Consulting Editor:
V. C. CHAPPELL
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The
CONCEPT
of MEMORY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
RANDOM HOUSE
New York
FIRST PRINTING
LEO MUNSAT
ALDEN VAN BUSKIRK
ot.
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Pensees,
PREFACE
The analytic techniques of philosophy have developed to the point where the investigation of a given
concept has become all but a philosophical exercise.
Thus, it is surprising that the concept of memory,
which has been so important in the history of philosophy, has been neglected to the extent that it has,
particularly in view of the emphasis placed upon that
area known as the philosophy of mind. In The Concept of Mind, for example, Ryle devotes only one out
of the seven sections comprising his chapter on imagination to this topic, and Wittgenstein has only one
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Preface
page on memory in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations. Where major efforts are devoted to the
topic of memory, the authors are more concerned with
the various epistemological problems associated with
our knowledge of the past than with the concept of
memory per se (cf. Von Leyden's Remembering).
The Concept of Memory may be viewed as an attempt to do three things. First, and perhaps most important, it tries to show that our concept of memory
involves such a variety of conditions of application in
various contexts and such a wide variety of types of
entities (e.g., dispositions, episodes, claims of special
authority, and so on) that no simple general account
of what memory is or involves could possibly capture
them all. The first and second chapters are, to a large
extent, devoted to showing this, and the chief method
of argumentation involves devising counterexamples
to plausible-sounding generalizations about memory,
such as "Memory is the ability to recall previous experiences" and "Memory is a kind of retention."
The second aim of the book is to give some sort of
positive account of the various memory sub-concepts,
or alternatively, the various forms of memory. To this
end, there are chapters dealing with memory of facts
(Chapter II), "suddenly remembering" (Chapter III),
dispo~itional memory (Chapter IV), and reminiscing
(Chapter V).
Finally, some attempt is made to discover the relationships which exist between the various forms of
memory, specifically whether some one form is basic
to all the others. To this end, the relationship between
memory as occurrence and memory claims is examined, with the aim of showing that all memory is in
various ways dependent on memory statements. When
one makes such a statement or claim, he is not re-
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CONTENTS
EXAMINATION OF SOME
CLAIMS ABOUT MEMORY
The temptation to over-generalize about memory is noted with examples such as "Memory is an ability to recall previous experiences and/or describe them."
This claim countered by the case "I just remembered-[ have to be home at six
o'clock"; what I remember here is not a
previous experience.
Nor is memory retention of something, for
what I remember in this case cannot sensibly be spoken of as being retained.
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Memorization shown to require (a) that something difficult be the object, (b) that one
practices. Memorization a way of committing to memory, not a form of remembering.
Repeating from memory what we have memorized is not to report some past experience.
Memory cannot be ultimately reduced to memory of previous experience, as Furlong argues.
The statement "Memory is always of the past"
is ambiguous. If it means what I remember
is something which occurred in the past,
it is false. If it means merely that what I
remember I must have previously known,
it is generally true, with one qualification.
Further differences between sorts of memory
shown by considering responsibility for forgetting.
Ability to memorize not sufficient for good
memory.
Summary.
II
REMEMBERING THAT
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III
SUDDENLY REMEMBERING
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NON-EPISODIC MEMORY
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REMINISCING, MEMENTOES,
AND REMINDERS
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between remtmscing and (just) talking
about what one remembers.
One can only reminisce about something if
he remembers it, but not vice versa.
Yet the activity of reminiscing can be one way
in which one "cashes in" on the claim to
remember, and is in this sense basic. But
it is the particular statement which one
makes in reminiscing which is important,
not the fact that it is reminiscing which
one is doing in making these statements.
Inasmuch as reminiscing can be a mental activity, the primacy of memory claims for
memory rests on the question "Can one
know or 'think' what he can't say?" But this
is not a question which is peculiar to memory.
"Suddenly remembering," an episode, is also
basic by the "cashing in" criterion, but the
notion of having something is prior to that
of suddenly getting it. That is, the nonepisodic concept is presupposed by the episodic one.
Summary.
VI
Hume's discussion of what he calls impressions and ideas asserts the possibility that
mental images might be mistaken for perception. Hume's point can be put in terms
of two senses of "imagine," one sense exemplified in "There's nobody there. You are
just imagining 1 it," and the other in "Close
your eyes and imagine 2 (picture) a person
climbing over a fence."
One cannot be asked to imagine 1 although one
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Contents
implies that the speaker is having mental
imagery.
