permanent mandatory injunction.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND

AND WIFE
Mariano B. Arroyo, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

LAW: Articles 142 and 143 of the Civil Code

Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo, defendant and

appellee. [No. 17014. August 11, 1921]

FACTS: Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vazquez

de Arroyo were married in 1910. they have lived
together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until
July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their
common

home

thenceforth

with

the

intention

of

living

separate from her husband. After

efforts had been made by the husband without avail

to induce her to resume marital relations, an action
was initiated by him for restitution of conjugal
rights,

and

permanent

mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to

return to the matrimonial home and live with him
as a dutiful wife.

RULING: To begin with, the obligation which the law

imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a
duty universally recognized in civil society and is
clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil
Code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife
against the husband is not conditioned upon the
procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the
existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it has
been determined that where the wife is forced to
leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from
her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel
him

to

make

provision

for

her

separate

maintenance; and he may be required to pay the

expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily
incurred in enforcing such obligation.

DEFENDANT: admits the fact of marriage, and that

she had left her husband's home without his

Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as

consent; but she averred by way of defense and

of society at large require that the courts should

cross-complaint that she had been compelled to

move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide

leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband.

for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this

Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief,

step involves a recognition of the de facto separation

to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a

of the spousesa state which is abnormal and

liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an

fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From

allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate

this consideration it follows that provision should

maintenance.

not be made for separate maintenance in favor of

the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and

TC: gave judgment in favor of the defendant,

separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

authorizing her to live apart from her husband, and

granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month.
Supreme Court of Michigan, held that an action for
the support of the wife separate from the husband
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for
leaving the conjugal home.
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution
of conjugal rights or absolute order or

will only be sustained when the reasons for it are

imperative. That imperative necessity is the only
ground on which such a proceeding can be
maintained. In the State of South Carolina, where
judicial divorces have never been procurable on any
ground, the Supreme Court fully recognizes the

right of the wife to have provision for separate

restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we

maintenance, where it is impossible for her to

are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an

continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but

order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be

the same court has more than once rejected the

entered to compel the restitution of the purely

petition of the wife for separate maintenance where

personal right of consortium. At best such an order

it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-

can be effective for no other purpose than to compel

treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper

the spouses to live under the same roof; and the

conduct.

experience of those countries where the courts of

justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice

In the light of the considerations stated, it is

is extremely questionable.

obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded

and none of the relief sought therein can be
granted. The same considerations that require the

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United

dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove

States, only one court, so far as we can discover,

that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done

has ever attempted to make a peremptory order

nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of

requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;

his wife and that she is under an obligation, both

and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to

moral and legal, to return to the common home and

follow and live with her husband, who had changed

cohabit with him. The only question which here

his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The

arises is as to the character and extent of the relief

decision referred to was based on a provision of the

which may be properly conceded to him by judicial

Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the

decree.

Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago,

and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the

The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the re-

American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation

stitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in

by process of contempt is rejected.

the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled

to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to return to the conjugal home and live

In a decision 1909, the supreme court of Spain

with him as a wife according to the precepts of law

appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia

and morality. Of course if such a decree were

Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to

entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would

the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon

be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she

her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition

should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present

of certain money and effects then in her possession

writer is aware, the question is raised for the first

and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of

time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for

the ganancial property, all income, rents, and

the court to make such an order.

interest which might accrue to her from the

property which she had brought to the marriage.
But it does not appear that this order for the return
are

of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by

convinced that it is not within the province of the

any other penalty than the consequences that

courts of this country to attempt to compel one of

would be visited upon her in respect to the use and

the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal

control of her property; and it does not appear that

rights to, the other. Of course where the property

her disobedience to that order would necessarily

rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for

have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Upon

examination

of

the

authorities

we

just and equitable value of the services rendered by

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B.
Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the

him was P500, which the defendants, Marcelo

Lauron and Juana Abella refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason.

marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory

The defendants argues that their daughter-in-law

part of the complaint.

had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and

that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any
relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day
when she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances
CFI: Dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient
evidence. The motion was likewise denied for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: Who is bound to pay the bill, is it the father
and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of
the latter?
HELD: The husband has the obligation to pay
and not the father and mother-in-law.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of
illness is comprised among the mutual obligations

PELAYO v. LAURON

to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual

support. If every obligation consists in giving, doing

12 PHIL. 453, January 12, 1909

or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are

mutually bound to support each other, there can be

FACTS:

Plaintiff ,

Arturo Pelayo, a physician

residing in Cebu, filed a complaint for collection of

sum of money amounting to 500 pesos, stating that
on or about October 13 , 1906, at night, the plaintiff
was called to the house of the defendants, Marcelo
Lauron and Juana Abella, situated in San Nicolas,
and that upon arrival he was requested by them to
render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law
who was about to give birth to a child; that
therefore, and after consultation with the attending
physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, on
account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by
means

of

FORCEPS

which

operation

was

performed by Plaintiff who also had to remove the

afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until
the following morning, and that afterwards, on the
same day, he visited the patient several times. The

no question but that, when either of them by reason

of illness should be in need of medical assistance,
the other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in
order that health may be restored, and he or she
may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such
support is therefore liable for all expenses, including
the fees of the medical expert for his professional
services. This liability originates from the abovecited mutual obligation which the law has expressly
established between the married couple.
The fact that it was not the husband who called the
plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is
no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as
the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to
which the life of the patient was at that moment

exposed, considered that medical assistance was

vs. COURT

urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband

ILUSORIO, respondents.

to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a

physician at such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable

OF

APPEALS

and

ERLINDA

K.

RTC: Granted wifes petition for writ of habeas

corpus.
CA: (1) Ordered visitation rights to Potenciano

While recognizing the validity and efficiency of a

Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children.

contract to furnish support wherein a person bound

(2) Recalled the writ of habeas corpus and denied

himself to support another who was not his relative,

the petition of habeas corpus.

established the rule that the law does impose the

obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but

This is a consolidated petition of Spouses Ilusorio;

as the liability arose out of a contract, the

the wife against the denial of the petition for habeas

stipulations of the agreement must be held.

corpus and the husband against the order of

The father and mother-in-law are strangers with

respect to the obligation that devolves upon the
husband to provide support, among which is the
furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the
time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the
defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
reason it is obvious that the former can not be
compelled to pay fees which they are under no
liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.

visitation rights.
FACTS: On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and
Potenciano Ilusorio were married and lived together
for 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he was
in Manila and at Ilusorio

Penthouse,

Baguio

Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the

other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of
their marriage, the spouses had six children,
namely: Ramon Ilusorio; Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner;
Maximo; Sylvia; Marietta; and Shereen.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos
arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that their mother
gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of
100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed
by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potencianos health deteriorated. The wife then filed
a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano before the RTC Antipolo due

[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA
I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE
and JANE DOE, respondents.

to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor

eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo and instead live at Cleveland
Condominium Makati.

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO

ILUSORIO,

MA.

ERLINDA

I.

ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to

BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners,

compel her husband to live with her in conjugal

bliss?

RULING: No court is empowered as a judicial

awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas

authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.

corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such

Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a

right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of

writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by

subjects sanity.

any other mesne process (Any process issued

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 139789, the Court

between the original and final process; that is, in

DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

between the original writ and the execution). That is

In G.R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition

a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to

and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals

the man and womans free choice.

insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent

Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases

of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of
liberty

must

be

an

illegal

and

involuntary

deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal

restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral. Evidence shows that there
was no actual and effective detention or deprivation
of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that he is
about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily

render

him

mentally

incapacitated.

Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or

medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions. There was no
unlawful restraint on the liberty of Potenciano
neither did he request the administrator of the
Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and
other children from seeing or visiting him. He made
it clear that he did not object to seeing them. In this
case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence
and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full
mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
we will deprive him of his right to privacy which is
a fundamental constitutional right. Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it

ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff and

appellant,

vs.

JOSE

CAMPOS

RUEDA,

defendant and appellee.

[No. 11263. November 2, 1916.]
Facts:
Eloisa Goitia and Jose Rueda were married in
Manila on January 7, 1915. A month thereafter,
Eloisa returned to her parents' home. According to
her, Jose made several demands for her to perform
lewd and lascivious acts on his genital organs which
she repeatedly denied to perform. Because of his

resistance to perform and heed on Jose's demand,

Jose maltreated her with words and inflicted
injuries upon her which prompted her to leave the
conjugal dwelling and return to her parents' home.
Eloisa then filed a petition for support outside of the
conjugal dwelling.
RTC: Denied the petition on the ground that a
husband cannot support his wife outside the
conjugal dwelling unless a judicial decree for divorce
or separation has been validly issued.
Issue: Whether or not Eloisa may claim for support
even if she is outside the conjugal dwelling.
Ruling: Yes. She is entitled for support.
Although the Code provides that the husband, as
his obligation to give support, may receive and
maintain the wife at the conjugal dwelling or give
pension that may be fixed, it does not necessarily
mean that it is either of the two. When the wife is
forced to leave the conjugal dwelling, she may file
and receive support from the husband even if she
lives outside the conjugal dwelling. This is so
because the marriage itself creates the obligation of
the husband to support his wife and the law will not
reward him by terminating the same because of his
wrongdoings which drove his wife to seek refuge in
the parental home.
P.S. Baka hanapin ni Mam, The case of Benso
Comas wherein the Court denied the petition of
the wife for support when the husband suffered
severe business losses. Ang difference nila, sa
case ni Comas, there was prior agreement
between the wife and the husband to live
separately.

Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale

between a father and daughter who are living under
PROPERTY RELATIONS

the same roof, especially so when the father has no

need of money as the properties supposedly sold

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.

were

all

income-producing.

