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MARRIAGE AND PERSONAL

RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

unreasonable
withdrawal
from
the
wedding is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Wassmers cause
of action is supported under Article 21 of
the Civil Code which provides in part any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article
21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly
awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton,
reckless, and oppressive manner this
warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY


Wassmer v. Velez
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and
Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage.
They decided to schedule it on September
4, 1954.
Wassmer made preparations such
as:
making
and
sending
wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and
other apparels, and other wedding
necessities. But 2 days before the
scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a
letter to Wassmer advising her that he will
not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said
wedding.
One day before the wedding, he
sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and
that he will be returning soon. However,
he never returned.This prompted Wassmer
to file a civil case against Velez.
Velez never filed an answer and
eventually judgment was made in favor of
Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary
and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his
failure to attend the scheduled wedding
was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held
civilly liable for breaching his promise to
marry Wassmer because there is no law
upon which such an action may be
grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against
him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of
damages is proper.
HELD:
Yes. The defense of fortuitous
events raised by Velez is not tenable and
also unsubstantiated.
It is true that a breach of promise
to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. However, in this case, it was not a
simple breach of promise to marry.
because of such promise, Wassmer made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs

Tanjanco v CA
TOPIC: Agreements Prior
Breach of Promise to Marry

to

Marriage:

PETITION: An appeal from the decision of


the Court of Appeals revoking an order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing appellants action for support
and damages

FACTS
From December 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco,
through his attestations of love and
PROMISE OF MARRIAGE to Araceli Santos,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Araceli Santos regularly until December
1959
Araceli then conceived a child (July 1959)
as
a
result,
which
brought
her
embarrassment and social humiliation and
forced her to resign her job as a Secretary
in IBM (salary: 230/month)
Apolonio
refusal
to
marry
Araceli
prompted Araceli to file in the CFI Rizal:
A decree for Apolonio to recognize the
unborn child;
To pay for support for the baby
430/month;
Plus Php 100,000 in moral and exemplary
damages;
And Php 10,000 attorneys fees

CFI Rizal dismissed the case


Araceli appealed to the CA, which held
that:
No cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of a child as yet UNBORN
BUT the complainant DID state a cause of
action for damages premised on ART 21 of
the Civil Code
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals,good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
And Art 23
ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals,good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for damage
A previous ruling that when a nineteen
year old girl was seduced and became
pregnant, there was no crime but she has
a right of action based on Art 23
Apolonio Tanjanco appeals the decision of
the CA
ISSUE
W/N Tanjancos breach of promise to
marriage can bring any action for
damages in court based on Art 21 and Art
23 of the Civil Code

HELD
Conduct based on the Facts are
incompatible with the idea of seduction
Definition of Seduction: "To constitute
seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise
or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction
In the case: Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promises.

No case is made under Art 21 of the Civil


Code and no other cause of action being
alleged
Araceli was a woman of adult age,
maintained repeated sexual acts with
Tanjanco from 1958 to 1959
- Decision of the CA is reversed, decision
of the CFI is affirmed
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Hon.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Marilou
Gonzales
Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry
Facts: This is a petition on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the decision of the CA who
affirmed Pangasinans RTC ruling in toto.
In August 1986, while working as a
waitress
in
Mabuhay
Luncheonette
Dagupan
City,
Pangasinan,
Marilou
Gonzales, then 21 years old, has been
introduced by the manager of the said
establishment to Gashem Shookat Baksh,
a 29 year old exchange student from Iran
taking
up
medicine
in
Lyceum
Northwestern in Dagupan. A few days
after they met, the petitioner started
courting Gonzales and soon after he made
a proposal to marry private respondent,
she decided to accept both his love and
proposal to marry the latter; on the same
day, they even went home to Gonzales
hometown in Bugallon to meet the girls
parents and discuss their plan of
celebrating their marriage towards the
end of the semester.
In the middle of the following year, Private
Respondent started living in Bakshs
apartment in Lozano Apartment. During
their cohabitation, she got pregnant but
her pregnancy was terminated after
petitioner made her drink medicines to
abort the fetus. In October of the same
year, Marilou Gonzales filed 2 complaints
with the RTC of Pangasinan without the
assistance of counsel seeking petitioner to
pay her moral damages for allegedly
maltreatment she him and breaking his
initial promise to marry after asserting
that he has already married a girl from
Bacolod City. After finding merit in the

complaint, the RTC of Pangasinan, ruled in


favour of Gonzales thereby ordering
petitioner to pay the former a total of
P20,000.00 for moral damages. Upon
appeal, petitioner alleged that the RTC
erred in not dismissing the case for lack of
legal basis and for ordering him to pay for
moral damages to Gonzales, however,
after the review of the evidences
presented, the CA ruled to affirm the RTCs
decision in toto for his fraudulent
protestations of love to the private
respondent and that he be ordered to
compensate for the moral damages
inflicted upon Gonzales in accordance with
the provision of Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.
Discontented with the CAs ruling, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC
contending that Article 21 should not be
applied to him because being a Muslim he
is not familiar with the Catholic and
Christian ways. Furthermore, he also
argued that the court erred in ruling that
he does not possess good moral character
for according to him he has not proposed
marriage to Gonzales and that even if he
has, failure on his part to fulfil the same is
is wholly excusable and tolerable because
of his Muslim upbringing.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner
should be ordered to compensate the
private respondent for his failure to fulfil
his promise to marry the latter.
Ruling: The Court in this case said that
the failure to fulfil a promise to marry per
se does not constitute a wrong for the
Congress has deliberately eliminated said
provision from their draft of the New Civil
Code.
In
resolution
thereof,
they
formulated Article 21 which grants
adequate legal remedies and expands the
concept of torts and quasi-delicts for the
untold number of moral wrongs impossible
for humans to specifically punish under
statute books. Applying the same to the
case at hand, the Court found the assailed
decisions justifiable for the rendered
judgement does not merely punish
petitioners failure to fulfil his promise but
also his application fraud and deceit as
shown through his acts and the wilful
injury he has inflicted upon private

respondents honor. In conclusion thereof,


the petition was DENIED.
Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute
A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011

Topic: Breach of Marriage

Facts:

Mary Jane Abanag (23 years old,


complainant) filed an administrative case
against Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent),
Court Stenographer I in theMunicipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas,
Samar for Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct. Complainant and respondents
were sweethearts. Both were unmarried.

Complainant alleged that she met the


respondent when he joined as a member
of the Singles for Christ. Respondent
courted her and professed his undying
love for her. Believing respondent's
promise that he would marry her, she
agreed to live with him. She became
pregnant, but after several months into
her pregnancy, respondent brought her to
a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to
take drugs to abort her baby. When she
did not agree, the respondent turned cold
and eventually abandoned her. She
became depressed resulting in the loss of
her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she
suffered.

Respondent
admitted
that
the
complainant would join him at his rented
room three to four times a week. When
the complainant became pregnant, he
asked her to stay and live with him. He
vehemently denied having brought the
complainant to a local "manghihilot" and
that he had tried to force her to abort her
baby. He surmised that the complainant's
miscarriage could be related to her
epileptic attacks during her pregnancy.
The respondent further testified that the

complainant's mother did not approve of


him, but the complainant defied her
mother and lived with him. He proposed
marriage to the complainant, but her
mother did not like him as a son-in-law
and ordered the complainant to return
home. The complainant obeyed her
mother. They have separated
ways since then, but he pledged his
undying love for the complainant.

Held/Ratio:

The Court find that the acts complained of


cannot be considered as disgraceful or
grossly immoral conduct.

Mere sexual relations between two


unmarried and consenting adults are not
enough to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy
between a man and a woman who are not
married, where both are not under any
impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an
unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate


official conduct and, to a certain extent,
private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching on
employees' personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their
family's future. We cannot intrude into the
question of whether they should or should
not marry.

The Court resolves to DISMISS the present


administrative complaint against Nicolas
Mabute for lack of merit. No costs.

ISSUE
WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz should
be suspended from his practice of law.

Castillo vda de Mijarez v Villaluz

HELD
What
complainant
and
respondent
contracted was a valid marriage borne out
by law and evidence
All essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage under the Family Code
were satisfied and complied with
Legal capacity of the contracting parties,
who must be male and female
Consent freely given in the presence of
the solemnizing officer
A valid marriage license except for those
cases provided in the FC
Marriage ceremony with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer, and their personal
declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age
Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Supreme
Court found the respondent engaging in
an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful
conduct
and
recommends
SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING
that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same or a
similar offense hereafter
Respondent fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for continued membership in
the legal profession
The nature of the office requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character,
a qualification not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice if
law, but whose continued possession is
essential to remain in the practice

Topic: Kinds of requisites and effects of


non-compliance

FACTS
Complaint for disbarment due to gross
immorality and grave misconduct
Respondent, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, was charged with Bigamy by
complainant and is being recommended
for suspension from practice of law
Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice
Onofre Villaluz married each other pending
the court's decision on the former's
marriage
Complainant was widowed by the death of
her first husband, and obtained a decree
declaring her husband presumptively
dead, after an absence of 16 years
Their relationship was shortlived as right
after their marriage, the complainant left
their would-be-honeymoon place after
some unbearable utterances made by the
respondent
Such unbearable utterances started when
complainant confronted the respondent
regarding the identity of the woman who
called
complainant
on
the
phone,
offending her with insulting remarks
Several months after, the complainant
learned that respondent subsequently
married a certain Lydia Geraldez
Thus, the basis of this complaint
She gathered evidence to show that
complainant falsified his civil status as
single, when he married Geraldez, in order
for him to lead an immoral and indiscreet
life
In respondents defense, he claims that
what he had with the complainant was but
a sham marriage to help her in an
administrative case filed against her
He further alleged that at the time of his
marriage to complainant, his first marriage
to Librada Pena was still valid and
subsisting as the decision of the court
annulling their marriage has not yet
reached finality

o
o

Silverio v Republic
GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007
-

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Silverio is a male
transsexual. He is biologically male and
had a gender re-assignment in Bangkok to
have a female body.

Silverio filed a petition to change his first


name from Rommel to Mely. The
petition also aims to change his sex from
male to female in his birth certificate
because of his sex reassignment. His claim
is based on the fact that he may be male
on the outside, he acts like a female.
He filed his petition in the Manila RTC and
was granted. The RTC ruled that in
consonance with the principles of justice
and equality, he could have his sex and
name changes.
Respondent Republic, through the office of
the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. They
argue that petitioner cannot be allowed to
change his name because there is no law
that allow him to do so.
Silverio filed a petition for reconsideration
but was denied. Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N Silverio is allowed to change his name
and sex in his birth certificate because of
his sex reassignment

HELD:
No. No law allows the change of entry in
the birthday certificate of sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.
- RA 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY
OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER). This law provides that it should
be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of
first names and not the regular courts. The
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name
is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even
assuming that the petition filed properly, it
cannot be granted still because the
ground upon which it is based (gender reassignment) is not one of those provided
for by the law. Under the law, a change of
name may only be grounded on the
following:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
-

2. The new first name or nickname has been


habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
- Silverio did not allege any of the above, he
merely alleged gender re-assignment as
the basis.
- Silverio cant change his sex because
again, there is no law that allows the
change. He was born a male hence it was
just but right that the entry written in
his birth certificate is that he is a male.
The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant by
examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing
sex
reassignment,
the
determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error, is immutable.
- Allowing the changes Silverio sought will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations.
- SC emphasized: If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone
sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn
governing
the
conferment
of
that
privilege.
Garcia v Recio
GR No. 138322
October 2, 2002
-

FACTS:
On March 1, 1987Rederic Recio, a Filipino
citizen, married a woman named Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon
A decree of divorce dissolving the
marriage was issued by an Australian
family court on May 18, 1989
On June 26, 1992 Recio became an
Australian citizen, which was evidence by
a certificate of Australian citizenship
that the Australian government issued.
June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate
of Australian
Citizenship"
issued
by
the Australian government

Recio remarried a Filipino woman named


Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan city on
January 12, 1994. Garcia and Recio lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage on October 22, 1995.
Garcia field a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage to Recio, on the ground
of Bigamy, and that she never knew of the
previous marriage he had. Recio prays
that the action be dismissed and argues
that his previous marriage with Editha
Samson has been validly dissolved by a
decree of divorce obtained in Australia,
therefore claiming that his marriage with
Garcia is valid.

ISSUE:
W/N Garcia and Recio can dissolve their
marriage for the grounds charged against
Recio
HELD:
- The SC remanded the case to the court a
quo to receive evidence. Based on the
records, the court cannot conclude that
Recio who
was
then
a
naturalized
Australian citizen was legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. Neither can the court
grant Garcias prayer to declare her
marriage null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Australian law he was really capacitated to
marry Garcia as result of the divorce
decree.
- The SC laid down the following basic legal
principles; a marriage between two Filipino
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
decree obtained
abroad
because
of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
- Divorce:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows
the
former
to
contract
a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.
-

1.
2.
1.

2.
-

1.
2.
-

Before a foreign divorce decree can be


recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it
legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the
party concerned
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
an official publication; or
a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be:
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept;
and
authenticated by the seal of his office
Divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different
types:
Absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii terminates the marriage
Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force
Recio presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce
On its face, the herein Australian divorce
decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy."
G.R. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA


CHOA, respondents

judgment
declaring
marriage as void.

FACTS:

3. Under the law, a marriage, even one


which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in


civil rites on Sept. 14, 1988. They did not
live together after marriage although they
would meet each other regularly.
On April 29, 1989, Liliana gave birth to a
girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting
her.
On May 20, 1990, Arthur contracted a
second marriage with Julieta Santella while
marriage with Liliana was subsisting.
Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur.
She also filed an administrative case
(revocation of engineering license for
grossly immoral act) against Arthur and
Julieta.
Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his
marriage with Liliana on the grounds of
concealment of pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that
she was psychologically incapacitated.
RTC and Board rendered decision while the
petition for annulment of first marriage
was pending.
ISSUE:

previous

RULING:
The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

W/N marriage annulment case had to be


resolved
first
before
criminal
and
administrative case be rendered judgment
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The following reasons show that
criminal and administrative case may
proceed and be rendered judgment even
before the annulment of marriage of the
spouses involved:

1. In People v. Mendoza and People v.


Aragon, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage
which is void ab initio.

2. Art. 40 of the Family Code states that


the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final

such

NOLLORA v. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 191425; September 7, 2011]
TOPIC:
Absence of Impediment
PETITIONER: Atilano Nollora, Jr.
RESPONDENT:
People
of
the
Philippines
PONENTE:
Carpio, J. (2nd Div)
LAW:
Revised Penal Code (RPC)
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally
dissolved xxx
Family Code (FC)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before
the
celebration
of
the
subsequent
marriage,
the
prior
spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already
dead. xxx
Code of Muslim Personal Laws (CMPL)
Art. 13 (2) [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [FC, in
lieu
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines] shall apply.
Art. 27. [N]o Muslim male can have more
than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law
and only in exceptional cases.
Art. 180. The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code relative to the crime of
bigamy shall not apply to a person

o
o

married in accordance with the


provisions of this Code or, before its
effectivity, under Muslim law.
NOTE: Red highlights are immaterial to
petitioners
case
since
Rowenas
innocence is not being deliberated upon.
FACTS:
Petition for review of RTC decision which
found petitioner guilty of Bigamy. Coaccused Rowena Geraldino was acquitted
for failure to prove her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
Apr 6, 1999: marriage between petitioner
and Jesusa Nollora in Bulacan
They met in Saudi Arabia. Jesusa was a
Staff Midwife in a hospital
Dec 8, 2001: petitioner contracted a
subsequent marriage with Rowena in
Quezon City
Petitioner and Rowena were childhood
friends and neighbors
Apr 18, 2005: petitioner refused to enter
plea during arraignment (plea of not guilty
was entered by the Court).
Jun 14, 2005: Rowena pleaded not guilty
Evidence for the Prosecution
Jesusa was still working in Saudi when she
got wind of this news, which was
confirmed when she came back here
According to Jesusa, she confronted
Rowena in her workplace in Taguig. Here,
the latter admitted that she knew of the
marriage between petitioner and Jesusa
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos backed
up her testimony by declaring that she
went with Jesusa to confront Rowena,
where the latter admitted to knowing
about the marriage
Jesusa also said that she already met her
before, when petitioner was introducing
her to his parents and overheard their
plans of marriage
Claims for damages
Due to this case, Jesusa was unable to
return to work in Saudi, losing the income
opportunity of P34K/month
As to moral damages, she claimed that
because of the incident, she started
entertaining thoughts of suicide, her
mother died, and she was almost raped
(because petitioner left her in Saudi)
Just asked for the return of her P50K
Evidence for the Defense

o
o

o
o
o

Petitioner claimed that he was a Muslim


convert on Jan 10, 1992, even before his
1st marriage
As a Muslim convert, he was entitled to
marry 4 wives under the Muslim belief
Presented a Certificate of Conversion
(dated Aug 2, 2004) which provides that
he converted on Jan 10, 1992
Presented a Pledge of Conversion (dated
Jan 10, 1992) issued by their Imam
Claimed that Jesusa knew of his being a
Muslim prior to their marriage and that the
complaint was due to hatred
Testified that Rowena did not know of his
prior marriage, since he didnt tell her due
to fears of losing her (a Catholic)
His marriage certificate with Rowena
stating that he was Catholic and single
was in line with his ruse
NOTE: in his marriage certificate with
Jesusa,
his
religion
was
Catholic
Pentecostal, (claimed ignorance)
Defense
witness
Hadji
Madueno
(President,
Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines)
testified that he indoctrinated and
converted petitioner, and that the latter
was made to report every Sunday
claimed that he was not aware of the first
marriage but was aware of the second
explained that a Muslim could marry more
than once, but before marrying another,
the consent of the first Muslim wife must
be secured. If the first is not a Muslim,
then there is no need to secure her
consent
if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the
same is contrary to their teachings. Since
his 2nd marriage was not in accordance
with this, he advised petitioner to re-marry
Rowena under
Muslim
marriage
celebration - otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim
Rowenas Defense
alleged that she was only a victim in this
incident of bigamous marriage and claims
to not know Jesusa before the trial.
Denies the confrontation or her confession
of awareness of the 1st marriage
claims that she is lawfully married to
petitioner. Prior to their marriage, she
asked him if he was single and he said
yes.

o
o

o
o

thought that petitioner was a Catholic


prior to their marriage, but after learning
of the 1st marriage, she knew that he is a
Muslim convert. After this realization, they
married in accordance with the Muslim
rites
RTC Ruling convicting petitioner and
acquitting Rowena
There are only 2 exceptions to Bigamy: (1)
Art 41, FC and (2) Art 27 & 180, CMPL
In Islam, monogamy is the general rule
and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs.
Only with the permission of the court can
a Muslim have a 2nd wife, subject to
certain requirements
having plurality of wives is merely
tolerated, not encouraged
Arbitration is necessary: a Muslim husband
who wants subsequent marriages must
first notify the Sharia Circuit Court, the
clerk of which shall serve a copy thereof to
the current wife/ves. If any objects, an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If said council fails to secure
the wifes consent, the Court shall, subject
to Article 27, decide WON to sustain her
objection
Petitioner did not comply with the
procedure required by law
he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert
in both
marriages
(indicative of criminal intent)
petitioner mistakenly believed that he can
just marry anybody again after marrying
Jesusa
a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to
just marry anybody the second, third or
fourth time
There
are
requirements
that
the Sharia law imposes (not met by
petitioner)
petitioner
should
have
notified
the Sharia Court where his family resides
so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife
argument that notice to the first wife is
not required since she is not a Muslim is of
no moment
attempt
to
escape
liability
by
recelebrating their marriage under Muslim
rights is not a cure since the criminal
violation has already been committed
no sufficient evidence that would pin
Rowena of being guilty

o
o

1.
2.

3.

4.

insufficient evidence presented against


her as these were open to several
interpretations
Their meeting when Jesusa was introduced
to petitioners parents cannot lead to the
conclusion that she understood what was
going on
Proof against the accused must survive
the test of reason, and the strongest
suspicion cannot sway judgment
CA denied petitioners appeal
Both
marriages
werent
conducted
according to Muslim rites, thus the Family
Code must apply
His claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare
ISSUE:WON petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy
RULING:
Yes, he is GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
Bigamy.
Petition DENIED. RTC decision
AFFIRMED. Imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months, 1 day prision
correccional as minimum to 8
years, 1 day prision mayor as
maximum.
Elements of Bigamy (all present)
That the offender has been legally
married. = Legally married to Jesusa
That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code. = Marriage with Jesusa was not
legally dissolved prior to marriage with
Rowena
That
he
contracts
a second or subsequent marriage.
=
Petitioner admitted the existence of 2 nd
marriage
That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
= 2nd marriage has all the essential
requisites, except for his lack of
capacity due to a subsisting marriage
Even granting arguendo that petitioner
was of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, he cannot
deny that both ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the CMPL
(Art 14-20)

o
o

o
o
o

Art. 13 (2) provides that marriages


solemnized not in accordance to Muslim
rites shall be governed by FC.
Thus,
regardless
of
his
professed
religion, petitioner cannot claim exemption
from liability for bigamy
Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the
marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions
are sufficient proofs of petitioners liability
His false declaration about his civil status
is thus further compounded by these
omissions
In
his
petition
before
the
SC, petitioner casted doubt on the validity
of his marriage to Rowena
He may not impugn his 2nd marriage in
order to extricate himself from criminal
liability
To allow such would open the doors to the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies
Such a void ab initio marriage may still
produce legal consequences, like a
criminal liability for bigamy
Nollora v People
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in
Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her
husband of two years has another wife.
She returned to the Philippines and
learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
contracted second marriage with a certain
Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano
and Rowena for bigamy. When asked
about the moral damages she suffered,
she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for return of her money in the
amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2
marriages, however, he claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back to 1992.
He presented Certificate of Conversion
and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he
allegedly converted as a Muslim in January
1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is

allegedly entitled to marry


allowed under the Islam belief.

wives

as

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a


victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know Jesusa and only
came to know her when the case was
filed. She insisted that she is the one
lawfully married to Nollora because she
believed him to be single and a Catholic,
as he told her so prior to their
marriage. After she learned of the first
marriage of her husband, she learned that
he is a Muslim convert. After learning that
Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he
also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is
bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and
Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the
second marriage is considered null and
void ab initio under Article 35 of the
Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are
all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is
legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their
marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage;
3)that Atilano admitted the existence of
his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Atilano due to his prior
marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts,
Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his
sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, he cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were
not conducted in accordance with Articles
14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws states that any marriage

between a Muslim and a non-Muslim


solemnized not in accordance with the
Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious
affiliation or his claim that his marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion,
he cannot claim exemption from liability
for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with
the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless
he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional
cases."
Only
with
the
permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can
a Muslim be permitted to have a second,
third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall
serve a copy to the wife or wives, and
should any of them objects, an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
the said council fails to secure the wife's
consent to the proposed marriage, the
Court shall subject to Article 27, decide
whether on not to sustain her objection
(Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate
with Rowena that his civil status is
"single." Both of his marriage contracts do
not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of
one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his
liability for bigamy. His false declaration
about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a
law, and in apparent attempt to escape
criminal liability, he recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been
violated.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO,
Petitioner, v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

TOPIC:
Nature of Marriage in the Philippine
Law
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido
(Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that
she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on
30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the
said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and
Eustaquios union, they begot four (4)
children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born
on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido,
born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa,
born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952.
Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his
family and his whereabouts was not
known. In 1979, Tecla learned that her
husband Eustaquio got married to another
woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null
and void for being bigamous - an action
she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by
Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed
her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim, essentially averring that she
is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao

City,
their
marriage
having
been
celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude
Parish in Davao City. She also contended
that the case was instituted to deprive her
of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio. Then the Trial
ensued. The RTC ruled against Tecla for
failure of the latter to present the
marriage contract of her and Eustaquio.
Aggrieved, Tecla appealed to the CA and
the latter reversed the ruling of the RTC
and ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio,
while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage
between
Peregrina
and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null
and void. The CA ruled that the RTC
committed an error when it failed to
consider the other evidence presented by
Tecla. Peregrina now questions the said
ruling assigning as error, among others,
the failure of the CA to appreciate the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio.

shown by the certifications issued by the


NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant,
competent
and
admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence - testimonial and
documentary - may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS,
the Supreme Court held that marriage
may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. The testimony by one
of the parties to the marriage or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify
as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
2. In a long line of cases, a
presumption of marriage is always upheld.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the
rationale behind the presumption:

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence
presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio.
2. Whether or not the court can
validly rely on the presumption of
marriage to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage

RULING:
1. YES. The evidence presented in
the RTC was sufficient to prove that the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio. As correctly stated by the
appellate court, the celebration of
marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who
appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a
living witness to the event. The loss was

The basis of human society


throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law.
A
presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper -

praesumitur pro matrimonio


presume marriage.

Always

Anaya vs. Palaroan


36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were
married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on
the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation.
The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount
of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several
months prior to their marriage, he had
pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his. According to her, the nondivulgement to her of such pre-marital
secret constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of
her marriage with Fernando on such
ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment
to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands premarital relationship with another woman
was not one of those enumerated that
would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph providing that no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to..
chastity shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar
does not constitute fraud and therefore
would not warrant an annulment of
marriage.

Villanueva vs CA
GR No. 132955
October 27, 2006
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a
trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the
marriage. He claimed that threats of
violence and duress forced him to marry
Lilia. He said that he had been receiving
phone calls threatening him and that Lilia
even hired the service of a certain Ka
Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten
him. Orly also said he was defrauded by
Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises
that he never impregnated Lilia prior to
the marriage. Lilia on the other hand
denied Orlys allegations and she said that
Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that
shows Orlys affection and care towards
her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject marriage may
be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent
HELD:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud
and intimidation is untenable. On its face,
it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to
annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have
the pending appealed bigamy case [filed
against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On
the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of
fear was not concretely established. He
was not able to prove that there was a
reasonable and well-grounded reason for
fear to be created in his mind by the
alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a
security guard who is well abreast with
self-defense and that the threat he so
described done against him is not
sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a
ground as well. His allegation that he
never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright
lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on
the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It
took him 4 and a half years to file an

action which brings merit to Lilias


contention that Orly freely cohabited with
her after the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832 affirming with modification the
January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the
award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.
JIMENEZ vs. CAIZARES
Topic: Parental Consent - Effect of
force,
intimidation
and
undue
influence
Facts:
Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling
his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Caizares, upon the ground that the office
of her genitals or vagina was too small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation.
The Court ordered the defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine
her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof.
The Court warned her that failure to
undergo medical examination and submit
the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the
case, and that judgment upon the
evidence presented by her husband would
be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was
not present, the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The city
attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the
ground,
among
others,
that
the

defendant's impotency has not been


satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be
examined; that instead of annulling the
marriage the Court should have punished
her for contempt of court and compelled
her to undergo a physical examination and
submit a medical certificate. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed or that
the wife be subjected to a physical
examination.
The
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
W/n the marriage in question may be
annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed
and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The wife did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing,
and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
Ruling:
The state has surrounded marriage with
safeguards
to
maintain
its
purity,
continuity and permanence.
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon
the sole testimony of the husband.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot
be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established,
because
from
the
commencement of the proceedings until
the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet
from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could
not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to
by competent authority.

Her infringement in this case is not selfincrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be
a witness against herself. "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency."2 The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically
incapable
of
sexual
intercourse
is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband
and wife.
Alcazar vs Alcazar G.R. No. 174451
October 13, 2009
(Antonio,
Michael)
Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity. Issue: Was
Rey psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligation as husband to
Veronica?
Facts of the Case: On 11 Oct 2000, Rey
Alcazar got married to Veronica Alcazar
got married on October 11, 2000. After
the wedding, they lived for five days in
San Jose, Mindoro Occidental, at the
residence of Reys parents. When they
returned to Manila, Rey did not live with
Veronica at her residence in Tondo. On 23
Oct 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to work as an upholsterer.
Rey did not communicate with his wife
while he was in Riyadh. In March 2002,
Rey returned to the country but did not go
to his wife in Tondo but instead proceeded
to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At this
time, Veronica surmised that that Rey
physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient
cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 (That
either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; ) of the Family
Code of the Philippines . There was also
no more possibility of reconciliation
between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, Veronica presented Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Tayag who claimed that
Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder and recommended

the declaration of nullity of marriage


between Rey and Veronica. Dr. Tayag did
not examine Rey personally but based her
diagnosis on the account of Veronicas
interpretation of Reys behavior as
husband. On June 4, 2004, RTC denied
Veronicas Complaint holding that Reys
acts of not living with her does not
translate to psychological incapacity.
There was no showing that his alleged
defects were already present at the
inception of their marriage. Upon appeal,
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision.
The petitioner went to the
Supreme Court to review the decision
made by the CA and RTC.
Decision: Psychological incapacity must
be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal,
or
a
neglect
in
the
performance of some marital obligations.
No evidence was presented to prove that
Rey was in any way physically incapable
to consummate
his marriage
with
petitioner. Veronica even admitted during
her cross-examination that she and Rey
had sexual intercourse after their wedding
and before respondent left for abroad.
There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondents part, then,
there is no ground for annulling
petitioners marriage to respondent.
From
the
court
deliberations,
the
petitioner failed to persuade the Court
that respondents failure to communicate
with petitioner since leaving for Saudi
Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner
after returning to the country, are grave
psychological maladies that are keeping
him from knowing and/or complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. The
Court emphasized that it is not
downplaying petitioners frustration and
misery in finding herself shackled, so to
speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations
like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.
The court decided that the May 24, 2006
Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of


Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing
petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars
Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002,
are affirmed.
Topic: Formal marriage requisite:
Marriage license
Law 4 provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a marriage
licence issued first by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a licence would render the
marriage void ab initio
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO,
Respondents.
[G.R. No.
1994.]

103047.

September

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

2,

This is to certify that the names


EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA
M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on
June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no.
3196182 allegedly issued in the
municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from
our
records.

Facts:

The first case filed was in the RTC of


Quezon City by Angelina M. Castro for the
nullity of her marriafe between Edwin F.
Cardenas as she claims that no marriage
license
was
issued
prior
to
the
solemnization of marriage.
On June 24, 1970, Angelina and Edwin
entered into a civil marriage presided by
Judge Pablo Malvar of Pasay City. This
happened
without
knowledge
of
Angelinas parents.
Edwin Cardenas was the one who took
care of the processing of documents
including the marriage license. Their
marriage contract states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not live together at first
because Angelinas parents do not know
about the marriage and only in March

1971 when Angelina got pregnant that


they decided to live together.
After four months, they separated. In Oct.
19,1971, Angelina gave birth and with
consent from her and Edwin, agreed to
have Angelinas brother adopt their
daughter
The baby went to the United States. In
Angelinas desire to follow her child, she
fixed her marriage status first and sought
the help of Atty. Frumencio Pulgar
regarding the nullity of her marriage. The
layer then found out that there was no
marriage
license
issued
prior
the
solemnization of marriage.
A certification from the Civil Register of
Pasig City Manila was given by Angelina as
proof which states:
"February
20,
1987

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed


Atanacio
(Sgd.)
Senior

CENONA
Civil

D.

QUINTOS
Registry

Officer"

Angelina Castro that she never went to the


civil registrar in Pasig on or before June 24,
1970 to apply for a license or even sign
one. She testified that she only signed the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition and
ruled that the certification is inadequate to
establish the non-issuance of marriage

licence and that the inability of the civil


register official to locate such license is
not conclusive in proving that there is
really no marriage license.
Angelina then went to the appellate court
for an appeal. Appellate court reversed
the decision and declared the marriage
null and void ordering the Civil registrar of
Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
Issue:

1. W/N the documentary and testimonial


evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior
to the celebration of marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas?
Ratio:
1. Yes. Angelina and Edwin got married on
June 24, 1970. The law governing the
marital relations at the time was the New
Civil Code. Law 4 provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage licence issued first by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of
a licence would render the marriage void
ab initio. The presentation of the
certification was also recognized by the
court in accordance with Sec. 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court,
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.- A
written statement by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his
office; accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his
contain no such record or entry.
In addition, Angelina Castro was the
only one who offered her testimony

because her husband Edwin had no


interest to participate in any of the
proceedings which he was duly
informed. However, no answer was still
received from him. The only reason
they were not able to present other
witnesses
was
the
unusual
circumstance that happened with their
marriage. The marriage was a civil
ceremony presided by a judge of a city
court but the marriage is one of those
commonly
known
as
secret
marriage- a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. If we look at the
records, the marriage of Angelina and
Edwin was not known to Angelinas
parents.

Final Decision:
Petition is denied.

SY v. CA
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
> Nov. 15, 1973 - Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City
> The union was blessed with children:
Frederick
and
Farrah
Sheryll
and
established a residence and operated
lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
> Sept. 15, 1983 - Fernando left the
conjugal dwelling and transferred to
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila.
> May 15, 1988 - their son, Frederick
joined his father in Tondo and from then
on, lived with his father.

> Feb. 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition


for legal separation, which was later
amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds:
a) he abandoned her without just cause
b) they have been living separately for
more than one year
c) they voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum
of
Agreement
dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules
that would govern the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership
> Judgment: Conjugal partnership of gains
has been dissolved and regime of
separation of properties has been
approved based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed. The custody of the
children has been granted to Filipina.
> May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal
action against Fernando for attempted
parricide. She alleged that it took place
when she fetched her son at Fernandos
house in Tondo. She got mad and spanked
Frederick when he ignored her and
continued to play computer. Fernando
pulled her away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her
body, and choked her until she fell on the
ground when he thought she was dead.
> April 26, 1990 - RTC convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
> Filipina filed a new action - Legal
Separation on the ff. grounds:
a) repeated physical violence
b) sexual infidelity
c) attempt by respondent against her life;
d) abandonment of her by her husband
without justifiable cause for more than one
year
> Dec. 4, 1991 - RTC - Pampanga granted
the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It
awarded custody of their daughter Farrah
Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
> Aug. 4, 1992 - Filipina filed a petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of her

marriage to Fernando on the ground of


psychological incapacity citing the ff.
manifestations:
1) habitual alcoholism
2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead
3) refusal to have sex with her, performing
the marital act only to satisfy himself.
- She also alleged hat such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the
time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter.
RTC Decision: Denied. Alleged acts do
not constitute psychological incapacity
which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage.
CA Decision: Affirmed the decision of
RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony
2. Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time
of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity
SC Decision:
1. Petitioner, for the first time, raises the
issue of the marriage being void for lack of
a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
Petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration
of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted

before the court (Date of issue of marriage


license = Sept. 17, 1974; Celebration of
Marriage = Nov. 15, 1973)

Restituto Alcantara - petitioner; husband

SC did not find any denial of such dates


on the part of the respondent. There being
no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner
and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in
Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil
Code, the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent is void from the
beginning.

Facts:

He did not object as well the presentation


of the said documents (marriage license &
marriage certificates), which were only
photocopies.
Nevertheless,
the
said
documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed
that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15,
1973. SC, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse
party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.
2)
The
remaining
issue
on
the
psychological incapacity need no longer to
be discussed as concluded by the SC, the
marriage is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746
Aug. 28, 2007
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of CA, which affirmed the
decision of RTC (dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage)
Parties:

Rosita Alcantara - respondent; wife

> Restituto filed a petition for annulment


of marriage against Rosita. He alleged:
1. that on Dec. 8, 1982, they went to Manila
City Hall to look for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met
one, who for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
Minister of the Gospel of CDCC BR Chapel.
They got married on that same day,
without securing the required marriage
license.
1. March 26, 1983 - they went through
another marriage at the San Jose Manuguit
Church in Tondo, again without a marriage
license.
1. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing in marriage
contract, is sham.
> Oct. 14, 1985 - Rosita gave birth to Rose
Ann Alcantara
> 1988 - the couple parted ways and lived
separately.
> Petitioners prayer: after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
> Respondents answer to the petition:
1. asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
1. contrary to petitioners representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October
1985 and to another daughter named
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.
2. petitioner has a mistress with whom he
has three children.
3. he only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.

4. in fact, has filed a case for concubinage


against
petitioner
before
MTCMandaluyong

RTC Decision: Dismissed for lack of merit


CA Decision: Dismissed for lack of merit
as well as the Motion for Reconsideration
- the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a
public document is a prima facie proof of
the questioned marriage under the Rules
of Court
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between the
petitioner and respondent is void:
1. when there was no marriage license at the
precise moment of the solemnization of
the marriage,
2. when a marriage license appeared both
parties were neither resident of the place
where the license was presumably issued
3. when there was a discrepancy on the
marriage license number issued in Cavite
and the marriage license number in the
marriage contract
SC Decision:
1. - The marriage involved herein having
been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
Family Code, the applicable law would be
the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same
Code. The law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In the
case at bar, the marriage contract
between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number.
Moreover, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar specifically identified

the parties to whom the marriage license


was issued further validating the fact that
a license was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The
court still holds that there is no sufficient
basis to annul their marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but
the parties or party responsible for the
irregularity
are
civilly,
criminally,
administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage


license number in the certification of the
Municipal civil registrar, which states that
the marriage license number issued to the
parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033.
It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere typographical error. It
therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.
De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No.
160172, February 13, 2008
FACTS:
Reinel and Annabelle met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a
marriage license in Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first
sexual relation sometime in October 1994,
and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to
the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the
same date.
Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went

back to their respective homes and did not


live together as husband and wife. On 13
Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the childs birth, the mother has been the
one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a
complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City . In her complaint, respondent alleged
that she is married to petitioner and that
the
latter
has
reneged
on
his
responsibility/obligation
to
financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia
as his child. Reinel denied his marriage
with Annabelle claiming that the marriage
is void ab initio because the affidavit they
jointly executed is a fake. And that he was
only forced by Annabelle to marry her to
avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy
sans marriage may bring her. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her
support. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties
marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the
paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners forgetfulness
should not be used as a vehicle to relieve
him of his obligation and reward him of his
being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child. The
appellate court also ruled that since this
case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as
null and void in the very same case.

There was no participation of the State,


through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal,
to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof
to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can
be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is
valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The
validity
of
a
void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites
shall
render
the
marriage
void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it
is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted
their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when
she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation,
shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous
cohabitation
of
persons
outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no scandalous cohabitation to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation
at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could

push through with the marriage has no


value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure
to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Abbas v Abbas
Facts: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas
was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo,
mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which
was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said
he did not know that the ceremony was
actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage,
Gloria presented a marriage contract
signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their
marriage.
The
marriage
contract
contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar which states that
the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was
never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on
the ground that there was no diligence to
search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be
that the marriage license was issued in
another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage
between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.

HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of


the essential requisites of marriage which
is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing
the RTC. The Local Civil registrars
certification enjoyed probative value as
her duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the
local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to
overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage
contract does not make it conclusive that
there was in fact a valid marriage license
issued to him nor does it cure the fact that
no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
Topic: Marriages exempt from License
Requirement
Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with
Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
They had 3 children namely Babyline,
Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the
shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license.
They
instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of
Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the


deceased may file for the declaration of
the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his
death?
Held:
1.
Yes. The marriage of Pepito and
Norma is void for absence of the marriage
license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepitos
first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Although, Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage
to Norma is still void.
2.
Yes, it can be questioned even after
the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage.
However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final

judgment need not be obtained only for


purpose of remarriage.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent
3/28/2008, Chicho-Nazario
TOPIC: Kinds of Void Marriages: Absence of
Requisites
PETITION:
2
consolidated
petitions.
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot, both
challenging the amended decision of the
CA (11/7/2006) which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot Void Ab Initio
FACTS
24 Nov 1986 Marriage
Jose and Felisa, in lieu of a
marriage license, executed a sworn
affidavit dated the same day
attesting that both had attained
age
of
maturity
and
being
unmarried,
they
have
lived
together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years

27 July 1993 Jose filed a complaint for


Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
with
the
RTC,
Laguna,
contending:
That his marriage is a sham as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated
That he did not execute the sworn affidavit
that they have lived in for 5 years
That his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud
Joses version of events:
1986, he became a boarder in Felisas
house
3 weeks after, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City hall
where she could claim a package from her
brother at Saudi
Upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a
man bearing three pieces of folded paper
approached them and told Jose that he
needed to sign them so that the package
can be released to Felisa

Jose refused but was cajoled by Felisa


saying that his refusal will get them both
killed by her brother who had learned of
their relationship
He reluctantly signed
On Feb 1987 he discovered he contracted
marriage with Felisa
He saw their marriage contract on Felisas
table
Felisa feigned ignorance when confronted
Felisas denial and defense on validity of
their marriage:
That they maintained their relationship
absent the legality of marriage since early
1980
That because of their age difference she
deferred contracting marriage
That while their marriage was subsisting,
Jose contracted marriage with a Rufina
Pascual (8/31/1990)
That on 3 June 1993, she filed Bigamy
against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman since they were both
employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board
Ombudsman suspended Jose from service
for 1 year

RTC dismissed the complaint, dismissing


Joses version and confirming validity of
their marriage
Joses story is implausible
Jose has signed the name of Felisa as wife
in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filed in the past
Joses sister testified on their marriage
Joses action has prescribed
Art 87 of the new civil code requires the
action for annulment of marriage be
commenced within 4 years from discovery
of fraud
CA affirmed RTC ruling BUT:
(!) In Joses motion for reconsideration
claiming that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Art 76 of the Civil
Code were not fully attendant, citing the
legal condition that the man and woman
must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years
before the marriage and that their marital
cohabitation was false..
THE CA REVERSED ITSELF (!)

Citing Ninal v Bayadog:


This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity
- that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous
5-year
cohabitation
is
computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.
Marriage
being
a
special
relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly
observed.
Art 80(3) Civil Code provides that
a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.
Meanwhile, Republic of the Ph through the
OSG filed a Petition for Review, praying
that their marriage be declared valid and
subsisting
ISSUE
W/N the marriage of Jose with Felisa is
valid

HELD
NO
Their marriage which was celebrated
before the enactment of the family code is
covered by the Civil Code
Art 76 has indeed rendered their marriage
void ab initio
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The

contracting parties shall state the


foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other
Reason for the law: the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.

They have fallen short of the minimum 5year requirement


For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it
is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
We must read the law as it is plainly
written
A question if whether they satisfied the
min 5yr requirement is factual in nature
A question of fact arises when there is a
need to decide on the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts
Factual findings are ordinarily not subject
to this Court's review
We cannot accept the insistence of the
Republic that the falsity of the statements
in the parties' affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with
- Petition
AFFIRMED

is

DENIED;

CA

decision

is

Mercedita Aranes vs. Judge Salvador


Occiano
Topic: Authority of Solemnizing OfficerWho are authorized
Facts: Petitioner in this case filed a
charge for Gross Ignorance of Law against
the Presiding Judge of Balatan, Camarines
Sur,
Judge
Salvador
Occiano
for
solemnizing petitioners marriage with
Dominador Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and for solemnizing the
same at Nabua, Camarines Sur which was
outside
his
territorial
jurisdiction.
According to the petitioner, after the said
marriage, she and Orobia lived together as

husband and wife until the latters death.


After Orobias death, petitioner allege that
because of the nullity of the marriage
theyve contracted, she was denied of the
right to receive inheritances from her
husbands vast properties and from
receiving her husbands pension for being
a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
After the case was referred to Elepano,
who
was
then
the
Acting
Court
Admnistrator, she required the respondent
to comment and in his comment, he
narrated that on Feb 15, 2000, a certain
Juan Arroyo requested him to solemnize
the marriage of petitioner furthermore
assuring that all documents pertinent to
the marriage has been completed;
because of this he agreed to solemnized
the marriage in Balatan., however, upon
the information of Orobias difficulty to
travel, he agreed to conduct the marriage
in Nabua. Also, according to him, before
officiating the said wedding, he first
examined the documents and upon finding
out that the petitioner does not possess a
marriage license refused to solemnized
the wedding and suggested that it be
reset to another date. But because of the
insistence of the parties, he was forced to
solemnize on the condition that the
petitioner would provide him with the
document within the day and that he
further stressed the necessity of the
marriage license arguing that without
which the marriage would be void; but the
petitioner failed to comply.
Upon further review of the records of the
case, it appeared that petitioner and
Orobia was able to file their Application for
Marriage License but neither of them
claimed said license after it was released.
The Court likewise found through the
Office of the Civil Registrar General and
the Office of the Local Civil Registry that
there is no record of such marriage.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is
guilty
for
(1)solemnizing
petitioner
wedding without the requisite marriage
license and (2)for conducting the same
outside of his territorial jurisdiction.
Ratio: Yes. As ruled in the case of People
vs. Lara, the Court held that except for
cases provided by law it is the marriage
license which gives the solemnizing officer

the authority to solemnize a wedding,


hence, a marriage which preceded the
issuance of such license should be
rendered void.
Yes. For solemnizing marriages outside of
his territorial jurisdiction, the Court said
that under the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 or BP129, the authority of RTC and
Inferior Court judges to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court, this ruling was further supported by
the SCs decision in the case of Navarro
vs. Domagtoy ruling the same. Applying
this to the case at hand, that the
respondent judges act of conducting a
marriage in Nabua which is outside of his
jurisdiction in Balatan constitutes a
violation of the law; and although he
cannot be charged with ignorance of the
law, he may still be held liable for violating
the law on marriage.
In conclusion thereof, respondent was
order to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with a
STERN WARNING that the repetition of
similar instances in the future would be
dealt with more severity.
Navarro vs Domagtoy S.C. AM MTJ-961088 July 19, 1996

seven years, thereby giving rise to the


presumption that she is already dead.
Judge Domagtoy maintains that this is
sufficient proof of the first wifes
presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony.

The second alleged act is that Judge


Domagtoy
performed
a
marriage
ceremony
between
Floriano
Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction. The
wedding was solemnized at the judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa
which is located some 40-45 kilometers
away from where he holds office and has
jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte.

Held:

Topic: Authority of the Solemnizing officer


Sub Topic: Who are Authorized

This administrative case is filed by


Municipal Mayor Rodolfo G. Navarro in
relation to two specific acts committed by
MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy, alleging
that said judge exhibits gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.

The first alleged act is solemnizing the


wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his
first wife (Ida Pearanda). Judge Domagtoy
countered that he relied on an Affidavit
stating that Ida Pearanda has not
returned nor been heard of for almost

Presumptive Death for Purposes of


Remarriage

1.Even if the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to
contract
a subsequent
marriage
(Article 41, Family Code)

2.Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a


summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wifes presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains
married to his first wife.

3.The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan


and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous
and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Penaranda.

Authority
(Judge)

of

Solemnizing

Officer

4.Article 8 of the Family Code, which is a


directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding
provision.
Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

5. A marriage can be held outside of the


judges
chambers or courtroom only
in the following instances:

5.1

judge solemnizes a marriage outside his


courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3 of the Family Code
which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject
the
officiating
official
to
administrative liability.

at the point of death,


5.2 in remote places in
accordance with Article 29
or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.

6. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one


of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer."

7. Under Article 7, marriage may be


solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction." Where a

8. A priest who is commissioned and


allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop.

9. An Court of Appeals Justice or a


Supreme Court Justice has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are
complied with.

10. However, judges who are appointed to


specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas
and not beyond.

11. Since Judge Domagtoys jurisdiction


covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy


is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six

(6) months and given a STERN WARNING


that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

minister of the religious organization to


which he belonged for the purpose of
launching his candidacy why did he not
resign in due form and have the
acceptance of his resignation registered
with the Bureau of Public Libraries.

Vilar v Paraiso
Formal requisites marriage license how
authorized

-The importance of resignation cannot be


underestimated.
The
purpose
of
registration is two-fold: to inform the
public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions,
but equally to keep it informed of any
change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection
of the public. This is specially so with
regard to the authority to solemnized
marriages, the registration of which is
made by the law mandatory (Articles 9296, new Civil Code). It is no argument to
say that the duty to secure the
cancellation of the requisite resignation
devolves, not upon respondent, but upon
the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such
cancellation, because the law likewise
imposes upon the interested party the
duty of effecting such cancellation, who in
the instant case is the respondent himself.
This he failed to do. And what is more, he
failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged
resignation as minister knowing full well
that a minister is disqualified by law to run
for a municipal office.

FACTS:
- November 13, 1951 general elections,
Vilar and Paraiso were candidates for
mayor in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the
canvassing,
Paraiso
was
proclaimed
mayor.
-Vilar (petitioner)contended that Paraiso
was ineligible to hold office as mayor
because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines
and such was disqualified to be a
candidate under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Vilar further
contended that on April 7, 1951,
respondent applied for and was granted a
license to solemnize marriages by the
Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of
the new church up to the end of April,
1952. Such license has never been
cancelled, nor respondent has requested
for
its
cancellation.
-Paraiso (respondent) in his answer denied
his ineligibility and claimed that he
resigned as minister of the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines on August 21,
1951 and such resignation was accepted.
ISSUE: W/N Paraiso ceased to be a
minister before the date of the elections
thereby removing his disability.
HELD: No
-The resignation Paraiso claims to have
filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to
circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run
for a municipal office. If respondent really
and sincerely intended to resign as

Martinez v. Tan
Form of ceremony
FACTS
Plaintiff commenced this action for the
cancellation of the certificate of marriage
and for damages
Plaintiff claims that what took place before
the justice of the peace did not constitute
a legal marriage
Under Gen. Order No. 68, Sec. 6, "No
particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must
declare, in the presence of the person

o
o

solemnizing the marriage, that they take


each other as husband and wife."
Plaintiff and defendant were married
before a justice of the peace in Leyte
where they executed an expediente de
matrimonio civil, a document written in
Spanish, and consists of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace,
stating that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage, and
asking him to solemnize their marriage
The statement was signed by them in the
presence of two witnesses
A certificate was then made out by the
justice of the peace, signed by him and
the witnesses, stating the parties had
been married by him
Both the parties knew the contents of the
document which they signed
The couple, however, did not live together
When Plaintiff Martinez went home to
Ormoc, she was convinced to file charges,
claiming that the marriage was not valid
since she signed the document in her own
home thinking it was a paper authorizing
Defendant to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage

ISSUE
WON the marriage was valid

HELD
Yes. They were validly married since there
was an expression of mutual consent and
both of them appeared before the justice
of the peace
The
evidence
presented
were
the
following
The document itself which the plaintiff
admits that she signed
Defendant who testified that they
appeared before the justice of the peace,
together with 2 witnesses to sign the
document mentioned
One of the witnesses who testified that
plaintiff,
defendant
and
witnesses
appeared before the justice of the peace
and signed the document mentioned
The other witness who testified to the
same effect
The bailiff of the court of the justice of the
peace who testified to the same effect
Evidence consisting of letters written by
the plaintiff

On the other hand, the only direct


evidence in favor of the plaintiff was her
own testimony that she never appeared
before the justice of the peace and never
married to the defendant, stating that
although she did sign the document, it
was signed in her home, without reading it
and at the request of the defendant who
told her it was a paper authorizing him to
ask the consent of her parents to marriage
The Court believes that the plaintiff was
not telling the truth in stating that she did
not appear before the justice of the peace,
and the testimonies of the plaintiff are not
sufficient to overcome the positive
testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant
Morigo v People
GR No. 145226
February 6, 2004
Facts:
Morigo and Barrete were board mates at
Tagbilaran City for four years. After school
year 1977-98, they lost contact with each
other.
1984, Morigo received letter from Barrete
from Singapore. Soon they exchanged
letters and became sweethearts. They
maintained constant communication after
Barrete went back to the Philippines and
left for Canada
1990, Barette proposed to Morigo to join
her in Canada. They both got married on
August 30, 1990 at the iglesia de Filipina
nacional at Catagdaan,Bohol
Soon Barrete went back to Canada to
work. On 1991, Barette filed a divorce
against Morigo which the court granted
and took effect on February 17, 1992
Morigo remarried a woman named Maria
Lumbago on October 4, 1992. Morigo
fileda complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Barette in the RTC,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place
Morigo was charged by Barette with
Bigamy and he moved for the suspension
of the case.
Issue:
W/N Morigo should have filed a declaration
for the nullity of marriage with Barette
before remarrying to relieve him from
bigamy

Held:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab
intio because there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Morigos
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his
guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendantsappellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man


and wife, had but one child, Domingo de
Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio
de Leon who died in the year 1915.
During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez
lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor.
The registry of births of the municipality of
Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1,
1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, who was named
Melecio Madridejo,
On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of
Siniloan, Laguna, is known as the son of
Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of
the father.
On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at
death's door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor (30 years of age) by
the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on
the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving
Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de
Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second
husband, Pedro Madridejo.

Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May,


1928.
Lower Court ruled that the marriage of
Madridejo and Perez was valid and that
Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that
marriage.
Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that
trial court erred in declaring that the
marriage in question was valid and that
Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that
marriage.
* This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken
by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al.
from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding that Melecio
Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin
and order the defendants to restore and
deliver the ownership and possession of
the property described in the complaints
filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio
Madridejo.
ISSUES:

1. W/N the marriage of Flaviana Perez to


Pedro Madridejo is valid
2. W/N
the
marriage
subsequently
legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD/RATIO:
1. With regard to the first assignment of
error, the mere fact that the parish priest
of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the
municipal
secretary
does
not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis;
the reason for this is that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity
were not lacking in the ceremony; the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
2. In the second issue, it is evident that
Melecio
Madridejo
has
not
been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and

Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by


compulsion, before or after their marriage.
Therefore, the second marriage of
Flaviana to Pedro did not legitimate him as
their son.

o
o

RULING:
The judgment is reversed, the complaint
dismissed, and the defendants absolved
with costs against the appellee without
prejudice to any right he may have to
establish or compel his acknowledgment
as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez.

ISSUE:WON
the
accused
and
the
deceased can be deemed to be married

PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
[G.R. No. L-61873; October 31, 1984]
TOPIC:
Certificate

Issuance

of

Marriage

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
People of the
Philippines
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Elias
Borromeo
PONENTE:
Relova, J. (1st Div)

o
o
o

o
o

FACTS:
Appeal from the Circuit Criminal Court
(now RTC) decision finding accused guilty
of parricide
Jul 3, 1981: 4 y.o. niece of Elias and
Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde
Tabora (mother of Susana) that Susana
was shouting for help because Elias was
killing her
Matilde told the neice to go to Geronimo
(her son) who was working in the mango
plantation
Geronimo told his dad and they went to
Susanas hut
Geronimo could only peep through the
bamboo slats at the huts wall where he
saw Susana dead (intestines spilling out)
beside her crying 1-m.o. child and Elias
lying near Susana, holding a bloody
kitchen bolo
The dad called the Mabolo police, who
demanded Elias to go out. Elias calmly
complied (after smoking)
Dr. Serna (police medico-legal) report:
cause of death was "stab wounds, multiple
chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular

region and left shoulder." 5 incised wounds


and 6 stab wounds
Defense
concurs with RTC's finding that he killed
Susana without legal justification
Elias should only be guilty of homicide,
since he and Matilde were not legally
married, as attested by the officiating
priest on the absence of a marriage
contract executed on the occasion of the
celebration or later on
Presence of mitigating circumstances of
provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender,
without
any
aggravating
circumstance to offset the same

o
o

RULING:
Yes, they are married.
Accused committed parricide and is
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
The indemnity of P12K is increased
to P30K, with costs. Petition
DENIED, RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
There is no better proof of marriage than
the admission of the accused of the
existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs.
Paras)
Contrary to his counsels submission, Elias
admitted upon being questioned that
Susana was his legitimate wife
Persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married
Reason: such is the common order of
society, otherwise the parties would be
living in constant violation of decency and
law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco)
presumption in favor of matrimony is one
of the strongest known in law.
law presumes morality, not immorality;
marriage, not concubinage: legitimacy,
not bastardy
Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it
is an institution which the public is deeply
interested in. Every intendment of the law
leans toward legal matrimony. (Perido v.
Perido)
the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate it

o
o

as long as in the celebration thereof,


all requisites for its validity are
present
forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate to the registry is not a
requisite. (Pugeda vs. Trias)

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales


G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988
Topic: Special Rule in Marriage
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on
January
17,
1977
leaving
behind
properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful
wife of the deceased whom he married in
China.
The trial court rendered decision in favor
of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven
valid in accordance with the laws of China.
Hence,
both
parties
moved
for
reconsideration to which the Supreme
Court granted.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.
Held: No. The law on foreign marriages is
provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court
has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign
law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the


principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must
be alleged and proven as any other fact.
To establish the validity of marriage, the
existence of foreign law as a question of
fact and the alleged marriage must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng
marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still
the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or
eighty-four (84) years later.
For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom and consequently of the marriage,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
Republic vs Orbecida
GR No. 154380
October 5, 2005
Facts:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City,
Philippines. They had a son and a
daughter.In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for
the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer.
In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife,
who had been naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree in
the USA and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley and they now live in
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine
trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Article 26 par. 2 of the
Family Code. The court granted the same.
The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, contends that Article 26

par 2 does not apply to Cipriano since it


only applies to a valid mixed marriage
(between a Filipino citizen and an alien).
The proper remedy is to file a petition for
annulment
or
for
legal
separation
Issue:
WON respondent can remarry invoking
Article 26 of the Family Code
Held:
Art 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code
1. The second paragraph of Art 26, Family
Code reads: Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry
under
Philippine
law
2. On its face, the foregoing provision does
not appear to govern the situation at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her
capacity
to
remarry
3. Records of the proceedings of the
Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married
to
the
Filipino
spouse.
4. Taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, we

hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26


should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization
of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
5. The twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
(a) There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner;
and
(b) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
6.
The reckoning
point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration
of
the
marriage,
but
their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter
to
remarry.
7. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed
to
remarry.
Statutory Construction (Ratio Legis
est
Anima)
8. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,

disregarding as far as necessary the letter


of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they
come
within
its
spirit
or
intent.
Burden of Proof; Recognition of
Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts
9. Cipriano did not present any evidence
concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not
evidence.
10. For his plea to prosper, he must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a
foreign
divorce
decree
can
be
recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove
(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
(b) such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must
be
alleged
and
proved.
(c) that the divorce decree allows his
former spouse to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26.
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Topic: Special law in Marriage - lex
loci celebrationis
Facts:
Fujiki is a Japanese national who married
respondent Marinay in the Philippiness. As
Fujikis parents opposed the marriage,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. They eventually lost
contact with each other. Later, Marinay
met another Japanese, Maekara. Without
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married in Quezon City,

Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to


Japan,
however,
Marinay
allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara, so
she left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their
relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. Fujiki then filed a petition in the
RTC. Fujiki asked the Philippine court to:
1. Recognize the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court ;
2. Declare void ab initio the bigamous
marriage between Marinay; and
3. Direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate
of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office(NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition, citing the
following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the
wife...
Sec. 4. Venue.
The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the
date of filing, or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner.
The
RTC
ruled,
explanation, that the
"gross violation" of the
The trial court held
"jurisdictional ground"
petition

without
further
petition was in
above provisions.
that this is a
to dismiss the

The Solicitor General, on the other hand,


argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void.
Issue:
1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages is
applicable.
2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign
judgment
nullifying
the
subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
SC granted the Petition
1) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, the Court held that the
rule that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."
Petitioner needs to present (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic
public
policy
and
other
mandatory laws.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though

living abroad." This is the rule of lex


nationalii in private international law.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered.
While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.
2) There is no doubt that the prior spouse
has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. When Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the
wife"it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a)
3) It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.

Lesaca vs Lesaca G.R. No. L-3605


April 21, 1952
(Antonio, Michael) Doctrine: Common
law marriages, Issue: 1) Whether the
allowances for support granted by the
court to the legitimate minor children of
the deceased are subject to collation and
deductible from their share of the
inheritance; 2) Whether money received
after marriage, as purchase price of land
sold before such marriage to one of the
consorts constitutes conjugal property;
and 3) Whether 1,040 cavans of palay of
the value of 20,800 received as rent on
decedents land for the years of 19461947 should be considered conjugal
property so that one-half should go to the
widow?
Facts of the case: Baldomaro J. Lesaca
died in the City of Manila on November 8,
1946. He was survived by his second wife
(Juana Felix), two minor children by the
latter, two children by his marriage, and
three acknowledged natural children by a
third woman. In his will he named Juana F.
Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his
children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. The case had three appeals.
On the first appeal: the Court of First
Instance declared that Baldomaros two
minor children are allocated a monthly
allowance of P100.00 for their living
expenses and an additional P300.00 for
the matriculation fees and uniform
expenses. The Court instructed Juana and
Consuelo Lesaca to deposit in the court all
the allowances stated. The co-executrices
refused to make the deposit, contending
that if any amount were to be paid for the
support and education of the minors the
same should be charged against their
share of the inheritance. The primary
issue of the first appeal - is whether the
allowances for support granted by the
court to legitimate minor children of the
deceased pending liquidation of his estate
are subject to collation and deductible
from their share of the inheritance.
The Second Appeal of case stated that the
co-executrices from another order of
March 11, 1949, declaring that the sum of

P2,500 received by them as repurchase


price of land bought by the deceased
before the marriage is conjugal property
and directing that one-half of said sum be
paid to the Juana Felix.
Interestingly,
Baldomaro and Juana were married in
1945, but the three parcels of land in
question were purchased in 1930.
According to the court records Garcia sold
the land for P2,500 to Baldomaro Lesaca
before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix
and repurchased it to for the same
amount after said marriage. If the money
paid by Baldomaro Lesaca was his own
exclusively, surely the mere fact that it
was returned or repaid after marriage
cannot convert it to conjugal property.
The
Third
Appeal
discussed
that
Baldomaro did not cultivate his land
personally but had it cultivated by one
who gave him a certain percentage of the
crop every year by way of rent. The lower
court found that the 1,040 cavans of palay
in dispute was the rent or the decedent's
share of the harvest from palay planted in
June or July 1946 that is, after his
marriage to Juana Felix and which must
have already matured or been near
maturity at the time when the conjugal
partnership was dissolved by the death of
the Baldomaro in November, 1946.
Decision: The order of March 11, 1949,
declaring that the allowances granted the
minors pending liquidation of the estate
should be deducted from their hereditary
shares in so far as they exceed what they
may be entitled to as fruits or income is
affirmed by the Court. Basis of the ruling:
Article 1430 of the Civil Code of 1898 (reenacted as Article 188 of the new Civil
Code) which provides that "the surviving
spouse and his or her children shall be
given an allowance for their support out of
the general estate, pending the liquidation
of the inventoried estate, and until their
share has been delivered to them, but it
shall be deducted from their portion
insofar as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income."
The order of March 11, 1949, declaring the
sum of P2,500 received by the coexecutrices from Ramon Garcia as

repurchase price of the three parcels of


land resold to the latter is conjugal
property and that the widow is entitled to
one-half thereof is reversed and the said
sum is declared to be part of the estate of
the deceased. The widow is not entitled
to receive one half of the money. In the
present case there is no showing that the
sum paid to Garcia was earned by the joint
efforts of the deceased and his widow. In
the absence of such proof the sum must
be deemed to have been the property of
the deceased to whom the land for which
it was given in payment was sold by
Garcia. It follows that the order below
adjudging one-half of the sum in question
to the widow is erroneous. The order of
April 28, 1949, declaring that the
decedents share of standing crop of palay
planted
during
the
coverture
and
harvested after the dissolution of the
marriage are fruits and income within the
purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code
and, therefore, should be considered
conjugal property, of which one-half
should be delivered to Juana Felix is
affirmed. The Court reiterated that it is
immaterial that the rent was actually
received after the dissolution of the
marriage through the death of one of the
spouses. It is the date of accrual that is
important.

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, Petitioner,


vs. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in
her capacity as Special Administratrix
in the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and
JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY
ELIGIR,
ERNESTO
YAPTINCHAY,
ANTONIO
YAPTINCHAY,
ASUNCION
YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA
Y.
YAPTINCHAY,
ROSA
Y.
MONZON,
ISABEL Y. VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y.
YAPTINCHAY,
FELICIDAD
Y.
ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.

Facts:

Original petition on certiorari

On July 13, 1965, petitioner Teresita C.


Yaptinchay sought the Court of First
Instance of Rizal first as special
administratix and as regular administratix
of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay.
Isidro Yaptinchay died in Hongkong on July
7, 1965. Teresita alleged that the they
lived together for 19 years and has
proclaimed themselves openly to the
public as husband and wife. They first
resided in 1951Taft Avenue Pasay City
from 1946 to 1964 and at 60 Russel
Avenue Pasay City from 1965 to 1960.
Isidro died without a will and left personal
and
real
properties
in
Philippines,
Hongkong and other places estimated with
an amount of PHP500,000.
Isidro has three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir, and
Asuncion Yaptinchay all of age who on July
7,8 and 11, 1965, on behalf of other
parties took away certainproperties from
residences of the deceased which the
petitioner alleges that some are her own
personal property thus the petitioner on
her appointment as special and regular
administratix becomes an urgent matter.
On July 17, 1965, the court ordered the
appointment of Teresita as special
administratix under a Php25,000 bond.
An opposition was filed by Josefina
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife
with her other children on the ground that
even if Teresita has cohabited with the
deceased does not give her right to the
properties and serve as administratix for
want of integrity. Josefina also filed a
petition to appoint her daughter Victoria
Yaptinchay as special administratix and
herself as regular administratix. The court
has set aside its order on July 17 to give
the opposition a chance to be heard. On
July 30, 1965, after both parties were
given a chance to speak, the court
appointed Victoria Yaptinchay as special
administratix under a PHp50,000 bond.
Victoria submitted an inventory of all
assets
including
a
bungalow
with

swimming pool located in \North Forbes


Park.
On Aug. 14, 1965, Teresita Yaptinchay filed
in the Court of First Instance Rizal on the
Pasig Branch for damages and an action
for replevin and for liquidation of the
partnership formed during cohabitation
between her and Isidro. Case was
docketed as Civil Case 8873. Judge
Guillermo Torres issued an order on Aug
17,1965 to prevent respondents from
disposing properties during the pending
hearing.
On Aug. 25, 1965, private respondents
resisted the action because they contend
that exclusive jurisdiction was already
given by the Court of First Instance Pasay
City, present liquidation case was filed to
oust this court of jurisdiction over said
properties and plaintiff was not entitled to
remedy or injunction, her alleged right
being in dispute and doubtful. They also
prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction
to direct Teresita Yaptinchay to cease and
desist
from
disturbing
Victoria
Yaptinchays exercise of administration on
possession of properties of the deceased
in any manner. Employees of Teresita
inside the North Forbes Park are ordered
to be removed from its property.
In June 15, 1966, an order was issued in
Civil Case 8873, that the court denies the
petition of preliminary writ of injunction
and temporary restraining order which the
plaintiff (Teresita) petitioned is lifted. That
upon the information given while the
disputed property in Forbes Park was
under construction, it was administered by
the deceased and after his death, it was
under the administration of her daughter
Victoria. The court ordered also the
plaintiff(Teresita) to return any properties
to North Forbes Park and not disturb in
any manner the defendant (Victoria
Yaptinchay).
On June 15, 1965 the court order was
amended and clarified its decision by
enjoining the defendants from selling,
disposing or encumbering said property
while case is pending. Teresitas motion for
reconsideration for the order on June 15,

1966 was overturned by the judges order


on Aug. 8, 1966 : Considering that
defendants, principally Virginia Yaptinchay
took actual or physical possession of the
said properties which were formerly held
by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and
plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and
under
her
authority,
as
Special
Administratix of the estate of the
deceased , Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied.
Issue:
1. W/N this Court in the exercise of its
supervisory powers should stake down as
having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the respondent judges order of
June 15, 1966, in Civil Case 8873 (Court of
First Instance of Rizal)
2. W/N petitioner can claim ownership?
Ratio:
1. No. A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction
is not to be granted for the purpose of
taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of
another title thereto has not been clearly
established.
With
this
being
said,
petitioner should have been correct if she
were lawfully in possession of the said
house when writ of injunction under Civil
Case 8873 was issued and if special
administratix had no right to property.
However, the situation was different.
Properties in dispute belong to Isidro
Yaptinchay and his legitimate wife Josefina
Yaptinchay by conjugal partnership.
Teresita Yaptinchay has also shown
varying versions one on the court
stating
that
she
exclusively
contributed funds for the North
Forbes House while in the affidavit
she submitted on Aug.3, 1965, she
alleged that the deceased and
herself has both contributed to the
construction of the house. She also

gave an evidence of seven


promissory notes she had acquired
from the Republic Bank stating that
it was for the construction of the
house. But upon observation, not
one was used for the purpose of
construction having one for the
purpose of fishpond development
and other purpose not related with
the construction of the house.
2. No. Article 144 of the Civil Code states
that: When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. Conditions are provided in
this article one being that there must be a
clear showing that petitioner, during
cohabitation has in fact contributed to the
acquisition of said property. Petitioner
failed to prove such condition.

Final Decision:
Petition is dismissed.
Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter
since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote
to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of
Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors
that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and
had eventually begotten a son. Escritors
husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered
into the judiciary. On the other hand,

Quilapio is still legally married to another


woman. Estrada is not related to either
Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of
Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed
in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where
her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is
in conformity with their religious beliefs.
After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was
approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified
and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan,
Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be
found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution


adheres
the
benevolent
neutrality
approach
that
gives
room
for
accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of


the
integrity
of
the
judiciary
by
maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. There
is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar,
it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents
position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The
Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right
to religious freedom. Furthermore, the
court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom
but must also apply the compelling state
interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED
to the Office of the Court Administrator.

The Solicitor General is ordered to


intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present
evidence
on
the
state's
"compelling
interest"
to
override
respondent's religious belief and practice;
and (c) to show that the means the state
adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive
to
respondent's
religious
freedom. The rehearing should be
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office
of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.
So vs. Valera
G.R. No. 150677
June 5, 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of CA, which reversed the
RTC decision, declaring the marriage of
the petitioner and respondent Lorna
Valera (respondent) null and void on the
ground of the latters psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Parties:
Renato Reyes So - petitioner
Lorna Valera - respondent
Facts:
> Renato and Lorna first met at a party
after being introduced to each other by a
common friend. Renato was 17 (HS) and
Lorna was 21 (college) during that time. It
led to a 19-year common-law relationship,
culminating of marital vows at the
Caloocan City Hall (1991). They had 3
children
in
their
relationship
and
subsequent marriage.
> May 14, 1996 - Renato filed a Petition
for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Marriage, alleging:
a) their marriage was null and void
for want of the essential and formal

requisites
b) Lorna was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the
essential
obligations
of
marriage
because:
- she failed and refused to
cohabit and make love with him
- she did not love and
respect him
- did not remain faithful to
him
did
not
give
him
emotional,
spiritual,
physical
and
psychological
help & support
- failed and refused to have
a family domicile
- failed and refused to enter
into a permanent union & established
conjugal & family
life with him
c) he and Lorna eloped 2
months after the party and love in
Bulacan,
Caloocan and Muntinlupa.
d) he does not what happened to
the blank marriage application form and
marriage contract that he
signed in 1986.
e) no marriage took place in 1991
however e submitted a certified true copy
of their marriage contract as
part of his documentary evidence.
f) she does not want to practice her
profession as a dentist that she even
sold the dental equipment he
bought for her
g) she disagreed with many of his
business decisions that led to many failed
deals for his communication
company
h) she did not take care of the
children
i) she gambles with his employees
whenever there were no clients
> He narrated that she locked him out of
the house when he came home late,
where he felt embarrassed when his
employees would wake him up inside the
car. And one time, he found his things
outside the house when he came home
later after closing a deal with clients. He
stayed at his friends house for 2 months.

He tried to go back however he was


prevented by her and told him that he was
not loved by her anymore. He attempted
to reconcile for the sake of their children
but she refused to accept him back.
> July 17 1996 - summons was served to
Lorna however she failed to file an answer.
> RTC ordered Prosecutor Andres Marcos
to investigate of there was a collusion to
see if the evidence was fabricated.
However he was unable to make a ruling
on the issue of collusion since the
respondent failed to appear before him.
RTC Decision: It nullified the marriage of
Renato and Lorna. The RTC concluded that
Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations.
> The Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).

CA Decision: Set aside the RTC decision


and dismissed the petition
Renato
failed
to
prove
Lornas
psychological incapacity. According to the
CA, Lornas character, faults, and defects
did not constitute psychological incapacity
warranting the nullity of the parties
marriage.
although Lornas condition was clinically
identified by an expert witness to be an
Adjustment
Disorder,
it
was
not
established that such disorder was the
root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.
it failed to establish that Lornas disorder
was incurable and permanent in
such a way as to disable and/or
incapacitate Lorna from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
Lornas hostile attitude towards Renato
when the latter came home late was a
normal reaction of an ordinary housewife
under a similar situation; and her
subsequent refusal to cohabit with him
was not due to any psychological
condition, but due to the fact that she no
longer loved him.
CA concluded that the declaration of
nullity of a marriage was not proper when

the psychological disorder does not meet


the guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court in the case of Molina
> Renato moved to reconsider the
decision, but the CA denied his motion.

SC Decision: Affirmed CA decision.


agreed with CA and ruled that the totality
of evidence presented by Ramon failed to
establish Lornas psychological incapacity
to
perform
the
essential
marital
obligations.
SC did not give much credence to the
testimony and report of Renatos expert
witness, who is the psychologist, as
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant
the
conclusion
that
a
psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage. The facts on which the
psychologist based her conclusions were
all derived from statements by the
petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause
cannot be doubted.
If in fact the respondent does not want to
provide the support expected of a wife,
the cause is not necessarily a grave and
incurable psychological malady whose
effects go as far as to affect her capacity
to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied.

Vincent Paul Mercado vs Consuelo


Tan
Topic:
Bigamous
marriages

and

polygamous

Facts:
v Petition for Certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA and the RTC of Bacolod
thereby convicting Mercado guilty of the
crime of Bigamy.
v In 91, Vincent Mercado contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan despite his
prior marriage to one Ma. Thelma
Oliva(1976)

v On October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy


case against Mercado with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City
v One month after said filing, Mercado
filed an action for the Declaration for the
Nullity of the marriage with Oliva; The
year after, the court rendered their
decision on Mercados petition thereby
declaring the marriage between Mercado
and Olive as null and void
v Ruling of the RTC and CA: Mercado is
guilty for the crime of Bigamy furthermore
stating that he violated Article 40 of the
Family Code which provides that:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment
declaring
such
previous
marriage null void.
Applying this on the case at hand, the
declaration of nullity of Mercados first
marriage came only after the complaint
has already been filed and while the case
is already in trial.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of
Bigamy
Ruling:
v Yes . Because all the elements of
bigamy are present in the present case as
follows:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity
v All the elements are present when
Mercado married Tan. When he married
Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado only filed an action to declare his
first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
v Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained

before a person can marry for a


subsequent time. Absent that declaration
a person who marries a second time shall
be guilty of bigamy.
Bobis v Bobis
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Topic:
Bigamous
Marriages

and

invoke that very same judgment to


prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
If such would be allowed, all that a
bigamist must do is to disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family
Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage, cannot be said to
have validly entered into the second
marriage. Any decision in the civil action
for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case
is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge.
Furthermore, in the case of Landicho v.
Relova the SC stated that he who
contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity.

Polygamous

Facts: On Oct. 21, 1985, respondent


contracted a first marriage with Maria
Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having
been annulled, respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on Jan. 25, 1996 and a
third marriage with Julia Hernandez.
Based on petitioners complaint, an
information for bigamy was filed against
respondent in the RTC of Quezon City.
Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil
action for judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of first marriage and filed a motion
to suspend the criminal case for bigamy
on the ground that the pending civil case
of nullity of the first marriage is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The RTC granted the said motion.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent
filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes
prejudicial question to a criminal case of
bigamy
Held: No. A prejudicial question is one
which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein. Its two elements are: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. In
the case at bar, respondent's clear intent
is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage and thereafter to

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE


COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M.
REYES,
Respondents
11/27/2000, Quisumbing
TOPIC: Kinds of Void Marriages: Bigamous
and Polygamous Marriages
PETITION: Seeking the reversal of the CA
decision (7/24/1996) that affirmed RTC
Pasig, declaring the marriage contract
between Edgardo Reyes and Ofelia Ty null
and void ab initio and ordering Reyes to
pay Php 15,000 as monthly support for
children Faye and Rachel

FACTS
First Marriage
March 29, 1977: Edgardo Reyes married
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in Manila

August 27, 1977: Church wedding of


Villanueva and Reyes
August 4, 1980: Declaration of Villanueva
and Reyes Marriage Null and Void Ab Initio,
by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of QC for lack of marriage license
and lack of consent of the parties
Second Marriage
April 4, 1979: Edgardo Reyess married
Ofelia Ty, officiated by judge of the City
Court of Pasay
April 4, 1982: Church wedding of Reyes
and Ty in Makati
Edgardo reyes files a case with RTC Pasig
praying that his marriage with Ty be
declared Null and Void
Alleges they had no marriage license
when they got married
Avers that he was still married with Anna
Maria Villanueva
Nullity of marriage with Villanueva has still
not been issued
Ofelia Ty defends their marriage
Submits marriage license dated Apr 3,
1979
Submits decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court
Avers that their church wedding on April 4,
1982 is undisputable
RTC declared the wedding Null and Void ab
initio which was affirmed by the CA (after
appeal) ruling that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted
And ordering Edgardo Reyes to give
monthly support to the children (Php 15k)
Ofelia Tys motion for reconsideration was
denied
ISSUE
W/N the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
HELD

Jurisprudence appears to be conflicting (!)


NO - People v Mendoza and People v
Aragon no need for a judicial declaration
that 2nd marriage is void
YES - Gomez v Lipana and Consuergra v
GSIS there was a need

NO Odayat v Amante
YES - Wiegel v Sempio-Diy
NO Yap v CA reverted Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon
Finally put to rest when it eventually
was embodied in the Family code
Art 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgement
declaring
such
previous
marriage void
YES Terre v Terre court applied again
Gomez, Consuerga and Wiegel
YES Domingo v CA
(!) However, in the peculiar case of
Apiag v Cantero, court again said that
there is NO need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he
could contract again a second
marriage BECAUSE:
The 2nd marriage and birth of children
happened before the promulgation of
Wiegel case (YES) AND the effectivity of
the family code
THEREFORE, similar to Apiag v Cantero:
Second marriage was entered in 1979 in
which the prevailing ruling was Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon (NOs)
There was NO need for judicial declaration
of its nullity
Second marriage is VALID
The provisions of the family code CANNOT
be retroactively applied, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children
(Petitioner also made a counterclaim for
damages and attorneys fees but this was
not granted because in ordering Reyes
payment for damages, we would have a
situation where the husband pays wife
damages from conjugal or common funds
since the court has held that their
marriage is VALID)
Petition is GRANTED. CA decisions and
resolutions are reversed partially: Marriage
is VALID and SUBSISTING; and the amount
of Php15 k is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED
for as long as the children are of minor
age or legally entitled thereto

Lucio Morigo vs People of the


Philippines
Topic: Marriage-Form of Marriage
Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari
seeking to reverse the October 21,1999
decision and resolution of of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed Bohol RTCs
decision finding herein petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy
punishable by a minimum prison term of
seven months of prision correccional to six
years and one day of prison mayor as
maximum.
The facts of the case are as follows: Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete first knew each
other after being boarddmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor in Bohol for 4
years. Towards the end of school year
1977-1978 however, they left the said
house and lost contact but reunited after
petitioner received a card from Barrete
which paved way to various exchanges of
letters until they eventually became
sweethearts. On August 30, 1990, they
were married at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Pilar, Bohol; weeks after the
said marriage, Barrete went back to her
work in Canada leaving petitioner behind.
One
year
immediately
after
their
marriage, Barrete filed for divorce with the
Ontario Court which was subsequently
granted after almost 3 months.
On October of 1992, petitioner believing
that the decision of the Canadian Court is
applicable
here
contracted
another
marriage with Maria Jececha Lumbago at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish. On
September 1993, he formally filed for a
civil complaint for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage he had with Barrete with
the RTC of Bohol arguing that the marriage
they had was void ab initio in the absence
of a formal ceremony. During the
pendency of said civil case the City
Prosecutor filed a criminal charge of
bigamy against him; thereafter trial
ensued for the criminal case wherein the
RTC of Bohol found petitioner guilty of
Bigamy, likewise on a separate decision,
the same court rendered their decision on
the civil case granting Morigos petition for
the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In deciding over the case the
Court was convinced that: First, parties to
a marriage should not assume that their

marriage is void and even if the marriage


was indeed void, they should first file for
the declaration of nullity of marriage
before contracting another marriage and
secondly, the Court reiterated that a court
of a foreign country to which neither of the
parties are domiciled have no proper
jurisdiction to declare the marital status of
the parties. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of Bohol RTC in toto on the
ground that they believe that the
petitioner is guilty for contracting a
second marriage before the dissolution of
the first one as punished under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code; the appellate
court likewise dismissed petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.; hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the first marriage
of petitioner is valid thereby making him
liable for Bigamy.
Ratio: In rendering their decision, the SC
took into consideration of the trial courts
decision on the civil case filed by the
petitioner wherein they declared that the
marriage of Morigo with Barrete was void
ab initio on the ground that they merely
signed a marriage contract and that there
was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing
office. In the absence of a formal
marriage, there is also no need for the
petitioner to file for a declaration for the
nullity of marriage. Subsequently, he
cannot be likewise held liable for Bigamy
for in the absence of a legal marriage, the
requisites for the crime of bigamy would
not be satisfied. In conclusion thereof,
Morigos petition was granted thereby
acquitting the petitioner of Bigamy.
Note: Elements of Bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code:
1.
That the offender has been legally
married
2.
That the marriage has not been
legally dissolved
3.
That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage
That the second marriage he contracted is
also valid
Tenebro vs CA GR 150758 February 18,
2004

Topic: Bigamous and Polygamous Marriage

Facts:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with


Leticia Ancajas in 1990. They lived
together continuously until the latter part
of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to
Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

In 1993, Tenebro contracted a third


marriage with Nilda Villegas, before Judge
Lee, Jr. of Branch 15, RTC of Cebu City.
When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to
Tenebro. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that Tenebro, was indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.

For his first defense, Tenebro admitted to


co-habiting with Villareyes but he denied
that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other since no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union. He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work
as a seaman. He presented a certifications
issued by the NSO and the City Civil
Registry of Manila attesting that the
respective issuing offices have no record

of a marriage celebrated between Tenebro


and Villareyes For his second defense,
Tenebro argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage to Ancajas
on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.

Held/Ratio:

Best Evidence of Marriage

1. The certified copy of the marriage


contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, is admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage
was celebrated between Tenebro and
Villareyes on and it should be accorded
the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
2. The marriage contract presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence as
to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be
given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any
record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage.

3. The mere fact that no record of a marriage


exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are
present.

solemnizing officer in the presence of at


least two witnesses).
Bigamy

4. Since a marriage contracted during the


subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy.
5. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
6. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage does not retroact to the
date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding
the
subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

8. The declaration of the nullity of the second


marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. All the
essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by
Tenebro and Ancajas.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636,
convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of
the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Teves v. People
Bigamous marriage

Requisites for Validity of Marriage

7. The requisites for the validity of a


marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein
the parties personally declare their
agreement
to
marry
before
the

FACTS:
-26 November 1992 Cenon Teves and
Thelma
Jaime-Teves
married
-After the marriage, Thelma left to work
abroad and would only come home to the
Philippines
for
vacations.
- 2002, Thelma was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with
Edita
Calderon.
-confirmed
by
NSO
marriage
contract between her husband and Edita.
-2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a
complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of
bigamy.
-During the pendency of the

criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of


Caloocan City, rendered a decision
declaring the marriage of petitioner and
Thelma null and void on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to
comply
with
her
essential
marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family
Code. Decision became final by a
Certification of Finality issued on 27 June
2006.
-Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA
contending that the court a quo erred in
not ruling that his criminal liability had
already been extinguished. Petitioner
claims that since his previous marriage
was declared null and void, there is in
effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is
no bigamy to speak of.

legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring


the previous marriage void. Parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry
again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
Montanez v Cipriano

ISSUE: W/N petitioner may be held guilty


for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC)
despite the judicial declaration that his
previous marriage with Thema is null and
void.

HELD: YES.

The court held that it does not


matter
whether
the
case
for
declaration of nullity was filed before
the case for bigamy was instituted,
for as long as the offender contracted
a subsequent marriage while his
previous
marriage
is
subsisting
thereby not being able to secure a
Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged
with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of
merit.

Bigamous and Polygamous marriages

o
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from

FACTS
On April 8, 1976, respondent married
Socrates Flores
On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent
married Silverio Cipriano
In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of
her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of his psychological incapacity, as defined
under the Family Code
On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa
declared
the
marriage
between
respondent and Socrates as null and void
Decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003
On May 14, 2004, petitioner, Silverios
daughter from his first marriage, filed with
the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna a complaint
for Bigamy against respondent
Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first
marriage was already declared void ab
initio in 2003, thus there ws no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage
to Silverio on January 1983
The prosecution argued that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her etition for
declaration of nullity

RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the


ground
that
both
marriages
were
governed by the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, hence no judicial declaration
of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage
ISSUE
WON the declaration of nullity of the
respondents first marriage in 2003
justifies the dismissal of the complaint for
bigamy filed against her

o
o

HELD
No
The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of an
individual who may feel that he is
adversely affected
As a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws
In this case, it is clear that the
respondents intent was to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity to escape
from the bigamy charges against her
Capili v People
GR No. 183805
July 3, 2013

Facts:
September 1999, Capili married Karla
Medina. Three months later in December
1999, he married another woman named
Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Medina filed an action for
declaration of nullity of the second
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In
June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case
against Capili.
Before a decision can be held in the
bigamy case, the action filed by Medina
was granted and Capilis marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the
subsisting marriage between Medina and
Capili.
Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the
bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared
void ab initio that marriage never took
place and that therefore, there is no
bigamy to speak of.

Issue:
W/N a declaration of nullity of the second
marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.

Held:
- No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
- When Capili married Tismo, all the above
elements are present. The crime of
bigamy was already consummated. It is
already
immaterial
if
the
was
subsequently declared void.
- The outcome of the civil case filed by
Karla Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capilis guilt or innocence
in the bigamy case because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of
the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
- The Supreme Court also notes that even if
a party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply
contract a second marriage without having
such first marriage be judicially declared
as void.
The parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo


Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On
October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor
Alagon.
In August 1994, he later filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina.
On February 23, 1999, the RTC granted
the petition.
On November 10, 2003, Eleanor Alagon
died.
In
the
meantime,
private
complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of
respondents previous marriage with
Modina and filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent
moved
to
quash
the
information on two grounds: (1) that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy;
and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished.
The RTC held that the facts constitute the
crime of bigamy. There was a valid
marriage
between
respondent
and
Modina; without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a
second marriage with Alagon. It further
held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal
liability has been extinguished because
the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA on
certiorari. He concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondents motion to quash the
information, considering that the facts
alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.
ISSUES:

1. W/N not the motion to quash by


respondent is appropriate
2. W/N the courts judgment declaring
respondents first marriage void ab initio
extinguished respondents criminal liability
HELD/RATIO:

1. NO. A motion to quash information is the


mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or
information
filed
against
him
for
insufficiency for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information. In
this case however, there is sufficiency of
the allegations in the information to
constitute the crime of bigamy. It
contained all the elements of the crime as
provided for in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved;
(3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the
second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing
the courts declaration that his marriage
to Modina is null and void from the
beginning should not be considered
because matters of defense cannot
be
raised in a motion to quash. It is not
proper, therefore, to resolve the charges
at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial.
2. NO. Respondents claim that there are
more reasons to quash the information
against him because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before
the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him is without merit. Criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, there is already liability. The
time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information
is
material
only
for
determining prescription. It has been held
in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.


RULING:
The petition for review on ceritorari is
granted. The CAs decision is set aside,
and the case is remanded to the RTC.
IWASAWA v. GANGAN
[G.R. No. 204169; September 11, 2013]
TOPIC:
Bigamous
and
Polygamous Marriages
PETITIONER: Yasuo Iwasawa (Japanese
National)
RESPONDENT:
Felisa Gangan, Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City
PONENTE:
Villarama, Jr., J. (1st Div)
LAW:
Family Code (FC)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
VOID FROM THE BEGINNING:
4. Those
bigamous
or
polygamous
marriages not falling under Art. 41.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be NULL AND
VOID, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. xxx
Civil Code (NCC)
Art. 410. The books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein contained.

FACTS:
Petition for review of the RTC decision
which denied the petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of petitioner and
Felisa due to insufficient evidence
Jun 20, 2004: Felisa married Raymond
Arambulo
2002: Petitioner met Felisa in one of his
trips to the Philippines. She told him that
she was single and has never been
married. The two became close.
Nov 28, 2002: Petitioner came back and
married Felisa in Pasay City. Afterwards,
they resided in Japan.

o
o

o
o

o
o

July 2009: Petitioner noticed that Felisa


was depressed and confronted her as to
why.
He was shocked when she told him that
her previous husband had just died (Jul 14,
2009).
Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Felisa due to it being
a bigamous one
Evidences forwarded: both marriage
certificates, Raymonds certificate of
death, and an NSO certification that Felisa
had 2 entries of marriage. (Prosecutor
appearing on behalf of the OSG confirmed
these documents authenticity)
evidence presented are public documents
which are considered self-authenticating.
As such it was unnecessary to call the NSO
Records Custodian as witness (cites NCC
Art 410 + trial prosecutors admission of
authenticity)
RTC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove Felisas prior existing
valid marriage to another man
Only petitioner testified to Felisas first
marriage, which is unreliable as he has no
personal knowledge of this or Raymonds
death, making him a stranger to their
marriage certificate. Same reasoning for
the NSO certification.
OSG disagrees with the RTC
Evidence
presented
by
petitioner
completely establish the facts in issue.
the Law on Registry of Civil Status (RA
3753) and the NCC declared the records
and entries made by the civil registrar as
public documents. As such, these are
admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their genuineness
There was no need for the court to require
petitioner to present the NSO records
custodian or officer testify
public documents have probative value
since they are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein (NCC Art 410)
Mar 19, 2013: Felisa sent a letter to the SC
She indicated that she is not against her
husbands petition to nullify their marriage
admitted therein that she married
Raymond
and
thereafter
married
petitioner. Her marrying petitioner without
telling the latter of her previous marriage
was due to poverty and joblessness
After confessing to petitioner, they
separated


o
o

ISSUE:WON the testimony of the NSO


records custodian certifying the
authenticity and due execution of
the public documents issued by
them was necessary before they
could be accorded evidentiary
weight
RULING:
No, it is not necessary.
Petition
GRANTED.
Marriage
between petitioner and Felisa is
NULL
and
VOID
for
being
BIGAMOUS
No doubt that subject documents are
those listed by the NCC Art 410 as public
documents.
proof of authenticity and due execution
was not anymore necessary
not only are said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein
facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since no party presented evidence to the
contrary
the second marriage of private respondent
to petitioner is BIGAMOUS and NULL and
VOID
a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous
marriage (void ab initio) [FC Art 35
(4)]
there being no judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage between Felisa and
Raymond, it was still subsisting at the time
of Felisa and petitioners marriage
celebration
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones
got married in December 1914. On
January 10, 1918, Jones secured a
passport. She never heard from him again.
In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to
judicially declare Arthur missing. On
October 25, 1919, the court declared
Arthur as an absentee with the proviso
that said judicial declaration of absence
would not take effect until six months after
its publication in the official newspapers

pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code.


In 23 April 1921, the court issued another
order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence, publication thereof
having been made in the Official Gazette
and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927,
Marciana contracted a second marriage
with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial
administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones,
Marcianas daughter from her first
marriage, filed a case and alleged that she
is the only heir of her mother and that her
mothers marriage to Felix was null and
void on the ground that from April 23,
1921 (when the court issued an order for
the taking effect of declaration of absence
& publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her
mother and Felixs marriage) was below
the 7-year prescriptive period. With this,
the marriage would be null and void and
would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and


Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a
legitimate heir of Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of
Marciana Escao's former husband should
be counted from January 10, 1918, the
date on which the last news concerning
Arthur W. Jones was received, and from
said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine
years elapsed. The validity of the marriage
makes him a legitimate heir.
Republic vs Nolasco
GR No. 94053
March 17, 1993
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica
Parker in a bar in England. After that, she
lived with him on his ship for 6 months.
After his seaman's contract has expired,
he brought her to his hometown in San
Jose, Antique. They got married in January
1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got


another employment contract and left the
province. In January 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother that 15
days after Janet gave birth to their son,
she left. He cut short his contract to find
Janet. He returned home in November
1983.
He did so by securing another contract
which England is one of its port calls. He
wrote several letters to the bar where he
and Janet first met, but all were returned
to him. He claimed that he inquired from
his friends but they too had no news about
Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the
RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his
wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic
through the Solicitor-General, appealed to
the CA, contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet presumptively
dead because Nolasco had failed to show
that there existed a well-founded belief for
such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a wellfounded belief that his wife is already
dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that
Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened
to 4 years; however, there is a need for
judicial declaration of presumptive death
to enable the spouse present to marry.
However, Article 41 imposes a stricter
standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "wellfounded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found


Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain
about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to
form the basis of a reasonable or wellfounded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco,
after
returning
from
his
employment, instead of seeking help of
local authorities or of the British Embassy,
secured another contract to London.
Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient
an excuse to justify his failure to locate
her. He did not explain why he took him 9
months to finally reached San Jose after
he asked leave from his captain. He
refused to identify his friends whom he
inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said
he had lost them. Moreover, while he was
in London, he did not even dare to solicit
help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure
and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make
it very difficult to regard the claimed belief
that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
Bienvenido vs CA
Topic: Subsequent marriage, upon
reappearance of absent spouse
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo
Velasco in Manila in
1942. In 1962, without his marriage to
Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio
contracted
another
marriage
with
respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita)
with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, Chito, born
in 1961. The marriage was solemnized in
Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had
been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and
Aurelios marriage when, because of their
quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling
place for long periods of time.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T.
Bienvenido, who had been estranged from

her husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her


from June
1968 until Aurelios death on May 28,
1988. He lived with her, the last time in a
duplex
apartment
in
Quezon
City.
Petitioners daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios
son, Chito, who lived with them for about
a year in 1976.
In 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the
lot on Delgado
Street in which they were staying from the
owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued in his name, Aurelio was
described as single.
In November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a
deed of sale of the property in favour of
petitioner Nenita in consideration of the
sum of
P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
326681 was issued in petitioners name in
1985.
In 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought
this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the
sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages.
Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a
forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate
wife of
Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that
she and the late Aurelio had purchased
the property in question using their joint
funds which they had accumulated after
living together for fourteen years, that the
sale of the property by the late Aurelio to
her was with respondent
Luisitas consent; and that she was a
purchaser in good faith.
Issues:

Whether the marriage of Aurelio and


Luisita is valid.
Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio
and Nenita is valid.
Ruling:
RTC: In 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint
of
Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents
Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not
claiming the property until 1988 despite
knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio
who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration
but the trial court denied their motion.
Court of Appeals:
On appeal the respondents prevailed. In
1993, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared respondents to be the
owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Although
Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985
she knew that Nenita had been staying in
the premises, the appellate court held that
respondents action was not barred by
laches because Luisita allegedly did not
know that Nenita had obtained title to the
property. On the merit, the Court of
Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof
to the contrary, Aurelios first wife must be
presumed to have been absent for seven
years without Aurelio having news of her
being alive when Aurelio contracted a
second marriage. On this premise, it held
(1) that the property in dispute belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and
Luisita and (2) that the sale of the
property to Nenita was void for the same
reason that donations between persons
who are guilty of concubinage or adultery
are declared void under Art. 739 of the
Civil Code.
Supreme Court:
The decision appealed from is REVERSED
and another one is entered,
DISMISSING
the
complaint
against
petitioner and DECLARING the deed of

sale executed in her favor and Transfer


Certificate of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City issued in her name to be
VALID.
Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be
illegal
and
void
from
its
performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled
or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of
contracting
such
subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed
dead
according
to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.

years. In fact the couple begot a child, in


1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding
that the property in question was property
of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and
the late Aurelio because there was no
such partnership in the first place.
The sale to petitioner must be presumed.
Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale executed with all the
solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681
issued in due course in her name.
Indeed, the property in question was
acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted
for twenty years (1968-1988). While
petitioner knew respondent Chito to be
Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is
nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to
be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single.
As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito
could have been Aurelios child by a
woman not his wife. There was, therefore,
no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling
that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith
of the property because she ought to have
known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

In the case at bar, the burden of proof was


on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelios marriage falls under any of these
exceptions in order to be considered valid.
They failed to discharge this burden.
Instead the contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception
refers to the subsequent marriage of the
abandoned spouse and not the remarriage
of the deserting spouse, after the period of
seven years had lapsed. This exception
cannot be invoked in this case in order to
sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage
to Luisita because apparently it was
Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the
time of his second marriage to Luisita, he
and Luisita had already been living
together as husband and wife for five

SSS vs. Jarque G.R. No. 165545 March


24, 2006

Issue: Mere appearance of the absent


spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

Facts of the Case: In 1955 Clemente


Bailon and Alice Diaz married in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the
presumptive death of Alice she being an
absentee. The petition was granted in
1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque.
The two live together until Clementes
death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim
her husbands SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that
she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that
they be given the reimbursement for the
funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of
Clemente. They further claim that
Clemente contracted three marriages; one
with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that
Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed
that Clemente obtained the declaration of
Alices presumptive death in bad faith for
he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her
in her parents place.

She was in Sorsogon all along in her


parents place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having
extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that
Jarque should reimburse what had been
granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go
to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with
Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs
decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita
appealed the decision of the SSS before
the Social Security Commission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled
the contrary.

Decision: There is no previous marriage


to restore for it is terminated upon
Clementes death. Likewise there is no

subsequent marriage to terminate for the


same is terminated upon Clementes
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is
futile for Alice to pursue the recording of
her reappearance before the local civil
registrar through an affidavit or a court
action. But it is not correct for the SSS to
rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial
power to review the decision of the RTC.
SSS is indeed empowered to determine as
to who should be the rightful beneficiary
of the benefits obtained by a deceased
member in case of disputes but such
power does not include the appellate
power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC
ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to
Clemente is still valid because no affidavit
was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clementes death and in this
case she can no longer file such an
affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or
good faith] of Clemente can no longer be
raised the marriage herein is considered
voidable and must be attacked directly not
collaterally it is however impossible for a
direct attack since there is no longer a
marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clementes death.

G. 1 (c) Subsequent marriage, upon


reappearance
of
absent
spouse:
Procedure
Republic of the Philippines vs. Yolanda
Cadacio Granada
G.R
NO.
187512
June 13, 2012
Facts:

Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of


Resolution (Jan.23,2009 & Apr. 9, 2009)
issued by the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the decision by the Regional Trial
Court of Petition for Declaraton of
presumptive death of the absent husband
of Yolanda Granada (respondent).
The antecedent facts:

In May 1991, Yolanda met Cyrus Granada


at
Sumida
Electric
Philippines,
an
electronics
company
situated
in
Paranaque where both were working. The
two got married in Manila City Hall on Mar.
3, 1993. They had a son after named
Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
In May 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
for employment when Sumida closed
down. After Yolandas husband went there,
she was not able to communicate with him
ever again with all efforts made to locate
him. Yolandas brother testified that he
went to relatives of Cyrus to ask of his
whereabouts but failed to locate him as
well.
After nine years, Yolanda filed a petition to
declare Cyrus presumptively dead.
The petition was presided by Judge Avelino
Demetriaof RTC Lipa City and on Feb. 7,
2005, RTC ruled a decision declaring Cyrus
as presumptively dead.
On March 10, 2005, petitioner represented
by Office of the Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration on the gorunds
that Yolanda failed to earnestly locate
Cyrus and failed to prove a well-founded
belief that Cyrus was in fact, dead. In June
29, 2007, RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner then filed a notice of Appeal to
elevate the case to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 41, Section 2(a) of
the Rules of Court but Yolanda filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
CA has no jurisdiction over the appeal
sought by petitioner. She contends that
according to Article 41 of the Family Code,
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death was a judicial proceeding, in which
rendered judgment is immediately final
and executory thus, is not appealable.
In Jan. 23,2009 resolution, Court of
Appeals granted Yolandas motion to
dismiss based on the case of Republic vs.
Bermudez-Lorino and ruled that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death
under Art. 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding. Judgment therefore,

is immediately final and executor upon


notice to parties.
Petitioner
filed
for
a
motion
for
reconsideration but was denied by
appellate court through a resolution dated
April 3, 2009.

Issue:
1. W/N the CA seriously erred in dismissing
the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive death is immediatiately final
and executor upon notice to the parties
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal
2. W/N the CA seriously erred in affirming the
RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of
the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent presented.
Ratio:
1. No. The Court affirms with the decision of
CA. Art. 41 providesA marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a wel-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead,
In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee,

without prejudice to the effect


reappearance of the absent spouse.

of

The article has clearly stated that Art. 41


of The Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Under now the provisions of
summary proceedings in Title XI of the
Family
Code:
Summary
Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law, on Art. 238
and Art. 247:
Art. 238 Until modified by the Supreme
Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code
requiring
summary
court
proceedings, such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
Art. 247 The judgment of the court shall
be immediately be final and executory.
In Art. 453 of The Family Code, it provides:
Art. 253 The foregoing rules in Chapters 2
and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles
41,51,69,73,96,124,and 217, insofar as
they are applicable.
Connecting all the provisions together, the
petition for declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding and
therefore, judgment of the court shall
immediately be final and executory.
For us to be guided accordingly, the
Supreme Court cited different cases and
explained each that can be used for future
reference.
In Republic vs. Bermudez-Lorino: Republic
also appealed the CAs affirmation to
decision of RTC for the same petition.
Court held that it was an error for Republic
to file a Notice of Appeal because in
Summary proceedings under the Family
Code, there is no reglementary period to
prepare for an appeal because according
to Art. 247, summary proceedings are final
and executory.

In Republic vs. Jomoc (which petitioner


contends that superseded the previous
case): The Supreme Court does not think
the same and explained that they
reversed the ruling of RTC and CA on not
allowing the petition for an appeal
because an action for declaration of death
of absence under Rule 72, Sec. 1, (m) is
under a category of special proceedings
and is not under art. 41 which is a
summary proceeding.
In Republic vs. Tango: The Supreme Court
settled the rule regarding appeals invoking
the same under Art. 41 of the Family Code
that it is final and executory. However, the
losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorati with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the
matter to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
At the case at bar, it is evident that the CA
did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
and is not therefore, subject to ordinary
appeal.
2.

No. The Supreme Court has taken


into consideration the argument of
the petitioner is constrained to
deny the petition. The petitioner
argued that respondent did not put
all efforts in finding her husband.
They argued that Yolanda would
have gone to the Taiwanese
Consular office to inquire about her
husbands whereabouts or would
have sought the mass media in
acquiring
the
same.
Also,
testimonies were given only by her
brother and relatives of her
husband were not present to
testify. The Court has considered
this but invoked that when the RTC
rendered
its
judgment,
the
summary
proceeding
was
immediately considered final and
executory.

Held:
Resolutions of CA are hereby affirmed.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
G.R. No. 119190

the defendant using an eyebrow pencil


and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother.
he married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
> She is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.

Jan. 16, 1997


> Defendants claim: he does not want
his marriage with his wife annulled
because...
> May 22, 1988 - they got married at the
Manila
Cathedral,
evidenced
by
a
marriage contract, followed by a reception
at South Villa in Makati.

> For the first night of their married life,


they proceeded to the house of the
defendants mother, slept together on the
same bed. Contrary to the plaintiffs
expectation that as newlyweds, they were
supposed to enjoy making love, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights,
even when they went to Baguio City.

> January 20, 1989 - because of what


happened they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital.The results of their
physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal, still a virgin and no
medication prescribed, while that of her
husbands examination and prescribed
medication were kept confidential up to
this time. Her husband was asked by the
doctor to return but he never did.

he loves her very much


he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable
since the relationship is still very young
and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and
that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured
if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or
science
> He also admitted that: everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and when he
forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
> Also, according to him , the reasons why
she filed this case against him are:
she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother
her
husband,
the
defendant,
will
consummate their marriage.
> The defendant submitted himself to a
physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent.
> Petitioner appealed in SC with the
following arguments:

> Petitioners claim: her husband is...


impotent
a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed

CA erred in affirming the conclusions of


the lower court that there was no sexual

intercourse between the parties without


making any findings of fact.
in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion
with
petitioner
is
a
psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent
to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that
there was no collusion between them.
SC DECISION:
affirmed.

with another. Indeed, no man is an island,


the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is
to say I could not have cared less. This
is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation.
It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation
of family relations.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

CAs assailed decision is


FACTS:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness


to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Evidently, one of the essential marital


obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband


and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court
order. Love is useless unless it is shared

The case at bar challenges the decision of


CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to
spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was
never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It
is indispensable that the parties must

exhibit inclinations which would not meet


the essential marital responsibilites and
duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the
marriage
did
not
manifest
such
characteristics
that
would
comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get
along with each other and had not shown
gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.
In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the


grounds of psychological incapacity laid
set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity


belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must


be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in


existence at the time of the
marriage

such incapacity must be grave so


as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced


in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision
of
the
National
Matrimonial Appellate Court or the
Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting


attorney and the fiscal assigned to
it to act on behalf of the state.