"I know what she looks like" does not mean
the same as "I see her face in my mind."
But by the same argument, neither could the
latter mean the same as "Now I remember
her face."
"Not only do I remember that I did it, but Iremember doing it" and "Not only do I remember that there was such a person, but
I remember him" supposedly examples of
perceptual memory.
Contrary to Malcolm, when one says these
things, he is only claiming to remember
many details about them. In such cases,
one is also claiming that he knows of these
details from having seen or done the things
in question. These details are of two sorts:
things I might have found out some other
way and things I could not have (and still
claim to remember), viz. my feelings and
thoughts at the time.
This is borne out by lack of a distinction, in
the case of how I felt, between remembering that I felt such and such and remembering feeling such and such.
Corollary: One's feelings are not subject (in
an informative way qua that feeling) to
detailed elaboration.
"Now I remember her face" is in a sense incomplete. It is not a report that one has
done something, but a claim that he now
(of a sudden) can (like "Now I can go
on").
Summary.
Not all uses of such expressions as "I remem-
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The
CONCEPT of MEMORY
chapter
Examination of
Some Claims
About Memory
because I no longer want to do it.) If what I remember, when I suddenly remember that I have to be
home at six o'clock, is something datable at all, it is
something that exists now just as much as it existed
in the past, namely, my having to be home at six
o'clock (or my wanting to get some letters mailed today, or some such thing). Similarly, I might be
tempted to go skiing with a friend, until I remember
that my ankles are very weak and decide that it would
be too dangerous. What I remember is not ~tomething
in the past (although it might have been-for example, I might remember that I got into trouble the last
time I was skiing because my ankles were weak; this
would be a case of remembering something "out of
the past").
These very same considerations would show us
that~l
iJ,o_t C1:. case of remembering previouse~eriences (claim (A) above) and also that
memo~y is not ~lw~ys a ~:J.tter of retention of a cert~sort ~(B) ab-o~~). For what can I be said to
haveretained when I suddenly remember that I have
to be home at six o'clock tonight? !__1lligh!_ret~~a
siqll, o.~..an.abillty,
or- even,
with a lit~!P.g,
an
r- -- ---------.experience, in that I am able to recall it. Here we are
incline<rto think in terms of an event's making an
impression on me; this impression (a kind of imprint
on a material or immaterial stuff) is what I retain,
and in virtue of which I am able to remember or perform. But even if we are able to view memory of some
things as a retention along these lines, there is no
event, no skill developed from practicing, no "sense
experience" (or at least there need not be), in a case
of remembering that I have to be home at six o'clock,
such that I could be said to retain it.
"But surely," one might argue, "if you have to be
memocy_is
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seeing blue things? Yet what someone hears on a dictating tape may have the result that he orders someone
to do such and such, or predicts that such and such
will happen, or sees something that is blue for the
first time (he never noticed it until it was called to his
attention). So, too, a sentence coming to mind might
have various results, in that you may remember
something, or predict something, or discover something, or wonder whether, and so forth. Thus, the
"playing back," whether it be of a neurological impulse or an impulse from a tape recorder, cannot
constitute the remembering, although it might be instrumental in that it has the result that someone
remembers. (I should think that even this is not the
role played by memory images. But more about images
later.) Yet it is just this, that these "playing backs" of
stored impulses constitute remembering, that one understands by the claim that "memory is a retention of
a certain sort."
Finally, we come to the claim that memory is a subclass of the possible ways in which I can know something. I might know that I have to be home at six
o'clock because I saw a note from my wife, or because
I realized it was necessary because I had a commitment at seven o'clock and I had to eat first, but it
would be most odd to answer the question, "How do
you know you have to be at home at six o'clock?" (if
the question itself sounds odd, substitute "What
makes you think you have to be home at six
o'clock?") by "I remember that I have to be home at
six o'clock," or, "I just remembered that I have to be
home . . ." Actually, a more reasonable question
would be "Why do you have to be home at six
o'clock?" not "How do you know . . . ?" or "What
makes you think that . . . ?" But then, if such ques-
II
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I have not said very much about the very important question of memory as a source of knowledge because I feel that
Gilbert Ryle has made a sufficient number of correct p9irtts on
this issue in The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes &.;N()ble,
1961 ), pp. 276-79, to refute the view of memory as a source
of knowledge. I feel, then, that on this issue I have just a~ded
another sort of case where remembering cannot be viewed as
a source of knowledge.
