Magno vs.

CA (Crim1)
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines,
respondents.

in question. All the while, said amount was in the

safekeeping of the financing company which is
managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND

ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,

Facts:

PETITIONERS,
VS.
COMMISSION
ELECTIONS AND DENNIS GARAY,

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring

complete set of equipment to make his car
repair shop operational, approached Corazon
Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance
and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate Magno and and
provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring
Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit but Magno
couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him
that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon

was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno

issued six checks, two of them were cleared and
the rest had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture,

Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then
pulled out the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP

Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found
guilty.

ON

RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that
petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 10[11] of
Republic Act Nos. 8189.

The petitioners contended, inter alia that Section

45(j) of the Voters Registration Act
was void for being vague as it did not refer to a
definite provision of the law, the violation
of which would constitute an election offense.
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Spouses Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May
2008 from the Decision of this Court
dated 30 April 2008.

ISSUE:
Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be

punished for the issuance of the checks in
question.

vagueness doctrine.

Held:
No
Ratio:

WoN criminal statute may be challenged

considering and following the void for

To charge Magno for the refund of a

warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained
with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust debt since he did not receive the amount

HELD:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law
is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.

However, this Court has imposed certain

limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial

impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar
Calderon.

invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of

criminal statutes is not appropriate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should

prosper

Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal

statutes would result in a mass acquittal
of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of actual case and controversy
and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual
concreteness.The rule established in
jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,

our

religious freedom, and other fundamental rights

may be facially challenged. Under
no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge.

Case Digest: Southern Hemisphere

Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council,
et al.

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were
filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Impleaded as respondents in the various
petitions
are
the
Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of
the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members.
All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie
against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege
with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: On 4 April 2001, an Information for
plunder was filed against former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for

being unconstitutional. He contends that (a) it

own conduct could not be regulated by a statute

suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it

drawn with narrow specificity. The possible

dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard

harm to society in permitting some unprotected

in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the

speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the

element ofmens rea in crimes already

possibility that the protected speech of others

punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all

may be deterred and perceived grievances left

of which are violations of fundamental right of

to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of

due process.

overly broad statutes.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of plunder is

People vs. Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May

1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur

unconstitutional for being vague?

Facts:

Decision: The test in determining whether a

criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and
practice. The vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. The
theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression
is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his

In a complaint filed by the Chief of

Police of Hindang, Leyte on 4 April 1975,
Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and
Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case 555 thereof for
violation of Republic Act 4670. The case was set
for arraignment and trial on 29 May 1975. At the
arraignment, Matondo, et. al. pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally
moved to quash the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The
motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on 13 June 1975. On 21 August 1975,
the municipal court denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit. On 2 September 1975,
Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial order on the same
ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further
allegation that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense considering that Section 32
of RA 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received
by the counsel for Matondo, et. al. on 20
October 1975, the motion for reconsideration
was denied. On 26 October 1975, Matondo, et.
al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII
(Civil Case B-622), to restrain the Municipal
Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of

Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of

said Criminal Case 555 upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.
Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the
additional ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense since the penal provision,
which is Section 32 of said law, is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It
imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the
term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being
solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the
Government. On 30 March 1976, having been
advised that the petition of Matondo, et. al. was
related to Criminal Case 1978 for violation of PD
442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to
Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Judge Fortunato B. Cuna of the former
branch transferred the said petition to the latter
branch for further proceedings (Civil Case
5428). On 15 March 1976, the Provincial Fiscal
of Leyte filed an opposition to the admission of
the said amended petition but Judge Auxencio
C. Dacuycuy denied the same in his resolution
of 20 April 1976. On 2 August 1976, the
Provincial Fiscal filed a supplementary
memorandum in answer to the amended
petition. On 8 September 1976, Judge Dacuycuy
rendered the decision holding in substance that
RA 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for
its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the
case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte only for preliminary investigation. On 25
September 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a
motion for reconsideration. Likewise, Matondo,
et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the
lower court's decision but the same was limited
only to the portion thereof which sustains the
validity of Section 32 of RA 4670. Judge
Dacuycuy
denied
both
motions
for
reconsideration in a resolution dated 19 October
1976. The Provincial Fiscal filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Section 32 of RA 4670, by not

