ISIS

War On
Terror
- Omkar H. Thakur
Roll. No. 99

ISIS A War on Terror

Introduction:The Sunni militants who now threaten to take over Iraq seemed
to spring from nowhere when they stormed Mosul in early June.
But the group that recently renamed itself simply the Islamic
State has existed under various names and in various shapes
since the early 1990s. And its story is the story of how modern
terrorism has evolved, from a political and religious ideal into a
death cult.
To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria why it
exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of
which the Paris attacks are only the latest you need to
understand the tangled story of how it came to be.

The Early Days (1989-1999):The group began more than two decades ago as a fervid
fantasy in the mind of a Jordanian named Abu Musab alZarqawi. A onetime street thug, he arrived in Afghanistan as a
mujahideen wannabe in 1989, too late to fight the Soviet Union.
He went back home to Jordan, and remained a fringe figure in
the international violent jihad for much of the following
decade. He returned to Afghanistan to set up a training camp
for terrorists, and met Osama bin Laden in 1999, but chose not
to join al-Qaeda.
The fall of the Taliban in 2001 forced Zarqawi to flee to Iraq.
There his presence went largely unnoticed until the Bush

administration used it as evidence that al-Qaeda was in

cahoots with Saddam Hussein. In reality, though, Zarqawi was a
free agent, looking to create his own terror organization.
Shortly after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, he set up the
forerunner to todays Islamic State: Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
(the Party of Monotheism and Jihad), which was made up
mostly of non-Iraqis.

Although Zarqawis rhetoric was similar to bin Ladens, his

targets were quite different. From the start, Zarqawi directed
his malevolence at fellow Muslims, especially Iraqs majority
Shiite population. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda regarded the Shiites
as heretics, but rarely targeted them for slaughter.
Zarqawis intentions were underlined with the bombing of the
Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, the holiest place of Shiite worship in
Iraq. Many survivors asked, Why us? Why, when there are so
many Americans around, bomb us?
One reason: sheer convenience. The Shiites were easier targets
because they didnt yet have the ability to fight back. But there
was also a political calculation. After Saddam was toppled,
Shiite politicians replaced the Sunnis who had long dominated
power structures in Iraq. Zarqawi was counting on Sunni
resentment against the Shiites to build alliances and find safe
haven for his group. It worked: Zarqawi sent dozens of suicide
bombers to blow themselves up in mosques, schools, cafes,
and markets, usually in predominantly Shiite neighbourhoods or
towns.

AQI The rise and fall (2003-2009):By 2004, Zarqawis campaign of suicide bombings across Iraq
had made him a superstar of the international jihadi
movement, and won the endorsement of bin Laden himself.

Zarqawi now joined his group to bin Ladens, rebranding it

Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI.

al-

Soon, however, Zarqawis targeting of civilians created

misgivings among the core al-Qaeda leadership. In 2005, bin
Ladens right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote a letter
chiding the Jordanian for his tactics. Zarqawi paid it no heed.
By the spring of 2006, Zarqawi was beginning to see himself as
something more than an emir or insurgent commander: He
aspired to spiritual leadership as well. (His successor as emir,
Baghdadi, would make the same transformation, appointing
himself caliph after taking Mosul.)
No longer content merely with alliances, he began to insist that
his Iraqi Sunni hosts submit to his harsh interpretation of sharia
lawveils for women, beheadings for criminals, and the whole
nine yards. Those who resisted, even prominent figures in the
community, were executed.
But Zarqawis ambitions were cut short in June, 2006, when the
U.S. Air Force dropped a pair of 500-pound bombs on his
hideout, 20 miles north of Baghdad.
His death came just as the tide was turning against AQI. Many
Sunni tribes, chafing at Zarqawis sharia rules, had begun to
fight back. The U.S. military, led by General David Petraeus,
capitalized on this to finance and support an insurgency-withinan-insurgency, known as the Awakening. Tribesmen willing to
fight AQI, even if they had previously fought the Americans,
were designated Sons of Iraq, to underscore the fact that
most of AQIs commanders were foreigners, like Zarqawi
himself. These Iraqi Sunnis believed that joining forces with the
U.S. would give them immunity from prosecution from previous
crimes, lucrative government contracts to rebuild devastated
Sunni areas, and a share of political power in Baghdad.