Brenda Marcos v Wilson Marcos


G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Facts:

Both Wilson and Brenda


worked for the military. They met
each other when they were
assigned at the Malacanang Palace.
Brenda worked as an escort for
Imee Marcos while Wilson worked
for
President
Marcos
as
a
presidential
guard.
Through
telephone
conversations,
they
became acquainted and eventually
got married.

After the downfall of the


Marcos regime, Wilson engaged in
different business ventures that did
not however prosper, rendering
him unemployed. Due to his
unemployment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence,
Wilson would inflict physical harm
to Brenda and his children and
sometimes force her to have sex
with him. As a result, they lived
separately in 1992.

As
they
were
living
separately, one day Brenda saw
Wilson
in
her
house
which
prompted the former to be angry
that she lambasted him. Wilson
then turned violent and inflicted
physical harm on Brenda and her
mother who came to her aid. The
following day after the incident,
she sought refuge in her sisters
house.

Brenda filed before the RTC a


petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the
part of Wilson. The RTC ruled in
favour of Brenda, declaring the
marriage void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity because
of Wilsons failure to find work to
support his family and his violent
attitude towards Brenda and their
children.

However, the CA reversed


the decision of the RTC stating that
psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of
the evidence because Wilson did
not subject himself to psychological
evaluation. That it was not

medically or clinically proven by


experts and clearly explained in the
decision.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the CA erred
in setting aside the RTC decision
simply because Wilson did not
subject himself to psychological
evaluation
2.
Whether or not the totality
of evidence presented should be
the determination of the merits of
the Petition for declaration of
nullity
Held:
1.
Yes.
Psychological
incapacity may be established by
the totality of the evidence
presented.
There
is
no
requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such
declaration.
In this case, Brenda had no choice
but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine
the psychological incapacity of
Wilson, who had refused to submit
himself
to
such
tests.
The
guidelines promulgated in the case
of Molina do not require that a
physician examine the person to be
declared
psychologically
incapacitated. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical
examination
of
the
person
concerned need not be resorted to.
2.
No. The acts of Wilson does
not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his
part. There was absolutely no
showing that his defects were
already present at the celebration
of the marriage or that it is
incurable. His behaviour can be
attributed to the fact that he was
unemployed and that this was the
period that he failed to perform his
marital obligations and not at the
inception of the marriage.

At the best, Brendas evidence


refers only to ground for legal
separation and not for declaring a
marriage
void.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus ERLINDA MATIAS
DAGDAG, Respondent
2/9/2001, Quisumbing
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity under FC
36
PETITION: Review on certiorari on CA
decision (4/22/1993) which affirmed RTC
Olongapo decision declaring the marriage
of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino
Dagdag void under Art 36 of the FC
FACTS
A week after the marriage of
Erlinda (16yo) and Avelino (20yo)
at Iglesia Filipina Independent
Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on
Sept 7, 1975, Avelino started
leaving
his
family
without
explanation
o Avelino would disappear for
months then reappear a few
months wherein he would
always be drunk and forced
his wife to sex or inflict
physical injuries if refused
Oct 1993 (??may typo ata
mga online sources, could
be 1983) was the last time
Avelino left his family
o Erlinda
had
to
be
a
manicurist
to
support
herself and children
o Erlinda learned Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime
and escaped from jail on Oct
22, 1985
July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed
with RTC Ologapon for
judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the
Family Code
o Summons was served by
publication
in
Olongapo

News since Avelino could


not be located (Sept. 3, 10
& 17, 1990)
On
presentation
of
evidence, Erlinda appeared
with sister-in-law Virginia
Dagdag who testified that
Avelino has been gone for
long
RTC issued an order giving
the Investigating Prosecutor
(IP) up to Jan 2, 1991 to
manifest W/N he would
present
controverting
evidence
Dec 27, 1990, without
waiting
for
the
IPs
manifestation, RTC rendered
marriage void under Art 26
FC
Jan 29, 1991 the IP filed a
motion
to
set
aside
judgment,
that decision
was premature
The OSG likewise filed a
motion for recon that it is
not in accordance with the
evidence of and the law
Denied by RTC (Aug 21,
1991)

That the findings of


facts
are
uncontroverted

That
In rerum
natura, these traits
are manifestations of
lack
of
marital
responsibility
and
appear now to be
incurable.
Nothing
can be graver since
the family members
are now left to fend
for
themselves.
Contrary
to
the
opinion
of
the
Solicitor-General,
these
are
not
common
in
marriage.

The
Solicitor
General
appealed to the Court of
Appeals raising that the

lower court erred that the


psychological incapacity of
the nature contemplated by
the law not having been
proven to exist
However,
CA
affirmed the decision
of RTC
Emotionally
immature
and
irresponsible,
an
alcoholic,
and
a
criminal
Plaintiff is endowed
with right to seek the
nullity
ISSUE
W/N the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as
he
is
emotionally
immature
and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice
HELD
Whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions,
predilections
or
generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
Republic v Molina guidelines
1. Incapacity must be permanent or
incurable
2. Root
cause
of
psychological
incapacity must be :
1. Medically
or
clinically
identified
2. Alleged in the complaint
1. Sufficiently
proven
by experts

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.

2. Clearly explained in
the decision
Marital obligations refer to Art 6871, 220, 221 and 225 of the FC
Plaintiff has burden of proof
Incapacity proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of
marriage
Trial
court
must
order
the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the SolGen to appear for the state
Interpretations of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the
Catholic
Church
of
the
Philippines while not controlling
should be given great respect: and
Illness is grave enough to bring
about
disability
to
assume
essential marital obligations
Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2
The allegation that the husband is
a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven; crime was not
even alleged
Investigating prosec was not given
an
opportunity
to
present
controverting
evidence;
RTCs
decision was prematurely rendered
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals:
o expert testimony should
have been presented to
establish the precise cause
of
private
respondent's
psychological incapacity
o burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner
o court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the
family
as
the
basic
autonomous
social
institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family
o any
doubt
should
be
resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage

- GRANTED, CA decisions is REVERSED


Republic of the
Quintero-Hamano

Philippines vs.

Lolita

Topic:
Kinds
of
void
Psychological Incapacity
Facts:

marriages-

This is petition to review the decision


rendered by the CA affirming the
declaration for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the
RTC of Rizal Branch 72.
In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines where Lolita
gave birth to their child on November
16,1987; 3 months after which, they
celebrated their marriage before Judge
Isauro Balderia . A month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan,
however after sending money for 2
months, stopped communicating with his
wife; this lead respondent to file a
complaint and a motion for the declaration
for nullity of marriage against Toshio.
Due to the impossibility of locating Toshio,
respondent filed for an ex parte motion for
leave to effect service of summons by
publication, however, after the lapse of 60
days after publication, respondent filed a
motion referring the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. Almost a year
after which, the RTC rendered its decision
thereby granting petitioners plea and
declaring the marriage between Lolita and
Toshio as NULL and VOID on the ground
that
Toshio
failed
to
fulfil
his
responsibilities as a husband to Lolita and
a father to their daughter and that such
behaviour could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity. This decision was
appealed by the OSG, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, but said appeal
was denied by the appellate court stating
that manifested thru Toshios acts, he is
psychologically
incapacitated
of
performing his marital obligations as
expressly provided in Article 68 of the
Family Code. The appellate Court likewise
stated that the case cannot be equated to
the cases of PR vs.CA and Molina and
Santos vs CA, for the present case involve
a mixed marriage with a Japanese
husband. Hence, this present appeal
alleging that the CA erred in declaring that
respondent was able to prove Toshios

incapacity mainly because of his act of


abandoning his family and that Lolita
failed to prove the incapacity using the
guidelines set forth by the SC in the case
of Molina.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the ruling in Molina
and Santos are applicable in the present
case
2.
Whether or not respondent was able
to prove Toshios psychological incapacity
to fulfil his marital obligations.
Ruling: No. Petition GRANTED and the
challenged ruling was SET ASIDE.
1.
First, contrary to the ruling of the
appellate Court that the ruling Molin and
Santos does not apply in the instant case,
the Supreme Court found that no
distinction must be made between
marriages celebrated between foreign and
Filipino spouses.
2.
Second, the SC ruled that although
Toshios act of abandoning his family was
undoubtedly irresponsible, the same
cannot be considered as a valid ground for
the declaration for nullity of marriage for
respondent fell short in satisfying the
guidelines set forth in the case of Molina
and Santos. In addition to this,as ruled in
Molina, it is not enough that to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
to fulfil marital obligations; it must also be
shown and proven that such incapability is
because of some psychological and not
physical illness. Hence, respondents
failure to prove the same would lead to
the presumption of validity for the
inviolability of marriage is guaranteed by
no less that the fundamental law of the
land.
[Notes]
Guidelines issued in the case of Republic
of the Philippines vs CA and Molina for the
declaration of nullity on the ground of
Psychological Incapacity
1.
The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favour of the continuation of marriage
2.
Root cause of P.I must be:
a.
Medically identified
b.
Alleged in the complaint
c.
Clearly explained in the decision

3.
Incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
4.
Incapacity must be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable
5.
Illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential marital obligations
6.
That the marital obligations must be
those embraced in Article 68-71 of the
Family Code as well as Article 220,221 and
225 of the same Code.
7.
Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling should be given great
respect by our Courts
8.
Trial Court must order the
prosecuting attorney and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel of the state.
Guidelines issued in the case of Santos vs
Court of Appeals, which provides that
Psychological
Incapacity
must
be
characterized by:
1.
Gravity
2.
Juridical Antecedence
3.
Incurability
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
155800 March 10, 2006

Facts
-The Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002.
-The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo
N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void.
- SC reversed and affirmed the trial courts
decision.

-Petitioner and respondent met in August


1989, when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age.
- They got married before a minister of the
Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and then a
subsequent church wedding at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on
December 6,1990. A
child was born on 19 April 1991, who died
five months later.
Petitioner
-On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a
petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void, citing
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent
was
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent's incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present.
-Petitioner
alleges
that
respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events
or things, to wit:
(1)
She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son, and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy's parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after
their marriage.
(2)
She fabricated a story that her
brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when infact, no such
incident occurred.
(3)
She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and toldsome of her
friends that she graduated with a degree
in psychology, when she was neither.

(4)
She claimed to be a singer or a
free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company(Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family
ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was
held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.
(5)
She invented friends named Babes
Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent
herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via
Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were
not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6)
She represented herself as a
person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make itappear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala
set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly
on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts.
(7)
She exhibited insecurities and
jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up
his
officemates
tomonitor
his
whereabouts. When he could no longer
take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her
for good in November 1991.

Medical Opinion
-Medical opinion was sought by the
petitioner. He presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and
Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy
and conservative type of person. They
also observed the respondent and her
persistent and constant lying to the
petitioner as that which was abnormal or
pathological, thus, undermining the basic
relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect. They doctors also stated
that respondent's extreme jealousy was
also pathological such that it has reached
the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.
Respondents
-Respondent opposed the allegations and
claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of
her husband. She asserted that there was
no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities. She presented her version,
thus:
(1)
She concealed her child by another
man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
(2)
She told petitioner about David's
attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent fromDavid's act of
touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.
(3)
She was actually a BS Banking and
Finance graduate and had been teaching

psychology at thePasig Catholic School for


two (2) years.
(4)
She was a free-lance voice talent of
Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and shehad done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed
held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8
December 1979.
(5)
She vowed that the letters sent to
petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were notfictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while
Babes
Santos
was
employed
with
Saniwares.
(6)
She admitted that she called up an
officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one
asking for chocolates from petitioner, and
not
to
monitor
her
husband's
whereabouts.
(7)
She belied the allegation that she
spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from hermonthly budget of
P7,000.00.
-Respondent argued that apart from her
non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her
by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the
totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.
Medical Opinion

In addition, respondent presented Dr.


Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
about her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant, together with
the
screening procedures
and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs
that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez stated that there
were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes because he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent's
psychological evaluation, and that he
made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a
good liar can fake the results of such test.
Annulment by the Catholic Church
-The
Metropolitan
Tribunal
of
the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties. During the pendency of
the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent
was impaired by a lack of due discretion.
Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld
by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
CA still reversed RTCs judgment.
Facts of the case as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards

set for the declaration of nullity of a


marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These standards were definitively
laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals[44] (also
known as the Molina case[45]), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited the Molina
guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case
at bar. Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article
36 (Legal Premises used by the Court
in Deciding the Case)
-Beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals wherein the Court acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive
of
the
basic
marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
-This was affirmed in the Molina case
wherein it states that psychological
incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with
them.
The Court further observes that ,the
evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto. Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the

matrimonial bond one is about to assume.In Republic v. Dagdag:


Whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions,
predilections
or
generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court
-The Court also cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively
state
that
"the
State
recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development," and that
"marriage,
as
an
inviolable
social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State."
These provisions highlight the importance
of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
-Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code,
in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State

concerning marriage and family, as they


promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with
the essential obligations of marriage.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This
Case
The Court has consistently applied Molina
since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1)
The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected"' by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
2)
The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological-not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming,

or knowing them, could not have given


valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause
must
be
identified
as
a
psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
3)
The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4)
Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to
the
other spouse,
not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the
same
sex.
Furthermore,
such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician
may
be
effective
in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be
psychologically
capacitated
to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5)
Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown

as downright incapacity or inability, not a


refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6)
The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Codeas regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7)
Interpretations
given
by
the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally-subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

Molina had provided for an additional


requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the
petition. This requirement however was
dispensed
with
following
the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the
Family
Code
mandates
that
the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering
the
consistent
vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscal's participation in the hearings before
the trial court is extant from the records of
this case.
The Court finds that the present case
sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in
Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome
his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse.
Second. The root cause of respondent's
psychological
incapacity
has
been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial
The trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioner's factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Third.
Respondent's
psychological
incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated

friends and made up letters from fictitious


characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in
the dark about her natural child's real
parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's
psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. A person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning,
and
the
corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to
any legal or emotional commitments.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to
comply
with
the
essential
marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. As noted by the trial court, it is
difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred
when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations
given
by
the
National
Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is
the requirement in Molina that such

psychological incapacity be shown to be


medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Petitioner points out that one
month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to
make their marriage work. However,
respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent's
condition is incurable.
The Court decides these cases on legal
reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more
than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code,
is REINSTATED. No costs.

Republic v Tanyag-San Jose


Topic: Psychological incapacity under FC
36
FACTS:
Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San
Jose married in 1988 and had two children.
o Nine years, the couple stayed with
Manolitos parents. He was jobless and
was hooked
to gambling and drugs. She sold fish at
the wet market of Taguig. On August 20,
1998,

of psychological incapacity.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a
clinical psychologist at the National Center
for Mental
Health,
declared
that
from
the
psychological test and clinical interview
she conducted on Laila,
she found Manolito, whom she did not
personally examine, to be psychologically
incapacitated
to perform the duties of a husband.
RTC denied Lalilas petition. CA reversed
RTCs decision.
ISSUE: W/N Manolitos alleged defects
constutite psychological incapacity.
HELD: No
Petitioners portrayal of respondent as
jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As
the Supreme Court
said in the Molina case It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due
to some
illness."

psychological

(not

physical)

Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not


even show that the alleged anti-social
personality disorder
of Manolito was already present at the
inception of the marriage or that it is
incurable. Neither does

Laila left Manolito and transferred to her


parents house.

it explain the incapacitating nature of the


alleged disorder nor identify its root cause.
It merely states

o March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for


Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground

that "[s]uch disorder is considered to be


grave and is deeply [immersed] within the
system [and]


continues to influence the individual until
the later stage of life."
The term "psychological incapacity" to be
a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of
the marriage.
CA decision set aside.
FACTS:

On January 29, 1989, petitioner


Manuel and respondent Leonida
were married, and had three
children
o Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners,
an
anesthesiologist
and
pediatrician, respectively
After 11 years of marriage, Leonida
filed with the RTC of Las Pinas a
petition to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations
o She alleges that in the
public eye, Manuel was the
perfect picture of a husband
and father but that was not
the case in their private life
She
describes
Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian,
unreasonably
meticulous,
and
easily angered
Manuels
unreasonable way of
imposing
discipline
on their children was
the cause of their
frequent fights as a
couple
She says this is in
stark contrast to the
affection Manuel has
for his mother

She also says that


her
husband
is
homosexual and that
he concealed it from
her
She
caught
him
in
a
indiscreet
telephone
conversation
manifesting
his affection
for a male
caller
She
also
found several
pornographic
homosexual
materials
in
his
possession
Furthermore
she
saw
Manuel
kiss
another man,
a certain Dr.
Nogales,
on
the lips
o When
she
confro
nted
him
about
it, he
denied
everyt
hing
Thi
s
bro
ug
ht
her
to
tak
e
her
chil
dre
n
wit
h
her
an

ISSUE:

d
lea
ve
the
con
jug
al
ho
me
o Since
then,
Manue
l
stoppe
d
giving
suppor
t
to
their
childre
n
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a
clinical psychologist, was presented
to prove Leonidas claim
o She
testified
that
she
conducted
evaluative
interviews and psychiatric
tests on Leonida
o She also had a one time
interview with Manuel face
to face
She concluded that
Manuel
is
psychologically
incapacitated
and
such incapacity is
marked
by
antecedence,
existing even before
the marriage and
appeared
to
be
incurable
Manuel countered that the true
cause of Leonidas hostility against
him was their professional rivalry,
Leonidas wife owning a hospital
withing the same area as Manuels
RTC nullified the marriage, not on
the ground of Art 36, but Art 45 of
the FC
CA denied the appeal

WON the marriage between the two can


be declared as null and void due to fraud
by reason of Manuels concealment of his
homosexuality

HELD:

Concealment of homosexuality is
the proper ground to annul a
marriage, not homosexuality per se
It is not proven that Manuel is a
homosexual
o No sufficient proof was
presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel
is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at
the time of their marriage
The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuels
sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses, and
took
cognizance
of
Manuels
peculiarities and interpreted them
against his sexuality
o These mush not be ruled as
indications of his sexuality
as they are not conclusive
and
are
not
sufficient
enough to prove so
Even granting that Manuel is
homosexual, there was nothing in
the complaint or anywhere in the
case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonidas consent
to the marriage had been vitiated
by such

G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009


MARIETA C. AZCUETA, Petitioner,
versus
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents

the RTCs decision. However, petitioner


brought before the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Marietta C. Azcueta, the petitioner, and
Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24,
1993, less than two months after their first
meeting, at St. Anthony of PaduaChurch,
Antipolo City.
At the time of their
marriage, petitioner was 23 years old
while respondent was 28. They had no
children; thy separated in 1997 after four
years of marriage.
Marietta filed a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with Rodolfo
Azcueta before RTC on the ground of
psychological incapacitated. Her husband
was not gainfully employed and never
bothered to look for a job. He just relied on
the allowance given by his mother who
also paid the rentals for the room the
couple lived in.
It was found through the testimony of Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, the psychiatrist presented
by Marietta, that Rodolfo was suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder
characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his
own decisions and dependency on other
people. She added that the problem began
during the early stages of Rodolfos life
but manifested only after his marriage and
that the problem was severe because he
would not be able take on the
responsibilities of a spouse. Moreover, the
disorder was incurable because it began in
early development and had been deeply
ingrained in his personality. Thus, she
concluded
that
Rodolfo
was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital duties and responsibilities.
RTC subsequently declared that the
marriage void ab initio. However, the
Solicitor General appealed the RTCs
decision since the psychiatric report was
purely based on the information given by
Marietta. The Court of Appeals reversed

W/N
Rodolfo
is
psychologically
incapacitated to justify a declaration that
his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code

HELD/RATIO:
YES.
Rodolfo
was
psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties
because of his Dependent Personality
Disorder.

First, petitioner successfully discharged


her burden to prove the psychological
incapacity of her husband. The totality of
evidence presented is adequate to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.
Mariettas testimony was corroborated in
material points by Rodolfos close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrists
testimony linking the manifestations of
Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

Second, the root cause of Rodolfos


psychological
incapacity
has
been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the petition, sufficiently proven by expert
testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial courts decision. As alleged in the
petition, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed, relied on his mother too much,
had inadequate sexual relations with
Marietta (once a month only as he looked
at sex as being sacred and that he could
not distinguish his wife from the his
mother), and refused to have children.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity


was established to have clearly existed at
the time of and even before the

celebration
of
marriage.
The
manifestations of Rodolfos dependent
personality disorder existed even prior to
the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by-product of his
upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity


has been shown to be sufficiently grave,
so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The fact
that at the time of his marriage to
petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or
the fact that the expert testimony has
identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for his abnormal behavior cannot be
overlooked.

RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The Amended
Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo
City is REINSTATED.
HALILI v. HALILI
[G.R. No. 165424; June 9, 2009]
PETITIONER: Lester Halili
RESPONDENT: Chona Halili
PONENTE: Corona, J.
LAW: Art. 36, Family Code (FC)

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply


with the essential marital obligations
embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one
who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic and
ordinary matters.

Sixth,
the
incurability
of Rodolfos
condition which has been deeply ingrained
in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained
by the expert witness.

Lastly, it is a settled principle of civil


procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.

Since
Rodolfos
psychologically
incapacitated had been established, the
marriage is void ab initio.

FACTS:
This decision resolves the MR of the April
16, 2008 SC resolution which denied
petitioners petition to set aside CA
decision
(which declared parties marriage as valid)
Petitioner sought to declare his marriage
to respondent null and void due to
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential
obligations of marriage in the RTC Pasig
City
o alleged that he wed respondent in civil
rites thinking that it was a joke
o After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband & wife, but
maintained the relationship
o They started fighting constantly a year
later, so petitioner stopped seeing
respondent and started dating other
women
o He received prank calls telling him to
stop dating other women as he was
already a married man

o It was only upon making an inquiry that


he found out that the marriage was not
fake

petitioners expert witness testified that


petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder

RTC declared the marriage null & void

o Te v. Yu-Te: courts should rule on


psychological
incapacity
(for
the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-tocase basis guided by experience, expert
findings in psychological disciplines and by
decisions of church tribunals

o found petitioner to be suffering from a


mixed personality disorder (dependent
and self-defeating personality disorder)
o held that petitioners personality
disorder was serious and incurable and
directly affected his capacity to comply
with

o Courts have the burden of making


decisions, but we must still consider as
essential the expert opinion on the

CA reversed and set aside the RTC


decision

Dr. Dayans testimony:

o totality of the evidence presented failed


to establish petitioners psychological
incapacity

o He is suffering from a mixed personality


disorder

from
self-defeating
to
[dependent] personality disorder (grave,

o Petitioners MR was denied

psychological and mental disposition of


the parties

SC affirmed CAs decision


o Petitioner filed MR, reiterating his
arguments that his evidence, especially
the testimony of his expert witness, was
as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Dayan
his essential
respondent

marital

obligations

to

more than enough to sustain the


conclusion that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying
with the
essential obligations of marriage
ISSUE: WON the evidence presented is
enough to declare him as psychologically
incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage
RULING:
YES,
it
is.
Motion
for
Reconsideration GRANTED. Marriage is
NULL & VOID for psychological incapacity.

incurable, and already existent at the time


of the celebration of his marriage)
disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle
their capabilities
fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments
o evident in the fact that petitioner was
very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions
o allowed himself to be dominated by his
father and, later, by respondent
o brought about by his dysfunctional
family (abusive, domineering father;
unhappy mother; children w/o affirmation)
o he also suffered from partner relational
problem during his marriage with Chona
o His motivation for marriage was very
questionable, as it was a very impulsive,
spur-of-the-moment decision

o He didnt understand what it meant to


be married. After the marriage, there was
no consummation, sexual
o After 3 months, he refused to see or talk
with the respondent and the relationship
died a natural death
o they didnt appreciate the civil [rites
which] they had undergone or even
considered themselves married
personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible
ways
of
behaving
(as
dysfunctional styles of living). These
disorders affect all
areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for
others.
intercourse, or cohabitation. He never
thought it was a really serious matter at
all.
After 3 months, he refused to see or talk
with the respondent and the relationship
died a natural death
o they didnt appreciate the civil [rites
which] they had undergone or even
considered themselves married
personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible
ways
of
behaving
(as
dysfunctional styles of living). These
disorders affect all
areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for
others.

Digna Najera vs. Eduardo Najera


G.R. No 164817
July 3, 2009
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts of the case:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner
filed with the RTC a verified Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with


Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation,
with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. In support
of her petition, she claimed:
1.
that at the time of the
celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage.
2. that at the earlier part of their
married life, she was the only one working
for them. Eduardo was unemployed. That
when respondent became seaman and
while on board a ship, respondent refused
to give support to their family.
3. That when the respondent came
home from abroad, nothing in their life
happened but quarrels and she always
suffered beatings from the respondent.
4. As a seaman, respondent was
away from home from nine to ten months
each year. In May 1989, when he came
home from his ship voyage, he started to
quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused
her of having an affair with another man.
He took to smoking marijuana and tried to
force petitioner into it. When she refused,
he insulted her and uttered unprintable
words against her. He would go out of
the house and when he arrived home, he
was always drunk.
5. Respondent left the family home,
taking along all their personal belongings.
He lived with his mother at Pangasinan,
and he abandoned petitioner.
6. a Psychologist was able to
examine the petitioner but not the
respondent. Psychologist Cristina Gates
testified that the chances of curability of
respondents psychological disorder were
nil. Its curability depended on whether
the established organic damage was
minimal -- referring to the malfunction of
the composites of the brain brought about
by habitual drinking and marijuana, which

possibly
afflicted
respondent
with
borderline
personality
disorder
and
uncontrollable impulses.
7. Petitioner disclosed that she also
filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on
the ground of psychological incapacity of
respondent.
8. Petitioner even alleged that she
was tried to kill by the respondent.
After the trial, the RTC promulgated
a decision but only a decree of legal
separation and not for declaration of
nullity of marriage dissolution of conjugal
property. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed
to the CA, petitioner alleged that the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
made a declaration of nullity of their
marriage. But the CA did not give
credence on the said decree because the
basis in annulling the said decree was not
based on psychological incapacity of the
respondent. CA also reasoned out that the
totality of evidence especially the
Psychology Report of Ms. Gates was not
convincing to warrant the reversal of RTC
decision. Not satisfied, petitioner appealed
the case via petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
The main issue is whether or not
the totality of petitioners evidence was
able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage
that would justify annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
No. the petition is untenable. The
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove
that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of

respondents
alleged
psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by
experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. The
petitioner also failed to prove that the
maltreatment made upon her by the
respondent was a ground for nullity of
marriage. Such ground was only for legal
separation. The factual basis of the
decision of National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is not also binding to the court
because the basis of such decision was
refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential
matrimonial
rights
and
obligations to be mutually given and
accepted and not on psychological
incapacity as what was alleged in the
Regional Trial Court by the petitioner.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that
the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina
Gates
regarding
the
psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by
the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.

The petition was denied.


Camacho-Reyes vs Reyes
GR No. 185286
August 18, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes
met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19
years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents
style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university students
budget. At that time, respondent held a
job in the family business, the Aristocrat
Restaurant. Petitioners good impression
of the respondent was not diminished by
the latters habit of cutting classes, not
even by her discovery that respondent
was taking marijuana. On December 5,
1976, petitioner and respondent got
married. They lived with Ramons parents

and they were supported by them. They


had a child which made their financial
difficulties worse. All the business
ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and
Socorro became the breadwinner of the
family. To make things worse, despite the
fact that Socorro would undergo an
operation for removal of a cyst,
respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive;
and
simply
read
the
newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany
her as she was wheeled into the operating
room. They tried to attend counseling
sessions but nothing has changed.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed
that respondent was having an extramarital affair. RTC granted the petition to
nullify the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. CA reversed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically
incapacitated
Ruling:
Yes, there existed psychological incapacity.
The marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent was nullified. Psychological
incapacity was shown by respondents (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extramarital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4)
failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a
job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of
estafa.
The high
court
found that
the marriage between the parties from its
inception had this congenital infirmity w
hichpertains to the inability of the parties
to
effectively
function
emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each
other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect
as well as to mutually render help and
support as mandated by Article 68 of the
Family Code.
Such finding was anchored by the unanim
ous findings of three psychology
experts: petitioner manifested inadequaci
es along her affective sphere that made h
er less responsive to the emotional needs
of her husband, while the respondent
manifested
strong
senseof Inadequacy along masculine strivi

ngs and narcissistic features that renders


him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and re
sponsibilities of marriage. The Supreme
Court further ruled that such psychological
incapacity, as stated by psychology
experts, is permanent, incurable, and
stable
over
time,
and
mere
recommendation of one psychology expert
that the incapacity is curable does not
automatically imply curability. The Court
arrived with such decision even though
two of the consulted experts based their
findings on mere hearsays while only one
based it from factual antecedence.
Therefore, the case has the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability
the three requirements of nullifying
marriage
based
on
psychological
incapacity.
Republic vs. Encelan
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:
Cesar Married Lolita, and they
had two children. To support the family,
Cesar went abroad and worked as an OFW
in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working
abroad, Cesar learned that Lolita is having
an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal
dwelling together with the two children.
But even with such circumstances, Cesar
never failed to send financial support for
the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a
petition against Lolita for the declaration
of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolitas psychological incapacity. Cesar,
during a hearing even presented a
psychological evaluation report on Lolita
with the finding that Lolita was not
suffering from any form of psychiatric
illness, but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good
and lasting marital relationship.... and her
transferring from one job to another
depicts some interpersonal problem with
co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal
to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital
and family relationship... Cesar found
ally in RTC as it gave him a favourable
decision which declared his marriage to
Lolita null and void. The court of Appeals

also affirmed the decision of RTC, and


thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not psychological
incapacity is indeed present in the person
of Lolita as to nullify a valid marriage.
Ruling:
No. Marriage is an inviolable
social institution protected by the State
and any doubt should be resolved in
favour of its existence and continuation
against its dissolution and nullity. In this
case, sexual infidelity and abandonment
of the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these
are simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered
personality
that
actually
prevented
the
erring
spouse
from
discharging
the
essential
marital
obligations, which the court found not
present in the person of Lolita.
2. Who can invoke nullity
Section
2(a)
of The
Rule
on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect
on March 15, 2003, provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
Catalan vs. Court of Appeals, 514
SCRA 607, February 6, 2007
Facts:

Petition for review assailing the


decision of the court of appeals

Orlando Catalan and Felicitas


Catalan were married on June 4,
1950 in Mabini Pangasinan. They
went to United States of America
and eventually became naturalized
citizens. After 38 years of marriage,
both got divorced on April 1988.

Two months (June 16, 1988) after


the
divorce,
Orlando married
Merope in calasiao pangasinan.

Petitioner Felicitas alleges that


such marriage between Orlando
and Merope was bigamous because
Merope had a subsisting marriage
with certain Eugenio Bristol and a
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages was filed
against Orlando and Merope by
petitioner
Felicitas
in
RTC
Dagupan.

Respondents filed a motion to


dismiss on the ground that
petitioner is not the real party in
interest but was denied by RTC.
Trial ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC


rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in
favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan
and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as
follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope
Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is
declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral
damages the amount of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, including costs of
this suit; andcralawlibrary
3) The donation in consideration of
marriage is ordered revoked and the
property donated is ordered awarded to
the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Respondents appealed to the court


of appeals which the latter
reversed the decision of rtc in part:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby
GRANT
the
appeal
and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS
Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44,
Dagupan City. No costs.

After motion for reconsideration


was denied, instant petition was
raised in this court
Issue:

1. W/N petitioner has the required


standing in court to question the nullity of
the mariage between respondents
2. W/N the failure of the Court of Appeals
to declare the questioned marriage void
constitutes reversible error.
Ratio:
1. The two basic ones of divorce are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force
A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest iand must be
based on a cause of actionii
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of the
marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.iii
According to Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15,
2003, provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
However, If it was proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the
decree does not allow Orlando to remarry,
the
trial
court
shall
declare
the
respondent's marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio but if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allows
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the petition to declare nullity
of marriage on the ground that petitioner
lacks legal personality to file such
petition.
2. A settled rule is that the Court is not a
trier of facts and does not undertake the
re-examination of evidence presented by
parties during the trial of the case but an
exception to this is when the findings of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals are

conflicting or when the findings are


conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based. Upon
findings of the pieces of evidence provided
to the RTC and Court of Appeals, the
evidence lack competent proof that they
are indeed naturalized and a divorce
decree was obtained.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. iv
However, before it can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts, cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.v Without the
divorce decree and foreign law as part of
the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality
to file the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
In such case, the RTC would be correct to
declare the marriage of the respondents
void for being bigamous, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan
dated December 21, 1959 between
Eusebio
Bristol
and
respondent
Merope,vi and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between
the respondents.vii
Held:
Case is remanded to trial court for proper
disposition

Avenido Vs Avenido G.R. No. 173540


January 22, 2014
Doctrine: Rules of evidence to prove
marriage, Issue: Failure to produce a
marriage certificate as evidence that
the marriage is null and void
Facts of the case: Tecla Hoybia Avenido
filed November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido on the
ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the

deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).


In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on
30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the
said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certification was issued by the LCR. In
1979, Tecla learned that her husband
Eustaquio got married to another woman
by the name of Peregrina, which marriage
she claims must be declared null and void
for being bigamous.
On April 1999,
Peregrina filed her answer to the
complaint with counterclaim, essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on
September 22, 1989 in Davao City, their
marriage having been celebrated on
March 30, 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was
instituted to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir
of Eustaquio.
During the trial, presented the testimonies
of three persons which include herself to
attest to her marriage to Eustaquio, as
well
as
submitting
pertinent
legal
documents to substantiate her marriage.
On the other hand, Peregrina contend that
her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on March 1979; her life as a
wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well
as her knowledge that Tecla is not the
legal wife, but was once a common law
wife of Eustaquio. The RTC decided that
the petition for the DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE filed by Tecla is
denied.
The counter claim filed by
Peregrina was dismissed. Tecla elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals. In its
August 31, 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in

favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of


her
marriage
to
Eustaquio,
while
pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage
between
Peregrina
and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null
and void. The CA emphasized that the:
the court a quo committed a reversible
error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of Adelina, the sister of
Eustaquio
who
testified
that
she
personally
witnessed
the
wedding
celebration of her older brother and Tecla
Climaco, the eldest son of Eustaquio and
Tecla, who testified that his mother was
married to his father, and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.
Peregrina questions the CA ruling because
the CA failed to appreciate the validity of
her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises
the following legal issues: 1. Whether or
not the court can validly rely on the
"presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage; 2.
Whether or not secondary evidence may
be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence
and the cause of the unavailability of the
best evidence, the original document; and,
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage
issued by the church has a probative value
to prove the existence of a valid marriage
without the priest who issued the same
being presented to the witness stand.
Decision: The Court stated that based on
the ruling made by the RTC Tecla could not
produce the documents to prove her
marriage to Eustaquio and did not take

into
account
the
testimonies
she
presented. The CA, on the other hand,
concluded that there was a presumption of
lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as
husband and wife and produced four
children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the
trial court, as well as the testimonial
evidence especially that of Adelina,
created sufficient proof of the fact of
marriage.
The Court upheld the CA ruling and cited
the case of Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni to substantiate its
decision. Said case stated that: While a
marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
persons
birth
certificate
may
be
recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents. The Court
reiterated that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented,
secondary
evidencetestimonial
and
documentarymay be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. The establishment of
the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla;
the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity
Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. The Petition
to reverse the CA decision is denied. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina
Macua
Avenido
and the
deceased
Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
AURORA
A.
ANAYA, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
FERNANDO
O.
PALAROAN, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. L-27930. November 26, 1970


Facts:

Petitioners appeal from an order of


dismissal of Civil Case No. E-00431
on the complaint of annulment of
marriage between Aurora and
Fernando
Palaroan
issued
by
Juvenile&Domestic Relations Court,
Manila
Petitioner
and
Fernando
(respondent) got married on Dec.
4, 1953.
Fernando filed for an annulment of
marriage on Jan. 7, 1954 by reason
of force and intimidation.
It was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civil Case No.
21589) and judgment was made on
Sept.
23,
1959
dismissing
Fernandos complaint and retaining
the marriage of Aurora and
Fernando.
The
Court
granted
Auroras
contention that while the amount
(payment) of counterclaim was
placed under negotiation to settle
the judgment; Fernando confessed
to Aurora that months before their
marriage, he had a pre-marital
relationship with one of his close
relative and this non-divulgement
to her has definitely wrecked their
marriage. This confession has
therefore made her want to put a
stop to it as their marriage
constituted FRAUD in obtaining her
consent, in accordance with no. 4
of Art. 85 of the Civil Code. She
seeks for the annulment of
marriage and moral damages.
Fernando denied having pre-marital
relations with a close relative. He
also said that he and Aurora never
lived together as he escaped from
her and her relatives after they got
married on Dec. 4, 1953. He now
alleges Aurora to have a lack of

cause of action and estoppel


(A legal principle that bars a party f
rom denying or alleging a certain f
act owing to that party's previous c
onduct, allegation, or denial.) for
her having prayed in Civil Case No.
21589 for validity of marriage and
enjoying the support that had been
granted to her.
Fernando
counterclaimed
for
damages for malicious filing of the
suit. However, he did not pray for
the dismissal of the complaint but
for the dismissal on the alleged
moral damages.
Aurora in her reply made several
allegations to quote:

and to convince them of his


intention not to live with plaintiff,
carried on a courtship with a third
girl with whom, after gaining the
latters love cohabited and had
several children during the whole
range of nine years that Civil Case
No. 21589, had been litigated
between them (parties);" (Record
on
Appeal,
pages
10-11)

"(1) that prior to their marriage on


4 December 1953, he paid court to
her, and pretended to shower her
with love and affection not because
he really felt so but because she
merely happened to be the first girl
available to marry so he could
evade marrying the close relative
of his whose immediate members
of her family were threatening him
to force him to marry her (the close
relative);
"(2) that since he contracted the
marriage for the reason intimated
by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the
very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligations
appurtenant
thereto,
and
furthermore, he covertly made up
his mind not to live with her;
"(3) that the foregoing clandestine
intentions intimated by him were
prematurely concretized for him,
when in order to placate and
appease the immediate members
of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative)

Because of the failed attempt to


reconcile both parties, trial was
scheduled to proceed on August
26, 1966. This was postponed.
When the court was reviewing the
expediente
(documents)
,they
found out that Auroras allegations
were insufficient citing the case of
Brown vs. Yambao, 102 PHIL 168
to quote:
"It is true that the wife has not
interposed
prescription
as
a
defense. Nevertheless, the courts
can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree
of legal separation, or annulment
of marriage, involve public interest,
and it is the policy of our law that
no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear
upon
the
record."

The court required Aurora to


submit a memorandum the reason
why the case should not be
dismissed. When Aurora submitted
such memorandum, the Court
found it inadequate and on Oct. 7,
1966 the Court dismissed the
complaint. The Court also denied
for reconsideration.

Issue:
1. W/N the non-disclosure to a wife by
her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is

a
ground
marriage

for

annulment

of

Ratio:
1. No. The non-disclosure is not a
ground for annulment of marriage.
If we take a look at Art. 85 Par. 4 of
the Civil Code (now Art. 45 Par. 3 of
the Family Code):

"ART. 85. A marriage may be


annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

"(4) That the consent of either


party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other as her husband or his wife, as
the case may be;"

Under Art. 86 (now Art. 46 of the


Family Code and amended), the
circumstances
that
constitutes
fraud are specified stating that:

"ART. 86. Any of the following


circumstances
shall
constitute
fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the


identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous
conviction of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude,
and the penalty imposed was

imprisonment
more;

for

two

years

or

(3) Concealment by the wife of the


fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband.
"No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of
marriage."
The non-disclosure of Fernando to Aurora
of the alleged pre-marital relations to a
close relative was not indicated in the said
provisions. Art. 86 was enacted by the
Congress to specifically mention the scope
of fraud. The legislative made it clear that
only those enumerated are the only
circumstances that constitute fraud by
including the last paragraph of Art. 86 that
no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage.
Although the Court feels the grief of
Aurora on the lewd acts of her husband,
they cannot relax the provision as she is
not the only interested party in the
marriage constituted but the Society as
well.
Aurora has stressed another fact that
since her marriage with Fernando,
Fernando failed to do his marital duties
and obligations and covertly made up his
mind not to live together. She said that the
Court failed to emphasize this fact too.
Aurora amended her reply in answer
adding another allegation. The Court in
their reply has said that this is another
cause of action entirely different from the
first cause that Aurora presented and
would mean that another case would have
to be filed to accommodate the cause of

action. The Court cannot accept changes


not alleged in the first reply of Aurora as
this would make the case endless. Also,
even if Auroras contention of Fernandos
failure for marital obligations were indeed
true, she would have raised this four years
within their marriage. Seeing that they
were married in 1953 and pleadings only
started on 1966, it must be declared
already barred.
Held:
Appealed order is affirmed
SY v. CA
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
> Nov. 15, 1973
- Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City
> The union was blessed with children:
Frederick
and
Farrah
Sheryll
and
established a residence and operated
lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
> Sept. 15, 1983 - Fernando left the
conjugal dwelling and transferred to
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila.

that would govern the dissolution of their


conjugal partnership
> Judgment: Conjugal partnership of gains
has been dissolved and regime of
separation of properties has been
approved based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed. The custody of the
children has been granted to Filipina.
> May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal
action against Fernando for attempted
parricide. She alleged that it took place
when she fetched her son at Fernandos
house in Tondo. She got mad and spanked
Frederick when he ignored her and
continued to play computer. Fernando
pulled her away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her
body, and choked her until she fell on the
ground when he thought she was dead.
> April 26, 1990 - RTC convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
> Filipina filed a new action - Legal
Separation on the ff. grounds:

> May 15, 1988 - their son, Frederick


joined his father in Tondo and from then
on, lived with his father.

a) repeated physical violence

> Feb. 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition


for legal separation, which was later
amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds:

c) attempt by respondent against her life;

a) he abandoned her without just cause


b) they have been living separately for
more than one year
c) they voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum
of
Agreement
dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules

b) sexual infidelity

d) abandonment of her by her husband


without justifiable cause for more than one
year
> Dec. 4, 1991 - RTC - Pampanga granted
the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It
awarded custody of their daughter Farrah
Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.

> Aug. 4, 1992 - Filipina filed a petition for


the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity citing the ff.
manifestations:
1) habitual alcoholism
2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead
3) refusal to have sex with her, performing
the marital act only to satisfy himself.
- She also alleged hat such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the
time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter.
RTC Decision: Denied. Alleged acts do not
constitute psychological incapacity which
may warrant the declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage.
CA Decision: Affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony
Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time
of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity
SC Decision:
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the
issue of the marriage being void for lack of
a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage

license are different and incongruous.


Petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration
of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted
before the court (Date of issue of marriage
license = Sept. 17, 1974; Celebration of
Marriage = Nov. 15, 1973)
SC did not find any denial of such dates on
the part of the respondent. There being no
claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner
and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in
Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil
Code, the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
He did not object as well the presentation
of the said documents (marriage license &
marriage certificates), which were only
photocopies.
Nevertheless,
the
said
documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed
that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15,
1973. SC, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse
party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.

The remaining issue on the psychological


incapacity need no longer to be discussed
as concluded by the SC, the marriage is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license
at
the
time
their
marriage
was
solemnized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage


between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.

Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896

The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing


the RTC. The Local Civil registrars
certification enjoyed probative value as
her duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the
local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to
overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was


invited to the house of Felicitas Goo,
mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which
was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said
he did not know that the ceremony was
actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage,
Gloria presented a marriage contract
signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their
marriage.
The
marriage
contract
contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar which states that
the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was
never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on
the ground that there was no diligence to
search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be
that the marriage license was issued in
another municipality).

HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of


the essential requisites of marriage which
is the issuance of a valid marriage license.

The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage


contract does not make it conclusive that
there was in fact a valid marriage license
issued to him nor does it cure the fact that
no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988
Topic: Special Rule in Marriage
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on
January
17,
1977
leaving
behind
properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful
wife of the deceased whom he married in
China.

The trial court rendered decision in favor


of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven
valid in accordance with the laws of China.
Hence,
both
parties
moved
for
reconsideration to which the Supreme
Court granted.

marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place


in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Yao


Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,


vs.
SOLEDAD
S.
ESCRITOR,
respondent.
2003-08-04 | A.M. No. P-02-1651
Puno, J:

Held: No. The law on foreign marriages is


provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed
outside
the
Philippines
in
accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or
incestuous
marriages,
as
determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court
has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign
law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must
be alleged and proven as any other fact.
To establish the validity of marriage, the
existence of foreign law as a question of
fact and the alleged marriage must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847
was still the law when the alleged

For failure to prove the foreign law or


custom and consequently of the marriage,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

FACTS:
Complaint:
Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter to
the judge of RTC Branch 253, Las
Pinas City, complaining of immoral
acts
committed
by
Soledad
Escritor, a court interpreter in said
court
o allegedly living with a man
not her husband
o begot a son by him
o tarnishing the image of the
courts and should not be
allowed to remain employed
Respondent:
During the investigation, Escritor
admitted that she has been living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without
the benefit of marriage for twenty
years and that they have a son
But as a member of the religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract
Society,
their
conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with
their religious beliefs
o after ten years of living
together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a "Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness
o Quilapio executed a similar
pledge
o That their faith claims that
marriage
should
be
presented:
First and foremost to
God
Secondly to society
(if all legal means

are exhausted then


one may use a
Declaration
of
Pledging
Faithfulness)
That such a
declaration is
effective
when
legal
impediments
render
it
impossible for
a couple to
legalize their
union

At the time Escritor executed her


pledge, her husband was still alive
but living with another woman
o Insofar as the congregation
is
concerned,
there
is
nothing immoral about the
conjugal
arrangement
between
Escritor
and
Quilapio and they remain
members in good standing
in the congregation.
Moreover, at the time
Escritor joined the judiciary,
her husband has already
died and there was no
longer
any
legal
impediment to marry on her
part, although Quilapio was
still married to another but
separated
Escritor, who is charged with
committing "gross and immoral
conduct"
under
the
Revised
Administrative Code, invokes the
moral standards of her religion, the
Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting
that her conjugal arrangement with
a man not her legal husband does
not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct for which she
should be held administratively
liable

ISSUE:
W/N the respondents right to religious
freedom should carve out an exception
from the prevailing jurisprudence for

which government employees are held


administratively liable
HELD:
UNDETERMINED (!)
- only a compelling interest can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious
liberty
- there is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her job and abandoning her
religion and family on the one hand and
giving up her employment and keeping
her religious practice and family on the
other puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion
- it is thus inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence must be
discharged by the proper agency (the
state)
- the state should have the right to have
its say on the matter, therefore the case is
remanded to the office of the Court Admin
and the Solicitor General will review the
case
GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
- Man does not live in isolation but in
society. Society is kept together by the
invisible bonds of common thought, thus
society is justified in taking steps to
preserve its moral code and the interests
of the state
Free exercise clause
The Free Exercise Clause embraces two
concepts - freedom to believe and
freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot
be
Conduct
remains
subject
to
regulation for the protection of
society.
absolute protection to individual
religious convictions and beliefs
and
prescribes
gov.
from
questioning a persons beliefs or
imposing penalties solely on just
those beliefs
Evolution of Different Tests employed
by the courts under the Free Exercise
Clause

(a) The belief-action test under this test,


regulation of religiously dictated conduct
would be upheld no matter how central
the conduct was to the exercise of religion
and no matter how insignificant was the
government's
non-religious
regulatory
interest so long as the government is
proscribing action and not belief.
(b) The Court abandoned the simplistic
belief-action
distinction
and
instead
recognized
the
deliberate-inadvertent
distinction, i.e., the distinction between
deliberate
state
interference
of
religiousexercise for religious reasons
which was plainly unconstitutional and
government's inadvertent interference
with religion in pursuing some secular
objective.
(c) The two-part balancing test of validity
of the infringing regulation where the first
step was for plaintiff to show that the
regulation placed a real burden on his
religious exercise. Next, the burden would
be upheld only if the state showed that it
was pursuing an overriding secular goal by
the means which imposed the least
burden on religious practices.
(d) Then came the stricter compelling
state interest test, this latter test stressed
that the state interest was not merely any
colorable state interest, but must be
paramount and compelling to override the
free exercise claim. A compelling state
interest
is
the
highest
level
of
constitutional scrutiny short of a holding of
a per se violation. Thus, when general
laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless
some
'compelling
state
interest'
intervenes.
Non-Establishment Clause
U.S.
Supreme
Court
adopted
Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of
separation between church and
state"
as
encapsulating
the
meaning of the Establishment
Clause.
The Lemon v. Kurtzman test
requires a challenged policy to
meet the following criteria to pass
scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause.
(i) the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose

(ii) its primary or principal effect


must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion
(iii) the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.'
(Establishment of religion clausestate cannot pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religion or
prefer one over the other)
Strict
Neutrality
vs.
Benevolent
Neutrality
The two main standards used by
the Court in deciding religion
clause cases: separation (strict
neutrality) and accommodation
(benevolent neutrality)
o Under the strict neutrality
approach, the government
should base public policy
solely
on
secular
considerations,
without
regard to the religious
consequences of its actions.
It adopts a policy of
religious blindness. This
approach has been used in
education cases where the
court refused to allow any
form of prayer, spoken or
silent, in public schools.
However, this separationist
approach
has
become
problematic
in
contemporary times when
both the government and
religion are growing and
expanding their spheres of
involvement and activity,
resulting in the intersection
of government and religion
at many points
o (b)
The
benevolent
neutrality
approach
allows
for
interaction
between the church and
state as called for by
necessity or practicality.
Benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion
under
certain
circumstances.
Accommodations
are
government policies that
take religion specifically into

account not to promote the


government's favored form
of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to
exercise
their
religion
without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore
is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a
person's
or
institution's
religion. As Justice Brennan
explained, the "government
[may] take religion into
account . . .to exempt, when
possible,
from generally
applicable
governmental
regulation individuals whose
religious
beliefs
and
practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to
create
without
state
involvement an atmosphere
in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish."
Accommodation theory
A three-step process (also referred
to as the "two-step balancing
process" when the second and
third steps are combined) is
followed in weighing the state's
interest and religious freedom
when these collide.
Three questions are answered in
this process:
(a) Has the statute or government
action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion?
The courts often look into the sincerity
of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief
because the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits inquiring about its truth. The
sincerity of the claimant's belief is
ascertained to avoid the mere claim of
religious beliefs to escape a mandatory
regulation.
(b) Is there a sufficiently compelling
state
interest
to
justify
this
infringement of religious liberty?
In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are
legitimate for the state and that they
are compelling.

(c) Has the state in achieving its


legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?
Philippine
jurisdiction
adopts
Benevolent Neutrality approach
The
Philippine
constitution's
religion clauses prescribe not a
strict but a benevolent neutrality
(Recognizes the religious nature of
the Filipino people and the
elevating influence of religion in
society,
and
could
allow
accommodation of morality based
on religion provided it does not
offend compelling state interests)
Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at
the same time strives to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of
morality
based
on
religion,
provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
In other words, in the absence of
legislation granting exemption from
a law of general applicability, the
Court can carve out an exception
when the religion clauses justify it.
(Religious Freedom Doctrine
Incumbent upon the court to
determine whether a certain ritual
is religious or not
Religious freedom will not be
upheld if it clashes with the
established institutions of society
and with the law such that when a
law
of
general
applicability
incidentally burdens the exercise of
ones religion, ones right to
religious freedom cannot justify
exemption from compliance with
the law)
(Victoriano Doctrine

Test of immediate and grave


danger to the security and welfare
of the community
Religious exercise may be indirectly
burdened by a general law whish
has for its purpose and effect the
advancement of the states secular
goals provided that there is no
other means by which the state
can
accomplish
this
purpose
without imposing such burden
The
court
referres
to
the
Compelling state interest test
which grants exemptions when
general laws conflict with religious
exercise, unless a compelling state
interest intervenes)

Tests applied on exercise of religious


freedom
The case at bar does not involve
speech where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were
appropriate.
The present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious
belief.
The
"compelling
state
interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved. Under this
test, not any interest of the state
would suffice to prevail over the
right to religious freedom as this is
a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy
of rights.
In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide.
Religious clauses and Morality
The morality referred to in the law
is public and secular morality, not
religious morality. The distinction is
important because the jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.
Whatever
pronouncement
the
Court makes in the case at bar
should be understood only in this
realm.