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when we said memory is of the past, of things l witnessed, heard, did. That there is a big difference between these two sorts of things (something I did, on
the one hand, and a fact like V3 = 1.732, on the
other) can be shown by the fact that there is a difference between saying "I remember that I proved what
the square root of three is" and "I know that I proved
what the square root of three is," but there is not
the same difference between "I remember what the
square root of three is" and "I know what the square
root of three is." Let us examine these two pairs of
sentences.
If I say that I remember proving that p, or that I
remember that I proved that p, then I am saying that
I did not find out that I proved it from, for example,
being told that I proved it, or reading that I proved it.
I am claiming that I was never informed of my having proven it, but that I know I proved it just because
I proved it. If, on the other hand, I simply claim to
know that I proved it, then I am leaving open the possibilities ruled out when I claimed to remember proving it, or that I proved it.
On the other hand, if we contrast remembering
that p with knowing that p, where what I remember is
a fact other than something I did, then the only
difference (between saying I know and saying that I
remember) is that if I say I remember, I am implying
that I did not just find out, that I knew it before.
Thus, I could be said to know what the square root of
three is if I just looked it up, but I could not be said to
remember it. It seems, then, that all that is required
for a person to be said to remember that V3 = 1.732
is that he know it, without having just now found out
(or calculated it in his head). But in order to be said
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tion of a "good memory." In his article, "The Validation of Memory and Our Conception of a Past," John
0. Nelson states:
Prefixes like "remember," "know," "it is certain," normally suggest a certain amount of risk being taken.
This is shown by the fact that memory-statements,
knowledge-statements, and the like possess, as it were,
logical escape hatches. If, for instance, a memory-claim
of mine is overturned, I am able to blame it on a poor
memory, and no one can blame me for that.D
I think that Nelson is right here, but notice he is talking about memory claims. He has in mind such things
as my being able or not being able to remember what
I ate at the picnic last year; when people talk of memory claims, they do not have in mind such things as "I
just remembered that I have to be home at six o'clock
tonight." If someone does not remember such things,
we do blame him. If a person makes memory claims
about what he did in the past, and they are frequently
wrong, we say his memory is unreliable. If a person
forgets that he has to be home for dinner at six
o'clock, forgets to do things he said he would do, and
is in general "forgetful," it is he that we brand as unreliable.
Finally, I would like to spend a moment pointing
out what is probably obvious anyway and that is the
relation between memorizing and remembering what
was memorized in terms of "good memory." The point
of this is no more than that whatever the similarities,
we are talking about different sorts of things; different sorts of skills are involved, and from this I feel
that any common account of the two must necessarily
9 John 0. Nelson, "The Validation of Memory and Our Conception of a Past," Philosophical Review, LXXII (January,
1963), 37
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orizing and remembering what one memorized particularly well captured by his account.
We have been examining various sorts of "rememberings" with the aim of showing that a general claim
about the nature of memory is doomed to failure because of the various sorts of things that are involved
in different cases of remembering. Might we not
make slightly less general claims about general
classes of rememberings, for example, one claim
about memory of the form "I remember that . . . ,"
another about such cases as "I suddenly (just) remembered that . . . ," another about "I remember
seeing him . . . ," etc.? But we cannot answer such
a question without a relatively detailed examination
of the various "forms." Let us begin, then, with memory claims of the sort "I remember that . . . ," and
see what such claims involve. I think a good point
from which to launch our investigation would be Norman Malcolm's chapter, "A Definition of Factual
Memory." 1I And a natural second step might be an
investigation of memory statements of the form "I
just remembered that . . ." (suddenly remembering), as so much of the burden of the investigation up
to this point has been on this sort of remembering.
an attempt to show that "remembering x'ing" is, in direct opposition to Furlong's claim, dependent on "remembering that." See
also my arguments to the same effect (Chapter IV, Part II).
1I Ibid., pp. 222-40.