Petraeuss Awakening campaign was accompanied by a surge

of U.S. troops, and it worked up to a point. Demoralized by
the loss of Zarqawi, AQIs foreign cadres melted away. But
Petraeuss plan was designed mainly to reduce the violence
and allow the U.S. to leave Iraq, not to repair the Shiite-Sunni
rift that Zarqawi had opened up. American politicians and
military commanders talked of creating a space for political
dialogue between the two groups, but the effort to enable that
dialogue was, at best, desultory. It was left to Iraqs elected
government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to make a
lasting peace.
As the U.S. discovered, Maliki and his Shiite-led governing
coalition were more interested in recrimination than
reconciliation. The Sons of Iraq were denied salaries they had
been promised.
Meanwhile, Maliki filled the ranks of Iraqi police and military
with Shiites, some of them partisans from militias that had
previously killed Sunnis. Sunni resentment now bubbled up
again, setting the stage for AQIs return.

Countering the Awakening Campaign of Son of

Iraq:After Zarqawis death, AQI announced that his successor would
be Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian bomb maker who had
trained in Afghanistan. Despite some intelligence officials
assumptions that Zarqawis death would cripple the
organization, Masri initially managed to maintain much of the
groups momentum, especially in carrying out attacks that
encouraged sectarian violence.
However, many Iraqi Sunnis continued to criticize AQI for the
foreign presence in its leadership and fighting forces, its
attempts to impose its own radical brand of Islam on Iraqis, and
its use of extreme violence. To brand the group as more Iraqi,

Masri convinced several other groups to merge into his when

he declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI,
although the group also continued to be known as AQI). Masri
installed an Iraqi, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, as the head of the ISI.
This declaration demonstrated that AQI aimed to unify
resistance against the U.S. and coalition forces, gain attention
and support from the global jihadi community, and prepare
governing structures to take control after the U.S. and coalition
withdrawal from the country. These goals were supposed to be
the first step toward creating a caliphate to rule in the Middle
East.

July 2012: The great ISIS prison break begins:There's one chapter of the story of ISIS's rise that very rarely
gets mentioned: its spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi
prisons in 2012 and 2013. These prison breaks supplied it with
a huge infusion of recruits, and also illustrates how effectively
ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi government's weakness.
In July 2012, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement to his
loyalists. "We remind you of your top priority, which is to
release the Muslim prisoners everywhere," he said, "and
making the pursuit, chase, and killing of their butchers from
amongst the judges, detectives, and guards to be on top of the
list."
This was, unambiguously, a call to break former Iraqi insurgents
out of jail and ISIS followed their leader's order. Over the
next year, they attacked a number of prisons across Iraq,
freeing somewhere in the neighbourhood of 1,000 inmates.
People incarcerated for common crimes were also recruited.
Prisoners convicted of criminal charges provide advantages to
the terrorist group, because they could have been recruited
during their incarceration. Even if common criminals were able

to resist jihadist persuasion efforts while in prison, they may

now feel indebted to their 'liberators'.
This won ISIS a rapid infusion of manpower and also
illustrates that well before the 2014 crisis, we had signs that
the Iraqi state was falling apart in a way that would empower
extremists. The ISIS crisis didn't come out of nowhere, in other
words: It was a slow motion disaster with plenty of advance
warning.
With thousands of armed men now at his disposal, Baghdadi
opened a second front against the Shiitesin Syria, where
there was a largely secular uprising against President Bashar alAssad. What mattered to Baghdadi and his propagandists was
that Assad and many of his senior military commanders were
Alawites, members of a Shiite sub-sect. Battle-hardened from
Iraq, ISI was a much more potent fighting force than most of
the secular groups, and fought Assads forces to a standstill in
many areas. Soon, Baghdadi renamed his group the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), reflecting his greater ambitions.
His black flags, emblazoned with the Arabic words for There is
no god but god and the reproduction of what many believe to
be the Prophet Mohammeds seal, became ubiquitous.
ISIs ranks were swelled by former Sons of Iraq, many of whom
had previously been commanders and soldiers in Saddams
military. This gave Baghdadis fighters the air of an army, rather
than a rag-tag militant outfit.

April 2013: ISIS officially becomes ISIS:As all this was happening, Baghdadi's organization was still
named al-Qaeda in Iraq. But Baghdadi worried that Joulani

his commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, the group in Syria was

acting too independently and would quit AQI to make Jabhat alNusra a separate group.
In April 2013, Baghdadi did something dramatic: He asserted
unilateral control over all al-Qaeda operations in both Syria and
Iraq. To demonstrate this change, he renamed AQI "the Islamic
State in Iraq and Greater Syria" or ISIS, for short.
This didn't sit well with Joulani, who appealed to al-Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, who'd never really trusted
AQI, sided with Joulani a decision that Baghdadi rejected. ISIS
and al-Qaeda eventually split, dividing the jihadist movement in
Syria.
This left ISIS to gradually emerge as an autonomous component
within the Syrian conflict. By February 2014, Zawahiri had had
enough. He formally exiled ISIS from al-Qaeda, leading to what
is often describes as "open warfare in Syria" between the
groups.