Application of Benevolent Neutrality


and the Compelling State Interest
Test
In ruling on Escritors claim of
religious freedom, the court applied
the compelling state interest test
from a benevolent neutrality
stance - i.e. the claim of religious
freedom would warrant carving out
an exception from the Civil Service
Law,
unless
the
government
succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
Applying the balancing process
earlier discussed, the court found
that Escritor's right to religious
freedom has been burdened as she
is made to choose between
keeping her employment and
following her religious precept. She
appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is
not merely using the "Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality
However, the case must be
remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator to properly settle the
issue of the existence of a
compelling state interest. The
government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold
which
can
override
respondent's religious belief and
practice. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is
the Office of the Solicitor General.

Vincent Paul Mercado vs Consuelo


Tan
Topic: Bigamous
marriages

and

polygamous

Facts:
v Petition for Certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA and the RTC of Bacolod
thereby convicting Mercado guilty of the
crime of Bigamy.

v In 91, Vincent Mercado contracted


marriage with Consuelo Tan despite his
prior marriage to one Ma. Thelma
Oliva(1976)
v On October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy
case against Mercado with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City
v One month after said filing, Mercado
filed an action for the Declaration for the
Nullity of the marriage with Oliva; The
year after, the court rendered their
decision on Mercados petition thereby
declaring the marriage between Mercado
and Olive as null and void
v Ruling of the RTC and CA: Mercado is
guilty for the crime of Bigamy furthermore
stating that he violated Article 40 of the
Family Code which provides that:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment
declaring
such
previous
marriage null void.
Applying this on the case at hand, the
declaration of nullity of Mercados first
marriage came only after the complaint
has already been filed and while the case
is already in trial.

v All the elements are present when


Mercado married Tan. When he married
Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado only filed an action to declare his
first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
v Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained
before a person can marry for a
subsequent time. Absent that declaration
a person who marries a second time shall
be guilty of bigamy.
Santos v CA
Psychological Incapacity

FACTS:

Leouel, a member of the Army, met


Julia
in
Iloilo
City.
Married
September 1986

The couple latter lived with Julias


parents. Julia gave birth to a son in
1987. Their marriage, however,
was marred by the frequent
interference of Julias parent as
averred by Leouel. The couple also
occasionally quarrels about as to,
among other things, when should
they start living independently
from Julias parents.

Julia went to the US to work as a


nurse despite Leouels opposition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty


of Bigamy
Ruling:
v Yes . Because all the elements of
bigamy are present in the present case as
follows:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity

7 months later, she and


Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in
1989. She never went home
that year.

In 1990, Leouel got the


chance to be in the US due
to a military training. During
his stay, he desperately
tried to locate his wife but
to no avail.

Leouel, in an effort to at
least have his wife come
home, filed to nullify their
marriage due to Julias
psychological incapacity.

Leouel asserted that due to


Julias failure to return home
or at least communicate
with him even with all his
effort
constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
Julia attacked the complaint
and she said that it is Leouel
who is incompetent.

The prosecutor ascertained


that there is no collusion
between the two. Leouels
petition is however denied
by the lower and appellate
court.

ISSUE: W/N
Julia
incapacitated.

is

psychological

HELD:

Before deciding on the case, the SC


noted that the Family Code did not
define the term psychological
incapacity, which is adopted from
the Catholic Canon Law.

Deliberations of the Family Code


Revision Committee, the provision
in PI, adopted with less specificity
than expected, has been designed

to allow some resiliency in its


application. The FCRC did not give
any examples of PI for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the FCRC would like the
judge to interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from
Canon
Law.
The
term
psychological incapacity defies
any
precise
definition
since
psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code


cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the
basic
marital
covenants
that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of
PI to the most serious cases of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative
of
an
utter
insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage.
This
psychological
condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

The SC also notes that PI must be


characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel
stands aggrieved, his petition must
be dismissed because the alleged
PI of his wife is not clearly shown
by the factual settings presented.
The factual settings do not come
close to to the standard required to
decree a nullity of marriage.

DENIED

Florence Malcampo Sin vs. Philipp Sin


GR No. 137590
March 26, 2001
Family code
- Emphasizes the permanent nature
of marriage, it is the foundation of
the family.
- Central to our traditional and
religious concepts of morality and
provides the bedrock where our
society finds stability.
- Marriage is immutable and when
both spouses give their consent to
enter it, it becomes irrevocable.
- A declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code
requires
the
application
of
procedural
and
substantive
guidelines. While compliance with
these
requirements
mostly

devolves upon petitioner, the State


is likewise mandated to actively
intervene in the procedure. Should
there be non-compliance by the
State with its statutory duty, there
is a need to remand the case to the
lower court for proper trial.
Facts:
- Appeal from a decision of the court
of appeals which affirmed decision
of the RTC which dismissed
petitioners petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage due to
psychological
incapacity
for
insufficiency of evidence
- 1987, petitioner Florence and
respondent Philipp (A Portuguese
citizen) got married at St. Jude
Catholic parish in San Miguel
Manila
- 1994, petitioner filed in the RTC a
complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Philipp. 1995
the RTC dismissed the petition
where
the
State
had
no
participation in the proceedings
- 1994, Jabson filed with the RTC a
manifestation stating that he found
no collusion between the parties
- 1998, petitioner filed with the CA a
motion for reconsideration but was
denied a year after
Issue:
- W/N declaration of nullity maybe
declared even with the absence of
the participation of the State in the
proceedings
Held:
- ARTICLE 48. In all cases of
annulment
or
declaration
of
absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed (italics ours).
- The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an

invalid one as well. This is made


clear
by
the
following
pronouncement: "The trial court
must
order
the
prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the
decision,17 briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095
(italics ours).

Cabreza v Cabreza

SERENO, J.
FACTS:
On January 2001, RTC of Pasig declared
the
marriage
between
Ceferino
(petitioner) and Amparo (respondent) as
null and void and ordered dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corp
involving the conjugal dwelling. He further
asked the RTC to authorize him to sign in
behalf of the respondent and order the
occupants to vacate the property.
The respondent then countered by filling a
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of
Possession and Notice to Vacate. Her
arguments are as follows: (1) the parties
had another conjugal lot apart from the
conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article
129 of the Family Code, the conjugal
dwelling should be adjudicated to her as
the spouse, with whom four of the five
Cabreza children were staying.
ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in reversing the RTC


decision by dismissing the complaint of
declaring the nullity of Deed of Sale on the
basis of litis pendentia and forum
shopping
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The CA erred in giving merit to the
respondents argument. The Complaint for
the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
Sale cannot prosper because, like the
Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it
effectively seeks the modification of an
already final Order of RTC Br. 70. Amparo
cannot be allowed to impugn the already
final Order of RTC Br. 70 which directed
the sale of the conjugal dwelling.
Litis pendentia has been properly invoked.
The following requisites have been met for
the proper invocation of litis pendentia as
a ground for dismissing an action: (a)
Identity of parties or representation in
both cases; (b) Identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts and the same
basis; and (c) Identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
With regard to forum shopping, it exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata (bar) in
the other.
RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED. The decision and
resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The
resolution of the RTC Branch 67, Pasig
City, which dismissed the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on
the ground of the litis pendencia and
forum shopping, is REINSTATED.
Buenaventura vs Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
127449
March 31, 2005
Facts:

Petitioner
deceived
private
respondent into marrying him by
professing true love instead of
revealing to her that he was under
heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he
married his wife. Respondent
claimed that this caused her to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after
and throughout their separation.
Petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground that both he and his
wife
were
psychologically
incapacitated.
The RTC promulgated its decision,
declaring that:
o The marriage entered into
between
petitioner
and
respondent null and void
o Petitioner to pay respondent
P2.5million
for
moral
damages,
P1million
exemplary damages with
6% interest and P100,000
attorneys fees
o Petitioner to pay respondent
P50,000 litigation costs
o Liquidation of the assets of
the conjugal partnership
property, particularly the
retirement
benefits
of
petitioner by giving 50% of
its net amount and 12%
interest per annum to his
wife; and 50% of his
outstanding shares of stock
o Petitioner to give a regular
monthly support of P15,000
in favor of his son, subject
to modification as the
necessity arises
o Awarding of the care and
custody of the minor to his
mother
Petitioner appealed before the
Court of Appeals. While the appeal
was pending, the CA, upon
respondents motion issued a
resolution increasing the regular
monthly
support
to
P20,000.

The CA dismissed petitioners


appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration was denied, hence
this petition.
Issue:
WON equal property shares shall
be owned by both parties even
though only one party exerted
efforts to acquire the properties
Ruling:
Since the present case does not
involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions
of article 50 in relation to articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case
maybe, do not apply. Rather the
general rule applies, which is in
case a marriage is declared void ab
initio,
the
property
regime
applicable
to
be
liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that
of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be
distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by RTC and CA, to have
been acquired during the union of
the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one
of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in the said
distribution.
The
liquidation,
partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by
the parties herein as ordered by
the court a quo should therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains
Quiao vs Quiao
Topic: Effects of annulment - On the
property regime of the marriage
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against petitioner Brigido
B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby

awarding the custody of their 3 minor


children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children
because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither
party
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration and appeal within the
period. After more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the
term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT
EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts. It further held that
after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right
to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No.
(2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo
is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
argues that Article 102 applies because
there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the
wife become joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established,

irrespective of the value each one may


have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art
102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the net
profits. And since the legal separation
decision states that the share of Brigido
in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with
nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters
into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code,
the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage. From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and
her own property and debts. The law does
not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties above are considered
part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally
between
the
spouses and/or
their
respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
Article 124 of the Family Code of which
applies to conjugal partnership property, is
a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family

Code which
property.

applies

to

community

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the


Family Code provide that the powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were
executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4
November 1995. The execution of the SPA
is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding
contract between the parties, making the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda De Bailon


G.R. no. 165545 March24, 2006

Issue: Mere appearance of the absent


spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

Facts of the Case: In 1955 Clemente


Bailon and Alice Diaz married in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15 years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the

presumptive death of Alice she being an


absentee. The petition was granted in
1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque.
The two live together until Clementes
death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim
her husbands SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that
she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that
they be given the reimbursement for the
funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of
Clemente. They further claim that
Clemente contracted three marriages; one
with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that
Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed
that Clemente obtained the declaration of
Alices presumptive death in bad faith for
he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her
in her parents place.

She was in Sorsogon all along in her


parents place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having
extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that
Jarque should reimburse what had been
granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go
to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with
Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs
decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita
appealed the decision of the SSS before
the Social Security Commission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled
the contrary.

Decision: There is no previous marriage


to restore for it is terminated upon
Clementes death. Likewise there is no
subsequent marriage to terminate for the
same is terminated upon Clementes
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is
futile for Alice to pursue the recording of

her reappearance before the local civil


registrar through an affidavit or a court
action. But it is not correct for the SSS to
rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial
power to review the decision of the RTC.
SSS is indeed empowered to determine as
to who should be the rightful beneficiary
of the benefits obtained by a deceased
member in case of disputes but such
power does not include the appellate
power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC
ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to
Clemente is still valid because no affidavit
was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clementes death and in this
case she can no longer file such an
affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or
good faith] of Clemente can no longer be
raised the marriage herein is considered
voidable and must be attacked directly not
collaterally it is however impossible for a
direct attack since there is no longer a
marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clementes death.

Marriage

when

one

spouse

is

absent

G.R.
NO.
180863
September 8, 2009

ANGELITA
VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. REPUBL
IC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

Petition for review on certiorari


under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing decision of RTC Camiling
(Nov. 12, 2007) dismissing the
Angelita
Valdezs
(petitioner)
petition for presumptive death of
her husband Sofio Polborosa.

Angelita and Sofio got married on


Jan. 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
Petitioner gave birth to their only
daughter Nancy on Dec. 13, 1971.
March 1972, Sofio left their
dwelling.
Both
mother
and
daughter waited for Sofio to return
but to no avail.
May 1972 (2months after), Angelita
decided to go to her parents home
in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
Three years had passed without
hearing any word from Sofio and on
Oct. 1975, Sofio went to Angelitas
current dwelling. After talking for
several hours, they both decided to
separate. This was executed on a
document. After that meeting,
Angelita never saw or heard any
news from Sofio again. That was
the last time they saw each other.
In Angelitas belief that Sofio was
already dead, she married Virgilio
Reyes on June 20, 1985.
Virgilio Reyes application for
naturalization with the United
States Department of Homeland
Security was denied on the
grounds that marriage of Angelita
to Sofio was still in effect.
On March 29, 2007, Petitioner
Angelita filed a petition in RTC
Camiling on the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
On Nov. 12, 2007, RTC dismissed
the petition for lack of merit
because Angelita was not able to
prove the well-grounded belief that
her husband was already dead.
Applying Art. 41 of the Family
Code, the present spouse is has the
burden to prove that her spouse
who has been absent and that she
has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The RTC said that this belief must
be proven by honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to know the

location of the absent spouse.


However, on petitioners own
admission, she did not try to find
her husband because of the mutual
agreement to live separately. Also,
her
daughter
testified
that
petitioner prohibited her daughter
from finding Sofio.
RTC also believed that there is a
strong possibility that Sofio is still
alive since he will just be 61 years
old at the time. Even if Angelita
says that her husband is a chain
smoker and drunkard, we do not
have evidence that he is still under
the same vice or if he even
stopped from doing so.
Petitioner filed for a motion of
consideration and stated that it is
the Civil Code that shall apply in
this case and not the Family Code
as they got married on Jan.11,
1971, way before the Family Code
was taken into effect. Petitioner
also argued that she had a vested
right under the Civil Code and it
must be Art. 384 and Art.390 Title
XIV that shall apply and not the
stricter provisions of the Family
Code as these were not expressly
repealed by the Family Code.
Applying
the
Family
Code
provisions would impair rights of
petitioner.
Motion for reconsideration was
denied by RTC on Dec. 10, 2007.
Hence, the petition for reversal of
the RTC decision.
In the manifestation and motion,
the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) recommended that the RTC
set aside assailed decision and
declare Sofio presumptively dead.
OSG argues that Art. 41 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the
case on the requirement of a wellfounded belief because it did not
exist
yet
when
Virgilio
and

petitioner were married. A vested


right was already obtained by
petitioner under the Civil Code and
OSG claims that such right cannot
be affected by the Family Code.
Acc. to art. 256 of the Family Code,
it shall not be retroactively applied
if they will prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights.
Issue:
1. W/N the RTC erred in applying the
provisions of the Family Code and
holding that petitioner needed to
prove a well-founded belief that
Sofio was already dead
2. W/N petitioners marriage with
Virgilio is valid despite lack of
declaration of presumptive death of
Sofio
Ratio:
1. Yes. Art. 41 of the Family Code
states:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by


any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was
already
dead.
In
case
of
disappearance where there is
danger
of
death
under
the
circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of

presumptive
death
of
the
absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)

As what was stated, the petitioner


and Sofio got married on June 11,
1971 while petitioner and Virgilio
on June 25, 1985 both covered at
the time under the Civil Code. Art.
83 of the Civil Code states that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be
illegal
and
void
from
its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled
or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive,
of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of
contracting
such
subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed
dead
according
to
Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a
competent court.
In Art. 390 of the Civil Code:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.

The
absentee
shall
not
be
presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be
opened.
The Court, on several occasions,
had
interpreted
the
above-quoted
provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially
declared
an
absentee.
The
declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent
for seven consecutive years at
the
time
of
the
second
marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The Court affirmed the decision of RTC but
denying the petition on different grounds
from the RTC decision, the ground being
the right application of jurisprudence on
the case.
2. Yes. Under the Civil Code, the
presumption of death is established
by law and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to

arise. Citing the case of In re


Szatraw, when the petitioner filed
for a presumption of death on the
husband, there is no right to be
enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against
her absent husband. A proceeding
on the presumption of death
cannot run independently in a
special case or proceeding as the
cause
of
action.
But
this
declaration, even if judicially made,
would not improve the petitioner's
situation,
because
such
a
presumption is already established
by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that
it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it
is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
Since
death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of
absence, Sofio is to be presumed
dead
starting
October
1982.
Therefore, marriage is valid under
par. 2 of Art. 83 of the Civil Code.

Held:
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be
dismissed since no decree on the
presumption of Sofio's death can be
granted under the Civil Code, the same
presumption having arisen by operation of

law. However, we declare that petitioner


was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in
1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is
legal and valid.
Wherefore, petition is denied.
ARCA v. JAVIER
GR No. L-6768
July 31, 1954
Facts:
> Respondent Alfredo Javier was a native
born citizen of the Philippines who, in
1937, married petitioner, Salud R. Arca,
another Filipino citizen. Before their
marriage they had already a child, Alfredo
Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimate.
> In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S.
Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United
States aboard a navy ship in connection
with his service leaving behind his wife
and child.
> On August 13, 1940, he filed an action
for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging that he
had abandoned by his wife.
> Having received a copy of the
complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer
alleging, among other things, that
appellant was not a resident of Mobile
County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines,
and that it was not true that the cause of
their separation was abandonment on her
part but that appellant was in the United
States, without her, because he was then
enlisted in the U.S. Navy.
> Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile
County rendered judgment granting
appellant a decree of divorce on April 9,
1941.

> July 1941 - Alfredo Javier married


Thelma Francis, who later on obtained a
divorce from him for undisclosed reasons.
> Alfredo returned to the country and
married Maria Odvina before the Municipal
Court of Manila.
> Salud filed a criminal case against
Alfredo for Bigamy which was dismissed
by the Court of First Instance of Manila marriage of Alfredo to Maria Odvina was
made in all good faith and in the honest
belief that his marriage with Salud has
been legally dissolved by the decree of
obtained by him from the Circuit Court of
Mobile County.
Issue: WON the decree granted by the
Circuit Court of Mobile County has a valid
effect in this jurisdiction
Ruling:

Philippines. He could not have acquired


legal residence or domicile at Mobile
County when he moved to that place in
1938 because at that time he was still in
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely
rented a room where he used to stay
during his occasional shore leave for shift
duty. That he never intended to live there
permanently is shown by the fact that
after his marriage to Thelma Francis in
1941, he moved to New York where he
bought a house and a lot, and after his
divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his
retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned
to the Philippines and married Maria
Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived
ever since. It may therefore be said that
appellant went to Mobile County, not with
the intention of permanently residing
there, or of considering that place as his
permanent abode, but for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife.
Such residence is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.

No.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
One of the essential conditions for the
validity of a decree of divorce is that the
court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and in order that this may
be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in
good faith in the State in which it is
granted.
The Intention of a Filipino to take up
residence in s state for the sole purpose of
obtaining divorce from his wife is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court and while the aggrieved spouse may
have filed an answer, the act does not
place her under the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile
County Court of Alabama had acquired
jurisdiction over the case for the simple
reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the

FACTS
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were
married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they
established
their
residence
in
the
Philippines and begot two children.
Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against
petitioner,
stating
that
petitioners business in Manila is their
conjugal property; that petitioner he
ordered to render accounting of the
business and that private respondent be

declared to manage the conjugal property.


Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
contending that the cause of action is
barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The
denial now is the subject of the certiorari
proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce


obtained by the parties is binding only
to the alien spouse.

HELD: Is it true that owing to the


nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is stopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

Somera v. Pilapil

GR No. 80116
June 30, 1989
Topic: Marriages dissolved by a foreign
judgement
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married
in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony
eventuated
in
Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against
Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The
Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2
complaint for adultery against the
petitioner.
The
case
entitled
PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was
assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same
case which was denied by the respondent.
Pilapil filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344
of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent
can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce
was already issued.

Held: No. Under Article 344 of the RPC, the


crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint
filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a
logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.

FACTS:
Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan on
May 18, 1941 but had no children.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California,
USA, submitting a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 on their
agreement to live separately and
settle their conjugal properties.
o 23 July 1954, obtained final
judgment of divorce
o Fe then obtained her 2nd and
3rd marriages in the USA

16 April 1972, Arturo died without a


will

31 August 1972, Lino Javier Inciong


filed a petition with RTC QC for
issuance of letters concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company
o Blandina Dandan, who was
married to Arturo on April
1947
and
had
five
legitimate children (plus 1
illegitimate child) with the
deceased, claimed to be the
surviving
spouse
and
opposed the petition
o Ruperto T. Padlan, sole
surviving spouse of Arturo
intervened
Fe Quita moved for the
immediate declaration of
heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of Arturos
estate
o Blandina
Dandan
and
children, plus Ruperto failed
to appear at the scheduled
hearing
o Records of birth of the
Padlan children were not
submitted,
prescribed
petiod lapsed

The trial court invoked the ruling in


Tenchavez v. Escano, which held
that a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the Civil
Code
was
not
entitled
to
recognition was valid in this

Stated differently, the inquiry would be


whether
it
is
necessary
in
the
commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
respondents
1998-12-22, Bellosillo, J
TOPIC: Marriages
foreign judgment

dissolved

by

jurisdiction, and discarded the


divorce between Fe and Arturo. It
expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo.
o Declared only Fe Quita and
Ruperto Padlan as declared
intestate heirs of Arturo
o On motion for consideration,
partial consideration was
granted
declaring
the
Padlan children (5)
o Declared
Blandinas
marriage void since it was
celebrated
during
the
existence of marriage with
Fe

On Blandinas appeal, CA declared


null and void the RTC decision and
order, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for
further proceeding
o CA found Blandinas claim
that RTC case was decided
without a hearing, holding it
to be sufficient ground to
sustain the appeal
o Fe claims that there is no
need to remand, which the
court dismissed
SC: the provision relied
upon by respondent court is
clear
o If there is a controversy
before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to
which
each
person
is
entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary
cases
During the proceedings, when
asked by Blandina whether or not
Fe was entitled to inherit from
decedent considering their divorce,
Fe replied that Arturo was a Filipino
and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained

Reading between the lines,


implied that Fe was no
longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce
Should
have
prompted the trial
court to conduct a
hearing establishing
her citizenship
Blandina
stressed
that
citizenship of Fe is relevant
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo Jr: that
aliens may obtain
divorces
abroad,
which
may
be
recognized in the
Philippines,
provided they are
valid according to
their national law
Once proved that
she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce,
Van
Dorn
would
become
applicable
and petitioner could
very well lose her
right to inherit from
Arturo

ISSUE:
WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the
divorce secured in the United States
HELD:
No
When asked whether she was an
American
citizen
petitioner
answered that she was since 1954.
Significantly, the decree of divorce
of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. [ Van
Dorn is applicable] (Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not
err in ordering the case returned to
the
trial
court
for
further
proceedings)
HOWEVER, Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner
and
Arturo
was
subsisting thereby resulting in a

bigamous marriage considered void


from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently,
she
is
not
a
surviving spouse that can inherit
from
him
as
this
status
presupposes
a
legitimate
relationship
- Petition is DENIED
- CA Decision that petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
NULL AND VOID is AFFIRMED
- CA Order modifying its previous decision
by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely,
Claro,
Ricardo,
Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception
of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED
Paula Llorente vs Court of Appeals
and Alicia Llorente
Topic: Marriages dissolved by foreign
judgement
Facts:
Petitioner and Lorenzo Llorente were
married in a Roman Catholic Church in
Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Lorenzo, being an enlisted serviceman
of the US Navy left for the US before the
outbreak of the Pacific War. In 1943,
Lorenzo acquired his American Citizenship.

After the Philippines have been


liberated by American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was able to get an accrued leave
to visit his wife in the Philippines.
Unfortunately though, upon arrival he
found out that his wife has been having an
adulterous relationship with his brother
and that she has been carrying a child;
whose paternal origin has not been
specified in the registry of the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua.
In 1946, a duly notarized agreement
has been entered by both Lorenzo and
Paula stating that:
o All forms of support provided for Paula
including all allowances provided by the
US Navy will be suspended.
o They would dissolve their marital union

o A separate agreement will be made


regarding their conjugal properties
o Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her infidelity since she admitted her
wrongs and agreed to separate
Upon his return to the US, Lorenzo filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California; said petition for divorce
was granted.
After which, Lorenzo went back to the
Philippines, he then met and soon after
married Alicia Llorente(who has no
knowledge of his prior marriage), to whom
he had 3 children.
In 1981, he executed a will, leaving all
his estates exclusively to his wife and 3
children. However, before the proceedings
in the RTC were concluded, Lorenzo died.
Questioning the validity of the said will,
Paula, Lorenzos former wife file for a
petition for letters of administrations over
Lorenzos estate in her favour; to which
the Court after finding merit in her claim
declared Paula the rightful successor of
Lorenzos estates.
Upon appeal however, the Court
modified the RTC ruling considering Alicia
as a co-owner of the properties. Hence,
the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce
judgement rendered in the US enabled
Lorenzo to contract a second marriage
thus invalidating Paulas claim.
Ratio:
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme
Court held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute
divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorce abroad
provided that they are valid according to
their national law. The Supreme Court held
that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case
to the court of origin for the determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will
and determine the successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law. The
deceased is not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition

and legal
foreigner.

capacity

since

he

was

Republic of the Philippines vs.


Cipriano
Orbecido
Marriages dissolved by foreign judgement

FACTS:

1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married


Lady Myros M. Villanueva in
Ozamis City, Philippines. They had
a son and a daughter.
1986, Cipriano's wife left for the
United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer.
2000, Cipriano learned that his
wife, who had been naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained
a divorce decree in the USA and
then married Innocent Stanley and
now live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the
Philippine trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family
Code. The court granted the
same.
RP, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, assails
RTC
decision.
o Contends that Article 26 par
2 does not apply to Cipriano
since it only applies to a
valid
mixed
marriage
(between a Filipino citizen
and an alien). The proper
remedy is to file a petition
for annulment or for legal
separation

HELD:

The second paragraph of Art


26, Family Code reads: Where
a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter
validly
obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
o On
its
face,
the
foregoing provision does
not appear to govern the
situation at hand. It
seems to apply only to
cases where at the time
of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the
time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties
were
two
Filipino
citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a
divorce
granting
her
capacity to remarry
o Records
of
the
proceedings
of
the
Family
Code
deliberations
showed
that
the
intent
of
Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge
Alicia
Sempio-Diy,
a
member of the Civil
Code
Revision
Committee, is to avoid
the
absurd
situation
where
the
Filipino
spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who,
after
obtaining
a
divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino
spouse.
o
Taking
into
consideration
the
legislative intent and

applying the rule of


reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to
include cases involving
parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a
divorce
decree.
The
Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at
the
time
of
the
solemnization
of
the
marriage.
To
rule
otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and
injustice.
The twin elements for
the
application
of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows: (a) There is a
valid marriage that has
been
celebrated
between
a
Filipino
citizen and a foreigner;
and (b) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the
alien
spouse
capacitating him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the
celebration
of
the
marriage,
but
their
citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
Clearly,
the
twin
requisites
for
the

application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case.
Thus
Cipriano,
the
"divorced"
Filipino
spouse,
should
be
allowed to remarry.
Cipriano did not present any evidence
concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence. For his plea to prosper, he
must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove
(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
(b) such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign
laws.
Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged
and
proved.
(c) that the divorce decree allows his
former spouse to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26.
GRANTED
Felcitas Amor- Catalan v Court of
Appeals, Manila, Orlando Catalan and
Merope Braganza
GR No. 167109
February 6, 2007
Facts:
- Petition assailing the decision of CA
in declaring the marriage between
respondents Catalan and Braganza
void on the grounds of bigamy
- 1950, Petitioner married Orlando
Catalan. They migrated to the USA
and became naturalized citizen.
- 1988
petitioner
and
Orlando
divorced after 38 years of marriage

1988, two months after divorce


Orlando married Merope. Petitioner
filed a declaration of nullity of
marriage in the RTC against the
relationship of Orlando and Merope
on the grounds of bigamy, alleging
that Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Bristol
Motion to dismiss was filed by
respondents for lack of cause of
action since petitioner was not a
real art-in-interest. Motion was
denied.
2009 RTC rendered judgment in
favor of petitioner
Respondents appealed the decision
in the CA, which reversed the
decision of the RTC

Issues:
- W/N petitioner has standing to
question
nullity
of
marriage
between respondents
- W/N failure of the CA to declare the
questioned
marriage
void
constitutes a reversible error
Held:
- Settled rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial
of the case. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule, like when
the findings of facts of the RTC and
the
Court
of
Appeals
are
conflicting, or when the findings
are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are
based.
- Petition to declare nullity of
marriage must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real
party in interest and must be based
on cause of action
- Petitioners personality to file the
petition the declare nullity of
marriage cant be ascertained
because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner


versus
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the
Solicitor General, Respondents

BRION, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking a direct appeal from the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.
Petitioner, Gerbert R. Corpuz, is a
naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas.
Subsequently, he left for Canada due to
work and other professional commitments.
Upon return to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man.
As a result, he filed for a petition for
divorce in Canada which was eventually
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. The divorce decree took
effect a month later.

After two years, Corpuz had fallen in love


with another Filipina and wanted to marry
her. He went to Civil Registry Office of
Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
decree of his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the registration,
an official of National Statistics Office
informed him that the former marriage still
subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982.

Subsequently, a petition for judicial


recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with
the RTC was filed by Corpuz. However, the
RTC denied the petition reasoning out that

Corpuz cannot institute the action for


judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided further
that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who
can institute an action under the principle
of Article 26 of the Family Code which
capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in
case the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree.

Court, not from the second paragraph of


Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The decision, as
well as the order, of the RTC is REVERSED.
Moreover, a REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings is
necessary.
VILLANUEVA v. CHIONG
[G.R. No. 159889; June 5, 2008]

ISSUE:
W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree

HELD/RATIO:
NO. The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the


Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens. However, this provision is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Corpuz petition
before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip off his legal
interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law, have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of him, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
Therefore, the right of Corpuz to claim the
recognition of the foreign divorce arises
from Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of

TOPIC:
Charges
upon
obligations of CPG without consent

and

PETITIONER: Sps. Walter and Aurora


Villanueva
RESPONDENT:
Sps. Florentino and
Elisera Chiong
PONENTE:
Quisumbing, J. (2nd Div)
LAW:
Civil Code
Art 160
o all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife
Art 166
o Unless the wife has been
declared
a non
compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property
of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent
o This article shall not apply to
property
acquired
by
the
conjugal partnership before the
effective date of this Code.
Art 173
o The wife may, during the
marriage, and within
ten
years
from
the
transaction questioned, ask t
he courts for the annulment
of
any
contract of
the
husband
entered
into

without her consent, when


such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the
conjugal
partnership
property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of
the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Art 178
o separation in fact between
husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect
the conjugal partnership
Art 1398
o An obligation having been
annulled,
the
contracting
parties shall restore to each
other the things which have
been the subject matter of
the contract, with their fruits,
and the price with its interest,
except in cases provided by
law. xxx

FACTS:
Petition for review which seeks to
modify the CA decision which affirmed
the RTCs annulment of the sale of
respondent Florentino to petitioners of
a parcel of land which the respondents
acquired during their marriage
Jan 1960: respondents were married
o Acquired the lot in question and
its Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)
o Respondents were separated in
fact since 1975
1985: Florentino sold of the lots
western part to petitioners for P8K
(installments)
o Florentino allowed petitioners
to occupy the lot and build a
store, a shop, and a house
there
o Dec 13, 1986: after the
payment
of
the
last
installment, petitioners
demanded the execution of a
deed
of
sale
in
their

favor. Elisera refused to sign a


deed of sale
Jul 5, 1991: Elisera filed with the RTC a
complaint for the Quieting of Title with
damages (Civ Case 4384)
Feb 12, 1992: petitioners filed with the
RTC
a
complaint
for
specific
performance with damages (CC 4460)
May 13, 1992: Florentino executed the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of petitioners
Jul 19, 2000: RTC consolidated the
cases
and
decided
upon
a
preponderance of evidence to: (1)
annul the Deed, (2) order petitioners to
vacate
and
remove
their
improvements from the lot, and (3)
order Florentino to return to petitioners
their payment, with interest from May
13, 1992
o Affirmed by CA
Petitioners arguments
o The lot is not conjugal property
but
Florentinos
exclusive
property
1. respondents
were
already separated in fact
at the time of sale
2. while there was no
formal
liquidation
of
respondents properties,
their separation in fact
resulted in its actual
liquidation
3. Eliseras share (eastern
part of the lot) had
previously been sold to
Sps Castro and Cuenca
o assuming arguendo that the lot
is conjugal, the transaction
should not be entirely voided as
Florentino had one-half share
over it
Eliseras arguments
o lot is conjugal property so its
sale to petitioners w/out her
knowledge,
consent
or
authority, was void
o sale was neither authorized by
any competent court nor did it
redound to their childrens
benefit
o Proof: TCT, a real property tax
declaration, and a MoA between

respondents
for
the
administration of their conjugal
properties
ISSUES:
1. WON the subject lot an exclusive
property of Florentino or a conjugal
property of respondents
a. If it is conjugal, WON the
transaction should be entirely
voided (Florentinos share of
the lot)
2. WON its sale by Florentino without
Eliseras consent was valid
RULING:
Petition DENIED. CA decision
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Order of payment of interest is
DELETED.
1. Yes, it is a conjugal property. Yes, the
alienation must be annulled in its
entirety and not only insofar as the
share of the spouse in the conjugal
property is concerned
Respondents separation in fact
neither affected the conjugal
nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Eliseras interest over it (Art 178,
NCC)
Petitioners mere insistence as to
the lots supposed exclusive nature
is insufficient to overcome the
presumption
of
a
property
belonging
to
the
conjugal
partnership (Art 160) when taken
against all the evidence for
respondents
o the
CTC
alone
isnt
sufficient to support the
presumption that the lot is
conjugal property since it
was registered in the
name of Florentino Chiong
xxx married to Elisera
Chiong
o But Eliseras real property
tax declaration stating her
and Florentino as owners of
the lot and
o the MoA they executed that
the lot is a conjugal
property is enough proof of
its conjugal nature
o the conjugal nature was
also admitted by Florentino

in the Deed, where he


declared his capacity to sell
as a co-owner of the
subject lot
the laws language (Art 173)
provides that the contract, in its
ENTIRETY,
executed
by
the
husband w/o the wife's consent,
may be annulled by the wife
o Had Congress intended to
limit such annulment in so
far as the contract shall
prejudice the wife, such
limitation should have been
spelled out in the statute
o the 1st sentence of Art 173
revokes prior jurisprudence
which held that annulment
refers only to the extent of
the interest of the wife

2. No, the lack of Eliseras consent to the


sale does not render it void ab initio
only VOIDABLE.
Villaranda v. Villaranda: w/o the
wifes consent, the husbands
alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the FC (Aug 3,
1988) is not void, but merely
voidable (Art 166-167)
o consent of both Elisera and
Florentino is necessary for
the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid
o contract
entered
by
Florentino is annullable at
Eliseras instance, during
the marriage and within 10
years from the transaction
questioned
consent of Elisera was not
obtained when Florentino sold the
lot (1985) and executed the Deed
(1992)
Elisera timely questioned the sale
when she filed CC 4383 (Jul 5,
1991), perfectly w/in 10 years from
the date of sale and execution of
the deed
if a voidable contract is annulled,
the restoration of what has been
given is proper (art 1398)

o
o

effect of annulment is to
wipe
out
a
contrcts
existence, and to restore
the
parties, insofar
as
legally
and
equitably
possible, to their original
situation
before
the
contract was entered into
petitioners should return to
respondents the land with
its fruits
respondent
Florentino
should return to petitioners
the P8,000 he received as
the price of the land
Under these circumstances,
however,
it
would
be
equitable to offset the two
amounts (legal interest for
the use of the money and
for the use of the land) with
each
other.
Award
of
payment of interest should
be deleted.

Gandionco vs Pearanda
GR No. 72984
November 27, 1987
Facts:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco,
filed a complaint against herein petitioner,
Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage as a civil case.
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent
elite which was approved and ordered by
the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to
suspend the action for legal separation
and the incidents consequent thereto such
as the support for pendent elite, in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably
tied with the criminal action thus, all
proceedings related to legal separation
will have to be suspended and await the
conviction or acquittal of the criminal
case.

Issue:
WON a civil case for legal
separation can proceed pending
the resolution of the criminal case
for concubinage
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions
of the petitioner were incorrect. The
governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
refers to civil actions to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense instead
of the contention of petitioner citing Art.
III Sec. 3 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously
with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense, even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences
thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
the children, support and disqualifications
from inheriting from the innocent spouse.
Decree of legal separation may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence,
where
no
criminal
proceeding
or
conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as
a remedy, can be availed of in an action
for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner
finds
the
amount
of
support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
Kalaw vs Fernandez
Topic: Concept of legal separation,
compare with NCC 97 - Sexual
infidelity

FACTS:
Tyrone
Kalaw
and
Malyn
Fernandez got married in 1976. After the
birth of their 4th child, Tyrone had an affair
with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn
left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, and they had
three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went
to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and
their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years
since the de facto separation from his
wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn
was psychologically incapacitated to
perform and comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He alleged
that 1) She leaves the children without
proper care and attention as she played
mahjong all day and all night; 2) She
leaves the house to party with male
friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and 3) She committed
adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel
with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked
in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a
psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify
on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr.
Gates explained that Malyn suffers from
Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and that
it may have been evident even prior to
her marriage because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing. Fr.
Healy
concluded
that
Malyn
was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties. He explained that her
psychological incapacity is rooted in her
role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
point that her needs became priority,
while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary.
ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently
proven
that
Malynsuffers
from
psychological incapacity
HELD: No. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded
that
respondent
is

psychologically incapacitated, but the


conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior
of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever
was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying
with friends. Malyns sexual infidelity was
also not proven because she was only
dating other men. Even assuming that
she had an extramarital affair with another
man, sexual infidelity cannot be equated
with obsessive need for attention from
other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily
constitute
psychological
incapacity.

Republic of the Philippines vs Quintos


G.R. 159594 November 12, 2012
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity to be
proven to nullify marriage. There must be
sufficient evidence to prove psychological
incapacity to declare nullity of marriage.
Facts of the case: Eduardo and Catalina
were married on March 16, 1977 in civil
rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
The couple was
not blessed with a child due to Catalinas
hysterectomy
following
her
second
miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo
filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations. Catalina
did not interpose any objection to the
petition, but prayed to be given her share
in the conjugal house and lot located in
Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After conducting an investigation, the
public prosecutor determined that there
was no collusion between Eduardo and

Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina


always left their house without his
consent; that she engaged in petty
arguments with him; that she constantly
refused to give in to his sexual needs; that
she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household
chores and caring for their adopted
daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and
that she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.
Catalina
underwent
a
neuropsychiatric examination by Dr.
Reyes. The results showed that Catalina
exhibited traits of Borderline Personality
Disorder that was no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but
submitted
her
Answer/Manifestation,
whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the
conjugal home without Eduardos consent
and flirting with different men. She
insisted that she had only one live-in
partner; and that she would not give up
her share in the conjugal residence
because she intended to live there or to
receive her share should the residence be
sold.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eduardo but the
case was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The CA then affirmed the decision made
by the RTC. On appeal with the SC, the
Office of the Solicitor General argues that
the RTC and CA erred in their decision.
The OSG argued that Catalinas infidelity,
gambling habits and abandonment of the
conjugal home were not grounds under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that there
was no proof that her infidelity and
gambling had occurred prior to the
marriage, while her abandonment would
only be a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code;
that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by
Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish
Catalinas psychological incapacity; that
Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted
effort to look into Catalinas past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be
able to explain her alleged psychological
incapacity; that there was not even a
finding of the root cause of her alleged

psychological incapacity; and that there


appeared to be a collusion between the
parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted
during the trial that he had given
P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her
non-appearance in the trial.
Decision:
The Court stated that the
incapacity should be established by the
totality of evidence presented during trial,
making it incumbent upon the petitioner
to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity.
The Court
reversed the decision made by the CA in
declaring the nullity of marriage of
Eduardo and Catalina.
The Court
presented the following arguments for its
decision.
First, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e.,
her frequent gossiping with neighbors,
leaving the house without Eduardos
consent, refusal to do the household
chores and to take care of their adopted
daughter, and gambling), were not even
established. Secondly, both lower courts
noticeably relied heavily on the results of
the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual
foundation to support the claim of
Catalinas psychological in capacity. Dr.
Reyes tendered no explanation on the root
cause that could have brought about such
behavior on the part of Catalina. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes had only one interview with
Catalina, and did not personally seek out
and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on
and established the conduct of the
spouses before and during the marriage.
For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked
depth and objectivity. Fourth, in Suazo v.
Suazo the Court stated that that there
must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor (an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality
structure) that effectively incapacitated
the respondent spouse from complying
with the basic marital obligations. The
only fact established here, which Catalina
even admitted in her Answer, was her
abandonment of the conjugal home to live
with another man. Yet, abandonment was
not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. Lastly,

the Court does not concur with the


assertion by the OSG that Eduardo
colluded with Catalina.

Campos v Campos, A.M. No. MTJ-101761, Feb. 08, 2012

Facts:

Aida Campos, wife and children Alistair


and Charmaine filed a complaint against
Judge Eliseo Campos (Former Judge at the
MTC Bayugan, Agusan del Sur), husband
and father on grounds of dishonesty,
serious misconduct and immorality.
On July 16, 2008, respondent filed a
declaration of nullity of marriage (Civil
Case No. 1118)in RTC Bayugan Agusan del
sur. Aida and Eliseo got married on
September 9, 1981 and had two children,
Alistair and Charmaine.
In the complaint, respondent said that
both him and Aida are psychologically
incapacitated therefore failing to comply
with their marital obligations. Respondent
admitted that he is a homosexual and he
imagined he was with another man just so
he could be intimate with his wife while his
wife had affairs with other men which he
did not question nor stopped such.
Aida denied the things respondent said
about her and said that respondent was
only saying this only because respondent
wants to marry another woman, the
reason why respondent wants to nullify
their marriage. Aida opposed the petition
and instead filed another petition for legal
separation.
Aida said that after respondent filed for a
petition of nullity of marriage, Eliseo
Campos also filed for an affidavit of loss
on the land title under the name of Alistair.
She said that the land is her property and
was wrongfully registered under Alistair.
She also said that the title has been in the
possession of Alistair when respondent
filed for the affidavit of loss. She claimed
that respondent only filed for the affidavit
of loss in case the Court grants the
petition of nullity of marriage.
Respondent admitted that indeed, he filed
for an affidavit of loss after the petition for
nullity of marriage only to protect his

interest after learning that his wife and


son are planning to use the property as
collateral for a loan. On the other hand, he
denied the allegations of Aida on him
having another woman and said that he
even admitted his homosexuality and
infidelity of their mother to his children.
He now sleeps in the basement after his
children abandoned him upon discovery of
his identity. In July 2, 2010, case was
referred to Executive Judge of RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
According to the report of Executive Judge
Hector
B.
Salise,
admission
of
homosexuality does not automatically
make the person immoral. The judge also
did not find any proof of respondent
having another woman. Respondent was
not guilty of dishonesty as having children
with Aida is not a sufficient proof that
Eliseo was lying about his identity for the
pending petition on nullity of marriage.
The Judge also said that Eliseo was only
protecting his interest on the title when he
filed for an affidavit of loss and the
complainants did not invalidate the
allegation of respondent regarding who
really owns the property.
What the Executive Judge only found was
Eliseo Campos guilty of misconduct after
contracting the land title under Alistairs
name when he was still a minor. The Judge
found out that respondent and Aida
conspired into entering this transaction for
fear that they would lose the property
during a pending case against respondent
at that time. Judge left it to the Court to
impose the proper penalty.
On the report and recommendation of
Office of the Court Administrator, burden
of proving the immorality of respondent
rests with the complainants. On the truth
about the homosexuality of Eliseo Camps,
this can be further proven in the
proceeding before the trial court. On the
affidavit of loss, Eliseos son Alistair
admitted that Eliseo is the real owner but
it was just registered under his name. The
perjury filed by Aida was dismissed
regarding the affidavit of loss because the
prosecutor found that respondent was
acting in good faith to protect his right.
Office of Court Administrator also found
respondent guilty of simple misconduct in
naming the title under the name of Alistair

when respondent knows that Alistair is


only a minor. Office of Court Administrator
recommends the dismissal of complaints
for immorality and dishonesty but
recommends an administrative penalty of
deduction of three months salary from the
time of respondents resignation on July 1,
2009.

Issue:

1. W/N Judge Campos is guilty of immorality


and dishonesty?
2. W/N respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct?
Ratio:

1. No. The Court ruled that complainants


failed to prove the immorality of
homosexuality of respondent. As said by
the OCA, the burden of proof rests on the
complainants. They were not able to prove
that respondent acted in any scandalous
manner nor prove of the another woman
alleged by complainants. However, the
Court reminded Eliseo Campos that as a
Judge, he is a subject of public scrutiny
and he must conduct himself in a way that
is consistent with the dignity of Judicial
Office. The alleged homosexuality is for
the determination of the trial court where
the case is pending. In regards to
dishonesty, the proof that they had
children is not enough to say that
respondent is lying about his identity. With
the affidavit of loss, it was also discovered
that respondent was only acting in good
faith to protect his interest. The said title
was kept in the respondents drawer and
when he came to look for it, it was gone.
The advice of the Register of deeds made
him file an affidavit of loss and the fact
that his own son did not invalidate the
claim that respondent is the real owner of
the property means that respondent is not
guilty of dishonesty.
2. Yes. Respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct. As the Court defined it : it is
an
unacceptable
behavior
that
transgresses the established rules of

conduct for public officers. It generally


means wrongful, improper, unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose although
it may not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent In the case at bar,
respondent as a Judge and who is familiar
with the law, has knowledge of such
transaction that it is not allowed to enter
Alistair in the said title because he was
still a minor and does not have legal
capacity yet on contracts for fear of losing
in the pending case at the time. What
Eliseo did was an unlawful conduct. Under
Section 9 in relation to Section 11(B), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, simple
misconduct is a less serious offense
punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not
less than one month nor more than three
months or a fine of more than P10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000. Seeing that
respondent already resigned, the Court
modified the penalty of deducting three
months salary from respondents benefits.
Held:
Guilty of simple misconduct
Ordered to pay PHP20,000 or deduct it
from his salary from benefits.
It is within the court handling the
declaration of nullity of marriage to
determine his claim of homosexuality.

Lapuz v. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after
nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without
any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio
counterclaimed
for
the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.
Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for
legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that (1) the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and (2) that
the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
Petitioners counsel moved to substitute
the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
Issue:

Whether the death of the plaintiff, before


final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it
also apply if the action involved property
rights.
Ruling:
Yes.
An action for legal separation, which
involves nothing more than the bed-andboard separation of the spouses, is purely
personal and only the innocent spouse
may claim legal separation. Being
personal in character, it follows that the
death of of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself: actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
This is also true even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree, such
rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of
nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing
the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned
union.
Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee
or by the heirs of the appellant

G.R. No. L-11766


1960

In January, 1955, defendant began


cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado
and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion
gave birth to a child who was recorded as
the child of said defendant (Exh. C.).It was
shown also that defendant and Asuncion
deported themselves as husband and wife
and were generally reputed as such in the
community.

October 25,

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:

Alleging abandonment and concubinage,


plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal
Separation and changed of surname
against her husband defendant Zoilo
Praxedes.

After the trial, without the defendant


adducing any evidence, the court a
quo rendered judgment holding that the
acts
of
defendant
constituted
concubinage,
a
ground
for
legal
separation. It however, dismissed the
complaint by stating:

The allegations of the complaint were


denied by defendant spouse, who
interposed the defense that it was plaintiff
who left the conjugal home. During the
trial, wherein the plaintiff alone introduced
oral as well as documentary evidence, the
following facts were established:

While this legal ground exist, the suit must


be dismissed for two reasons, viz:

Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an


action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five
years from and after the date when the
cause occurred.

Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides


that the legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage.

This stipulation is an unbridled license she


gave her husband to commit concubinage.
Having consented to the concubinage, the
plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.

Plaintiff and defendant were legally


married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga,
Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how
they should live as husband and wife, the
couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live
separately from each other, which status
remained unchanged until the present. On
April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the
significant portions of which are hereunder
reproduced..

a) That both of us relinquish our right over


the other as legal husband and wife.
b) That both without any interference by
of us, nor either of us can prosecute
other for adultery or concubinage or
other crime or suit arising from
separation.

any
the
any
our

c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for


any support from my husband or any
benefits he may received thereafter, nor I
the husband is not entitled for anything
from my wife.
d) That neither of us can claim anything from
the other from the time we verbally
separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to
the present when we made our verbal
separation into writing.

ISSUE

WON it was error for the lower court to


have considered that the period to bring
the action has already elapsed and that
there was consent on the part of the
plaintiff to the concubinage.
HELD:

The complaint was filed outside the


periods provided for by the above Article.
By the very admission of plaintiff, she
came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955.
She instituted the complaint only on April

24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant


did not even press this matter in her brief.

The very wording of the agreement Exhibit


B. gives no room for interpretation other
than that given by the trial judge.

Condonation and consent on the part of


plaintiff are necessarily the import of
paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only
implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100
Civil Code), specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Having condoned
and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is
now undeserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil.,
413). Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that
the complaint should be dismissed. He
claims however, that the grounds for the
dismissal should not be those stated in the
decision of the lower court, "but on the
ground that plaintiff and defendant have
already been legally separated from each
other, but without the marital bond having
been affected, long before the effectivity
of the new Civil Code" (appellants brief,
pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to
counsel's contention, because it is
contrary to the evidence.

Conformably with the foregoing, we find


that the decision appealed from is in
accordance with the evidence and the law
on the matter. The same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

People v Zapata
G.R. No. L-3047
May 16, 1951
Topic: Concept of Legal Separation When may petition be filed
Facts:

In the CFI of Pampanga, a complaint


for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against his wife, Guadalupe Zapata, and
her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc; for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual
intercourse during the period from the
year 1946 14 March 1947. Guadalupe
entered the plea of guilty.

In the same court, on 17 September


1948, the offended husband filed another
complaint for adulterous acts committed
by his wife and her paramour from 15
March 1947 to 17 September 1948.

Each of the defendants filed a


motion to quash the complaint of the
ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.

CFI upheld the contention of the


defendants and quashed the second
complaint.
o That the adulterous acts charged in the
first and second complains must be
deemed one continuous offense, the
defendants in both complaints being the
same and identical persons and the two
sets of unlawful acts having taken place
continuously during the years 1946, 1947
and part of 1948, and that the acts or two
sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of
adultery complained of in both cases
constitute one and the same offense,
within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision that "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."

Hence, this present petition.


Issue: Whether or not the filing of another
complaint of adultery constitutes double
jeopardy
Held:

No. For as long as the status of the


spouses
remain
unchanged,
the
relationship undissolved and unbroken, an
encroachment or trespass upon that
status constitutes a crime. There is no
constitutional or legal provision which bars

the filing of as many complaints for


adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.

The culprits perpetrate the crime in


every sexual intercourse and they need
not do another consummate it. If the
defendants again committed adulterous
acts not included in the 1st complaint and
for which the 2nd complaint was filed,
another crime of adultery was committed.

Another reason is that if the 2nd


complaint places the defendants in double
jeopardy, the adultery committed by the
male charged in the 2nd complaint, should
he be absolved or acquitted of the 1st
complaint upon the evidence that he did
not know that his co-defendant was a
married woman, would remain or go
unpunished.
o The defense set up by him against the
1st complaint upon which he was acquitted
would no longer be available, because at
the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the 2nd complaint, he already
knew that this defendant was a married
woman and he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband
should pardon his adulterous wife, such
pardon would not exempt the wife and her
paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the
pardon was granted because the pardon
refers to previous and not to subsequent
adulterous acts

LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs.