providing a determinable term of imprisonment,
renders the penalty excessive, cruel and
unusual.
Held:
The rule is established beyond question
that a punishment authorized by statute is not
cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the
nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous
one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.
Based on this principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the
defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved
is cruel and unusual. "The Constitution directs
that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The
prohibition of cruel Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishments which never existed in
America, or which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance there
(sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition. That the penalty is grossly
disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient
basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the
ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that
the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In
addition, what degree of disproportion the Court
will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution
has still to await appropriate determination in
due time since, to the credit of our legislative
bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a
penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or
"excessive." However, Section 32 of RA 4670
provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a
maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration

thereof may range, from one minute to the life

span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a
duty essentially legislative in nature and which
does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of
legislative powers. This time, the presumption of
constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing
considerations, and by virtue of the separability
clause in Section 34 of RA 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof
should be declared unconstitutional.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003)

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled

to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The
official
exchanges
of
communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the

Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs
and the United States Embassy

Participation of members of the

Philippine Narcotics Command in the buybust operation conducted at the residence
of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust
operation conducted by Philippine police
narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the
house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where
heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher
was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in
the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department
of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note of the United States Embassy addressed
to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of
Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that
the note is a true and faithful copy of its original.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE

These may be inadequate to support the

diplomatic status of the latter but they give
enough
indication
that
the
Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond

the scope of his official function or duties.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR

no. 125865 January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from
suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The
latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig
City which set aside the MeTC rulings and
ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner
elevated the case to the SC via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered
with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the

communication from the DFA that the petitioner

is covered by any immunity. It has no binding
effect in courts. The court needs to protect the
right to due process not only of the accused but
also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in official capacity. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as
this case. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive

application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied
only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in
time to provide relief to the accused in line with
the constitutional guarantee to the right to
speedy trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit
themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed
in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral
arguments.
HELD:
The rule should be applied prospectively. The
court upheld the petitioners contention that
while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it
does not and should not preclude the equally
important right of the State to public justice. If a
procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would
work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under

Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely
on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules
retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by
the court, it intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so
would be tantamount to the denial of the States
right to due process. A retroactive application
would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of
crimes and their heirs.

GO VS. DIMAGIBA
Facts :
Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Susan Go 13
checks.
Go presented the checks to the drawee bank for
encashment but were dishonored due to the
reason account closed. Dimagiba was
prosecuted for the violation of BP 22.
MTCC convicted him of the case. Dimagiba
appealed to the RTC. RTC denied the appeal
and sustained the conviction. No further appeal
was brought to the CA. RTC issued a Certificate of Finality. MTCC issued an
order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the
service of his sentence. A Writ of Execution was
issued to enforce his civil liability.
Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
MTCC denied the motion.
He filed with the RTC a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. RTC issued an Order directing
the immediate release of Dimagiba from
confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of
P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. RTC invoked
Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,
which allegedly required the imposition of a fine
only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or

a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this

rule should be retroactively applied in favor
of Dimagiba.
Issue
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas
corpus was validly granted
Held
NO, it was not validly granted.
Ratio
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody. It is
therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is
detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person
in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment. However, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is
attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or
(3) the imposed penalty has been excessive,
thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, Dimagiba
raised the same arguments that he had invoked
in the motion for reconsideration. His resort to
this extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an
appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions,
in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed. But he
effectively misused the action he had chosen,
obviously with the intent of finding a favorable
court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had
already become final and executory. Such an
action deplorably amounted to forum shopping.
Respondent should have resorted to the proper,

available remedy instead of instituting a different

action in another forum. His arguments
for his release insubstantial to support the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel

engaged in the transport of animals named
Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the
port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said
vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674
heads of cattle without providing appropriate
shelter and proper suitable means for securing
the animals which resulted for most of the
animals to get hurt and others to have died while
in transit.

within the jurisdiction of the courts of the

Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during
the time the ship was within the territorial waters
- regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign
port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant
was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:

Issue:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney

General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court
of First Instance of Manila presented by the
defendant. The defendant, accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while the
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two
and a half miles from the shores of the city. In
the said demurrer, the defendant contended the
lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said
crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the
case.
Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an

offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Whether or not the Philippine courts have

jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.

