LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings
Delegates are requested to keep a few pointers in mind before reading the background guide and preparing for the
simulation of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security or
UNGA 1 (DISEC) at DIMUN 2016
a. A background guide is not supposed to contain all the information on an agenda. It contains an introduction to the
agenda to help delegates in further research.
b. The background guide is divided into different sections.
The first section is about the UNGA 1 (DISEC) and its function and powers. The functions and powers of all
councils and committees are outlined by their mandate, which also defines the scope of debate in council. The
mandate also defines what kind of actions can be taken by the UNGA 1 (DISEC) and how it is separate from the
actions taken by other committees.
c. The second section clearly marks the sources that will be accepted as proof/evidence in the committee. In
situations where the Executive Board asks a delegate for proof/evidence to back up their statements, any source
might be brought up for debate if it has institutional backing, and might even be accepted as the belief of the
country. But no sources, other than those mentioned in this section will be accepted as credible.
However, research can be done and debate can continue using any source as such, but delegates are advised to crosscheck statements and speeches with the mentioned credible sources to be on a safe side.
d. The third section explains the agenda at hand in brief.
Delegates must note that to understand any agenda it is important to deeply explore its development in history and
understand various political, social, legal, cultural, religious, economic and security aspects riding with it. The guide
just touches upon some of these aspects and the delegates must explore them in detail while preparing for and
deliberating during the conference.
e. Many sections are followed by or include links which will help in understanding the agenda better, attaining
relevant documents and guide you for further research on the issue. Delegates are requested to visit and explore
these links.
f. Following is a suggested pattern for researching (if required):
Researching and understanding the United Nations and the Committee/Council being simulated Its Mandate,
including understanding historical work done on the agenda. Research on the allotted country. Understanding its
polity, economy, culture, history etc. Comprehending the Foreign Policy of the allotted country. It includes
understanding the ideology and principles adopted by the country on the agenda. It further includes studying past
actions taken by the country on the agenda and other related issues specifically analyzing their causes and
consequences. Reading the background guide thoroughly. Researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes
and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional reports, national reports,
news articles, blogs etc. Understanding policies adopted by different blocs of countries (example: NATO, EU etc.)
and major countries involved in the agenda. Including their position, ideology and adopted past actions.
Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and statements on them. It is the same as
preparing topics for the moderated caucuses and their content. Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions the
UNGA can adopt on the issue as per your countrys policies. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of
information/allegation you are going to use in committee

Keeping your research updated using various news sources, especially news websites given in the proof/evidence
section.
Lastly, we would request all the delegates to put sincere efforts in preparation and research for the simulation and
work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all. Feel free to contact if you have any queries or doubts.

Warm Regards
VICE CHAIRPERSON
RAYMON SINGH
raymonkhanuja@gmail.com

I. ABOUT THE COMMITTEE

1. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

The UNGA is the main deliberative policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations (UN), comprising
of all 193 Members of the UN. Additionally, non-Member States, non-governmental organizations, and
intergovernmental organizations have received invitations to participate as observers in the sessions and work of the
UNGA. It provides a unique forum for multilateral discussions on the full spectrum of international issues covered
by the Charter of the UN. Mandate of the UNGA is outlined by Chapter IV (Titled The General Assembly) under
the Charter of the UN.
Apart from the UNGA Plenary (which majorly decides the agendas for meetings and ratifies resolutions adopted in
the other Committees) its work is distributed to its six main Committees, each examining different topics that affect
the international community:
The First Committee examines topics pertaining to international security and peace; the Second Committee
examines economic and financial topics; the Third Committee examines social, cultural, and humanitarian affairs;
the Fourth Committee examines special political questions and decolonization, the Fifth Committee handles
administrative and budgetary issues of the United Nations; and the Sixth Committee examines legal questions in the
General Assembly.
In addition to the six Main Committees of the General Assembly, a number of Boards, Commissions, Committees,
Councils, and Working Groups work to support the advancement of the General Assemblys mandate.
2. First Committee on Disarmament and International Security (DISEC)
The First Committee is one of the six Main Committees of the UNGA. It deals with disarmament, global challenges
and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the
international security regime.
It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the
powers and functions of any other organ of the UN; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments;
promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of
armaments.
Originally, this committee was known as the Political and Security Committee, but was rapidly overwhelmed by the
range of issues that could be assigned to it. In time, it came to focus on nuclear and conventional disarmament. In
addition to traditional disarmament topics, the committee also examines emerging non-traditional disarmament
issues, such as preventing an arms race in space and telecommunications in terms of international security; the
committee also discusses regional issues and the role of gender in disarmament.
The committee works in close cooperation with its subsidiary organs like the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, international initiatives like the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament and administrative bodies
like the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and United Nations Regional Centres for Peace
and Disarmament.
3. Functions and Powers
Functions and Powers of the UNGA are outlined specifically within Article 10 18 under the Charter of the UN.