HONORABLE
HERMOGENES
CONCEPCION, as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VI
and
EMMA
BENITEZ
ARANETA,
Respondents.
7/31/1956, LABRADOR, J.:
TOPIC: Court procedure in legal separation

FACTS:
Petitioner Luis Araneta filed for legal
separation against Emma on the ground of
Adultery
Emma filed omnibus petition supported by
her affidavit
to secure custody of their three minor
children
monthly support of P5,000 for herself and
said children
return of her passport
to
enjoin Plaintif from
ordering
his
hirelings from harassing and molesting her
to have Plaintif therein pay for the fees of
her attorney in the action.
Luis opposed the petition supported by
affidavits and documents
denying the misconduct imputed to him
and
alleging
that Defendant had
abandoned the children
alleging that conjugal properties were
worth only P80,000, not one million pesos
as alleged by Emma
denying the taking of her passport or the
supposed vexation
contesting her right to attorneys fees.
prayed that as the petition for custody and
support cannot be determined without
evidence, the parties be required to
submit their respective evidence
contended that Emma is not entitled to
the custody of the children as she had
abandoned them and had committed
adultery
that there are no conjugal assets and she
is not entitled to support because of her
infidelity and that she was able to support
herself
The Respondent judge, Hon. Concepcion
resolved the omnibus petition, granting
the custody of the children to Emma and a
monthly allowance of P2,300 for support

for her and the children, P300 for a house


and P2,000 as attorneys fees
Main reason: Art 103 of the Civil Code - An
action for legal separation shall in no case
be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition
That the provision is mandatory
Case cannot be tried within the period of
six months from the filing of the complaint
Admitting evidence now will make
reconciliation difficult if not impossible
The court should act as if nothing yet had
happened, ignore adultery, ignore any act
of cruelty to his wife
The status quo of the family must be
restored as much as possible
In this country, unlike perhaps in any other
country of the globe, a family or a home is
a petite corporation. The father is the
administrator who earns the family funds,
dictates rules in the home for all to follow,
and protects all members of his family.
The mother keeps home, keeps children in
her company and custody, and keeps the
treasure of that family. In a typical Filipino
family, the wife prepares home budget
and makes little investment without the
knowledge of her husband. A husband
who holds the purse is un-Filipino. He is
shunned in Filipino community. The court
therefore, in taking action on petition No.
1 should be guided by the above
considerations
Petitioner files the present petition for
certiorari against said order and for
mandamus
to
compel
the
Respondent judge to require the parties to
submit evidence before deciding the
omnibus petition
ISSUE:
W/N submission of evidence on the
question of custody and support should be
granted before deciding on the omnibus
petition

HELD:
YES
We granted a writ of preliminary injunction
against the order
More than 6 months has elapsed since the
filing of the petition questioned BUT Art
103 is intended as a cooling off period to

make possible a reconciliation between


the spouses AND it does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such
as the determination of the custody of the
children
and
alimony and
support
pendente
lite
according
to
the
circumstances
Article 105, Civil Code; The law expressly
enjoins that these should be determined
by
the
court
according
to
the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts,
rank in justice may be caused.
Why should the court ignore the claim of
adultery? Why assume that the children
are in the custody of the wife? Evidence of
all these disputed allegations should be
allowed that the discretion of the court as
to the custody and alimony pendente lite
may be lawfully exercised.
The rule is that all the provisions of
the
law
even
if
apparently
contradictory, should be allowed to
stand and given effect by reconciling
them if necessary.
A statute is passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intend (STATCON!)
Thus the determination of the custody and
alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off
period. That is, evidence not affecting the
cause of the separation, like the actual
custody of the children, the means
conducive
to
their
welfare
and
convenience during the pendency of the
case, these should be allowed that the
court may determine which is best for
their custody.
- Writ prayed for is hereby ISSUED and
the Respondent judge or whosoever takes
his place is ordered to proceed on the
question of custody and support pendente
lite in accordance with this opinion. The
courts order fixing the alimony and
requiring payment is REVERSED. Without
costs.

Jose De Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano


Topic: Court Procedure in Legal Separatin
Facts:
Ocampo and Florenciano were married
in April 5, 1938.
In 1951, Ocampo discovered that his
wife is having an illicit affair with one Jose
Alcaraz; because of said discovery,
Ocampo sent Seferina to Manila to study
beauty culture for one year.
Towards the end of 1952, after Seferina
finished school, she left Ocampo and from
then on the lived separately from one
another.
After a lapse of 3 years, Jose again
discovered his wife having an illicit
relation with another man named Nelson
Ozarme and immediately signified his
intention to terminate their union and to
file for a petition for legal separation to
which defendant, Seferina manifested her
conformity with Ocampo on the condition
that he will not charge her further with
adultery.
Upon the questioning by the Fiscal, she
admitted having an illicit affair to a man
other than her husband
CFI of Nueva Ecija and CA: Dismissed
the case on the grounds of collusion,
condonation and prescription for filing the
complaint in accordance with Article 100
and 101 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the case
Ruling: Yes.
In their ruling, the Supreme Court said
that contrary to the believe of the lower
court and the CA, the mere expression of
the defendant that she too wants to obtain
legal separation is no obstacle to the
prosecution for it does not constitute
collusion.
In relation to the above and as
mentioned in Article 100 of the Civil Code,
collusion as a ground for the dismissal for
a petition for legal separation should be
defined as an agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to
commit, or to appear to commit, of to be
represented in court as having committed

a valid matrimonial offense, or to suppress


evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain
divorce.
With regards the alleged condonation of
the husband to his wifes illicit activities,
the SC said that plaintiffs failure to look
for
his
wife
does
not
constitute
condonation or consent for it was already
established that it was she who left their
home, hence, hers was the obligation to
return.

proper remedy, which must be availed of


within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals


GR No. 106169
February 14, 1994
-

Facts
As member of diplomatic service assigned
to different countries, petitioner left his
wife, respondent, the administration of
some of their conjugal properties.
1985 petitioner retired as an ambassador
and returned to the Philippines but not to
his wife and children. 4 years later he filed
a judicial authorization to sell a building
belonging to his conjugal partnership with
the wife, claiming that he was living alone
with no income
Respondent opposed authorization and
filed for legal separation. That the house
was being occupied by her and her 6
children.
She asked the court to grant the decree of
legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture
of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin
the petitioner and his agents from a)
disturbing the occupants of the Forbes
Park property and b) disposing of or
encumbering
any
of
the
conjugal
properties.
After trial, Judge Umali found petitioner
guilty
for
contracting
a
bigamous
marriage. Court then decreed
legal
separation
between
petitioner
and
respondent, forfeiture of his share in the
conjugal properties and non-entitlement to
support
Pendente lite, respondent filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
interfering with the administration of their
properties
1992, CA granted the preliminary injuction
Petitioner argued that the law provides of
a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife,
according to Ar. 124 of the FC:
Art.
124.
The
administration
and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for

In the event that one


spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise
unable
to
participate
in
the
administration
of
the
conjugal
properties,
the
other spouse may assume
sole
powers
of
the
administration.
These
powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the
court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction
shall be construed and the
third person, and may be
perfected as a binding
contract
upon
the
acceptance by the other
spouse or the authorization
by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
-

Petitioner also argues that CA falied to


appoint an administrator of the conjugal
assests as mandated by Art. 60 of FC

Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for


legal separation, the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of
a
written
agreement
between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or
a third person to administer
the absolute community or
conjugal
partnership
property. The administrator
appointed by the court shall
have the same powers and
duties as those of a
guardian under the Rules of
Court.

Issue
W/N respondent, pendent lite, can enter
into a contract of lease of a conjugal

property without the consent of both


spouses
-

Held
While the law does indeed grant the
spouses
joint administration
over
conjugal properties under Art. 124
FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be
applied in the instant case since the
legal separation case filed by the
wife is stil pending
Pending the appointment of an admin
istrator over the conjugal assets, CA
was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration
pursuant to Art. 61FC. This provision
states that after a petition for legal
separation has benefited, the trial
court shall, in the absence of a
written
agreement
between
the
couple, appoint either one of the
spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.
While it is true that no formal
designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties (and
thus
also
disqualifying
him
as
administrator thereof).
The
primary
purpose
of
the
provisional remedy of injunction is to
preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations
between
the
partiesand thus protect the rights of
the plaintiff respecting these matters
during thependency
of
the
suit.
Otherwise, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do or continue doing
the act which the plaintiff asks the
court
to
restrain
and
thus
makeineffectual the final judgment th
at may be rendered afterwards in fav
or of theplaintiff

G.R. No. 996, October 13, 1902

LUIS R. YANGCO, petitioner,


versus

pending litigation, should be granted the


said allowance.

ISSUE:
W/N the alimony should be granted to
Victorina who claimed to be Luis wife

WILLIAM J. ROHDE, respondent


HELD/RATIO:
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Victorina Obin
which prayed that she be declared the
lawful wife of petitioner, Luis R. Yangco.
She further prayed for that she be granted
a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and
attorneys fees. A demurrer was then filed
by the petitioner, but then Judge William
Rohde of the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila overruled the same. He
further ordered that on the 22nd of July
the petitioner should pay the plaintiff, in
advance, a monthly allowance of 250
Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of
March last past; furthermore, there must
be payment on the 1st day of August
following all accrued allowances, in
addition to the allowance for the said
month, amounting to the sum of 1,500
pesos. The plaintiff, in the said action,
owned no property, and the judge did not
require from her any security.

Petitioner then filed a case of prohibition


against the said order of Judge William
Rohde because the former claimed that
Victorina was not his wife and that there
was insufficient evidence to prove of
Victorinas claim.

The respondent judge said that the SC had


no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
that the petition did not state facts
sufficient to create a cause of action. He
further claimed that Victorina, as a
married woman, by reason of divorce

NO. The respondent judge was in error


when he enacted judgment for alimony
because of lack of evidence. In addition,
there was no law or reason which allows
the granting of alimony to a person who
merely claims to be a spouse without
supporting such a claim with evidence.

RAMOS v. VAMENTA
[G.R. No. L-34132]
[July 29, 1972]
TOPIC:
Support and custody
pendente lite
PETITIONER: Lucy Somosa-Ramos
RESPONDENT:
Hon.
Cipriano
Vamenta, Jr. (Presiding Judge, CFI Negros
Oriental), Clemente Ramos
PONENTE:
Fernando, J. (En Banc)

LAW:
NCC
Art.
97.
A
petition
for
legal
separation may be filed: (1) For
adultery on the part of the wife and
for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal
Code; or (2) An attempt by one
spouse against the life of the other.
Art.
103.
An
action
for
legal
separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.
Art. 104. After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and
manage their respective property.
The husband shall continue to
manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it
proper, it may appoint another to
manage said property, in which case
the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and
shall not be allowed to dispose of the
income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the
court.
FACTS:
Jun 18, 1971: Petitioner filed Civ Case
in the sala of respondent judge vs.
Clemente for legal separation on the
grounds of concubinage and an
attempt at her life on his part.
She also sought for the issuance of a
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction for the return to her of her
paraphernal and exclusive property,

o
o

then under the administration and


management of Clemente
Jul 3, 1971: opposition to the hearing
of such a motion based on Art 103,
NCC
Jul 16, 1971 pleading of respondent:
if the motion asking for preliminary
mandatory injunction were heard, the
prospect of the reconciliation of the
spouses would become even more
dim
Respondent judge favorably ruled on
respondents plea and held that Art
103 also prohibits the court from
acting on a motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction
ordered the suspension of the
hearing on petitioners motion for a
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction filed simultaneously with
the suit for legal separation
Petitioner disputes this ruling
ISSUE:WON NCC Art 103 which prohibits
the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of 6
months from the filing of the
petition would also preclude the
court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy
to such a suit

o
o

RULING:
No, it is not an absolute bar
to
the
hearing
motion
for
preliminary injunction prior to the
expiration of the 6-month period.
Petition
GRANTED.
Assailed
decision SET ASIDE. Respondent
judge directed to proceed to hear
the
motion
for
preliminary
mandatory
injunction.
Costs
against Clemente.
Ordinarily, no delay in the Courts
action is permissible
Justice to parties would not thereby
be served
The sooner the dispute is resolved,
the better for all concerned
A suit for legal separation, however,
is something else
involves a relationship on which the
law would attach the quality of
permanence

o
o
o
o

o
o

its undeniable that there are times


when domestic felicity is less than it
ought to be
Nonetheless, it will not serve public
interest or the welfare of the
husband or the wife, to allow them to
go their respective ways
Especially where there are offspring
A suit for legal separation lies
Even then, the hope that the parties
may settle their differences is not all
together abandoned
time may aid in the process
Guilty parties may mend his or her
ways, and the offended party may in
turn exhibit magnanimity
interposition of a six-month period
before an action for legal separation
is to be tried
The court where the action is pending
according to NCC Art 103 is to remain
passive
let
the
parties
alone
in
the
meanwhile; precluded from hearing
the suit
lower courts view: an ancillary
motion such as one for preliminary
mandatory injunction is not to be
acted on; otherwise, there would be a
failure to abide by the literal
language of such codal provision
Nonetheless,
the
law
remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases
for judicial power to assert itself
Art 104 recognizes that the question
of management of the husband and
wifes respective property need not
be left unresolved even during such
six-month period
The absolute limitation from which
the court suffers under Art. 103 is
eased; parties may in the meanwhile
be heard
Otherwise, the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile
continue
in
the
management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property
Araneta v. Concepcion: the period of
6 months fixed in NCC Art. 103 is
intended as a cooling off period for a
possible reconciliation between the
spouses, but this practical expedient
does not have the effect of overriding

other
provisions,
such
as
the
determination of the custody of the
children and alimony and support
pendente lite according to the
circumstance ... The law expressly
enjoins
that
these
should
be
determined by the court according to
the circumstances. If these are
ignored or the courts close their eyes
to actual facts, rank injustice may be
caused
At any rate, more than six months
had elapsed. No more impediment for
the lower court to act on the motion
of petitioner for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Reyes, J., [concurring]
Concurs, specially in view of
ruling in De la Via vs. Villareal

the

LERMA VS CA
GR No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz
were married on May 19, 1951. On August
22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint
for adultery against the respondent and a
certain
Teodoro
Ramirez
and
on
September 26, 1972 the court of First
Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case
of the respondent and found her and her
co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the
charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. During the pendency of the
adultery case against the respondent, on
November 18, 1969 the respondent filed
with the lower court, a complaint against
the petitioner for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their
children and support, with an urgent
petition for support pendente lite for her
and their youngest son, Gregory, who was
then and until now is in her custody.
The respondent's complaint for legal
separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life.
The application for support pendente lite
was granted in an order dated December
24,1969, which was amended in an order
dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner
filed his opposition to the respondent's
application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge
he had filed against the respondent. On
March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with
respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul the aforementioned
orders on the ground that they were
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The
next day the respondent court gave due
course to the petition and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop Judge
Luciano from enforcing said orders. The
respondent court, in its decision of
October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed
orders and granted the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence before
the lower court in support of his defense
against the application for support
pendente lite. The respondent moved to

reconsider the decision on the ground that


the petitioner had not asked that he be
allowed to present evidence in the lower
court. The respondent court, in its
resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside
the decision of October 8 and rendered
another, dismissing the petition. This is
now the subject of the instant proceeding
for review.
ISSUE:
W/N adultery is a good defense against
the respondents claim for support
pendent lite
HELD:
The lower court and CA erred in upholding
Art 292 of NCC because it is not in itself
the source of the legal right to receive
support. It is not a defense when the
support is to be taken from the conjugal
partnership property. The right to separate
support or maintenance, even from the
conjugal
partnership
property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable
cause for the spouse claiming such right
to live separately. This is implicit in Article
104 of the Civil Code, which states that
after the filing of the petition for legal
separation the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other. A petition
in bad faith, such as that filed by one who
is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation
at the instance of the other spouse,
cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the
same Code the obligation to give support
shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance;"
and under Article 921 one of the causes
for disinheriting a spouse is "when the
spouse has given cause for legal
separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for support
pendente lite. CA and lower courts
decision were set aside and their
enforcement enjoined, without prejudice
to such judgment as may be rendered in
the pending action of legal separation
between the parties.

Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez


1956(Civil Code provisions apply here)

Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong and Leonila Ginez


were married in Asingan Pangasinan when
Bugayong was on leave as a serviceman in the
US navy.
Both lived in the house of Bugayongs
sister and before he left for work, they came to
an agreement that Leonila would stay with his
sister.
His sister transferred to Sampaloc Manila
and sometime in July, 1951, Leonila left his
sisters house and informed Benjamin through
a letter. She went to stay with her mother in
Pangasinan but transferred to Dagupan after
to study for college.
Benjamin on that same month that Leonila
left his sisters abode started receiving letters
from Valeriana Polangco, Benjamins sister in
law and from unknown senders (which were
not even produced during the proceeding)
stating acts of infidelity of his wife that he did
not state as well.
On cross-examination, Benjamin also said
that a letter was destroyed containing
information about a certain Eliong kissing
her.
All these letters prompted him to consult
the Navy chaplain sometime in Oct. 1951 for a
legal separation due to acts of infidelity of his
wife to which the chaplain directed him to the
navy legal department.
In Aug. 1952, Benjamin went to
Pangasinan to find his wife. He found him in
their godmothers house Mrs. Malalang but
both went and stayed in Pedro Bugayongs
house,his first cousin as husband and wife for
two nights and one day. Thereafter, they went
to Benjamins house and again lived together
as husband and wife to which he confronted
Leonila for the truth regarding her alleged acts
of infidelity. Leonila instead of replying packed
up her stuff and left Benjamin. Leonilas act of
leaving was a confirmation to Benjamins view

of infidelity and went then to Bacarra, Ilocos


Norte to soothe his feelings.
Benjamin filed in the Court of first instance
a complaint of legal separation but Leonila
with her counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground that assuming that it was
true, of Leonilas infidelity, husband condoned
to such acts and complainant failed to state a
cause of action to render a valid judgment.
Case was dismissed which was elevated to
the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in entertaining
the condonation as a ground for dismissal in as
much as same was not raised in the answer or
in a motion to dismiss.
Ratio:
No. The Court did not err in dismissing the
case due to condonation of the spouse.
According to Art. 97 of the Civil Code: A
petition for a legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for
concubinage on the part of the husbans as
defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
of the other.
Art. 100 of the Civil Code states: The legal
separation may be claimed by the
innocent spouse provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
Art.102 of the Civil Code states- An action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within
one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred.
In Benjamin testimony, he admitted that they
both slept together twice first in his cousins
house and second, in his house.

In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, it has been


held that "condonation is implied from sexual
intercourse after knowledge of the other
infidelity.
such
acts
necessary
implied
forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with
reason and justice that if the wife freely
consents to sexual intercourse after she has
full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her
consent should operate as a pardon of his
wrong."
If there had been cohabitation, to what
extent
must
it
be
to
constitute
condonation? Single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
(27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
It is clear that the act of Benjamin of having
sexual intercourse is an implied act of his
condonation to his spouses supposed
infidelity acts as stipulated in Art. 100 of the
Civil Code that legal separation may not be
claimed if there was condonation involved.
The U.S jurisprudence was cited, as there was
no jurisprudence here regarding this matter at
the time.

Held:
Order appealed is affirmed

Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168

Facts:

- William Brown filed an action to obtain


legal separation from his lawful wife,
Juanita Yambao.

- He alleged that while he was under


internment
during
the
Japanese
occupation, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Field, of whom she
begot a baby girl; that he learned of his
wife's infidelity only upon his release in
1945; that thereafter the spouses lived
separately and later executed a document
liquidating their conjugal partnership.

- The wife failed to answer the summons


in due time, and upon petition of the
plaintiff, the court declared her in default.
- However, the Court, in accordance with
article 101 of the new Civil Code, directed
the City Fiscal to investigate whether or
not a collusion existed between the
parties.
- The examination by the Assistant City
Fiscal during the trial elicited the fact that
after liberation, Brown had lived maritally
with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal
separation granted on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established,
Brown had incurred a similar misconduct,
thus barring his right of action under
Article 100 of the new Civil Code, which
provides that where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed
by
either
of
them.
Furthermore,the action had prescribed
because Brown, although he had learned
of his wife's infidelity in 1045, only filed
action in 1955.

- Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: WON
separation

Brown

can

obtain

legal

Ruling:

- SC affirmed the decision of the lower


court.

- It was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to


light any circumstance that could give rise
to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed on, to enable
appellant to obtain a decree of legal
separation that he sought without regard
to the legal merits of his case." Inasmuch
as it was clearly established that Brown
had cohabited with a woman other than
his wife, such fact bars him from claiming
legal separation. The policy of Article 101
of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case
of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages
under article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract,
that it is a social institution in which the
state is vitally, interested, so that its
continuance or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties
themselves. it is proper that the Fiscal's
inquiry be allowed to focus upon any
relevant matter that may indicate whether
the
proceedings
for
separation
or
annulment are fully justified or not.

- As to the prescription of the action, it is


clearly brought out of time. Under article
102 of the new Civil Code, not only must
the party aggrieved bring his action for
legal separation within one year after he
has knowledge of the cause but such
action can no longer be maintained after
the lapse of five years from the date when
such cause occurred, whether the
complainant was cognizant of the cause or

no. In the instant case, Brown did not


bring his action until 10 years from the
time he learned of his wife's misconduct.
While it is true that the wife did not
interpose prescription as a defense, yet
the courts can take cognizance thereof, in
line with the policy of the law that no
decree of legal separation be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.

Ong vs Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October


23, 2006

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July


13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a
complaint for legal separation under Art
55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical
violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted
prayer for legal separation. CA upheld
RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The
climax of the couples drama was on
December 14, 1995when the respondent
asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their
son, back from Bacolod which turned into
a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting
the respondent on the head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing a gun at respondents head
asking her to leave the conjugal house.
William argues that since respondent
herself has given ground for legal
separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing
to return thereto unless the conjugal
properties
were
placed
in
the
administration of petitioners in-laws, no
decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in upholding the


RTCs decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground
for legal separation when abandoned her
family.

HELD:
No.
RATIO:

It is true that a decree of legal separation


should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation
(Art
56 (4)
FC).
However,
the
abandonment referred to in the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. Also, it was
established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct which does not
constitute the abandonment contemplated
in the said provision. Petition is denied.

Armando Medel (Medel) instituted an


action before the CFI of Manila for legal
separation against Rosario Matute (P),
upon the ground of adultery committed by
P with his brother. The CFI of Manila found
P guilty of the charge against her,
decreeing the said legal separation and
awarding to Medel the custody of their 4
children.

Thereafter, Medel went to the US, leaving


the children under the care of his sister, in
whose house P subsequently lived in order
to be with her children. When Medel came
back in the Philippines, he and his children
lived in Cebu.

One day, P, with the permission from


Medel and the condition that P will return
their children after 2 weeks, brought the
children in Manila to attend the funeral of
her father. However, P did not return the
children but instead, filed a civil case
praying to issue an order awarding the
custody of their children in favour of her. P
alleged that the children, 3 of whom (16,
14 and 12 years old), do not want to
return to Medel, because he is living with
another woman.

Matute v Macadaeg
GR L-9325
May 30, 1956

Medel opposed the petition of P and filed a


petition to declared and punish P for
contempt of court, in view of her failure
and refusal to restore the custody of their
children to him.

Topic: Effects of Decree of Legal


Separation on the custody of children

Facts:

After hearing, the CFI, presided by Judge


Macadaeg (R), issued an order absolving P
from contempt but denying Ps motion for
her custody of the children and ordering
her to deliver them to Medel within 24
hours from notice.

This prompted P to institute an action


certiorari and prohibition against Medel
and R with preliminary injunction, upon
the ground that the order of R has been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Also, the facts remains that P is without


means of livelihood and, according to her
own admission, she lives on the charity of
her brothers. She has no home of her own
to offer to her children, but only she would
shelter them under the roof of her
brothers.

Issue:
Laperal v Republic of the Philippines
Whether or not P can have the custody of
her children with Medel

GR No L-18008
10/30/1962

Held:
FACTS:
No. By virtue of the decree of legal
separation, Medel already had the custody
of the children. P merely obtained his
permission to bring them to Manila. Thus,
P obtained and has the physical
possession of the minors in a precarious
manner. P hold it in the name, on behalf
and by authority of Medel. Medel may,
therefore, demand the return of their
children anytime, and P is bound to
comply immediately with such demand.

Under Rule 100, Section 6 of the Rules of


Court, it is conceded that children over ten
(10) years of age, whose parents are
divorced or living separately, may choose
which parent they prefer to live with,
unless the parent chosen is unfit to take
charge of their care by reason of moral
depravity,
habitual
drunkenness,
incapacity or poverty.
Without deciding whether the adultery
committed by P with her own brother-inlaw involves moral depravity.

May 1960, Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a


petition for change of name/ to resume
using her maiden name
That she and her husband were given a
decree of legal separation and that she
has ceased to live with him for many years
now
Petition was opposed by the City Attorney
of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art
372 of the Civil Code and that it is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court
Court denied petition on the same ground
Art 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before legal
separation
In motion for recon, it was granted
ISSUE: WON Laperal after having obtained
legal separation may be granted to
resume using her maiden name

HELD:

Art 372, language of the statute is


mandatory because her marriage status is

unaffected by the legal separation, there


being no severance of the vinvulum
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change
of name may be observed HOWEVER, her
only reason for change of name was her
legal separation which alone is not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of
name, for to do so would circumvent the
mandatory provisions of Art 372
- DISMISSED

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO


GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo were married in 1910 and have
lived together as man and wife until July 4,
1920 when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living
separate from her husband. Marianos
efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain. Thereafter,
Mariano initiated an action to compel her
to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint
that she had been compelled to leave
because of the cruel treatment of her
husband. She in turn prayed that a decree
of separation be declared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as
well as permanent separate maintenance.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the


evidence before him, reached the
conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued
ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent
breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can


compel one of the spouses to cohabit with
each other

HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts
of this country to attempt to compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaled, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution
of
the
purely
personal
rights
of
consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable.

We are therefore unable to hold that


Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to
the unconditional and absolute order for
the return of the wife to the marital
domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented
herself without sufficient cause and that it
is her duty to return.

Therefore,
reversing
the
judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital

home without sufficient cause; and she is


admonished that it is her duty to return.
The plaintiff is absolved from the crosscomplaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs of either instance.

Rights and obligations of spouses


Cuaderno
Nov 28, 1964

Cuaderno

Complaint for support on Aug 1957


by
Lourdes
Ramirez-Cuaderno
against
her
husband
Angel
Cuaderno
o Couple living separately
since
Nov
1956
when
husband
inflicted
bodily
injuries in course of quarrel
& took her to her mothers
house util claim for support
Juvenile and Domestic Relations
court ordered Angel to give his wife
a monthly support of P150.
o She was driven out of
dwelling,
or
at
least
prevented to because of his
maltreatment.
CA on appeal reversed above so
that appellant and appellee may
again resume cohabitation which
they are hereby admonished to do
as their duty as husband and wife."
o Cohabitation is not yet
impossible
Wife filed instant petiton for review.

For while marriage entitles both


parties
to
cohabitation
or
consortium, the sanction therefor is
the spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife2 and
not any legal mandate or court
order. This is due to the inherent
characteristic
and
nature
of
marriage in this jurisdiction
The fact that the wife allegedly
accepted money from her husband
and desisted from accepting any
later, because according to the
latter, she was demanding for
more, only indicates that even
before the filing of the present
case, the defendant-husband was
already providing something for the
separate maintenance.
o Considering that the wife
has no income of her own,
while the husband has an
employment, the sum of
P150.00 fixed by the trial
court for the wife's monthly
support does not seem to
be unreasonable.
o As the separation has been
brought
about
by
the
husband and under the
circumstances established
during the trial, the same
shall subsist until a different
situation
between
the
parties shall take place.

Juvenile court decision revived

ISSUE: W/N Lourdes is entitled to support.


HELD: Yes

It would be taking an unrealistic


view for us to compel or urge them
to live together when, at least for
the present, they specially the
husband
are
speaking
of
impossibility of cohabitation.

Abella v Comelec
201 SCRA 253
Facts:
- Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin
Abella was allowed to interevene)
filed a petition with the Comelec to
disqualify Larrazabal from running

as governor of Leyte on the ground


that
she
misrepresented
her
residence in her certificate of
candidacy in Leyte. She was in fact
a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was disqualified from
running in the same
office
(Governor of Leyte)
COMELEC granted the petition, but
Larrazabal was already proclaimed
Governor. Her disqualification lead
to Abella- who had second highest
votes, took his oath as governor in
Leyte.
Petitioner avers that COMELEC
decision is erroneous when it relied
on the provisions of the Family
Code to rule that petitioner lacks
required residence to qualify her to
run for governor. Citing the Election
law, she argues that the Election
Law, the matter of determination of
the residence is more on the
principle of intention, the animus
revertendi rather than anything
else.
She states that her subsequent
physical transfer residence to
Ormoc
thereafter,
did
not
necessarily erase her residence in
Leyte, for as long as she had the
animus revertendi evidenced by
her continuous and regular acts of
returning there in the course of the
years, although she has physically
moved to Ormoc

within a province whose charters


do not provide a similar prohibition.
Component cities like Ormoc,
where Larrazabal comes from,
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are
treated like highly urbanized cities
which is outside the supervisory
power of the province to which
they are attached.
Sec. 89 of RA 179 prohibits
registered voters of Ormoc from
voting and being voted for elective
offices in Leyte.
Second Issue, No. The local election
in Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered
as
a
bona
fide
candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the belief
that she was qualified for the
position of governor therefore
Abella lost in the election since he
only got second highest vote.
Public policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest
number of votes in the election for
that office. It does not necessarily
mean that the disqualification of
the person with the highest vote
entitles the next person with
second highest as the next winner.

SSS v. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No.


164790 August 29, 2008

Issue:
- W/N Larrazabal is registered voter
of Leyte
- W/N Abella, who got the second
highest vote, maybe proclaimed as
governor when larrazabal was
disqualified

REYES, R.T.

Held:
- First issue, No. Sec. 12, Article X of
the Constitution provides that aside
from
highly-urbanized
cities,
component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are
independent of the province and it
provides for other component cities

FACTS: Antonio de los Santos and


respondent Gloria de los Santos, both
Filipinos, were married on April 29,1964 in
Manila. Less than one year after, Gloria
left Antonio and contracted another
marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in
Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria
went back to Antonio and lived with him
until 1983. They had three children: Alain

DOCTRINE: An estranged wife who was not


dependent upon her deceased husband
for support is not qualified tobe his
beneficiary.

Vincent, Arlene, and Armine. In 1983,


Gloria left Antonio and went to the United
States. Later on, she filed for divorce
against Antonio in California and executed
a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The
divorce was granted on November 5,
1986. In 1987, Antonio married Cirila de
los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union
produced one child, May-Ann N. de los
Santos. On the other hand, Gloria married
Larry Thomas Constant, an American
citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US. In
1989, Antonio amended his records at SSS
and changed his beneficiaries from Mrs.
Margarita delos Santos to Cirila de los
Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to MayAnn de los Santos; and from Erlindade los
Santos to Armine de los Santos. Antonio
retired from his employment in 1996, and
from then on he began receiving monthly
pension. He died of respiratory failure on
May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila
applied for and began receiving his SSS
pension benefit, beginning December
1999. On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed
a claim for Antonios death benefits with
SSS. Her claim was denied because she
was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is
still qualified as a primary beneficiary of
the deceased SSS member Antonio
HELD/RATIO: As found by both the Social
Security Commission (SSC) and the CA,
the divorce obtained by respondent
against the deceased Antonio was not
binding
in
this
jurisdiction.
Under
Philippine law, only aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law. The
divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria
while she was still a Filipino citizen and
thus covered by the policy against
absolute divorces. It did not sever her
marriage ties with Antonio. However,
although respondent was the legal spouse
of the deceased, she is still disqualified to

be the primary beneficiary under the


Social Security (SS) Law. She fails to fulfill
the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio. In Social
Security System v. Aguas, it held the
instructive information in determining the
extent of the required dependency
under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court
ruled that although a husband and wife
are obliged to support each other, whether
one is actually dependent for support
upon the other cannot be presumed from
the fact of marriage alone. Further, Aguas
pointed out that a wife who left her family
until her husband died and lived with
other men, was not dependent upon her
husband
for
support,
financial
or
otherwise, during the entire period. Said
the Court: In a parallel case involving a
claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the
Court defined a dependent as one who
derives his or her main support from
another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to,
someone else for support; not able to exist
or sustain oneself, or to perform anything
without the will, power, or aid of someone
else. In that case, the Court found it
obvious that a wife who abandoned the
family for more than 17 years until her
husband died, and lived with other men,
was not dependent on her husband for
support, financial or otherwise, during that
entire period. Hence, the Court denied
Glorias claim for death benefits.

SSS v. FAVILA
[G.R. No. 170195]
[March 28, 2011]

TOPIC:

Joint obligation to support

PETITIONER: Social Security Commission;


Social Security System

RESPONDENT:
PONENTE:

Teresa Favila

Del Castillo, J.

LAW:
RA 1161 (SS Law)

Sec 8. Terms Defined


e) Dependent The legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted
child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and not
over twenty-one years of age,
or over twenty-one years of
age, provided that he is
congenitally incapacitated and
incapable
of
self-support,
physically
or
mentally; the
legitimate
spouse
dependent for support upon
the
employee;
and
the
legitimate
parents
wholly
dependent upon the covered
employee for regular support.
k) Beneficiaries The dependent
spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who shall
be the primary beneficiaries. In
their absence, the dependent
parents and, subject to the
restrictions
imposed
on
dependent
children,
the
legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who shall
be the secondary beneficiaries.
In the absence of any of the
foregoing, any other person
designated by the covered
employee
as
secondary
beneficiary.
Family Code (FC)

Art 68: The husband and wife are


obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support

FACTS:

Aug 5, 2002: respondent Teresa filed a


Petition before SSC
o after she was married to
Florante on Jan 17, 1970, the

latter designated her as the


sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form
he submitted before SSS on
June 30, 1970
o when they begot their 3
children, her husband likewise
designated each of them as
beneficiaries
o when Florante died on Feb 1,
1997, his pension benefits
under the SSS were given to
their only minor child at that
time, Florante II but only until
his emancipation at age 21
o Believing that as the surviving
legal wife she is likewise
entitled to receive his pension
benefits, she filed her claim
which the SSS denied
SSS answer:
o May 6, 1999: the claim for
Florantes pension benefits was
initially settled in favor of
Teresa as guardian of the minor
Florante II.
o She was paid the monthly
pension for a total of 57 months
(Feb 1997 - Oct 2001, when
Florante II reached the age of
21)
o Jul 11, 2002: the claim was readjudicated on July 11, 2002
and the balance of the 5-year
guaranteed pension was again
settled in favor of Florante II
o Estelita
Ramos,
sister
of
Florante, wrote a letter stating
that her brother had long been
separated from Teresa, that
they lived together for 10 years
and then decided to separate
because Teresa had an affair
with a married man (they
allegedly slept with each other
4 times a week)
o an interview conducted in
Teresas neighborhood in Tondo
revealed that though she did
not cohabit with anyone after
their separation, there were
rumors that she had an affair
with a police officer
o cited Sec 8(k) and 13 of RA
1161

SSC concluded that Teresa was not


dependent upon Florante for support
and consequently disqualified her from
enjoying her husbands death benefits
o the
surviving
spouses
entitlement
to
an
SSS
members death benefits is
dependent on two factors which
must concur at the time of the
latters death:
1. that
he/she
is
the
legitimate spouse;
SSC opined that
this is affected by
factors such as
separation de
facto,
marital
infidelity
and
such
other
grounds sufficient
to disinherit a
spouse under the
law
the
word
"remarry" under
under Sec 8(k) of
the
SS
Law
includes a spouse
who
cohabits
with a person
other than the
deceased spouse
(in
an
illicit
relationship)
Notable in this
case is that while
Teresa
denied
having remarried
or cohabited with
another man, she
did not, however,
deny her having
an
adulterous
relationship.
2. that he/she is dependent
upon the member for
support
Although Teresa
is
the
legal
spouse and one
of
Florantes
designated
beneficiaries, she
is
disqualified

from claiming the


death
benefits
because she was
deemed
not
dependent
for
support
from
Florante due to
marital infidelity.
no support is due
to a spouse in an
illicit relationship
or
those
separated-in-fact
due
to
an
adulterous
act
since the actual
absence
of
support from the
member
is
evident
from
such separation
To allow him/her
to
enjoy
the
members death
benefits would be
tantamount
to
circumvention of
the law.
o Teresa did not timely contest
her non-entitlement to the
award of benefits (only when
Florante
IIs
pension
was
stopped did she deem it wise to
file her claim) and is thus
estopped
OSG also believed that she is not
entitled to the benefits claimed
o she lacks the requirement that
the wife must be dependent
upon the member for support
1. This is in view of the rule
that beneficiaries under
the SS Law need not be
the legal heirs but those
who are dependent upon
him for support
o She did not file a protest before
the SSS to contest the award of
the 5-year guaranteed pension
to their son Florante II; as such,
she cannot raise the matter for
the first time before the courts
o no further benefits are due to
Florantes other beneficiaries
considering that the balance of

the 5-year guaranteed pension


has already been settled
CA reversed the SSCs decision in favor
of Teresa
o she is a primary beneficiary
because she is the lawful
surviving spouse of Florante
and in addition, she was
designated by Florante as such
beneficiary
o There was no legal separation
or annulment that could have
disqualified her from claiming
the death benefits and that her
designation as beneficiary had
not been invalidated by any
court of law
o SSS v. Davac: it is only when
there is no designation of
beneficiary
or
when
the
designation is void that the SSS
would have to decide who is
entitled to claim the benefits
o once a spouse is designated by
an SSS member as his/her
beneficiary, same forecloses
any inquiry as to whether the
spouse is indeed a dependent
deriving support from the
member
o when
SSS
conducted
an
investigation
to
determine
whether
Teresa
is
indeed
dependent, SSS was adding a
requirement not imposed by
law
o The result of said investigation
and the basis for her nonentitlement
was
from
unfounded rumors
o SSSs conduct of investigations
was
violative
of
the
constitutional right to privacy.
SSS has no power to investigate
and pry into the members and
his/her familys personal lives

ISSUE:WON
Teresa
is
a
primary
beneficiary in contemplation of the SS Law
and thus entitled to the benefits

RULING:
Petition
GRANTED.
CA
decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Teresa is NOT a dependent spouse
within the contemplation of RA
1161 and is NOT entitled to death
benefits accruing from the death of
Florante

Petitioners arguments
o To be entitled to death benefits,
a surviving spouse must have
been actually dependent for
support upon the member
spouse during the latters
lifetime including the very
moment of contingency
o This is clearly the intention of
the
legislature;
otherwise,
Section 8(k) of the SS law would
have simply stated "spouse"
without the descriptive word
"dependent"
o She is Florantes legal spouse,
but she is not the "dependent
spouse" referred to in the said
provision
Given the reason for the
couples separation
Absence of proof that
Teresa
relied
upon
Florante for support
o In the process of determining
non-dependency status of a
spouse, conviction of a crime
involving marital infidelity is not
an absolute necessity
sufficient for the award
of death benefits that a
thorough
investigation
be conducted by SSS
Here, Florantes sister
(does not stand to
benefit
from
the
controversy)
revealed
that Teresa frequented a
casino and was disloyal
to him so that they
separated after only 10
years
This
was
affirmed
through the interview
conducted in Teresas
neighborhood

Hence, it is not true that


her infidelity was not
sufficiently proven.
o A members designation of a
primary beneficiary does not
guarantee
the
latters
entitlement to death benefits
because such entitlement is
determined only at the time of
happening of the contingency.
there may have been
events
which
supervened subsequent
to the designation
This is why SSS must
conduct an investigation
of all claims for benefits.
o SSS did not intrude into
Florantes and his familys
personal
lives
as
the
investigation did not aggravate
the situation insofar as Teresas
relationship with her deceased
husband was concerned
It merely led to the
discovery of the true
state of affairs between
them
death
benefits
were
awarded to the rightful
primary
beneficiary,
Florante II
such an investigation is
an essential part of
adjudication process
Respondents arguments
o Ceneta v. SSS (CA decision):
the
term
dependent
spouse refers to the
legal spouse who is
entitled
to
receive
support from the other
spouse (and must not
re-marry to be entitled
to
the
SSS
death
benefits)
being legally married to
the
deceased
SSS
member until death is a
dependent for support
(FC Art 68)
marriage
not
having
been lawfully severed,
the law presumes her to

o
o

be
continually
dependent for support
No evidence can be adduced to
prove that petitioner ceased to
derive
all
her
needs
indispensable
for
her
sustenance, and thus, she
remains a legal dependent
mere allegation of adultery not
substantially proven cannot
validly deprive petitioner of
lawful support and her claim
being the legal wife, she is
presumed to be dependent
upon Florante for support
despite their separation and the
rumors of infidelity, Florante
did
not
withdraw
her
designation
as
primary
beneficiary
SSS added to the requirements
of the law the condition of
dependency for support upon
the member spouse during the
latters lifetime. That this could
not have been the lawmakers
intention as it would make it
difficult or even impossible for
beneficiaries
to
claim
for
benefits under the SS Law
courts
(or
quasi-judicial
agencies), may not, in the guise
of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include
therein matters not provided
nor intended by lawmakers

SC
o

for a spouse to qualify as a


primary beneficiary under Sec 8
(k), he/she must not only be a
legitimate spouse but also a
dependent as defined under
paragraph (e), that is, one who
is dependent upon the member
for support
SS Law Sec 8 (k) and (e) are
very clear, plain and free from
ambiguity; hence, we need only
apply it by giving it its literal
meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation (verba
legis)
SSS v. Aguas:

for the claimant to


qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must
prove that she was the
legitimate
spouse
dependent for support
from the employee and
must thus establish 2
qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she
is dependent upon the
member for support
1) that he/she is the
legitimate
spouse; and
2) that he/she is
dependent upon
the member for
support
a wife who is already
separated de facto from
her husband cannot be
said to be dependent
for support upon the
husband, absent any
showing to the contrary
Conversely,
if
the
husband and wife were
still living together at
the time of his death, it
would
be
safe
to
presume that she was
dependent
on
his
support, unless it is
shown
that
she
is
capable of providing for
herself
claimant has the burden
to prove that all the
statutory requirements
(dependency) have been
complied with
no question that Teresa was
Florantes legal wife; but what
is at point is whether she was
dependent
upon
him
for
support in order for her to fall
under the term "dependent
spouse"
her alleged affair with another
man
was
not
sufficiently
established
Memorandum of SSS
Senior Analysts Agilles

and Simpas reveals that


it was Florante who was
in fact living with a
common law wife, Susan
and
their
3
minor
children at the time of
his death
Estelitas
claim
of
Teresas
cohabitation
with a married man is a
mere allegation without
proof
uncorroborated hearsay
or
rumor
does
not
constitute
substantial
evidence
Teresas assertion that being
the legal wife, she is presumed
dependent upon Florante for
support is still untenable
In Re: Application for Survivors
Benefits of Manlavi:
"DEPENDENT" - derives
his/her main support
from another or relying
on,
or
subject
to,
another for support; not
able to exist or sustain
oneself, or to perform
anything w/out the will,
power or aid of another
wifes marriage to the
deceased
was
not
dissolved prior to the
latters death, but the
Court still denied her
claim for survivorship
benefits
from
GSIS
because she abandoned
her family to live with
other men for more than
17
years
until
her
husband died
during this period, she
was not dependent on
her husband for any
support; hence, she is
not a dependent
Teresa only presents a bare
allegation without evidence
that she was dependent upon
her husband for support. She
also has a misplaced reliance
on
the
presumption
of
dependency by reason of her

valid
and
then
subsisting
marriage.
Investigations conducted by
SSS do not violate a persons
right to privacy
SSS is the primary
institution in charge of
extending social security
protection to workers
and their beneficiaries
and is mandated to
require
reports,
compilations
and
analyses of statistical
and economic data and
to make an investigation
as may be needed for its
proper
administration
and development
ensures that the benefits
provided under the SS
Law are received by the
rightful beneficiaries
necessary to carry out
the mandate of Sec 15
of the SS Law (Nontransferability
of
Benefits)

for nullity is pending. On May 16, 2005,


the trial court rendered its decision
declaring the marriage null and void
awarding custody of the children to the
mother and ordering Roxas to provide
support to the children. Several actions
were raised in court; with Roxas asking for
a decrease of monthly support while
Calderon asking for an increase in the
amount and Roxas payment on his
arrears for support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the matter of support


pendent lite is already interlocutory and
final

HELD:
CALDERON VS ROXAS
GR No. 185595
January 9, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Calderon and respondent Roxas


were married on December 4, 2085 and
their union produced four children. On
January 16,1998, petitioner filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of their
marriage in the ground of psychological
incapacity. While the action was pending,
the trial court granted Calderons request
for support pendent lite (while the action

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to


recognize that the interlocutory aspect of
the assailed orders pertains only to private
respondents motion to reduce support
which was granted, and to her own motion
to increase support, which was denied.
Petitioner points out that the ruling on
support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment were in the
nature of final orders assailable by
ordinary appeal. SC disagrees. An
interlocutory
order
merely
resolves
incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of
the case. In contrast, a judgment or order
is considered final if the order disposes of
the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same

action. Clearly, whether an order or


resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent
on
compliance
or
noncompliance by a party to its directive,
as what petitioner suggests. Moreover,
private respondents obligation to give
monthly support in the amount fixed by
the RTC in the assailed orders may be
enforced by the court itself, as what
transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the
private respondent in contempt of court
and ordered him arrested for his
refusal/failure to comply with the order
granting support pendente lite. A few
years later, private respondent filed a
motion to reduce support while petitioner
filed her own motion to increase the same,
and in addition sought spousal support
and support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of
the order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioners theory that the assailed orders
have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent
is
therefore
untenable. The
remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.

San Diego Vs RTC GR no 193960


January 7, 2013

Issues: 1) whether the RTC has


jurisdiction over the ofense; 2) whether
RA 9262 should be construed in a manner
that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact
contrary to what has been admitted
should be quashed.

Facts of the case: Petitioner (Karlo San


Diego) was charged with violation of
Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information
which states: On July 13, 2009, in the City
of Angeles, the accused, being then the
boyfriend of the complainant wilfully and
feloniously use personal violence, by
pulling her hair, punching complainant's
back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning
and
degrading
the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity
as a human being, in violation of Section
5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
After
examining the supporting evidence, the
RTC
found
probable
cause
and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner on November 19, 2009.
The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12,
2010,
filed
a
Motion
for
Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with
Motion
to
Quash
the
Information.
Petitioner averred that at the time of the
alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was
no longer in a dating relationship with
private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent


admitted that her relationship with
petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that on July 13,
2009, she sought payment of the money
she had lent to petitioner but the latter
could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent
slapped petitioner causing the latter to
inflict on her the physical injuries alleged
in the Information.
The RTC denied
petitioner's motion. It did not consider
material the fact that the parties' dating
relationship had ceased prior to the
incident, ratiocinating that since the
parties had admitted a prior dating

relationship, the infliction of slight physical


injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children as
defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Decision: The petition has no merit.


Petitioner insists that the act which
resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their
dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court. The Court is not
persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in
this Act, (a) "Violence against women and
their children" refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
sufering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion,
harassment
or
arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two


limiting qualifications for any act or series
of acts to be considered as a crime of
violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a
woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom
he has or had sexual or dating relationship
or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in
physical harm or suffering. The Court
emphasized that while it is required that

the offender has or had a sexual or dating


relationship with the offended woman, for
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence
of
such
relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed.

Accordingly,
the
Information
having
sufficiently
alleged
the
necessary
elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and
the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the
resulting physical harm to private
respondent, the offense is covered by RA
9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law which reads: SEC. 7. Venue - The
Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the ofense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order of the


RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two
(2) days to amend the Information to
reflect the cessation of the dating
relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with
Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or
information.- If the motion to quash is

based on an alleged defect of the


complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order
that
an
amendment
be
made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that information
may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. In the present
case, the accused petitioner has not yet
been arraigned; hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the
Information and in denying the motion to
quash the same.

The Court decided that the petition


is dismissed. The Orders dated September
13, 20 I 0 and October 5, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210
are
affirmed.

Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.


G.R. No. 164201

real properties registered in the names of


Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued.
- Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution claiming
that the properties levied were conjugal
assets and not paraphernal of Melecia.
- RTC denied the motion. The spouses
moved for reconsideration but the RTC
denied the same. In this case, it is
submitted that Efren and Melencia were
married when the Civil Code was still in
effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial
agreement, hence CPG governed their
property relations.
- However, both RTC and CA held that
property regime changed into ACP when
family code took effect, it reason out that
Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that
the Code shall have retroactive effect in so
far as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.

December 10, 2012

Facts:

- The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his


wife, Melencia and others of murder and
eventually a decision was rendered
acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding
Melencia and another person guilty as
charged and was sentenced to death.
Supreme Court affirmed RTCs decision but
modified
the
penalty
to
Reclusion
Perpetua.
- Upon motion for execution by the heirs of
the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of

Issue: WON the conjugal properties of


spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid
murder case.

Ruling:

Note: SC noted that RTC & CA erred in


holding that property regime changed into
ACP when family code took efect because
it is evident that Article 256 of the Family
Code does not intend to be applied back
and automatically convert into absolute
community of property relations all
conjugal partnership of gains that existed

before 1988 excepting only those with


prenuptial agreements.

- Yes.
- As long as the conditions under Art. 121FC have been covered.
- Supreme Court explained that it is clear
from the facts that Efren and Melencia
were married when the Civil code was still
the operative law on marriages. The
presumption, absent any evidence to the
contrary, is that they were married under
the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides that the future spouses main in
marriage settlements agree upon absolute
or relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains or upon a complete
separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The family code itself provides in
Article 76 that marriage settlements
cannot be modified except prior to
marriage, and clearly, under this situation,
the spouses cannot modify their regime.
Post marriage modification of settlements
can take place only where (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of
legal separation; (b) the spouses who were
legally separated reconciled and agreed to
revive their former property regime;
(c)judicial separation of property had been
had on the ground that a spouse
abandons the other without just cause or
fails to comply with his obligations to the
family; (d) there was judicial separation of
property under article 135; (e) the spouses
jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains. None of
these circumstances exists in this case.
- Article 119 provides as well, that in the
absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same is void, the system of relative

community or conjugal partnership of


gains established under the civil code shall
govern the property regime of the
spouses. the family code contains terms
governing the conjugal partnership of
gains that supersede the terms of the
conjugal partnership of gains under the
civil code. Article 105 of the family code
states that the provisions of such chapter
on the conjugal partnership of gains shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains
already
established
between
spouses before the effectivity of this
code,without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the
civil or other laws as provided in Article
256.

FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MAXIMA
BARROSO,
ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts:

The spouses Juan Lambino and


Maria A. Barroso begot three
children named Alejo, Eugenia and
Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919
said spouses made a donation
of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor
of their son Alejo Lambino and
Fortunata Solis in a private
document
(Exhibit
A)
in
consideration of the marriage
which the latter were about to
enter into. One of the conditions of
this donation is that in case of the
death of one of the donees, onehalf of these lands thus donated
would revert to the donors while
the surviving donee would retain
the other half. On the 8th of the
said month of June 1919, Alejo

Lambino and Fortunata Solis were


married
and
immediately
thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to
them. On August 3, 1919 donee
Alejo Lambino died. In the same
year donor Juan Lambino also died.
After the latter's death, his wife,
Maxima
Barroso,
recovered
possession of the donated lands.

present case. We are concerned


with a donation propter nuptias,
which, according to article 1328 of
the Civil Code, must be governed
by the rules established in Title II,
Book III of this Code, on donations
(articles 618 to 656), Article 633
provides that in order that a
donation of real property may be
valid, it must be made in a public
instrument. This is the article
applicable
to
donation propter
nuptias in so far as its formal
validity is concerned. The only
exceptions to this rule are onerous
and remuneratory donations, in so
far as they do not exceed the value
of the charge imposed, which are
then governed by the rules on
contracts (art. 622), and those
which are to take effect upon the
donor's death, which are governed
by the rules established for
testamentary
successions
(art.
620).

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis


filed the action, which is the
subject matter of this appeal,
against
the
surviving
donor
Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and
Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the
deceased donor Juan Lambino, with
their
respective
husbands,
demanding of the defendants the
execution of the proper deed of
donation
according
to
law,
transferring one-half of the donated
property, and moreover, to proceed
to the partition of the donated
property and its fruits.

The court rendered judgment


based upon article 1279 of the Civil
Code granting plaintiff's prayer and
ordering the defendants to execute
a deed of donation in favor of the
plaintiff, adequate in form and
substance to transfer to the latter
the legal title to the part of the
donated lands assigned to her in
the original donation.

Issue:
WON Article 1279 of the Civil Code is
applicable
Held:

We are of the opinion that article


1279 of the Civil Code, relating to
contracts, is not applicable to the

We
have,
therefore,
a
donation propter nuptias which is
not valid and did not create any
right, since it was not made in a
public instrument, and hence,
article 1279 of the Civil Code which
the lower court applied is not
applicable thereto. The last named
article provides that, should the
law require the execution of an
instrument or any other special
form in order to make the
obligations of a contract effective,
the contracting parties may compel
each other to comply with such
formality from the moment that
consent has been given, and the
other requirements for the validity
of the contract exist. Suffice it to
state that this article refers to
contracts and is inapplicable to the
donation in question which must be

governed
by
the
rules
on
donations. It may further be noted,
at first sight, that this article
presupposes the existence of a
valid contract and cannot possibly
refer to the form required in order
to make it valid, which it already
has, but rather to that required
simply to make it effective, and for
this reason, it would, at all events,
be inapplicable to the donation in
question, wherein the form is
required precisely to make it valid.