Held:

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from

the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters
and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply.
A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed

in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts
have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense.
The Court said that having the opium smoked
within our territorial waters even though aboard
a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to

Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases
cannot be filed because neither was it said that
the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it
say about ships not licensed under Philippine
laws, like the ships involved.

pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore,

the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered
further proceedings.
People vs Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573
G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
ARELLANO, C. J.
Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of
public order committed on board a public vessel
is NOT triable by our courts
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law
FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English
nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that
it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found
during the inspection and search of the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the
saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found
on the part of the ship where the firemen
habitually sleep
the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant
to the instructions he had from the Manila
custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not
be taken shore so it was returned
2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these
sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention
of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been
searched several times for opium, he ordered
two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed
within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court
sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further
ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
Government.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the

imprisonment and the fine imposed to six
months and P1,000

GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited

use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does NOT constitute
a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality

EX: when the article, whose use is

prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in that said
place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1
of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat 11 men, women, and
children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat
arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once
on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro
the 2 women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home
in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation
on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

 Piracy is a crime not against any particular

state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of
piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by
all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No.
2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy,
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force
in the Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1)
an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving themselves. It is, therefore,
only necessary for us to determine as to whether
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that
the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and
that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty.

Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488

US v. AH CHONG / G.R. No. L-5272 / March 19,
1910
FACTS:
Because of recent bouts of burglaries, Ah Chong
kept a knife under his pillow for protection. On
the day of the incident, he also placed a chair in
front of the door for further protection. He was
awakened when someone was trying to open
to door. Ah Chong asked who the person was,

twice, but did not reply until the chair was struck
above his knees. In a fit of panic and confusion
and believed that he was being attacked, he
grabbed his knife and stabbed the intruder who
turned out was his roommate, Pascual. He
died after and Ah Chon was charged of murder
ISSUE: Whether was guilty?
RULING:The Supreme Court decided that it was
mistake of fact. Ah Chong thought that
the person behind the door was an intruder. The
SC was convinced that he acted in good faith
and was defending himself. There was no
malice and he only protected his life and
property.
PEOPLE VS OANIS
G.R. No. L-47722 / July 27, 1943
FACTS:
Policemen, Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
received information regarding whereabouts of
the criminal Anselmo Balagtas who is with Irene
Requinea. Once, on the location, Oanis and
Galanta found a man with his back towards and
started shooting him. The man found to
be Serapio Tecson, Requineas paramour. Oanis
and Galanta gave the trial court contradictory
testimonies which they didnot believe and held
them guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
ISSUE: Whether Oanis and Galanta was guilty.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the most important
fact was that Tecson was shot with his back
towards the respondents. Even though they
acted in mistake of fact and honest performance
of their duty, they found respondents guilty of
murder. The SC said that both men had time not
to use violent means. Tecson was not resisting
or showing signs of defense. Also, both men
committed treachery making ita qualifying
circumstance to murder. Their arguments of
mistake of fact and honest performance was
held as mitigating circumstances.

Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) &
8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

committed by him.
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
No. L-74324 17November1988
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of
Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and
sentencing them to a prison term ranging from
12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20
years (prison temporal) as maximum and for
samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they
used to sleep together. On the evening of May
19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after
midnight accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived (they were drunk),
and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda.
Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can
of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter,
Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours
after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that
murder can be the crime? If not what are the
criminal responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the
same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit
a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda
and the accused, and add to the that that the
meeting at the scene of the incident was purely
coincidental, and the main intent of the accused
is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven,
the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different acts directed
against miranda is individual NOT collective and
each of them is liable only for the act that was

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted

action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by
his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient
evidence that appears in the record establishing
qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy).
And granted the mitigating circumstance that he
never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

PEOPLE VS GARCIA
GR No. 153591
FACTS:
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their
apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down
to which Garcia commented that Chy was being
arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand
on him. Two days later, the group decided to
drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel.
Chy was about to come out of his house and
upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly
punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows
and when he found an opportunity to escape, he
ran home and phoned his wife to call the police
regarding the mauling. He also complained of
difficulty in breathing. He was found later
unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.
Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia
appeals that the injuries he caused were not as
violent in nature as to have caused the death of
Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the
boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the
victim could not have caused any direct physical
effect to cause the heart attack if the victims
heart is healthy. What could have caused said
heart attack is the victims emotions concerning
the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated
RULING:
The circumstance that the petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates
his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the
Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said
circumstance must be appreciated in favour of
the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries
he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally
and logically caused the actual death of the
victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.
Considering this mitigating circumstance,
imposable penalty should be in the minimum
period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the trial court properly imposed upon
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

payment of the sale of a house and lot situated

at No. 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to accused, said
accused then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to defraud and
damage Alberto Quijada Jr made alterations and
wrote words, figures and phrases to the original
receipt which completely changed its meaning
by making appear thereon that it was issued on
January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five
Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and
in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the
receipt was only for the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos.

Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal

agreement was entered into between Alberto
Quijada, Jr. (Alberto) and Avella for the sale of
the formers house and lot located at 46 P.
Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for the
purchase price of P1.2 million pesos. On
October 23, 1990, an earnest money in the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) was
given to Alberto by Avella. On October 31, 1990,
the amount of one hundred and fifty-five
thousand pesos (P155,000) was delivered by
Avella representing this time the downpayment
for the house and lot. A subsequent payment of
five thousand pesos (P5,000) was made on
January 21, 1991.

GARCIA v. CA Case Digest

AVELLA GARCIA v. CA
G.R. No. 128213 December 13, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Avella Garcia (Avella) was

charged with Falsification of a Private
Document, defined and penalized under Article
172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the
Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion
reads:

That on or about the month of January, 1991 in

Pasay City, Philippines , Abella Garcia, being
then in possession of a receipt for Five
Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued
by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down

The relationship between buyer and seller

turned sour. Avella filed a complaint for estafa
against Alberto for his failure to execute a deed
of sale and deliver the subject property. Among
the evidence she submitted was the copy of the
receipt she prepared on January 21, 1991.
However, the receipt appeared to have been
altered in the following manner: 1) the word
fifty was inserted before the word five on the
second line of the receipt to read fifty five
thousand instead of five thousand; 2) the
number 5 was inserted before 5,000.00 on
the third line of the receipt so that it would read
55,000.00; 3) additional words were inserted in
the last sentence of the receipt which reads,
Now covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D.
Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute
of [sic] valid deed of conveyance covering the

same sale; 4) on the date January 21 the

number 4 was superimposed so that it would
read as January 24 instead; and 5) there now
appears the amount of 55,000.00 and below it
the word value on the upper left hand corner of
the receipt.

Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted

a criminal action before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City charging that Avella
had made it appear that he received P55,000
when he received only P5,000. Needless to
state, the City Prosecutor found that a prima
facie case of violation of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code had been committed by
Avella and accordingly filed the corresponding
Information.

Avella, in her defense, admitted that she did in

fact alter the receipt but claims that it was done
in the presence and at the request of Alberto.

