The End of the Mamlk Sultanate: (Why did the Ottomans Spare the Mamlks of Egypt
and Wipe out the Mamlks of Syria?)
Author(s): David Ayalon
Source: Studia Islamica, No. 65 (1987), pp. 125-148
Published by: Maisonneuve & Larose
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595720
Accessed: 01-10-2016 15:04 UTC
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Introductory Remark
Ibn Iyis (1) and Ibn Tiilin (2) about the fate of the Mamlu
immediately follow them; (3) b) the fact that any kind of othe
source material cannot replace them; c) the fact that they wer
not studied sufficiently. Particularly inadequate is their
study against the background of the previous Mamlik regime.
(1) Ibn IyAs, Badd'i" al-Zuhir fi Waqd'i' al-Duhir, Istanbul, 1931, vol. V.
(2) Ibn Tilfin, Mufdkahat al-Khilldn fi HIawddith al-Zamdn, Cairo, 1964,
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to the campaign against Rhodes, is the best proof for their crying
need for this kind of military manpower.
This policy was not, however, without its very grave dangers.
The main problem which the Ottomans had to solve, and quite
quickly, was on what a scale and within which area they can afford
sources the best way to follow the manner in which the Ottomans
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Safawids for the first time, but from the vast preparation
(6) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 39, 11. 7-21. The preparations were not confined to Egypt,
but included Syria as well (Ibn Tfilfin, I, p. 261, 11. 19-21).
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of the Safawids from their crushing defeat, and their reappearance as a major power, challenging and menacing once
again both the MamlRiks and the Ottomans. As early as Safar
922/March 1516, i.e. barely a year and a half after their defeat,
(7) Aleppo was the key point in the Mamlak defensive system, both against
the Safawadis and against the Ottomans. See the references in the following
notes. It continued to be a bastion in the Ottoman defence of Syria against
the Safawids. See below.
(8) Ibn Tilon, I, pp. 316, 11. 11-17, 317, 11. 1-2, 318, 11. 7-9, 328, 11. 2-3,
11. 7-9. Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 118, 11. 16-19, 121, 1. 20 - 122, 1. 8, 144, 1. 23 - 145,
258, 11. 4-5, 257, 11. 8-15, 262, 11. 1-6. No aggressive action on a large scale a
military assistance to the ruler of Bagdad when he was attacked and ousted b
them from his capital (ibid., IV, p. 146, 11. 13-6). A contributory factor to
fear of the Safawids in the Mamlik Sultanate, was that that enemy threate
from the same direction as the Mongols (including Timurlank). A deep seated
dread of the Mongols lasted a long time after their danger had been completely
removed. See e.g. Ibn Tailon, I, p. 252, 11. 20-21; Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 143, 1. 11 144, 1. 1, 227, 1. 17 - 228, 1. 18. It should, however, be stressed here that in spite
of the anxiety and nervousness prevailing in the Mamlik Sultanate in the last
years of its existence there was no feeling that the Mamlfk regime is doomed.
(9) On the evaluation of the victory see Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 401, 11. 4-6, 403, 11. 10-
19; V, pp. 100, 11. 8-11, 350, 11. 1-3. In the last two references the victory over
the Mamliks is added to that over the Safawids. On the versions of the battle
see ibid., pp. 393, 11. 3-11, 396, 11. 4-9, 396, 11. 4-9, 398, 11. 2-16, 400, 1. 5 - 401, 1. 4,
402, 1. 6 - 404, 1. 5. Unlike the Mamlfiks, the Safawids were not wiped out of
existence, because, in addition to their freshness and religious zeal, they were
greatly helped by the vastness of their country, its bad roads and mountainous
terrain, and also by its severe winter. In the actual battles they had no answer
to Ottoman firearms. Their zeal in battles of this kind could only increase their
casualties.
9
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await the outcome of the struggle, "for whichever of the two will defeat his adversary,
will inevitably march against our realm" (fa-inna kulla manintasara minhumd
'al& gharimihi ld budda an gazhaf 'al& bilddind) (ibid., V, pp. 20, 1. 18 - 21, 1. 17).
On the exchange of diplomatic envoys between the Safawids and the Mamlaks,
and the arrogance and haughtiness of the Safawids see: Ibn Iyhs, IV, pp. 123,
11. 14-18, 184, 11. 15-17, 207, 11. 18-23, 218, 1. 23-220, 1. 1, 220, 1. 17 - 221, 1. 20,265,
11. 6-18, 266, 11. 1-10, 271, 11. 7-14; V, p. 33, 11. 19-23; Ibn Tfilfin, I, pp. 354, 11.14-15,
257, 11. 3-12, 18-19.
(11) That the advance of the Safawid army in Northern Mesopotamia was very
real, can be deduced from the fact that "numerous Ottomans", including the
Viceroys of Amid and al-Ruhd, together with their retinues, arrived in Damascus
in Rabi' I 923/March 1517, after having fled from that army (Ibn Talfin, II, p. 58,
11. 17-20).