Further,

petitioner

claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3

and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the

G.R. No. 55322. February 16, 1989.

former, therefore, cannot validly sell. As to the

FACTS:

to Agustina his 1/3 share.

Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina

RTC: The trial court sustained the foregoing

Jocson-Vasquez

are

the

only

Exhibit 2, he only questioned the sale by his father

surviving

offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and

Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto
Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra
Poblete predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Subsequently,
Emilio Jocson also died intestate.

contentions of petitioner. It declared that the

considerations mentioned in the documents were
merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there
was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid
for the properties; 2) the prices were grossly
inadequate

which

is

tantamount

to

lack

of

consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the

sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-

The present controversy concerns the validity of

Vasquez,

three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson

circumstances obtaining between the parties; and

during his lifetime. These documents purportedly

that the real intention of the parties were

conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what

donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson

apparently covers almost all of his properties,

from participating in the estate of his parents. It

including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of

his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null and
void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only
heirs of their deceased parents.

taking

into

consideration

the

further declared the properties mentioned in

Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete and ordered that
the

properties

subject

matter

of

all

the

The documents, which were presented as evidence

documents be registered in the name of herein

by Ernesto Vasquez are as follows:

petitioners and private respondents.

1. Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa; (exhibit 3)

CA: reversed the RTCs ruling and ruled that

2. Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan; (exhibit 4)

Exhibit 3 and 4 is now barred by prescription,

3. Deed

of

Extrajudicial

Partition

and

Adjudication with Sale.

The petitioner filed his original complaint and
assailed that the above documents, be declared null
and void.

pursuant to the settled rule that an action for

annulment of a contract based on fraud must be
filed within 4 years, from the discovery of the fraud.
(Registered on July 29, 1968; complaint was filed on
June 20, 1973).
With regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and
subsisting, and the partition with the sale therein
made by and between Emilio Jocson and Agustina

Jocson Vasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong

subject properties have all been made in accordance

to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that

with Art. 996 of the Civil Code on intestate4

it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the

succession, and the appellees remaining 1/3 has

wife.

not been prejudiced.

In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. LISSUE: WON the CA erred in not declaring as

22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held

inexistent and null and void the contracts in

that:

question.

Anent their claim that the shares in question are

RULING:

conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a

The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack

invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which

consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree

provides that x x x. As interpreted by this Court,

of

the

the party who invokes this presumption must

vendor

first prove that the property in controversy was

proof

documents

modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly

becomes

more

themselves

stringent

show

that

where
the

acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so

where the documents were notarized, as in the case
at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this
case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not
sufficiently proven that the questioned documents
are without consideration.

Vasquez had no other source of income other than

what she derives from helping in the management of
the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and
which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price,
was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas,
who testified that Agustina and her husband were
engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice.

because of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin

with, there was no showing that the prices were
grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price
paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total
of

the

validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he

must first present proof that the disputed properties

properties

alleged

by

petitioner.
As to the Exhibit 3 and 4, where in it was assailed
that the properties were conjugal properties, the
Court ruled that:
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:

and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,

however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is
insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the properties
were

acquired

during

the

spouses

coverture.

Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two

different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already

Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void

value

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may

were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson

Firstly, Moises Jocsons claim that Agustina Jocson-

assessed

acquired during the marriage.

existing. It may be that the properties under dispute

were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a
bachelor but were registered only after his marriage
to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was
described in the certificates of title as married to
the latter.
Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of
title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner.
This is so because the words married to preceding
Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is
the owner of the properties, the same having been

registered in his name alone, and that he is married

approved by the trial court. Ironically, the said

to Alejandra Poblete.

agreement failed to fully subserve the intended

amicable settlement of all the disputes of the

In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson,

spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel of one

presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed

of them, the compromise agreement which was

properties

parents

designed to terminate a litigation spawned two new

coverture. We would have ruled that the properties,

petitions, with each party initiating one against the

though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson

other.

alone, are conjugal properties in view of the

Court

presumption under Article 160. There being no such

agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981,

proof, the condition sine qua non for the application

the date when it was approved by the trial court,

of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We

and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by

rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the

the parties.

were

acquired

during

his

of

Appeals

held

that

the

compromise

exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

ISSUE:
There being no showing also that the camarin and

when does the compromise agreement became

the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4,

effective.

were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio

Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be

HELD:

considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of

The supreme court tacitly held in affirmative in the

Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on

ruling

petitioner.

We are in agreement with the holding of the Court

of

the

court

of

appeals

that:

of Appeals that the compromise agreement became

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the

effective only on the date when it was approved by

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

the trial court, and not when it was signed by the

TODA,

JR.

V.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

March 26, 1990 (183 SCRA 713)

parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 in

the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take

FACTS:

place save in virtue of a judicial order. Hence, the

Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were

separation of property is not effected by the mere

married on June 9, 1951 and begot with two

execution of the contract or agreement of the

children. Individual differences and the alleged

parties, but by the decree of the court approving the

infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal

same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon

union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file a case

judicial approval, without which it is void. Provided

against him in the former Court of First Instance of

further, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides

Rizal,a

that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon

petition

partnership

termination

conjugal
and

the issuance of a decree of separation of property.

Furthermore, respondent court correctly held that

held,

the issue involved was more of a question of

parties

alleged

of

dissipation of conjugal funds. After hearings were

the

for

for

in

mismanagement

order

to

disagreeable

avoid

further

proceedings,

interpretation

of

contract

rather

than

A petition to joint for approval of dissolution of

determination of facts. Benigno failed to make a

conjugal partnership was filed and signed by the

plausible showing that the supposed evidence he

parties with the embodied a compromise agreement

had intended to present, if any, would not be merely

allocating to the spouses their respective shares in

collateral matters.

the conjugal partnership assets. The said petition

and

the

compromise

agreement

therein

were

SPOUSES

RICKY

LEONARDO

WONG
JOSON,

and

ANITA

JUANITO

CHAN,

SANTOS,

EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. NO. 70082. AUGUST 19, 1991
FACTS:

Private

respondent

Romarico

Henson

married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They

have 3 children but even during the early years of
their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been
most of the time living separately. The former stayed
in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila.
During the marriage Romarico bought a 1,787square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for
P11,492 from his father, Dr. Henson with money
borrowed from an officemate.
Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan
whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of
jewellery for sale valued at P321,830.95. When
Katrina failed to return the jewellery within the 20day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded
payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of
Anita a check for P55,000 which was dishonored for

lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with

and his wife were never personally served a copy

estafa before the then CFI of Pampanga and Angeles

thereof; that he had nothing to do with the business

City.
LC rendered a decision dismissing the case on the

transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her

ground that Katrinas liability was not criminal but

properties levied on execution and sold at public

civil as no estafa was committed by the issuance of

auction by the sheriff were his capital properties

the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed

and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in

to enter into such transactions; and that the

against Katrina and Romarico Henson, an action for

the case were null and void.

On November 10, 1978, the LC issued an order

collection of a sum of money also in the same

restraining the Register of Deeds of Angeles City

branch of the aforesaid court.

The court promulgated a decision in favor of the

from issuing the final bill of sale of TCTs in favor of

Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to

pay the Wongs P321,830.95 with legal interest from

until further orders of the court.

After trial on the merits, the LC rendered a decision

May 27, 1975, the date of filing of the complaint,

holding that Romarico was indeed not given his day

until fully paid. A writ of execution was thereafter

in court as he was not represented by counsel nor

issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City

was he notified of the hearings therein although he

covered by TCTs all in the name of Romarico

was never declared in default, noting that the

Henson x x x married to Katrina Henson.

On November 11, 1977 a public auction was

complaint

administered by Deputy Sheriff Sicat, the properties

case do not show that Romarico had anything to do

registered

in

the

name

of

Romarico

Henson

Juanito Santos and TCTs in favor of Leonardo Joson

as

well

as

the

testimonial

and

documentary evidence adduced at the trial in said

married to Katrina Henson were sold at the

with the transactions between Katrina and Anita.

The defendants appealed to Appellate Court in its

auction to Juanito L. Santos, two parcels of land in

decision the said court affirmed the decision of the

the amount of P145,000, and Leonardo B. Joson,

LC.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as

two parcels of land in the amount of P119,000.00.

After the inscription on TCTs the property covered

conjugal properties, the appellate court ruled in the

by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the

negative. It noted that the properties are Romaricos

Rural Bank on account of the mortgage loan of

exclusive capital having been bought by him with

P8,000 which Romarico and Katrina had obtained

his own funds. But granting that the properties are

from said bank. The property was sold by the sheriff

conjugal,

to the highest bidder for P57,000 on September 9,

obligations as the latter were exclusively hers

1977.
On September 14, 1978, Juanito Santos, who had

because they were incurred without the consent of

earlier bought the same property at public auction

the family and they did not redound to the benefit of

on November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying the

sum of P57,000 plus the legal interest of P6,840.00.
About a month before such redemption, Romarico
filed an action for the annulment of the decision as
well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and
the auction sale therein in the same CFI. Romarico
alleged that he was not given his day in court
because he was not represented by counsel as Attys.
Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina; that
although he did not file an answer to the complaint
he was not declared in default in the case; that
while Atty. Albino received a copy of the decision, he

they

cannot

answer

for

Katrinas

her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of

the family.
ISSUE: WON the execution of a decision in an
action for collection of a sum of money may be
nullified on the ground that the real properties
levied upon and sold at public auction are the
alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did
not participate in his wifes business transaction
from which said action stemmed.
RULING: On the matter of ownership of the
properties involved the Court disagrees with the

appellate

are

and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no

been

more than what the seller can legally transfer. But,

still

inasmuch as the decision the case is void only as

presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even

far as Romarico and the conjugal properties are

though Romarico and Katrina had been living

concerned, the same may still be executed by the

separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the

Spouses Wong against Katrina Henson personally

properties

exclusively
acquired

court

that

owned
during

the

by
the

properties

Romarico.
marriage,

prices of P145,000 and P119,000 respectively,

received by said spouses from the public auction

exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof

that Romarico acquired the properties with money

sale.
The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure

he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear

proceeding against Romarico and Katrina Henson

where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If

filed by the Rural Bank of Porac should, however, be

he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part

respected unless Romarico exercises his right of

of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof

redemption over the property covered by TCT in

on

considering that in the determination of the nature

accordance with law.