On January 21, 1991, Alberto, along with his

sister, came to Avellas residence in
Mandaluyong City to ask for additional
downpayment for the house and lot. At that time
she only had P5,000 in cash which she handed
over to Alberto and then promised him a bigger
sum in the future. Avella then hand wrote two
receipts which was signed by Alberto and his
sister, as evidence of the payment of P5,000.
One receipt was her copy while the other was
for Alberto. Three days later, on January 24,
1991, Avella called up Mr. Celso Cunanan
(Celso), an architect, from whom she asked to
borrow P50,000. Celso had earlier committed to
Avella that he would lend her P50,000. Celso
arrived at her house that evening to give her the
money. Already present in the house were
Avella, her sister and Alberto. Celso delivered to
Avella P50,000 which the latter, in the formers
presence, handed over to Alberto. With respect
to the alteration, Avella explained that Alberto did
not have with him his copy of the January 21,
1991 receipt and so he told her to just add in
her copy the amount of P50,000 to make it
P55,000. Avella acceded to the request and
made the changes in front of Alberto while he

was counting the money. Avella said she

showed the altered receipt to Alberto but that he
was not able to affix his signature thereon
because he was in a hurry to leave. Avellas
account was corroborated by the testimony of
Celso who declared that all these happened in
his presence.

Avella further claimed that this case was filed

against her in retaliation for the estafa case she
filed against Alberto. As claimed by Avella, she
found out that the deed of sale which
purportedly transferred ownership of the house
and lot to Alberto was a fake. Upon her request,
the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.),
Questioned Documents Division, examined the
signatures of Mr. Floro Caceres and Mrs.
Paciencia Castor Caceres, the transferees of the
subject property, contained in the deed of sale.
In its report the N.B.I. determined that the
questioned signatures and sample signatures of
Floro Caceres and Paciencia Caceres were not
written by one and the same person

ISSUE: W/N Avella is guilty under Art 171 and

172 of the RPC

HELD: The plea lacks merit and is denied.

The elements of the crime of falsification under

Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that there be an alteration (change) or
intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it
was made on a genuine document; (3) that the
alteration or intercalation has changed the
meaning of the document; and (4) that the
changes made the document speak something
false. When these are committed by a private
individual on a private document the violation
would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the
same code, but there must be, in addition to the
aforesaid elements, independent evidence of
damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person.

Given the admissions of Avella that she altered

the receipt, and without convincing evidence that
the alteration was with the consent of private
complainant, the Court holds that all four (4)
elements have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is
readily apparent as it was made to appear that
Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he
did not. Hence, Avellas conviction.

Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of

Presumptive Death, malice, good faith as a valid
defense
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as

minimum, to 10 years, as maximum and
P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus
costs of suit
Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy
Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that
he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent whereas under Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony
CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating
that Article 41 of the Family Code should apply
that there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the
absent spouse and modified minimum to 2 years
and four months

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art.

349 RPC, Art. 41 FC

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a

felony by dolo (deceit).

FACTS:
July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaa
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned
Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her
again
January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B.
Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial
student, in Dagupan City while she looked for a
friend during her 2 days stay
Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a
motel together and he proposed marriage and
introduced her to his parents who assures that
he is single
April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to
build a home after
1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or
thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina would
ask for money, he would slap her
January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and
left and stopped giving financial support
August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and
was embarrassed and humiliated to learn that
Eduardo was previously married
Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that
he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina
RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy and sentenced to an indeterminate

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed

Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

o
o

o
o

o
o

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision

mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is
to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only
upon the personal belief of parties, but upon
certain objective facts easily capable of accurate
judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy,
the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and
(b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act
is performed with deliberate intent
Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury

When the act or omission defined by law as a

felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it
to have been intentional
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by
dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil
act and an evil intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent.
EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the
law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
burden of the petitioner to prove his defense
that when he married he was of the wellgrounded belief that his first wife was already
dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975
failed to discharge his burden since no judicial
declaration as proof
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the
rules on presumptive death on Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code which states that before
the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
moral damages may be awarded under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code for being against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society

Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted.

