SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE
T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1] dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court[3] dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private
respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the
States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program.
The facts follow.
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat,
Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With
leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered
tenants of the land.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents,
ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00)
per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located
at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied
by the trial court in its Order[5] dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did
not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not
tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the
assailed Decision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6] citing
excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two
affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a
notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake. [7] The affidavit of Land Banks
counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for
Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch
48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing [8] due to his heavy
workload.
The trial court, in its Order[9] of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief
because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.
In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to
include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence
and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly
meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was
erroneous.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the
reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus
failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination
of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial
court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in
1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition
in 1972.
Private respondents filed a Comment[10] dated February 22, 1997, averring that
Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due
merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro
forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of
Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the
intricate art and technique of pleading.
Land Bank filed a Reply[11] dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations
demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[12] Both parties complied.[13]
The petition is unmeritorious.
At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes
excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.

Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against.[14]
Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks
counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for
reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.
Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for
Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch
48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his
arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable
negligence.
The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed
by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the intricate art and
technique of pleading.[15]
Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but
a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much
less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. [16] The trial court therefore correctly
considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for
denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate
the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the
rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we
never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable
merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by,
rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and
rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17]
Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other
issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration
of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial
court.
The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private
respondents did write a letter[18] to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation
summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a
conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left
unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[19] we declared that
there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional
trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers
to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. [20]
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of
just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation
should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of
possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang,
Manila v. Court of Appeals, [21] we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take
place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just
compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) [22] before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD
27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche.[23]
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and

the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the
just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.[24]
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents
for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This
Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just
compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her G.R. No. 170220
capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO
C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY
TAEDO and EMILIO A.M.

SUNTAY III,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 20, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October
27, 2005 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated
its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339
and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2] of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)[3] of the Registry of
Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682
hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(1972)[4] and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).[5] The land was thereafter subdivided and
distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP
fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in
favor of Lubrica.

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from
Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128[6] of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro,
consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an
area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of
P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at
P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination
of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation
at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the
128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).[7]
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions[8] for
judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339
for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46
thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988)[9] and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP
deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10] granting petitioners motion, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I
(LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16
(e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of
1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in
cash and bonds, as follows:
1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the
amount received by the Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount
of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.

Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within
five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her
compliance within such period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.
SO ORDERED.[11]
LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution [12] dated May 26, 2003. The
following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order [13] directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco,
LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.
Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]
On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order [15] and
on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.[16]
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [17] in favor of the petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order
dated March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27,
2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is
hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts
provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a
deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no
reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of
the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Amended Decision,[19] the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of

Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to
effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant
Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is
hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and
acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of
Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic)
commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated
agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed
(sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.
SO ORDERED.[20]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the
preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously
computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21] it held that the formula to compute
the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government
Support Price.Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the
corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal
taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were
effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the
Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the
prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment,
instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in
1972.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C.
NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and[22]
B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.[23]

Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the
expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that
the value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24] the Court ruled thus:
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of
agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo
just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and
not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the
President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the
landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take
effect on the payment of just compensation.
The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the President v. Court of
Appeals[25] that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D.
No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation
judicially determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the
effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.
[26]

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to
receive the just compensation therefor.The parcels of land were already subdivided and
distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their
use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to
compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the
time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their
names.Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which,
under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners. [27] The
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.[28]

Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform[29] is instructive, thus:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenantfarmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as
of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. x x x
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank.Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under
P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just
compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No.
6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.[30]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[31] we held that:
RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall
acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and
distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be

finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just
compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as
the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.[32]
Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada [33] that the above provision
was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:
Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market
Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet
received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is
important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.[34]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent
Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the
PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and
(c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation
Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian
Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned
formula.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO

L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO
F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on
October 6, 1995[1], petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration contending
mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of
the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act
6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of
the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of
the final valuation of their properties.
Petitioner DAR maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of
Republic Act 6657, absent any specific indication, may either be general or special,
regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known in law,
and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." [2]
We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in
limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners,
that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x" (Italics
supplied)
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. [3] Thus, recourse to any rule which
allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of R.A.
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. As we
have previously declared, the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted,
and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. [4] Administrative regulations must always
be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.[5]
The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners
and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to
accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains
in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the
landowners.[6] Additionally, it is argued that the release of the amount deposited in trust
prior to the final determination of the just compensation would be premature and expose
the government to unnecessary risks and disadvantages, citing the possibility that the
government may subsequently decide to abandon or withdraw from the coverage of the
CARP certain portions of the properties that it has already acquired, through
supervening administrative determination that the subject land falls under the exempt
category, or by subsequent legislation allowing additional exemptions from the
coverage, or even the total scrapping of the program itself. Force majeure is also
contemplated in view of the devastation suffered by Central Luzon de to lahar.Petitioner
DAR maintains that under these conditions, the government will be forced to institute
numerous actions for the recovery of the amounts that it has already paid in advance to
the rejecting landowners.[7]
We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private
property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation
where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow
it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be
paid for the expropriated property. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to
the hilt, but subject however to the limitation that he can only be entitled to a "just
compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR,
the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to
affirm the withholding of the release of the offered compensation despite depriving the
landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the
latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.
Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory
as it would discourage owners of private lands from contesting the offered valuation of

the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for fear of the hardships that could result from
long delays in the resolution of their cases. This is contrary to the rules of fair play
because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. [8] It is significant to note
that despite petitioner's objections to the immediate release of the rejected
compensation, petitioner LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners,
has nevertheless allowed partial withdrawal through LBP Executive Order No. 003,
[9]
limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash proceeds. This is a clear confirmation that
petitioners themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners' immediate access
to the offered compensation despite rejecting its valuation. But the effort, though
laudable, still falls short because the release of the amount was unexplainably limited to
only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected offer, notwithstanding that
the rejecting landowner's property is taken in its entirety. The apprehension against the
total release of the rejected compensation is discounted since the government's interest
is amply protected under the aforementioned payment scheme because among the
conditions already imposed is that the landowner must execute a Deed of Conditional
Transfer for the subject property.[10]
Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will
be unnecessarily exposed if immediate withdrawal of the rejected compensation is
allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial evidence to support the
same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow
the taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them empty handed
by withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether
or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to subsequently decide to
abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered
useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain
that must never be sanctioned.Legislations in pursuit of the agrarian reform program are
not mere overnight creations but were the result of long exhaustive studies and even
heated debates. In implementation of the program, much is therefore expected from the
government. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the
implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted
legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' motions for reconsideration are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

SAMUEL
ESTRIBILLO,
CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.,
RONGIE
D.
AGUILAR,
TACIANA
D.
AGUILAR,
ARTEMIO
G.
DE
JUAN,
ESTANISLAO
DELA
CRUZ,
SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO
ERIBAL,
REYNALDO
C.
ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA,
RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL
JAMANDRE,
HILARION
V.
LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ,
TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E.
NASTOR,
NELSON
L.
NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA,
ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T.
PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA,
FERNANDO
C.
RUFINO,
PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO
S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE
VIBO,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 159674

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM

and

HACIENDA

MARIA, INC.,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

June 30, 2006

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the
Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January
2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients

of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located
atBarangay Angas,
Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur,
with
their
respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers
presented below:

Petitioners

TCT/EP Nos.

Areas
(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO

TCT No. T-287/EP No. A037675

1.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A037814

2.0000
0.1565

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-913/EP No. A027295

3.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-944/EP No. A027296

4.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN

TCT No. T-302/EP No. A037809

3.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.

TCT No. T-290/EP No. A035676

3.1437

7. EDGAR DUENAS

TCT No. T-949/EP No. A037658

4.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL

TCT No. T-952/EP No. A037836

2.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA

TCT No. T-950/EP No. A037844

2.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO

TCT No. T-928/EP No. A037873

1.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE

TCT No. T-909/EP No. A159348

2.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA

TCT No. T-288/EP No. A037674

4.5526
0.4579

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ

TCT No. T-973/EP No. A037840

4.4939

14. TERESITA NACION

TCT No. T-900/EP No. A037849

2.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR

TCT No. T-825/EP No. A037829

3.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLAS

TCT No. T-396/EP No. A037826

2.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIA

TCT No. T-910/EP No. A037673

1.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIO

TCT No. T-912/EP No. A037860

6.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA

TCT No. T-914/EP No. A037830

2.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO

TCT No. T-923/EP No. A037848

4.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAIN

TCT No. T-954/EP No. A037813

4.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and

TCT No. T-891/EP No. A037880

3.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBO

TCT No. T-893/EP No. A037827

1.3185[2]

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are
the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels
of
land
also
located
at Barangay Angas,
Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP
numbers identified as follows:

(Deceased) Registered
Owners

TCT/EP Nos.