The decisions of the appellate court and the lower

of a property acquired by a person during covertrue,

court

the controlling factor is the source of the money

modifications above-stated.

utilized in the purchase.

The
conjugal
nature

paramount

of

the

of

and exclusively. The Spouses Wong must return to

said presumption or to prove that the properties are

of

absence

are

Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson the purchase

is

the

they

clear,

matter

in

Having

satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome

this

subsists

said

importance

properties

notwithstanding, Katrinas indebtedness may not be

paid for with them her obligation not having been
shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the
fact that her rights over the properties are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the CC (before the effectivity of
the FC on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of the family or
when she borrows money for the purpose of
purchasing things necessary for the support of the
family if the husband fails to deliver the proper
sum; when the administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband, and when the wife gives
moderate donations for charity.
The execution purchasers Santos

and

Joson

possess no rights which may rise above judgment

debtor Katrinas inchoate proprietary rights over the
properties sold at public auction. After all, a person
can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell

are

hereby

AFFIRMED

subject

to

the

In addressing specifically the issue regarding the

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.*

ANTONIO

A.S.

REGIONAL
QUEZON

VALDES,

TRIAL

CITY,

COURT,

and

petitioner,
BRANCH

CONSUELO

M.

vs.
102,

disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court

said:

GOMEZ-

VALDES, respondents.

Considering that this Court has already declared

the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147,

FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were

the property regime of petitioner and respondent

married on 1971. They have 5 children. In 1992,

shall

Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of their

ownership.

marriage in the trial court pursuant to Article 36 of

be

governed

by

the

rules

on

co-

the Family Code, which was later granted.

The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the
Consuelo sought a clarification of that portion of
the decision directing compliance with Articles 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family

Code

contained

no

provisions

on

the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in

Family Code finds no application since Article 102

refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the
absolute community of property.

unions without marriage. Meantime, the children

filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order,

but was denied. In his recourse to this Court,
petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the

In its Order, the trial court made the following

Family Code should be held controlling.

clarification:
ISSUE: Whether or not Articles 50, 51 and 52 in
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the

relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code

govern the disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses

parties and will be owned by them in equal

shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their
family home and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares.

RULING: NO. The trial court correctly applied the

law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the

In the liquidation and partition of the properties

owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply.

provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the

case may be, of the Family Code. This peculiar kind
of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other,
so exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage.

Under this property regime, property acquired by

both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the

family

household.

Unlike

the

conjugal

partnership of gains, the fruits of the couples

separate property are not included in the coownership.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue

on the settlement of the parties common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately. A court which had jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the family home and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of
the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership

of

gains,

the

property

regimes

recognized for valid and voidable marriages are

irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses.

Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the

spouses Atayan, their onetenth (1/10) pro indiviso
SPS.

TRINIDAD

S.

ESTONINA,

ESTONINA

petitioners,

and

PAULINO

COURT

vs.

OF

APPEALS, SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA

HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA,
REMEDIOS,
MARILOU,

ELVIRA,
and

OFELIA,

LOLITA

all

VIRGILIO,
surnamed

GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA

and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.

Certificate of Title issued in the name of Santiago

Garcia who died on October 2, 1967. Some six years
after Santiago Garcias death, the CFI of Manila
order

granting

Trinidad

Estoninas

application for a writ of preliminary attachment in a

civil

case

plaintiffs

entitled
-

Trinidad

versus

Estonina,

et

al.,

Garcia,

et

al.,

Consuelo

defendants. Consequently, a notice of attachment

was inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance at
the back of TCT in favor of Trinidad Estonina
covering

all

the

rights,

title,

interest,

and

participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of

Santiago Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of
land covered by the said title.

Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta,

namely Ofelia, Remedios, Elvira and Castor, all
Garcia,

executed

deed

selling,

transferring and conveying unto the spouses Celso

Atayan and Nilda Hicban their title, rights, interest
and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro
indiviso share in the said parcel of land. A year
after, Santiago Garcias second wife and widow,
Consuelo

Garcia

and

their

children,

Virgilio,

Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed

suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their fourtenths (4/10) pro indiviso share in the same parcel
of land. In 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of
Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcias son from his
first

marriage),

and

their

was made on the parcel of land. It was sold at a

public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the
highest bidder. The IAC ruled in favor of Trinidad
Estonina. Rendered a decision declaring owners

decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the

Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. T-99961 was issued in favor of Trinidad
Estonina married to Paulino Estonina.
RESPONDENT: In 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a
complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale and
transfer certificate of title with damages before RTC,
impleading as defendants the spouses Estonina and
the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses
Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of
land. They prayed that the sale at public auction of
the parcel of land and the Sheriffs final deed be
declared null and void; that they be declared owners
of nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso interests, shares
and participation in the parcel of land.

In 1977, while the case was pending, the children of

surnamed

against Consuelo Garcia, execution pending appeal

and/or CANCELLED. Upon the finality of the said

FACTS: A parcel of land was covered by Transfer

an

Trinidad Estonina obtained a favorable decision

copy of Certificate of Title No. T-82229 a NULLITY

G.R. No. 111547. January 27, 1997.

issued

share in the parcel of land.

children,

Roderick,

PETITIONER: spouses Estonina claimed that the

respondents (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith
in allegedly purchasing the parcel of land, they
being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and
valid

attachment;

that

there

was

no

valid

extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed by

the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights
could have been adjusted and settled before doing
anything with his property; that the deeds of sale
executed by his heirs were anomalous, fictitious and
simulated intended to defeat the adverse judgment
rendered by the Court against them and the writ of
attachment issued pursuant thereto as they were
derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly
executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23, 1967; that
the property in question is presumed to be conjugal

answerable for obligations and liabilities of the

married to Paulino Estonina, and issue

conjugal partnership incurred during the existence

another one, also in her name, married to

of the partnership.

the same person, stating therein that said

person is the owner of the property therein

RTC: dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. It

covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso,

found,

and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs

among

others,

that

the

property

was

acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia

of Santiago Garcia pro indiviso.

and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal

in nature. It relied solely on the fact that when TCT
covering the said land was issued, Santiago Garcia
was already married to Consuelo Garcia, thus
giving rise to the presumption that the same was
indeed conjugal. It found the testimony of Consuelo
Garcia that the said property was inherited by
Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother to be
self-serving and completely disregarded the said
testimony.

CA: concluded that contrary to the finding of the

RTC, the parcel of land in question was not the
conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia,
but was the formers exclusive property. It gave
credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo
Garcia that the said parcel of land was inherited by
Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia
Clemente and that it used to be part of a big tract of
land which was divided among Santiago and his
sisters.

Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on

October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of onehalf (1/2) of the said parcel of land was
transmitted

to

succession.

By

his
the

heirs

by

intestate

law

on

intestate

succession, his nine children, five by his first

wife

and

four

out

of

the

subsequent

marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second

wife and widow, inherited the same at onetenth

(1/10)

each

pro

indiviso.

The

remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the

conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus,
inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited onetenth (1/10) of her husbands conjugal share
in the said property and is the owner of onehalf (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she
owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the
said parcel of land. Finding as such, the
RTC held that what could be attached by the
spouses

Estonina

and

later

levied

only Consuelo Garcias rights and interests

which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the
property. Thus, the RTC ordered the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99961 in
name

of

TRINIDAD

S.

part of Santiago Garcias estate upon his death.

When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and
Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to
the extent of one/tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share.
Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcias one tenth
(1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in
question which could be validly attached, levied and
sold in execution to satisfy the judgment against her
and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No.
88430.
ISSUES: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS
CONJUGAL OR EXCLUSIVE. WHAT ARE THE
SHARES OF ESTONINA AND ATAYAN.
LAW: Article 160 of the Civil Code

on

execution and sold at public auction was

the

- It was therefore the entire property that formed

ESTONINA,

RULING:

The evidence on record as well as

established jurisprudence on the matter, lead us to

concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the property involved in this dispute is indeed the
exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code

that all property of the marriage belong to the

having been registered in his name alone, and that

conjugal partnership applies only when there is

he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

proof that the property was acquired during the

marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for

Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it

the operation of the presumption in favor of the

was the entire parcel of land in question that

conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the

formed part of his estate and which passed to his

petitioners have been unable to present any proof

ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death.

that the property in question was acquired during

And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what

the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They

could therefore be attached and sold at public

anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the

auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-

title over the land in question was issued, Santiago

tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia

was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by

in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction

the registration in the name of Santiago Garcia

of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff

married to Consuelo Gaza. This, according to the

in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the

spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal

one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null

nature of the property. The foregoing contention has

and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of

no merit. In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals

Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.

we held that:

Worth reiterating is the basic precept that the power

of the court in the execution of judgments extends
only over properties unquestionably belonging to the

The certificates of title, however, upon which

judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff of a

petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact

property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be

that the properties were registered in the name of

considered as made under the authority of the

Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is no

court only when the property levied upon belongs to

proof that the properties were acquired during the

the defendant. For, as the saying goes, one mans

spouses

goods shall not be sold for another mans debts.

coverture.