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II Remembering
That
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Remembering That
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cASE (a)
Let us begin by considering my first example, "I remember that I once killed a deer while driving." Let
us suppose that I once killed a deer while driving and,
further, that I remember that I killed one from the
time that I did kill it (time t). 3 Let us further suppose that at time t 1 , a time later than t, someone says
to me, "Say, I just found out that you killed a deer
while driving," and I reply, "Yes, you needn't have
told me that; I remember that I once killed one." And
now, one year since t 1 , I still remember that I once
killed a deer while driving, and still from time t. But
if I hadn't known that I killed it (say, if I had not
known at t that what I killed was a deer, or that I had
killed it), I at least might know it now anyway, because of the remark made to me at t 1 . Hence, I remember that p from t: I know that p, I knew that p at
t, but if I had not known that p at t, I might now know
it anyway. I take this case as showing that Malcolm
has not given us necessary conditions for a person's
remembering that p from timet. For I canb~ ~aid to
3 I say "Let us suppose that . . . I remember that 1 killed
one from the time that I did kill it." 1 want to note that this is
implied by my saying that I remember that I killed it, just as
mv having killed it is implied by my saying that I remember
that 1 killed it. That is, when 1 say that 1 remembPr that I killed
it, I am ruling out the possibility that I fourul cntt that I killed
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Remembering That
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colm's conditions are not necessary for a person remembering that p from a time t for a memory statement which does not involve remembering something
I did. My case is as follows:
CASE
(c)
(d)
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II
I would first like to summarize briefly the considerations that led Malcolm to state his definiendum in the
form "A person, B, remembers that p from a time,
t. . . ." At the very beginning of his chapter on factual memory, Malcolm gives a preliminary definition
for factual memory statements:
The definition is very simple. It is the following: A
person, B, remembers that p if and only if B knows that
p because he knew that p. It will be convenient to say
that this definition is composed of three elements: the
present knowledge that p, the previous knowledge that
p, and the relationship between the present and the
previous knowledge expressed by saying that B knows
that p because he previously knew that p. Each element
i< a logically nc"'"'l' 'ndttion and th conjunction
Remembering That
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And again:
Another expression we can use here is "source,"
i.e., the source of A's present knowledge that p is his
previous knowledge of it. . . . To say "His previous
knowledge is the source of his present knowledge" implies that he has not just now learned over again that p.
\
And finally:
The meaning of "just now IS, however, pretty indefinite. If I was told something two hours ago would
that be "just now"? Or would "just now" have to be
ten minutes or ten seconds ago? I believe this is an
artificial problem. I think that when we say "A remembers that p," we refer, more or less vaguely, to a more
or less definite previous time when A knew that p. We
are asserting that A remembers that p from that time.
This will imply that A has not learned over again that
p since that time. If this is correct we can get rid of the
phrase "just now" in stating our analysis of factual
memory. The statement "He remembers that p" will
imply: "He knows that p, and at a previous time, t, he
knew that p, and he has not learned over again that p
since t." It would be up to the person who made the
original statement to specify the time, t, to which he
refers.s
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Remembering That
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Ibid., p.
216.
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Remembering That
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Accepting for the moment these conditions for "remembering that" statements where a reference is
made to a time t from which the p in question is remembered, we still have a slight problem. Clearly the
above would be the analysis we would think appropriate for a memory claim of the form "I remember that
v'3 = 1.732 from grade school." Just as clearly, we
would not want to use this analysis for "I remember
that v'3 = 1.732," because here we are making no
reference to a time from which the p is remembered.
But now what about a memory claim where what I
claim to remember is something I did, for example, "I
remember that I once killed a deer while driving"?
Surely there is a reference to a time t, such that I
remember what I remember from that time; but, on
the other hand, it would be most odd to make this
reference explicit-in fact, I think it would be redundant. For, if what I have claimed above is correct (p.
31 ), if I claim to remember something I did, there
seems to imply that I could have said what it was. On the
other hand, to say "At that time, when he asked me, I did not
know, but I know now" seems to imply that I have found out
since he asked me. I think, however, that we do have a locution
to cover such cases. If I try to remember something at a certain
time but cannot, and then later on can (do), we say I "knew
it all along." And I think that if we now say that I remember
that p, then we are committed to describing my previous inability to recall that p as "not being able to think of it at the
time" and not as "not knowing at the time (when asked) that
p." Hence, when I say, "There is no time between t and now
("now" being when he remembers that p) such that it was true
of him that he did not know that p," I mean among other things
to be taking care of just the sort of case where a person, at some
time after t, cannot think of p but now remembers it. I want to
say of this person that he "knew it all along," and to rule out
such questions as "But did he know it at just that time when
he could not think of it?" or, "Did he know it at every moment
between when he first knew it and when he remembered it?"
Hence, the awkward negative phrasing of this condition.