Condition in Syria:-

Bashar Assad has been president since June 2000 when his
father, the former president, died. He led the Baathist party in
Syria, an ostensibly secular/communist party allied with
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In fact, this party had become
dominated over the years by the Alawite minority group in
Syria (an extreme wing of Shi'a Islam), while Hussein and his
relatives were Sunni. In both nations, the minority groups ruled
the larger majority (of Sunnis in Syria, and Shi'a in Iraq).
In Feb 2011, the first protest was held in the capital asking for
reforms was inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and
Egypt. Further protests against the government spread from
Damascus to Homs and the southern city of Deraa, often after
Friday prayers. These were entirely peaceful marches, but they
were mainly by people from the Sunni majority in Syria. They
were also led by people who supported a secular regime, with
no intent to establish a Sunni religious government.
By mid-March, the regime started responding with violence,
shooting a few protesters, and their funerals became new
protest marches. The protesters started increasingly calling for
democracy in Syria and an end to four decades of "emergency
rule" by decree.
More people were killed at massive protests near the Omari
Mosque. The regime released 260 political prisoners in late
March in attempt to appease the protests, but the protests
continued into April with more police shootings and arrests of
protesters ramping up, including hundreds of arrests in Baida.
After the alleged end to emergency rule on April 21, enormous
protests across 20 towns led to further crackdown.
People were infuriated by continued police killing of protesters,
called more and more for an end to the Assad regime rather
than merely political reforms towards democratic rights.

Deraa was surrounded by tanks in late April with thousands of

troops. Over 250 were killed and hundreds of protesters
arrested in their homes. Food supplies to Deraa were cut off
through May in effort to starve protesters out.
Douma, a poor suburb of Damascus, was also encircled and
political arrests carried out at hundreds of homes.
By early May, Homs was also besieged with police carrying out
waves out house searches and mass arrests. The same pattern
was repeated in other towns and suburbs in May.
The bodies of arrested protesters began to come back to their
families dead, and showing signs of torture -- including horrific
injuries to teenage boys (eyes gouged out, kneecaps broken,
genitals cut off, etc). A video of a 13 year old boy's mutilated
body circulated on YouTube.
Soldiers who refused to fire on protesters began to be executed
by the regime.
It was at this point that some protesters understandably began
to call for armed resistance. This was the start of the entry of
AQI in Syria which was then rebranded as ISIS- Islamic States of
Iraq and Syria to prove to the people of Syria that they were
fighting on behalf of them.

NAME CHANGES:2002: Jama'at Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ). Zarqawis most prominent
force in Iraq, which the U.S. State Department used to refer to
Zarqawis network of militants.
October 2004: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi
Bilad al-Rafidayn in Arabic). Zarqawi formally joined Al Qaeda
and remained in command of the group.
October 2006: Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). The name change was
a rebranding attempt, intended to consolidate existing support,
indicate an increase in groups focus on its governmental
infrastructure, and gain a wider base of local followers. In this
period, it also commonly continued to be known as AQI.
April 2013: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The groups cooperation with AQ
Central and al-Nusra broke down, while its operations expanded
into Syria. The variation in the name in translation stems from
the word al-Sham, which refers to an area spanning Southern
Turkey through Syria to Egypt, which can be translated as
Greater Syria or the Levant.
June 29, 2014: Islamic State (IS). The group declared the
foundation of a Caliphate, with its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
as Caliph. Many media sources continue to refer to the group as
ISIS/ISIL.

War on Terror:In the wake of the Paris terror attacks, President Barack Obama
took some very intense questions about whether the United
States is hitting ISIS hard enough. Was it time to change
strategy? He said no, that the answer was to ramp it up.
A variety of military powers are engaged against ISIS -- the
United States, France, Russia, the United Kingdom -- along with
several Arab nations and the Kurds, who are fighting them in
northern Iraq and Syria.
The United States:The US air force has carried out the majority of air strikes
against IS targets since forming a coalition of Western and
regional powers in August 2014.
President Barack Obama is extremely reluctant to send ground
troops to fight IS after protracted and unpopular wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, but the US does have about 3,500 troops in
Iraq to train the country's armed forces.
The US has also provided weapons and training to "moderate"
Syrian rebel groups, and unconfirmed reports suggest US
special forces have been fighting alongside anti-IS forces in
both Iraq and Syria.
In October US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter signalled a
possible shift in the US campaign against IS, telling reporters
that US forces were prepared to engage in "direct action on the
ground".
Mr Carter did not go into detail about the circumstances under
which the US might carry out ground operations against IS, but
said: "Once we locate them, no target is beyond our reach."

