PART I:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
POWERS & STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
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There are two aspects of this provision. The first is the non-establishment clause.
Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. The second
aspect is at issue in this case.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other
religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. x x x
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop
amounts to religious expression. x x x
xxx
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, does not convey any
religious doctrine of the Catholic church.
That the position of the Catholic Church appears to coincide with the message of the
tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of
religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under
Team Patay and Team Buhay according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim
that the expression on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the
Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. Furthermore, the
definition of an ecclesiastical affair in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission cited by
petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall
within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in
the Austria case such as proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. (The
Bishop of the Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015)
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
A proposed bill does not present an actual justiciable controversy. The filing
of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial
restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass.
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the
existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
As emphasized by this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v.
Commission on Elections :
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable
controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. In the concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa :
Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be
an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. x x x
Petitioners allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. x x x This court is not empowered to review
proposed bills because a bill is not a law.
[In] Montesclaros v. COMELEC x x x [t]his court held that:
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill
lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy.
A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law . A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill,
having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the
nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. x x x . . . . . . . .
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed
bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not
before. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing
any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus,
the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to
judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and
the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. x x x
Similar to Montesclaros , petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing
laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of
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bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. A
proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the
judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere
speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does
not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts determination. (In The
Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements v.
Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143,
January 21, 2015)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular
litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of
third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speechrelated conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression.
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xxx
American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with
regard to the statute's facial validity.
xxx
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the
therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were
actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said
cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its
entirety.
xxx
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical
scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
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It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two
positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was an issue that comes under all the
recognized exceptions. (Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
Even if the DAP program has already been terminated, the Court can still rule
on its constitutionality because all the exceptions to the moot and academic
principle are present.
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the [Disbursement
Acceleration Program] as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the
challenges to the DAPs constitutionality.
xxx
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the
past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic
by supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when
the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3)
when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review. Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were ultimately
sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence,
the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review. (Araullo v. Aquino,
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules
enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This
provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses
the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in
Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.
(Underscoring supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may
be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
xxx
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective,
this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental
cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
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"based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned." x x x
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are
joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may
be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals
of the Protected Seascape of Taon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The size limitation [on election campaign propaganda] and its reasonableness
are not political questions because the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
on regulations on free speech justifies subjecting the official actions of the Comelec
to review of the Court.
Respondents argue further that the size limitation [on election campaign propaganda]
and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the ambit of this courts power of
review. x x x
This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the
tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free ex pression. Despite the
invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from
deciding on the merits of this case.
In Taada v. Cuenco, this court previously elaborated on the concept of what
constitutes a political question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not
judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted)
xxx
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence
of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political
question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts
that are exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the
Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference.
It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
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not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
xxx
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of
the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Political questions: The Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of a law. It may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.
[W]hile the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results. x x x
x x x The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make
sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. x x x.
xxx
x x x Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to
the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Political questions: The conduct of the foreign relations is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative departments. The Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse Filipino
citizens claims against Japan.
Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government
in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system
established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime
against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They allege that the prohibition against these
international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in
waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against
Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for
crimes against humanity. x x x
xxx
Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive
Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
The petition lacks merit.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
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xxx
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such
category involves questions of foreign relations.
The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution
to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims
of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the
Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. (Vinuya
The validity of the Pork Barrel System is not a political question because it is
not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of gover nment
but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. (Belgica v. Executive
can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the
DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there
are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their
criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended
by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budge t
submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
xxx
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the
illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity
and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially
recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave
the way for the nullification of the P144.378 Billion worth of infrastructure projects, social and
economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying
these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP,
the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact
doctrine. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void
The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the principle of separation of
powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of
project implementation, such as project identification, fund release and fund
realignment, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. x x x [T]here is a violation
of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another departments functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive
branch of government. x x x Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive
department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law.
[T]he Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is
properly the domain of the Executive. x x x Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress
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law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of
implementing the national budget begins.
xxx
[T]he defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority
of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program
menus have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. x x x
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. x x x
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. x x x The fundamental rule [is] from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013)
his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and
thus effectuated without veto consideration. The legislators identification of the
projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on.
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power
to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item -veto
power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
xxx
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists
a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be
put into an appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations
of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item.
xxx
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the
GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." x x x
xxx
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system x x x impairs
the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
xxx
On 16 April 2009, [petitioners] filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are
exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion
that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president
as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-inChief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. x x x
xxx
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Courts authority
to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of
lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As
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noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval
or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for
instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.
xxx
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora , the Court had occasion to
rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.
xxx
In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, the Court characterized these
powers as exclusive to the President, precisely because they are of exceptional import:
x x x The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but
there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts
as the leader of the countrys police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." x x x
xxx
x x x But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM,
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the
President
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is
the local chief executive, is ultra vires x x x. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
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(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid
The transfer of funds under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is
invalid for lack of a valid law authorizing the transfer. The GAAs of 2011 and 2012
authorized the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that
the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the
GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, contravention of
the Constitution.
[Section 59 of the 2011 GAA and Section 53 of the 2012 GAA] were textually unfaithful
to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section
25(5). The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of
funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of
appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any
item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the
transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an
office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the
Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim authority to
transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
necessarily savings. Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist. Funds described as unreleased or unalloted are not necessarily
savings.
[T]he power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had
been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist , for only
then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected
this interpretation and made it operational, viz:
xxx
The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure indication that
savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon
the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.
xxx
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description
of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories
of items from which savings can be generated. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing item,
project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which
savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The power to augment
cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA.
20 | P a g e
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should
be "to augment an item in the general appropriations law for the respective offices." The term
"augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree.
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the
appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient.
xxx
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient
before it could be augmented from savings. x x x
xxx
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we
conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered
by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
xxx
[T]he failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently
indicated that Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP
concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did not
recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring
expenditure that did not receive any appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP,
any funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in enacting the
GAAs. That happened in some instances under the DAP. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
July 1, 2014)
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
xxx
[T]here must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure
with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation.
Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified
amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the
degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to
unforeseeable contingencies.
xxx
[O]nly DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation
by legally accumulated savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the transfers
of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited.
[T]he phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire
Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the
House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief
Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?
xxx
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and
P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA and the House of
21 | P a g e
2014)
22 | P a g e
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable.