Acquisition

of

title

and

registration thereof are two different acts. It is well

settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing x x x. It may be
that the properties under dispute were acquired by
Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were
registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the
certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of

title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner.
This is so because the words married to preceding
Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson x x x. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Emilio
Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same

security for the credit line extended to PBM,

respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President
of PBM, executed security agreements on December
10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself
jointly

and

severally

answerable

with

PBMs

indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the

loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo
Ching with the Court of First Instance.

RTC:

ordering

PBM

and

respondent-husband

Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the

principal amount of P50, 300,000.00 with interests.
The lower court issued a writ of execution
pending appeal. However, Private respondents filed
a case of injunction against petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance to enjoin the auction
sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on
the ground that, among others, the subject loan
did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner
Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of
the writ of execution and with the sale of the said
properties at public auction. However , CA issued a
TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent

spouses

conjugal

properties.

certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only

bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone is considered for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it
chargeable.

Ayala Investment vs. CA

HELD: NO. The loan procured from AIDC was for

286 SCRA 272, February 12, 1998

the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the

benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained

contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal

a P50,300,000.00

partnership of gains.

loan

from

petitioner

Ayala

Investment and Development Corporation. As added

PBM has a personality

distinct and separate from the family of Ching

despite

the

fact

that

they

happened

to

be

stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the

debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to
Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings.

Based

from

the

foregoing

jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or

services are given to another person or entity, and

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG,

vs. COURT

the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor,

that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of obligations for the

OF

APPEALS

and

GILDA

CORPUZ.
[G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998]

benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of

loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his

CA: (1) Affirmed the decision of the lower court in

family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan

declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and

contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as

the amicable settlement as null and void and of no

a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry

effect;

or profession, it is not embarking in a business.

(2) Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership

Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be

and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the

made liable for the surety agreement which was

remaining one-half portion of the subject lot;

clearly for the benefit of PBM. The court did not

(3) Ordering Gilda Corpuz to reimburse Spouses

support the contention of the petitioner that a

Guiang the amount of P9,000.00 paid by Spouses

benefit for the family may have resulted when the

Guiang to Manuel Callejo (previous owner) for the

guarantee was in favor of Chings employment

unpaid balance of their account in favor of Manuel

(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks,

Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing

prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated

one-half of the amount of realty taxes paid by

in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly

Spouses Guiang on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-

resulting from the loan.

165409, both with legal interests thereon computed

from the finality of the decision.
FACTS:

Private

respondent Gilda Corpuz

was

married to Judie Corpuz on December 24, 1968 in

Bacolod City, before a judge. The couple have three
children, namely: Junie, Harriet, and Jodie or Joji.
On 1983, the couple bought the subject lot in
Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo.
The consideration was payable in installment, with
right of cancellation in favor of vendor should
vendee fail to pay three successive installments.
On April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie
Corpuz sold one-half portion of the Lot Spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Gilda left for
Manila

sometime

in

1989

to

process

her

employment overseas but became a victim of illegal

recruitment. She stayed Manila for some time until
her daughter Harriet informed her of her fathers

plan to sell the remaining one-half portion of the

or encumbrance shall be void. Compare with the

subject lot including the house to Spouses Guiang.

equivalent provision of the Civil Code, Article 166

Gilda replied thru a letter that she was objecting to

the sale. Harriet gave the letter to Luzviminda
Guiang so the latter would advise her father. The
husband, Judie Corpuz proceeded with the sale by
executing a Deed of Transfer of Rights for a total
consideration of P30,000.00. Petitioner Luzviminda
even executed a new sale agreement, this time, with
the previous owners widow Manuela Callejo.

husband had a new wife and was nowhere to be

found. She gathered her children and stayed at the
conjugal dwelling. The petitioners charged her of
trespassing before the Barangay authorities of
Barangay General Paulino Santos, Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The parties entered into an amicable
settlement for Mrs. Corpuz to voluntarily leave the
house, despite the latters effort to annul the
settlement, Spouses Guiang filed a motion for its
execution with the MTC and treated it as ratification
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights.

Transfer of Rights) void or voidable? (2) Was the

amicable settlement entered by private respondent a
ratification of the Contract of Sale?

void. The sale of a conjugal property requires the

consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null
and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
the

conjugal

partnership

without

the

wifes

consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made

however

is

not

null

and

void. It

is

merely

voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to

annul the said alienation or encumbrance. While
173

(Civil

Code)

states

the

10-year

prescriptive period for filing such action. This

particular provision was not carried over to the
Family Code. Thus, any alienation or encumbrance
made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code
took

effect

by

the

husband

of

the

conjugal

partnership property without the consent of the wife

is null and void.
(2) It cannot be denied that the amicable settlement
executed by the parties is a contract which is a
direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By
express provision of law, such a contract is also void
hence it cannot be ratified.

latter

of a previous illegal contract, is also void and

inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, petitioner, vs. SPS.
MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER

RULING: (1) The Deed of Transfer of Rights was

in

the

Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result

ISSUES: (1) Was the contract of sale (Deed of

voidable. Only

generally alienate or encumber any real property of

Article

Upon Gildas return, she learned that her

merely

(Civil Code) provides that the husband cannot

case

can

and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA

FERRER, respondents.
G.R. No. 166496. November 29, 2006.*
Facts:

ratification cure the defect. Article 1390 of the

Josefa Ferrer was married to Alfredo Ferrer. Before

Civil Code which refers to the ratification of

their marriage, Alfredo acquired a lot. During their

contracts which were entered into by a person

marriage, Alfredo obtained a loan from SSS for

whose consent was obtained and vitiated through

improvements on the said lot to build a two door

mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or

apartment, a house and a warehouse therein. Such

fraud is inapplicable since in this instance, the

loan was paid allegedly by the conjugal funds.

wifes consent to the contract of sale of their

Respondent Manuel, half brother of Alfredo, was

conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.

allegedly an occupant of the said warehouse and

Article 124 of the Family Code was correctly

apartment. He used to pay monthly rentals until

applied by the two lower courts. It states that in the

absence of such authority or consent, the disposition

September 1991 when he allegedly bought the said

land together with Alfredo's another half-brother

and herein respondent Ismael, by virtue of a Deed of

Sale executed by Alfredo and Manuel. The TCT
issued to Alfredo was cancelled and another TCT
was issued and registered under the names of
herein respondents, Manuel and Ismael. Josefa
alleged that Manuel and Ismael made Alfredo sign a
document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Alfredo when in fact it was a deed of
sale of the land. In fact, when Alfredo learned of
this, he filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Annulment of the said sale which was denied by
both the RTC and the CA. Josefa then filed a
Petition for payment of conjugal improvements, sum
of money and accounting. She alleges that since the
money used as payment for the loan made by
Alfredo to build the improvements on the said lot
form part of the conjugal funds, she therefore, must
be

entitled

to

the

reimbursements

by

herein

respondents. She relied her argument on the ruling

of the RTC which says that the ownership of the
improvement follows the ownership of the principal.
Therefore, inprovements therein belongs to Alfredo
without prejudice to the right of reimbursement on
Josefa's part.
Issue:

Whether

or

not

Josefa

is

entitled

to

reimbursement by the respondent.

Ruling:
No, she is not.
Article 120 provides for the solution in determining
the ownership of improvements made on the

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS,

petitioners,

vs.

SPOUSES

VICTOR

and

ELENA ALINAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 158040.April 14, 2008.

exclusive property of the spouse. Thus, when an

improvement is introduced which is greater than
the value of property at the time of improvement,
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership
subject to reimbursement to the owner-spouse.
Otherwise, the ownership shall be retained by the
owner-spouse subject to the reimbursement of the
conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, since the respondents were not
the owner-spouse, they are not liable for payment of
reimbursement of the same.

FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners)
separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving to
Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They
left behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A with
a bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with
petitioners house. These two lots are the subject of
the present petition.

Petitioner

Onesiforo

Alinas

(Onesiforo)

and

RULING:

respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers.

Petitioners

allege

that

they

entrusted

their

Petitioners claim that it was the CA which declared

properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent

respondent spouses owners of Lot 896-B-9-A (with

spouses) with the agreement that any income from

bodega) is misleading. It was the RTC which ruled

rentals of the properties should be remitted to the

that respondent spouses are the owners of Lot 896-

Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank

B-9-A and, therefore, since only the respondent

of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were

spouses appealed to the CA, the issue of ownership

believed sufficient to pay off petitioners loans with

over Lot 896-B-9-A is not raised before the appellate

said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega

court. Necessarily, the CA merely reiterated in the

was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained

dispositive portion of its decision the RTCs ruling

from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-9-B with the house

on respondent spouses ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A.

was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he

left blank papers with his signature on them to

It is a basic principle that no modification of

facilitate the administration of said properties.

judgment or affirmative relief can be granted to

Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their

two lots were already titled in the name of
respondent spouses. Petitioners filed with the RTC a
complaint for recovery of possession and ownership
of their conjugal properties with damages against

a party who did not appeal. Hence, not having

appealed from the RTC Decision, petitioners can
no longer seek the reversal or modification of
the trial courts ruling that respondent spouses
had acquired ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A by

respondent spouses.

virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.

RTC: It ruled that the defendant spouses did not

However, with regard to Lot 896-B-9-B (with

scheme the plaintiffs to obtain the properties or

house), the Court finds it patently erroneous for the

enriched themselves at the expense of the plaintiff.

CA to have applied the principle of equity in

Plaintiffs have not proven that they entrusted

half share in the subject property to respondent

defendant spouses with the care and administration

of their properties. It was Valeria Alinas, their
mother, whom plaintiff Onesiforo requested/directed
to take care of everything and sell everything and
Teresita Nuez, his elder sister, to whom he left a
verbal authority to administer his properties.

concocted deeds of conveyances with the use of his

signatures in blank is not worthy of credence.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. It also denied

for

reconsideration

filed

by

the

petitioners.
ISSUE:

WON

Although

petitioners

were

married

before

the

enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,

the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their
property relations are governed by Chapter IV on

The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear

dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code which
provides:

Only the respondent spouses appealed to the CA.

motion

spouses.

Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.

Plaintiff Onesiforos allegation that defendants

the

sustaining the validity of the sale of Onesiforos one-

Art.124.The administration and enjoyment of

the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

the

sale

of

Lot

896-B-9-B

respondent spouses is null and void.

to9

otherwise

unable

to

participate

in

the

administration of the conjugal properties, the other

spouse may assume sole powers of administration.

Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent

These

spouses is entirely null and void.

powers

do

not

include

the

powers

of

disposition or encumbrance which must have the

authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code
and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners conjugal
property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void
in its entirety.
It is true that in a number of cases, this Court
abstained from applying the literal import of a
particular provision of law if doing so would lead to
unjust, unfair and absurd results.
In the present case, the Court does not see how
applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead
to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that
respondent spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo
is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that
petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents
do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The
fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents,
namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10,
1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated
March

10,

1989,

reveals

that

they

had

full

knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As

held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, a
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
claim he acted in good faith. Such being the case,
no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses
as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone
despite their knowledge that the subject property is
a conjugal property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
Docena

vs.

Lapesura

GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that It has been our

FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano
Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a
parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses
Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation
since time immemorial. The trial court ruled in
favor of the spouses. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have
leased

from

the

plaintiff-appellant.

private

respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of

the above decision which has already become final
and

executory

However,

and

the

the

motion

public

was

granted.

respondent

sheriff

subsequently filed a Manifestation requesting that

he

be

clarified

in

the

determination

of

that

particular portion which is sought to be excluded

prior to the delivery of the land adjudged in favor of
plaintiff Casiano Hombria. In resolution it was held
that no attempt should be made to alter or modify
the decision of the Court of Appeals. So therefore,
respondent

sheriff

issued

an

alias

Writ

of

Demolition.
Spouses filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the
Implementation of Writ of Demolition. This motion
was denied . A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
was filed by the petitioners with the Court of
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders
and of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of
Demolition.
Court of Appeals: dismissed the petition on the
following grounds that the petition was (1).filed
beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised
Rules

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

of

Civil

Procedure

and

that

the

(2).

certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto

was signed by only one of the petitioners.

previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum

shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or
plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one
of them is insufficient. The subject Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping signed by the Antonio Docena
alone should be deemed to constitute substantial
compliance with the rules. There are only two
petitioners in this case and they are husband and
wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged
to be conjugal in the instant verified petition. The
property subject of the original action for recovery is
conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under the NCC or
the FC, it is believed that the certificate on nonforum shopping filed in the CA constitutes sufficient
compliance with the rules.
Under the NCC, the husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a
matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The
husband may defend the conjugal partnership
without being joined by the wife. The husband alone
may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum
shopping.

The

husband

as

the

statutory

administrator of the conjugal property could have

filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone,
without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to
defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be
filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he
may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be
attached to the petition.
Under the FC, the administration of the conjugal
property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does
not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power

of

management

alone,

subject

to

the

intervention of the court in proper cases as provided

P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, on

under Article 124 of the Family Code.

April 15, 1992.

This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and

Even under the provisions of the Family Code, the

signed by Ediberto. When petitioner pointed out the

husband alone could have filed the petition for

conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured

certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of

her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale.

demolition issued against the conjugal property

The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were

with the CA without being joined by his wife. The

thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day,

signing of the attached certificate of non-forum

petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met

shopping only by the husband is not a fatal

in the latters office for the formal signing of the

defect.Therefore, premises considered, the petition

is hereby Granted and the case is REMANDED to

typewritten Contracts to Sell.

After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner

the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check

No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00

THELMA

A.

JADER-MANALO

NORMA

and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15,

FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO

1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real

vs.

CAMAISA

estate broker and an employee in Edilbertos office.

G.R. NO. 147978. JANUARY 23, 2002

The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal

FACTS: petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly

The following day, petitioner received a call from

came

across

an

advertisement

affixing of his wifes signature.

placed

by

respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C.

Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified
Ads Section of the newspaper for the sale of their
ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in
Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with
the RTC she was interested in buying the two
properties so she negotiated for the purchase
through a real estate broker, Mr. Ereno, authorized
by respondent spouses. Petitioner made a visual
inspection of the said lots with the real estate
broker and was shown the tax declarations, real
property tax payment receipts, location plans, and
vicinity maps relating to the properties. Thereafter,
petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to
be respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to
buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa
with the knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the
real estate broker. After some bargaining, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of
P1,500,000.00

for

the

Taytay

property

and

P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property to be paid on

instalment

basis

with

downpayments

of

respondent Norma requesting a meeting to clarify

some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate
her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer,
met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate
broker in Makati. During the meeting, handwritten
notations were made on the contracts to sell, so
they arranged to incorporate the notations and to
meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses
and the real estate broker at Edilbertos office for
the formal affixing of Normas signature, she was
surprised when respondent spouses informed her
that they were backing out of the agreement
because they needed spot cash for the full amount
of

the

consideration.

Petitioner

reminded

respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had

already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to
sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner.
Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting
petitioner

to

performance

file
and

complaint

damages

for

against

specific

respondent

spouses before the RTC to compel respondent

Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell. A
Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondents which
was denied by the TC.
Respondents then filed

their

Answer

with

Compulsory Counterclaim, alleging that it was an

agreement

between

herein

petitioner

and

ISSUE: WON the husband may validly dispose of a

respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the

conjugal

subject properties was still subject to the approval

consent.

and

conformity

of

his

wife

Norma

property

without

the

wifes

written

Camaisa.

Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent

RULING: The law requires that the disposition of a

to the sale, her refusal was duly communicated by

conjugal property by the husband as administrator

Edilberto

issued by

in appropriate cases requires the written consent of

petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and she

the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,

accepted

objection.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124.

Respondent further claimed that the acceptance of

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

the checks returned to petitioner signified her

partnership property shall belong to both spouses

assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject

jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands

properties. Respondent Norma denied that she ever

decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the

participated in the negotiations for the sale of the

court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must

subject properties and that she gave her consent

be availed of within five years from the date of the

and conformity to the same.

On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma filed a

contract implementing such decision. In the event

Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that there

unable to participate in the administration of the

to petitioner. The checks

the

same

without

any

is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the

basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties
considering that the wifes written consent was not
obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal
properties belonging to respondents; hence, the
contract was null and void.
The TC rendered a summary judgment dismissing
the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of
the FC, the court cannot intervene to authorize the
transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife
since said wife who refused to give consent had not
been shown to be incapacitated.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA which
affirmed the dismissal by the TC. The Court
explained

that

the

properties

subject

of

the

contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the

consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect
to the sale. Since private respondent Norma refused
to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected.
In

fact,

the

downpayment

was

returned

by

respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner.

The CA also stressed that authority of the court to
allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property
without

the

consent

of

the

other

spouse

is

applicable only in cases where the said spouse is

incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal property.

that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise

conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such

authority

or

consent

the

disposition

or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction

shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerers.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give
her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent

Norma

actively

participated

in

negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,

which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required

by

law

for

its

validity.

Significantly,

petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign

the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of
a transaction is not consent.
Petitioner argues that since respondent Norma
unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under Article
124 of the Family Code is warranted. The argument

is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she

alleges that if the written consent of the other
spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
matter may be brought to court which will give such
authority

if

the

same

is

warranted

by

the

circumstances. However, it should be stressed that

court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted
to in cases where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
consent to the contracts. In the absence of such

FACTS: In a complaint filed by petitioner Honorario

Carlos, he averred that respondent and his wife
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
requested

him

to

advance

the

amount

of

US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot.

To enable and assist the spouses conduct their
married life independently and on their own,
petitioner issued a check in the name of a certain
Pura

Vallejo,

seller

of

the

property,

who

acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in

showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization

full payment of the property.

cannot be sought.
The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of

amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged

the CA is AFFIRMED.

When petitioner

inquired from the spouses as to the status of the

their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet
in a position to make a definite settlement of the
same. Thereafter,

respondent

expressed

violent

resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to

the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner.
In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the
payment of the loan, but the spouses failed to
comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and
damages against respondent and his wife before the
RTC.
As they were separated in fact for more than a year
prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and
his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together
with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed,
however, that said loan was payable on a staggered
basis

so

she

was

surprised

when

petitioner

demanded immediate payment of the full amount.

In

his

separate

Answer,

respondent

admitted

receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed

that the US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan
of respondent. It was his share of income on
contracts obtained by him. He also denied having
made death threats to petitioner, and by way of
G.R. No. 146504. April 9, 2002.*

compulsory

HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T.

of his wifes love and affection, attorneys fees and

ABELARDO, respondent.

counterclaim,

he

asked

for

moral

damages from petitioner for causing the alienation

costs of suit.

RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent

salaries or commissions from the corporation. The

appealed to the CA.

court quoted with favor the disquisition of the trial

CA: reversed and set aside the trial courts decision

court on this point:

and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of

Early in time, it must be noted that payment of

evidence to show that the subject amount was

personal debts contracted by the husband or the

indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his

wife before or during the marriage shall not be

wife. The Court of Appeals found that the amount of

charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar

US$25,000.00 was respondents share in the profits

as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The

of H.L. Carlos Construction. MR was file but was

defendants never denied that the check of

likewise denied.