The court held that the killing was done in
performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the
obligation to surrender and his disobedience
with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The
action was justified by the circumstances.
Case digest on PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES
FLORA
G.R.
NO.
125909
The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were
convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo
and the attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were
found to have conspired to kill Ireneo. However,
during the commission of the crime, Emerita was
also killed and Flor hit by a bullet.
HELD:
Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators
or which are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the
actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only
shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else.
Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of
Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired at
Emerita and Flor can be convicted for the
murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.
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Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November

17, 2010
Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro

PEOPLE

v.

DELIMA

[46

Phil.

738

(1922)]

Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail.

Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in the house
of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered
his surrender but Napoleon answered with a
stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it,
fired his revolver but didnt hit Napoleon. The
criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his
weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima
was tried and convicted for homicide; he
appealed.

G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August

2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the

death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.

Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary

release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no

identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the
MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal
case, including the arraignment his arraignment
as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion,

the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a

resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief from his petition for
certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight

Physical Injuries for injuries sustained

respondent; and

by

2. Whether petitioners constitutional

right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:
The accused negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,

submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner,

arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article

shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence

under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the

second
prosecutions
as
constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the

accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger
and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of nonprosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule
of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.

PEOPLE vs ILIGAN
191 SCRA 643
FACTS:
At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo
Quinones and his companions Zaldy
Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from
barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio
fiesta. On the way they met the
accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew

Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo

Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to
box him. Felix quickly said that they had
no desire to fight. Upon seeing his
nephew fall, Fernando Iligan drew from his
back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.
Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three
accused. They ran for a good while andeven
passed the house of Quinones, when they
noticed that they were no longer being
chased the three decided to head
back to Quinones house. On the way
b a c k t h e t h r e e accused suddenly emerged
from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked
Quinones Jr.o n t h e f o r e h e a d w i t h h i s
bolo causing him to fall down. Felix
a n d Z a l d y r a n . U p o n returning they saw
that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his
head busted.The postmortem examination
report and the death certificate indicates
that thevictim died of shock and massive
cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular
accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the
victims death given that it was dueto a vehicular
accident and not the hacking.
HELD: YES.
We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he
was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate
Iligan from liability for the death
of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the
RPC which states that criminal liability shall b e
incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act
d o n e b e different from that which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that
an intentional felony has been committed
and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be the direct natural and logical consequence of
the felony committed by the offender
.
It is held that the essential elements
are present in this case. The
intentional felony committed was the
hacking of the head of Quinones the
f a c t t h a t i t w a s c o n s i d e r e d superficial
by the physician is immaterial. The location of
the wound intended to do away with
him.T h e h a c k i n g i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e
d on the national highway where

v e h i c l e s p a s s a n y moment, the
hacking blow received by Quinones
weakened him and was run over by a
vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus
deemed as the proximate cause of the
victims death. Iligan is held liable for homicide
absent any qualifying circumstances

same to clean her shoes, which she needed for

church the next day
o Then she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped
by his place of work
o She saw her husband inside a building of the
NAWASA standing by the window

People v. Mananquil
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J.
Dean Lozarie Law 109 Crim 1 Group B5
FACTS:
Prosecutions version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina
Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City, where her husband was working as
a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of
gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft
Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a coffee
bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day,
because the latter had burned her clothing, was
maintaining a mistress, and had been taking all
the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she
knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened, Elias
Day shouted at his wife and castigated her,
saying PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then
got the bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo
shirt of the victim aflame
Defenses version
o Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she
left for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten
centavos worth of gasoline, intending to use the

o She entered and knocked at the wooden door.

Elias opened the door, but when he saw his wife
he shouted at her.
o She told him that she had brought him fluid for
his lighter, but Elias, who was drunk, cursed her
PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON. This
shouting continued despite her telling him that
she had come just to bring the gasoline that he
wanted
o She trembled and became dizzy. She was
beside herself and did not know that she was
sprinkling the gasoline on her husbands face.
o She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down
for a while. Then she remembered her grandson
who was alone in the house so she went home,
leaving her husband who was walking to and fro
and not paying attention to her
o She went to bed but could not sleep. She
returned to NAWASA to apologize to her
husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police
officers were present
o An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she
was Eliass wife
o When she said yes, officer accused her of
setting her husband on firean accusation she
denied
o The police took her to the headquarters,
prepared a written statement which she was
made to sign upon a promise that she would be
released if she signed it
ISSUES:
WON appellants extrajudicial confession was
voluntarily given YES
WON burns sustained by victim contributed to
cause pneumonia which was the cause of the