P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree. Clearly, as it was only for
the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. (Biraogo v. Philippine
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases
that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, x x x, the Court then unequivocally
declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present
Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
23 | P a g e
legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the
exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with
by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of pardon
by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution x x x
xxx
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and
prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes. (Risos-
24 | P a g e
xxx
In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure. x x x
xxx
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, we reiterated that the presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency:
x x x We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe
life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a nonsitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. x x x
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo
cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would
assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for
the abduction of Rodriguez. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15,
2011)
THE JUDICIARY
Rule-making power: The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by the Supreme Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective
power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress:
xxx
The rule making power of this Court was expanded . This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure . In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put
to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance
25 | P a g e
System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter,
Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all
kinds. Reaffirming Echegaray s construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive
power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence:
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated
by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence , the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain . x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
26 | P a g e
(Re: in the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court and Sheriff's
Fees of Cooperative etc., A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)
Judicial and Bar Council: There should be only one (1) representative from
Congress.
There should be only one (1) representative from Congress in the Judicial and Bar
Council: The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to have each ex-officio
member as representing one co-equal branch of government. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
27 | P a g e
Development Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies
and instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has
primary jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit.
[R]espondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner,
a local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. x x x
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive
jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule
VIII, Section 1 further provides:
over:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal
retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant
accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos (P 1,000,000.00); d) request for
relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts
in excess of Five Million pesos (P 5,000,000.00).
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas , we ruled that it is the COA
and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money claim against
respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties failure to
argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Thus:
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for
although petitioners collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the
circumstances surrounding petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs
jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money
against a local government unit. This brought the case within the COAs domain to pass upon
28 | P a g e
money claims against the government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts
and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x.
(Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592
& 20262, November 27, 2013)
COAs authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those
determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers
within reach of accounting officers.
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed,
however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only
liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and
such other papers within reach of accounting officers. Petitioners claim was for a fixed amount
and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioners summation of its
accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and
other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COAs jurisdiction under the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development
When money claims need not be filed first with COA: Money claims against
the government need not be filed with COA first, and may be filed directly with the
courts directly, if the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as when there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant, or where the
question involved is purely legal.
Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial
Court was done without exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent
should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts.
However, it has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Lacap, this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there
is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical a nd oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public
interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and
(e) are present.
The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two
decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government
office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present
case involve the validity and the enforceability of the Contract of Agreement entered into by the
parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission
on Audit or the DPWH. x x x
xxx
The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed
way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted
from the work done by respondent. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Eslao to
the present case. In Eslao, this Court stated:
29 | P a g e
...the Court finds that the contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered,
which were for the benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the
contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and
presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand
compensation on the basis of quantum meruit . (Emphasis supplied.)
NATIONAL ECONOMY
The Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract for the largescale exploration and development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are
the following: 1) the service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general
law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions; 2) the President shall be the
signatory for the government; and 3) within 30 days, the President shall report it to
Congress
Petitioners maintain that [Service Contract]-46 [which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait, a narrow passage of
water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu] transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision
or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because [Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., (JAPEX)] is 100% Japanese-owned. Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46
cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under
paragraph 4 of the same provision. x x x
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large -scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall not ify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed
under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service
contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. x x x
xxx
[T]he phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the
30 | P a g e
government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts , the foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in
the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4,
with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The
following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and
void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution. (Resident Marine
Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Taon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April
21, 2015)
and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the
constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a
public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)
Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the
Grandfather Rule will apply. Thus, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation
and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine
the total percentage of Filipino ownership. The ultimate Filipino ownership of the
shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added to
the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation.
"Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the
Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. x x x
xxx
x x x Sec. 2 [of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution] which focuses on the State entering
into different types of agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources with entities who are deemed Filipino due to 60 percent ownership of capital is
pertinent to this case, since the issues are centered on the utilization of our countrys natural
resources or specifically, mining. Thus, there is a need to ascertain the nationality of petitioners
since, as the Constitution so provides, such agreements are only allowed corporations or
associations "at least 60 percent of such capital is owned by such citizens."
x x x It is apparent that it is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the
grandfather rule in cases where corporate layering is present.
xxx
Under the above-quoted SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of
the Investee Corporation. The first case is the liberal rule, later coined by the SEC as the
Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the
1967 SEC Rules which states, (s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60%
of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine
nationality. Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of
the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a corporation which
is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the
portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, "but if the percentage of
Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares
corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality ." Under the Strict
Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the
Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total percentage
of Filipino ownership.
Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level
of the Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee
Corporation x x x.
xxxx
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or
the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership
is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign
stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture
corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently,
where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not
apply.
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for
the application of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt
prevails and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt
32 | P a g e
is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro,
since their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporationMBMI, funded them. However,
petitioners also claim that there is "doubt" only when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than
60%.
The assertion of petitioners that "doubt" only exists when the stockholdings are less
than 60% fails to convince this Court. DOJ Opinion No. 20, which petitioners quoted in their
petition, only made an example of an instance where "doubt" as to the ownership of the
corporation exists. It would be ludicrous to limit the application of the said word only to the
instances where the stockholdings of non-Filipino stockholders are more than 40% of the total
stockholdings in a corporation. The corporations interested in circumventing our laws would
clearly strive to have "60% Filipino Ownership" at face value. It would be senseless for these
applying corporations to state in their respective articles of incorporation that they have less
than 60% Filipino stockholders since the applications will be denied instantly. Thus, various
corporate schemes and layerings are utilized to circumvent the application of the Constitution.
Obviously, the instant case presents a situation which exhibits a scheme employed by
stockholders to circumvent the law, creating a cloud of doubt in the Courts mind. (Narra Nickel
Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April
21, 2014)
xxx
[T]he law [P.D. No. 1067] limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and
juridical entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private
corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos. In the case of Angat River,
the NWRB has issued separate water permits to MWSS, NPC and NIA.
Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected with public
interest, was opened to private sector and any new generation company is required to secure a
certificate of compliance from the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), as well as health,
safety and environmental clearances from the concerned government agencies. Power
generation shall not be considered a public utility operation, and hence no franchise is
necessary. Foreign investors are likewise allowed entry into the electric power industry .