The lower court states in its


judgment that the present donation
is onerous, and pursuant to article
622 of the Civil Code must be
governed by the rules on contracts.
This opinion is not well founded.
Donations
for
valuable
consideration, as may be inferred
from article 619 of the Civil Code,
are such as compensate services
which constitute debts recoverable
from the donor, or which impose a
charge equal to the amount of the
donation upon the donee, neither
of which is true of the present
donation, which was made only in
consideration of marriage. The
lower court insists that, by the fact
that this is a donation propter
nuptias, it is based upon the
marriage as a consideration, and
must be considered onerous.
Neither is this
opinion
well
founded.
In
donations propter
nuptias, the marriage is really a
consideration, but not in the sense
of being necessary to give birth to
the obligation. This may be clearly
inferred from article 1333, which
makes the fact that the marriage
did not take place a cause for the
revocation of such donations, thus
taking it for granted that there may
be a valid donation propter nuptias,

even without marriage, since that


which has not existed cannot be
revoked. And such a valid donation
would be forever valid, even if the
marriage never took place, if the
proper action for revocation were
not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the
statutory period of prescription.
This is, so because the marriage in
a donation propter nuptias is rather
a resolutory condition which, as
such, presupposes the existence of
the obligation which may be
resolved or revoked, and it is not a
condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.

The judgment appealed from is


reversed and the defendants are
hereby
absolved
from
the
complaint,
without
special
pronouncement
of
costs.
So
ordered

Velasquez v CA
GR No 126996
2/15/2000

FACTS:
BACKGROUND/GUIDE

Problem: Ownership of 6 properties left by


Spouses Aquino who died intestate
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
CA decision that denied their motion for
recon
6 properties in Pangasinan: 995sqm
residential land; 27849sqm sugar and
coconut farm; 2077sqm land; 2857sqm
residential land; 595sqm residential land;
2077sqm Riceland

o
o

o
o
o

o
o

Family Tree:
Spouses Leoncia De Guzman and Cornelio
Aquino childless
Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her
sisters:
Sister 1: Anatalia De Guzman (mother of
plaintiff, herein CA/respondent)
Sister
2:
Tranquilina
de
Guzman
(grandmother
of
defendants,
herein
Velasquez/petitioner)
Herein CA include heirs of Sister 1
(Anatalia): surnamed Meneses, including
Santiago Meneses
Herein Velasquez include heirs of the
son of Sister 2 (Tranquilina), Cesario
Velasquez: surnamed Velasquez
CASE

In 1989, heirs of Anatalia, surnamed


Meneses, (herein respondent) filed a
complaint for annulment, partition and
damages against heirs of Velasquez
(herein petitioner) for refusal to partition
the 6 properties of the Spouses Aquino
That Leoncia De Guzman, one year before
her death had a talk with her sisters
Anatalia and Tranquilino, witnessed by
their children, that the documents of
donation and partition of the 6 properties
which Leoncia and her husband executed
were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give all to Cesario
Velasquez since Anatalia had several
children to support
That Cesario Velasquez with Tranquilina
promised to give of the properties
That after death of Leoncia, Velasquez
took possession of ALL properties despite
demands
Pray nullity of any docs for it did not bear
genuine signatures of the Aquinos and
order equal division of the properties
Velasquez filed their Amended Answer
alleging that during the lifetime of the
Aquinos, they had already disposed the
properties in favor to them through an
Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias,
Deed of Conveyance, and that 4th and 5th
parcels were owned by 3rd parties
Denied the conference and the promise
that the Meneses claim
That their possession has been peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse to the
exclusion of all others

That by Res Judicata, the petition is


already barred by 3 previous cases on the
same subject which were all dismissed
(last dismissal due to failure to prosecute)
and that there is 4 yrs prescription
RTC granted petition of Meneses, and
ordered division of the 6 properties
Testimony of 80yrs old Santiago Meneses
(re: the conference and promise) was
found to be credible spontaneous, clear,
straightforward, and convincing
Version of Velasquez were incredible and
unbelievable and that they manipulated
the transfer to themselves
On appeal, CA rejected defense of Res
Judicata (as it was not pleaded earlier) and
prescription (that an action for partition is
imprescriptible); CA also denied MR
Velasquez claim that the array of
documents that they presented as
evidence was declared null on the basis of
the telltale story of Meneses
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners have acquired
absolute and exclusive ownership of
properties in question

HELD:
[- Court confirmed Res Judicata, its
requisites are present the trial courts
should have aready dismissed the petition
of the Meneses]

Petitioners submission is of merit


No preponderance of evidence adduced
during the trial to support its findings and
conclusions; CA and RTC relied solely on
the
testimony
which
was
never
corroborated with evidence
If the testimony was true, the Aquino
spouses could have executed another set
of documents to show alleged intention to
divide the properties
Petitioners were able to adduce the
uncontroverted and ancient documentary
evidence showing that during the lifetime
of the Aquinos they already disposed 4 of
the 6 parcels in year 1919 and 1939 via

Escritura de donation propter nuptias,


Deed of Donation inter vivos, Escritura de
Compravente, Deed of Conveyance
A donation as a mode of acquiring
ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to
the donee and the donation is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property
donated. The donation of the first parcel
made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners
Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were
then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old
respectively was accepted through their
father Cesario Velasquez, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body
of the same deed of donation and made
part of it, and was signed by the donor
and the acceptor. Legally speaking there
was delivery and acceptance of the deed,
and the donation existed perfectly and
irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may
be revoked only for the reasons provided
in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil
Code. The donation propter nuptias in
favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels
including a portion of the second parcel
became the properties of the spouses
Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked
by the non-performance of the marriage
and the other causes mentioned in article
86 of the Family Code. The alleged
reason for the repudiation of the
deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses
did not intend to give away all their
properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's
sister)
had
several children to
support is not one of the grounds for
revocation of donation either inter
vivos or propter nuptias, although
the donation might be inofficious.

The Escritura compraventa over another


portion of the second parcel and the Deed
of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor
of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is
also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated
July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified
and confirmed the rights and interests of
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
including
the
previous
deeds
of
conveyance executed by the Aquino
spouses over the second parcel in the
complaint and such deed of sale became
the basis for the issuance of TCT No.
15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939.
The best proof of the ownership of the
land is the certificate of title and it requires
more than a bare allegation to defeat the
face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys
a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of
Cesario Velasquez, he entered into
contracts of mortgage and lease over the
property as annotated at the back of the
certificate of title which clearly established
that he exercised full ownership and
control over the property. It is quite
surprising that it was only after more than
fifty years that private respondents
asserted co-ownership claim over the
subject property.

The Aquino spouses had disposed the four


parcels of land during their lifetime and
the documents were duly notarized so that
these documents enjoy the presumption
of validity. Such presumption has not
been overcome by private respondent
Santiago
Meneses
with
clear
and
convincing evidence. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. Petitioners were able
to
establish that these four parcels of land
were validly conveyed to them by the
Aquino spouses hence they no longer

formed part of the conjugal properties of


the spouses at the time of their deaths. As
regards the fourth and fifth parcels,
petitioners alleged that these were also
conveyed to third persons and they do not
claim any right thereto.

The properties sought to be partitioned by


private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no
longer part of the hereditary estate which
could be partitioned
no co-ownership exist between private
respondents and petitioners, no reason to
discuss the other arguments raised by the
petitioners in support of their petition
- GRANTED, RTC and CA decision are SET
ASIDE

In Ps answer, he alleged that R did not


have a valid cause of action against him
because he had inherited that portion
from his parents, that his grandfather (the
original owner), granted to the said land to
his father when he got married to his
mother by means of donation propter
nuptias.

After due proceedings, the MCTC ruled in


favour of R stating that Rs parents had
purchased the said property from Ps
grandfather. Then R inherited the land
when Rs parents died and registered the
same and they were given a Certificate of
Title.

Abobon v Abobon
GR 155380
August 15, 2012

Topic: Donations Propter Nuptias

Facts:

Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon


(R) were the plaintiffs in an action for
recovery of possession against Petitioner
Numeriano Abobon (P) in the MCTC of
Pangasinan. R averred that they were the
registered owners of a parcel of
unirrigated Riceland, that they had
allowed P, their first cousin, the use of the
said land out of benevolence, that they
now immediately need the said land for
their own use and P should vacate it.
However, P refused.

Also, the MCTC found that the land P


referred to as donated to his parents was
not the same as the land in question due
to their boundaries being different and
that in the donation propter nuptias, Ps
grandfather stated that the parcels of land
thereby covered had not been registered
under the provisions of the Spanish
Mortgage Law. Even assuming that the
land P was referring to was in the land
really in question, Ps claim would still not
prosper because the donation propter
nuptias had also been cancelled or
dissolved when his mother had signed as
an instrumental witness and his father had
given his consent to the sale of the land in
question by his grandfather and that this
signified either that his parents had
conformed to the dissolution of the
donation propter nuptias in their favour, or
that the land sold had been different from
the land donated to them.

P appealed to the RTC but it was DENIED.


P then appealed to the CA which was also
DENIED. Hence, this petition.

defensive allegation and such manner of


attack against the title was a collateral
one, which was disallowed by The Property
Registration Decree.

Issue:

Who is the true owner of the land in


question

Held:

Lastly, P insists that the land he occupied


had been donated to his parents and was
different from the land in question.
However, his insistence lacks factual
support. All the lower courts uniformly
found that his evidence related to a parcel
of land entirely different from the land in
question. And that findings of fact by the
lower courts, particularly when affirmed by
the CA, is conclusive to the SC.

The lawful owner of the land in question is


the R and the lower courts did not err in
ruling in their favour.

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REG


FLORA,
It is a fundamental principle in land
registration under the Torrens system is
that a certificate of title serves as
evidence
of
an
indefeasible
and
incontrovertible title to the property in
favour of the person whose name appears
therein. The Certificate of Title thus
becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals
with property registered under the Torrens
system may rely on the title and need not
go beyond the title. It is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with
fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of
indefeasibility finds no application. R has
the preferential right to the possession of
the land in question because the
certificate of title is issued in Rs name.

Also, Ps argument lacks basis. In order for


P to properly assail the vailidity of Rs title,
P must himself bring an action for that
purpose. Instead of brining that direct
action, P mounted his attack as a

BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO, Petitioners, versus H


FORTUNATO
DORONIO,
NAMELY:
TRINIDAD
DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA
AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, Respondents
G.R. No. 169454 12/27/2007

This case is a review on certiorari is the


Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance
and
damages.
The
CA
declared
respondents as rightful owners of one-half
of the subject property and directed
petitioners to execute a registerable
document
conveying
the
same
to
respondents.

The Facts

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia


Gante, now both deceased, were the
registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan,
Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 352. The courts below
described it as follows:
The spouses had children but the records
fail to disclose their number. Marcelino
Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both
deceased, were among them and that the
parties in this case are their heirs.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino
Doronio, while respondents are the heirs
of Fortunato Doronio. One of the
properties subject of said deed of donation
is the one that it described as follows:

Fourth - A piece of residential land located


in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not
measure it, the area is bounded on the
north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east
by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a
road to Villasis.

It appears that the property described in


the deed of donation is the one covered by
OCT No. 352. Based on OCT No. 352, the
adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and
Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the
deed of donation, the owner of the
adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio.
Furthermore, said deed of donation
remained a private document as it was
never notarized. According to petitioners,
they are now the owners of the entire
property in view of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their
predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that


only half of the property was
actually
incorporated in the said deed of donation
because it stated that Fortunato Doronio,
instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro
Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent
property at the eastern side. Respondents
posit that the donors respected and
segregated the possession of Fortunato
Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They
are the ones who have been possessing said
land
occupied
by
their
predecessor,
Fortunato Doronio.
The heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before the
RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For
the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation" docketed as Petition Case No. U920. No respondents were named in the said
petition although notices of hearing were
posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen. No one interposed an objection to
the petition. The petition was eventually
granted on September 22, 1993. This led to
the registration of the deed of donation,
cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was
titled
in
the
names
of
petitioners'
predecessors.
On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato
Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the
form of a petition in the same Petition Case
No. U-920. The petition was for the
reconsideration of the decision of the RTC
that ordered the registration of the subject
deed of donation. The petition was dismissed
on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the
decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had
already become final as it was not appealed.
They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only
one-half of the property.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties


stipulated, among others, that the property
was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which
was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also
agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not
there was a variation in the description of the
property subject of the private deed of
donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not
respondents had acquired one-half of the
property covered by OCT No. 352 by
acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the
transfer of the whole property covered by OCT
No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the
private deed of donation notwithstanding the
discrepancy in the description is valid; (4)
whether or not respondents are entitled to
damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No.
44481 is valid.
After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in
favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino
Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the
parties admitted the identity of the land
which they all occupy; that a title once
registered under the torrens system cannot
be defeated by adverse, open and notorious
possession or by prescription; that the deed
of donation in consideration of the marriage
of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence,
it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No.
44481 in the names of said parents; and
that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio
(plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as
they are not the rightful owners of the
portion of the property they are claiming.
The RTC disposed of the case, thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court
hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the
herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against
defendants.
Respondents appealed to the CA. They
argued that the trial court erred in not
finding that respondents' predecessor-ininterest acquired one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or
intestate succession; that the deed of
donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and

void; that assuming that the deed of


donation was valid, only one-half of the
property was actually donated to Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that
respondents acquired ownership of the
other half portion of the property by
acquisitive prescription.
In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the
CA reversed the RTC decision with the
following disposition:
The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the
appellants as rightful owners of one-half of
the property now covered by TCT No.
44481, the appellees are hereby directed to
execute a registerable document conveying
the same to appellants.
The appellate court determined that the
intention to donate half of the disputed
property to appellees' predecessors can be
gleaned from the disparity of technical
descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No.
352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante and in the deed of donation propter
nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of
appellees' predecessors."
On the other hand, the property donated to
appellees' predecessors was described in
the deed of donation as:
"Fourth - A piece of residential land located in
the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not
measure it, the area is bounded on the north
by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by
Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a
road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a
house of light materials - also a part of the
dowry
Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot
donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico differ from the boundaries of the land
owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante

donated only half of the property covered by


OCT No.
352.
"In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests
the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x
relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died
intestate, their property shall pass to their
lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino
Doronio. Donating the entire property to
Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and
excluding
another
heir,
Fortunato,
tantamounts to divesting the latter of his
rightful share in his parents' inheritance.
Besides, a person's prerogative to make
donations is subject to certain limitations, one
of which is that he cannot give by donation
more than what he can give by will (Article
752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is
donated as exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess.
Petitioners now contend that the CA erred
in:
1. DECLARING
ADMISSIBILITY
OF
THE
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352
DESPITE
OFLACK
OF
TRANSLATION
THEREOF.

"(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial


language shall not be admitted as
evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino."
The
argument
is
untenable.
The
requirement that documents written in an
unofficial language must be accompanied
with a translation in English or Filipino as a
prerequisite for its admission in evidence
must be insisted upon by the parties at the
trial to enable the court, where a translation
has been impugned as incorrect, to decide
the issue. Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:
SECTION 36. Objection. - Objection to
evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the
course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections
must be specified.

2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE


DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO
THEPREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE
HEREIN APPELLANTS.

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of


said documentary evidence on time, it is now
too late in the day for them to question its
admissibility

3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION


PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS
PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL
AND UNPROCEDURAL.

Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be


Threshed Out in a SpeciaL Proceeding, Not in
Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although


Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection

Not

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT


No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is
written in Spanish language. They posit that

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in


alleging that the issue regarding the
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio
must be resolved in an action for the
settlement of estates of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil


Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or
special. Both are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.
xxxx
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted
authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that
actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that
special
proceedings
include
those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this
sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the
case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct
and independent proceeding for particular
relief,
such
as
may
be
instituted
independently of a pending action, by
petition or motion upon notice.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the


word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings."
Declaration of Validity of Donation Can Be
Challenged by an Interested Party Not
Impleaded in Petition for Quieting of Title or
Declaratory Relief or Where There is No Res
Judicata. Moreover, This Court Can Consider a
Factual Matter or Unassigned Error in the
Interest of Substantial Justice.
Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the
determination of validity of the deed of
donation on the ground that (1) it has been
impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has
already been determined with finality by the
RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only
issue in an action for reconveyance is who
has a better right over the land.
We cannot agree with petitioners' contention
that respondents may no longer question the
validity of the deed of donation on the
ground that they already impliedly admitted
it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a
void contract is inexistent from the
beginning. The right to set up the defense of
its illegality cannot be waived.[49] The right
to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent
contract is not limited to the parties as in the
case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is
extended to third persons who are directly
affected by the contract.
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an


instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this rule.
SECTION 2. Parties. - All persons shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration;
and no declaration shall, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the action.
(Emphasis ours)
However, respondents were not made parties
in the said Petition Case No. U-920. Worse,
instead of issuing summons to interested
parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting
of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Respondents are not bound by the decision in
Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not
made parties in the said case.
The rules on quieting of title expressly
provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet
title shall not prejudice persons who are not
parties to the action.
That respondents filed a subsequent pleading
in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the
decision there had become final did not
change the fact that said decision became
final without their being impleaded in the
case.
Said
subsequent
pleading
was
dismissed on the ground of finality of the
decision.
the RTC totally failed to give respondents
their day in court. As a result, they cannot be
bound by its orders. Generally accepted is
the principle that no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by
judgment rendered by the court.
Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to
apply, the following must be present: (1) a

decision on the merits; (2) by a court of


competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is
final; and (4) the two actions involve identical
parties, subject matter and causes of action.
[61] The fourth element is not present in this
case. The parties are not identical because
respondents were not impleaded in Petition
Case No. U-920. While the subject matter
may be the same property covered by OCT
No. 352, the causes of action are different.
Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for
declaratory relief while the case below is for
recovery of property.
We are not persuaded by petitioners' posture
that the only issue in this action for
reconveyance is who has a better right over
the land; and that the validity of the deed of
donation is beside the point although
respondents did not directly raise the issue of
validity of the deed of donation at the
commencement of the case before the trial
court, it was stipulated by the parties during
the pre-trial conference. In any event, this
Court has authority to inquire into any
question necessary in arriving at a just
decision of a case before it. Though not
specifically questioned by the parties,
additional issues may also be included, if
deemed important for substantial justice to
be rendered.
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property
Made in a Private Instrument Before the New
Civil Code Took Effect on August 30, 1950 is
Void
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No.
352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481
in favor of petitioners' predecessors have no
legal basis. The title to the subject property
should, therefore, be restored to its original
owners under OCT No. 352.
Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is
not possible as it has not yet been
determined in a proper proceeding who
among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still

unproven whether or not the parties are the


only ones entitled to the properties of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
As earlier intimated, there are still things to
be done before the legal share of all the heirs
can be properly adjudicated.
Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired By
Another By Adverse Possession or Extinctive
Prescription
The claim of respondents that they became
owners of the property by acquisitive
prescription has no merit. Truth to tell,
respondents cannot successfully invoke the
argument of extinctive prescription. They
cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive
prescription of the portion of the property
they have been possessing. The reason is
that the property was covered by OCT No.
352. A title once registered under the torrens
system cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession; neither can it
be defeated by prescription.[76] It is notice to
the whole world and as such all persons are
bound by it and no one can plead ignorance
of the registration.

Property relations of spouses


Mateo v Lagua

The appealed Decision is REVERSED AND


SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of petitioners'
predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the
Pangasinan to:

Register

of

Deeds

of

(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No.


44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and
VeronicaPico; and

(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352


in the names of its original owners, spouses
SimeonDoronio and Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.

Petiton for review on CA decision


reducing
of
donation
propter
nuptias for being inofficious
Cipriano Lagua (wife Alejandra
Lagua) original owner of 3 parcels
of land
o 1917 donated 2 lots to son
Alejandro in consideration of
his marriage to Bonifacia
Mateo

couple
took
possession
but
title
remained with Cipriano
o 1923, Alejandro died. Widow
lived w/ father in law who
undertook farming of lots
giving
Bonifaca
owners
share of harvest
o 1926 Cipriano refused to
deliver her share
o Alejandra
obtained
judgement awarding her
possession of 2 lands
1941 Cipriano executed deed of
sale on same 2 parcels in favour of
youre son Gervasio
o Bonifacia
still
received
ownersshare until 1956
o 1956 she learned of sale
Bonifacia & daughter Anatalia
assisted by husband Luis Alcantara
filed annulment of deed of sale
o CFI Pangasinan granted
ordered Gervasio & Sotera
Gervasio to vacate & deliver
possession
Gervasio & Sotera action for
improvements on lot dismissed

G & S then filed for annulment of


donation. It was their claim that in
donating the two lots, which
allegedly were all that plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff
not
only
neglected
leaving
something for his own support but
also prejudiced the legitime of his
forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua.
CA held that the donation to
Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a
combined area of 11,888 square
meters execeeded by 494.75
square meters his (Alejandro's)
legitime and the disposable portion
that Cipriano Lagua could have
freely given by will, and, to the
same
extent
prejudiced
the
legitime of Cipriano's other heir,
Gervasio Lagua. The donation was
thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered
to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua a portion of 494.15 square
meters to be taken from any
convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the donation to Alejandro of 2


lots prejudiced the legitime of Gervasio.
HELD: Yes
The infirmity in the above course of action
lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the
new Civil Code specifically provides as
follows:
ART. 908.
To determine the legitime,
the value of the property left at the death
of the testator shall be considered,
deducting all debts, and charges, which
shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate,


shall be added the value of all donations
by the testator that are subject to
collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion


about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate
of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting an payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs
can be established; and only thereafter
can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Certainly, in order that a donation may be
reduced for being inofficious, there must
be proof that the value of the donated
property exceeds that of the disposable
free portion plus the donee's share as
legitime in the properties of the donor.
-Since
no
evidence
to
rule
on
inofficiousness Trial court decision uphelp,
w/o prejudice to parties litigating on issue
of inofficiousness.

Cornelia
Matabuena
Cervantes
38 SCRA 284
March 31, 1971

Petronila

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS


BETWEEN
HUSBAND
AND
WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION
AGAINST
DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE
TO
COMMON
LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between
the
spouses
during
the
marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals
decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision
of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally.
If the policy of the law is, in the language

of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.


Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que
han de consuno, [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for
thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib.
32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just
that such donations should subsist lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2.
ID.;
SUCCESSION;
INTESTATE
SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE
WIDOW. The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property.
Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship
between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the
Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister to the other half
Facts:
- Petitioners
brother,
Felix
Matabuena, donated a piece of lot

in 1956 to his common-law spouse


herein respondent.
Felix and Petronila only got married
on 1962, 6 years after the deed of
donation
was
executed.
Five
months later, Felix died.
Petitioner, being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of Felix,
filed a claim over the property by
virtue of an affidavit of selfadjudication executed by her in
1962, had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon.
Lower court of Sorsogon declared
at the donation was valid because
it was made at the time when Felix
and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Art. 133 of the Code
inapplicable.

Issue:
- W/N the ban on donation between
spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship.
Held:
- Yes. As a fundamental principle
that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as
what is written. The reason for the
ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent
the possibility of undue influence
and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the
other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.
- Court however said that the lack of
the
donation
made
by
the
deceased to Respondent does not
necessarily mean that Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and
respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
- Article 1001, Civil Code: Should
brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.

SSS v Davac G.R. No. L-21642 July 30,


1966
J. Barrera
FACTS: The late Petronilo Davac, a former
employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.,
became a member of the SSS. He
designated Candelaria Davac as his
beneficiary and indicated his relationship
to her as that of a "wife" sometime in
1957. He died in 1959; thereupon, each of
the respondents (Candelaria Davac and
Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for
death benefit with the SSS. The deceased
contracted two marriages, the first, with
claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second
with Candelaria Davac. The processing
was withheld. The Social Security System
(SSS) filed this petition praying that the
two parties be required to litigate their
claims. Through the Social Security
Commission (SSC), it further issued the
resolution naming Davac (the second
partner) as the valid beneficiary. Not
satisfied with the resolution, Lourdes
Tuplano (the first partner) brought the
appeal to the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSC acted
correctly
in
declaring
respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to
receive the death benefits in question
HELD/RATIO: Yes. SSS resolution affirmed.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161,
provides: (1) SEC. 13. Upon the covered
employee's death or total and permanent
disability under such conditions as the
Commission
may
define,
his
beneficiaries, shall be entitled to the
following benefitThe beneficiary "as
recorded" by the employee's employer is
the one entitled to the death benefits. The
appellant (the first partner) contends that
the designation made in the person of the
second and bigamous wife is null and void

because (1) it contravenes the provisions


of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the
lawful wife of her share in the conjugal
property as well as of her own and her
child's legitime in the inheritance. As to
the first point, appellant argues that a
beneficiary under SSS partakes of the
nature of a beneficiary in life insurance
policy
and,
therefore,
the
same
qualifications and disqualifications should
be applied. Article 739 and 2012 of the
Civil Code prohibits persons who cannot
receive donations from being beneficiaries
of a policy. The provisions mentioned in
Article 739 are not applicable to
Candelaria Davac because she was not
guilty of concubinage; there was no proof
that she had knowledge of the previous
marriage of her husband, Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by
appellant, the benefits accruing from
membership in SSS do not form part of the
properties of the conjugal partnership of
the covered member. They are disbursed
from a public special fund created by
Congress in pursuance to the declared
policy of the Republic "to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which ... shall provide
protection
against
the
hazards
of
disability, sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from
salary
contributions.
Under
other
provisions, if there is a named beneficiary
and the designation is not invalid, it is not
the heirs of the employee who are entitled
to receive the benefits (unless they are
the designated beneficiaries themselves).
It is only when there is no designated
beneficiaries, or when the designation is
void, that the laws of succession are
applicable.
Furthermore,
the
Social
Security Act is not a law of succession.

SUMBAD v. CA
[G.R. No. 106060]

[June 21, 1999]

FACTS:

of sale, and recovery of possession


with damages
Alleged
that
they
were
the
children/heirs of George and Agata
Spouses owned property in Otucan,
which was sold by George after Agata
died and used the proceeds to buy the
residential lot in Sum-at (supported by
witness Dalino, sister of Agata)
Maria sold lots within said property
without their knowledge/consent. They
only discovered in 1988
Prior to the sale, respondents were
warned that the property didnt belong
to Maria but to them. They proceeded
with the purchase and refused to meet
with petitioners
Petitioners Witnesses

Petitioners
were
children
and
compulsory heirs Agata and George
Tait, Sr.
After the death of Agata in 1936,
George maintained a common-law
relationship with Maria to whom on Apr
2, 1974, he donated a parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at,
Bontoc.
Dec 24, 1977: George died
1982-1983: Maria sold lots included
within the Sum-at property in favor of
private respondents
1988: Maria died
Jul 24, 1989, the petitioners filed an
action for quieting of title, nullification
of deeds of sale and recovery of
possession with damages claiming that
Maria sold the Sum-at property without
their knowledge and consent
o she had no right to sell the
same considering that the
money used to purchase the
said property came from the
proceeds
of
the
inherited
Utocan property of their mother
which was sold by George;
o the deed of donation between
George and Maria was null and
void for being a forgery
Petitioners perspective

TOPIC:
Marriages

Donations in Common Law

PETITIONER: Emilie T. Sumbad, Beatrice


B. Tait
RESPONDENT:
etc.
PONENTE:

Court

of

Appeals,

Mendoza, J. (2nd Div)

Jul 24, 1989: petitioners action to


quieting of title, nullification of deeds

Dalino: George sold the Otucan


property after Agatas death and used
the proceeds to buy the Sum-at
property
Lanoy: when George acquired the Sumat property, he was already married to
Maria. Money used to purchase came
from the sale of the house at Bauko
Court deemed this to be not
conclusive of the fact that the
money came from the proceeds
of the Otucan sale
Atty. Papa: she was the register of
deeds of Bontoc since Feb 1987. She
did not recall receiving a letter from
Emelie. She issued a certification that
there was no deeds of sale between
Maria and private respondents
Shirley: she was boardmates during
college with Raquel Tait (Georges
ward). She saw the latter forge a deed
of donation and George's and Marias
signature at the time when George
was already dead
Deemed
rehearsed,
vague,
incredible, and unconvincing by
the Court. No evidence as well
(handwriting experts)
Respondents perspective

denied
to
being
informed
of
petitioners claim
alleged that the property didnt belong
to the conjugal partnership of George
and Agata (since the latter died 30

years before the issuance of the Tax


Declaration)
Maria (deceased) didnt need the
consent of petitioners to sell the
property
Respondents witnesses

Felipa: Rosita demanded additional


money from Felipas son, who paid
for the lot. Emilie was there when
she demanded.
Julio: They verified from the records
of the municipal office that Maria
was the owner.
Glenn: Also verified from the
Municipal Assessors office that the
property was owned by Maria. He
also testified that after he received
a letter from Petitioners, they held
a conference in Rocitas house,
wherein they were asked for more
money
Edward: deed of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Bondoc
Private respondents arguments
o they were purchased in good
faith and for value as they
purchased the lots on the
strength of a Tax Declaration
over the Sum-at property
showing the seller, Maria, to be
the owner of the property
o the action was barred by laches
trial court dismissed the complaint
(affirmed by CA)

ISSUES:
3. WON the deed of donation is void due
to it being a forgery
4. WON Deed of Donation is invalid under
Art 749 of the Civil Code
5. WON Deed of Donation is contrary to
Art 133 of the Civil Code
6. WON the claim that they werent
aware of the sale until 1988 is credible
RULING:
Petition DENIED. Petitioners
have not sufficiently shown the
nullity of respondents title to the
lots. CA decision AFFIRMED.

1. No merit.
The fact finding of the CA shall
not be disturbed on appeal
unless the court has overlooked
or
ignored
some
fact/
circumstance
of
sufficient
weight or significance which
would alter the result of the
case.
Forgery should be proved by
clear and convincing evidence,
the burden of which lies with
alleger
Petitioner had not shown that
the deed of donation was
invalid. It was presumed that
the deputy clerk of court who
notarized
the
deed
was
authorized by the clerk of
court.
Shirleys testimony is difficult to
believe (rehearsed as she
anticipated the question of
petitioners
counsel,
and
sometimes said more than was
called for by the question.)
Petitioners
should
have
presented handwriting experts
to support their claim that
Georges signature on the deed
of donation was indeed a
forgery
2. Deed is Valid under Art 749
Art 749, CC requires a public
instrument as a requisite for the
validity
of
donations
of
immovable property
Person who notarized it was
the deputy clerk of court who
acted for and in the absence
of the Clerk of Court
In accordance with Sec
21,
Revised
Administrative Code
(which
lists
officials
authorized to administer
oaths, among which is
the Clerk of Court and
people who act in the
capacity of the listed
officers)
3. Deed is Valid under Art 133

Art 133: donation between


spouses during marriage shall
be void. This prohibition doesnt
apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the
donor. Nor does it apply to
moderate gifts which spouses
may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing.
Now Art 87 of the FC:
prohibition applies to people
living as husband and wife
without valid marriage
This point is being raised for the
first time, which the petitioners
cannot do on appeal
Even assuming that they arent
thus
precluded,
petitioners
werent
able
to
present
evidence in support of such
no showing of George
and Marias marriage
and if so, when it took
place
or that at the time of
donation, George and
Maria were maintaining
common-law relations
evidence showing that at the
time the deed was executed,
their father and Maria were still
maintaining
common-law
relations should have been
presented. Beatrices testimony
is only to the effect that in 1941
Maria
became
their
stepmother. No evidence on
record that George and Maria
continuously
maintained
common-law relations until Apr
2, 1974 when the donation
was made

4. Nope.
Petitioners mother died in
1936, father on 1974, yet they
waited 12 years before claiming
their inheritance?
Petitioners are guilty of Laches
Laches is the failure for
an unreasonable length
of time to do that which
shouldve been done
earlier

precluded them from


assailing the donation
made their father in
favor of Maria
ARCABA vs.
BATOCAEL

TABANCURA

VDA.

DE

GR No. 146683
November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima


Montallana became the registered owners
of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St.
and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and
his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights,
where the latter waived her share
consisting of of the property in favor of
Francisco. Since Francisco do not have
any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece,
Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a
widow and took care of Franciscos house
as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila


were lovers since they slept in the same
room.
On the other hand, Erlinda
Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila
was
his
mistress.
However,
Cirila
defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and
that Francisco was too old for her. She

denied having sexual intercourse with


Francisco. When the nieces got married,
Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow
started working for Francisco who was 75
year old widower. The latter did not pay
him any wages as househelper though her
family was provided with food and
lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated
and
became
bedridden.
Tabancura
testified that Franciscos only source of
income was the rentals from his lot near
the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before


Francisco died, he executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a
portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq
m., together with his house to Cirila who
accepted the same. The larger portion of
268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year
of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in


1993, the lot received by Cirila had a
market value of P57,105 and assessed
value of P28,550.
The decedents
nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter


vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas
favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a


sufficient
proof
of
common
law
relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of Cirila
Comille such as application for business
permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that
Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual


intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer
be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the
public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.

Willem Beumer Vs Avelina Amores


G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

Issue: Can a foreigner reimburse his


investment in the purchase of Filipino
land

Facts of the Case: Willem Beumer, a


Dutch National, and Avelina Amores, a
Filipina, were married in March 29, 1980.
In November 10, 2000, the RTC of Negros
Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of
their marriage on the basis of Beumers
psychological incapacity as contemplated
in Article 36 of the Family Code. Beumer
filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership on December 14, 2000 asking
for the distribution of their properties
claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
The
properties
include
several
lots
of
Dumaguete Cadastre (lot 1, lot 2142, lot
5845, lot 4, lot 2055-A and lot 2055-I.
Amores claimed that, with the exception
of their two (2) residential houses on Lots
1 and 2142, she and Beumer did not
acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she
used her own personal money to purchase
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I
by way of inheritance. Amores submitted
a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she
purchased
Lot
2142
and
the
improvements thereon using her own
money. Accordingly, Amores sought the
dismissal of the petition for dissolution as
well as payment for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.

During trial, Beumer testified that while


Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered
in the name of Amores, these properties
were acquired with the money he received
from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit, since Amores did not
have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition. Beumer also claimed that the
joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code,
thus it is invalid. Amores maintained that
the money used for the purchase of the
lots came exclusively from her personal
funds.

The RTC Negros decided that the source of


funds for the acquisition of said lots,
Beumer could not have acquired any right
over these properties as Beumer still
attempted
to
acquire
them
not
withstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of private lands.
This was
made evident by the sworn statements
petitioner executed purporting to show
that said lots were purchased from the
exclusive funds of his wife. Beumers plea
for reimbursement for the amount he had
paid to purchase said properties on the
basis of equity was likewise denied. Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Beumer filed a petition for review on the
CA ruling to the SC.

Decision: The SC held that the petition


lacks merit. The issue to be resolved is
not of first impression. In Re: Petition For
Separation
of
Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, the
Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his

former
Filipina
spouse,
Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut
Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the prohibition against
foreign
ownership
of
Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Beumers statements regarding the real


source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have
previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondents personal funds were used to
purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, Beumer has come before the Court
with unclean hands; he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge. In any
event, the Court cannot, even on the
grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
Beumer given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to
be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. The
ruling of the CA is affirmed.

Respondents filed with SEC against


Abrenica and state to return
partnership funds from a sale of a
parcel of land in Batangas. The
other case was regarding the
return the retainer fees Abrenica
received and the balance of cash
advance of Abrenica way back in
1997.
SEC transferred the case to RTC
QC. The decision was:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1.
Ordering
the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to render full
accounting of the amounts
he received as profits from
the sale and resale of
the Lemeryproperty
in
the
amount
of
4,524,000.00;
2.
Ordering
the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to remit to the law
firm the said amount of
4,524,000.00 plus interest
of 12% per annum from the
time he received the same
and converted the same to
his own personal use or
from September 1997 until
fully paid; and
3.
suit.

To pay the costs of

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959


Abrenica vs. Abrenica
Facts:

Petitioner Erlando Abrenica is a


partner in the law firm Abrenica,
Tungol
and
Tibayan.
Respondentsare his two partners
Danilo
Tungol
and
Abelardo
Tibayan.

1.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to render a
full
accounting
of
the
amounts he received under
the
retainer
agreement
between
the
law
firm
and Inc. and Atlanta Land
Corporation in the amount
of 320,000.00.
2.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to remit to

the law firm the amount


received by him under the
Retainer Agreement with
Atlanta
Industries,
Inc.
andCorporation in
the
amount of 320,000.00 plus
interests of 12% per annum
from June 1998 until fully
paid;

III.
The lower court
erred in not ruling that the
real
estate
transaction
entered
into
by
said
petitioners
and
spouses
Roman and Amalia Aguzar
was a personal transaction
and not a law partnership
transaction.

3.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to pay the
law firm his balance on his
cash advance in the amount
of 25,000.00 with interest
of 12% per annum from the
date this decision becomes
final; and

IV.
The lower court
erred in ruling that the
testimonies
of
the
respondents are credible.
V.
The lower court
erred in ruling that the
purchase price for the lot
involved was 3 million and
not 8 million.

4.
To pay the costs of
suit. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed an appeal to CA and
CA rendered a decision saying that
petitioner filed a wrong remedy
and
dismissed
the
case.
Respondents were able to seek
judgment as the decision in G.R.
No. 169420 became final and
executory.
Erlando who was not happy with
the decision filed with the CA along
with his wife Joena a petition for
annulment of judgment on the
previous case. They said that the
court erred on the following
grounds:
The lower court erred in
concluding
that
both
petitioners and respondents
did
not
present
direct
documentary evidence to
substantiate
[their]
respective claims.
II.
The lower court
erred in concluding that
both
petitioners
and
respondents relied mainly
on testimonial evidence to
prove
their
respective
position[s].

VI.
The lower court
erred
in
ruling
that
petitioners
retainer
agreement
with
Atlanta
Industries, Inc. was a law
partnership transaction.
VII.
The lower court
erred when it failed to rule
on
said
petitioners
permissive
counterclaim
relative to the various
personal loans secured by
respondents.
VIII.
The lower court not
only erred in the exercise of
its jurisdiction but more
importantly it acted without
jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction

We

note

that

petitioners

were

married on 28 May 1998. The cases


filed

with

the

Securities

and

Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6


May 1998 and 15 October 1998
were

filed

against

petitioner

Erlando only. It was with the filing


of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April

2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a

co-petitioner.
The CA dismissed the case again as
final and executory but both
Abrenica and Joena cannot be
stopped and filed again another
petition. This time, they injected
extrinsic fraud which was also
discussed on the dismissed case.
The CA dismissed the case again
for being insufficient in form and
substance.
On September 13, 2007, petitioner
Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion with Branch 226, alleging
that the sheriff had levied on
properties belonging to his children
and petitioner Joena. On that same
day, Joena also filed an affidavit of
third party claim on the same
branch alleging that she and her
stepchildren owned a number of
personal properties sought to be
levied. She insisted that she owns
the two motorcycles as well as the
house and lot to be which formed
part of the absolute community of
property. She also alleged that it
being a family home were exempt
from execution in pursuant of Rule
39, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court. She now sought the
discharge
and
release
and
remittance to her half of the
proceeds.
Petitioner moved to withdraw his
motion on the RTC scheduled
supposedly on Oct. 17, 2007
because of ongoing negotiations
with respondents.
Both
Abrenica
and
TIbayan
witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de
Guzman Jr. of RTC QC executed an
agreement to postpone the auction
sale of said property in anticipation
of an amicable settlement of
money judgment.

A sheriffs certificate was issued on


Jan. 3, 2008 in favour of the law
firm for the said property at 5M.
Petitioner elevated the case to SC
as they say that they were denied
due process by CA when they filed
a second case for annulment of
judgment of the decision of RTC.
Respondents alleged that petitioner
performed
an
act of
forum
shopping and filed a motion for
contempt against Abrenica.

Issue:
1. W/N Joena had a right to the claim
2. W/N petitioner committed forum
shopping and can be filed for
contempt
Ratio:

1. No. Joena turned out to be a


second wife. From the records,
Erlando Abrenica was first married
to MA. Aline Lovejoy Padua on Oct.
13, 1983. They had three children:
Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April
1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on
9 September 1986), and Patrik
Randel (born on 12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first
marriage of Erlando, he and Joena
got married on 28 May 1998.In her
Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that
the levied personal properties were
owned by the latter. We note that
two of these stepchildren were
already of legal age when Joena
filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik
Randel, parental authority over him

belongs to his parents. Absent any


special

power

authorizing

attorney

to

represent

Joena

Erlandos
cannot

of

children,

be

her

sustained.

claim

Petitioner

Joena also asserted that the two (2)


motor vehicles purchased in 1992
and 1997, as well as the house and
lot covered by TCT No. 216818
formed

part

of

the

absolute

community regime. However, Art.


92, par. (3) of the Family Code
excludes

from

property

the

the

community

property

acquired

before the marriage of a spouse


who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage; and the fruits
and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither

these

two

vehicles nor the house and lot


belong to the second marriage.

2. No. Petitioners are not guilty of

successively,
for
the
purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Thus, it
has been held that there is
forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of
an adverse decision in one
forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other
than by appeal or certiorari)
in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a
petition before the Supreme
Court, a party files another
before the Court of Appeals
since in such case he
deliberately splits appeals
in the hope that even as
one case in which a
particular remedy is sought
is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy)
would still be open, or
(3) where a party attempts
to obtain a preliminary
injunction in another court
after failing to obtain the
same from the original
court.

forum shopping.Respondents claim


that petitioners and their present

Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed

counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista,

to

were

undertaken

guilty

of

forum

shopping

question

the
by

the

proceedings
sheriff

in

when the latter filed Civil Case No.

executing the judgment in Civil

09-1323-MK

of

Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-

Marikina City while the case was

42959. On the other hand, the

still

with

pending

In Executive
Gordon, we

the

RTC

before

us.

present case questions the merits

Secretary

v.

of the Decision itself in Civil Case

explained

shopping in this wise:

forum

Nos.

Q01-42948

and

Q01-

42959. These cases have different


causes of action. Thus, it cannot be

Forum-shopping consists of
filing multiple suits involving
the same parties for the
same cause of action, either
simultaneously
or

said that petitioners were clearly


guilty of forum shopping when they
filed the Complaint before the RTC
of Marikina City.

Held: Petition denied.

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia


30 SCRA 111

Facts:

Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to


Chavez based on a surety bond executed
in favor of Philippine National Bank. Garcia
was one of the guarantors of the
indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB
filed complaint against Luzon Surety. This
subsequently prompted Luzon Surety,on
August of the same year, to file a
complaint against the guarantors (one of
which was Garcia). The lower court ruled
in favor of PNB in the first case and
ordered the guarantors in the second case
to pay Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960, CFI
issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay
the amount of P3,839. On August, the
sheriff levied his sugar quedans, conjugal
property of the Garcia spouses.The
Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the
lower court found in their favor based on
Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed
to the CA which affirmed the lower courts
decision Review through SC.

Issue:

WON the signing of the indemnity


agreement redounded to the benefit of the
family and thus,should fall under the
liabilities of the conjugal partnership.

Ruling:

No. The administrators obligations are


only chargeable to the conjugal property if
he believes it is done for the benefit of the
family. No proof was presented that
Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or
guarantor, did so for the benefit of the
family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety
did benefit the family because it added to
Garcias reputation as being trustworthy
and enhanced his standing in the
community. This is too remote/fanciful a
benefit to be considered in terms of what
is provided for in Art. 161.

Gelano v CA
FACTS
Insular Sawmill, Inc
o Private respondent
o With a corporate life of 50
years (September 1945September 1995)
o general lumber and sawmill
business
o leased
the
paraphernal
property of petitioner-wife
Guillermina M. Gelano in
Paco, Manila
o its officers and directors had
come to know petitionerhusband Carlos Gelano
who received from the
corporation cash advances
on account of rentals to be
paid by the corporation on
the land
Carlos
Gelano
obtained
from
private respondent cash advances
of P25,950.00
o said sum was taken and
received on the agreement
that
private
respondent
could deduct the same from
the monthly rentals of the
leased premises until said
cash advances are fully paid
o was able to pay only
P5,950.00 thereby leaving
an
unpaid
balance
of
P20,000.00
Petitioner Guillermina M. Gelano
refused to pay on the ground that

said amount was for the personal


account of her husband asked for
by, and given to him, without her
knowledge and consent and did not
benefit the family
Petitioners husband and wife also
made credit purchases of lumber
materials from private respondent
with a total price of P1,120.46 in
connection with the repair and
improvement
of
petitioners
residence
o partial payment was made
by petitioners in the amount
of P91.00
o in view of the cash discount
in favor of petitioners in the
amount of P83.00, the
amount
due
private
respondent on account of
credit purchases of lumber
materials is P946.46
which
petitioners
failed to pay
Joseph Tan Yoc Su, executed a joint
and several promissory note with
Carlos Gelano in favor of China
Banking Corp
o In order to accommodate
and help petitioners get a
loan
o However, petitioners failed
to pay
o Respondent was made to
pay P9,106
Carlos Gelano was
able to pay private
respondent
the
amount of P5,000.00
but the balance of
P4,106.00 remained
unsettled.
Guillermina
M.
Gelano refused to
pay on the ground
that she had no
knowledge about the
accommodation
made
by
the
corporation in favor
of her husband.
Corporation filed a case for
collection against petitioner

Private respondent amended its


Articles of Incorporation to shorten
its term of existence up to
December 31, 1960 only
o duly field with the SEC
o the trial court was, however,
not informed of the said
shortening of period
On November 20, 1964 and almost
four (4) years after the dissolution
of the corporation, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent

ISSUE:
whether a corporation, whose corporate
life had ceased by the expiration of its
terms of existence, could still continue
prosecuting and defending suits after its
dissolution and beyond the period of three
(3) years provided for under Act No. 1459,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law,
to wind up its affairs, without having
undertaken any step to transfer its assets
to a trustee or assignee.
HELD:
In American corporate law, upon which our
Corporation Law was patterned, it is well
settled that, unless the statutes otherwise
provide, all pending suits and actions by
and against a corporation are abated by a
dissolution of the corporation.[5]
Section 77 of the Corporation Law
provides that the corporation shall be
continued as a body corporate for three
(3) years after the time when it would
have been dissolved, for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it, so that, thereafter, it shall no
longer enjoy corporate existence for such
purpose. For this reason, Section 78 of the
same law authorizes the corporation, at
any time during said three years to convey
all of its property to trustees for the
benefit
of
members,
stockholders,
creditors and other interested, evidently
for the purpose, among others, of enabling
said trustees to prosecute and defend
suits by or against the corporation begun
before the expiration of said period.

When Insular Sawmill, Inc. was dissolved


on December 31, 1960, under Section 77
of the Corporation Law, it still has the right
until December 31, 1963 to prosecute in
its name the present case. After the
expiration of said period, the corporation
ceased to exist for all purposes and it can
no longer sue or be sued. However, a
corporation that has a pending action and
which cannot be terminated within the
three-year period after its dissolution is
authorized under Section 78 to convey all
its property to trustees to enable it to
prosecute and defend suits by or against
the corporation beyond the three-year
period. Although private respondent did
not appoint any trustee, yet the counsel
who prosecuted and defended the interest
of the corporation in the instant case and
who in fact appeared in behalf of the
corporation may be considered a trustee
of the corporation at least with respect to
the matter in litigation only. Said counsel
had been handling the case when the
same was pending before the trial court
until it was appealed before the Court of
Appeals and finally to this Court. We
therefore hold that there was a substantial
compliance with Section 78 of the
Corporation Law and as such, private
respondent Insular Sawmill, Inc. could still
continue prosecuting the present case
even beyond the period of three (3) years
from the time of its dissolution.
From the above quoted commentary of
Justice Fisher, the trustee may commence
a suit which can proceed to final judgment
even beyond the three-year period. No
reason can be conceived why a suit
already commenced by the corporation
itself during its existence, not by a mere
trustee who, by fiction, merely continues
the legal personality of the dissolved
corporation should not be accorded similar
treatment allowed to proceed to final
judgment and execution thereof.
The word trustee as used in the
corporation statute must be understood in
its general concept which could include
the counsel to whom was entrusted in the
instant case, the prosecution of the suit
filed by the corporation. The purpose in
the transfer of the assets of the
corporation to a trustee upon its

dissolution is more for the protection of its


creditor and stockholders. Debtors like the
petitioners herein may not take advantage
of the failure of the corporation to transfer
its assets toa trustee, assuming it has any
to transfer which petitioner has failed to
show, in the first place. To sustain
petitioners contention would be to allow
them to enrich themselves at the expense
of another, which all enlightened legal
systems condemn.
The last two assigned errors refer to the
disposition of the main case.
Petitioners contend that the obligations
contracted by petitioner
Carlos Gelano from November 19, 1947
until August 18, 1950 (before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code) and from
December 26, 1950 until July 14, 1952
(during the effectivity of the New Civil
Code) were his personal obligations,
hence, petitioners should not be held
jointly and severally liable. As regards the
said issues, suffice it to say that with the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the
obligation
contracted
by
petitionerhusband Carlos Gelano redounded to the
benefit of the family, the inevitable
conclusion is that the conjugalproperty is
liable for his debt, pursuant to paragraph
1, Article 1408,
Civil Code of 1889 which provision
incidentally can still be found in paragraph
1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code.
Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not
joint and several as erroneously described
by the Court of Appeals, the conjugal
partnership being only a single entity.

G Tractors Inc. v CA
GR L-57402
February 28, 1985

Topic: Charges upon the ACP and CPG w/


consent

Facts:

Private Respondent Luis R. Narciso,


legally married to Josefina S. Narciso, is a
businessman engaged in the production
and exportation of Philippine mahogany
logs.

The Petitioner, G-Tractors Inc. is in


the business of leasing heavy equipment
such as tractors and bulldozers

On Feb. 26, 1973 Luis entered into a


Contract of Hire of heavy Equipment with
G-Tractors.

Luis was not able to pay his


obligations to G-Tractors, so they filed a
case against him to collect his obligation.

Luis was declared in default,


however a compromise agreement offered
by Luis was accepted by G-Tractors. It
stated that Luis will pay thru instalments.
Again Luis failed to comply, so G-Tractors
filed a motion for execution. Luis asked for
the suspension of the writ of execution on
claims that he had a pending loan w/ a
bank. The RTC denied his petition for
suspension & the writ of execution was
issued.

Levy was accordingly made by the


City Sherriff on certain personal properties
of the Narciso couple and an auction was
held on Mar. 7, 1975.

Likewise, on February 12, 1975, the


Sheriff also made a levy on all rights,
interest, title, participation which Luis may
have over a parcel of residential land,
which parcel of land is allegedly the
conjugal property of the spouses Luis R.
Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso.

Auction date for the real estate


property was set for Mar. 25, 1975 wherein
G-Tractors won all these auctions.

Luis entered into another


agreement (a contract of lease over the
aforementioned property) with G-Tractors,
wherein he would pay P1,000 monthly
rental fee. Luis paid P12,000 for 1year
rental.

Narciso couple then filed a


complaint for declaration of nullity of levy
on the residential property on the ground
that it is a conjugal property. Luis entered
into a contract with G-Tractor which she
was not informed of and which she did not
benefit from. That the Sherriffs sale
clearly stated that only properties under
Luis Narciso would be sold. And that
Josefina could not be bound by the
judgment rendered in said case.

G-Tracors moved to have a transfer


of certificate, which Luis opposed their
motion on account of his complaint to
nullify the said auction of the said land.
RTC granted G-Tractors petition, Luis
moved to reconsider, and the Judge
dismissed his motion. A motion for
preliminary injunction was filed by Luis,
which was also dismissed.

On Oct. 2, 1976 Narcisio Couple


filed a petition for certiorari w/ preliminary
injunction before the CA. The CA reversed
the RTC.

Issue

Whether or not the judgment debt of


private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a
conjugal
debt
for
which
the
conjugalpartnership property can be held
answerable.

should not be made to suffer and answer


alone.
So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of
his career or profession or suffers losses in
a legitimate business, the conjugal
partnership must equally bear the
indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his
family. Such is the nature of the judgment
debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso
to petitioner. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership
of
gains
of
private
respondents Narcisos, must answer for the
same. Necessarily the sale at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City of
TCT No. 120923 belonging to the conjugal
partnership of gains of the private
respondents Narcisos in order to satisfy
the judgment debt of the private
respondent Luis R. Narciso with petitioner,
was validly and legally made in
accordance with law and not legally
assailable.

Held:

Yes.

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides


that the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations


contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership

There is no question that private


respondent Luis R. Narciso is engage in
business as a producer and exporter of
Philippine mahogany logs. He operates a
logging concession and holds office right
in the conjugal where he and his family
resides. His account with petitioner GTractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use
of petitioner's tractors which he leased for
the purpose of constructing switchroads
and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of
the logging concession which is not his
exclusive property but that of his family.
There is no doubt then that his account
with the petitioner was brought about in
order to enhance the productivity of said
logging business, a commercial enterprise
for gain which he had the right to embark
the conjugal partnership.

