Kilusan-Olalia v CA 528 S 45 (2007)

FACTS:
facts
the
common
consolidated
to
cases
follows:
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
the
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
certiorari
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
temporary
restraining
order.
During
pendency
of
G.R.
No.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
and
impelling
KILUSANstrike.
OLALIA
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
prompted
NLRC,
which
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
common
consolidated
to
cases
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
and
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
the
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
restraining
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
the
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
follows:
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
common
consolidated
to
cases
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
restraining
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
follows:
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
the
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
and
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
the
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
common
consolidated
to
cases
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
restraining
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
and
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
the
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
the
common
consolidated
to
cases
follows:
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
restraining
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
and
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
the
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
the
common
consolidated
to
cases
follows:
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
and
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
the
regular
employees.
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
restraining
order
issued
77629
is
in
hereby
G.R.
FACTS:
facts
common
consolidated
to
cases
are
as
No.
772629
Department)
Labor
of
(MOLE),
Employment
declared
as
bargaining
exclusive
Kimberlys
employees,
garnered
the
having
votes
in
election.
certification
filed
with
this
Court
a
petition
which
for
G.R.
No.
77629
assailing
of
the
MOLE
the
Order
order.
During
pendency
G.R.
Kimberly
77629,
service
several
employees
refused
to
heed
the
impelling
KILUSANOLALIA
strike.
to
stage
a
injunction
case
with
the
prompted
NLRC,
which
temporary
(TROs).
The
orders
issuance
of
TROs
brought
was
by
again
this
Court
via
petition
certiorari
and
prohibition.
eventually
78791
were
consolidated
by
this
The
portion
dispositive
of
decision
follows:
reads
as
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
77629:
in
G.R.
No.
med-arbiter
in
Case
No.
R04-OD-M-4-15count
challenged
votes,
64
and
that
the
union
number
thereafter
of
votes
declared
be
as
the
duly
representative
regular
KIMBERLY;
KIMBERLY
workers
to
who
pay
have
been
differential
respect
minimum
pay
wage,
allowance,
month
pay,
13th
and
benefits
for
provided
applicable
collective
agreement
time
from
the
regular
the
decision
appealed
which
from,
affected
thereby,
are
AFFIRMED.
The
restraining
order
issued
77629
isemployees.
in
hereby
G.R.

In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v Schwani Inc. 575 S 535 (2008)

Facts:
Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity
incorporated under the laws of California. It is a signatory to the
Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and the
TRIPS Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the restaurant business,
but it has never engaged in business in the Philippines.

Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are

corporations organized in the Philippines. Sometime in 1991,
Sehwani filed with the BPTTT an application for the registration of
the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the letter O formed like a star).
Its application was approved and a certificate of registration was
issued in its name on 1993. In 2000, Sehwani, Incorporated and
Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the
former entitled the latter to use its registered mark, IN N OUT.

Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service

mark applications with the Bureau of Trademarks for the IN-NOUT and IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out
Burger found out that Sehwani, Incorporated had already obtained
Trademark Registration for the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the
letter O formed like a star). Also in 2000, In-N-Out Burger sent a
demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from
claiming ownership of the mark IN-N-OUT and to voluntarily
cancel its trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not accede to InN-Out Burgers demand but it expressed its willingness to surrender
its registration for a consideration.
In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an
administrative complaint against the Sehwani, Inc. and Benita Frites,
Inc. for unfair competition and cancellation of trademark
registration.