US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject

ISSUE: Whether on not the CA erred in finding

insufficient evidence to prove that the amount of
US$25,000.00 was a loan obtained by private
respondent and his wife from petitioner.

house and lot. They do not deny that the same

served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of
the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the
conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded

RULING: YES. Petitioner, to prove his claim that the

to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-

amount was in the nature of a loan or an advance

husband and defendant-wife are jointly and

he extended to respondent and his wife, he

severally liable in the payment of the loan.

presented Bankers Trust Check No. 337 in the

amount of US$25,000.00 he issued on October 31,
1989 to Pura Vallejo. He also introduced in evidence

While respondent did not and refused to sign the

an

wife

acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,

instrument

acknowledging

executed
her

by

respondents

husbands

undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of

accountability to petitioner for the said amount

the family because it was used to purchase the

which was advanced in payment of the house and

house and lot which became the conjugal home of

lot. A formal demand letter by counsel for petitioner

respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding

dated August 24, 1994 sent to and received by

the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art.

respondent was also on record. All these pieces of

21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable

evidence,

for such loan together with his wife.

taken

and

together

her

with

respondents

admission that he and his wife received the subject

amount and used the same to purchase their house
and lot, sufficiently prove by a preponderance of
evidence petitioners claim that the amount of

Note.Where the husband contracts obligations in

behalf of the family business, the law presumes and
rightly so that such obligation will redound to the

US$25,000.00 was really in the nature of a loan.

benefit

Moreover, respondent failed to substantiate his

of Appeals, 286 SCRA 272 [1998])

claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of

the

corporation.

respondent

was

There
a

was

no

stockholder

showing
of

H.L.

that

Carlos

Construction. His name does not appear in the

Articles

of

Incorporation

as

well

as

the

Organizational Profile of said company either as

stockholder or officer. Not being a stockholder, he
cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said
corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he
was an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to

of

the

conjugal

partnership.

(Ayala

Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court

the name of petitioner Relucio. It was also averred

that in the past twenty-five years since Alberto
abandoned Angelina, he has sold, disposed of,
alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed
or stashed away properties, assets and income
belonging to the conjugal partnership with the
IMELDA

RELUCIO,

petitioner,

vs.

ANGELINA

private-respondent and either spent the proceeds

thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner

MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.

Relucio and their two illegitimate children or

permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond

G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002.

the reach of the private-respondent and their four

FACTS: Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez
filed

petition

for

APPOINTMENT

AS

SOLE

children.

ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP

PETITIONER: filed a MTD on the ground that

OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., against

private respondent has no cause of action against

defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda

her.

Relucio in the RTC of Makati. She alleged that

sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally
married to her, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself
full and exclusive control and administration of the
conjugal properties, spending and using the same

RTC: denied Relucios MTD on the ground that she

is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party
because

some

of

the

subject

properties

are

registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or

solely in her name. MR was denied.

for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of

the private respondent and their four children; that
defendant

Lopez,

after

abandoning

his

family,

maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with

petitioner Imelda since 1976. During their period of

CA: promulgated a decision denying the petition for

certiorari assailing the TC's denial of her MTD. MR
denied.

cohabitation since 1976 Alberto and petitioner

Relucio,, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly
of stockholdings

in Lopez-owned or controlled

LAW: Article 128 of the Family Code

corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial

lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry.
These properties, which are in the names of Alberto
and Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and
proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely
through the actual contribution of money, property
and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil,
actual contribution from petitioner Relucio. It was
alleged that Alberto excluded the Angelina and their
four children from sharing or benefiting from the
conjugal properties and the income or fruits there
from. He either did not place them in his name or
otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or
concealed them from the Angelina. He placed
substantial portions of these conjugal properties in

ISSUES:

1.

Whether

respondents

petition

for

appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal

property, accounting, etc. against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action
against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioners inclusion as party defendant
is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy.

RULIING: The complaint is by an aggrieved wife

property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not

the

involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership

allegations does it appear that relief is sought

between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is

against petitioner. Respondents causes of

whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J.

action were all against her husband.

Lopez share, if any there be, in property co-owned

against

her

husband.

Nowhere

in

by him with petitioner.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment
of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal

Respondents asserted right to forfeit extends to

partnership or absolute community property arising

Alberto J. Lopez share alone. Failure of Alberto J.

from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a

Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial

complete stranger to this cause of action. Article

court finds in respondents favor, results in a breach

128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to

of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a

wit:

cause of action. Such cause of action, however,

pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

If a spouse without just cause abandons the other

or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the

The respondent also sought support. Support

family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court

cannot be compelled from a stranger.

for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or

for authority to be the sole administrator of the

The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use

conjugal partnership property. xxx

respondent Angelina M. Lopez own words, one by

The administration of the property of the marriage

to petitioner in the common and specific allegations

an aggrieved wife against her husband. References

is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all

other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J.
Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of
action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no rightduty relation between petitioner and respondent
that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact,
none of the three elements of a cause of action
exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by
respondent husband.The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of
marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the
marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez.
Hence, no cause of action can exist against
petitioner on this ground.
Respondents alternative cause of action is for
forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez share in the co-owned
property acquired during his illicit relationship and
cohabitation

with

[petitioner]

and

for

the

dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains

between

him

[respondent].

[Alberto
The

third

J.

Lopez]

cause

of

and
action

the
is

essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez share in

of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set

forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes
of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.

Gesmundo

obtained

loan

in

the

amount

of P300,000.00 from petitioner Homeowners Savings

and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos
house and lot. The husbandt defaulted in payment
of

the

loan.

Petitioner

instituted

extrajudicial

foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.

After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest
bidder.

Respondent instituted with the Regional

Trial Court, Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and

Certificate of Sale.
RTC: Declared the forclosure of

mortgage void.

Subject property was conjugal in nature.

CA: affirmed the trial courts finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption that the subject property acquired
during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to
their conjugal partnership.
ISSUE:

(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE

CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO,

JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER
THEREOF IS

VALID AS

TO

HIS UNDIVIDED

SHARE.
(2)

WHETHER

OR

NOT

THE

CONJUGAL

PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF

THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD: NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides

in
Homeowners Savings Bank vs. Dailo
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005

part:

ART.

124.

The

administration

and

enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property

shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume

FACTS: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino

Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and
lot . The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

sole powers of administration. These powers do not

include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. In applying Article 124

of the Family Code, this Court declared that the

on the subject property, which formed part of their

absence of the consent of one renders the entire

conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article

sale null and void, including the portion of the

124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)

conjugal property pertaining to the husband who

authority or written consent of the other spouse,

contracted the sale.

any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal

property shall be void. Both the trial court and the

Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on

August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement,

the

system

of

relative

community

appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of

the real estate mortgage on the subject property for
lack of respondents consent.

orconjugal partnership of gains governed the

property relations between respondent and her

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he

late husband. With the effectivity of the Family

conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal

Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse

Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made

without the consent of the other to the extent that

applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already

established before its effectivity unless vested
rights have already been acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime
of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type
of partnership, where the husband and wife place
in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the
chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late
husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code
and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is
silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage

(1)

the family may have been benefited; . . . . Certainly,

to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone
is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
[ The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court.

Consequently,

the

conjugal

partnership

cannot be held liable for the payment of the

principal obligation.

WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES.

[G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012]

RTC Negros Oriental: Awarded the parcels of land

to respondent, tools and equipment in favor of
petitioner as his exclusive property, and the two
house on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the
parties since these were acquired during their
marital union and since there is no prohibition on
foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units. The petitioner being a foreigner, is not allowed
by

law

to

acquire

any

private

land

in

the

Philippines, except through inheritance.

CA:

Affirmed

the

RTC

decision

and

denied

Petitioners claim for reimbursement by virtue of

equity as he was well aware of the constitutional
prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the
Philippines.
FACTS:

Petitioner,

Dutch

National,

and

respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980.

After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental,
declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of

the

formers

psychological

incapacity

as

contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.

Consequently,
Dissolution

petitioner
of

filed

Petition

Conjugal

for

ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to reimbursement

(half/whole) of the

purchase

price

of subject

properties on the ground of equity?

Partnership dated

December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of

RULING: No. In In Re: Petition For Separation of

the following described properties claimed to have

Property-Elena

been acquired during the subsistence of their

Muller the Court had already denied a claim for

marriage, to wit:

reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of

By Purchase: a. Lot 1, Block 3 of Lots 2144 & 2147

Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut

of the Dumaguete Cadastre including a residential

Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena

house constructed thereon;

Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller

b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre including a

cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity

residential house constructed thereon;

where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly

c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre;

bought the property despite the prohibition against

d. Lot 4, Block 4 Lots 2144 & 2147 of the

foreign

Dumaguete Cadastre.

under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine

By way of inheritance: e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the

Constitution which reads:

Dumaguete Cadastre;

Section

f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre.

In

defense, respondent

averred

that,

with

the

exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots

1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any

her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by

way of inheritance. As proof, she submitted a joint
affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to
the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 including the
improvements

thereon. During

trial,

petitioner

testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were

registered

in

the

name

of

respondent,

these

properties were acquired with the money he received

from the Dutch government as his disability benefit
since respondent did not have sufficient income to
pay for its acquisition. He also claimed that the joint
affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds
of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the
Family

Code,

hence,

invalid.

Respondent

maintained that the money used for the purchase of

the lots came exclusively from her personal funds,
in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as
well

as

products

Tupperware.

from

Avon,

Triumph

and

ownership

7.

of

Save

Muller

Philippine

in

cases

v.