Areas
(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA

TCT No. T-920/EP No. A037832

4.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIO

TCT No. T-929/EP No. A037861

3.0078[3]

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in

this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have
been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other
persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same
were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the

Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of
which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three
parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Lot No.

Area
(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls 4

28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls 4

11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls 4

487.47

TOTAL

527.83[4]

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 [5] was issued

mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that

527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the
coverage
of
Operation
Land
Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other
occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and
1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and
the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all

relevant proceedings, including the determination of the Average
Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land
Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and
Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308
hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights

in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was registered
with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT
No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the

entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of

Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted

and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and
EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian

Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions
seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings
covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was
not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted,
and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions,
which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the
EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been
awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the
other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite
claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not
devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a

Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void
the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered
was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any
established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when
Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The
Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the
Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were
ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department

of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed

the RARAD Decision.

After
the
DARAB
denied
petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued
the following assailed Resolution:

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and

Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel
A.Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding
Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners
authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition

necessarily DISMISSED.[6]

is DENIED

DUE

COURSE and

Petitioners
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for
the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to
Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed
Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution

promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for
certiorari.

We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution

sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that

their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be

justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special

circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum
shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at
bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the

Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which
stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving
strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by
the party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping

was executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners,
such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby
rendering the petition fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended states:

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements

shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal
basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover,
granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed
could cure the petitions defect, the requirement of personal knowledge
of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other
petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[7]

foregoing,

Petitioners now file this present

there had been compliance with Rule
Rules of Civil Procedure. They further
that the EPs are ordinary titles which
year after their registration.

the

Motion

for

Petition contending that

7, Section 5 of the 1997
reiterate their argument
become indefeasible one

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners have sufficiently

complied with Rule 7, Section 5
of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
concerning
the
Certification Against Forum
shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was

preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the
rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals
and agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7,
Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or

principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 was designed x x x to promote

and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible.[8] Technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate, justice. [9] The same guidelines should still
apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and

Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase
plaintiff or principal party who is required to certify under oath the
matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held
in Mendigorin v. Cabantog[10] and Escorpizo v.
University
[11]
of Baguio
that the certification of non-forum shopping must be
signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only
by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[12] we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the

external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of non-forum
shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and
not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do
so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for
the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly

conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[13] where
this Court ruled that:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification

was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant
case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is
defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or
principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not
commenced any action involving the same issues in any court,
etc. Only
petitioner
Din,
the
Vice-Mayor
of
San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no
showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the
latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that
petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his copetitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or
pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a

matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation

contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must
show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five

petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman
charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the
above declaration at the outset was made together with a
determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the
Petition.[14] There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the
unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of
Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence
the remark by this Court that [p]etitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. In the present
petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who
reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they
reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for
hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the
absence of convenient means of transportation.Their houses are
located far apart from each other and the mode of
transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of
them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers
(who are members of a non-government organization engaged in
development work) are based in Quezon City who started
assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in
1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB
level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading,
Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel
to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very
meager
resources
of
their
farmers
organization,
the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekono
mikanhong Kalambuan(KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was

dismissed, petitioners counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried

earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when
the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named
petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some could
not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily
residing in other towns, while some already died because of old
age.[15] Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not
participate, and are not parties to this petition.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special

circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation
of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not
present in the case at bar, [16] without discussing the
circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that
the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should
still be determined whether there are special circumstances that
would justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning
verification and certification against forum shopping, such as
those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission,[17] the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a
certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not
contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the
Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in
their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in
this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we
explained that:

[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it

was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretarys certificate

that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to

represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the
certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board
resolution attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration before the
appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial
compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the
prescribed procedural requirements.