10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative

complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property
rights; Provided, That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints
where the total damages claimed are not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided, futher, That availment of
the provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Xxx
Xxx

Issues:
Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an
administrative body) have jurisdiction of cases involving
provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition).[1]
Whether or not there was unfair competition.
Held:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has
jurisdiction in cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair
competition) due to the following reasons:
Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically
identifies the functions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs,
thus:
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Bureau of Legal
Affairs shall have the following functions:
10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration
of marks; cancellation of trademarks; subject to the provisions of
Section 64, cancellation of patents and utility models, and industrial
designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;

(viii) The assessment of damages;

Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the
cancellation of the disputed mark in the name of respondent
Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation of petitioners
intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the
IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or

registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the
suspension of the validity thereof for such period of time as the
Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not
exceed one (1) year;
Xxx

While Section 163 thereof vests in civil courts jurisdiction

over cases of unfair competition, nothing in the said
section states that the regular courts have sole
jurisdiction over unfair competition cases, to the
exclusion of administrative bodies.
Sections 160 and 170, which are also found under Part
III of the Intellectual Property Code, recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction of civil courts and the IPO over
unfair competition cases.
These two provisions read:

Section 160. Right of Foreign Corporation to Sue in Trademark or

Service Mark Enforcement Action. Any foreign national or juridical
person who meets the requirements of Section 3 of this Act and does
not engage in business in the Philippines may bring a civil
oradministrative action hereunder for opposition, cancellation,
infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin and
false description, whether or not it is licensed to do business in the
Philippines under existing laws.
Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative
sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from
two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the
acts mentioned in Section 155, Section168, and Subsection169.1.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal
Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the petitioners administrative
case against respondents and the IPO Director General had
exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment of the IPO
Director of Legal Affairs.

The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1)

confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods and (2)
intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing
similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but
may result from other external factors in the packaging or
presentation of the goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be
inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered
for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The evidence on record shows that Sehwani

Inc. and Benita Frites were not using their registered trademark but
that of In-n-Out Burger. Sehwani and Benita Frites are also giving
their products the general appearance that would likely influence the
purchasers to believe that their products are that of In-N-Out Burger.
The intention to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the
goods as packed and offered for sale, and, thus, an action will lie to
restrain unfair competition. The respondents frauduulent intention to
deceive purchasers is also apparent in their use of the In-N-Out
Burger in business signages.

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Compnay Inc. et.al v

Valdez
GR No. 150107 28Jan2008
Doctrine:

GR: Courts acquire jurisdiction only upon payment of the prescribed

docket fees.
XPN: When the party is authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as
an indigent.

Facts:
Legend: (P): Tokio Marine, a company engaged in the insurance business
and its corporate officers and consultants, (R): Jorge Valdez, former unit
manager of Tokio Marine
1.
2.

3.
4.

1977: Tokio Marine and (R) entered into a Unit Management

Contract.
1998: (R) filed a complaint for damages against (P) before the
RTC alleging that (P) violated terms of the Contract by refusing to
pay him, among others, his commissions and bonuses
a. He prayed that he be awarded the ff:
i. actual damages in the total amount
of P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding
interests;
ii. moral damages of P10,000,000.00;
iii. exemplary
damages
amounting
to P10,000,000.00;
iv. attorneys fees corresponding to 30% of the said
amounts;
v. costs of the suit.
(R): Urgent Ex Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent
Plaintiff

October 28, 1998 RTC Order allowed (R) to litigate as

a pauper and ordered the CoC to accept the complaint for

filing without payment of filing fees computed as...

(P615,672.83) which amount, however, shall constitute a lien upon
any judgment to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
5. (P): Motions to Dismiss
6. (R): manifested that he filed various criminal complaints against
the (P)
7. RTC denied the MtoDismiss
8. (P): Motion for Reconsideration
a. denied
9. (P): filed Answer Ad Cautelam
10. (P): filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction of the order
of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss. PETITION #1
11. CA: directed issuance of a preliminary injunction of the civil case
during the pendency of the petition

