
refused

A
complaint
Severino.

for

demanded
from
to do so.
quieting

of

of
in

the
his

Severino

title

was

lots
in

Nemenio.
sale
of

titles
to
the
two
name,
he
visited

to

vacate

filed

by

title

is

the

said

Nemenio

(2)
the
lots

against

ISSUES:
(1) Whether
remedy.
(2)

Whether

the
Amores

action
is

(3) Whether
Nemenio
upon
his
reliance in
HELD: (1) YES. Quieting
removal
of
any
cloud
title to real
property.

for
a

is
the

of
title
upon
or

quieting

purchaser

of
in

good

also
a
purchaser
indefeasibility of the
is
a
doubt

the

best

faith.
in
good
faith
Torrens Title.

common
law
or
uncertainty

remedy
for
with
respect

the
to

Its
purpose is to
secure an
adjudication
that
a claim
of
title
or
an
interest
in
property,
adverse
to
that
of
the
complainant,
invalid,
so
that
the
complainant
and those
claiming under
him may
forever afterward
free from
any
danger
of
hostile
claim.

to
is
be

In
an
action for
quieting of
title ,
the competent
court
is
tasked
to
determine
the
respective
rights
of
the
complainant
and
other
claimants
not
only
to
place
things
in
their
proper
place
but
to
make the one
who has
no
rights to
said
immovable ,
respect
and not
to
disturb
the
other ,
but
also for
the
benefit
of
both , so that he
who has the
right would see every
cloud
of
doubt over the
property
dissipated, and he
could
afterwards without
fear
introduce the improvements
he
may
desire,
to
use
and
even
to
abuse
the
property
as
he
deems best.
(2) NO.
Amores
did
not
act
in
good
faith
when
he
bought
two
disputed lots, however, when he
registered his
title, the
preponderance
of
evidence
supports
the
finding
that
he
already
had
knowledge
of
the
previous
sale
of
the
disputed
lots
to
Severino .
Such
knowledge
tainted
his
registration with
bad
faith.

31

The prior
registration
of
does
not
by
itself
confer
property.

the
disputed property by the second
buyer
ownership
or
a
better
right
over
the

Under
belong
to
registry of

ownership
in
good

Article
1544,
the
purchaser
property.

the
who

of
an
immovable
faith
registers
it

property
first
in

For a
second
buyer to
successfully invoke the protection
1544
of
the
Civil
Code ,
he
must
possess
good
faith
registration of
the
deed
of
conveyance
covering
the
same.

shall
the

by Article
until
the

(3) NO. Nemenio cannot claim to be


purchaser in good faith because
he
visited
the
residence
of
Severino
before he
registered
the
disputed
lots
on
his
name .
The
registration
of
Nemenio
was
done
in
bad
faith.
The
defense
of indefeasibility of
a
Torrens
Title
does
not
extend
to
a
transferee
who
takes
the
certificate
of
title
with
notice
of
a
flaw.
A holder in bad faith of a
prosecution
of the law,
for the
fraud.

ELIAS

GALLAR

vs.

G.R. No. L-20954,


FACTS:
On January 9, 1919 ,
with the
right to
repurchase

certificate of
law
cannot

title
be

is not
entitled to
used as a
shield

HERMENEGILDA

the
for

HUSAIN

May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 186

Teodoro
sold his
within six
years
shortly
after
the
right to Graciana,

land
in
a

to Serapio for P30


private
document.

On
January
28,
1919,
Serapio transferred his

deed

of

sale,

Graciana
subsequently transferred her
rights to the land to
Elias
2, 1919 in
exchange for
one
cow
in a
private
document.

on

April

On
the
same
occasion,
April
together
with the
TCT
was
delivered
the
so
bar

On
October
10,
1960,
after
heirs
of
Teodoro
to
execute
that he could get
a
transfer
On
the
other
Elias action.

hand,

the

2,
to

execution
sister
of

1919,
Elias.

of
the
Teodoro.

possession

of

41
years,
Elias
filed
a
a
deed
of
conveyance
certificate of
title.
heirs

of

Teodoro

invoked

the

suit
against
in
his
favor
prescription

ISSUES:
(1)
the

Is
Elias
quieting

(2)

Has

suit
one
of
title?

the

action

for

specific

performance

or

one

for

prescribed?