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than

frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at
the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural
rules areintended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and
a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to
attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is
the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and
Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA
484].

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[18] the authority

of petitioners resident manager to sign the certification against
forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after
the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for
Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days
before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum

shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the
filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the
required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are

unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a

petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has

allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing
of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as
substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the
filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the
petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys
petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy
submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping
certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring
verification and certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be

considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify
tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. Moreover,
in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy,
the
Court
excusednon-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized
to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on
behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the

certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the
requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forumshopping.Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an
even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[19] we, likewise,

considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the
case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our
rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the

certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the
Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were
special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict
application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the
apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x

There were even cases where we held that there was

complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the
merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,[20] petitioners raised in their Petition
for Review the allowance of respondents Appeal Brief which did
not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held
therein that:

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum

shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition
of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of
respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their
claim.Indeed, it has been held that [i]t is within the inherent power of
the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do
justice.

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21] the

non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle of social
justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their
respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not
correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the
petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural
lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright
dismissal of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions
on their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and
capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way
of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations
of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result
would be detrimental to the working woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the

sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would
be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice
considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be
heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued

pursuant
to
Emancipation
Patents are as indefeasible
asTCTs issued in registration
proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible

upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The
DARAB, however, ruled that the EP is a title issued through the
agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance,
correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR).Hence, it is not the same as or in the same
category of a Torrens title.

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22] provides that

certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an

administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the
instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No.

141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D.
1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent
is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility.Nevertheless,
the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal
that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D.
1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by
the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in

accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore,

corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary
registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied
for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the
land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance
with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a
family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and
cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the
title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected
to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with
the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and
suspicion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural
lands pursuant to the Land for the Landless policy of the State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the

distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would
arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be
subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued
in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential
Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant
thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof.
Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land

Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be
construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into
the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements
thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted
to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands,
duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the
signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.[23]

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105

of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the

corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenantfarmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No.
27), [24] the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire
the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no
longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it
be decreed to another person.[25]

As
we
held
through
in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.[26]:

Justice

J.B.L.

Reyes

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and

the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue
thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in
Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one
year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership

Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system
of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Chapter IX[27] on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs

and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as

certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of

indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already
raised before the RARAD.[28]
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to
have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the Republic
Act No. 6657,[29] with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being
issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian
reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the
expenditure of more time and resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for

cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661,
and more than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs to the
farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a
substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the
disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No.
6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27. [30] This is further
proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:

(i)

HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action

to oust petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;

(ii)

HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed

property from 1972 onwards and never protested
petitioners act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii)

HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares,

signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the

area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented

to be rice and corn lands;
(iv)

HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after

executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the
corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are
hereby declared VALID andSUBSISTING:

Original Grantees

TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO

TCT No. T-287/EP No. A037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A037814

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-913/EP No. A027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-944/EP No. A027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,

TCT No. T-302/EP No. A037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.

TCT No. T-290/EP No. A035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS

TCT No. T-949/EP No. A037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL

TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-

037836
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA

TCT No. T-950/EP No. A037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO

TCT No. T-928/EP No. A037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE

TCT No. T-909/EP No. A159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA

TCT No. T-288/EP No. A037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ

TCT No. T-973/EP No. A037840

14. TERESITA NACION

TCT No. T-900/EP No. A037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR

TCT No. T-825/EP No. A037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS

TCT No. T-396/EP No. A037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIA

TCT No. T-910/EP No. A037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIO

TCT No. T-912/EP No. A037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA

TCT No. T-914/EP No. A037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO

TCT No. T-923/EP No. A037848

21. PATERNO P. SAIN

TCT No. T-954/EP No. A037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON

TCT No. T-891/EP No. A037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO

TCT No. T-893/EP No. A037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA

TCT No. T-920/EP No. A037832

25. RAFAEL PATIO

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairman

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached

in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice