[LC]

Neorealism and Its Critics

Robert Keohane, editor
Chapter 1: Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics
Robert Keohane
Does the theory of IR have implications for practice? YES
Look carefully for unstated assumptions in theories (5)
Assumptions of political realism: states are the key units of action; they seek power, as an
end in itself or as a means; they behave rationally (7)
Since 1945 US foreign policy discussed in language of power and interests rather than
ideals or norms (9)

Criticisms of Morgenthau:
1. Explaining lust for power in terms of human nature does not allow us to account for
variation in warfare over time and space
2. His definition of power is murky (11)
Is rationality a good assumption? Not clear it is; and other models (near rational)
produce very different system-level outcomes . . . so this requires further study (13)

[Summary of Waltz]
Ruggie: structural change has no source other than unit-level processes (17)
Keohane: Waltzs theory of balance of power is inconsistent with his assumption that sates seek
to maximize power (18)
Overall theme: Waltzs theory does not do a good job explaining change in world affairs.
**
Chapter 6: Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis
John Ruggie
P. 131-141: summary of Waltz [not reproduced here]
Question: Does Waltz succeed on his own terms, that is, does his theory explain systemic
continuity in intl politics? JGR says no.

Waltzs neorealism provides no means by which to account for shift from medieval to
modern intl syst (141)
- not a question of distribution of capabilities
- is a question of how the units are separated from each other in other words,
their differentiation, Waltzs second structural level that he says drops out
because units are alike (142)
- Ruggie says, differentiation is not about differences, it refers to separateness

Medieval state (think Spruyts description): amalgam of conditional property, private

authority, overlapping rights, no clear boundaries; is an anarchy but without todays
notion of exclusive territorial rights (142-3)
Modern state: institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive
jurisdictional domains (143)
Philosophical foundations for the modern state: Locke, who wrote that the purpose of
civil society is to protect natural individual property rights (which arise prior to society)
(144)
Vattel philosophized similarly but on international plane: the community of states exists
to maintain the system of territorial sovereignty of each state (145)
- similarity btw private property and sovereignty: (1) both differentiate among units
in terms of possession of self and exclusion of others; (2) establish systems of
social relations among the units; (3) theorists legitimated political order based on
minimal needs of the units (145)

The second structural level of differentiation provides an explanation for change in the intl
system. Further consequences:
1. allows us to give meaning to the exchange of considerations, which is how Waltz
describes collaboration in anarchy: roughly, quantitative equivalence (146)
2. sovereignty is not irrelevant because of interdependence; think of analogy to private
property, which is interfered with by states; but still the concept influence when and how,
thus both concepts, while not absolute, are relevant because they shape, condition, and
constrain social behavior (147)
3. gives the theory greater explanatory power; for example, the functional scope of the
international system varies depending upon the hegemonic form of state/society
relations that prevail at a given time. (I dont fully understand this, but JGRs example
is, this explains the different types of economic interdependence that prevailed at end of
19thC and today: laissez-fair liberalism in the former and embedded liberalism today)
4. provides a more comprehensive view of the political and economic dimensions of intl
politics, which developed at similar time from similar structural roots and are in part codetermined (148)

Waltz also ignores dynamic density, meaning the quantity, velocity, and diversity of
transactions between units. Waltz considers this unit-level; but Ruggie claims it can
reach a point where it triggers change in structure (148-9)
Waltz improperly relegates certain factors to the unit level that should be coded as
systemic dynamic density: we should at least consider demographic trends, changes in
industrial production and location, similar changes in technologies, and ecological and
resource constraints (150)
- in doing so, Waltz loses the generative property of his theory. The question he
should be asking is not if these make any difference for the relative positions of
the superpowers, but for the absolute capacity of bipolarity to mute the (generally
negative) effects of anarchy and sovereignty (151)
By making unit-level processes all a product of system structure, Waltz loses the ability
to make predictions of change (151). In other words, continutity of the system is a part of
his premise even before it is hypothesized as an outcome. Structural change has no

source other than unit-level processes; so if they are exogenous to the system, the theory
cant make predictions about change.
Favorite phrase: They derived an ought from an is, where the is was neither transcendental
nor purely subjective, but enjoyed an irreducible intersubjective quality. (146)
If anyone figures out what that means, please let me know.
**
Chapter 7: Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond
Robert Keohane