(3)
If the heirs
of Teodoro
had been the
property (instead of Elias)
would the answer

possessor
be
the

of the
same?

HELD: (1) Elias suit


should
be
considered an
action to quiet
title
as
it
seeks
to
quiet
title ,
to
remove
the
cloud
cast
on
his
ownership despite the fact that the transactions had all
been merely
in
private
document.
(2) As
imprescriptible.

Elias

is

in

possession

of

(3)
If
the
heirs
of
Teodoro
were
property,
Elias
action
would
have
been
action would
not
be one to quiet
title ,
property
which
must
be
brought
within
limitation governing such action.

the

land,

the

action

in
possession
of
prescribed
for
then
but one to recover
the
statutory
period

is

the
the
real
of

VICENTE SAPTO vs. APOLONIO FABIANA


G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958, 103 Phil 683
FACTS: On June 8, 1931,
Samuel and Constancio
deed of
sale of a
portion of
land
covered by
favor of
Apolonio for
P245.00.
The
sale
was
conveyed
to
Apolonio
thereof
since
1931.

never
and

registered.
the
latter

Possession
has
been

Sapto executed
TCT # T-5701
of
in

the
the

land

a
in

land
was
possession

to

32

Thereafter,
Constantino died
death
was
survived
by
his
Vicente.

without
widow

any
and

issue. Samuel
upon
children ,
Laureana

his
and

On
October
19,
1954,
the
widow
of
Samuel,
together
with
their
two children, filed an
action for
the
recovery of the
parcel
of land sold by their predecessors to Apolonio in
1931.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether
an
action for
quieting of
title
would
compel
the sellers successors-in-interest
to execute the proper deed
of conveyance in 1954
in favor of
the buyer.
(2)

Has

the

action

(3)
Whether
the
question, although
binding?

prescribed?

deed
of
was
never

sale
over
registered, is

the
still

land
valid

in
and

HELD: (1)
YES. The
action for quieting of
title
is to remove the cloud
cast
upon the
buyers
ownership
by the refusal of the sellers successorsin-interest
to
recognize
the sale
by
their
predecessors.
Thus, Apolonio,
it
from
that
date
execute
the
proper
may be
registered.
(2)
action

NO. Since
DOES
NOT

being
may
deed

a buyer of
the
land in 1931 who
possessed
still
compel
the
sellers successors-in-interest
to
of
conveyance
in
1954
so
that
the
deed

Apolonio
has
been in possession
PRESCRIBE
or
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.

of

the

property ,

the

(3)
YES.
Since
the
property
has
remained
and
still
in
the
possession
of
the
vendee
of
the
property ,
it
is
clear
that
conveyance
between buyer
and his vendors
is valid
and binding upon the
vendors ,
and
is
equally binding
and
effective
against the
heirs
of the
vendors .
To
hold
otherwise
would
make
of
the
Torrens
system
a
shield
for
the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs.

HERMINIO M.

DE

GUZMAN vs. TABANGAO REALTY

G.R. No. 154262,

February 11,

FACTS: Sometime in
1980, Serafin and
Josefino
credit
oil
and
lubricating products
from FSPC ,
to
pay for their
credit
purchases
from
FSPC.
FSPC
filed
Josefino
before

a
the

complaint
RTC
of

for
sum
Manila.

After
trial,
decision
was
rendered
to
pay
their
outstanding
obligation
to
final
and
executory.
On
by
TCT
Guzman.
to
on

June
30,
#
3531

INC.

2015, 750 SCRA 271

of

de
but

Guzman
purchased on
they
eventually
failed

money

against

Serafin

finding
Serafin
and
Josefino liable
FSPC
and
the
judgment
became

1983,
FSPC
levied
upon
a
in
the
name
of
Spouses

parcel
of
land
covered
Serafin
&
Amelia
de

At
the
public
auction,
the
sheriff
awarded
the
certificate
Tabangao Realty
as
the
highest
bidder and the same
was
TCT # 3531 on
April 13,
1988.