Some key points to be noted are

Under Article 10 the UNGA has the power to discuss any issue or matter within the scope of the Charter or relating
to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present charter, except as provided under Article 12. It
can also make recommendations to the Members of the UN or to the UN Security Council or to both. Hence
resolutions adopted on issues or matters making recommendations to the Member States by the UNGA are not
legally binding under the International Law; however they have significantly helped in tackling global issues and
affected lives of millions of people.
Under Article 11(2) the UNGA may discuss any issue on maintenance of international peace and security brought
before it, except as provided in Article 12.
Under Article 12(1) when the UN Security Council is discussing and deliberating any dispute or situation as per its
assigned function under the Charter, the UNGA cannot make recommendations on that dispute or situation unless
the UN Security Council so requests
Under Article 13 the UNGA is tasked with initiating studies and making recommendations to promote international
cooperation in the political field, encouraging the development of international law, promoting the implementation
of cultural, social, and human rights, and promoting fundamental freedoms free from discrimination.
Under Article 15 the UNGA receives and considers reports issued by the other principal organs established under
the Charter as well as reports issued by its own subsidiary organs and bodies.
Should the UN Security Council fail to address a breach of international peace and security due to deadlocks
between its permanent five members, the UNGA can consider the matter immediately, laid out in Article 11, but
further codified with the adoption of UNGA resolution 377(V) (1950) entitled Uniting for Peace.
4. Voting
Each member of the UNGA is entitled to one vote as per Article 18(1) of the Charter. The decisions on matters in
the UNGA are decided by a simple majority, i.e. 50% +1 affirmative votes. However, as per Article 18(2) decisions
on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the total number of affirmative votes. These
questions or matters include recommendations with respect to international peace and security, the election of nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, the admission of new members to the UN, suspension of rights and
privileges of the members, expulsion of members etc. The decision to adopt an important question in itself requires
a simple majority procedurally.
Links:
http://www.un.org/en/
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
http://www.un.org/en/ga/
http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/
http://www.un.org/disarmament/
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument

II. PROOFS/EVIDENCE IN COMMITTEE

Evidence or proof is from the following sources will be accepted as credible in the committee:
1. News Sources
a. REUTERS Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact stated or is in contradiction of the fact
being stated by another delegate in council can be used to substantiate arguments in the committee.
(http://www.reuters.com/ )
b. State operated News Agencies These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the
News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as
such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are,
i. RIA Novosti (Russia) http://en.rian.ru/
ii. IRNA (Iran) http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm
iii. Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China) http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/
2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports
and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied
by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Some examples are,
i. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America http://www.state.gov/index.htm
or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm
ii. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (http://www.mea.gov.in/) or Peoples Republic of China
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/).
iii. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports http://www.un.org/en/members/
(Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative.)
iv. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm), ASEAN
(http://www.aseansec.org/ ), OPEC (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ ), etc.
3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for the Executive Board.
i. UN Bodieslike the UNSC(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/) orUNGA(http://www.un.org/en/ga/).
ii. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/ ), World Bank
(http://www.worldbank.org/ ), International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm ), International
Committee of the Red Cross (http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp ), etc.
iii. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System (http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm ), the International Criminal
Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC )
NOTE: Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/ ), Amnesty International
(http://www.amnesty.org/ ), Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org/ ) or newspapers like the Guardian
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/), Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ ), etc. be accepted as
PROOF/EVIDENCE. But they can be used for better understanding of any issue or even be brought up in debate if
the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a Government.

III. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

Following is the list of documents that need to be perused by all delegates before they come to the council, without
which you may find yourself standing on shore, while the council will sail away. Please understand that you need to
know the following aspects regarding each of the mentioned documents:
The reason why this document exists (for e.g. the Geneva Conventions were enacted to lay down the rules of war
and for the treatment of all parties concerned in the wars.)
The nature of the document and the force it carries, i.e. whether it is a treaty, a convention, a doctrine, a declaration
or a universally accepted custom or norm.
The areas where the document can be applied or has jurisdiction on (for e.g. international humanitarian law applies
only to situations of armed conflict, whereas the human rights laws applies at all times of war and peace alike.)
The contents of the document at hand. You need not memorize any articles or rules of any convention or treaty, but
should know what the document has to say in various situations that may arise in the council.
The delegates must have the understanding of the following:
1. UN Charter -The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 at San Francisco by the nations
represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, most of them earlier allies in the
Second World War. The allies began being referred to as the 'United Nations' towards the end of that war. The
Charter came into force on October 24 1945. Since that time all members joining have had to declare themselves
bound by both documents - though practice has demonstrated on too many occasions that that declaration has not
been taken too seriously. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ http://research.un.org/en/docs/charter
2. International Bill of Human Rights - The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) , and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two Optional Protocols.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf
3. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15)
4. International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small
Arms and Light Weapons

5. Firearms Protocol : Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (A/RES/55/255)
6. The Arms Trade Treaty : http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/
All documents from 3-5and more can be found at :
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Small_Arms_2008.pdf
KINDLY NOTE: This list is non exhaustive and delegates should research about anything that comes their way
during reading.

IV. INTRODUCTION
BAN KI-MOON, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that the widespread availability of small arms and
light weapons was a factor in the over 250 conflicts of the past decade, leading to more than 50,000 deaths each year
and record levels of displacement. Civilians, including children, suffered the most. The diversion of weaponry,
through poor management, allowed rebels, gangs, criminal organizations, pirates, terrorist groups and insurgents to
bolster their firepower.
Small arms do not only make easy the taking and maiming of lives, but also kill economies and the social bonds on
which every kind of collective institution and progress rely. Denial of education and health, criminality, illicit
plundering of natural resources, decreased trade and investment, violence against women and girls, gang violence
and the collapse of the rule of law were facilitated by widespread access to the weapons.
The recent entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), laid the foundation for a global framework of arms
transfer controls. It required exporting States Parties to ensure that their exports would not be used to violate arms
embargoes, fuel conflict, facilitate terrorism or violate international law. He encouraged all Member States to
accede to the Treaty and to faithfully implement it.
ZEID RAAD AL HUSSEIN, United Rights Nations High Commissioner for Human, mentioned These are the
weapons of the easy kill: the most portable, most easily accessible, most casual instruments of death even a
small child can, with its tiny muscles, vanquish a life. In war, however appallingly, it is often the child that receives
the bullet. The most vulnerable, those who could not flee conflict, were often the primary victims of arms-fuelled
conflict, and inexplicable human cruelty was assisted by the availability of arms. Arms profiteering, he stressed,
was the partner of war crimes.
The contrast was breathtakingly stark, he said, between the comfortable profits of the weapons brokers and the
victims of their use. Small arms do not only make easy the taking and maiming of lives, but also kill economies
and the social bonds on which every kind of collective institution and progress rely
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) affects security while anti-personnel mines and
explosive remnants of war kill and maim both people and livestock long after the end of hostilities. Both can have
destabilising effects on social, societal and economic development and can represent major challenges to regional
and national security.
small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine
guns.
light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft
guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;portable
launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortarsof calibres of less than 100 mm.
PRODUCERS
More than 1,000 companies from some 100 countries produce small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.
Only about a dozen countries produce advanced guided light weapons.
Procurement analysis suggests that within a 50 year period, world production of military assault rifles, carbines,
pistols, and light and heavy machine guns would range between 36 million and 46 million units, with an annual
production of small arms alone (firearms, rather than light weapons) averaging 700,000900,000. Research
suggests that close to 80 countries currently produce small arms ammunition for pistols, revolvers, rifles, carbines,

sub-machine guns, and machine-guns. Producers with the capacity to make the equipment necessary to manufacture
small arms ammunition are far less numerous, however.
More than 60 countries currently produce complete light weapon systems or components. More than half of them
are known to manufacture either parts or entire man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) or anti-tank guided
weapons (ATGWs).
The granting of licenses and production rights and the spread of technology have enabled many countries to produce
small arms and light weapons without undertaking expensive or time-consuming research and development
programmes. The Survey estimates that 530,000 to 580,000 military small arms are produced annually either under
licence or as unlicensed copies.
1.

Industrial production

Most of the top manufacturing countries are also the top exporting countries. Some countries, however, such as
India, Pakistan, and North Korea, also have substantial small arms industrial production capacities to accommodate
sizeable domestic markets.
2.