The husband is the administrator of the


conjugal partnership and as long as he
believes he is doing right to his family, he

Francisco v Gonzales
9/17/2008
Topic: Charges upon ACP: Family Expenses

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari on CA
decision, affirming RTC decision, to deny
petitioners motion to stop execution sale
This motion to stop execution sale was on
a property that was covered by the
Compromise Agreement in the Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage entered by the
parents of the Petitioners (Petitioners here
are the minor children, Cleodia and
Ceamantha of the Francisco spouses,
represented by their Grandmother)
Compromise agreement states that in the
spouses desire to manifest concern for
their children, the title and ownership of a
conjugal property in Ayala Alabang
(located in Taal St.) are to be transferred
to the children by way of deed of donation
when they reach 18 and 19 yrs old

Meanwhile, the other property of their


mom (Michele) who was cohabiting with
her partner (Matrai, not the biological
father of the children), also in Ayala
Alabang in Lanka Drive, was subject in a
case for Unlawful Detainer and to which
MTC Muntinlupa ordered mom and Matrai
to vacate and pay rentals, unpaid bills etc.
Pending appeal on this case, a notice of
sale by execution was issued by the sheriff
covering the property of the spouses in
Taal St. (!)
When petitioners grandmother learned
about this, she, as guardian-in-fact of
petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit
of 3rd party claim and a very urgent motion
to Stop Sale by Execution which was
DENIED hence this petition
Petitioners argue that they are the rightful
owners of the property; that their parents
already waived in their favor the rights
over the property; the adjudged obligation
of the mom in the ejectment case did not
redound to the benefit of the family; and
that the moms obligation is a joint
obligation between her and the guy and
not joint and solidary
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC erred in proceeding with the
execution, levy and sale of the Taal St.
property under such circumstances

HELD:
RTC erred the power of the court in
executing judgments extends only to
properties
unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. In this case,
to Michele and Matrai One mans
goods shall not be sold for another
mans debts
RTC should not have ignored that the Taal
St. property was in the name of the dad
(Cleodualdo) and Michele, and not Michele
and Matrai
Cleodualdo and Michele marriage was in
1986, prior to effectivity of the Family
Code,
their
property
relations
are
governed by the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership gains

CA acknowledged conjugal in nature


however it ruled that since Micheles
obligation was not proven to be a personal
debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal
and redounded to the benefit of the
family, and hence the property may be
held answerable for it Court DOES NOT
agree (!)
A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of
the
family,
or
when
she
borrows money for that purpose upon
her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of
the
conjugal
partnership
is
transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity.
Failure to establish any of these
circumstances
means
that
the
conjugal asset may not be bound to
answer for the wife's personal
obligation.
Furthermore, prior to the issuance of the
Notice of Levy on Execution, already
attached in the title was that it shall be
transferred to the petitioners (children,
Cleodia and Ceamantha) by Deed of
Donation should have put the RTC and
sheriff on guard
The subject in question here is that which
is leased by Matrai and Michele who was
already living separately from Cleodualdo
and purported to be wife of Matrai
To hold the property in Taal St. liable for
the obligations of Michele and Matrai
would be going against the spirit and
avowed objective of the Civil Code to give
the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit
- GRANTED, CA and RTC decision are SET
ASIDE

Roberto and Venus Buado vs. Court of


Appeals and Romulo Nicol

FACTS:


Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case
against Erlinda Nicol for the latters civil
liability arising from the criminal offense of
Slander

After 3 years, the trial court


rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to
pay civil damages; this decision was
likewise affirmed by the CA. In 1992, the
court issued a Writ of Execution ordering
Nicol to pay the spouses from his estates
the amount of P40k for moral damage,
Attys fees and litigation expenses within
60 days upon the courts issuance.
However, upon finding that Erlindas
properties were insufficient, the Deputy
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real prop
addressed to the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite

In line with this, an auction sale was


held with the petitioners as the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of Mr.and Mrs. Buado.

After almost one year, the husband


of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint
for the annulment of certificate of sale and
damages with preliminary injunction
against petitioners and deputy sheriff.- He
argued that there was no proper
publication and posting for the auction
sale. He also claimed that the judgment
obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to
P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained
the P500,000 worth of property for only
P51,685.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed


the petition of Romulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the


decision of the RTC and held that Branch
21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint
filed by the respondent in this case.

The petitioners filed a petition


where they said that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion for
reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda
Nicol arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not


chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike the system of absolute community
where liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains.

The conjugal partnership of gains


has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the
wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

The Supreme Court does not agree


to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado
that in Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court
held that the car which was claimed by
the third party complainant to be conjugal
property was being levied upon to enforce
"a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is
proper since the obligation which is
personal to the husband is chargeable not
on the conjugal property but on his
separate property. Hence, the filing of a
separate action by Romulo Nicol was
proper. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS.


RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY

CONSTANTINO and MR. & MRS.


LIBERTY CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
ROSE
MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO,
in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 41, Quezon City and
NENITA CO BAUTISTA represented by
VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, respondents.

for unlawful detainer against petitioners in

2000-08-30 | G.R. No. 143016

spouses can sign the petition. Court finds

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.


They were sued as "Mr. and Mrs." in the
said case. Petitioners now contend that
since what is involved in the instant case
is their common rights and interest to
abode

under

the

system

of

absolute

community of property, either of the


merit in the petition.

If the petitioners are husband and wife


and only one of them signs the petition
(for review on certiorari and mandamus),
is the petition dismissible for violation of
the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify
it under oath? This is the sole issue raised
by petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr.
and Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy
Constantino, and Mr. and Mrs. Liberty
Cruz.
In a resolution, dated January 25, 2000,
the Court of Appeals ruled in the
affirmative. [Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56748 entitled
"Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr. & Mrs. Randy
Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy Constantino and
Mr. & Mrs. Liberty Cruz, Petitioners, vs.
Hon. Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge in the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Metro Manila,
Branch 41, Quezon City and Nenita Co
Bautista, represented by Victorio a.
Bautista, Rollo, pp. 24-25.] Said court
dismissed petitioners' petition for review
on certiorari and mandamus for failure to
comply with the Rule on Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping after finding that the
petition "was signed only by Ronnie Dar,
Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino, and
Liberty Cruz, without authority attached
thereto to sign for and in behalf of their
co-petitioners."
Facts of the case shows that private
respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 issued


by the Supreme Court on February 8, 1994
provides, among others:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February
8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals and is intended to
prevent the multiple filing of petitions or
complaints involving the same issues in
other tribunals or agencies as a form of
forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same
purpose, the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court and existing circulars,
shall be strictly complied with in the filing
of complaints, petitions, applications or
other initiatory pleadings in all courts and
agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
and shall be subject to the same sanctions
provided hereunder.
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or
principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath
in such original pleading, or in a sworn
certification
annexed
thereto
and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth
of the following facts and undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the

Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or


agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge,
no such action or proceedings is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
(c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may
have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceedings has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or
agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein
have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory
pleadings referred to and subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint,
counter-claim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint, or complaint-inintervention,
petition,
or application
wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
xxx
With respect to the contents of the
certification which the pleader may
prepare, the rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of. While this section
requires that it be strictly complied with, it
merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that it cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely
disregarded but it does not thereby
prevent substantial compliance on this
aspect of its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to
promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules
of procedure - which is to achieve

substantial justice as expeditiously as


possible.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals
should have taken into consideration the
fact that the petitioners were sued jointly,
or as "Mr. and Mrs." over a property in
which they have a common interest. Such
being the case, the signing of one of them
in the certification substantially complies
with the rule on certification of non-forum
shopping.
The resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated January 25, 2000 and April 24,
2000, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition.
Uy
GR 109557

CA

Incapacity

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that


rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be
allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell
the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further contest that such illness of the
husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet
such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of
Gilda contending that such decision is
pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the
rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that
the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of
the person and properties of his father. As
such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should

follows the ruled governing special


proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
requiring
procedural
due
process
particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits.
He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on Separation in Fact
Between
Husband
and
Wife
contemplating a situation where both
spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he
argued that this should not be applied in
their case.

guardians, and not the summary judicial


proceedings under FC. SC further held
that such incapacity of the trial court to
provide for an opportunity to be heard is
null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda


sold the property to her daughter and son
in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA
reversed the decision of the lower court.

February 29, 2008

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a


husband
who
suffered
stroke,
a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property
and dispose a parcel of land with
improvements.

HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on
summary proceedings does not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, trial court found
that subject spouse was incompetent who
was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence,
the
proper
remedy
is
a
judicial
guardianship
proceeding
under
the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides
that wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a
spouse who desires to sell real property as
administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of
the wards estate required of judicial

Ugalde v Ysasi
GR No. 130623

Facts
-

Ugalde and Ysasi got married


before the MTC. They did not
execute
any
ante-nuptial
agreement, and had a son.

In 1957, petitioner and respondent


separated. Respondent allegedly
contracted another marriage with
Smith. At the same time, petitioner
alleges that respondent and Smith
had been acquiring and disposing
of real and personal properties to
her prejudice as the lawful wife.

She alleges that she has been


defrauded of rental income, profits
and
fruits
of their
conjugal
properties.

December 1984, petitioner filed a


petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnerships of gains
against respondent. Petitioner asks
for
her
conjugal
share
in
respondents inheritance as per the
settlement
of
the
state
of
respondents parent

Respondent countered that he and


petition entered into an agreement
which provided that their conjugal
partnership of gains shall be
deemed dissolved as of April 1957
(Amicable settlement). That the
Amicable settlement was approved.
Respondent also alleges petitioner

obtained a divorce in Mexico and


contracted a second marriage with
Galoway.
-

Finally respondent alleges that


their marriage was void because it
was executed without the benefit
of a marriage license.

RTC ruling dismissed the petition,


considering that the marriage was
void without a marriage license.
Also, there was no proof that
petitioner and respondent acquired
properties during their union.

Court of Appeals affirmed the


decision of the RTC. This lead to the
instant petition

Issue
-

W/N CA committed a reversible


error in affirming the RTCs decision
which dismissed the action for
dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains.

Held: No
-

Regarding
the
dissolution
of
conjugal partnership of gains, the
existence of conjugal partnership
of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage, which petitioner and
respondent dont have due to the
absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner
and
respondents
marriage was held on February
1951, and the applicable law was
the Civil Code. So when the RTC
decided their case, the conjugal
partnership was already dissolved.

DIO v. DIO G.R. No. 178044


19, 2011 CARPIO, J.

January

DOCTRINE: Article 50 of the Family Code


does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared

void without waiting for the liquidation of


the properties of the parties. In this case,
petitioners marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on coownership.
FACTS: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma.
Caridad L. Dio(respondent) got married
on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag
(Dr.
Tayag)
submitted
a
psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable
and deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years. The trial court
granted the petition on the ground that
respondent
was
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code. Trial court, upon motion for
partial reconsideration of petitioner,
modified its decision holding that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when
it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code
HELD/RATIO: YES. The trial courts decision
is affirmed with modification. Decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial courts
decision
without
waiting
for
the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The Court has ruled in

Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage,


regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case
before the Court.In this case, petitioners
marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the
spouses
should
be
liquidated
in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of
the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

FACTS:

DELIZO v. DELIZO
[G.R. No. L-32820-21]
[January 30, 1976]
TOPIC:
Absolute
Community
Property for marriages before FC
PETITIONER: Dorotea De Ocampo vda.
Delizo + 9 children (Appellants)
RESPONDENT:
Urbana
Delizo,
Ambrocio Flora, Severino Delizo, Heirs of
Francisco Delizo (Appellees)
PONENTE:

Antonio, J.

Nicolas Delizos 1st marriage was with


Rosa Villasfer (from Apr. 20, 1981 to
Rosas death on Dec 7, 1909)
2nd marriage was with Dorotea De
Ocampo (from Oct 1911 until Nicolas
death on May 3, 1957)
Action for partition of the conjugal
partnership properties initiated by
Respondents (children and g.children
from 1st marriage) against their father
and petitioner
o Defendants
opposed
this,
claiming that the properties in
the complaint were of the 2nd
marriage
o May 3, 1957: Nicolas died and
was substituted by his children
from the 2nd marriage
o June 3, 1957: In the meantime,
Special proceedings were filed
by petitioner
o Involved are the properties
acquired by Nicolas
RTC distributed the properties as
follows:
o pro indiviso to 3 children
(and heir of the deceased
sibling) of 1st marriage
o pro indiviso to surviving
spouse Dorotea
o pro indiviso, in equal shares
to
the
children
of
both
marriages 13 parts
Petitioners appealed to the CA, which
affirmed with modifications the RTCs
decision
o Caanawan lands
married to Dorotea in
the Original Certificate
of Title doesnt mean
that the property is
owned
by
the
2nd
conjugal
partnership,
but simply indicates the
civil status of Nicolas
Acquisition
of
the
properties took place
during the existence of
the 1st marriage (1905)

No showing that this


exclusively belonged to
Nicolas,
it
should
correspond to the 1st
conjugal partnership
of the fruits of the
property which should
pertain to the heirs of
Rosa refers only to of
the net after deducting
the expenses of clearing
the land, cultivating,
gathering,
and
preservation
Other properties
No controversy that they
were acquired during
the 2nd marriage
of the conjugal properties of
1st
marriage
=
separate
property of the husband in the
2nd conjugal partnership
Fruits of the Caanawan
property were acquired
through the labor of
Nicolas and Dorotea
If left to itself, it cannot
bear any fruits since
there
werent
any
improvements on it
Whatever is produced
via the spouses labor &
industry belongs to the
conjugal partnership
2nd marriage is entitled
to reimbursement for
the increase in value of
the 47 ha. portion which
was
cleared
and
developed heirs of 2nd
marriage couldnt be
entitled to more than
30%
of
the
gross
produce
Munoz property
purchased with a loan
(belonging to the 2nd
conjugal
partnership)
and the fruits (gross
production)
of
the
Caanawan property
FINAL
20% of all properties
acquired during the 2nd

marriage
(including
Munoz) to the children of
1st marriage
of Caanawan
and house and
lot at 562 P
Campa
St.,
Manila (1/6 for
each child)
20% of all other
properties (1/15
for each child)
80% of all properties
acquired during the 2nd
marriage constitute the
2nd conjugal partnership

to
Nicolas,
divided
among
his heirs (2/65 for
each)
to Dorotea (or
2/5 thereof)
To Nicolas Delizo:
Caanawan property and
house and lot on P.
Campa
Due to death,
divided
among
surviving spouse
and all of his
children (1/26 for
each heir)
Petitioners appeal to the SC
o 67-ha. Caanawan property cant
be a property of the 1st
marriage
they were public lands
being
homesteads
during the 1st marriage
only during the 2nd
marriage were the reqts
of
public
land
law
complied with, resulting
in
the
confirmation,
registration, & issuance
of the Torrens title to
Nicolas & Dorotea
o respondents claim for partition
shouldve been barred
by
acquisitive
&
extinctive prescription,
laches, and estoppel
legal presumption of all
properties
of
the

marriage belong to the


2nd conjugal partnership
wasnt rebutted
these properties were in
adverse
possession
under claim of title of
petitioners for 47 years
It
wouldve
been
more
equitable if the 1st partnership
properties
were
divided
between different partnerships
in proportion to the duration of
each and the capital of the
spouses (Art 189, NCC)

ISSUE:WON
the
67-ha.
Caanawan
property are of the 1st marriage
RULING:
RTC

No. Case REMANDED to the

Purchase of lands during the period of


the 1st marriage doesnt automatically
mean that they should be considered
as properties of the 1st marriage
They were homesteads, part of the
public domain
Did not show that all of the
requirements of the Homestead Law
were complied with to warrant a grant
of patent to the homesteader prior to
the 1909 death of Rosa
Art 926: the right of the homesteader
to the patent doesnt become absolute
until after he has complied with all
requirements of the law.
Required that the land be
cultivated for 5 years before the
filing of application
3 years after, applicant shall
prove by 2 credible witnesses
that he has resided and
cultivated the land
Determination of whether a parcel of
land acquired by homestead is
conjugal property of the 1st or 2nd
marriage is the time of the
fulfillment of the requirements of
the public land law for the acquisition
of such right to the patent
20 ha were cultivated and rendered
productive from 1905-1909

Equity demand that the rights


to
said
properties
be
apportioned to the parties in
proportion to the extent to
which the requirements of the
public land laws had been
complied
with
during
the
existence of each conjugal
partnership
No
controversy
with
the
other
properties, on their being acquired
during the 2nd marriage
Since the capital of either marriage or
the contribution of each spouse cannot
be determined with precision
Should be divided between the
2 conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of
each partnership
2nd conjugal partnership entitled
to 46/64 or 23/32 of total mass
of properties
1st conjugal partnership to
18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro
indiviso
to Nicolas delizos estate
to be distributed in equal
shares to the estate

Belcodero vs CA
GR No. 89667
October 20, 1993
Facts:
- Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday
on July 27, 1927, they had three
children. In 1946, Alayo left the
conjugal home and then lived with
Josefa Rivera, they had a child,
Josephine Belcodero (petitioner)
- In 1949, Alayo bought a parcel of
land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc where he
indicated in the deed that he was
married to Josefa. The Transfer
Certificate of Title was later named
to Josefa. In 1958, Alayo married
Josefa even with a subsisting
marriage with Juliana.

In 1967, Alayo died. After three


years, Josefa executed a document
of extrajudicial partition and sale of
the lot which was then described as
their conjugal property.
In 1980, Juliana and her three
legitimate children filed an action
for reconveyance of the property.
The lower court and the CA both
ruled in favor of Juliana and
ordered petitioner to execute a
deed of reconveyance of the
property.

Issue:
- WON CAs decision is correct
Ruling:
- Yes,
property
remained
as
belonging
to
the
conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his
legitimate wife
- Under NCC Article 160, all
property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
- Since the property was acquired by
Alayo and Josefa was merely
authorized to have title to the
property transferred to her name,
the latter had no right to the
property. Moreover, she recognized
Alayos ownership when she and
Joosephine executed the deed
ofextrajudicial partition and sale.
- The applicable prescriptive period
for the reconveyance of the
property by the beneficiaries is 10
years.

Estrella Orpiano Vs Spouses Tomas


G.R. No. 178611 January 14, 2013

Issue: whether there is indeed forum


shopping?

Facts of the case: In 1979, a Decision


was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Quezon
City
declaring
Estrella
Orpiano
an
absent/absentee spouse and granting
Alejandro Orpiano the authority to sell the
lot. The JDRC Decision was annotated on
the back of TCT No. RT-23468. On March
19, 1996, Alejandro Orpiano sold the lot on
installment basis to Antonio and Myrna
Tomas for P12, 170,283. A new title TCT
No. N-152326 was issued in the name of
the Tomas spouses despite the fact that
the purchase price has not been paid in
full. On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed
a civil case in RTC of Quezon City, Branch
226 seeking collection of the balance of
the price in the amount of P4,314,100
supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas
spouses, with damages.
During the
pendency of the collection case, Alejandro
died. His heirs, Estrella included, were
substituted in his stead in the collection
case. Estrella moved to amend the
Complaint to one for rescission/annulment
of sale and cancellation of title, but the
court denied her motion. She next moved
to be dropped as party plaintiff but was
again rebuffed.

On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed a civil case


for annulment of the March 1996 sale and
cancellation of TCT No. N-152326, with
damages, against the Tomas spouses and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
which was impleaded as a nominal party.
Estrella claimed that the 1979 declaration
of her absence and accompanying
authority to sell the lot were obtained by

Alejandro
through
misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit, adding that the May
1979 JDRC Decision was not published as
required by law and by the domestic
relations court. Thus, the declaration of
absence and Alejandros authority to sell
the lot are null and void. Correspondingly,
the ensuing sale to the Tomas spouses
should be voided, and TCT No. N-152326
cancelled.
In their answer to the
annulment Complaint, the Tomas spouses
prayed for the dismissal thereof on the
ground of forum shopping, arguing that
the filing of the annulment case was
prompted by the denial of Estrellas
motion initiated in the collection case to
amend the Complaint to one for
annulment of sale. After pre-trial in the
annulment case, the court proceeded to
tackle the issue of forum shopping. The
parties
submitted
their
respective
memoranda touching on the sole issue of
whether Estrella is guilty of forum
shopping.

On September 25, 2006, the trial court


issued an Order dismissing the annulment
case. It sustained the view taken by the
Tomas spouses that Estrella filed the
annulment case only because the
collection court denied her motion to
amend the case to one for annulment of
the sale, and thus the annulment case was
Estrellas attempt at obtaining a remedy
which she could not secure in the
collection case. On December 27, 2006,
Estrella filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari questioning the September 25,
2006 Order, the CA found that Estrella was
indeed guilty of forum shopping in filing
the annulment suit while the collection
case was pending. The CA held that a
final judgment in the collection case
ordering the Tomas spouses to pay the
supposed balance of the price will
necessarily result in a finding that the sale

between Alejandro and the Tomas spouses


is a valid sale. This then would prevent a
declaration of nullity of the sale in the
annulment case. Thus, a petition to the
SC was filed.

Decision: Forum shopping is defined as


an act of a party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may
also be the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
Although the Court believes that Estrella
was not prompted by a desire to trifle with
judicial processes, and was acting in good
faith in initiating the annulment case, still
the said case should be dismissed
because it produces the same effect which
the rule on forum shopping was fashioned
to preclude. If the collection case is not
dismissed and it, together with the
annulment case, proceeds to finality, not
only do we have a possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered; an unfair
situation, as envisioned by the Tomas
spouses, might arise where after having
paid the balance of the price as ordered
by the collection court, the cancellation of
the TCT and return of the property could
be decreed by the annulment court.
Besides, allowing the two cases to remain
pending makes litigation simply a game of
chance where parties may hedge their
position by betting on both sides of the
case, or by filing several cases involving
the same issue, subject matter, and
parties, in the hope of securing victory in
at least one of them.

While Estrella correctly made use of the


remedies available to her amending the
Complaint and filing a motion to drop her
as a party she committed a mistake in
proceeding to file the annulment case
directly after these remedies were denied
her by the collection court without first
questioning or addressing the propriety of
these denials. While she may have been
frustrated by the collection courts
repeated rejection of her motions and its
apparent inability to appreciate her plight,
her proper recourse nevertheless should
have been to file a petition for certiorari or
otherwise question the trial courts denial
of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff,
citing just reasons which call for a ruling to
the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or
misjoinder of parties are the proper
subject of certiorari. The SC reiterates
that considerations of expediency cannot
justify a resort to procedural shortcuts.
The end does not justify the means; a
meritorious case cannot overshadow the
condition that the means employed to
pursue it must be in keeping with the
Rules. The Petition is denied for lack of
merit.

Castro vs. Miat

Castro vs miat
Facts:

Moises and Concordia Miat, a married


couple bore two children, Alexander
and Romeo. Both parents bought two
parcels of land. The first lot is at Wawa
La Huerta, Airport Village, Paranaque
Manila and the second lot is at Paco,
Manila. Concordia died on April
30,1978.
When Moises was at Dubai, he agreed
that both lots will be given to his two
children, Romeo and Alexander. When

he returned in 1984, he changed his


mind and said that he'll have the
Paranque lot and both Romeo and
Alexander can have the Paco lot
through an agreement to which both
agreed.
Regarding the Paco property, Moises
and Concordia bought it on installment
basis on May 17, 1977. It was only in
Dec.4, 1984 that Mooses was able to
pay for the balance. The title was
secured under his name as widower.
Romeo, his son, said that his father
violated the agreement they had before
that once the property was paid in full,
the title will be placed under the name
of Romeo and Alexander. When this was
demanded from Moises, he gave a
duplicate copy of the title to Romeo.
Both sons lived and duly paid the taxes
and insurance premiums. In August
1985, Alexander and his first wife left
the Paco property and in April 1988,
Alexander sold his share in the Paco
property for PHP42,750. Alexander
received an amount of Php6000 as
downpayment from Romeo. No deed of
assignment was made in favor of
Romeo because of loads of work and
tight schedule was assailed plus the
possession of the title of Romeo.
In Feb. 1988, Romeo discovered from
his godmother in his wedding Mrs.
Rosalina Castro, mother of Virgilio
Castro (petitioner) that she had given
Moises
Php30,000
downpayment
regarding the Paco Property for her son
Virgilio Castro.
In Dec, 1988, the status of Paco
property was discussed in MTC Manila
in the chamber of Judge Anunciacion.
On Dec. 16, 1988, the lawyer of Virgilio
sent a letter to Romeo for a conference.
Romeo was also informed that the Paco
property was sold last Dec. 5, 1988 by
Moises through a deed of sale to Virgilio
for PHP95,000.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises
testified that even the death of
Concordia, there was already an
agreement that the Paco property will
go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated
on
the
deathbed
of
Concordia. When Moises returned to
Manila for good, the agreement was

repeated again with the relatives of


Miat. Alexander sold his share to Romoe
which was corroborated by Pedro
Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Pedro Miranda
worked with Moises at Bayview Hotel
and Hotel Filipinas. Pedros wife is the
cousin of Romeo and Alexander.
Romeo borrowed the title because he
will mortgage it to his friend Lorenzo.
When Moises ran into a financial
constraint, he mortgaged said property
to Virgilio Castro for PHP30,000.
Moises said to Romeo and Alexander
that he will be forced to sell the
property if they will not pay the
mortgage. They all then went to Manila
City Hall along with Virgilio and his
parents to discuss the sale of the
property with a judge and lawyer
present. After the conference, Moises
proceeded with the sale of the property
to Castro.
Alexander got 2/3 of the sale while his
father got 1/3 of it. Romeo did not
receive anything but was permitted to
till their Nueva Ecija property.
Virgilio testified that Romeo was
informed of the selling of property with
Romeo replying in one of the
conversations bahala ka. Also he said
that Romeo was again informed in MTC
Manila.
The events forced Romeo to file an
action to nullify the sale between
Moises and Virgilio, compel Moises and
Alexander for a deed of conveyance or
assignment of PAco property to him
upon payment and make them pay for
damages. After trial in RTC, the decision
states:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court hereby orders
the
following:
1)
Defendant
Alexander V. Miat to execute a
deed of sale of his share in the
property upon payment by plaintiff
Romeo of the balance of the
purchase
price
in
the
sum
of P36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V.
Miat to recognize as valid the sale
of defendant Moises share in the
house and lot located at No. 1495C Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; 3) the

dismissal of defendants counterclaim; and 4) defendants to pay the


costs of suit."

Both parties appealed to


decision was modified as:

CA

and

(1) The deed of sale entered into


between
defendants-appellants
Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio
and Michelle Castro is hereby
NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises
Miat and Alexander Miat are
ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance over the Paco property
with TCT No. 16383 (sic) in favor of
plaintiff-appellant
Romeo
Miat,
upon payment by Romeo Miat of
the balance of the purchase price
in the sum of P36,750.00.
(3)
Defendants-appellants
are
ordered, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiff-appellant attorneys
fees in the amount of P30,000.00
and to pay the costs of suit."

Hence, the petition in this court.


Issue:
1. W/N Paco property is conjugal or
capital?
2. W/N there was a valid oral partition
covering said property?
3. W/N spouses Castro were buyers in
good faith?
Ratio:
1. The Paco property is conjugal
property
of
Moises
and
Concordia.The provisions of the
New Civil Code will apply to Moises
and Concordia as they got married
before the Family Code took effect.
In Art. 153 (1) of thw New Civil
Code, it states that:
"The following
partnership property:

are

conjugal

(1) Those acquired by onerous title


during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses; x x x."

SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,

The records show that said


property was purchased when they
were married using their common
fund. Petitioners also overlook
Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership; unless it
be
proved
that
it
pertains
exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." This article does not
require proof that the property was
acquired
with
funds
of
the
partnership.
The
presumption
applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired
does not appear
2. Yes. The oral partition was valid
and the Court affirmed the
acceptance of the CA of said pieces
of evidence presented. The portion
of letter of Moises to Romeo:

Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina


G. MOISES B. MIAT, asawa ng yumao na,
na si Gng. CONCORDIA VALENZUELA MIAT,
at mga anak nitong sina G. ROMEO V. MIAT
at G. ALEXANDER V. MIAT:

Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay


nanunumpa sa harapan ng Punong
Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:

Na
ang
kasunduan
sumusunod:

"Pebrero 18, 1989


SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

ang

mga

1. Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng


mag-asawa (MOISES at CONCORDIA) sa
Airport Village sa Paraaque, Metro Manila
ay mapupunta kay G. MOISES B. MIAT;
2. Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq.
m.) ng mag-asawa ring nabanggit ay sa
magkapatid na ROMEO at ALEXANDER
mapupunta at ito ay nasa address na
1495-C FABIE, PACO, MANILA.
MGA SUMUMPA:58

"KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG


MABUTI ANG ANONG BALAK AT
1)
Ceferino
GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI
SA
(kapatid
ni Moises)
BAHAY,
AT
YAN
AY
PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO KONG (sic)
MAKAKABUTI SA INYONG DALAWA.
AT
WALA
AKONG
HIGIT
NA
2)
Avelina
PAPABURAN SA INYONG
DALAWA
(asawa
Ceferino)
PAREHO KAYONG MAHAL
SA ni
AKIN,
HINDI AKO TULAD SA IBANG
MAGULANG NA HINDI PAREHO ANG
PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG
BAHAY56 AY
PARA 3)
SA
INYONG Virgilio
(kapatid niMAY
Moises)
DALAWA, LALO NA NGAYONG
ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO. x x x"
[All caps in the original]
4)
Aurea
(kapatid
ni
Moises)
Another one when there was a
written agreement:

ay

B.

Miat

(Sgd.)
6)
Lorenzo
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

J.

Miat

(Sgd.)
7)
Patricio
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

Miat

(Sgd.)
8)
Victor
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

Miat-Joson

(Sgd.)
5)
Jose
(asawa ni Aurea)

(Sgd.)
9) Elsa P. Miranda

A.

Joson

(Sgd.)
REYNALDO
Kapitan ng Barangay

P.

went to Judge Anunciacion of


Manila in order to find out if Romeo
has a right over the property.
Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting
that Romeo has a right over the
Paco property by virtue of an oral
partition and assignment. Virgilio
even admitted that he knew Romeo
was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the
owner of the property. In fact,
Virgilio Castro is fully aware that
Romeo owns the property, they
being neighbors.

WONG

The consideration for the grant to


Romeo and Alexander of the said
property was best expressed in a
letter of Moises to Romeo:
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at
nauunawaan
ninyo
ang
mga
pagkakamali ko at mga kasalanan
kong nagawa sa inyong mag-iina,
huwag kayong mag-alala at lahat
nang naipundar namin nang (sic)
inyong nanay ay sa inyong
dalawang magkapatid mapupunta."
We also hold that the oral partition
between Romeo and Alexander is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is
enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand
( P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his
share in the Paco property. Secondly,
Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat
and
Pedro
Miranda,
who
testified
regarding the sale of Alexanders share to
Romeo, were intensely questioned by
petitioners counsel.
3. No. The buyers were not in good
faith. A purchaser in good faith is
one who buys property and pays a
full and fair price for it at the time
of the purchase or before any
notice of some other persons claim
on or interest in it. The rule is
settled that a buyer of real
property, which is in the possession
of persons other than the seller,
must
be
wary
and
should
investigate the rights of those in
possession.
Otherwise,
without
such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as buyer in good faith.
"In the case at bench, the said
spouses have actual knowledge of
the adverse claim of plaintiffappellant. The most protuberant
index that they are not buyers in
good faith is that before the sale,
Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo
Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio
testified that together with Romeo,
Alexander and Moses Miat, they

Held:
The decision of the appellate court in CAG.R. CV No. 43053 is affirmed.

Titan v David
G.R. No. 169548
March 15, 2010

Facts:

Manuel and Martha David were married on


March 25, 1957. In 1970, they acquired a
602 sq.m. lot at White Plains, Quezon City,
registered in the name of "Martha David,
married to Manuel David". In 1976, they
separated and no longer communicated
with each other.

In March 1995, Manuel


Martha had sold the said
Construction Corporation
already been placed to in

discovered that
property to Titan
and the title had
the name of it.

He filed a complaint for Annulment of


Contract & Reconveyance against Titan,
alleging that such sale was made without
his consent and knowledge, and therefore
void. He also prayed to have the property
reconveyed to them and a new title be
issued in their names.

the SPA itself indicated that Martha &


Manuel lived in the same street in
Navotas. So, the court:
1. invalidated the Deed of Sale as well as
the title that was issued in the name of
Titan
2. ordered Titan to reconvey the property
to Martha and Manuel

Titan filed a counterclaim praying for the


dismissal of the complaint because the
property was bought in good faith and for
value as it relied on a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) signed by Manuel, which
authorized Martha to dispose the property.

3. directed the Registry of Deeds of


Quezon City to issue a new title in the
names of Manuel and Martha.

CA Decision: RTC decision affirmed


Manuel replied claiming that the SPA was
spurious and that his signature was
forged, thus Martha had no authority to
sell the property.

The court granted Manuel's motion to


amend the complaint, impleading Martha
as a co-defendant, however, despite
personal service of summons, she failed to
file an answer. Thus, she was declared in
default.

RTC Decision:
> The property was conjugal in character
as it was purchased by Manuel and Martha
with conjugal funds during their marriage
> The SPA was spurious, and that
Manuel's signature was forged. The
genuineness and due execution of the SPA
was placed in doubt since it did not
contain Manuel's residence certificate, and
was not presented for registration with the
Register of Deeds, which is in violation of
Sec. 24 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Moreover, it was doubtful that an SPA
would have even been necessary, since

ISSUE: WON the property in question is


part of the Spouses' conjugal partnership

SC Decision: The property is part of the


spouses' conjugal property.

Based on the law in force at time of the


celebration of the marriage between
Martha and Manuel in 1957, which is the
Civil Code of the PH:

Article 160. All property of the marriage


is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.

Article 153. The following are conjugal


partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by


onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;

The said provisions were carried over to


the Family Code, Art. 117 in particular, and
was made even more unequivocal in Art.
116, which said , all property acquired
during
the
marriage,
whether
the
acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved..

Therefore, since the property was part of


the conjugal property, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses.

EVANGELINE
METROPOLITAN
COMPANY

D.
IMANI
vs.
BANK
&
TRUST

G.R. No. 187023


November 17, 2010
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:

Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner)


signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement
in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar
P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo,
Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and
Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As
sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding
Six
Million
Pesos
(P6,000,000.00).
Later,
CPDTI
obtained
loans
of P100,000.00
and P63,825.45,
respectively. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes signed by Cesar and
Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made
several demands for payment upon CPDTI,
but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank
to file a collection suit against CPDTI and
its sureties, including herein petitioner.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a
decision4 in favor of Metrobank. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Metrobank then filed with the RTC a
motion for execution,
which was
granted A writ of execution was issued
against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The
sheriff levied on a property covered and
registered in the name of petitioner. A
public auction was conducted and the
property was awarded to Metrobank, as
the highest bidder.
Metrobank
undertook
to
consolidate the title covering the subject
property in its name, and filed a
Manifestation and Motion, praying that
spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be
directed to surrender the owners copy of
TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation.
Petitioner opposed the motion arguing
that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be
held answerable for the liabilities incurred

by CPDTI to Metrobank. The RTC denied


Metrobanks motion.
Metrobank filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by the
RTC. But on petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reinstated its
previous order declaring the property
levied upon as conjugal, which cannot be
held answerable for petitioners personal
liability.The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA
ruling that she committed a procedural
gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ
of execution, the auction sale, and the
certificate of sale instead of the remedy
under Rule 39. The issue on the conjugal
nature of the property, she insists, can be
adjudicated by the executing court; thus,
the RTC correctly gave due course to her
motion. She asserts that it was error for
the CA to propose the filing of a separate
case to vindicate her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy
provided under Section 16, Rule 39 is the
proper remedy

Held:
No. When the sheriff thus seizes
property of a third person in which the
judgment debtor holds no right or interest,
and so incurs in error, the supervisory
power of the Court which has authorized
execution may be invoked by the third
person. Upon due application by the third
person, and after summary hearing, the
Court may command that the property be
released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or
possessor. What the Court can do in these
instances however is limited to a

determination of whether the sheriff has


acted
rightly
or
wrongly
in
the
performance of his duties in the execution
of the judgment, more specifically, if he
has indeed taken hold of property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. The
Court does not and cannot pass upon the
question of title to the property, with any
character of finality. It can treat the matter
only in so far as may be necessary to
decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or
not. The sheriff in the execution
proceedings is made by a party to the
action, not a stranger thereto, any relief
therefrom may only be applied with, and
obtained from, only the executing court;
and this is true even if a new party has
been impleaded in the suit.
The filing of the motion by petitioner to
annul the execution, the auction sale, and
the certificate of sale was, therefore, a
proper remedy. The remedy of terceria or
a separate action under Section 16, Rule
39 is no longer available to Sina Imani
because he is not deemed a stranger to
the case filed against petitioner: [T]he
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.
Thus, it would have been inappropriate for
him to institute a separate case for
annulment of writ of execution.
Dewara v Lamela
GR 179010
April 11, 2011

Topic: Presumption of CPG

Facts:

Eduardo Dewara and Elenita


Magallanes Dewara married before the

enactment of the FC. Thus, the CC


governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita wentto work in California, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

Eduardo, while driving a private


jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod.

MTCC - Eduardo guilty of the charge


and sentenced imprisonment and to pay
civil indemnity of P62,598.70 actual
damages and P10,000 moral damages.

RTC junked appeal affirmed the


decision of the MTCC and it became final
and executory.

The writ of execution on the civil


liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no
property in his name. Levy on execution
on a Lot named after Elenita.

Petitioner - levy on execution of Lot


was illegal because the said property was
her paraphernal or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the
personal
liability
of
her
husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the
execution sale. She sought the annulment
of the sale and the annulment of the
issuance of the new TCT in the name of
respondent spouses.

Respondent - subject lot was the


conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and
Eduardo. They asserted that the property
was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property
was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of
the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the

accident was registered in the name of


petitioner; and that Elenita did not
interpose any objection pending the levy
on execution of the property.

The RTC decided in favor of


petitioner. The RTC declared that said
property was paraphernal in nature.

RTC gave credence to the testimony


of
Elenita
on
the
circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First,
it was sold to her by her father and her
aunt so that the family would remain on
the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq
m property was for the purpose of helping
her expand her capital in her business at
the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a
donation and was therefore gratuitous in
character.

Having declared that the property


was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
RTC ruled that civil liability of Eduardo,
which was personal to him, could not be
charged to exclusive property of his wife.

On appeal, the CA reversed the


decision of the RTC. The gross inadequacy
of the price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. Except for the
assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in
the records that would indicate a defect in
Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent
to the sale. The CA ruled that Elenita and
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous
title during their marriage through their
common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo.
Issue:
WON the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita

or the conjugal property of Elenita and


Eduardo.
Held:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or
the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
The
separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal
nature.
Moreover,
the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies
even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption
to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject
property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is
also undisputed that their marital relations
are governed by the conjugal partnership
of gains, since they were married before
the enactment of the Family Code and
they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations.
Thus, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property applies to
the lot in question. The presumption that
the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical,
and convincing evidencethere must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it.

The SC stated that Elenita has not


sufficiently proven that the prices involved
in the sales in question were so
inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the
nature of a donation rather than a sale.

That even after having declared that the


Lot is the conjugal property of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily
follow
that
it
may
automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations,
fines, or indemnities of one of the
spouses. Before debts and obligations may
be
charged
against
the
conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts
and obligations should have redounded to,
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon the husband or the wife, as a rule,
may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines
and indemnities may be enforced upon
the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the Civil Code have been covered.

In this case, it is just and proper that


Ronnie be compensated for the serious
physical injuries he suffered. It should be
remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name
of Elenita, she was not made a party in the
said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his
name.
The
payment
of
indemnity
adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie

may be enforced against the partnership


assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo
after the responsibilities enumerated
under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for
under Article 163 of the Civil Code.

Lim v Equitable PCI Bank


1/15/2014

Topic: Conjugal Partnership of Gains: What


is included in the CPG

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari on CA
decision
Nov 17, 1988 petitioner Francisco Lim
executed Irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney (ISPA) in favor of his brother
Franco
Lim,
authorizing
Franco
to
mortgage his share in the property which
they co owned
Feb 9, 1989 BDO Savings and Mortgage
bank release a loan of Php8.5M by virtue
of the ISPA
Dec 28, 1992 Loan was paid by Franco
June 14, 1996 petitioner Francisco,
Franco and their mother Victoria Lim
obtained from Equitable PCI Bank (EPCI) a
loan of Php30M in favor of Sun Paper
Products Inc. To secure the loan, petitioner
and Franco executed in favor of Equitable
PCI Bank a Real Estate Mortgage over
same property
Sept 29, 1999 a Tax Declaration was
issued in the name of EPCI for another
property (property #2)
Thereafter, a Writ of Possession in favor of
EPCI was issued by the RTC
Jan 11, 2011 petitioner Franco filed
before the RTC a Motion for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and a
Complaint for Cancellation of SPA,
Mortgage Contract, Certificate of Sales,
TCT 9370 (property #2), and the Tax
Declaration, with Damages and Issuance
of
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction
against ECPI, his brother Franco, and his
mother Victoria
Alleging that he did not authorize Franco
to mortgage property #2 to ECPI and that

his signatures in the Reasl Estate


Mortgage and Surety Agreement were
forged
RTC granted petitioners Motion for the
issuance of TRO and application for
injunctive relief
That there is sufficient reason to believe
that grave and irreparable injury will result
on petitioner before the main case can be
heard on notice.
Respondent (EPCI) in an Answer Cum
Motion to Dismiss contend that the trial
court has no jurisdiction; that it is not
privy to the execution of the ISPA; that
there is no allegation that the foreclosure
was defective or void, no reason to cancel
tax dec and TCT Franco and Victoria did
not participate in proceedings
On appeal, CA reversed RTC decision, that
petitioners mere allegation that his
signature in the mortgage contract was
forged is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the notarized
document
- hence this petition wherein he claims
respondents negligence in approving the
loan and accepting the subject property
AND insists that respondent should
have been alerted by the fact that
the mortgage contract was executed
without the consent of his wife
ISSUE:
W/N the petiioner was able to prove his
signature was forged and that respondent
bank exercised diligence in the subject
mortgage transaction

HELD:
- Petition is bereft of merit
He failed to prove his signature was forged
Allegations
of
forgery
cannot
be
presumed, must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence
He failed to prove negligence on the part
of the respondent
No evidence was presented
Nature of the property was never raised as
an issue, so petitioner cannot undermine
the contract by saying that he is now
American and married when it was written
that him and Franco were single Filipino
citizens

Absence of wifes signature also has no


bearing in the case
We are not unaware that all property of
the marriage is presumed to be conjugal,
unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife;
that this presumption is not overcome by
the fact that the property is registered in
the name of the husband or the wife
alone; and that the consent of both
spouses is required before a conjugal
property may be mortgaged.
-- However, we find it iniquitous to apply
the foregoing presumption especially
since the nature of the mortgaged
property was never raised as an issue
before the RTC, the CA, and even before
this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged
in his Complaint that the said property
was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent
had no opportunity to rebut the said
presumption.
Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals:
Article 160 of the Civil Code: All property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property
acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, it appears
on the face of the title that the properties
were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a
spouse only and there is no showing as to
when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said
spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved.
- DENIED
Laperal v Republic of the Philippines
GR No L-18008
10/30/1962

FACTS:

May 1960, Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a


petition for change of name/ to resume
using her maiden name
That she and her husband were given a
decree of legal separation and that she
has ceased to live with him for many years
now
Petition was opposed by the City Attorney
of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art
372 of the Civil Code and that it is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court
Court denied petition on the same ground
Art 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before legal
separation
In motion for recon, it was granted
ISSUE: WON Laperal after having obtained
legal separation may be granted to
resume using her maiden name

HELD:
Art 372, language of the statute is
mandatory because her marriage status is
unaffected by the legal separation, there
being no severance of the vinvulum
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change
of name may be observed HOWEVER, her
only reason for change of name was her
legal separation which alone is not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of
name, for to do so would circumvent the
mandatory provisions of Art 372
- DISMISSED

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO,
COURT OF APPEALS, et al,

vs. HON.

FACTS:

Petitioner, the legal wife of private


respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by
his second marriage allege that the ff
properties were acquired during their
marriage and that the same was

administered by her husband until he was


invalidated by Tubertulosis:
1.
Sari sari store, a residential house
and lot and an apartment house in
Rodriguez, Rizal and;
2.

A house in Rodriguez, Rizal

She also claim that private


respondent succeeded in convincing their
father to sign a genra power of Attorney
which
thereby
authorized
Conchita
Evangelista to administer the rouse and
apartment in Rizal.

In line with this, she filed a suit for


damages and for annulment of general
power of attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista (Eusebios daughter in his first
marriage) to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments allegedly
acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during
their conjugal partnership.

The trial court rendered judgment in


favor of private respondents due to
petitioners failure to establish proof that
said properties were acquired during the
existence
of
the
second
conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the
CA ruled that those properties belong
exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the
capacity to administer them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the
trial court's ruling that the properties,
subject matter of controversy, are not
conjugal but the capital properties of
Eusebio exclusively.
RULING:

Indeed, Art 158 and 160 of the New


Civil Code has been repealed by the
Family Code however, since the real of the

aforementioned articles does not operate


to prejudice or affect the rights which
have become vested while the said
provisions were in force. In order to
resolve the issue we will deal with it on the
nature of the contested properties based
on the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Art 160 of the New Civil Code


provides that: All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or the wife ; However, the burden of
proving this presumption must first be
proven by the one contending which
necessitate the presentation of the proof
of acquisition during the coverture it being
a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption.

In this case, the petitioner failed to


adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties were acquired their marriage.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the
property prior or subsequent to his second
marriage is inconsequential. The property
should be regarded as his own exclusively,
as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148
of the NCC which essentially provides that
properties already owned by a spouse
prior to the marriage and brought into the
marriage is considered his or her separate
property.

Insofar as the administrations of the


properties are concerned, Eusebio shall
retain control thereof considering that the
assets are exclusively his capital.

Petition is denied. The Decision of


the CA is affirmed

(G.R No. 171904) TAN, Petitioner, - V GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL


(G.R No. 172017) GRACE ANDRADE,
ET AL, Petitioners, ' - V - BOBBY TAN,

Respondent. 2013-08-07
171904/G.R. No. 172017

G.R.

No.

This is a consolidated petitions for review


on certiorari assailing the Decision 2 dated
July 26, 2005 and Resolution 3 dated
March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 7 1987 which affirmed
with modication the Judgment 4 dated
April 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case
No. CEB 20969.
The Facts
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the
registered owner of four parcels of land
known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20 5
situated in Cebu City (subject properties)
which she mortgaged to and subsequently
foreclosed by one Simon 6 Diu (Simon).
When the redemption period was about to
expire, Rosario sought the assistance of
Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem
the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario
sold the same to Bobby and her son,
Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for
E100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 29, 1983
(subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983,
Proceso,
Jr.
executed
a
Deed
of
Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights
and interests over the subject properties
in consideration of 1350,000.00. The Deed
of Assignment was signed by, among
others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of
Rosarios sons, as instrumental witness.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed
of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option
to Buy the subject properties in favor of
Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in
the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase
the same for the sum of P310,000.00.
When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby
consolidated his ownership over the
subject properties, and the TCTs therefor
were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children,


namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry,
Andrew, Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all
surnamed Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and
Charity A. Santiago Andrade, led a
complaint
for
reconveyance
and
annulment of deeds of conveyance and
damages against Bobby before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In
their complaint, they alleged that the
transaction between Rosario and Bobby
(subject transaction) was not one of sale
but was actually an equitable mortgage
which was entered into to secure Rosarios
indebtedness with Bobby. They also
claimed that since the subject properties
were inherited by them from their father,
Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the
subject properties were conjugal in nature,
and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose
of their respective shares therein. In this
light, they argued that they remained as
co-owners of the subject properties
together with Bobby, despite the issuance
of the TCTs in his name.
In his defense, Bobby contended that the
subject properties were solely owned by
Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name
and that he had validly acquired the same
upon Proceso, Jr.s failure to exercise his
option to buy back the subject properties.
He also interposed the defenses of
prescription and laches against the
Andrades.
The RTC Ruling
On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Judgment
dismissing
the
Andrades
complaint. It ruled that the subject
transaction was a bona fide sale and not
an equitable mortgage, noting further that
the subject deed of sale was not even
questioned by the Andrades at the time of
its execution. As Proceso, Jr. failed to
exercise his option to buy back the subject
properties, the titles thereto were validly

consolidated in Bobbys favor, resulting to


the issuance of TCTs in his name which are
deemed to be conclusive proof of his
ownership thereto. As regards the nature
of the subject properties, the RTC found
that they appeared to be the exclusive
properties of Rosario. Finally, it found that
the Andrades claim over the subject
properties had already prescribed and that
laches had already set in. The Andrades
then filed an appeal.
The CA Ruling
On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision upholding in part the
RTCs ruling.
It found that the subject deed of sale was
indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona
fide contract of sale. In this accord, it
denied the Andrades claim that the
subject transaction was an equitable
mortgage since their allegation that the
purchase price was unusually low was left
unsupported by any evidence. Also, their
averment that they have been in
continuous possession of the subject
properties was belied by the testimony of
Andrew Andrade (Andrew) who stated that
Bobby was already in possession of the
same.
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the
subject properties belong to the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her late
husband, Proceso, Sr., and thus, she coowned the same together with her
children, the Andrades. In this respect,
the sale was valid only with respect to
Rosarios pro-indiviso share in the subject
properties and it cannot prejudice the
share of the Andrades since they did not
consent to the sale. In effect, a resulting
trust was created between Bobby and the
Andrades and, as such, prescription and/or
laches has yet to set in so as to bar them
from
instituting
the
instant
case.
Accordingly, the CA ordered Bobby to

reconvey to the Andrades their share in


the subject properties.
In View of the CAs pronouncement, the
parties led their respective motions for
reconsideration. For the Andrades part,
they sought the reconsideration of the
CAs ruling as to its characterization of the
subject transaction as one of sale,
insisting that it is actually an equitable
mortgage. As for Bobbys part, he
maintained that the sale should have
covered the entirety of the subject
properties and not only Rosarios proindiviso
share.
Both
motions
for
reconsideration were, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution 30 dated March 3,
2006. Hence, the present consolidated
petitions.
Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves around
the CAs characterization of the subject
properties as well as of the subject
transaction between Rosario and Bobby. In
GR. No. 172017, the Andrades submit that
the CA erred in ruling that the subject
transaction is in the nature of a sale, while
in GR. No. 171904, Bobby contends that
the CA erred in ruling that the subject
properties are conjugal in nature.
T
he
Co
urt
s
Rul
ing
A.

Ch
ara
cte
riz
ati
on
of
the
su
bje
ct
tra
nsa
cti
on.

Settled is the rule that when the trial


court's factual findings have been affirmed
by the CA, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon the Court,
and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45
petitions. While there exists exceptions to
this rule such as when the CAs and
RTCs finndings are in conflict with each
other the Court observes that none
applies with respect to the ruling that the
subject transaction was one of sale and
not an equitable mortgage. Records
readily reveal that both the RTC and the
CA observed that there is no clear and
convincing evidence to show that the
parties agreed upon a mortgage. Hence,
absent any glaring error therein or any
other compelling reason to hold otherwise,
this finding is deemed conclusive.
Consequently,
Andrades

the

petition

in

G.R. No. 172017 must


therefore be denied. B.
Characterization
the

of

subject

properties.
With respect to the nature of the subject
properties, the courts a quo were at
variance such that the RTC, on the one
hand, ruled that the said properties were
exclusive properties of Rosario, while the
CA, on the other hand, pronounced that
they are conjugal in nature. In this regard,
the consequent course of action would be
for the Court to conduct a re-examination
of the evidence if only to determine which
among the two is correct.
Pertinent to the resolution of this second
issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code 38

which states that [a]ll property of the


marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must,
however, prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage.
As a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the
marriage. The presumption in favor of
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with
strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
In this case, records reveal that the
conjugal partnership of Rosario and her
husband was terminated upon the latters
death on August 7, 1978 43 while the
transfer certificates of title over the
subject
properties were
issued on
September 28, 1979 and solely in the
name of Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of
legal age, widow, Filipino. No evidence
was adduced by the Andrades to establish
that the subject properties were procured
during the coverture of their parents or
that the same were bought with conjugal
funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that
she is the absolute owner of the disputed
parcels of land in the subject deed of sale
was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr.,
who was a party to the same. By virtue of
these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTCs finding that the subject properties
were exclusive or sole properties of
Rosario.

The Court further observes that laches had


already set in, thereby precluding the
Andrades from pursuing their claim. Case
law defines laches as the failure to assert
a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined
to assert it.
Records disclose that the Andrades took
14 years before filling their complaint for
reconveyance in 1997.
The argument that they did not know
about the subject transaction is clearly
belied by the facts on record. It is
undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was a covendee in the subject deed of sale, while
Henry was an instrumental witness to the
Deed of Assignment and Option to Buy
both dated July 26, 1983. Likewise,
Rosarios sons, Proceso, Jr. and Andrew,
did not question the execution of the
subject deed of sale made by their mother
to Bobby. These incidents could only lead
to the conclusion that they were wellaware of the subject transaction and yet
only pursued their claim 14 years after the
sale was executed. Due to the abovestated reasons, Bobbys petition in G.R.
No. 171904 is hereby granted.
The Court (a) GRANTS the petition of
Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904; and (b)
DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade,
Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade,
Andrew Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam
Rose Andrade, and Joseph Andrade in GR.
No. 172017. The Decision dated July 26,
2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71987 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is
REINSTATED.
Veloso

Martinez

Administration of exclusive property by


the other spouse.