The United States and its coalition partners have targeted ISIS
with 8,216 airstrikes -- 5,383 in Iraq and 2,833 in Syria, through
November 16, the Pentagon says.
Through the end of October, the United States struck ISIS 5,473
times, compared with 1,574 strikes by other countries in the
coalition, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Jordan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
France:France was part of the US-led coalition targeting IS in Iraq from
September 2014. In September 2015 it carried out its first raids
on targets in Syria.
President Francois Hollande vowed to intensify strikes against IS
after the group said it was behind the deadly attacks in Paris of
13 November 2015.
When France hit ISIS after ISIS claimed credit for a terrorist
attack that killed 130 in Paris, it made sure news reports had
detailed information about French jets bombing Raqqa. France
also had bombed ISIS targets even before the Paris attacks.
United Kingdom:The UK parliament voted in December 2015 to extend its
bombing campaign against IS in Iraq to targets in Syria. The
motion to strike targets in Syria was put forward by the
Conservative government and opposed by the Labour leader,
Jeremy Corbyn.
Mr Corbyn urged Labour MPs to vote against the strikes but
allowed them a free vote, and 67 MPs voted in favour. UK
strikes began the night of the vote, with RAF Tornados bombing
an IS-controlled Omar oil fields in eastern Syria.
The UK parliament had in 2013 voted against strikes in Syria. It
approved British air strikes against IS targets in Iraq in
September 2014.

Saudi Arabia:Saudi Arabia is part of US-led military action against IS targets

in Syria.
Riyadh also agreed to a US request to provide a base to train
moderate Syrian rebel forces.
The kingdom has been a key supporter of the rebels, including
hard-line Islamist groups, but it has rejected an Iranian
accusation that it has directly supported IS.
However, wealthy Saudis have sent donations to the group and
some 2,500 Saudi men have travelled to Syria to fight.
The Saudi authorities are concerned that IS will inspire Saudi
jihadists to challenge the monarchy's legitimacy and seek to
overthrow it.
In July 2014, Riyadh deployed 30,000 troops to beef up security
along its border with Iraq, and the following month hosted
Iran's deputy foreign minister as the two regional rivals agreed
to co-operate.
Jordan:Jordan, a staunch US ally, said it had joined the US and several
Gulf Arab states in carrying out air strikes on IS militants in
Syria in September 2014 to "ensure the stability and security"
of its borders.
IS has threatened to "break down" Jordan's borders and the
group enjoys the support of a growing number of people in the
kingdom, some of whom staged demonstrations in the southern
town of Maan in June 2014. More than 2,000 Jordanian citizens
are believed to have travelled to Syria to fight in the past three
years.
Before launching the air strikes on IS, the Jordanian military had
doubled its military presence along the border with Iraq.

The killing of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh, captured by IS

in December 2014, appears to have strengthened the
government's resolve to take on the militants, with King
Abdullah II saying his death would not be in vain and promising
a "severe response".
Iran:Regional Shia power Iran has seen IS - which regards Shia
Muslims as heretics who should be killed - advance to within 25
miles (40km) of its border.
Although Iran stands on the opposite side of much of the
international community over Syria, it has called for cooperation against IS. It has reached out to its rival Saudi Arabia
- the leading Sunni power - and turned a blind eye to US actions
in Iraq, which it has historically opposed.
In Iraq, the Iranians have played a key role in countering IS.
Revolutionary Guards have advised Iraqi security forces, Iranian
pilots have carried out air strikes, and Iranian-backed Shia
militia have been mobilised.
Iraq:The former Shia-dominated government of Nouri Maliki
marginalised Iraq's Sunni community, creating conditions which
helped the extremist Sunni IS come to prominence.
When IS overran the northern city of Mosul in June 2014 before
moving southwards, Mr Maliki requested US air strikes.
However, US President Barack Obama said further military
assistance was dependent on an inclusive government being
formed.
He nevertheless launched air strikes in August 2014 when
thousands of members of the Yazidi religious minority became
trapped on Mount Sinjar.
In September 2014, Mr Maliki stepped aside and a new Iraqi
government was named. The next phase of US assistance will
reportedly involve an intensified effort to train, advice and

equip the Iraqi military, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and Sunni