However, there is no mention of water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower
facilities. x x x
xxx
33 | P a g e
holder of water permit. Such was the situation of hydropower projects under the BOT
contractual arrangements whereby foreign investors are allowed to finance or undertake
construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the facility
constructed. However, in case the facility requires a public utility franchise, the facility operator
must be a Filipino corporation or at least 60% owned by Filipino.
xxx
Lease or transfer of water rights is allowed under the Water Code, subject to the
approval of NWRB after due notice and hearing. However, lessees or transferees of such water
rights must comply with the citizenship requirement imposed by the Water Code and its IRR. x
xx
xxx
x x x [T]he Water Code explicitly provides that Filipino citizens and juridical persons who
may apply for water permits should be "duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water
resources."
xxx
In fine, the Court rules that while the sale of AHEPP to a foreign corporation pursuant to
the privatization mandated by the EPIRA did not violate Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
which limits the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the full
supervision and control of the State or the States undertaking the same through joint venture,
co-production or production sharing agreements with Filipino corporations 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipino citizens, the stipulation in the Asset Purchase Agreement and
Operations and Maintenance Agreement whereby NPC consents to the transfer of water rights
to the foreign buyer, K-Water, contravenes the aforesaid constitutional provision and the Water
Code. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9,
2012)
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it
consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so
provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation. This Court explained that in order to determine implied waiver when the
State or its agency entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract
was entered into in its governmental or proprietary capacity , thus:
x x x. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does
not automatically mean that it has waived its nonsuability. The State "will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its nonsuability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied." Statutory provisions
waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in
derogation of sovereignty.
35 | P a g e
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign,
can do no wrong. Moreover, as the eminent Justice Holmes said in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:
x x x A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. x x x
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor
of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual,
government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of
the number of suits that the State has to defend against. x x x
[I]n the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167
SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro,
declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being
engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It went on to explain in this wise:
xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although
not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, no t to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not
its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It
is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state , may, more
than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v.
Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]
xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec. Order
365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the National Airports
Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted
on June 20, 1952, did not alter the character of the CAAs objectives under Exec. Order 365. The
pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which
led the Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in
Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25). x x x
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or nongovernmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity
from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states:
xxx
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized. The rule is t hus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the
state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary
business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits
against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a
corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so
far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J.,
313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, p p. 206-207; Italics supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine National
Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the Philippine
National Railways, although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as
it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the
CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve
proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies
performing strictly governmental functions.
In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as
an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but
was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity
that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO
had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.
xxx
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent
has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil
Aviation Authority Act of 2008.
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO. x x x
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers,
duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues, x x x.
37 | P a g e
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP,
including the power to sue and be sued x x x. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos,
38 | P a g e
In line with the ruling in UNIMEX Micro-Electronics GmBH, the Commissioner of Customs
should pay AGFHA the value of the subject lost shipment in the amount of US$160,348.08 x x
x. (Commissioner of Customs v. AGFHA Inc., G.R. No. 187425, March 28, 2011)
The DPWH can be sued and held liable to pay for a project that was already
completed decades ago. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed
way back on 9 July 1992. x x x
xxx
Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services
rendered and work done by invoking the states immunity from suit. This Court has long
established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, and recently reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO , that
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice to a citizen. As this Court enunciated in EPG Construction:
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat
respondents right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have for years r eceived and accepted
benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondents honest toil and labor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility
against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True
enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be
sued under any circumstance.
xxx
xxx
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the
State's immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated
property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases
applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be
subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State's immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court x x x cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and
allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly
demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular
instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum
meruit for construction done on the public works housing project.
CITIZENSHIP IN GENERAL
Election of citizenship: Children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the
age of majority, but failed to immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry did not lose their right to elect Philippine citizenship. Their
registration of the documents of election should be allowed, if in the meanwhile
positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done.
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of
allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately
file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals
39 | P a g e
xxx
Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that
was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements
for such election.
xxx
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the
Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;
and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry
were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered
no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship.
xxx
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public
official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say
is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the
documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
xxx
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act
of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship
has been claimed.
xxx
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a
serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to
40 | P a g e
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified
acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
xxx
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly
negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still
be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. (Ma v.
Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost
the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive
effect. A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
While Section 2 [of RA 9225] declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, " such
is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions
for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under
the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is
required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for
the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. x x x
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for
re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A.
9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused
is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence x x x.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003 x x x.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity
of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph
of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country . x x x
xxx
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
41 | P a g e
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No.
STATE POWERS
POLICE POWER
Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. The
regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate exercise of police power.
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive
and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law.
They stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate
brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. x x x
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on
their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If
petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services
of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is
an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business
or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power
of the State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals. x x x
[U]nder the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions.
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real
estate practitioners x x x.
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the States police power. x x x
x x x Police power x x x is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. (Remman Enterprises v. Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014)
The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the
interests of the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals .
Lacking these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise
of its police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two
tests have been used by the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
42 | P a g e
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series
of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys
purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as
discussed in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr. :
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
(Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the
aesthetic appearance of the community. The requirement under the ordinance for
owners of educational institutions to build their fences six meters back for
beautification purposes is invalid.
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in
excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see -thru;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and
industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1)
demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be
80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area.
xxx
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "unneighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and
is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals .
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been
settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of
the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas
There must be reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. In limiting the height of
fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one
43 | P a g e
meter to be at least 80% see-thru, the ordinance employs means that have no
reasonable relation to its purpose of ensuring public safety and security, and is thus
an invalid exercise of police power.
The petitioners argue that x x x Section 3.1 [of Ordinance No. 192] limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see -thru,
should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the
reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the
prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the
petitioners, however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is
unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not
appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a
higher level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed premises could entice and tempt
would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and
breach. It also appears that the respondents concrete wall has served as more than sufficient
protection over the last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the
State may not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of
the aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru
fence will foster "neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College,
with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise
of its police power.
This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable" regulation.
We have demonstrated that not only an important or substantial state interest, but even a
compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674s requirement of disclosing subscribers to election
surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for
public service" and is impelled by the imperative of "fair" elections.
As a valid exercise of COMELECs regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is correctly
deemed written into petitioners existing contracts. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on
EMINENT DOMAIN
A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters
to provide for parking space is tantamount to a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. The total destruction of value of the property is not
required for a taking to be compensable.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners [city officials] from requiring
them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter)
which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a
parking area.