The
Spouses
De
Guzman
within one
year
from registration
TCT
# 3531.

and

did
not
redeem
the
subject
of
the
Sheriffs
Certificate of

of
sale
annotated

property
Sale
on

On
October
19,
2001,
upon
the
deaths
of
Spouses
De
Guzman ,
their
heirs
filed
a
complaint for
quieting of title on
the ground
that
the
Sheriffs
Certificate of
Sale
has lost
its effectivity as it had
been
terminated and
extinguished by
prescription, laches and
estoppel, since more
than
13
years
having
elapsed
from
its
registration
on
April
13,
1988
without
the
buyer
taking
any
step
to
consolidate
its
ownership
and/or
take
possession of
the property.
ISSUE;
instant

Whether
case.

the

action

for

quieting

of

title

would

prosper

HELD:
NO.
For
an
action
to
quiet
title
to
prosper ,
two
requisites must
concur:
(1) the plaintiff
or
complainant
has
equitable
title
or
interest
in
the
real
property
subject
of

in

the

indispensable
a
legal
or
the
action ;

33
and
(2)
the
deed,
casting
a
cloud
on
inoperative
despite its

claim,
his
prima

encumbrances,
or
proceeding
claimed
to
be
title
must
be
shown
to
be
in
fact
or
facie appearance of
validity or legal
efficacy.

Complainants allegation that they


deceased
Spouses
De
Guzman
and
registered
in
Spouses
De
Guzmans
these
allegations
are
insufficient
to
property.

were children and only


heirs of the
that
the
subject
property
was
still
names
under
TCT
#
3531 .
However,
establish
complainants
title
to
the

Respondent
Tabangao
was
already substituted to
and
acquired
all
the
rights,
title,
interest,
and
claims
of
the
Spouses
De
Guzman
to
the
subject
property on April
13, 1989 ,
when the one year
redemption period
expired.
Upon the deaths of Amelia de
Guzman on January 1, 1997 and
her husband
Serafin de
Guzman on
April
23, 2001,
they had no more
rights, title, interest
and claim to the
subject
property
on by
succession
to complainants as their heirs.
The
execution
of
the
final
deed
of
sale
and/or
conveyance
to
Tabangao is a mere
formality and confirmation of the title
already vested
in
respondent
under
Rule
39,
Section 33
of
the
Rules
of
Court .
There
is
nothing in
the
rules requiring the institution
of a
separate action for
execution
of
such
a
deed .
Therefore,
no
prescription
period
for
any
action has begun to run.

CLT REALTY DEVT

CORP.

G.R. No. 160726,

vs. PHIL-VILLE DEVT

CORP.

March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 289

FACTS: A
complaint
for
quieting of
title
was
filed by Phil-Ville against
CLT
claiming
that
it
has
been
in
actual,
open,
notorious,
public,
physical
and
continuous
possession
of
the
16
parcels
of
land before
1980
up to the
present .
It fenced said parcels
of land in
1980
and
1991.
On
the
other
of
land
known
as
No. 177013.

hand ,
CLT
Lot
26 of

claimed to be the
owner
of
a
parcel
the
Maysilo Estate as evidenced by TCT

However, CLTs
TCT No. 177013, although apparently valid as
effective ,
is
in truth and in
fact, invalid and ineffective
and
unless
declared
by
the Court, will
inevitably prejudice Phil-Villes
title
over its 16 parcels of
land,
as said
title
of
CLT
is
a potential cause
of
litigation between
Phil-Ville
and
CLT
as
both
parties
are
claiming
title
to
the
subject
properties
when
CLTs
TCT
#
T-177013
actually
overlaps
the
16
parcels
of land of
Phil-Villes 16 TCTs.
The
RTC
declared
Phil-Ville
as
the
true,
absolute
and
legitimate
owner
of
the
sixteen (16)
parcels
of
land
and
CLTs
TCT
#
T-177013
was
declared null
and void.
It
was
found out that CLT
purchased
or
acquired its TCT # T-177013
on
December 10, 1988
from its
predecessor
Estrellita
Hipolito who
acquired the
land covered
by her
TCT # R-17994
by
virtue
of
an
approved
Compromise
Agreement
between
her
and
Atty.
Jose B. Dimson wherein the latter
transferred
to
Hipolito on September 2,
1976 Lot
26
of
the
Maysilo
Estate
covered
by
TCT
#
R-15166 ,
which
property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of
an court
order
dated
June 13, 1966
awarding to
him as his
attorneys
fees
whatever
remained undisposed of in Lots
25-A , 26, 27, 28
and 29
of the
Maysilo Estate of
Maria De La Concepcion Vidal . Finally, the LRTC
Verification
Committee
found
that
nothing
more
was
left
for the heirs