(,
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Remembering That
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Remembering That
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III
If we can give an account of all factual memory state-
j.
ments with three sets of conditions, perhaps the general theme running through the first chapter, that no
general statement about what is involved in memory is
likely to hold up, must be weakened. For, although we
have not come up with one analysis for all "remembering that" statements, at least we have come up
with some more or less general conditions, one set for
each of three different kinds of one form of memory,
namely "rememberings" of the form "remembering
that." (Put this way, our "general claims" seem not
general at all.) But I think that other examples can be
constructed which show that even these three sets of
conditions do not adequately d~fine factual memory,
and, more important, that they cover up important
differences between even those sets of cases which fit
some one of these three sets of conditions (and, incidentally, Malcolm's set of conditions as well).
It seems to me that any memory statement of the
form "I remember that" followed by a counterfactual
is nonsensical, or perhaps better, a misuse of the term
"remember." 1 For example, I do not think we can
understand statements like "I remember that if we
had offered him more money, he would have stayed,"
or, "I remember that if the doctor had arrived on
time, he would have lived." Yet surely I may know
that he would have stayed if we offered him more
money; I may have known it at the time the offer was
made (he told me), and, supposing he died after he
told me, and had not told anyone else, if I had not
known it then, I would not know it now. (This case
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Remembering That
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chapter
III Suddenly
Remembering
know}
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~xamp_!_~_9i_~Ell_remembermg, wg~
~~hene!_~r:__it __ ~~ou~?__~cc_~~ud_der.!!J_~~~plb~~.=,
~_!!_l_f.::t.f_t_,__:w~_use
Suddenly Remembering
43
because we lack a sufficient number of candidatesthere are enough of these in the form of feelings,
images, bodily movements, and, I suppose, physiological processes-but because we will never be willing
to settle on any one of these and say "It is this one."
And the reason why we will not settle on any one or
combination of these as composing the essence of
suddenly remembering is that none of these phenomena are in themselves or in combination either necessary or sufficient for the occurrence of the phenomenon of suddenly remembering. For one can suddenly
remember without snapping his fingers, without having a feeling of excitement or relief or elation, without
saying that he has remembered, without doing anything apropos of what he remembered, without picturing anything. And one can have an image of a boiling
pot come to mind, have a feeling\of excitement come
over him, snap his fingers and run to turn off the stove,
but not have suddenly remembered that he left the
stove on; he had suddenly decided to eat somewhere
else. In this case, the snap of the fingers was not an
expression of suddenly remembering, but a snap of "By
gosh, I'll do it." (The mental image of the pot boiling
may have been part of his dismal contemplation of
another meal at home.) And, of course, in order for
someone to suddenly remember that he left the pot on
the stove, he must have left the pot on the stove. And
if he did not leave the pot on the stove, then, no matter what process or feeling or image or movement
takes place, it is not suddenly remembering that the
pot was on the stove. And unless the pot's boiling is in
some way relevant to the person's intentions, desires,
etc., 1 then, although he may find himself thinking
1 What sorts of things satisfy the "relevancy" condition will
be brought out in examples below.
44
Suddenly Remembering
45
etc.,
Suddenly Remembering
47
II
Three different sorts of "rememberings" immediately
suggest themselves as examples of suddenly remembering. I have in mind:
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Even in these cases, one wants to say "I just remembered something," rather than simply "I just remembered," or perhaps, "No, wait, I just remembered.
. . ." What these cases seem to suggest is that what
one remembers has to be relevant in a particular way
to what one is talking about, proposing, or in some
other way engaged in at the time, such as planning
something, or building something.
Finally, we come to rather straightforward cases of
"just remembered" where there need not be any spe-
(.,
Suddenly Remembering
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so
Suddenly Remembering
51
52
membered, so that in a situation where I was not trying to remember, I could have said "That reminds
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me."
(2) We are on the way to a bar to get a beer, and
you say to me, "Hurry up; I'm not going to wait all
day." I say, "O.K. Let's go. Oh, wait, I just remembered, I have to pick up a file from the office." Here,
with only this given in the situation, I could not intelligibly have said, instead of what I did say, "Say, that
reminds me, I have to . . . ,"or "Now I remember,
I was supposed to pick up. . . ." (I could only have
said the latter if I had been trying to remember what
I was supposed to do or had wanted to do.)
(3) I have been trying to think of what I was supposed to do before I went home today, and a friend is
trying to help. He says, "Was there something you
were to take home, or did you have some letters to
mail, or did you have an appointment?" And as he is
saying this, I remember, and say "Oh, now I remember, I had to give my key to the janitor to have another one made." I could not intelligibly have said
"That reminds me-l had to give my key . . . ," nor
could I have said "I just remembered something-!
was supposed to . . ." unless what I remember here
is not what I was trying to remember.