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 [of City Ordinance No. 192] which
requires the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. The petitioners
initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to be created would remain with the
respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by
the public on non-school days would only be incidental. x x x
xxx
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for
the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public.
Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property
will continue to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of
title nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where
the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court is
of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a
taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property for public use
without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas
45 | P a g e
Here, it is even pointless to take up the matter of said requisites for the issuance of writ
of possession considering that, as stated, NO complaint was ever filed in Court AT THE TIME of
the seizure of defendants properties. (National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No. 200858,
August 7, 2013)
Agrarian Reform
The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method
by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land is the alternative. By using the word collectively, the Constitution
allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer .
Thus, allowing corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the
farmers becoming stockholders or members does not violate the agrarian r eform
policy under the Constitution.
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads:
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or
COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The wording of the provision is unequivocal the farmers and regular farmworkers have a
right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two
(2) modes of land distribution direct and indirect ownership. x x x Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural
land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership
by farmers. x x x By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership
of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. x x x
Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows
workers cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph
of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers
becoming stockholders or members.
x x x Sec. 31 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the
Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. Even the framers of the l987
Constitution are in unison with respect to the two (2) modes of ownership of agricultural lands
tilled by farmers DIRECT and COLLECTIVE x x x.
xxx
[T]he stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian
reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
(Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5,
2011)
46 | P a g e
It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of
more than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the possession of their prope rty.
Is the action barred by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to
recover possession or just compensation?
xxx
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still
fail. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when
to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no
application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents
claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his
property is taken for public use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents claim following the
long-standing rule that where private property is taken by the Government for public use
without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners
action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly
provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its
return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just
compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are
estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which
the power was exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation. (Secretary of
the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1,
2013)
the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1,
2013)
The reckoning point for determining just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of taking.
Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.
Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of
just compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just
compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just
compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of
taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appear outdated.
47 | P a g e
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This
rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if
it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.
xxx
The Court in the [Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National
Railways [PNR], Eusebio v. Luis, Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, and
Republic v. Sarabia] cases was confronted with common factual circumstances where the
government took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without
initiating expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, while the
landowners failed for a long period of time to question such government act and later instituted
actions for recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the landowners
right to the payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just
compensation. The Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. x x x As in said
cases, just compensation due respondents in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al., and
repeatedly held by the Court in recent cases, thus:
x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken
and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." x x x The owner of private property
should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it is taken x x x.
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in
1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above
amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving such
outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in
guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property
owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
x x x For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the
date of taking. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson,
Please also note that the ruling in DPWH v. Tecson runs counter to an earlier ruling of
the Supreme Court in Heirs of Pidacan v. Air Transport Authority [G.R. No. 162779, June 15,
2007], wherein the High Tribunal noted that it would be iniquitous to reckon the value of the
property at the time of the taking in 1948. It ruled that justice and fairness dictate that the
48 | P a g e
appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners property was when the trial court
made its order of expropriation in 2001.)
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Statutes and
executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines
in ascertaining the amount thereof.
While a court should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in
arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto. The determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.
In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the market value of the
affected property, Napocor relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395 x x x.
xxxx
Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owners
loss. The word just is used to qualify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey
thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample." The payment of just compensation for private property taken for
public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As
such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining
whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial
function that cannot "be usurped by any other branch or official of the government." Thus, we
have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method
of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. In National Power Corporation v. Bagui, where
the same petitioner also invoked the provisions of Section 3A of RA No. 6395, we held that:
Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the
Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation
laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao, National Power Corporation v. Tuazon
and National Power Corporation v. Saludares and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners
for the easement of right-of-way only and not the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines. But we uniformly held in those cases that since the high-tension electric
current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of
the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them
for the full market value of their property. (National Power Corporation v. Spouses Zabala, G.R.
49 | P a g e
The Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is
delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12%
interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or
beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn
interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by
BSP-MB Circular No. 799,58 series of 2013.59. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.
TAXATION
A tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional
contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of
its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government. Thus, the
coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes.
The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free
to private individuals.
Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of
the States inherent power of taxation. As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which,
in general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties,
exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government
and for all public needs.
Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an
enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed
by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the
government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the
following reasons:
(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on
the coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No.
276, which created the Coconut Consumer[s] Stabilization Fund (CCSF),
mandated the following:
a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada
or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be imposed on every
first sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under RA 6260,
effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973.
The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine
National Bank or any other government bank to the account of the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which
shall not form part of the general fund of the government.
xxx
Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations
by the people. They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal
sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:
xxx.
(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the
proper legislative authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected under
PD No. 276.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES
51 | P a g e
DUE PROCESS
The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the
state into the fundamental rights of its citizens. It cannot be invoked in private
controversies involving private parties. A political party is still a private
organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party
does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due
process clause.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue
of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right
to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to
Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings
and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations .
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. The constitutional
limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to
administrative bodies.
x x x The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty
without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to
the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against
arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities . In
the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right
to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental
rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. x x x
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not
interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free
to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association.
According to the [Court of Appeals], x x x [i]n the proceedings before the NBI, the
respondents were not furnished a copy of the complaint and were not likewise required to file
their answer or to present countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely
provided by the petitioner.
xxx
The respondents Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument that they
were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of
Justice, resulting in the denial of their right to due process.
xxx
On the respondents allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigativ e
agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon
its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also
renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to
prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the
respondents due process right could have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to
the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of
probable cause. x x x
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI
issued the questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the
signatures appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioners submitted sample signatures
were not written by one and the same person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report, too,
was procured during the conduct of the NBIs investigation at the petitioners request for
assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive
and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate documents examination
by handwriting experts based on their own evidence. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23,
2014)
The requirements for due process in administrative cases set in the Ang Tibay
case do not apply to preliminary investigations. The purpose of the Office of the
Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation is to determine probable
cause for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights
and obligations of the parties. The Ombudsman and the prosecution service are
inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the
respondent in preliminary investigations. There is nothing unconstitutional with this
procedure because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law
enforcement process leading to trial in court.
We likewise take exception to Justice Brions assertion that "the due process standards
that at the very least should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary inves tigation are
those that this Court first articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [Ang Tibay]. "
Simply put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases. An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary
investigations will have absurd and disastrous consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay
described as the "fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character." These requirements are "fundamental and
essential" because without these, there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution.