victims death
RULING: YES
RATIONALE
Court found appellants aforesaid assertions
a mere pretense to flimsy to be accepted as
true, no error in the trial courts pronouncement
that the appellants sworn statement was
voluntarily given by her
Contrary to her claim, she knew and
understood Tagalog even though she was not a
Tagala as she had stayed in Manila
continuously for 14 years
her total indifference and seemingly
unperturbed concern over the fate that had
befallen the victim supports the theory that she
has murder in her heart and meant to do harm
to her husband
Mananquil claimed that victims pneumonia,
from which he died, was caused by the alcohol
which he was drunk on that night. But as
testified by a doctor, taking alcohol cannot cause
pneumonia
Pneumonia was complication of the burns
sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate
cause of death, the court held on to state that
this could not have resulted had not the victim
suffered from second-degree burns
MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and
RANDYVER PACHECOG.R. No. 155791.
March 16, 2005
Facts:
An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court that the accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson
Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a
demurer to evidence which the trial courtgranted
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable
for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for

Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the

order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled
that the acquittal in this case is not merely based
on reasonable doubt butrather on a finding that
the accused-appellees did not commit the
criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to
the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any
civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in
a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds
that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them.
Issue: Whether or not the extinction of
respondents criminal liability carries with it the
extinction of their civil liability.
Held:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. The prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury
he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from where the civil liability may arise
does not exist.
PEOPLE v. QUIANZON / G.R. No. 42607 /
September 28, 1935
FACTS:
Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres
Aribuabo applied a firebrand on his abdomen.
He died after 10 days. Three witnesses
corroborated to facts and Quianzon also owned
up to his act.The trial court charged Quianzon of
homicide. His counsel argued that it should only

be convicted serious physical injuries as

Aribuabo died because of his carelessness and
his disobedience to his doctors
ISSUE: Whether Quianzon committed homicide.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that Quianzons
contention was without merit. The doctor even
said that it was difficult if the victim would survive
or not. His act was the direct cause of the
victims death. The SC held that Quianzon was
guilty of murder with additional mitigating
circumstance because of his admission to the
crime.
URBANO v. IAC (INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT / G.R. No. 72964 / January 7, 1988
FACTS:
In 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field
where he found his sacks of palay soaked from
an overflowing canal. He saw Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe at the scene and asked
who did it. Javier admitted and Urbano got angry
and struck him with his bolo on his right palm.
No charges were filed as Javier and Urbano
had an amicable settlement wherein he paid
some of the medical dues. A few days later,
Javier died from tetanus. The family of Urbano
filed a homicide charge against him and was
found guilty afterwards. Then the IAC, through a
petition, affirmed the RTCs decision. A motionfor
a new trial was based on their barangay captain
where he saw Javier catching fish in the dirty
irrigation water days before his death.
ISSUE: Whether Urbanos act was the direct
cause of Javiers death.
RULING:
Urbano argues that it was Javiers fault that he
got infected with tetanus because his hands
were healing days before his death. Javier was
not infected days after the hacking incident.
The SC found that the wound was infected but it
was not because of the hacking as Javier would
only have mild tetanus if that were true. The SC
found that the act of Urbano was not
the proximate cause of Javiers death. The SC
acquitted him of the homicide charge but direct
him to pay civil liabilities.