tribesmen willing to turn against IS.
It is not clear how new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will deal
with the Shia militiamen who have stopped IS reaching
Baghdad. Some have been accused of operating outside of the
state's control and carrying out reprisal attacks against Sunnis.
Syria:Since the start of the uprising against his rule in March 2011,
President Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly warned of the threat
of Islamist extremists to Syria and the wider region.
Western powers initially dismissed Mr Assad's portrayal of his
opponents as "terrorists", but became increasingly concerned
by the rise of IS and al-Qaeda's affiliate, al-Nusra Front.
Although they now acknowledge that IS cannot be beaten
without attacking its strongholds in Syria, Western powers still
want Mr Assad out of power and are reluctant to co-operate
with him.
The Syrian foreign ministry said it was given advance warning
of the US-led air strikes on IS targets on its territory in
September 2014, stating it supported international efforts at
"combating terrorism".
United Arab Emirates:The UAE was reported to have offered its air force to attack IS
positions in Iraq before it participated in the military action in
Syria in September 2014.
It is vehemently opposed to Islamist groups in the region and is
believed to have launched air strikes on Islamist-allied militia in
Libya from bases in Egypt in August 2014.
Qatar:Qatar was another Gulf state to participate in or support the
US-led military action against IS in Syria. The emirate is the

location of Al Udeid Air Base, a highly-classified US facility from

which all attack and surveillance missions in the region are coordinated by US Central Command (CentCom).
The Qatari government has been forced to repeatedly deny
accusations from Iraq's Shia leaders that it provided financial
support to IS. However, wealthy individuals in the emirate are
believed to have made donations and the government has
given money and weapons to hard-line Islamist groups in Syria.
Bahrain:Bahrain has also participated in or supported the US-led
military action against IS in Syria.
The kingdom hosts the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth
Fleet, which is responsible for naval forces in the Gulf, Red Sea,
Arabian Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.
Turkey:Turkey believes that the deadly bombings in the border town of
Suruc, in July 2015, which killed 32 youth activists, and in the
capital Ankara in October, which killed nearly 100, were carried
out by IS.
Turkish jets have carried out attacks on IS positions in Syria,
and the Nato member is allowing US jets to use its southern
Incirlik air base.

Lebanon:Lebanon has become deeply divided by the conflict in Syria,

and has had to deal with an overspill of violence and a huge
influx of refugees.
In August 2014, Syria-based IS fighters raided the border town
of Arsal, killing and kidnapping dozens of Lebanese security
personnel.

Jihadist militants have also carried out a series of deadly

bombings in Beirut and elsewhere. They have mostly targeted
Iranian facilities and Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia Islamist
group whose fighters have played a key role in helping turn the
tide in President Assad's favour.
Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam has warned that the
spread of IS poses "a big test that our destiny depends on". His
country's many religious and political factions have been urged
to put aside their differences to ensure the group does not
establish a foothold.

Mosul Offensive:The Mosul offensive (2016), also called Operation Conquest or

Operation Fatah, refers to an ongoing offensive which started in
the Iraqi province of Nineveh, against ISIL's positions in Mosul
and the surrounding region. The offensive is a joint effort by the
Iraqi government forces with allied militias, Iraqi Kurdistan,
limited US ground forces, and US and allied air support. It is
part of the military intervention against ISIL, with the aim of
pushing ISIL out of the second-largest city of Iraq, Mosul, as
well as the rest of the Nineveh Governorate. The operation
follows the Mosul offensive in 2015, which successfully
recaptured parts of the region northwest of Mosul.

Conclusion:In Summary, the present seminar research paper has discussed

the history of the organization ISIS, the ideology of the

organization, the conditions which gave rise to this organization

and the threat it poses in front of the entire world and also what
the world is doing to counter this threat.
My personal views:People think of ISIS as a terrorist organisation. But the question
which is never answered is whether it is really just a terrorist
organisation?
Well frankly speaking NO!!!
The history clearly shows that the rise of Al-Qaeda was not
because of some religious dispute but because of the foreign
intervention in the Middle East.
The capitalist tendencies of the West as well as the declaration
of war upon Saddam Hussain facilitated Al-Qaeda to open
another branch in Iraq namely
Al-Qaeda in Iraq which then
separated from the original Al-Qaeda and renamed itself ISIS.
Today ISIS is not just a terrorist organization whose aim is to
create fear and disorder amongst people and government
Today ISIS has officially become the Caliphate claiming the
leadership of all the Muslims all over the world. It has taken the
responsibility to lead the Muslim religion to its previous glory. It
aims at freeing the Middle-East from any foreign control (direct
or indirect).
So in conclusion what I feel is that ISIS is not just a terrorist
organization, but it is a social movement turned violent. It is a
revolution to overthrow the foreign control, especially
American, from the Middle East.
This is not just some religious war but it is the classic struggle
between the oppressors and the oppressed. The world is
suffering because of the mistake done by the American
Government.