Helmut

land enshrined

of

hereditary

succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.

conjugal properties during their marriage, the

purchase of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 came from

Buenaventura

Petitioner openly admitted that he "is well

aware

of

the

above-cited

constitutional

prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of

such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latters name. As also
explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is
that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
A contract that violates the Constitution and
the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner
cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or
allow him to recover the money he had spent for the
purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to
an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties

where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any

rights

from

an

unconstitutional

transaction

knowingly entered into. Neither can the Court grant

petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of
unjust enrichment as it does not apply if the
action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,
the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January
24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.

Elena and Helmut Muller got married in Germany

on September of 1989. They lived in Germany for a
while before they decided to move to the Philippines.
By the time they were in the Philippines, Helmut
inherited the house they used to live in Germany
which they sold for 2.3M. The proceeds of the said
sale was used to buy a parcel of land in Antipolo
and to build a house therein. The said parcel of land
was registered under the name of Elena while the
money used to buy the said lot and the house
therein was Helmut's. Due to indifferences between
the two, they decided to separate. Helmut then filed
a petition for separation of properties in the RTC of
QC. The RTC of QC terminated the absolute
community of properties between spouses Muller
but

prohibited

Helmut

from

claiming

reimbursement from the property in Antipolo since

the money he inherited was his separate property
being acquired by gratuitous title, by virtue of the
Constitutional Prohibition of Foreigners to own
lands in the Philippines. The CA assailed the
decision.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be reimbursed
from the spouses' property in Antipolo?
Ruling:
No, he cannot.
The Constitutio is clear as to its mandate which
prohibits foreigners from owning lands except in
cases of hereditary succession. In this case, Helmut
was fully aware that he cannot own properties in
the Philippines which is the reason why he named
said properties under the name of his wife. To allow
him to be reimbursed is to acknowledge the fact
that he indeed owned the said property even if
prohibited by law.
IN

RE:

PETITION

PROPERTY

FOR

ELENA

SEPARATION

OF

BUENAVENTURA

MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,

respondent.
G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006.*
Facts:

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA

(CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P.
DELA CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.
FACTS:
Miguel Pang married Private respondent Carlina (or
Cornelia) on July 16, 1949. A few months after the
wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Their only child,
Herminia, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to
the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire
duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in
Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with

his wife and child. The trial court found evidence

RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint after

that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to

declaring that there was little evidence to prove that

divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for

the subject properties pertained to the Conjugal

good,

property of Carlina and Miguel Palang.

he

refused

to

live

with

the

private

respondents, but stayed alone in a house in

Pangasinan.

CA: Reversed the trial courts decision.

On July 1973, the then 63 year old Miguel

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in

contracted a second marriage with a 19 year old

not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute

Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). Prior to their marriage

sale covering the riceland and the house and lot,

they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land

the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda

located at Pangasinan. A house and lot was also

Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay

purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.

alone.

Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of

ISSUE: WON the Riceland and the House and lot

Donation as a form of compromise agreement to

settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting

form part of the conjugal property of Miguel and

Carlina Palang

of 6 parcels of land to their only child.

RULING:

During the cohabitation of Erlinda and Miguel, they

Yes.

produced a son, Kristopher Palang. Miguel and

Erlinda

were

convicted

of

Concubinage

upon

Calinas complaint. 2 years later Miguel died.

Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang
de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted
the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during
his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while
the Riceland is registered in their names (Miguel
and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the
property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added
that the house and lot is her sole property, having
bought the same with her own money. Erlinda
added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made

in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and
a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the
latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be

no co-ownership and no presumption of equal

the separation of property between spouses and the

shares.

termination of the conjugal partnership. Separation

of property between spouses during the marriage

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her

shall not take place except by judicial order or

testimony that she is engaged in the business of

without judicial conferment when there is an

buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to

express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The

persuade us that she actually contributed money to

judgment

buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact

compromise was not specifically and expressly for

that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973,

separation of property and should not be so

petitioner was only around twenty years of age and

inferred.

Miguel

Palang

was

already

sixty-four

and

which

resulted

from

the

parties

pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her

WHEREFORE,

youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in

DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of

1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the

Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

purchase price of subject property, there being no

proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought
two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said
added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code.

Proof

commenced

of
their

the

precise

adulterous

date

when

they

cohabitation

not

having been adduced, we cannot state definitively

that the riceland was purchased even before they
started living together. In any case, even assuming
that

the

subject

property

was

bought

before

cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still

apply and proof of actual contribution would still be
essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasi-nan, we find no basis to justify
her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and
Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal
property in favor of their daughter Herminia in
1975. The trial court erred in holding that the
decision adopting their compromise agreement in
effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of

the

instant

petition

is

hereby

Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an

answer to the complaint. She averred therein that
the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein
it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with Mario Fernandez. She
then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
On appeal before the RTC, petitioner and the two
other defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous
relationship, and that they acquired the property in
question as their love nest. It was further alleged
that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their 2 children for around 10 years,
and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees of the other
apartments, until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of his
marriage.The respondents then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the
same was denied by the RTC. The CA rejected
petitioners claim that she and Respondent Mario
Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES

MARIO
FERNANDEZ
and
LOURDES
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000.*
FACTS:
An ejectment case was filed by the Spouses
Fernandez against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building that through
tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for
the last 7 years without the payment of any rent;
that it was agreed upon that after a few months,
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while
the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a
month, both as rental, which agreement was not
complied with by the said defendants. They have
demanded several times that the defendants vacate
the premises, as they are in need of the property for
the construction of a new building.

CA ruled that "In the instant case, no proof of

actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the
purchase of the subject property was presented. Her
only evidence was her being named in the Contract
to Sell as the wife of Mario Fernandez. Since she
failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the subject apartment building,
We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Respondent Mario. Thus the saud property
pressumed to beling to the conjugal property of
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage and there
being no other proof to the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the coowner of the property
HELD:
No. The petitiin is not meritorious , As correctly held
by the Court of Appeals the applicable law is not
Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code.
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are
not incapacitated to marry each other or to one in
which the marriage of the parties is void from the

beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that

amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife. It is clear that
Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to
Lourdes
Fernandez.
Art. 148 needs actual contributions. Petitioner fails
to present any evidence that she had made an
actual contribution to purchase the subject
property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of coownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.

FACTS: On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio

Likewise, her claim of having administered the

property
during
the
cohabitation
is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself
does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148
of the Family Code provides that the administration
of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of coownership. The property in question belongs to the
conjugal partnership of respondents.

and

Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for Partition and/or

Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and
Damages against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo in
RTC Makati. The petitioner and respondent, both
married and with children, but separated from their
respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages
still subsisted. During their union, they set up the
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with
petitioner as president and chairman of the board of
directors, and respondent as vice-president and
treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner
respondent

properties

which

acquired
were

real

and

registered

personal
solely

in

respondents name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable

differences,

the

couple

separated.

Petitioner

demanded from respondent his share in the subject

properties, but respondent refused alleging that
said properties had been registered solely in her
name.
In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that
she engaged in the customs brokerage business
with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with
other individuals and duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because the fact was that they were still legally
married to their respective spouses. She claimed to
be the exclusive owner of all real and personal
properties involved in petitioners action for partition
on the ground that they were acquired entirely out
of her own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34
of the ROC. She contended that summary judgment
was proper, because the issues raised in the
pleadings were sham and not genuine.
The TC rendered its decision granting respondents
motion for summary judgment. It ruled that an
examination of the pleadings shows that the issues

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA

CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000

involved

were

purely

legal.

It

also

sustained

respondents contention that petitioners action for

partition amounted to a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title covering the
subject properties. It held that even if the parties

really had cohabited, the action for partition could

ownership in cases where the parties in union are

not be allowed because an action for partition

among co-owners ceases to be so and becomes one

incapacitated to marry each other.

It was error for the TC to rule that, because the

for title if the defendant, as in the present case,

parties in this case were not capacitated to marry

alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in

each other at the time that they were alleged to have

question. For these reasons, the TC dismissed case.

been living together, they could not have owned

The CA ordered the case remanded to the court of

properties in common. The Family Code, in addition

origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in

to providing that a co-ownership exists between a

Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect

man and a woman who live together as husband

that an action for partition is at once an action for

declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance
properties

of

involved.

determinate
If

the

portion

defendant

of

the

asserts

exclusive title over the property, the action for

partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court
should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable
to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the
court should dismiss the action, not because the
wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis
exists for requiring the defendant to submit to
partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioners
action for partition was a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title, the CA held that
since petitioner sought to compel respondent to
execute documents necessary to effect transfer of
what he claimed was his share, petitioner was not
actually attacking the validity of the titles but in
fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate
court upheld petitioners position that Art. 144 of

and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise

provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the
couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied
trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the CC which
provides that (I)f two or more persons agree to
purchase property and by common consent the legal
title is taken in the name of one of them for the
benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in
favor of the others in proportion to the interest of
each. We do not think this is correct. The legal
relation of the parties is already specifically covered
by Art. 148 of the FC under which all the properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint

the CC had been repealed by Art. 148 of the FC.

contributions of money, property or industry shall

ISSUE: Can the parties be considered as co-owners

of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the

of the properties, under the law, considering the

present status of the parties as both married and
incapable of marrying each other, even assuming

constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form

other. The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of
the CC, then are no longer material since a trust
relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is

that they lived together as husband and wife?

governed under Title III, Book II of the CC.

The amended decision of the CA is REVERSED and

RULING: The provision of the CC, applies only to

the case is REMANDED to the RTC for further

cases in which a man and a woman live together as

husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
provided they are not incapacitated or are without
impediment to marry each other, or in which the
marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not
bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties
living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art.
148 of the FC now provides for a limited co-

proceedings on the merits.

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO

FEHR, respondent.
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003.*
FACTS:

This

case

arose

from

petition

for

declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological

incapacity

to

comply

with

the

essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the

Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr
against

respondent

Bruno

Fehr.