(12) For references to the anxiety caused by the Safawid threat in Egypt and
Syria during Sultan Selim's stay in the area, see: Ibn Iy&s, V, pp. 176, 11. 12-18,
182, 11. 2-7; Ibn TTalin, II, pp. 74, 11. 14-18, 74, 1. 19 - 75, 1. 2.
(13) Ibid., p. 79, 11. 16-21.
(14) Ibid., p. 82, 11. 8-11.
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of
attack was considered to have been, can be learnt from the fact
that in Jumidd II/June of that year prayers and recitals of the
Safawid. (16) In the rest of the period under study fear of the
Safawids did not, in any way, subside. (17)
Had the Safawid front been the only one with which the
Ottomans had to cope, they would have had little reason for
real concern, for they had military and technical superiority
which the Safawids never had a chance to context. But the
write in his name to the Kings of the Franks and suggest to them
(15) Ibn Iyfs, V, pp. 243, 11. 1-20, 247, 11. 21-23, 248, 1. 12 - 249, 1. 9. See also
(18) Ibn Iyfis, IV, pp. 191, 11. 4-9, 205, 11. 9-18.
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132
DAVID
the
AYALON
Safawids.
(19)
The
way
unprecedented
longer
hostile
expansion,
frontiers,
but
the
various
provinces
of
th
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of the sea, or of great parts of the shore, would not have had
such a decisive effect on the hinterland and on the big inland
cities. The mountainous character of the country, together
made the rule over that country far more difficult than over
in that country. There was a vast contiguous territory inhabited by Turkomans, which stretched deeply into Eastern
Anatolia, North Western Iran and Northern Syria. (24) Now,
(21) It is obvious that only the inhabited, cultivated and cultivable land of
Egypt is intended in this statement.
(22) On the position of Egypt and Syria vis-d-vis an external naval power, see
my "The Mamlfiks and Naval Power", Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences and
Humanities, vol. I, Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 10-11, and note 5 on p. 10. See also
"Egypt as a Dominant Factor, etc.", op. cit., pp. 35-36.
(23) During the Ottoman reign an important centre of power gradually came
into being in Upper Egypt, but this belongs to a later period (see "Egypt as a
(24) In Northern Syria the Turcomans must have constituted a decisive factor
over a very big region in the closing decades of the Mamlik reign. According
to an eyewitness evidence from QA'itb&y's Sultanate the dominant language from
Latakia on the Mediterranean shore to al-Bira on the Euphrates was not Arabic,
but Turkish (Abri al-Baq5' Ibn al-Ji'dn, al-Qawl al-Mustaraf ff Safar al-Malik
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within the greatest part of their former realm, thus paving the
way for their attempt to overthrow the Ottomans. It was his
son and successor, Suleyman the Magnificent (926-974/15201566), who, although he greatly improved the position of the
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might also occur. But, on the whole, the pattern was kept
into one, thus leaving in Syria only two provinces instead of the
earlier seven, and handing over the by far bigger of the two to a
Mamlik ! (the province of Aleppo was ruled from the very outset
by an Ottoman BMshi). On top of all that he put the Circassian
(27) Ibn Tfilfin, II, p. 67, 11. 19-21.
(28) Ibn Iyfs, V, p. 378, 11. 20-26.
(29) Ibn Tfilfin, II, p. 82, 11. 4-7. Rumours about the appointment of al-
Ghaz5li as viceroy started circulating about a month before it actually took place
(ibid., p. 78, 1. 11). Sultan Selim left Damascus on the 10th of Safar/February 21,
1518 (ibid., p. 82, 1. 17).
(30) "The Muslims City, etc.", pp. 328-329; "Egypt as a Dominant Factor",
pp. 34-35.
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136
DAVID
AYALON
MamlGks,
who
still
remaine
diction
of the
new
MamlGk
viceroy
! (wa-ad.fa
al-Jarakisa...
ilayhi). (31)
There
might
well be
yet another
factoramr
which
could
tempt the new viceroy to raise the banner of rebellion against
the Ottomans at the first opportunity. From the inadequate
information at our disposal it would appear that Sultan Selim
did not leave behind in Damascus as strong a contingent of
Ottoman soldiers as he did in Cairo. (32) What might corroborate that suggestion is that even during the rebellion the
existence of such a contingent is not mentioned in the sources
used in this paper. But only further study will give the correct
answer to this question.
Thus, within less than a year since the complete conquest of
the Mamlik Sultanate, and as a direct result of Sultan Selim's
outcome.
Mamlilk institutions and Mamltik way of life over all the terr
loyalty to the Ottomans, many of their institutions and innovations, in spite of the vehement opposition of the Chief QdlT
Syria under one governorship might have been the great size of the Ottoman Empire, which necessitated bigger administrative units than those of Mamlfk Syria.