These "fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be taken away by legislation because
they are part of constitutional due process. These "fundamental and essential requirements"
are:
53 | P a g e
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. x x x.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, x x x."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in sucha manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further clarified in GSIS v. CA (GSIS): "what
Ang Tibay failed to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing due
process, the requirement of an impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called
upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review
his decision on appeal." The GSIS clarification affirms the non applicability of the Ang Tibay
guidelines to preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the
role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation and prosecution of government
personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay , as amplified in GSIS. The
purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after
conducting its own fact finding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an
information, and not to m ake a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties
under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay . The investigating officer
investigates, determines probable cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after filing the
corresponding information.
x x x The Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the control and supervision of
the Secretary of the Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing
officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations . Obviously, this procedure
cannot comply with Ang Tibay , as amplified in GSIS. However, there is nothing unconstitutional
with this procedure because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law enforcement
process leading to trial in court where the requirements mandated in Ang Tibay , as amplified in
GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To
now rule that Ang Tibay , as amplified in GSIS, should apply to preliminary investigations will
mean that all past and present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of constitutional
due process. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)
The ex-parte issuance of temporary protection order (TPO) - before notice
and hearing - is valid because time is of the essence to prevent further violence.
Moreover, after a TPO is issued, the respondent is afforded an opportunity to
present his side.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner
bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of [Protection Orders], of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. x x x
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
54 | P a g e
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim
and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent
the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim .
xxx
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,
the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when
the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of
VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to
attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. x x x [T]he victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in
the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition
within five (5) days from service. x x x The opposition to the petition which the respondent
himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. It is clear from the
foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267,
Void for vagueness doctrine: Vague laws are void because first, these violate
due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid; second,
these leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the
due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a
"private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7
only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
xxx
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
55 | P a g e
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the
words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care
service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
"public health service provider," xxx
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the
obvious reason that they are used synonymously. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014)
The JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published, because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary.
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy [requiring five years of service as judges
of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts] violates
procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). x x x
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the
ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body
under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements
of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of firstlevel courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding
force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such
as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an
internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC
and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these
vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for
and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in
determining competence, independence, integrity and probity. x x x
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published
on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is
aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that
should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining
competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should have amended its rules and
56 | P a g e
published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have
special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published.
Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the
judiciary. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Counsels mistake and due process: The general rule is that a client is bound
by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique ,
unless the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his
day in court. To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the
petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear
abandonment of the clients cause.
As to petitioners claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former
counsels error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time
and again, this Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and
mistake in handling a case, and to allow a client to disown his counsels conduct would render
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. While this rule has recognized exceptions, We find that there is no reason for this
Court to deviate from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v.
Moral:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel
in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by
counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the
client. While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding
circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when
its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3)
where the interests of justice so require."
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x,
it must be shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend its
interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process." To properly claim gros s
negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty
of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners motion to re -open
the proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
x x x Accused-movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or
gross incompetence on his counsel alone as the decision not to present further evidence in
his defense bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the said manifestation.
x x x While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that
the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as
gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings.
The failure of the government to produce the semen specimen from a rape
victim does not entitle the accused in a rape case to outright acquittal on the ground
of violation of his right to due process. Due process does not require the State to
preserve the semen specimen from a rape victim although it might be useful to the
accused, unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police.
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of
the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
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The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with
this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony
as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the
very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen
specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. x x x
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long
be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution
or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did
not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea
of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing
did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving
the specimen in the meantime. (Alejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010)
Due process for military academy cadets: A cadet facing dismissal from the
military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests
(life, liberty, or property). Hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the
bounds of procedural due process is a must. The PMA is not immune from the
strictures of due process.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right
to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended by E.O. No. 1005), AFP Code of
Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism,
and, in general, military culture. x x x Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
they can never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the form er should yield to the
latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some
civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to
what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and
honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say
or do. In the context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the
right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent .
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with
a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. x x x
x x x [A] cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason,
the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the
minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far
more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she
has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that
career.
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically
pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In
Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress
without her consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their
defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this
Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest"
58 | P a g e
(particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during
the period of his detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two
cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to
free speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362,
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong x x x held that although both Ang Tibay and
Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos
since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural
rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice; that the proceedings may be summary; that cross-examination
is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt
nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the
individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals :
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which
is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted
to investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding.
xxx
59 | P a g e
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally
controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the
Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and
immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from
the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and
be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of v iew of
time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not
too far from what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals .
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He
was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together
with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain
his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. Aft er a
thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor
Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level - from
the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent.
A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFPGHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact -Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
EQUAL PROTECTION
Favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. The unequal power relationship between women and
men, the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence, and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women -- all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. These substantial distinctions
are germane to the purpose of preventing violence and abuse against women and
children.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. x x x The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. x x x
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. x x
x All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x R.A. 9262 x x x did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. x x x
xxx
III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all
members.
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case." (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there
is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."
xxx
Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does
not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.
xxx
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained,
the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public,
remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their
political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is
no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
xxx
Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private
vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items(5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates
in elections. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
xxx
On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to
respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and
interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased
relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few
hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as
well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and
jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer
alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation
1-09. x x x
xxx
Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in
the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters," as being violative of the constitutional
proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that this
alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are
proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights , particularly:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the
martial law powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ." (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03,
2012)
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Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid
down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affid avits submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined
by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066,
Search warrants: There must be probable cause the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be searched.
In People v. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066,
2010)
description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was
only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants residence,
consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. (People v. Tuan, G.R.
In a search incident to a lawful arrest, law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the
process cannot be reversed. x x x
xxx
A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears
emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the
conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest. x x x Evidently, what happened in this case was that a search was first undertaken and
then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the search. (Sanchez v.
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception,
unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves
the purpose of protecting the public. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
[T]here could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on
what constitutes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People
v. Chua wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the
latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer
must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
The following are requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine:
1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2) discovery is inadvertent; and 3) object is
immediately apparent. Contraband inside a match box being held by the person
unlawfully arrested, and which was not readily apparent to the police officers
cannot be validly seized under the plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion.
As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not
inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu
was allegedly inside a match box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
68 | P a g e
19, 2014)
69 | P a g e
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information
is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the
case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit,
basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of
these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and
seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa is informative on this
matter.
In People v. Bolasa , an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the
house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When
they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and
woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police
officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects . This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under
any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had
just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any
reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accusedappellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was
no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second,
the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they
saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner,
the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted
first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence
of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal
search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and
emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that
the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should
have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing
search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree and should be excluded. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Airport security searches are valid even without a warrant, because of their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
[T]he prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the
person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final
security check at the airports pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the
contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the
"slightly bulging" item while frisking petitioner.
In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger
during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a
warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting t o board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry -on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There
is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials
or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
xxx
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty
the contents of his pockets upon the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand
while frisking petitioners short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed
under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said provision reads:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall
contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand -carried
luggage(s) are subject t o search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. (Italics in the original)
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People v. Canton where the accused, a
female passenger was frisked at the NAIA after passing through the metal detector booth that
emitted a beeping sound. Since the frisker noticed something bulging at accuseds abdomen,
thighs and genital area, which felt like packages containing rice granules, accused was
subjected to a thorough physical examination inside the ladies room. Three sealed packages
were taken from accuseds body which when submitted for laboratory examination yielded
71 | P a g e
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused was forthwith arrested
and prosecuted for illegal possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Cantons conviction for the crime of illegal possession of s habu, we
ruled that accused-appellant was lawfully arrested without a warrant after being caught in
flagrante delicto. We further held that the scope of a search pursuant to airport security
procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the "T erry search" doctrine. The
more extensive search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of
packages on her body, her apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion
of the frisker that she was hiding something illegal. Thus:
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited
materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply
refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further
search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in
the ladies room was justified under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a valid search
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from
him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioners reluctance to show the contents of his
short pants pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his
nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying
an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. (Sales v. People, G.R. No.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures. x x x
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures. But to fully understand this concept and application for the
purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light
of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti:
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, x x x was in turn derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such,
the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court
and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction .
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States , the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
72 | P a g e
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right
under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No.
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared
that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hos pital
officials infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as
reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or
file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in
his own office while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored
outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable
73 | P a g e
regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their
desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of
privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a
reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials
was reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the search was not
a reasonable search under the fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the
inquiry into the standards governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the
appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the
standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires
balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion. x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must
balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy
against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer
wished to enter an employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors,
who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply
unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants,
supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating
the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the
primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter. x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers
is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide
myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers
were required to have probable cause before they entered an employees desk for the
purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give
the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much
meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related
reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine
inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x
To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers
must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory
reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an
investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an
investigation, they have an interest substantially different from the normal need for law
enforcement. x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies
operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably
suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted
with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or
incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to
law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal
law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the
work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here
would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting
the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than
reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable
damage to the agencys work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
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xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement make the probable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x
for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as
investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related
misconduct, should
be
judged
by
the standard
of
reasonableness under
all
the
circumstances. Under
this
reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:
first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception,
x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of workrelated misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigator y
work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to
the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature
of the [misconduct]. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
xxx
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches
involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test
under which government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation
of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
xxx
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board which involved the
constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses,
have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature
of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within
the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. x x x The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at
bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC
Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its
inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include (1) the
employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control
of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his
privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of
the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together. Thus, where the
employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept
the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and
items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to
prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his
office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his
computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his
friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at
the PALD, he x x x hardly had any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a
paying customer. Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the
aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the
use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:
POLICY
1.
The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service
Commission and may be used only for legitimate business purposes.
2.
Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them
in the performance of their respective jobs.
3.
Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at
any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission
shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall
select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy
in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the
Internet or any other computer network. Usersunderstand that the CSC may use
human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer
Resources .
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The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that
they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes . (Pollo v.
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Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges
against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former
which involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal
files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship
of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and
circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC
MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
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Considering that the appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white
crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid
search and seizure. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)
Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The
accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of leaving
a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there
is an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal
possession of shabu.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the
warrantless search and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest
was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is tempora rily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to
operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended
has committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had jus t committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that
proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the very least
appeared suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the
police officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b)
of Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased
the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the
80 | P a g e
notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle . x x
x The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the
house of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show
that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to
warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu
from her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words, there
was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu.
In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was
being committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to
believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to
be arrested has recently committed the crime.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint
of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime
less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community
where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude
that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers'
observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as
the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting
them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case saw
Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners
as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the
courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the
victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed -the police immediately responded and
had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in
this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
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The arrest of a person who has presented himself before the police station to
clear his name and prove that he is not the accused -- is not valid, as he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang
[P]etitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has pro bable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When
petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an
escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without
a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
FREE SPEECH
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial
challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. This is to
counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may
simply restrain himself from speaking to avoid being charged of a crime.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. x x x
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional
right can raise any constitutional ground absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial"
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights
under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute.
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The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech
that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him
into silence. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. x x x The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. (Southern Hemisphere
Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010; Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560,
November 19, 2001)
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The prohibition on the sending of internet spam under Republic Act (R.A.)
10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) is a violation of freedom of
expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him;
commercial speech is also entitled to protection.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial
electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell,
or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
xxx
355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the
author of the libelous statement or article. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
The law penalizing aiding and abetting the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting" unnecessarily
sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a
chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are
not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful
conduct. Its vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject
to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
xxx
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the
mouse. x x x Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will
be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity.
xxx
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the
internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal
conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether
or not one netizens comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?
xxx
x x x Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom
of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014)
85 | P a g e
(Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)
xxx
We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to
speech "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,"
"foster[ing] informed and civic minded deliberation." On the other hand, commercial speech has
been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." The
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expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. x x
x
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party -list
group.
xxx
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must
be protected by this court. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high." "Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state
to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property.
The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech."
xxx
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content
is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
87 | P a g e
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by noncandidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally
advocacies of a social issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of
election paraphernalia involving speech of persons who are not candidates is valid,
if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided
by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message.
The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it
deeply believes. x x x It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily even
almost incidentally will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. x x x It seeks to effectively
communicate a greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism" "because it tears
down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. x x x
x x x The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of those in the
list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that
further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the
church of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates .
Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive
and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply
exhort the public to vote for a person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate.
