HUMES THEORY OF PITY AND MALICE

SAMUEL C. RICKLESS
(Summary)
On Humes theory of passions, there is unnoticed interpretative puzzle concerning the
nature and proper classification of pity and malice. Hume illustrated the two kinds of perception,
the impressions and ideas. There are two kinds of impressions, the impressions of sensation or
the original impressions and the impressions of reflection or secondary impressions where all
passions are secondary. Hume also classifies and distinguishes between the direct and indirect
passions. Humes theory seems to fall in confusion and inconsistency; however this paper aims
to draw clear conclusion in light with Humes theory of passion as a whole. Pity and Malice, as
derived, are both fall under direct and indirect passions.
Hume distinguishes the general idea of perception of the human mind, the ideas and
perception. Impressions are the appearance that goes to the soul and ideas are the indistinct
images of impressions. Hume explains that the impressions of sensation cause images of the
impressions which ideas then cause impressions of reflexion. Hume then turns to the category of
secondary impressions between the direct and indirect. The distinction is being immediate and
mediate causation. Hume tells us that the impressions, which arise from good and evil most
naturally, but it would be a mistake, Humes point, in fact, that it does not arise from the idea of
good and evil at all, but rather arise from unaccountable natural impulse or instinct. Hume
illustrated the mechanism whereby direct secondary impressions are produced, a mechanism
constituted by a double relations of impressions and ideas. Understanding this requires
understanding the distinction of the object and cause of indirect secondary impressions.
The puzzle arises when Hume turns to the question of where to fit the passions of pity
and malice into his classificatory scheme. It is clear that they must be impressions and secondary.
But, as secondary impressions, are pity and malice direct or indirect? This is the question. The
standard view, indeed so standard as not to have elicited much in the way of comment in the
secondary literature, is that according to Hume pity and malice are indirect secondary
impressions. Hume clearly states that pity and malice are indirect, and not direct, secondary
impressions. However, it is similar to direct passion based on its nature and understanding of it.
So not only does Hume appear to be confused about whether pity and malice are direct or

indirect, but he also appears to be confused about their nature and their relations to the other
passions in his inventory. The problem is serious and threatens repercussions throughout Humes
account of the passions. Once the central paradigms are shaken, the theory to which they belong
threatens to falter.
Hume takes pity and malice to be different combinations of desire and aversion. Hume is
assuming that pity for an individual is a combination of two things, the desire for the happiness
and aversion to the misery, and that malice towards an individual is exactly opposite to pity in
being a combination of two things, the aversion to the happiness and desire for the misery. He
also uses them as critical premises in his argument for the claim that benevolence is similar to
pity and the claim that anger is similar to malice. In saying that pity and benevolence are the
same desires, Hume means that pity and benevolence are both desires of happiness to another;
and in saying that malice and anger are the same desires, Hume means that malice and anger are
both desires of misery of another. This suggests that, for Hume, the difference between pity and
benevolence does not lie in their nature, but in their causes or circumstances.
There are three passages, namely on concern or joy, on grief or joy, on uneasiness or joy,
that suggest that, for Hume, pity is a kind of sorrow, while malice is a kind of joy. The first thing
to notice about these passages is that they all consistently identify malice with a kind of joy, a joy
in, or arising from, the misery or grief of others. The three passages offer a somewhat less
obviously consistent picture of the nature of pity. The Concern/Joy, Uneasiness/Joy, and
Grief/Joy Passages all support the thesis that, according to Hume, pity is a kind of sorrow and
malice is a kind of joy. Now, as Hume points out in several places, neither sorrow nor joy is to be
identified with either desire or aversion. It is clear from his more extensive discussion of the
direct passions, where joy (grief) is described as arising from a good (evil) that is certain or
probable while desire (aversion) is described as arising from good (evil) considerd simply.
So we must simply accept, that Hume provides us with two completely different, and mutually
inconsistent, models of pity and malice, on one of which pity and malice count as different
combinations of desire and aversion, and on the other of which pity and malice count as grief and
joy respectively.
Although the proper interpretation of the relevant texts is underdetermined, the reason for
this is that on the first view it becomes decidedly unclear exactly what benevolence and anger are

supposed to be and why we should be thinking of them as numerically distinct from love and
hate respectively. For, according to the first picture, love causes benevolence, which in turn
causes a combination of desire and aversion, while hate causes anger, which in turn causes a
different combination of desire and aversion. Hume tells us that love and hate are indirect
secondary impressions, and describes the double relation of impressions and ideas that produces
or constitutes these passions. But if benevolence is numerically distinct from both love and
desire/aversion and if anger is numerically distinct from hate and desire/aversion, then the nature
of benevolence and the nature of anger become completely dense. Moreover, if the most that
Hume can tell us about benevolence is that it has the same effects as love, and if the most that
Hume can tell us about anger is that it has the same effects as hate, and then Occams Razor
suggests that benevolence should simply be identified with love, and anger with hate.
Humes picture of the nature of pity and malice and their relations to other passions, pity
is a kind of grief that arises sympathetically from perception of anothers grief, while malice is a
kind of joy that arises comparatively from the same source. Pity, like grief more generally, is a
direct secondary impression, but one that is similar to the indirect secondary impression of love
inasmuch as both passions produce the affection of benevolence, itself nothing more than a
desire for the happiness of another combined with aversion to his misery. Malice, like joy more
generally, is also a direct secondary impression, but one that is similar to the indirect secondary
impression of hate inasmuch as both passions produce the affection of anger, itself nothing more
than a desire for the misery of another combined with aversion to his happiness. This picture is
not consistent with everything Hume tells us. But that it is the best reconstruction of the entirety
of his statements on the relevant issues.

Bibliography
Rickless, S. C. (2013). Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice. British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, 21(2), 324-344.