Craft Production

Craft production of small arms refers principally to weapons and ammunition that are fabricated largely by hand in
relatively small quantities. These weapons, produced in dozens of countries across the globe, are often used in
crimes and against government targets.
CLASSIFICATION
Several other important distinctions can be made to classify the range of products. Ammunition, for instance, is
categorized as cartridge-based or non-cartridgebased. Light weapons can be designed as either direct- or indirectfire weapons. While the mortar is an example of indirect-fire weapons, developments in air-busting ammunition will
progressively blur this notion. Anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and bunker-busting weapons can be either guided, unguided,
crew-served, or fire-and-forget weapons firing high-technology projectiles.
Rudimentary weapon systems still feature predominantly in arsenals around the world, confirming an ongoing
demand for low-cost, low-tech weapons. With an estimated nine million or more units produced, the rocketpropelled grenade RPG-7 is exceptionally inexpensive, user-friendly, and easy to upgrade; it has become a weapon
of choice for armies of the developing world and non-state actors alike.
Less-lethal weapons form another category that has seen substantial developments in both military and law
enforcement applications.
a. Small Arms
Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light
machine guns.
b. Ammunition
Small arms and light weapons ammunition features a range of ammunition types from small calibre cartridge-based
ammunition to rocket propelled, high explosive projectiles fired from re-loadable or disposable shoulder-fired
launchers.
c. Less-lethal Weapons
Less-lethal weapons are designed to incapacitate people without causing death or permanent, irreversible injury.

Specialized literature usually refers to these weapons as 'non-lethal' in a military context, and as 'less-lethal' in a
domestic securityor policecontext.
d. Light Weapons
Light weapons are mortars up to 120 mm in calibre; hand-held, under-barrel, and automatic grenade launchers;
heavy machine guns; portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems; anti-materiel rifles, recoilless rifles, and
guns; portable rocket launchers and portable rockets fired from rails.
e. MANPADS
Man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) are light-weight surface-to-air missile systems designed to be
operated by a single individual or small crew.
LIFECYCLES OF SALW
There are many ways in which SALW can end up being misused in environments where the state is unable to fully
control the accessibility to and illegal possession of arms. In general, political, economic and social transformations
within countries tend to increase availability of arms.
SALW, unlike heavy arms, circulate in both the military and civilian markets. While military markets involve legal
transfers from the producers and certified states to the purchasing state, civilian markets are flooded with excess
arms that might result from either military budget cuts or producers surplus production6. While it is not always
possible to accurately pinpoint how SALW find their way into one country from another, and eventually into the
hands of civilians, seven possible ways can be identified7:

Arms captured from enemies during fighting

Soldiers defecting from armed groups
Stolen or captured peacekeeping stocks (from UN troops)
Arms supplied by the armed forces
Purchase through the open market
Supply from government stockpiles of neighbouring states
Inheritance from family and relatives or friends.

For example, lets consider the life of a gun manufactured in a developed country considered to be at peace, and
purchased legally for national defence by another country that has recently been embroiled in a domestic conflict.
The gun is initially in the possession of state forces. However, in this instance, corrupt officials permit the looting of
a stockpile containing the gun for personal profit, or looting of stockpiles is made easy because the
facilities are not secure. The gun, along with many other weapons, is sold to a small armed group that is operating
outside the law and is building on popular discontent to overthrow the government. This group has found it easy to
play on the fears of those in small villages and towns and recruit members. Suddenly, the gun is now being used in
rapes, assaults and other violations of human rights. The diagram below illustrates this and other paths.
Many ways have been suggested for dealing with these all-too-typical problems. One would be to tighten trade
regulations and procedures. Another would be to address governmental corruption. Yet another would be making
sure that stored weapons are difficult to access, marked and traceable. Or one could focus on reducing the demand or
reasons for using weapons, for instance by educating people and providing employment that prevents them from
falling under the influence of armed groups and criminal gangs. In the end, a combination of all of these approaches
is necessary to reduce the problem.