For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vot e for [z], Iba
kami sa Makati."
xxx
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must
provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as
to time, place, and manner. x x x
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are
not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which
will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into
speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole,
has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be
provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The
regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the
message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content.
For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the
principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
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Second, x x x the present law x x x if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance
from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2
by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences. (The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when
this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the
Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in
this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the
posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in
the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person
cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in
his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to
what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or
regulation, may do.
Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from
their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the
unconstitutionality of COMELECs interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may
be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELECs
infringement upon petitioners property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to
promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations
must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise property
rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.
x x x Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in seeking
to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an
impermissible encroachments on the right to property. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission
The Comelecs general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to
regulate or limit the speech of the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by
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21, 2015)
5.8. Given the reduction of a candidate's airtime minutes in the New Rules,
petitioner GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for
his political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or
will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his
political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have
27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement
spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.
5.9. With a 20-hour programming per day and considering the limits of a station's
coverage, it will be difficult for 1 advertising spot to make a sensible and feasible
communication to the public, or in political propaganda, to "make known [a candidate's]
qualifications and stand on public issues".
xxx
The Court agrees. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling
state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates
and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. x x x
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates
as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and
relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of
such candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.
Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is arguably the most cost effective medium of
dissemination. Even a slight increase in television exposure can significantly boost a candidate's
popularity, name recall and electability." If that be so, then drastically curtailing the ability of a
candidate to effectively reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his freedom to
speak as a means of connecting with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections,
constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are
presumed invalid.
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment. Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless
of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its validity.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition
is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to
express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property,
and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign
material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of
revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election
offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press
enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of
other rights depends on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press. x x x
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court struck down the COMELECs prohibition against
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that:
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is
not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car , to
convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the
car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a
statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided
that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional
power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted.
However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of
the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions,
furthers an important and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity,
time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. It is further conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said
prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is
absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)
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United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
election surveys partake of the nature of election propaganda. x x x Hence, Section 5.2 of the
Fair Election Acts regulation of published surveys.
We thus proceed to evaluate Resolution No. 9674s requirement of disclosing the names
of subscribers to election surveys in light of the requisites for valid regulation of declarative
speech by private entities in the context of an election campaign:
First, the text of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act supports the inclusion of
subscribers among those persons who "paid for the survey[.]" Thus, Resolution No. 9674 is a
regulation finding basis in statute.
COMELEC correctly points out that in Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, those who
"commissioned" and those who "paid for" the published survey are separated by the disjunctive
term "or." x x x
The second class makes no distinction between those who pay for a specific survey and
those who pay for election surveys in general. Indeed, subscribers do not escape the burden
ofpaying for the component articles comprising a subscription. x x x
Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one
reasonably grounds Resolution No. 9674s inclusion of subscribers to election surveys. Thus,
regardless of whether an intermediate or strict standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes
scrutiny.
It is settled that constitutionally declared principles are a compelling state interest:
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. xxx
[T]he regulation of election surveys effects the constitutional policy, articulated in Article
II, Section 26, and reiterated and affirmed in Article IX-C, Section 4 and Article XIII, Section 26
of the 1987 Constitution, of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"
Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey x x x can be a means
to shape the preference of voters and, thus, the outcome of elections. x x x Accordingly, the
imperative of "fair" elections impels their regulation.
Lastly, Resolution No. 9674 is "narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of fre e
expression" and is "demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object."
While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners publication of election surveys), it
does not go so far as to suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor censorship
specifically aimed at election surveys. The freedom to publish election surveys remains . All
Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the manner of publication, that is,
that the disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those subscribed to,
published election surveys must be made. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections,
regulating the manner of publication, petitioners remain free to publish election surveys.
COMELEC correctly points out that "[t]he disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to,
publication."
In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is neither unduly burdensome nor
onerous. Prior to the promulgation of Resolution No. 9674, survey firms are already understood
to be bound by the requirement to disclose those who commission or pay for published election
surveys. Petitioners have been complying with this without incident since the Fair Election Act
was enacted in 2001. After more than a decade of compliance, it is odd for petitioners to
suddenly assail the disclosure requirement as unduly burdensome or onerous. (Social Weather
The Comelec rule on mandatory right to reply is valid: The Constitution itself
mandates the right to reply. Moreover, radio and TV broadcasting companies do not
own the airwaves but are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. The
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service.
Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides:
SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or
coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published or
aired against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or
radio station which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the
same page or section or in the same time slot as the first statement. x x x
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair
and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply. Given
that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law itself has
weighed in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and the right to reply.
Moreover, as already discussed by the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections .
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals
and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a
franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened
with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.
[T]he constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
The free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices.
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The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form
of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the
state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S.
Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the
power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in
Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution." (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
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programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
x x x The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
xxx
x x x [P]etitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
xxx
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad [party].
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." It is
the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No.
Right to privacy may extend to places where one has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access, such as a business office.
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test should be used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right to privacy. The reasonableness of a
persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v.
Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on
a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding
the case. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
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Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras
be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the AntiWiretapping Law.
xxx
x x x [P]etitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether
they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26,
2013)
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit
its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right
which necessarily accompanies said choice. x x x
xxx
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that her
students, who are the minors Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escuderos students, and that it is reasonable
to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook
friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
xxx
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise,
the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions tha t they utilized
Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected
zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to
the photographs in question. (Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014)
invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College,
2010)
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Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis , the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these
terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in t he investigation
of the enforced disappearance. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of
military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The
identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or
police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial
court erred in granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where
James Balao is detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention or confinement,
and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. Such pronouncement
of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of
evidence. (Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011)
Writ of amparo proceedings do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability. The principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination
of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing
or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been,
in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo:
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.
[A]mparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should
be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are
105 | P a g e
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no
determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions.
a.
15, 2011)
party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. (Vivares v. St.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted.
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
107 | P a g e
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental
right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such
as dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the
act of the police in collecting information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information to a
government body tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP
released information to the government investigating commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the
same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that
act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the
Zearosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs)
in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential
report x x x.
Gamboa [Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte] alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides,and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.
xxx
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly
tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the
PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission. As a result, she claimed
that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified
with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she
prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos
Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c)
rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making
baseless reports.
xxx
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. x x x
108 | P a g e
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths,
take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to
produce documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission
to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the
commission in the performance of its functions.
xxx
[T]he right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may
yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether
the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and
the relevant state interest involved.
xxx
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. x x x
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of [private armed
groups] PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently .
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths,
take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to
produce documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission
to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the
commission in the performance of its functions.
xxx
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.
One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
x x x Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by
the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.
x x x [T]he fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. x x x
xxx
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the
private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
109 | P a g e
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas
data must be denied. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just
and humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons occupy areas
where government infrastructure projects with available funding ar e about to be
implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and
humane manner, RA 7279 commands requires compliance with a prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders. Evictions and demolitions
without any court order under RA 7279 are valid.
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from
evicting the individual petitioners as well as the petitioner associations members from their
dwellings in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon without any court order, and to compel
the respondents to afford them judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279
(RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which authorizes evictions
and demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.
xxx
We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the
necessity of examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of
Sections 1 [due process] and 6 [liberty of abode and of changing the same], Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution. In Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions
and demolitions without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers
colonies on government resettlement projects as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot,
apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA. x x x We further stated that
demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in the
following instances: x x x
We note that Section 10, Article13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural
poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law
and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary
evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when
persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented.
To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner,
paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the
following prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders:
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons orentities at least thirty (30) days prior to the
date of eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas
where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction
or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
110 | P a g e
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from
Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent
otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are
permanent and of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy
the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however,
That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged
and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit
concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government
agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court,
after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should
relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount
equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be
extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
(Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
The constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the
investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal
111 | P a g e
investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify
dismissal. (Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014)
There is no constitutional right to counsel for resource persons in a
congressional inquiry.
The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial
investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings
as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel. (Philcomsat v.
Miranda rights apply even to suspects who voluntarily surrender to the police
and are subjected to questioning.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the
Miranda rights , which require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b)
anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right
to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.
The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include
the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins
"when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements."
It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply when one is "taken into custody by the
police," such as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the
pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently
compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to
undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the
task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by questioning of
persons suspected of felonies. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include
the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law."
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police
officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. (Emphasis supplied) (People v. Chavez,
112 | P a g e
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question,
under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This
right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against selfincrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional
right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed
to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently
fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. (People v.
xxx
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed
reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal
cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513
[1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo,
213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378
Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence ,it has been held that a woman charged with adulte ry may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36
Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to
be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
[1950])28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. x x x
xxx
In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." x x x
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug
case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that
point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was
arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample
was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal
drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
xxx
x x x We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23,
2014)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was
dismissed upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached.
Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent
court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
114 | P a g e
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several
others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the
DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack
of impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.
We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy
never had a chance to attach. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014)
The protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double
jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1)
a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the
first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted
or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In
this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are present
in view of the MeTC Resolution dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to
evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal
Case No. 370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double
jeopardy a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first is present. x x x
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the
information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime
for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
(RPC). The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
xxx
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes
of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the
said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third
requisite for double jeopardy to attacha second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
firstis, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct
nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part
of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special
law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez , the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased else wise, where two different
115 | P a g e
laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate and distinct offenses as
discussed abovethe first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second
against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the
other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an
accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose
from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act
constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a
special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an
obstacle to the prosecution of the other. (Assistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its
dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy
does not attach.
The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule,
the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment,
(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea
entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2)
exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the
case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to
support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in
the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is
lacking, considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the
express consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in
jeopardy with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only
provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must
be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall
under any of the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to
continue the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of
insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the
proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
(Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present
case when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the
full exercise of the rights of an accused person:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. x x x A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its dis cretion in refusing
to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for
clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
116 | P a g e
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at
bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish
probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
x x x [T]he right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right, not part of the
"fundamental and essential requirements" of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and
amplified in GSIS. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The
constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in
preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement
of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the
governments constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. The people have the right to access the papers and
documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder
for a government project.
The peoples right to information is provided in Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used a s
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. (Underscoring supplied.)
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority thus laid down the rule that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order. In addition, Congress has prescribed
other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.
In this case, petitioners first letter dated April 20, 2010 requested for documents such
as Terms of Reference and proposed bids submitted by the bidders. At that time, the bids were
yet to be submitted at the bidding scheduled on April 28, 2010. It is also to be noted that
PSALMs website carried news and updates on the sale of AHEPP, providing important
information on bidding activities and clarifications regarding the terms and conditions of the
Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) to be signed by PSALM and the winning bidder (Buyer).
In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, the Court held that pending the enactment of
an enabling law, the release of information through postings in public bulletin boards and
government websites satisfies the constitutional requirement, thus:
xxx
The Court, however, distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to
permit access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution,
the other aspect of the peoples right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain
access to documents and paper of the particular agency . Moreover, the duty to disclose covers
only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. Such
relief must be granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents and papers
relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a government contract.
Here, petitioners second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for detailed
information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or
responsible officer, office address and Philippine registration. But before PSALM could respond
to the said letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19, 2010. PSALMs letter-reply dated
May 21, 2010 advised petitioners that their letter-re quest was referred to the counsel of KWater. We find such action insufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement and
inconsistent with the policy under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in an
"open and transparent" manner. PSALMs evasive response to the request for information was
unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such as company profile,
names of authorized officers/representatives, financial and technical experience.
Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to allow
petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal
capacity of the winning bidder. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative
Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No.
192088, October 9, 2012)
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose
disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who
violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the
academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and
who may be admitted to study.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent
right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2), Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance
with Section 30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title
VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that
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enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , it was held that concomitant with such
freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent
with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc . and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong, the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high
degree of discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
xxx
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic
freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process
and the 1987 Constitution. x x x
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more
in line with the facts of this case. x x x
xxx
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and
1987. In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire , which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a
university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study . An educational
institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. x x x
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university -student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." x x x In this regard, the Court has
always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the
power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules . In Miriam College
Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere
of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules
and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis
in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty
to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen
ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage
critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to
carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible,
effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom
to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as
well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of
graduation privileges.
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The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation
for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v.
Court of Appeals , We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already
conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution
1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely,
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As
out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given
"a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly
can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
enjoyed
and the
for the
pointed
x x x As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, [PMA] certainly has
the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the
minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's
action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
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