1. Camara v.

Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 1967

Facts. On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing
Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an
apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations
of the citys Housing Code. The inspector was informed that the Appellant
was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector
confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because
residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building.
The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a
warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellants apartment a second
time two days later, and again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The
Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district
attorneys office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two
other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again
refused because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing
Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of
Appeals held the housing section does not violate Fourth Amendment rights
because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than
criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection
which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable
conditions.
Issue. [W]hether administrative inspection programs, as presently
authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights
are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. Yes. [Frank v. Maryland], to the extent that it sanctioned such
warrantless inspections, must be overruled. The majority here observed,
[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the
discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement
that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say
that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this
context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized
review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of
a criminal penalty.
2. Salazar v. Achacosa 183 scra 145, 1990
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA,
charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA
regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and

paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing

illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The
group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar,
who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed
with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because
she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due
process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting
officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure
Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the
President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a
general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it
must identify specifically the things to be seized.
3. Catura v. CIR 37 scra 303, 1971
FACTS:Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador (petitioners) are the President and
Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Employees Association, a duly registered labor organization. On December
27, 1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace
Act was filed by the CIR and the principal complainants, being Celestino
Tabaniag and other employees constituting more than 10 percent of the
membership of the labor organization (respondents). Petitioners were

charged of unauthorized disbursement of union funds. Complainants

demand a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as
well as to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial
activities of the union open to inspection by the members. The demands were
refused.
The executive board of the organization also passed a resolution calling
for a general membership meeting to pass on the issue regarding the union
funds. Catura cancelled the meeting. Another meeting was called, but there
was still no response. Members were the forced to elevate the matter to the
Department of Labor which issued subpoenas for the presentation of the
account books, but to no avail.
Having exhausted all the remedies provided in the unions constitution
and by-laws, the complaint sought to declare petitioners guilty of unfair labor
practice under the Industrial Peace Act, to cease and desist from further
committing unfair labor practice, and to render a dull and detailed report of
all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts
and other records of financial activities open to inspection by the members.
On December 28, 1966, private respondents sought an injunction to
prevent Catura, who turned out to be re-elected as President on November
15, 1966, from taking oath of his office
Then came the order of December 29, 1966 by Associate Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to
requiring and directing the petitioners to deliver and deposit documents
related to finances at the hearing of the petition.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners alleging that
they were not heard before such order was issued. The order was sustained.
Hence, this petition for review of the resolution of the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether the CIR, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure
compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under the
Industrial Peace Act, can require a labor organizations books of accounts,
bank account, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to finances be delivered and deposited with it at the
hearing to conduct such investigation.
HELD:
The controlling provisions of law concerning the power of investigation
of the CIR may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the
Industrial Peace Act. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to
be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough
by the prosecutor of CIR to call for the exercise of the statutory power of

investigation. All the challenged order did was to require petitioner to deliver
and deposit the documents. The documents required to be produced
constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether there was a
failure to comply with the mandates of law. The matter was properly within its
cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should
be deemed implied unless such is arbitrary. Wherefore, petition for certiorari
is denied.
4. Evangelista v. Jarencio 69 scra 99,1975
Facts:
The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,
1966 created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO). He charged the agency with the responsibility to
investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruption, smuggling, lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which
are prejudicial to the government.The President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
On June 7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner
Quirico Evangelista as Undersecretary of the agency, issued to respondent
Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public ServiceOfficer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to be and appear as witness at
the office
of the PARGO. Instead of obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed a Petition
for prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order which was granted by the CFI of Manila,
hence, this petition.
Issue / Held:
WON the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of
fact-finding investigations.
YES. Manalastas lost.
Ratio:
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only
in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings
whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.
The petitioner draws its subpoena power in EO No. 4 and the enabling law
fixes no distinction when and in what function the subpoena power should be
exercised. The Court finds no reason to depart from the established rule, ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Nor could the court find merit
in the argument that the subpoena power granted by Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code is restricted under the Rules of Court to abridge
its application.

5. Office of Court Administration v. Canque 588 scra 226

6. Carmelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152
7. Masangcay v. Comelec 6 scra 27
8. Bedol v. Comelec 606 scra 554
9. Goairan v. Alcala 444 scra 428
10.
Ang Tibay v. CIR (60 PHIL 635)
11.
1. KMU v. Garcia Jr., 239 SCRA 386
12.
2. PASEI v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298
13.
3. Santiago vs. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106
14.
4. U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1
15.
5. Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
16.
6. DAR v. SUTTON, G.R. No. 162070, Oct. 19, 2005
17.
7. SOL. GEN. v. MMA, 204 SCRA 837
18.
8. BOIE-Takeda v. DE LA SERNA, 228 SCRA 329
19.
9. UNITED BFHA v. BF HOMES, 310 SCRA 304
20.
10. LUPANGCO v. CA, 160 SCRA 848
21.
Marcos v. Court of Appeals (278 SCRA 843)
22.
Pp vs maceren 79 scra 450
23.
Us vs panlilio 98 phils 608
24.
Pp Vs santos 63 phils 300
25.
Perez Vs lpg gr. No. 159149 june 26, 2006
26.
Pp. Vs Que po lay 94 phils 640
27.
Tanada vs Tuvera 136 scra 27 1985 decision
28.
Tanada vs tuvera 136 scra 27 1986 decisions
29.
1) Presidential dollar vs ca 171 scra 348
30.
(2) Cojuangco vs pcgg 190 scra 226
31.
(3) Santiago jr. vs bautista 32 scra 188
32.
4) Smart comm vs ntc Gr. No. 1518908 aug. 12 2003
33.
(5) Guerzon vs ca 164 scra 182
34.
(6) Antipolo realty vs nha 135 scra 399
35.
(1) Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers (GR 153660 June 10, 2003)
36.
(2) First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals (237 SCRA 519)
37.
(3) Villa v. Lazaro (189 SCRA 34)
38.
(4) Paterok v. Bureau of Customs (193 SCRA 132)
39.
(5) Lumigad v. Exevea (GR 117565 Nov. 18, 1997)
40.
(6) Casimiro v. Tandog (GR 146137 June 8, 2005)
41.
(7) Globe Telecom v. National Telecommunications Commission
(GR 143946 July 26, 2004)
42.
(1) Villaflor v. Court of Appeals (280 SCRA 297)
43.
(2) Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro (77 SCRA 264)
44.
(3) Centeno v. Centeno (343 SCRA 153)
45.
(4) Nuesa v. Court of Appeals (GR 132048 March 6, 2002)
46.
(5) Regional Director of Region 7, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals (GR 110193 January 27, 1994)
47.
(6) Laguna CATV Network v. Maraan (GR 139492 Nov. 19, 2002)
48.
(7) Corpus v. Cuaderno (4 SCRA 749)

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58. (17)

(8) Madrigal v. Lecaroz (91 SCRA 20)

(9) Cabada v. Alunan (260 SCRA 838)
(10) Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito (186 SCRA 704)
(11) NFA v. CA (253 SCRA 470)
(12) Gravador v. Mamigo (20 SCRA 742)
(13) Almine v. CA (177 SCRA 796)
(14) Smart v. NTC (408 SCRA 678)
(15) UP Board of Regents v. Razul (200 SCRA 685)
(16) Arrow Transport Corporation v. Board of T (63 SCRA 193)
Tan v. Veterans (105 PHIL 377)