12. (R), now 75 years old and sickly, filed before the CA an Urgent
Notice of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private
Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned
Pending Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be
Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence.
13. (P): filed before the CA a petition to cite (R) in contempt of court
for violating the preliminary injunction issued by the CA.
PETITION #2
14. The two petitions were consolidated.
15. The deposition of (R) was taken by a notary public and was filed
by the latter with the CA.
16. The CA dismissed the petitions and lifted and dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction.
17. Hence these two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Petitioners arguments [ISSUES]:
1. CA erred in denying (P)s motions to dismiss (R)s complaint for
non-payment of docket fees (NO)
2. CA erred in not finding that (R) engaged in forum shopping (NO)
3. CA erred in not finding that (R) was guilty of contempt of court
(NO)
Held/Ratio:
1. GR: Courts acquire jurisdiction only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees
a. The exception is Section 21, Rule 3, ROC:
SEC. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action,
claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex
parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has
no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of
docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts of stenographic notes
which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to
the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
xxx

2.

Furthermore, Sec. 19 of Rule 141 of the ROC provides that:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent
litigant (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do

not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an

employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three
hundred thousand pesos (p300,000.00) shall be exempt from the
payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall
execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income abovementioned nor they own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit.
xxx

3.

4.

For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is

not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent
although not a public charge
he has no property or income sufficient for his support aside
from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to
work and in employment.
Given the above Rule, affidavits of members of the (R)s family is
not required. Also, the Supreme Court, as a court of law, will not
examine the sufficiency of the (R)s affidavit that he is an indigent.

Other issues:
1. Forum shopping
a. (R)s Certification of Non-forum Shopping attached to his
complaint is substantial compliance with the Rule.
b. It should also be recalled that he manifested before the
court that he filed several criminal complaints against the
(P).
2. Contempt of court

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court:

such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere
with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during
litigation.
Indirect contempt of court = contumacious acts
perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any
unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.
The ff requisites must be complied with before a person
may be charged with indirect contempt of court:
i. a charge in writing to be filed;
ii. an opportunity for respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court; and
iii. an opportunity to be heard by himself or by
counsel
The aforementioned requisites were complied with and
the CA ruled that the filing of the deposition was done by
the (R) in good faith to clarify such misunderstanding in
the previous depositions.
Moreover, taking the (R)s deposition is not part of the
proceedings of civil case thus, not covered by the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Negros Slashers v Teng 666 S 629

NATURE:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Alvin Teng is a professional basketball player who started
his career as such in the Philippine Basketball Association and then
later on played in the Metropolitan Basketball Association (MBA).
Teng signed a 3-year contract with Laguna Lakers. Before
the expiration of his contract the Lakers traded and/or transferred
Teng to petitioner Negros Slashers.
During the MBA Championship Round for the year 2000
season, Teng exhibited the following behaviors:
On game number 4, Teng had a below-par
playing performance. Because of this, the
coaching staff decided to pull him out of the
game. He then sat on the bench, untied his
shoelaces and donned his practice jersey.
On Game Number 5 - Teng called-in sick and
did not play.Teng was required to explain
writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for his precipitated absence
during the crucial Game 5.
He was also informed that formal investigation would be
conducted which he failed to attend. The investigation proceeded at a
later date.
The management of Negros Slashers came up with a
decision, and through its General Manager, petitioner Rodolfo
Alvarez, wrote12 Teng informing him of his termination from the
team
Teng filed a complaint before the Office of the
Commissioner of the MBA pursuant to the provision of the Uniform
Players Contract which the parties had executed.
Teng also filed an illegal dismissal case with the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter issued a decision finding Tengs dismissal
illegal. It ruled that the penalty of dismissal was not justified since
the grounds relied upon by petitioners did not constitute serious