However, this meant ignoring the particular local conditions, especially within a
policy of appointing Mamlaks as viceroys of most of the area of the defunct
Sultanate and of sparing the Mamlik society.
(32) For the Ottoman contingent left by Sultan Selim in Egypt, see my article
in the Bernard Lewis Festschrift.
(33)new
Ibn rulers,
al-Farfilr,
a Shrfi'ite
the Mamliks,
turned
.Hanafite,
the madhhab
of the
immediately
afterunder
the Ottoman
conquest.
This was
undoubtedly
the reason for his excessive pro-Ottoman zeal.
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clear in the above evidence of Ibn TUilfin is, that had al-Ghazili
been in Damascus on the arrival of the Ottoman emissaries, he
would have started his revolt on the very same day. This
11. 3-4. Cp. also Ibn Tailon, II, p. 85, 11. 14-18.
(35) Al-Ghazzi, I, p. 199, 1. 8; Ibn Iyis, V, p. 418, 1. 5.
(36) Ibn Tiliin, II, pp. 123, 1. 11 - 124, 1. 7. On the start of the revolt see also
al-Ghazzi, I, p. 199, 11. 12-15; Ibn Iyis, V, pp. 362, 11. 11-21, 418, 11. 4-6.
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138
DAVID
AYALON
al-Qa'da/November
declaration
letter
of
the
from
7,
nam
revolt,
him
to
his
Kh~y
including
the
commanders
Futih.t
["the father
of Con
People kissed
the ground
in
mentioned in the Friday s
mosque and in the other pulpits of Damascus. When he
would have been better for him, for the army of the Circassian
Mamlfiks and the people of Egypt (ahl Misr) and all the
(39) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 418, 11. 5-15. Al-Ghazili failed in his attempt to capture
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that they would fight him only if he attacked Egypt. (43) This
declaration never had to be put to the test, because al-GhazMli
was not given the opportunity to attack the land of the Nile.
cavalry.
Its commander-in-chief
wasviceroy
Farh.t of
B shM
the Third
Vizir.
Other
commanders were the
Aleppo,
and,
very significantly, as we shall explain later, Ibn Siw~r, the
(44) True, Sultan Suleyman wrote to Khiyrbak shortly before the decisive
battle against al-Ghazili that there is no need for the participation of the Egyptian
army in quelling the rebellion (ibid., p. 371, 11. 20-21). This, however, does not
alter the fact that all Khiyrbak's attempts to induce the Ottoman units to march
against al-Ghazlli ended in failure. One consideration of Sultan Suleyman for
not using the Ottoman units stationed in Egypt against al-Ghazill, might have
been his fear that denuding that country from those units might tempt the Circassians
of Egypt to revolt. He certainly could not rely on those Circassians in his plan to
crush al-Ghazlli.
(45) Ibn lyds, V, pp. 376, 1. 20 - 377, 1. 10. Al-Ghazzi, I, pp. 170, 1. 6 - 171,
1. 8. G. W. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574, The University
of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1942, pp. 75-76. Al-Ghazzi gives a slightly
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learnt that Ibn Siwdr became the ally of the Safawid ruler,
corresponded with him with the intent of conducting subve
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all this was not sufficient to make them trustworthy in the eyes
threat was his chief preoccupation. His first and only instruc-
dog against the same enemy, could not have been overlooked by
the new Shi'ite power. It should also be remembered, that the
first objective of al-Ghazdli, after having secured Damascus, was
to capture Aleppo, the very town which Selim took such care to
"Mamliks".
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142
DAVID
AYALON
Suleyman
he
gave
arrived
Christian
in
him
the
Sha'bdn
Greek,
soon
Vice
929/
decide
the
Safawids
and
Frankis
caused
sufficient
trou
Yet
he
was
928/early
not
dismissed.
October
1522),
ho
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defeat over the greatest part of their former realm is the best
proof for the urgency of the Ottomans' need for that kind of
have misled the new rulers to believe that the Mamltiks could
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144
on
DAVID
the
AYALON
threshold
Egypt
as
well.
of
the
Saf
Therefore,
from
the
Shiite
territ
much
headache
occupation.
to
their
APPENDIX A
A Note on
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offer to a newcomer?
the Ottomans", JESHO, vol. III (1960), pp. 148-174, 275-325, and "Mam
10
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the local chronicle. Yet they can never serve as a real sub-
stitute to it.
(55) See also my "The Historian al-Jabarti and his Background", BSOAS,
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years shorter than the period covered by Ibn Iyas (it ends in
Dhti al-Qa'da 926/end of October 1520). However, it begins
well before the Ottoman conquest, and the information it does
contain is of a high quality. In combination with the account
of Ibn Iy~s, which often transcends the boundaries of Egypt,
we can learn from it a lot about Ottoman Syria, and about more
APPENDIX B
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148
DAVID
AYALON
secret." (57)
David AYALON
(Jerusalem)
(57) Ibid., p. 483, 11. 8-15.
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