*Figures from the Small Arms Survey, Geneva.Source: International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
ADVANTAGES OF LIGHT WEAPONS
In recent conflicts, more people have been killed by small arms and light weapons than by major weapons systems.
The distinguishing features of these weapons that make them so suitable to contemporary intra-state conflicts
include:
Low Cost and Wide Availability. Because the production of small arms and light weapons requires little in the way
of sophisticated technology, and because these weapons are manufactured for military, police and civilian use, there
are plentiful suppliers around the world. In addition, the existence of many tens of millions of such weapons
whether newly produced, given away by downsizing militaries or recycled from conflict to conflictleads to
bargain-basement prices in many areas around the world.
Lethality. The increasing sophistication and lethality of rapid-fire assault rifles, automatic pistols and submachine
guns and their diffusion to non-state actors has given such groups a firepower that often matches or exceeds that of
national police or constabulary forces. With such weapons capable of firing up to 300 rounds a minute, a single
individual can pose a tremendous threat to society. The incorporation of new technology into shoulder-fired rockets,
mortars and light anti-tank weapons has only increased the firepower that warring factions bring to bear in civil
conflicts.
Simplicity and Durability. Small arms are easy to use and maintain, require little maintenance or logistical support
and remain operational for many years. Such weapons require little training to use effectively, which greatly
increases their use in conflicts involving untrained combatants and children.
Portability and Concealability. Small arms and light weapons can be carried by an individual soldier or light vehicle,
are easily transported or smuggled to areas of conflict, and can be concealed in shipments of legitimate cargo.

Military, Police and Civilian Uses. Unlike major conventional weapons, which are most often procured solely by
national military forces, small arms and light weapons cross the dividing line separating military and police forces
from the civilian population. Depending on the gun control laws of a particular country, citizens are permitted to
own anything from pistols and sporting guns to fully automatic rifles. In many countries, moreover, there has been a
dramatic increase in the number and size of private militias and security firms which, in many cases, are equipped
with military-type weapons.
All of these characteristics of light weapons have made them particularly attractive to the sort of paramilitary and
irregular forces that have played such a prominent role in recent conflicts. These forces have limited financial and
technical means, lack professional military training, and often must operate in remote and inaccessible areasall
conditions that favor the use of small arms and light weapons. At the same time, many states have increased their
purchases of these weapons for use in counterinsurgency campaigns against ethnic and political groups and to
suppress domestic opposition movements
CHANNELS
i.

Legal Channels

Currently, there are over 300 manufacturers of light weapons and related equipment in 50 countries around the
world, a 25 percent increase in the last decade alone. Until the end of World War II, the major producers of these
weapons were the industrialized nations. In recent decades, however, these established producers have been joined
by China, Israel, South Africa and many developing countries. Estimates of some common models produced by
these countries in the past few decades show the enormity of the problem: 5 million to 7 million Belgian FAL
assault rifles produced in 15 countries; 35 million to 50 million Soviet/Russian AK assault rifles manufactured by
Soviet/Russian factories and licensees; 7 million German Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles made in 18 countries; 8
million U.S. M-16 rifles produced in seven countries; and 6 million Chinese-made AK-type assault rifles.
These numbers, as alarming as they are, do not include the millions of surplus arms that have been sold or given
away as the world's major military powers have reduced their forces and/or found themselves with excess
production capacity following the end of the Cold War. Because small arms and light weapons have few moving
parts and are extremely durable, even weapons that are 10- to 20-years old are often fully operational and as
effective as newly produced weapons. Accordingly, countries such as the United States, Russia and Germany
(especially with the dismantling of the East German army) have been able to sell or transfer millions of light
weapons to their allies and clients abroad.
ii.

Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels

In addition to legal sales and military assistance programs, small arms and light weapons are disseminated through
covert and "gray-market" channels (that is, channels that operate with government support even though in violation
of official government policy), most often by government intelligence agencies or private companies linked to such
agencies. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA helped to supply some 3 million AK-47 assault
rifles (mainly Chinese and Egyptian models) to rebel mujahideen; thousands of these weapons have since turned up
in fighting in Kashmir and elsewhere in South Asia, and as far away as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In
addition, the United States and the Soviet Union supplied arms to rebel groups in Central America and sent massive
amounts of weapons to various factions in Angola and Mozambique.
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow have discontinued many of these activities. But it is widely
believed that military commanders and managers of military factories in Russia and some of the other newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union have engaged in large-scale covert sales of weapons to clients in
neighboring states and beyond. Government officials in other states have also been accused of smuggling arms to
allied groups in other countries, whether for profit or to advance particular political or religious objectives. Officials

in Zaire, for instance, reportedly bought large quantities of weapons on the international market and sold them to
UNITA forces in Angola for profits running into the hundreds of millions of dollarsmost of which is believed to
have wound up in the overseas bank accounts of former President Mobutu Seso Seko and his associates.
Another form of gray-market transfers entails the delivery of weapons from government stockpiles to political
entities and ethnic militias associated with the ruling clan or party. Prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for
example, the Hutu-dominated government distributed small arms and machetes to government-linked militias. Once
the killing began, the Rwandan military sought to crush any organized Tutsi resistance while the militias slaughtered
unarmed Tutsis and moderate Hutus. A similar pattern was evident in Haiti in the early 1990s, when the ruling
military junta organized and armed the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) to suppress
popular support for ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
iii.