These three examples were simply illustrations of
the sort of factors which determine whether a particular case of suddenly remembering is a case of "just
remembering," being reminded, or, if you will, finally
thinking of what one was trying to remember. And
now we can perhaps summarize what we have found.
(A) "Oh, say, I just remembered that . . . ." One
can only say this in cases where what one remembers
is or is relevant to what one intended or wanted to do
Suddenly Remembering
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Suddenly Remembering
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chapter
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IV Non-Episodic
Memory
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Non-Episodic Memory
I
There are several considerations which might make
one think of memory statements as some sort of report, more specifically, a report about the person who
makes it to the effect that he remembers something,
that he houses the phenomenon or experience of "remembering." Several examples which make it look as
though memory statements are such reports are:
(I )-I am sure that if he had been there, I would remember it.
( 2 )-Yes, I do remember him.
(3)-Well, I seemed to remember him saying that
(said after I am convinced that he did not say
it).
ss
r'
:1,:
Non-Episodic Memory
59
.:
r I
6o
Non-Episodic Memory
61
II
/..
\,;
!'
.,,
6o
II'
Non-Episodic Memory
61
right." (Similar things could be said for the other examples). But the argument can just as easily be run
the other way. One might take this equivalence of expressions as showing that statements like "You are
right" are really reports to the effect that I am of the
belief that you are right and hence are not claims
about you but about me.
I do not wish to bring the question to a discussion
of the nature or uses of language. I merely wish to
indicate what I feel to be at the base of the feeling
that memory statements are a kind of report about the
person who is making them, to the effect that he is
doing or experiencing something which might be
called remembering. There are really two views involved, then. One view is that a memory claim is
really a report about the person making the claim;
and this view is coupled with the view that what one
is reporting when one claims to remember something
is the "memory experience."
This whole view,'made up of the two parts mentioned above, is particularly tempting with memory as
its target. It is tempting because it is easy to think of
memory as an experience or phenomenon or occurrence, and hence to think of memory statements as
reporting such an experience or occurrence. If we
could separate the memory claim from any kind of
experience, if we could show that indeed a memory
claim is "about" something other than the present
state of the person making it, then the need to look
for the "experience" or "phenomenon" or "occurrence"
(including memory images) would become less compelling. What is needed, then, is a positive account of
memory statements, and hopefully an account which
is complete without recourse to "experiences" and
Non-Episodic Memory
but that this claim has a certain sort of basis. If, for
example, I were basing this claim on a calculation
which I just made on the basis of how many people
were invited to previous parties of this sort, I could
not say that I remember, but rather, that I would
guess, or estimate, that . . . . Of course, a claim that
my claim is based on certain factors, such as a previous knowledge of how many people were on the list,
or a claim that I came by this information in one of a
number of ways, rather than one of a number of
others, might be construed as a claim about me. But it
is not a claim about me now, about my present
thoughts, experiences, mental activities, etc. Thus, if
I claim to remember seeing Jones spill the drink, I
am, I would say, claiming two things. First, I am
claiming that Jones did spill the drink, and secondly,
I am claiming that I came by that information by having witnessed it. If we want to now say that, after all,
this is partially a claim about me, namely, that I witnessed his spilling"the drink, fair enough. But it is not
a claim about my present state. It is not a report that I
am doing something now, namely remembering
something, as we might have reports from people to
the effect that they are presently reminiscing. But
then, we do not even have a locution of the form "I
am remembering . . . ," a form in which we would
expect such a report to be phrased, if there were such
a thing.
There is, then, a large class of first person memory
statements which are dispositional in character.
When a person makes such a claim, he is claiming
that he -is in a position to make other memory claims
which are not dispositional. And when he makes
these, he is claiming that something is the case and
Non-Episodic Memory
f
I
66
'
Non-Episodic Memory
68
6g
Non-Episodic Memory
II
The next question I would like to examine is, could
we have such things as "remembering" in the dispositional sense (He remembers it; yes, I remember him;
yes, I remember it) if we did not have non-dispositional memory claims (I remember that such and
such; I remember her expression-she looked like
this)?
Let us begin with another look at the relationship
between dispositional and non-dispositional memory.