misconduct or willful disobedience or insubordination that would

call for the extreme penalty of dismissal from service.
This case was appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a
Decision setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
complaint was dismissed for being premature since the arbitration
proceedings before the Commissioner of the MBA were still pending
when Teng filed his complaint for illegal dismissal. Teng filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for being filed beyond
the ten-day reglementary period.
Aggrieved, Teng filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the NLRC Decision. The CA set aside the resolution of the
NLRC and reinstated with modification the Labor Arbiters
Decision. . The CA held that there was no serious misconduct or
willful disobedience or insubordination on Tengs part. Negros
Slashers motion for reconsideration was denied.
Negros Slashers filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari and argued the following:
1) that Teng committed a blatant violation of the rule against
forum shopping; and
2) that Tengs petition for certiorari with the CA should have
been dismissed outright because it was filed beyond the reglementary
period. Petitioners point out that Teng received the NLRC Decision
on October 15, 2004 and therefore had ten days or until October 25,
2004 within which to file a motion for reconsideration. But he filed
his motion for reconsideration only on October 26, 2004 and said
motion was denied on March 21, 2005 for being filed late. Thereafter
he filed his petition for certiorari with the CA on June 20, 2005.
ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to

respondent Tengs petition for certiorari despite its late filing;
(2) whether or not Teng violated the rule on forum shopping
when he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC while a similar complaint was
pending in the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA
HELD:
1)
The Court ruled that the CA did not commit a reversible
error in giving due course to Tengs petition for certiorari although
said petition was filed late. Ordinarily, rules of procedure are strictly
enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system.
However, in not a few instances, they relaxed the rigid application of
the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time
honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all
the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. In that way,
the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.
2)
The Court likewise found no merit in petitioners claim that
respondents act of filing a complaint with the Labor Arbiter while
the same case was pending with the Office of the Commissioner of
the MBA constituted forum shopping.
For forum shopping to exist, it is necessary that (a) there be
identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) there be identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in one action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other action.

Petitioners are correct as to the first two requisites of forum

shopping. First, there is identity of parties involved: Negros Slashers
Inc. and respondent Teng.Second, there is identity of rights
asserted i.e., the right of management to terminate employment and
the right of an employee against illegal termination. However, the
third requisite of forum shopping is missing in this case. Any
judgment or ruling of the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA
will not amount to res judicata.
To clarify, res judicata is defined in jurisprudence as to have four
basic elements: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Here, although contractually authorized to settle disputes, the
Office of the Commissioner of the MBA is not a court of competent
jurisdiction as contemplated by law with respect to the application of
the doctrine of res judicata.At best, the Office of the Commissioner
of the MBA is a private mediator or go-between as agreed upon by
team management and a player in the MBA Players Contract of
Employment.28Any judgment that the Office of the Commissioner of
the MBA may render will not result in a bar for seeking redress in
other legal venues. Hence, respondents action of filing the same
complaint in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC does not
constitute forum shopping.

Digital Microwave Corp. v CA GR 128550 16Mar2000

ISSUE:
whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their successional rights;

Guy v Court of Appeals GR 163707, September 15, 2006

FACTS:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and
Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
(Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting
of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate.
They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy,
son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without
securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of
Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

HELD:
As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid
and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to
a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of
its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and
an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim.Considering that the document did not specifically mention
private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot
be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim.
Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted
by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the
persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and

distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article

1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of
their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant
case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right,
there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived
their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself
has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It
would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary
rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence,
petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must
fail.

accounting, and that a receiver be appointed. As prayed for, Atty.

Joaquin Garaygay was appointed Receiver of the company.

Sy Chin v Court of Appeals GR 136233, November 23, 2000

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 18, 1998
decision of the Court of Appeals which ruled that the SEC acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and annulled its decision dated December
6, 1995 and the Resolution dated July 25, 1997 .
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Sometime in 1952, the brothers Tang Chin, Feliciano Tang,
Ricardo Alonzo a.k.a. Tang Kong Suy, Tang Chin Heng and William
Tang a.k.a. Tang Kong Sia formed a partnership under the name of
Tan Chin Heng & Company. After the death of Tang Chin, Feliciano
Tang and Tang Kong Suy, conflicts arose from their heirs (herein
petitioners) and the surviving partners (private respondents) because
of the companys failure to render an accounting and non-distribution
of profits. In order to settle their differences, the parties agreed
to refer the matter to the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and executed an agreement with respect to the
distribution of properties on n March 11, 1975.
On February 5, 1991, the petitioners filed a petition for
dissolution and liquidation of the partnership with the SEC. The
petitioners prayed that the manager, Tang Chin Heng render an