1914 case.The respondent, Lucia


Martinez, is the widow of Domingo
Franco, and after the death of her
husband
she
was
appointed
administratrix of his estate. Jewelry
belonged to her personally and was
inherited from her mother.
A short time before the death of
Domingo Franco he borrowed from
the petitioner the sum of P4,500
and gave as security for the
payment of said sum the jewelry
described in the complaint. The
money
was
borrowed
under
promise to repay the same, with 12
per cent interest
It is not clear whether or not the
jewelry, at the time of the
execution of said document, was in
fact delivered to the petitioner. It
states that the jewelry was
contained in a box which remains
closed after the jewels were shown
to Mariano Veloso. The document
further admits the key shall remain
in possession of Domingo Franco.
After the death of Domingo Franco
it appears that said jewelry was
found in the same "caja" and that
the key was in the possession of
the respondent.
During the trial of the cause the
petitioner attempted to show that
the jewels in question were pawned
to him by Domingo Franco, with the
full knowledge and consent of the
respondent. And not only that, the
petitioner further attempts to show
that after the death of Domingo
Franco, the respondent promised to
pay the amount for which the said
jewels
were
pawned.
The
respondent positively denies that
she knew that her husband had
pawned her jewels or that she

promised to redeem the same by


paying the amount due.
W/N jewelry belongs to the petitioner.
No.

In view of the fact the record shows


that the jewels were the sole and
separate property of the wife,
acquired from her mother, and in
the absence of further proof, we
must
presume
that
they
constituted
a
part
of
her
paraphernal property. As such
paraphernal property she exercised
dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the
exclusive control and management
of the same, until and unless she
had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the
intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article
1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof
in the record that she had ever
delivered the same to her husband,
in any manner, or for any purpose.
That being true, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of
her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above
cited.

PLATA V. YATCO
AMALIA
PLATA, petitioner, vs.
HON.
NICASIO YATCO, Judge, CFI of Rizal, Branch
V; BENITO MACROHON, Sheriff of Quezon
City and The Spouses CESAREA E.
VILLANUEVA
and
GREGORIO
LEAO respondents.

Nature: Petition for certiorari on an Order


issued by CFI Rizal citing Plata in contempt

of court for refusing to vacate certain


property
Ponente: Reyes, JBL
Date: 28 Dec 1964

(2) That which is obtained by the


industry, or work, or as salary of
the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests
received or due during the
marriage,
coming
from
the
common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.
(1401)

DOCTRINE:
Where a property was acquired by the
woman while she was still single, the
subsequent conveyance thereof to a third
person, and the reconveyance of her
several months afterward of the same
property, did not transform it from
paraphernal to conjugal property, there
being no proof that the money paid to the
vendor came from common or conjugal
funds (Civ. Code, Art 153).

The illegal detainer judgment against the


husband alone cannot bind nor affect the
wife's possession of her paraphernal,
which by law she holds and administers
independently, and which she may even
encumber
or
alienate
without
his
knowledge or consent.

FACTS:

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership


of the paraphernal property. (1382)

Art. 137. The wife shall have the


administration
of
the
paraphernal
property, unless she delivers the same to
the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer
it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be
recorded in the Registry of Property. As for
the movables, the husband shall give
adequate security. (1384a)

Art. 140. A married woman of age may


mortgage,
encumber,
alienate
or
otherwise dispose of her paraphernal
property, without the permission of the
husband, and appear alone in court to
litigate with regard to the same. (n)

Relevant Provision of Law:


NCC Art. 153 ; 136, 137, 140
Facts:
Art. 153. The following
partnership property:

are

conjugal

(1) That which is acquired by onerous


title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;

In 1954 Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of


land in Caloocan, Rizal, for which the
Provincial RD issued TCT No. 25855 in the
name of Amalia Plata, single, Filipino
citizen.

On 13 Feb 1958, she sold the property to


one Celso Saldaa who obtained TCT No.
40459 therefor.

On 24 Sep 1958, after 7 mos, Saldaa


resold the same property to Amalia Plata,
married to Gaudencio Begosa," a new
TCT No. 43520 was issued to the vendee,
Amalia Plata.

She is not bound by detainer judgment


because she is not lawfully married to
Gaudencio Begosa, and that she had
acquired the property while still single,
and was in possession thereof when the
Sheriff attempted to enforce the writ of
ejectment.

ISSUE:
Also on 24 Sep 1958, "Amalia Plata, xxx
married to Gaudencio Begosa," in
consideration of a loan of P3,000,
mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva, the
same property and its improvements "of
which the mortgagor declares to be hers
as the absolute owner thereof." Begosa,
signed as co-mortgagor.

The property was foreclosed, and sold in


an auction sale to Villanueva, the highest
bidder. on 13 May 1961, the Sheriff issued
a final deed of sale; the RD issued the
buyer TCT, No. 55949.

Subsequently, Villanueva sued Begosa


alone for illegal detainer, and obtained
judgment against the latter, which
became final and executory.

A writ of execution was duly issued, but


Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject
her from the property, and she filed a third
party claim, averring ownership of the
property. Upon motion, CFI cited both
Plata and Begosa in contempt.

Platas contention:

W/N Amalia Plata is bound by the detainer


judgment against Gaudencio Begosa.
More specifically, W/N the subject property
is a conjugal property of Plata and Begosa.

RULING:
NO. The subject property is a paraphernal
property of Amalia Plata and, therefore,
she cannot be bound by the detainer
judgment against Begosa.

Since the property was paraphernal, and


the creditors and purchasers were aware
of it, the fact being clearly spread on the
land records, it is plain that Plata's
possession
was
not
derived
from
Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer
judgment against the husband alone
cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by
law
she
holds
and
administers
independently, and which she may even
encumber
or
alienate
without
his
knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts.
136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not
made party defendant in the eviction suit,
the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the
judgment of eviction against her husband,
and it was no contempt of court for her to
do so, because the writ of execution was
not lawful against her.

RATIO:
-

SC presumed the validity of marriage


between Plata and Begosa based on
the ff:
i.
the admissions of married
status in public documents;
ii.
the presumption that persons
openly
living
together
as
husband and wife are legally
married to each other, and
iii.
the prior marriage of Begosa to
someone
else
does
not
necessarily
exclude
the
possibility of a valid subsequent
marriage to Plata.

The property was acquired by Plata


while still single, as shown in the TCT.
The subsequent conveyance thereof to
Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance
of her several months afterward of the
same property, did not transform it
from paraphernal to conjugal property,
there being no proof that the money
paid to Saldaa came from common or
conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153).
The deed of mortgage in favor of
respondents Villanueva actually recites
that the petitioner was the owner of
the tenement in question and so does
the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her.

Begosas signing as a co-mortgagor,


by itself alone, would not suffice to
convert
the
land
into
conjugal
property, considering that it was
paraphernal
in
origin.
This
is
particularly the case where the
addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor
was clearly an afterthought, the text of
the deed showing that Plata was the
sole mortgagor.

LAURENA v. CA
G.R. No.
September 22, 1988 CARPIO, J.

159220

FACTS: Darlene and Jesse Lauro Laurena


met in January 1983 and were married in
the same year. They have two children. In
1993, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, alleging that he was
psychologically
incapacitated,
which
existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage although she discovered it
only after the marriage. She alleged that
after their wedding, they went to Baguio
City for their honeymoon. They were
accompanied by a 15-year old boy, the
son of one of his house helpers, who he
invited to sleep in their hotel suite; this
she
found
as
weird.
After
their
honeymoon, they settled in his house in
Paranaque City. She became pregnant in
1984,
but
suffered
a
miscarriage.
According to her, she almost bled to death
while he continued watching a television
show at the foot of their matrimonial bed.
He gave priority to the needs of his
parents; would come home past midnight;
and even tried to convert her to his
religion. In addition, he was a womanizer.
She lived in Batangas for three years,
tending to their gasoline station while he
remained
in
Paranaque
City.
She
discovered that he had been living a
bachelor's life while she was away. She
also noticed that he had feminine
tendencies. They would frequently quarrel
and one time, he hit her face. She alleged
that in September 1990, he abandoned
their
conjugal
home
and
stopped
supporting their children. She further
alleged that during their marriage, she
and
respondent
acquired
several
properties which were all part of their
conjugal partnership of gains. She prayed
for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, for custody of their
children, and for monthly support of
P25,000.
He
denied
petitioner's
allegations, asserting that she was
emotionally immature and extremely
jealous. He alleged that some of the
properties were not part of their conjugal
partnership of gains. He prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. The trial court
denied the petition for declaration of
nullity, the conjugal partnership of gains
dissolved, the children being over 7 years
of age can choose whose custody theyd
be, and support of said minors shall be

borne by the parents in proportion to their


respective incomes. Petitioner appealed
insofar as the trial court denied her
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
she failed to prove that the root cause of
his psychological incapacity, noting that
Dr. Lapuz, the psychiatrist that she
presented, was not able to talk to him and
simply based her conclusions and
impressions of him from her two-hour
session with Darlene. It further ruled that
she was not able to prove that his alleged
psychological incapacity was existing at
the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
Also,
in
her
complaint,
petitioner's bases were his irresponsibility,
insensitivity, and infidelity, but during the
trial, she claimed that it was his
homosexuality. Her allegations lacked
factual and evidentiary bases. It could not
lead to the conclusion that it was
incurable. The Court of Appeals excluded
also some properties, which belonged to
the parents of Jesse.
ISSUE:
1.
Is
he
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations? 2. Were the properties
excluded by the Court of Appeals form
part of the conjugal partnership of gains?
HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The totality of the
evidence presented by petitioner failed to
show that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity
was grave, incurable, and existing at the
time of the solemnization of their
marriage. 2. NO. The ancestral house and
lot in Tanauan, Batangas and the
properties
acquired
through
the
operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station
and Jeddah Trucking belong to the
respondent alone since in the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, only those properties
acquired DURING the marriage, shall be
the properties of both the husband and
wife. The said properties originally
belonged to the respondents parents
which was transferred to the respondent in
his favor. However, the duplex house and
lot on Dayap Street, Makati City belongs to
both the petitioner and respondent since
they are paying for this property during
their marriage.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. v. COURT OF


APPEALS
[G.R. No. L-45038]
[April 30, 1987]

TOPIC:
property

Administration of exclusive

PETITIONER: Manotok Realty, Inc. (MRI)


RESPONDENT:
Felipe Madlangawa
PONENTE:

Court

of

Appeals,

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

LAW:
Civil Code

Art. 136. The wife retains the


ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137. The wife shall have the
administration of the paraphernal
property, unless she delivers the same
to the husband by means of a public
instrument
empowering
him
to
administer it.
In
this
case,
the
public
instrument shall be recorded in the
Registry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give
adequate security.

Rules of Court

Rule 89, Sec. 1. Order of sale of


personalty. Upon the application of
the executor or administrator, and on
written notice to the heirs and other
persons interested, the court may
order the whole or a part of the
personal estate to be sold, if it appears
necessary for the purpose of paying
debts, expenses of administration, or
legacies, or for the preservation of the
property
FACTS:

Felipe claims that he has been


occupying a lot in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
since 1949
o Permitted
by
Andres
(subdivision overseer at the
time) on the condition that
Felipe would buy it later
Apr 2, 1950: Clara (lot owner), died
and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties (which included
the lot) were placed under custodia
legis
Apr 22, 1950: Felipe made a P1,500.00
deposit for the lot which was received
by Vicente (husband of Clara)
o lot had an area of 240 sq m and
was sold at P30.00 per sq m
o P5,700.00
unpaid
balance
(Felipe did not pay after Claras
death no further payments
from 1950)
o Claras heirs could not settle
their differences
Apr 28, 1950: Vicente appointed as a
special admin. of the estate. Felipe
remained in possession of the lot
Mar 1959: MRI became the successful
bidder and vendee of the Tambunting
de Legarda Subd.
o 44 parcels of land spread out in
the districts of Tondo and Sta.
Cruz, Manila (lot in dispute
included)
o pursuant to the deeds of sale
executed in its favor by the
Philippine Trust Company (PTC)
as administrator of the testate
estate of Clara in Spec.
Proceeding 10809 of the Manila
probate court
o Deed of Sale, among others,
provided for the following terms
and conditions:
1. The
VENDEE
(MRI)
assumes the risk and
expenses of ejecting the
tenants
or
squatters
xxx. Any rentals or
damages that may be
due or collectible from
them for the period
subsequent to the date
of this deed of sale shall

belong to the VENDEE


but rentals due from
them
prior
to
the
execution of this deed of
sale shall belong to the
VENDOR.
xxx

3. The VENDEE renounces


the right to warranty in
case of eviction with the
knowledge of the risks of
eviction and assumes its
consequences
with
respect not only to the
lots subject-of the above
mentioned cases and
claims but also with
respect to any other lots
subject of contracts of
sale or promises to sell
that may have been
executed
by
the
deceased, Clara and/or
Vicente, and it hereby
relieves the estate of
Clara and the PTC, in its
capacity
as
Administrator thereof, of
any and all liability with
respect thereto in case
of eviction. All sums of
money that have been
paid to the deceased
Clara
and/or
Vicente
and/or the administrator
of Clara on account of
the purchase price of
said lots shall belong to
the estate, but any sums
of money that are or
may be due as the
balance of the purchase
price of said lots shall
belong to the VENDEE.
In a bid to clear the Subd. of squatters
and occupants, MRI sent circulars to
the occupants and published notices in
the Manila
Times
and
the Taliba
advising them to vacate, otherwise,
court action would follow
o Felipe was one of the many
occupants who refused to
vacate, and filed an action to
recover the lot

Trial Court dismissed the action after


finding that the Identity of the land
described in the complaint had not
been sufficiently established as the
same one in Felipes material and
physical possession
CA ruled that the only right remaining
to MRI is to enforce the collection of
the balance
o found the Identity of the lot to
be recovered by MRI to be the
same as that in Felipes
possession
o MRI stepped into into its
predecessors shoes. Since the
area involved in this case is
only 115 sq m, the balance
(minus the P1.5K deposit) is
P2,551.85 (to be paid in 18
equal monthly installments)
MRI filed this petition for certiorari,
seeking to set aside the CA decision
upholding
the
dismissal
of
its
complaint for reinvidicatory action with
damages vs. Felipe and ordering it to
accept the payment of the P2,551.85
balance from him and to execute the
deed of sale of the in favor of the latter
after
o no dispute that the property in
question was the paraphernal
property of Clara (died on Apr
2, 1950)
o Vicente had no authority to sell
the lot to the Felipe on May 12,
1950 since the former was
appointed as administrator of
Claras estate only on Aug 28,
1950
o Sale could not have bound
Clara's estate because Vicente
neither acted as the owner nor
the administrator of the lot
when it took place
o On provision # 2 (MRI bound
itself to respect the contracts of
sale / promises to sell Vicente
executed and renounced the
right to warranty in case of
eviction): only valid sales
executed by the deceased Clara
and by persons vested with
authority to act on behalf of her
estate are to be respected

Felipes arguments
o questioned provisions of the
deed
of
sale
are
a
declaration/admission against
the interest of MRI, and shows
that the acts of Vicente had
been ratified by the PTC and
approved by the probate court
o MRI
is
estopped
from
questioning the authority of
Vicente in selling the property
in dispute
ISSUE:WON the sale by Vicente in favor of
Felipe is valid, binding, and
enforceable against MRI (in what
capacity did Claras husband act in
disposing of the lot?)
RULING:
CA decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Felipe is ordered to
SURRENDER the material and
physical possession of the lot to
MRI and to pay the latter the
rentals from May 1950 until he
surrenders the lot. MRI shall
reimburse Felipe the P1,500.00
with legal interest from May 1950
or offset it from the rentals due.
Costs against Felipe.

Sale between Vicente and Felipe


is void ab initio, Vicente being neither
an owner nor admin. of the property
o Vicente couldnt have validly
disposed of the lot as a
continuing admin. of Claras
paraphernal properties as there
is no evidence that he was such
during her lifetime
o Thus, it cannot be said that the
sale between MRI and Vicente
had its inception before Claras
death and was entered into by
the Vicente for and on behalf of
Clara = consummated only
after her death
probate court appointed Vicente as
administrator of the estate only on Aug
28, 1950 more than 3 months after
the questioned sale took place

As such, the sale cannot be the subject


of the ratification by PTC or the
probate court
A void contract is inexistent from the
beginning and cannot be ratified or the
right to set up the defense of its
illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, NCC)
o The right to set up the nullity of
a void or non-existent contract
is not limited to the parties as
in the case of annuable /
voidable contracts it is
extended to 3rd persons who
are directly affected
o Any person may invoke the
contracts
inexistence
if
juridical affects founded there
are asserted v. him
Sec 1, Rule 89, RoC provides for the
procedure on how a property in
custodia legis can be disposed of by
sale
o After Vicentes appointment as
administrator of the Claras
estate, he should have applied
before the probate court for
authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the Felipe.
o If the probate court approved
this, then Vicente would have
been able to execute a valid
deed of sale
o No effort on Vicentes part to
comply with the rule of
procedure nor on that of the
respondent to protect his
interests or to pay the balance
of the installments to the court
appointed administrator
o Kline v. Shoup: The law
recognizes the issuance of an
order
of
sale
as
an
indispensable
requisite
in
effecting a valid sale of the
property of a decedent's estate
Considering the lots location, we find
a monthly rental of P0.20/sq m to be
more than fair to Felipe for his use of
the premises. MRI, should return the
P1.5K received by Vicente, with legal
interest, to Felipe

Ong vs CA

GR No. L-63025
November 29, 1991
Facts:
- Petitioner seeks to annul the
auction sale of parcel of land,
allegedly
owned
by
petioner
Ramon Ong and his former wife
Teodora Ong, which was awarded in
favor of Boix in a public bidding
conducted
by
Deputy
Sheriff
Camino. The title of the property
was later registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte.
- It is said that the parcel of land was
rendered in favor of Boix because
petitioners wife, Teodora, was not
able to pay the promissory notes
she gave to Boix in relation to her
loan for her logging business. The
decision
became
final
and
executory and Boix was able to
secure a writ of possession.
- However, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the writ of possession
because he claims that the
property was conjugal and thus
could not be held liable for
personal debts contracted by the
wife and that there was no valid
publication
thus
making
the
auction void.
- Lower court and CA both denied
the motion filed by petitioner, thus
this instant case.
Issue:
- WON the property can be validly
subject to auction
Ruling:
- Yes, the publication in the local
newspaper with regard to the
notice of auction was in accordance
with the law. Further, the said
property was acquired prior to their
marriage.

The lot was named after Teodora


Ong while the house erected was
declared to be conjugal. The use of
the name Teodora Ong in the title
is not a sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the
marriage. SC hold that the lot in
question is paraphernal or owned
by the wife therefore is liable for
her personal debts.
The property is named after the
name of the wife only unlike the
house which was named after the
two spouses.
Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.

Dewara v Lamela
GR 179010
April 11, 2011

Topic: Presumption of CPG

Facts:

Eduardo Dewara and Elenita


Magallanes Dewara married before the
enactment of the FC. Thus, the CC
governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita wentto work in California, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

Eduardo, while driving a private


jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod.

MTCC - Eduardo guilty of the charge


and sentenced imprisonment and to pay

civil indemnity of P62,598.70 actual


damages and P10,000 moral damages.

RTC junked appeal affirmed the


decision of the MTCC and it became final
and executory.

The writ of execution on the civil


liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no
property in his name. Levy on execution
on a Lot named after Elenita.

Petitioner - levy on execution of Lot


was illegal because the said property was
her paraphernal or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the
personal
liability
of
her
husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the
execution sale. She sought the annulment
of the sale and the annulment of the
issuance of the new TCT in the name of
respondent spouses.

Respondent - subject lot was the


conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and
Eduardo. They asserted that the property
was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property
was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of
the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the
accident was registered in the name of
petitioner; and that Elenita did not
interpose any objection pending the levy
on execution of the property.

The RTC decided in favor of


petitioner. The RTC declared that said
property was paraphernal in nature.

RTC gave credence to the testimony


of
Elenita
on
the
circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First,
it was sold to her by her father and her
aunt so that the family would remain on
the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq

m property was for the purpose of helping


her expand her capital in her business at
the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a
donation and was therefore gratuitous in
character.

Having declared that the property


was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
RTC ruled that civil liability of Eduardo,
which was personal to him, could not be
charged to exclusive property of his wife.

On appeal, the CA reversed the


decision of the RTC. The gross inadequacy
of the price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. Except for the
assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in
the records that would indicate a defect in
Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent
to the sale. The CA ruled that Elenita and
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous
title during their marriage through their
common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo.
Issue:
WON the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita
or the conjugal property of Elenita and
Eduardo.
Held:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or
the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
The
separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal
nature.
Moreover,
the

presumption of conjugal ownership applies


even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption
to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject
property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is
also undisputed that their marital relations
are governed by the conjugal partnership
of gains, since they were married before
the enactment of the Family Code and
they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations.
Thus, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property applies to
the lot in question. The presumption that
the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical,
and convincing evidencethere must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it.

The SC stated that Elenita has not


sufficiently proven that the prices involved
in the sales in question were so
inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the
nature of a donation rather than a sale.

That even after having declared that the


Lot is the conjugal property of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily
follow
that
it
may
automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations,
fines, or indemnities of one of the
spouses. Before debts and obligations may
be
charged
against
the
conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts
and obligations should have redounded to,

the benefit of the conjugal partnership.


Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon the husband or the wife, as a rule,
may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines
and indemnities may be enforced upon
the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the Civil Code have been covered.

In this case, it is just and proper that


Ronnie be compensated for the serious
physical injuries he suffered. It should be
remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name
of Elenita, she was not made a party in the
said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his
name.
The
payment
of
indemnity
adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie
may be enforced against the partnership
assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo
after the responsibilities enumerated
under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for
under Article 163 of the Civil Code.

Mendoza Vs Reyes

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed


properties are conjugal properties.

Facts of the case: Ponciano and Julia


were married in 1915. The properties in
question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought
on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly
obtained a loan to pay their balance.
The
corresponding deed of absolute sale was
executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption
vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase:
'with my marital consent. As a result of these
sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA
REYES married to PONCIANO REYES." While
Ponciano was absent attending his farm in
Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in
question to Efren Mendoza and Inocencia De
Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge
and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the
spouses were living separately and were not in
speaking terms. Ponciano filed a complaint for
the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of
land contending that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his wife and
that she had sold them to petitioners "all by
herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties


were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they
had purchased the same in good faith and for
adequate consideration .Julia testified that she
bought the two parcels of land on installment
basis and that the first payment came from her
personal funds. The deed of sale is declared
null and void with respect to one- half
share of Ponciano. Article 153 of the Civil
Code provides that the following are
conjugal partnership property: That which is
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only
one of the spouses; It is sufficient to prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage in

order that the same may be deemed conjugal


property. In its decision, the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dismissed the complaint and declared the
properties in question exclusive and paraphernal
properties of Julia De Reyes. It ruled that she could
validly dispose of the same without the consent of
her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent
purchasers. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the CFI.

Decision: The SC ruled that the disputed


property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. Records show that the funds
came from loans obtained by the spouses.
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and the
wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
liabilities of the partnership. Julias claim of
exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax
Returns which she herself prepared and filed in
behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she
made the statement that the rentals paid to her
were income of the conjugal partnership, and she
made to appear the properties in question as
capital assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed
to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later
registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact
that property acquired during marriage was
registered in the name of the husband alone does
not affect its conjugal nature, neither does
registration in the name of the wife.
Joe E. Ros (deceased) and Estrella
Aguete vs. PNB
Facts:

Petition for review assailing the


decision of CA last Oct. 17,2005.
On January 13 1983, Jose Ros and
Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage and all
legal proceedings of PNB Laoag on
the CFI Ilocos Norte.
It was raffled later then in RTC
Laoag City.
The complaint indicates that Jose
Ros obtained a loan from PNB in an
amount
of
PHP115,000
and

executed an estate mortgage with


a parcel of land and improvements
thereon under Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity of the loan, they
remained with balance causing PNB
to make foreclosure proccedings on
the property. After extrajudicial
sale, it ruled in favour of PNB as
the highest bidder. After one year
without anyone redeeming said
property, it was registered in the
name of PNB Laoag on Aug. 10,
1978.
Aguete then stated that she has no
knowledge of the loan obtained by
Jose Ros neither consented to the
mortgage
of
their
conjugal
property. A complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings, sale and
consolidation of property saying
that her signatures were forged
and the loan did not result any
benefit to the family.
RTC rendered a decision on June
29, 2001 part of it read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage (Exhibit C) and
the
subsequent
foreclosure
proceedings conducted thereon
NULL and VOID;
2. ORDERING the Register of Deeds
of the City of Laoag to cancel
TCT No. T-15276 in the name of
defendant PNB and revert the
same in the name of plaintiffs
spouses Joe Ros and Estrella
Aguete;
3. ORDERING defendant to vacate
and turnover the possession of the
premises of the property in suit to
the plaintiffs; and
4. ORDERING defendant to pay
plaintiffs
attorneys
fee
and
litigation expenses in the sum of
TEN
THOUSAND
(P10,000.00)
PESOS.

PNB filed for Notice of Appeal on


Sept. 13, 2001. Petitioner on the
same month filed for motion for
execution
pending
appeal.
Petitioners added that they obliged
themselves to make the house
habitable at a cost of not less
P50,000.00. The repair cost would
accrue to PNBs benefit should the
appellate court reverse the trial
court. PNB continued to oppose
petitioners motion

In an Order12 dated 8 May 2002,


the trial court found petitioners
motion for execution pending
appeal
improper
because
petitioners have made it clear that
they were willing to wait for the
appellate
courts
decision.
However, as a court of justice and
equity, the trial court allowed
petitioners to occupy the subject
property with the condition that
petitioners would voluntarily vacate
the premises and waive recovery of
improvements introduced should
PNB prevail on appeal.

On Oct. 17, 005, the appellate


court rendered a decision, reversed
the trial courts decision and
dismissed petitioners complaint.
The appellate court ruled in favour
of respondents

Issue:
1. WN Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in not giving weight to the
findings and conclusions of the trial
court, and in reversing and setting
aside such findings and conclusions
without stating specific contrary
evidence;
2. W/N The Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the real
estate mortgage valid;
3. W/N the Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in declaring, without
basis, that the loan contracted by
husband Joe A. Ros with respondent
Philippine National Bank Laoag

redounded to the benefit of his


family, aside from the fact that
such had not been raised by
respondent in its appeal
Ratio:
1. No. The CA did not err in reversing
the RTC decision. The application of
the provision is the Civil Code since
mortgage was done in 1968 and
they were married already.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal
partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry,
or work or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or
due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive
property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the
marriage,
from
obligations
which
constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or
the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both husband
and wife, and of legitimate children of one
of the spouses;

(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to


complete a professional, vocational or
other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or
is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the
wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage
may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Art. 173 allows Aguete to question Ros
encumbrance of property but the article
does
not
guarantee
annulment
of
contract. This will only be declared upon
the finding that Aguete indeed gave
consent to the encumbrance of the
property.
2. No. The real estate mortgage is
valid. The documents disavowed by
Aguete are acknowledged before a
notary public, hence they are
public
documents.
Every
instrument duly acknowledged and
certified as provided by law may be
presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
The execution of a document that
has been ratified before a notary
public cannot be disproved by the
mere denial of the alleged signer.
PNB was correct when it stated that
petitioners omission to present
other
positive
evidence
to

substantiate their claim of forgery


was fatal to petitioners cause.
Petitioners did not present any
corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could
authoritatively
declare
that
Aguetes signatures were really
forged.
3. No. The loan contracted by the
husband redounded to the benefit
of his family.The application for
loan shows that the loan would be
used exclusively for additional
working [capital] of buy & sell of
garlic & virginia tobacco. In her
testimony,Aguete confirmed that
Ros engaged in such business, but
claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware
of loans contracted by Ros, but did
not know where he wasted the
money.Debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of
the industry or profession by which
he contributes to the support of the
family cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts.If the
husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his
own
business
or
his
own
profession, that contract falls
within the term x x x x obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where

the husband contracts obligations


on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to
the
benefit of the
conjugal
partnership.
Held:
Petition denied. Decision of the CA is
affirmed.
Jovellanos v CA
G.R. No. 100728
June 18, 1992
Facts:
Sept. 2, 1955 - Daniel and Philamlife
entered into a Contract of lease and
conditional sale agreement over the a
property located at Philamlife Homes, QC.
During that time, he was married to
Leonor Dizon, who died on Jan. 2, 1959.
May 30, 1967 - Daniel married Annette.
Dec. 18, 1971 - Mercy, Daniel and Leonor's
daughter, married Gil Martinez. They built
a house on the back portion of the
premises, at the behest of Daniel.
Jan. 8, 1978 - Philamlife executed to
Daniel a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The next day, Daniel donated to his
children (petitioners) with Leonor all his
rights, title, and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon.
Sept. 8, 1985 - Daniel died.
Annette filed a petition claiming that
said property was acquired by
husband while their marriage was
subsisting, which forms part of
conjugal property of the 2nd marriage.

the
her
still
the

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend


that the property were acquired by their
parents during the existence of the first
marriage.
RTC Decision:

1. declared Annette and her minor


children with Daniel as pro-indiviso owners
of the property
2. declared Gil and Mercy Martinez as the
exclusive owners of the 2-storey house at
the back of the said bungalow, with all the
rights vested in them as builders in good
faith
CA Decision: RTC decision affirmed
Issue: to which marriage does the
property belong to as conjugal property?
SC Decision: The said property belongs
to the second marriage, but also proclaims
that reimbursements should be made to
the children of the first marriage (in line
with ART 118 of the FC).
The contract entered into by Daniel and
Philamlife is specifically denominated as a
"Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement"
with a lease period of twenty years.
During the twenty-year period, Daniel had
only the right of possession over the
property. The lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. Generally, ownership is transferred
upon delivery, however, the ownership
may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are
made in full will the deed of absolute sale
be given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as
the true owner, rather than just having
inchoate rights to the property. The time
when he was able to pay the remaining
balance, he was already married to his
second wife, Annette, which makes the
said property as their conjugal property.
ART 118: any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses
shall be reimbursed
Depriving the children from the first will be
unfair due to the fact that the lease was
contracted during the first marriage,
wherein a portion of the payment came
from.
Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063,
July 23, 2009

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De


Leon, then single, and the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot
situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full
payment of the price of the lot. TCT was
issued on February 24, 1972 in the name
of Bonifacio, single. On January 12,
1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister,
Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The
Deed of Sale did not bear the written
consent and signature of Anita. On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses
registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo,
and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner
of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that
the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his
exclusive property because he was still
single when he acquired it from PHHC.
They further alleged that they were not
aware of the marriage between Bonifacio
and Anita at the time of the execution of
the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et
al stating that the lot in question was the
conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio
has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were
paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once
owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the

property was only passed to Bonifacio


after he had fully paid the purchase price
on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In
effect, the property was acquired during
the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
Munoz v Ramirez
GR 156125
August 25, 2010
Topic: Improvements on CPG
Facts: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a
residential lot (which the wife inherited) to
the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k).
Thereafter, they used the money loaned to
construct a residential house on said lot.
It is alleged that the petitioner Munoz
granted the spouses a 600k loan, which
the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS.
The balance of the loan (400k) will be
delivered by Munoz upon surrender of the
title over the property and an affidavit of
waiver of rights (over the property) to be
executed by the husband. While the
spouses were able to turn over the title,
no affidavit was signed by the husband.
Consequently, Munoz refused to give the
400k balance of the loan and since the
spouses could no longer return the 200k
(which was already paid to GSIS), Munoz
kept the title over the property and
subsequently, caused the issuance of a
new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the
annulment of the purported sale of the
property in favor of Munoz. The RTC ruled
that the property was the wifes exclusive
paraphernal property (since she inherited
it from her father) and as such, the sale is
valid even without the husbands consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the
property
was
originally
exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife, it
became conjugal property when it was
used as a collateral for a housing loan that
was paid through conjugal funds. Hence,
the sale is void.

ISSUE
(1):
Is
the
paraphernal or conjugal?

property

Held: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule,


all property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. In this case, clear
evidence that the wife inherited the lot
from her father has sufficiently rebutted
this presumption of conjugal ownership.
Consequently, the residential lot is the
wifes exclusive paraphernal property
(pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158
of the CC and the ruling on CalimlimCanullas. True, respondents were married
during the effectivity of the CC and thus
its provisions should govern their property
relations. With the enactment of the FC
however, the provisions of the latter on
conjugal partnership of gains superseded
those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that
governs the present case and not the CC.
And under Article 120 of the FC (which
supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when
the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in the value are more
than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property
shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the
property shall be retained in ownership by
the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement
for
the
cost
of
improvement.

unusually inadequate; (b) vendor remains


in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c)
upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase, another instrument extending
the period of redemption is executed; (d)
purchase retains for himself a part of the
purchase price; (e) vendor binds himself to
pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in
any other case it may be fairly inferred
that the real intention of the parties is for
the transaction to secure the payment of a
debt.
In this case, considering that (a) the
spouses remained in possession of the
property (albeit as lessees thereof); (b)
MUNOZ retained a portion of the purchase
price (200k); (c) it was the spouses who
paid real property taxes on the property;
and, (d) it was the wife who secure the
payment of the principal debt with the
subject property the parties clearly
intended an equitable mortgage and not a
contract of sale.

G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989


LOURDES
MARIANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
and
DANIEL
SANCHEZ, respondents.

In this case, the husband only paid a small


portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is
fairly reasonable to assume that the value
of the residential lot is considerably more
than the contribution paid by the husband.
Thus, the property remained the exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife at the
time she contracted with MUNOZ; the
written consent of the husband was not
necessary.
ISSUE (2): Was the transaction a sale
or equitable mortgage?

The proceedings at bar concern (1) an


attempt by a married man to prevent
execution against conjugal property of a
judgment rendered against his wife, for
obligations incurred by the latter while
engaged in a business that had admittedly
redounded to the benefit of the family,
and (2) the interference by a court with
the proceedings on execution of a coequal or coordinate court. Both acts being
proscribed by law, correction is called for
and will hereby be effected.

Held: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under


Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is
presumed an equitable mortgage when:
(a) price of sale with right to repurchase is

FACTS:

The proceedings originated from a suit


filed by Esther Sanchez against
Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First
Instance at Caloocan City, for
recovery of the value of ladies ready
made dresses allegedly purchased by
and delivered to the latter.
o

Rendered in favor of defendant


Mariano,
ordering
Veritas
Insurance
Company
(which
issued attachment bond) pay
Mariano full coverage 11k

Pending appeal by Sanchez,


Mariano filed a motion for
immediate execution

In virtue of the writ of


execution, Sheriff garnished the
11k from Veritas and levied real
and
personal
property
belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Esther and her
husband

Esthers petition for certiorari at


the CA was dismissed

appliances
and
utensils
necessarily used in the conjugal
dwelling, were exempt from
execution

CFI QC then issued an order to desist


from proceeding

Mariano instituted a special civil action


of certiorari with CA
o

CA ruled: that the Quezon City


Court had not interfered with
the execution process of the
Caloocan Court because Daniel
Sanchez's action in the former
court
raised
an
issue-the
validity of the sheriffs levy on
the conjugal partnership assets
of
the
Sanchez
spouses
different from those adjudicated
in the Caloocan Court, and
Sanchez was not a party to the
case tried by the latter.

Dismissed her petition

ISSUE:

Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, now


made his move
o

filed a complaint for annulment


of the execution in the Court of
First Instance at Quezon City
in his capacity as administrator
of the conjugal partnership

alleged that the conjugal assets


could not validly be made to
answer
for
obligations
exclusively contracted by his
wife, and that, moreover, some
of the personal property levied
on,
such
as
household

W/N the claim that property levied on in


execution of a judgment is not property of
the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchezs
wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the
Sanchez Spouses

HELD:

In the case at bar, the husband of


the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a stranger to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against
his wife

In
any
case,
whether
by
intervention in the court issuing the
writ, or by separate action, it is
unavailing
for
either
Esther
Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to
seek preclusion of the enforcement
of the writ of possession against
their conjugal assets
For it being established, as
aforestated, that Esther had
engaged in business with her
husbands consent, and the
income derived therefrom had
been expended, in part at
least, for the support of her
family, the liability of the
conjugal assets to respond for
the wifes obligations in the
premises cannot be disputed
CA decision is reversed and set
aside

Ayala Investment & Development Corp


and Abelardo Magsajo vs CA an Sps.
Alferdo and Encarnacion Ching
GR 118305
February 12, 1998
Topic: Conjugal Property of Gains-Charges
upon and Obligations of CPG
Facts:
Alfredo Ching, former EVP of
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)
executed a security agreement
with herein petitioner when his
former
company
obtained
a
P50,300,000.00
loan
from
petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC);
said agreement made him joint and
severally
answerable
to
the
companys debt.
However, due to PBMs failure to
pay the loan, AIDC filed a
complaint against both PBM and
Alfredo Ching.

Trial court ordered both defendants


to pay their debt to AIDC in the
amount of P50,300,000.00 with
interests; pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance
and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale
on 3 of their conjugal properties on
May 1982.
Respondent
spouses
filed
injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRO enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way
for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent
spouses
conjugal
properties;
Since,
only
AIDC
participated in the said bidding,
they got the property.
The following year AIDC filed for
the dismissal of the petition for
injunction arguing that the same
has already been moot and
academic upon the consummation
of the sale. They further pointed
our that by the wording in Art 161
of the NCC there is no need to
prove
that
actual
benefit
redounded to the benefit of the
partnership
as
long
as
the
transaction was entered into for
the
benefit of the
conjugal
partnership.Respondent filed their
opposition and after presenting
witnesses, the trial court declared
the sale on execution null and void.

Issue: WON the debt which the


husband entered alone considered for
the
benefit
of
the
conjugal
partnership which would make it
chargeable
against
the
conjugal
partnership
Ruling: No.
Contrary
to
the
petitioners
assertion, the Court clarified that
the terms redounded to the
benefit of or benefited from as
contemplated in Art 161 of the NCC

and Art 122(1) of the FC


respectively are one and the same.
The Court agreed in the decision of
the respondent court when they
ruled that the loan procured from
AIDC was for the advancement of
PBM and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership considering
that PBM has a distinct personality
from the family. And that the debt
is clearly a corporate debt and
AIDCs right of recourse against
Alfredo as surety is only to the
extent
of
his
corporate
stockholding and does not extend
to the CPG of the family.
It was also emphasized that in all
the courts decision involving the
accommodation of contracts, they
underscore the requirement that
there must be the requisite
showing advantages which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the
spouses or benefits to his family;
However, AIDC failed to satisfy this
evidentiary requirement.
The Court likewise agreed that the
proper law applicable to the case at
bar is the Family Code specifically
Art 122 (1) which explicitly states
that:
The payment for personal debt
contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family
Said
provision
highlights
the
underlying concern of the law for the
conservation
of
the
conjugal
partnership.
Court was also of the view that no
matter how often an executive
acted or was persuaded to act, as
surety for his own employer, this
should not be taken to mean that
he had thereby embarked in the
business of guaranty.
ALFREDO CHING vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

By virtue of a sale of a parcel of land to


Ching Leng Transfer Certificate of Title No.
91137 was issued on September 18, 1961.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of
America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching
filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a
petition for administration of the estate of
deceased Ching Leng . Thirteen (13) years
after Ching Leng's death, a suit against
him was commenced on December 27,
1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo
for reconveyance of the abovesaid
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No.
91137 in his favor based on possession.
The RTC favored the Asedillo and the
decision was publish in a newspaper.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance
of property and cancellation of title is
in personam, and if so, would a dead man
and/or his estate be bound by service of
summons and decision by publication.
Held:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to
or possession of, real property is not an
action in rem or an action against the
whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a
judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard.
Private
respondent's
action
for
reconveyance and cancellation of title
being in personam, the judgment in
question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Ching Leng. The real
purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the

portals of the court, or sitting on the


"mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land (National Grains
Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]). A
Torrens title is generally a conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496).
The instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs.
MIGUELA
C.
DAILO
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Charges upon and obligatins of conjugal
partnership.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify


with respect to the share of the spouse
who
makes
the
disposition
or
encumbrance in the same manner that the
rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of
the Civil Code does. Where the law does
not
distinguish,
courts
should
not
distinguish
DISMISSED

FACTS

provision of Article 124 of the Family Code,


in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.

Spouses Dailo purchased a house


in San Pablo city.
Marcelo Dailo executed SPA to
Gesmundo authorizing to obtain
loan from petitioner in the amount
of 300k and executed as mortgage
above property without consent
and knowledge of respondent.
Upon maturity petitioner instituted
extrajudicial
foreclosure
proceedings. Certificate issued in
favour of petitioner as highest
bidder.
In the meantime Marcelo died.
Claiming
no
knowledge
of
mortgage,
his
wife
Miguela
instituted for Nullity of Mortgage
and Sale.
RTC and CA granted Miguelas
petition.

W/N Mortgage of Marcelino is valid to his


undivided share.
NO.
The basic and established fact is that
during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of
their conjugal partnership. By express

Ayala Investment v Ca
February 12, 1998 (286 SCRA 272)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of
PBM, executed security agreements on
December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount with interests. Pending the appeal
of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the
notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal
properties on May 1982. Respondent
spouses filed injunction against petitioners
on the ground that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining
lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties. A
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered
on July 1982.
ISSUE:
What debts and obligations contracted by
the husband alone are considered for the

benefit of the conjugal partnership which


are chargeable against the conjugal
partnership?
HELD
If the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services
to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within
the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the
time of the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered
to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership Is a surety agreement or an
accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer
within the contemplation of the said
provision?
On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof
must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the
P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
petitioner should have adduced evidence
to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as
surety redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
The petitioners claim that the
benefits were: employment of Ching would

be prolonged, his shares would appreciate,


and it would enhance his career. However,
these are not the benefits contemplated
by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It cannot merely be a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In the second assignment of error,
the petitioner advances the view that
acting as surety is part of the business or
profession of the respondent-husband.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession . The
court are likewise of the view that no
matter how often an executive acted or
was persuaded to act, as a surety for his
own employer, this should not be taken to
mean that he had thereby embarked in
the business of suretyship or guaranty.
*We do not agree with petitioners
that there is a difference between the
terms redounded to the benefit of or
benefited from on the one hand; and
for the benefit of on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Article 161
(1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of
the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term for the benefit of. On
the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that The payment of
personal debts by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. As can be seen, the
terms are used interchangeably.
ARTICLE 105 Conjugal Partnership of
Gains (What is excluded?)
Security Bank and Trust Company,
petitioner v. Mar Tierra Corporation,
Wilfredo Martinez, Miguel Lacson and
Ricardo Lopa, respondents
PONENTE: Corona, J.
FACTS:

On May 7, 1980, Mar Tierra


Corporation
through
its
president, Wilfredo Martinez,
applied for a P12M credit
accommodation with Security
Bank and Trust Company, which
the bank approved.

On July 2, 1980, the credit line


was increased to P14M and
Martinez, Lacson and Lopa
executed a new Indemnity
Agreement in favour of the
bank.
On September 25, 1981, Mar
Tierra Corp availed of the credit
line and received the sum of
P9,952,000, which it undertook
to pay on November 30, 1981.
It was able to pay P4,648,000 of
the principal and over P2.7M on
interest and other charges. The
corporation was not able to pay
the balance because it suffered
a loss and eventually closed
operations in 1984.
Security Bank filed a complaint
for the sum of money with
prayer for attachment against
the respondent corporation and
individual
respondents.
Security Bank subsequently
dismissed the case with respect
to Lacson and Lopa leaving
Martinez as the remaining
individual respondent.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC
issued a writ of attachment on
the real and personal property
of
Mar
Tierra
Corp
and
Martinez. As a consequence,
the
conjugal
dwelling
of
Wilfredo and Josefina Martinez
in Caloocan City was levied on.
On June 20, 194, RTC held that
Mar Tierra Corp and Martinez
are jointly and severally liable
to Security Bank the amount of
P5,304,000 plus 12% interest
and 5% penalty starting June
21, 1982, plus attorneys fees.
It however found that the
obligation
contracted
by
Martinez did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal
home of Martinez.
Security Bank filed an appeal
but CA affirmed RTCs decision,
hence,
this
petition
for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

HELD:

RATIO:

Whether or not the conjugal


property/dwelling of Wilfredo
Martinez can be attached by
Security Bank against the
unpaid credit line obtained by
Mar Tierra Corporation, secured
by an Indemnity Agreement
(surety or guaranty) signed by
Wilfredo Martinez.
No,
the
conjugal
property/dwelling of Wilfredo
Martinez cannot be attached by
Security Bank against the
unpaid credit line.
If the money or services are given
to another party or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot
by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the
surety
or
his
family.
No
presumption is raised that, when a
husband enters into a contract of
surety
or
accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
Proof
must be presented to establish the
benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any
showing of benefit received by it,
the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable on an indemnity
agreement
executed
by
the
husband to accommodate a third
party/entity
(Mar
Tierra
Corporation).
To hold the conjugal partnership
liable for an obligation pertaining to
the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to
protect the solidarity and well
being of the family as a unit. The
underlying concern of the law is the
conservation
of
the
conjugal
partnership. Hence, it limits the
liability of the conjugal partnership
only to debt and obligations
contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.


COSTUNA v. DOMONDON

[G.R. No. 82753]


[December 19, 1989]
TOPIC:
Charges
upon
obligations of CPG without consent

and

RESPONDENT:
Laureana Domondon
(Presiding Judge, QC RTC); CA Presiding
Justices

PETITIONER: Estela Costuna

PONENTE:

Sarmiento, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna


acquired three parcels of land during
theirmarriage.
1976: Aged 68, Amadeo made his last
will and testament. After this, Amadeo
and Estela were beset with marital
problems.
1977: Amadeo sustained third degree
burns and had to be treated in
different
hospitals.
His
relatives
requested that he be brought to his
hometown in Samar because his
signatures are needed (re: his other
properties there). Amadeo never
returned to his wife Estela, despite
demand, even a petition for habeas
corpus.
Amadeo filed a petition for the
partition of properties, with the
Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court.
Because he failed to get Estelas
consent to the partition despite
repeated demands/requests, Amadeo
was constrained to sell half of the
undetermined portion of the conjugal
property, without the wifes consent. It
was sold to Laureana Domondon.
1978: Amadeo died.

Estela instituted a special proceeding


for the allowance of Amadeos Will.
However, Domondon opposed it,
claiming that half of the conjugal
property was already sold to her by
Amadeo prior to his death. The probate
court did not rule on this, but it
allowed the will.
Domondon filed a case with the RTC to
compel Estela to comply with the Deed
of Sale executed by Amadeo before his
death, that is, to convey to Domond on
the properties already sold to her. The
RTC ruled in favour of Domondon.
Estela appealed to the CA, but the CA
ruled the same. Ergo, the present
case.
Estela argues that the sale of the half
of the conjugal properties (not
yetdetermined
what
properties
because the Court was not able to
proceed with the partition due to lack
of Estelas consent) was prejudicial to
her rights as sole heir of Amadeo and
as spouse.

ISSUE(S):
7. W/N the sale of 1/2 of the conjugal
property by Amadeo is valid without
Estelas consent
8. W/N the CPG should be made liable for
the payment of the hospital and
medicalexpenses of Amadeo who
allegedly abandoned the conjugal
home and his wife
RULING:
(insert Dispositive portion
here; e.g. Petition DENIED / x is
DISBARRED / x is SUSPENDED)
3. The sale is valid
As a general rule, the other
spouses consent is necessary.
However, in this case, the consent
of
Estela
was
unreasonably
withheld by her. The Court is
constrained
to
relax
the
application of the law, and
consider the sale fallingwithin the
legal exceptions to the general
rule.

The Court cannot overlook


the vital fact that Amadeo
executed a lastwill and
testament
designating
Estela as his sole heir. In
thisconnection,
we
find
merit
in
Damondon's
assertion
that
no
othermotive
could
be
attributed to Estela but her
greed.
4. CPG is liable
NCC 161 (now FC 121) provides
that the conjugal partnership shall
be
liable forall
debts
and
obligations contracted by the
husband
for
the
benefit
of
theconjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the
samepurpose, in the cases where
she
may
legally
bind the
partnership.
o In this case, the shares of
Amadeo was sold by him to
cover
thehospitalization,
medical and other expenses
necessary
for
his
survival.He was old and
gravely
ill.
His
other
relatives in Samar are also
notthat well in financial
resources
o The health and well-being of
both or either of the
spouseswould
undeniably
redound to the benefit of
their
conjugalpartnership.
The advancement of the
interests
of
the
conjugalpartnership
depends in great measure
on the soundness of the
body
and
mind
of the
partners.
o Ergo, the cost of the
hospitalization of Amadeo is
chargeable to the CPG, it
being to the benefit of their
conjugal partnership
o

Villanueva Vs Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008

Issue: Whether or not the property is an


exclusive lot of Florentino or a conjugal
property and was the sale of the property
valid without the consent of Elisera?
Facts of the case: Florentino and Elisera
Chiong were married since Jan 1960 but
were separated in 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired a certain lot.
During their marriage, they acquired Lot
No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog
City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold
the one-half western portion of the lot to
Walter and Aurora Villanueva for P8,000,
payable
in
installments.
Thereafter,
Florentino
allowed
petitioners
to
occupy the lot and build a store, a shop,
and a house thereon. Shortly after their
last installment payment on December 13,
1986,
the
Villanuevas
petitioners
demanded from the Chiongs the execution
of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera,
however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
RTC-Dipolog City annulled the deed of
absolute
sale
and
demanded
the
petitioners to vacate the lot and remove
all the improvements that they have
introduced. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA decision was appealed to the SC.
Decision:
The SC stated that the
petitioners' contention that the lot belongs
exclusively to Florentino because of his
separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at
the time of sale dissolved their property
relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents'
separation in fact neither affected the
conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Elisera's interest over it. Under Article
178 of the Civil Code, the separation in
fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. The SC added that under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property
acquired by the spouses during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains; unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere
insistence as to the lot's supposed
exclusive
nature
is
insufficient
to

overcome such presumption when taken


against all the evidence for respondents.
The SC held that applying Article 166, the
consent of both Elisera and Florentino is
necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid. In this case, the
requisite consent of Elisera was not
obtained when Florentino verbally sold the
lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992.
Accordingly, the contract entered by
Florentino is annullable at Elisera's
instance, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately,
Elisera timely questioned the sale when
she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5,
1991, perfectly within ten years from the
date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners
contend
that,
assuming arguendo the property is still
conjugal, the transaction should not be
entirely voided as Florentino had one-half
share over the lot. Petitioners' stance
lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia AguilarReyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et
al., a case involving the annulment of sale
executed by the husband without the
consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation must be annulled in its entirety
and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Although the transaction in the said case
was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment
of the whole transaction is the same.
Because the property is conjugal, consent
of the spouse is needed before the other
spouse can alienate the property. The
contract was annulled and the petitioners
were asked to return to the respondents
the land with its fruits and respondents
were asked to return the sum of P8,000
with legal interest.

Ravina vs. Abrille


Facts:

Respondent Mary Ann Abrille and


Abrile are husband and wife having
four children, all parties in the
case.

1982: Spouses acquired a 555


square meter parcel of land a Lot 7
Kamuning St. Juna Subdivision,
Matina, Davao City covered in TCT
(transfer ertificate of title) T-88674.
Said lot was adjacent to the lot
Pedro Abrille bought when e was
still single registered in his name
TCT No. T-26471.
Through joint efforts and from a
loan from Bank of the Philippines,
spouses were able to build a house
on both lots. They continued to
build
improvements
eventually
building a poultry house and an
annex.
1991: Pedro got himself a mistress
and started neglecting his family. In
effect, Mary Ann was forced to sell
or mortgage their movables to
support family and continuance of
studies of their children.
Pedro, alone in the transaction with
petitioners offered both lots for sale
to them. Mary Ann objected and
addressed this to the petitioners
but Pedro Abrille still pushed
through with the Selling of the
properties.
Pedro was able to sell said lots
without Anns consent supported
by a deed of sale dated June 21,
1991. It also appears on the said
deed hat Mary Ann did not sign on
top of her name.
One day, when Mary Ann was out
and the children were in school,
Pedro along with armed members
of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit in connivance to
petitioners
transferred
the
belongings of Mary Ann to an
apartment.
Upon coming home, Mary Anne and
her daughter were prevented from
going into the said properties. They
waited outside until