The distinction between dispositional uses of remember ("I remember him") and non-dispositional uses of
remember ("I remember that he was very thin, had
bright blue eyes . . .") is not a particularly sharp
7 We are now in a position to show what is odd about such
statements as "I remember that if the doctor had arrived on
time, he would have lived." (Chapter II, p. 37) Counterfactuals are, in a sense, always judgments rather than immediately
verifiable truths. One who states a counterfactual, then, is in a
way offering a kind of judgment or guess or speculation, rather
than, for instance, a report. Inasmuch as stating counterfactuals
is a matter of speculation, and prefacing a statement with "I
remember that . . . " is to claim special authority, the two
illocutionary forces involved are at odds, the one being something like "I speculate that" and the other something like "I
have special authority to claim the truth of the following." This
is not to deny that one can be very confident about what is still
a speculation. Hence, "I am sure that if the doctor had arrived
on time, he would have lived," or even "I know that if the
doctor had arrived on time he would have lived."
70
Non-Episodic Memory
71
72
Non-Episodic Memory
73
whole discussion has gone. For not only has an attempt been made to show that memory is not a process or occurrence or experience, but a further supposition has been slipped in, namely, that to remember
is either to be able to or actually to make memory
claims. This would seem to indicate that, for example, only individuals with a language could ever be
spoken of as remembering anything or as having a
memory. But surely animals can remember such
things as people or places.
It is indeed quite true that, for example, dogs can
be spoken of as remembering their masters, say, after
a long absence. And we may say that our dog Rennie
remembers our friend Dave but not that Dave has
brown hair, is about six feet tall, and so on. And this
would seem to show that not only can there be memory without language but that there can be memory of
a person or object without remembering that.
It has to be admitted that the example of the dog
shows both these things. But what also has to be
noted is that it is quite a different matter for a person
to remember someone and for a dog to remember
someone. It is not enough for a person to show recognition to say that he remembers someone. But it is
enough (what else could there be?) for the dog. Suppose we know that our dog has never met Mr. Smith,
but, upon seeing him, he gets excited, as though he
knew him. We might want to suggest that the dog
mistakenly thinks he knows Smith (a bit bizarre) or
that the dog thinks that Smith is someone else (better) or that. there is something about Smith that he
likes (most reasonable). But if the dog has seen
Smith before and gets excited when he sees him again
(more than he usually does when he sees people),
there is no question but that the dog remembers him.
74
Non-Episodic Memory
75
-.::..
Non-Episodic Memory
77
Chapter III was devoted to the discussion of the phenomenon of suddenly remembering. And what about
reminiscing? For here we have a memory verb which
does take the present continuous. Reminiscing is
surely something one can be "doing."
There is, then, work left to be done if we are to
show that memory is "essentially" non-episodic.
chapter
i
'
IV Non-Episodic
Memory
'
s6
57
Non-Episodic Memory
I
There are several considerations which might make
one think of memory statements as some sort of report, more specifically, a report about the person who
makes it to the effect that he remembers something,
that he houses the phenomenon or experience of "remembering." Several examples which make it look as
though memory statements are such reports are:
(I )-I am sure that if he had been there, I would remember it.
( 2 )-Yes, I do remember him.
(3)-Well, I seemed to remember him saying that
(said after I am convinced that he did not say
it).
ss
r'
:1,:
Non-Episodic Memory
59
.:
r I
6o
Non-Episodic Memory
61
II
/..
\,;
!'
.,,
6o
II'
Non-Episodic Memory
61
right." (Similar things could be said for the other examples). But the argument can just as easily be run
the other way. One might take this equivalence of expressions as showing that statements like "You are
right" are really reports to the effect that I am of the
belief that you are right and hence are not claims
about you but about me.
I do not wish to bring the question to a discussion
of the nature or uses of language. I merely wish to
indicate what I feel to be at the base of the feeling
that memory statements are a kind of report about the
person who is making them, to the effect that he is
doing or experiencing something which might be
called remembering. There are really two views involved, then. One view is that a memory claim is
really a report about the person making the claim;
and this view is coupled with the view that what one
is reporting when one claims to remember something
is the "memory experience."