On February 9, 1993, the Hearing Officer of the SEC rendered a

decision. Based on the report of the Receiver, he affirmed that certain
partnership properties shall be distributed to the partners/heirs in
proportion to their contribution in accordance to the Articles of the
Partnership. The petitioners moved for a partial reconsideration of
the decision. The motion was denied by the hearing officer in an
Order dated August 11, 1993. The petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal but this was not perfected due to their failure to file the
Memorandum on Appeal and to pay the docket fees within the period
provided for by the Revised Rules of Procedure of the SEC.
Consequently, a motion for execution was filed by the private
respondents on October 28, 1993 which was granted by the hearing
officer on January 5, 1995. Petitioners filed an opposition thereto.
Thus, petitioners went up to the Commission En Banc. Private
respondents filed an opposition asserting that the SEC no longer had
jurisdiction over the case considering that the decision of the hearing
officer had already become final and executory.
The SEC, nonetheless, took cognizance of the case and
remanded the case to the department of origin. A Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification was filed by the private respondents
but this was denied by the SEC Commission en banc. A petition
for certiorari was consequently filed with the Court of Appeals
assailing the SEC decision. On August 18, 1998, the CA ruled that
the SEC acted in excess of its jurisdiction. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Hearing Officer to

have granted the respondents motion for a writ of execution on
January 5, 1995 after the petitioners have failed to perfect their
appeal.

RULING: Yes. As can be gleaned from the records, the Decision of

the Hearing Officer rendered on February 9, 1993 to which a timely
motion for partial reconsideration was filed had already become final
and executory for petitioners failure to perfect their appeal to the
SEC en banc. The Court quote the respondent courts finding on this
matter:
The most critical incidents that transpired in the respondent
Commission were these: The SEC Hearing Officer rendered on
February 9, 1993 a decision. However petitioners failed to pay the
docket fee and file a Memorandum on Appeal.
In the light of said rule, it is as clear as a dew that the appeal to the
SEC en banc was not perfected and resultantly, the Decision of
February 9, 1993 has become final and executory. There was,
therefore, nothing for the SEC en banc to review. The latter
implicitly conceded that the appeal was not perfected but it
nonetheless took cognizance of it upon the justification that the same
can be treated as a direct attack against the orders of the hearing
officer, the purpose of which is to annul the same.
Secs. 1 and 2, Rule XV of the SEC requires a verified petition and
the payment of a docket fee. In the case at bench, there was no such a
verified petition nor payment of docket fees. This Court rules that
under the circumstances, the Commission en banc acted without
jurisdiction or at least in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the
Decision on December 6, 1995 and Resolution dated July 25, 1997.
xxx
It is the well-established rule that the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal has
the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. As such,

execution shall issue as a matter of right to the winning party. Rule

39, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding,
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected. Pursuant to this rule, it was proper for the
Hearing Officer to have granted the respondents motion for a writ of
execution on January 5, 1995 after the petitioners have failed to
perfect their appeal.
It must be noted that petitioners appeal to the Commission en
banc was an appeal on the order of execution which is not
permissible under the rules. The order granting the motion for writ of
execution is not appealable as provided under Rule 41, Section 1.
Clearly, therefore, the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it entertained petitioners
appeal and treated it as a direct attack against the orders of the
hearing officer. This in effect re-opened the case that has already
become final and executory. Time and again, this Court has made the
pronouncement that there must be an end to every litigation. Once a
judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing
party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Cavila v Heirs of Clarita Cavile 400 S 255 (2003)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals

Doctrine: The execution by one of the petitioners of the certificate

of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the
Rules where all the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, share a common interest.