of
Maria
dela
Concepcion
Vidal
attorneys
fees
and
consequently,
Dimson
to
convey
to
Hipolito .
null
and void
as no land had
which
was
derived
from TCT #

to
convey
to
Jose
R.
Dimson
as
his
nothing
at
all
was
left
for
Jose
R.
In
short,
Hipolitos
TCT
No.
R-17974
is
been registered and
TCT
No. T-177013
T-17974
is similarly null and void.

ISSUED: Whether TCT


their
16 parcels
of

imposes

# T-177013
land.

cloud

on

Phil-Villes

titles

to

HELD: YES.
Quieting of title is common law remedy for the
removal of
any
cloud,
doubt,
or
uncertainty
affecting
title
to
real
property
or
any
interest
but
is
in
truth
and
in
fact
invalid ,
ineffective,
voidable
or
unenforceable,
and
may
be
prejudicial
to
said
title ,
an
action
may
be
brought
to
remove such cloud
or to
quiet
title.
In
requisites
equitable
and
(2)

order
that
an
action
for
quieting
of
title
may
prosper ,
two
must
concur: (1) the
plaintiff
or
complainant
has
a
legal
or
title
or
interest
in
the
real
property
subject
of
the
action ;
the
deed,
claim,
encumbrance,
or
proceeding
claimed
to
be

34
casting
cloud
on
his
title
inoperative despite its
prima

must
facie

be
shown
to
be
in
fact
invalid
or
appearance of
validity or
legal efficacy.

Both
requisites
in
order
for
an
action
for
quieting
of
title
have
been met: (1) Phil-Ville
had
established its
equitable
title
or
interest
in
the
16 parcels of land subject of the
action ; and (2) TCT No. T-177013,
found
to
overlap
titles
to
said
properties
of
Phil-Ville ,
was
previously
declared
invalid.

VILMA I.

QUINTOS

vs.

PELAGIA

G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, 726


FACTS:
Spouses
Ibarra
were
owners
281
square meters
covered
by
TCT
ten

In
(10)

NICOLAS

a
parcel
318717.

of

land

1990,
Spouses
Ibarra
had
already
passed
away ,
children
ownership over
the
subject property.

Having
failed
to
secure
instead
resorted
to
executing
a
2004 to
transfer
the property in
over

of
#

I.

SCRA 482
consisting

leaving

to

of
their

a
decision
for
partition,
the
siblings
Deed
of
Adjudication
on
September
21,
favor of the ten (10)
siblings.

Subsequently,
respondents
(7
siblings)
sold
their
7/10
the property in favor of the Spouses Candelario.

undivided

share

On
June
1,
2009,
the
petitioners
(remaining
3
siblings)
filed
a
complaint
for
quieting
of
title
against
the
respondents
and
Spouses
Candelario
and
alleged that they have been
in
adverse , open,
continuous,
and
uninterrupted
possession
of
the
property
for
over
four
(4)
decades
and there
are entitled
to
equitable title.
However
in
2005,
the
with
Avico
Lending Investor
of
the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether
ownership over

the
the

respondents
entered into
over the
subject
matter

petitioners
property.

were

HELD: NO. Quieting of


title
in a
of
any cloud, doubt, or
uncertainty

able
common
affecting

a
Contract of
Lease
without
the
objection

to

prove

equitable

title

or

law
title

remedy
for the removal
to
real property.