This whole view,'made up of the two parts mentioned above, is particularly tempting with memory as
its target. It is tempting because it is easy to think of
memory as an experience or phenomenon or occurrence, and hence to think of memory statements as
reporting such an experience or occurrence. If we
could separate the memory claim from any kind of
experience, if we could show that indeed a memory
claim is "about" something other than the present
state of the person making it, then the need to look
for the "experience" or "phenomenon" or "occurrence"
(including memory images) would become less compelling. What is needed, then, is a positive account of
memory statements, and hopefully an account which
is complete without recourse to "experiences" and
Non-Episodic Memory
but that this claim has a certain sort of basis. If, for
example, I were basing this claim on a calculation
which I just made on the basis of how many people
were invited to previous parties of this sort, I could
not say that I remember, but rather, that I would
guess, or estimate, that . . . . Of course, a claim that
my claim is based on certain factors, such as a previous knowledge of how many people were on the list,
or a claim that I came by this information in one of a
number of ways, rather than one of a number of
others, might be construed as a claim about me. But it
is not a claim about me now, about my present
thoughts, experiences, mental activities, etc. Thus, if
I claim to remember seeing Jones spill the drink, I
am, I would say, claiming two things. First, I am
claiming that Jones did spill the drink, and secondly,
I am claiming that I came by that information by having witnessed it. If we want to now say that, after all,
this is partially a claim about me, namely, that I witnessed his spilling"the drink, fair enough. But it is not
a claim about my present state. It is not a report that I
am doing something now, namely remembering
something, as we might have reports from people to
the effect that they are presently reminiscing. But
then, we do not even have a locution of the form "I
am remembering . . . ," a form in which we would
expect such a report to be phrased, if there were such
a thing.
There is, then, a large class of first person memory
statements which are dispositional in character.
When a person makes such a claim, he is claiming
that he -is in a position to make other memory claims
which are not dispositional. And when he makes
these, he is claiming that something is the case and
Non-Episodic Memory
f
I
66
'
Non-Episodic Memory
68
6g
Non-Episodic Memory
II
The next question I would like to examine is, could
we have such things as "remembering" in the dispositional sense (He remembers it; yes, I remember him;
yes, I remember it) if we did not have non-dispositional memory claims (I remember that such and
such; I remember her expression-she looked like
this)?
Let us begin with another look at the relationship
between dispositional and non-dispositional memory.
The distinction between dispositional uses of remember ("I remember him") and non-dispositional uses of
remember ("I remember that he was very thin, had
bright blue eyes . . .") is not a particularly sharp
7 We are now in a position to show what is odd about such
statements as "I remember that if the doctor had arrived on
time, he would have lived." (Chapter II, p. 37) Counterfactuals are, in a sense, always judgments rather than immediately
verifiable truths. One who states a counterfactual, then, is in a
way offering a kind of judgment or guess or speculation, rather
than, for instance, a report. Inasmuch as stating counterfactuals
is a matter of speculation, and prefacing a statement with "I
remember that . . . " is to claim special authority, the two
illocutionary forces involved are at odds, the one being something like "I speculate that" and the other something like "I
have special authority to claim the truth of the following." This
is not to deny that one can be very confident about what is still
a speculation. Hence, "I am sure that if the doctor had arrived
on time, he would have lived," or even "I know that if the
doctor had arrived on time he would have lived."
70
Non-Episodic Memory
71
72
Non-Episodic Memory
73
whole discussion has gone. For not only has an attempt been made to show that memory is not a process or occurrence or experience, but a further supposition has been slipped in, namely, that to remember
is either to be able to or actually to make memory
claims. This would seem to indicate that, for example, only individuals with a language could ever be
spoken of as remembering anything or as having a
memory. But surely animals can remember such
things as people or places.
It is indeed quite true that, for example, dogs can
be spoken of as remembering their masters, say, after
a long absence. And we may say that our dog Rennie
remembers our friend Dave but not that Dave has
brown hair, is about six feet tall, and so on. And this
would seem to show that not only can there be memory without language but that there can be memory of
a person or object without remembering that.
It has to be admitted that the example of the dog
shows both these things. But what also has to be
noted is that it is quite a different matter for a person
to remember someone and for a dog to remember
someone. It is not enough for a person to show recognition to say that he remembers someone. But it is
enough (what else could there be?) for the dog. Suppose we know that our dog has never met Mr. Smith,
but, upon seeing him, he gets excited, as though he
knew him. We might want to suggest that the dog
mistakenly thinks he knows Smith (a bit bizarre) or
that the dog thinks that Smith is someone else (better) or that. there is something about Smith that he
likes (most reasonable). But if the dog has seen
Smith before and gets excited when he sees him again
(more than he usually does when he sees people),
there is no question but that the dog remembers him.
74
Non-Episodic Memory
75
-.::..
Non-Episodic Memory
77
Chapter III was devoted to the discussion of the phenomenon of suddenly remembering. And what about
reminiscing? For here we have a memory verb which
does take the present continuous. Reminiscing is
surely something one can be "doing."
There is, then, work left to be done if we are to
show that memory is "essentially" non-episodic.