Facts:

Bernardo Cavile contracted 3 marriages and acquired 6

parcels of land now being disputed
1. Ines Dumat-ol 1 child (Simplicia)
2. Orfia Colalho 2 children (Fortunato and Vevencia)
3. Tranquilina Galon 3 children (Castor, Susana and
Benedicta)

Issue:

Oct 1977 descendants of his 1st and 2nd marriage (herein

respondents) filed a complaint for partition against the
descendants of his 3rd marriage (herein petitioners).
Allegation:
- They are co-owners of the properties in
question having inherited them from
Bernardo
- Upon the death of Bernardo, his son by 3 rd
marriage (Castor) took possession of the
properties as administrator for and in behalf
of his co-owners
- When Castor died, his children took
possession of the land but no longer as
administrators. They claimed the properties
and their fruits as their own and repeatedly
refused respondents demand for partition.
Among the evidence proferred was a notarized Deed of
Partition executed by the heirs of Bernardo Cavile in 1937.
Trial court dismissed the petition for partition.
Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision saying the trial court
erred in admitting the Deed of Partition as evidence without
proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Hence, this petition.
The respondents pray for the denial of the petition on two
grounds: it violates the rule on the certification against forum
shopping; and the CA did not commit any error in its
assailed decision.
The respondents harp on the fact that only one of the 22
petitioners, Thomas George Cavile, Sr. executed and signed
the certification against forum shopping when the Rules
require that said certification must be signed by all the
petitioners.

Was the certification against forum shopping signed by only one of

the petitioners sufficient to meet the Rules? Yes

Ruling:

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must

be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the
signing by only one of them is insufficient.
However, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed
to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification.
The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
The execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all
the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.
All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, share a common interest, and share a
common defense in the complaint for partition. When they
filed the petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only
one argument to defend their rights over the properties in
question.
There is sufficient basis for Thomas George Cavile to speak
for and in behalf of his co-petitioners.
The trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint for
partition, it appearing that the lawful heirs of Bernardo
Cavile have already divided the properties among
themselves, as evidenced by the Deed of Partition.

The document (Deed of Partition) speaks for itself. It was

acknowledged before the Notary Public and recorded in his
notarial book. Documents acknowledged before notaries
public are public documents which are admissible in
evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. They enjoy the presumption
of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The respondents failed to overcome the presumption of
regularity.
The properties left by Bernardo Cavile have already been
partitioned among his heirs.

organized a union known as Piglas Kamao. At the time of the

formation, the officers of the union were respondents
Ronnie Tamayo, President; Jose del Carmen, Vice-President;
and Jocelyne Padua, Secretary. Respondents claim that petitioner,
through its President, Rico Ocampo, interfered with the formation of
the union.
Respondents were informed of the petitioners plan to close
the basement level store to give way to the opening of a Sari-Sari
outlet on the third floor of Robinsons Galleria. Respondents were
supposed to be absorbed in other Sari-Sari store branches. However,
on January 9, 1994, petitioner put up an advertisement in the Manila
Bulletin, announcing its need for inventory, accounting, and sales
clerks.Applicants were requested to apply personally at the
Robinsons Galleria branch.
During the month of January 1994, petitioners managerial
staff approached union members to express disapproval of the union
membership. On January 26, 1994, respondent union filed an unfair
labor practice case with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against the petitioner
for harassment, coercion, and interference with the workers right to
self-organization.