After

due

proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage

void ab initio and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of property.
However, after a careful scrutiny of the inventory of
properties submitted by both parties, the Court
finds Bacolod property (owned by petitioners
parents,

Herminio

Mercado

and

Catalina

D.

Mercado) and Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium

(purchased on installment basis by respondent with
his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983)
excluded

from

the

conjugal

properties.

Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium is

hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of

respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Petitioner is

March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased

hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204

on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at

in the name of respondent, being respondents

LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to

exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage.

Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as

Both the Petitioner and Respondent are further

the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation

enjoined to jointly support their minor children for

as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as

their

witness, using the name Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon

education,

uniforms,

food

and

medical

expenses.

completion of payment, the title to the condominium

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said

unit was issued in the name of petitioner.

Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204,

In light of these facts, the court gives more credence

LCG Condominium and the support of the children.

to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was

Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on

acquired

installment basis at the time when petitioner and

Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,

respondent were living exclusively with each other

said property should be governed by the rules on

as husband and wife without the

co-ownership. It applies to unions of parties who are

benefit of

during

apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family

impediment

Code.

marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.

initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in

the liquidation and partition of the properties they

contract

not

cohabitation.

legally

to

and

parties

marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should

RTC: since their marriage was declared void ab

capacitated

the

barred

marriage,

by

but

any

whose

This provision creates a co-ownership with respect

to

the

properties

they

acquire

during

their

cohabitation.

own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the

As held in Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC, for Article

Family Code. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal but

147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must

was opposed by the respondent. Petitioner withdrew

be capacitated

the notice of appeal and instead filed a special civil

exclusively with each other as husband and wife;

action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court

and (3) their union is without the benefit of

of Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial

marriage or their marriage is void. All these

court in its Order dated October 5, 2000.

elements are present in the case at bar. It has not

CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of

merit. The CA reiterated that petitioner has not
shown any reason to warrant the issuance of a writ
of certiorari as the errors she raised were mere
errors of judgment which were the proper subject of
an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.

to

marry

each

other;

(2)

live

been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered

any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article

36

of

the

Family

Code

because

of

ISSUE: Who is the owner of Suite 204 of LCG

respondents psychological incapacity to comply

Condominium and how the properties acquired by

with essential marital obligations.

petitioner and respondent should be partitioned?

RULING: It appears from the facts, as found by the
trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of
long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City
and moved in with respondent in the latters
residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit
and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born
on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on

The

disputed

property,

Suite

204

of

LCG

Condominium, was purchased on installment basis

on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and
respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent.

As regards the settlement of the common properties

of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership should apply.
There is nothing in the records that support the
pronouncement of the trial court that the parties
have agreed to divide the properties into three1/3
share each to the petitioner, the respondent and
their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her
petition before this Court that the parties have
agreed on a four-way division of the properties1/4
share each to the petitioner and the respondent,
and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover,
respondents argument that the three-way partition
is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code does not hold water as said provisions
relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold
that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common
property of petitioner and respondent and the
property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S.

REY, respondents.

PETITIONER: claimed that the expenses for the

G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003.*

construction of their house were defrayed solely

FACTS: 17 y/o Gina S. Rey was married, but

He averred that private respondents meager income

separated de facto from her husband, when she met

petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in July
1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to
cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a
lot owned by Jacintos father. Their cohabitation was
not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living
as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid
Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish
dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in
Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship
with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic
absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with
petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to
separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.

from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel.

as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in
the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish
was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was
contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to
her

from

his

fishing

trips.

Petitioner

further

contended that Gina did not work continuously in

Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month
duration each year. When their house was repaired
and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private
respondent did not share in the expenses because
her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents. From his
income in the fishing business, he claimed to have
saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which

RESPONDENT: filed a complaint for Partition and

Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership
against the petitioner with the RTC of Boac,
Marinduque in 1997. She alleged that from her
salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in
Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the
completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her
own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she
was able to acquire and accumulate appliances,
pieces of furniture and household effects, with a
total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be
declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing
her contribution to the construction of their house,
be reimbursed to her.
She deposited part of her earnings in her savings

was placed in a joint account deposit with private

respondent. This savings, according to petitioner
was spent in purchasing the disputed personal
properties.
TC: declared the petitioner as in default for failure
to file a pre-trial brief. MR was denied, and
respondent was allowed to present evidence ex
parte. Rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent directing the defendant to return and/or
reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy
thousand
actually

pesos (P70,000.00) which the

contributed

to

its

construction

latter
and

completion and declaring the plaintiff as the

exclusive owner of the personal properties.
CA: TC's decision was affirmed.

account with First Allied Development Bank. Her

ISSUE: WON Gina had presented sufficient proof of

Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had

actual contribution.

a balance of P21,046.08.

She further stated that

she had a total of P35,465.009 share in the joint

LAW: Article 148 of the Family Code

account deposit which she and the petitioner

RULING: It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto

maintained with the same bank. Gina declared that

were not capacitated to marry each other because

said deposits were spent for the purchase of

the former was validly married to another man at

construction

the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their

materials,

personal properties.

appliances

and

other

property regime therefore is governed by Article 148

of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous

marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships

of the partys own evidence and not upon the

in a state of concubinage, relationships where both

weakness of the opponents defense. This applies

man and woman are married to other persons, and

with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the

multiple alliances of the same married man. Under

plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

this regime, . . . only the properties acquired by

The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the

both of the parties through their actual joint

relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some

contribution of money, property, or industry shall be

measure of protection as the plaintiff must still

owned by them in common in proportion to their

prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable

respective contributions . . . Proof of actual

relief can be granted only after the court is

contribution is required.

convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff

In the case at bar, although the adulterous

cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the

warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact

has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.

Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the

applies

intended

house and personal properties of the parties.

precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the

Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she

Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code

contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their

was enacted, there was no provision governing

house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she

property relations of couples living in a state of

specify the extent of her contribution. What appears

adultery

the

in the record are receipts in her name for the

cohabitation or the acquisition of the property

purchase of construction materials, in the total

occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article

amount of P11,413.00.

because

or

this

provision

concubinage.

was

Hence,

even

if

148 governs.

On the other hand, both parties claim that the

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.

money used to purchase the disputed personal

Fernandez which involved the issue of co-ownership

properties came partly from their joint account with

of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous

First Allied Development Bank. While there is no

marriage

question that both parties contributed in their joint

and

respectively,

adulterous

account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient

contribution in the acquisition of the property is

proof of the exact amount of their respective shares

essential.

The

ruled
claim

therein

that
of

who

proof

relationship,
actual

petitioners

we

an

of

co-ownership
were

parties

of

the

therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code,

to

the

in the absence of proof of extent of the parties

bigamous and adulterous union is without basis

respective

because they failed to substantiate their allegation

presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal

that they contributed money in the purchase of the

properties

disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of

existence and value of which were not questioned by

Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted

the

property was titled in the name of the parties to an

equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.

adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in
the acquisition of the property.

contribution,
were

petitioner.

valued
Hence,

their
at
their

share

shall

P111,375.00,
share

therein

be
the
is

Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner

of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted
house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests

properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is

upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings

ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to

or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative

private respondent, failing which the house shall be

issue. Contentions must be proved by competent

sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents

evidence and reliance must be had on the strength

claim.

Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two

in equal shares.
CA: Reversed the RTCs ruling. Ruled that under
the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis-vis the

evidence

on

record

and

attending

circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is

meritorious,

as it has been substantiated by

competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to

overcome the burden of proving his allegation that
the subject property was purchased by Yolanda
thru his exclusive funds.
On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened
to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the
property because with or without contribution he
was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article
484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property
during their extramarital union, such property
would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rule on co-ownership

ATIENZA v. DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
FACTS: In 1983, Petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the
President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation,
hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De
Castro as accountant for the two corporations. In
the course of time, the relationship between Lupo
and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a
married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium beginning the later part of
1983. Out of their union, two children were born.
However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways.
Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a
judicial partition of a land between them in the
Bel- Air subdivisionLupo said Yolanda bought the
said property with his own funds Yolanda on the
other hand said shebought it with her own funds.
RTC: Rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and

ISSUE: WON the disputed property is the exclusive

property of Yolanda
HELD: Yes . It is not disputed that the parties
herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because Lupo Atienza was validly married to
another woman at the time of his cohabitation with
Yolanda.

Their

property

regime,

therefore,

is

governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which

applies

to

bigamous

marriages,

adulterous

relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage,

relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies

to

cohabitation

properties
in

acquired

proportion

to

during

their

said

respective

contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the

extent of the proven actual contribution of money,

property or industry. Absent proof of the extent

thereof,

their

contributions

and

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of

corresponding

title in the name of any person does not foreclose

shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Adriano v.

the possibility that the real property covered thereby

CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R.

may be under co-ownership with persons not

No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza

named in the certificate or that the registrant may

v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November

only be a trustee or that other parties may have

29, 2006).

acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation

of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998,
Article 148 thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there
was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
the property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez;
Article 256, F.C.). It is the petitioners posture that
the respondent, having no financial capacity to
acquire

the

property

in

question,

merely

manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2)

corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the
Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987
and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the respondent and the
vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the
petitioner.

The

claim

of

co-ownership

in

the

disputed property is without basis because not only

did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in
the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary
proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast,

aside

from

his

mere

say

so

and

voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly

find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere
allegation is not evidence.

certificate of title. However, as already stated,

petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
courts finding that the disputed property falls
under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code.
In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his
cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There
can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the
respondent sufficiently established that she derived
the funds used to purchase the property from
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman

engaged

in

foreign

currency

trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She

presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She
also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the
financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property.