Realism is weak when it comes to accounting for change

Realism also does not provide a set of testable answers to questions about state behavior
Lakatoss scientific research program for evaluating theories first describes theories as
having four parts:
1. inviolable assumptions
2. initial conditions (defines scope of the assumptions)
3. auxiliarly/observational hypotheses
4. positive heuristic (tells us what other hypotheses to entertain and how to conduct
research)
- evaluation criteria: do our auxiliary hypotheses discover new facts (and not
simply the anomalous facts they were designed to explain) = a progressive
research program(161)

I. Structural Realism as a Research Program

Three realist assumptions: major world actor = territorially organized entities; state
behavior can be explained rationally; states seek power and calculate interests in terms of
power (163).
Thucydides and Morgenthau: imagine themselves as political leaders, consider rational
alternatives, and which he would choose in that situation = rational reconstruction
Waltzs systemic theory: internal attributes of actors are given by assumption rather than
treaded as variables (165). The rationality assumption permits inferences about actor
behavior to be made from the systems structure (167). Power is considered to be
fungible, like money in economics (167).
II. Progress Within the Realism Paradigm: Three Achievements
Balance of power theory: as relative capabilities change, coalitional patterns change.
However, Waltz can only forecast that balances will periodically recur; his theory is so
general it is very difficult to test in any meaningful way (171-2)
Balance of power theory is inconsistent with the assumption realists often make that
states maximize power (174). Why do realists make it? B/c without it, if states sought
self-preservation, we would have to consider competing goals states may have.

Snyder and Diesing: use game theory to analyze nine kinds of bargaining situations. But
using states positions in intl system, S&D could not determine interests in about half of
their decision-making units (176)
- needed intragovernmental politics, ideas about perception, grp decision-making,
etc., to complete their matricies

Gilpin: states make cost-benefit calculations about alternative courses of action (eg
changing intl syst)
- realism cannot explain why hegemonic states do decline in power; Gilpins
explanation: diminishing returns to empire; hegemons consume more and invest
less; technology diffuses to others
- as hegemons power declines, a new round of hegemonic conflict sets in (179)
Keohane: Gilpin explains reaction to change but not the sources of it or why certain
contenders emerge in the first place. It also cannot explain peaceful change (180).

III. Explanations of Outcomes From Power: Hypotheses and Anomalies

Interests cannot be derived, simply on the basis of rational calculation, from the external
positions of states (which Gilpin, Krasner, Waltz acknowledge) (183)
Power does seem to be a good indicator of who wins wars (183). But power is not
fungible [argument goes on along Baldwins lines] so intl system is likely to have
several structures, according to the resources that can affect outcomes for a certain set of
issue-areas (184)
In response, we have the conversion-power theory [again see Baldwin] and that
discrepancies between power resources and outcomes are explained by an asymmetry of
motivation in favor of the objectively weaker party (186)
- in this case, need a way to measure intensity of motivation independently of
behavior
On the other hand, the problem with assuming complete infungibility of power (K says
Baldwin comes close) is that no generalizations would be possible (187)
Keohane suggests that parsimonious theories remain useful for initial explanations; then
we can use an issue-area approach to seek hypotheses that apply only to specific areas
(188)
- to define issues areas: see what issues gvnts regard as closely interdependent, treat
them collectively (189)
IV. Beyond Structural Realism
Systemic theory is important because we must understand the context of action before we
can understand the action itself (193)
Modified structural realism: retains state rationality, states as principal actors assumption
(193)
However, that states seek power is an overriding interest would be qualified; under
different systemic conditions, states will define self-interests differently (194). This
approach leads to three pieces of advice:
1. when explaining world politics, consider the hypothesis that outcomes reflect
underlying power resources, w/o being limited to this POV

2. entertain the hypothesis that power resources are differently distributed in different
issue-areas
3. explore effects of intl structure on state interests as well as other intl factors and
domestic factors (195)
Level of information in the system can affect actors behavior; it is not a systemic
constant; institutions affect information (196)

V. Conclusion: World Politics and Peaceful Change

Threat of nuclear war morally compels us to consider peaceful intl change
Intl institutions, rules, and patters of cooperation can affect calculations of interest; thus
they should be a focus of scholarly attention & policy concern (199)