Illicit and Black-Market Channels

The third major category of light weapons transfers includes illegal sales through black-market channels, the supply
of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal sanctions, and the theft of arms from government
stocks or private citizens. In recent years, there has been a striking growth in the operations of black-market dealers
to satisfy the needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal conflicts. Because such actors are normally barred from
purchases on the legal munitions market, they must acquire their weaponry from illicit sources. The growing number
of UN arms embargoes has also produced an increased demand for black-market arms. Although it is impossible to
estimate the value or scale of all such transactions, some estimates place 1993 black market sales to the belligerents
in Bosnia alone at $2 billion or more.< 8 >
The black-market trade has been facilitated by the existence of vast stockpiles of surplus arms in the states of the
former Soviet blocarms which in many cases are guarded by near-destitute soldiers and officers who are all too
eager to conspire in their theft by black-market dealers or to enter the illicit trade themselves. Moreover, there are
strong linkages between the illegal narcotics trade and black-market arms trafficking. These underground networks
have developed sophisticated methods for the procurement, transportation and sale of small arms and light weapons,
at times with the connivance of governments or corrupt public officials.
Finally, theft of weapons from military and police warehouses is a major problem in countries afflicted by civil war
or insurgent violence. As civil strife spread across Albania in the spring of 1997, thousands of weapons were looted
from military depots by insurgents, criminals and civilians. These weapons not only increased the levels of armed
violence in Albania, but reportedly were also being smuggled across the border into the Serbian province of Kosovo,
where 2 million ethnic Albanians pose an irredentist challenge to Serbian authority. In South Africa and Colombia,
stolen weapons contribute to a culture of violence and criminality that undermines the stability of the state and the
cohesion of society.
The following list of legal, illegal and covert methods by which small arms and light weapons are sold, transferred
and exchanged underscores the complexity of the problem:
nments to allied governments abroad;

eveloping nations;

ethnic group;
-market sales to the governments of "pariah" countries and to insurgent and separatist forces;

her for profit or in pursuit of common political

objectives.
ARMS TRADE TREATY
THE LEGALITY OF WEAPONRY The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in April 2013 in light of the human suffering, political repression, crime and terror among civilian
populations due to the large availability of weapons. The ATT came into force meaning to:
reduce the violence against millions of civilians in conflict-ridden regions;
help create a conducive environment for the United Nations to carry out its mandates in the areas of humanitarian
assistance, peacekeeping, peace-making and post-conflict peacebuilding and the promotion of the Millennium
Development Goals;
foster a safer environment for humanitarian actors operating in volatile areas across the globe. The treaty has been
a highly debated issue, however, with two major exporters, Russia and China, not signing the treaty. This has caused
a major drawback in the effectiveness of the treaty and raising concerns among member states
CONCLUSION.
The international community should urgently mobilize to counter the problem of illicit weapons and ammunition,
and should act quickly to curb the proliferation of such weapons in Africa, he said. It was more necessary than ever
that Member States be encouraged to implement the United Nations Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light
Weapons and the ATT. Member States must do all they could to ensure that they were meeting all relevant
international obligations and commitments to control the movement and misuse of small arms and light weapons,
and to stem the flood of arms into conflict zones. They must do more to enhance and strengthen international
cooperation and assistance. They should ensure that all peacekeeping operations included, as fundamental to their
mandates, the need to prevent and combat small arms and light weapons proliferation and misuse. They should also
support civil society in that regard. Finally, they should actively promote and support a full role for women as
participants and decision-makers in addressing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

FURTHER RESEARCH
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What should be done about the growing market for small arms?
2. What can be done to prevent further escalation of conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East due to
the accessibility of weapons?
What measures should be taken up by major exporting nations to reduce illicit small arms trade?
What should be done by nations in the North African and Middle Eastern regions to prevent an influx of
small arms into the areas?
What should be done about the concerns raised over the Arms Trade Treaty?