For
an
action
to
quiet
title
to
prosper ,
two
indispensable
requisites
must
concur,
namely: (1) the
plaintiff
or
complainant
has
a
legal
or
equitable
title to
or
interest in the
real property subject of the
action ,
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
doubt on the title must
be shown to be in
fact invalid
or
inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or efficacy.

IMELDA SYJUCO
G.R. No.
FACTS:
The
Syjucos
situated
in
Caloocan
26, 1984.

vs. FELISA D.

BONIFACIO

148748, January 14, 2015, 745 SCRA 468

are
City

the
registered
owners
of
a
parcel
of
land
covered
by
TCT
# T-108530
issued
on
March

They
have been in
open,
continuous and
uninterrupted possession of
the
subject
land,
by
themselves
or
through
their
predecessors-in-interest
since 1926 and they
have been paying the real property taxes over the
subject land since
1949.
Sometime
in
1994,
Syjucos
learned
that
the
purported
owner
subject
land was
Felisa Bonifacio who
was able to
register the
land
in
her
name under TCT
No. 265778
on March 29, 1993.
Bonifacios
1992
by RTC,
to Segregate.

title
was
issued
pursuant
to
Branch 125 of
Caloocan City

an
in

of
the
subject

order
dated
October
8,
the Petition for Authority

For
unexplained
reasons,
the
Registry
of
Deeds
of
Caloocan
issued
TCT
No.
265778
to
Bonifqacio
on
March
29,
1993
even
before
RTC Branch 125
declared its Order
dated October
8, 1992
granting Bonifacios
petition for
segregation final
and
executory on
April 6,
1993.

35
On
July
28,
1994,
to
protect
their
rights
and
interest
over
the
subject
property,
the
Syjucos
lodged
a
special
civil
action
for
quieting
of
title
especially
praying
for
declaration
of
nullity
and
cancellation
of
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778.
Subsequently,
the
land
to
VSD Realty.
by TCT # 285313
in
on

As a result, the
April 25, 1995.

Syjucos
discovered
that
Bonifacio
sold
Bonifacios TCT # 265778
was
cancelled
the name of
VSD Realty.
Syjucos

amended

their

petition

the
and

impleading

subject
replaced

VSD

Realty

ISSUES:
(1)
Whether
an
action
for
attack
on
the
certificates
of
Realty.

HELD:
attack

(2)

Whether

an

action

for

(1)
on

YES.
The
instituted
a
certificate of title

quieting
of
title
is
title
of
Bonifacio

quieting

of

title

has

action
in
this
case
to
real
property.

a
direct
and
VSD

prescribed.
is

clearly

direct

In
their complaint for
quieting of
title,
the
Syjucos
specifically pray
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
and/or
cancellation
of
Bonifacios
TCT
#
265778
and VSD TCT # 285313 over the subject land.
The
relief
sought
is
certainly
feasible
since
the
objective
of
an
action for
quieting of title
as
provided under
Article
476
of the
Civil
Code, is
precisely to
quiet
title, remove, invalidate, annul and/or
nullify a
cloud
on
title
to
real
property
or
any
interest
therein
by
reason
of
any
instrument,
record,
claims,
encumbrance
or
proceeding
which
is
apparently
valid
or
effective
but
is
in
truth
and
in
fact ,
ineffective,
voidable or
unenforceable
and may be prejudicial to the title.
(2) NO. It
is
an
established
doctrine
in
land
ownership
dispute
that
the
filing
of
an
action
to
quiet
title
is
imprescriptible
if
the
disputed
property
is
in
the
possession
of
the
plaintiff.
One
who
is
in
actual
possession
of
a
piece
of
land
claiming
to
be
the
owner
thereof
may
wait
his
possession
is
disturbed
or
his
title
is
attacked
before
taking
steps
to
vindicate
his
right ,
the
reason
for
this
rule
being
that
his
undisturbed
possession
gives
him
a
continuing
right
to
seek
the
aid
of
a court
of
equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse
claim
of
a
third
party
and
its
effects
on
his
own
title ,
which
right
can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

GODSPEED