Sari-sari Group of Companies, Inc. v Piglas Kamao 561 S

569 (2008)
FACTS:
In December 1990, Mariko Novel Wares, Inc. (petitioner) began its
retail outlet operations under the name Sari-Sari in the basement of
Robinsons Galleria in Quezon City. Among its employees were:
Head Checker Ronnie Tamayo, Checker Jose del Carmen, Section
Heads Jocylene Padua,
Vicky Bermeo,
and
ElizabethMatutina (respondents), all of whom were assigned at the
Robinsons Galleria branch. On November 30, 1993, respondents

On the next day, January 27, 1994, petitioner notified DOLE

and the respondents of the closure of the Galleria branch due to
irreversible losses and non-extension of the lease of the store
premises, to be effective on February 28, 1994. Moreover, the
respondents were told that they would not be absorbed in the other
branches of the petitioner because of redundancy.
On February 11, 1994, respondents Tamayo, Del Carmen,
and Padua filed amended complaints of unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal against petitioner. On March 28, 1994, respondents
filed six supplemental complaints for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of premium pay for holiday and rest day for the years 1992 and
1993, and non-payment of 13th month pay for the year 1994 as well

as for moral and exemplary damages. In its defense, petitioner

denied that the closure of the Galleria branch was intended to
prevent the formation of the union, saying that the closure was due
to consistent losses the branch was incurring.
On April 27, 1997, the LA rendered his decision dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practices and
damages for lack of merit. However, the LA ordered the petitioner to
pay the respondents separation pay and proportionate 13th month
pay.
During
the pendency of
the
appeal,
respondents Bermeo, Matutina, and Padua separately filed their
respective manifestations and Motions to Dismiss, praying that the
appeal be dismissed as to them due to their having already executed
their respective quitclaims releasing Mariko from liability.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA but dismissed the claims
of Bermeo, Matutina and
Padua
as
they
had
executed
quitclaims. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the NLRC. The CA ruled that petitioner failed to
discharge its burden of submitting competent proof to show the
irreversible substantial losses it suffered warranting the closure of the
Galleria branch. Also, the release and quitclaims executed by
respondents Padua, Bermeo and Matutinadid not preclude them from
assailing their termination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed serious error in granting
respondents petition for certiorari and setting aside the findings of
both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter?
RULING:
Effect of Quitclaims
It is well-established that quitclaims and/or complete
releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing

their claims arising from the unfair labor practice of the

employer. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/ or
complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and
void.The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of
the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts.
Closure or Retrenchment?
The decision of the LA, disposed of the issue by stating that the
decision to close the Robinsons branch was a management
prerogative.
After a perusal of the records of the case and pleadings submitted,
we find that petitioner had in fact retrenched workers. All the
pleadings submitted to the LA by the petitioner clearly showed that
what it had in mind when it terminated the services of respondents
was that it had retrenched workers. It was only when respondents
appealed the LA decision that petitioner pursued a new theory, that
is, that what was involved was a simple closure of business which
did not require proof of substantial losses.
Having concluded that petitioner retrenched workers, we now decide
as to whether or not petitioner had complied with the requisites of
retrenchment. For retrenchment to be valid, the following requisites
must be satisfied:
1.
The losses expected should be substantial and not
merely de minimis in extent;
2.
The substantial losses apprehended must be
reasonably imminent;
3.
The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary
and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and

4.
The alleged losses, if already incurred, and the
expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be
proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The CA was correct in finding that petitioner failed to
discharge its duty of showing that the dismissal of the employees
was legal.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to submit its audited
financial statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the years 1991 and 1992. Thus, other than petitioners bare allegation
of irreversible loss, there is no evidence to prove and substantiate it.
Petitioner having failed in discharging its burden of submitting
sufficient and convincing evidence required by law, we hold that

respondents Ronnie Tamayo, Jose del Carmen, Jocylene Padua,

Vicky Bermeo and Elizabeth Matutina were illegally dismissed.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either (1)
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no
longer viable; and (2) backwages. In the case at bar, since fourteen
years have already lapsed since the termination of the respondents,
we deem it proper that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement be
awarded. Since petitioner has already paid respondents their
separation pay, it is only liable to pay the respondents
their backwages computed from the time of their illegal dismissal up
to the time of the finality of this judgment.