INTOD VS CA
215 SCRA 52
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that
he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of
a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them. Otherwise, he would
also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them
armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and
fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was
no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder
based on the testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder
since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with
the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's
absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art.
4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime

 Legal impossibility would apply to those

circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended
physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person
already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to
be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime;
legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot
be held liable for any crime

People v. Domasian
G.R. No. 95322

March 1, 1993

Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4
FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was
walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along
Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon,
he was approached by Pablito Domasian who
requested his assistance in getting his father's
signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed
to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the
man went into a building to get the certificate.
Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry
when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him
to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took
another tricycle, this time bound for the
municipal building from where they walked to the
market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver
and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As

Enrico was crying and being firmly held,

Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became
suspicious and asked Domasian about his
relationship with the boy who told him they were
brothers. Their physical differences and the
wide gap between their ages made Grate doubt
so he immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted
from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went
after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.
Noticing that they were being pursued,
Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a
passenger jeep when he met his parents, who
were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same
day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico
and warned that otherwise the boy would be
killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar. After comparing it with some
records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note demanding
P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra
thought the handwriting in the note was familiar
so he referred it to the NBI for examination and it
turned out to be Dr. Samson Tans signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently
charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon
o Domasians alibi: at the time of the incident
he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's
house and later went to an optical clinic with his
wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tans alibi: he was in Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed
Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of
kidnapping kidnapping with serious illegal
detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention may consist not only in placing a

person in an enclosure but also in detaining him

or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not
finding that the sending of the ransom note was
an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs
of the same article, which clearly applies to him,
thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability
shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received,
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act
cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of
its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of
the ransom note would have had the effect only
of increasing the penalty to death under the last
paragraph of Article 267 although this too would
not have been possible under the new
Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that
it exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act
through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared
toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million
in exchange for Enrico's life.

US vs. Eduave
36 Phil 209
Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl
suddenly and struck her from behind with a
sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the
lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and
one-half inches long and two inches deep,
severing all of the muscles and tissues there.
The accused was incensed at the girl for the
reason that she had theretofore charged him
criminally before the local officials with having
raped her and with being the cause of her
pregnancy. He was her mothers querido and

was living with her as such at the time the crime

here charged was committed
Issues: WON the crime murder or homicide if
the girl had been killed, WON the stage of
commission is attempted or frustrated
Held: The crime committed was MURDER; The
attack was made treacherously. Qualified by the
circumstance of alevosia (Sp. treachery, a-le-voSI-a), the accused making a sudden attack upon
his victim partly from the rear and dealing her a
terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo.
The stage of commission is FRUSTRATED;
Not attempted murder because defendant
PERFORMED ALL OF THE ACTS which should
have resulted in the consummated crime and
voluntarily desisted from further acts.
People vs. Orita
184 SCRA 105
Facts:
Victim: Cristina Abaya, 19 years old, freshman at
St. Josephs College in Borongan, Eastern
Samar
At around 1:30 am, after attending a party,
Abayan came home to her boarding house. As
she knocked at the door, Orita suddenly held her
and poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for
him to let her go but instead of doing so, Orita
dragged her upstairs with him while he had his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right
hand holding and poking the balisong at the
victim. At the second floor, he commanded
Christina to look for a room. Upon finding a
room, Orita held her against the wall while he
undressed himself. He then ordered her to
undress. As she took off her shirt, he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie
on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing
the balisong at her neck, ordered he to hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. In this position,
only a portion of his penis entered her, so he
ordered Abayan to go on top of him. With him
lying on his back and Abayan mounting him, still,
he did not achieve full penetration and only part
of his penis was inserted in the vagina. At this
instance, Abayan got the opportunity to escape
Orita because he had both his hands and the
knife on the floor. Abayan, still naked, was
chased from room to room with Orita climbing
over the partitions. Abayan, frantic and scared,
jumped out of a window and darted for the
municipal building and was finally found by Pat.

Donceras and other policemen. Due to darkness

though, the failed to apprehend Orita.In the
medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the
following findings: circumscribed hematoma at
Ant. neck, linear abrasions below left breas,
multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions
on both kness, erythemetous areas noted
surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact;
no laceration fresh and old noted; examining
finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal
cavity tight, no discharges noted

no penetration or didnt reach labia/mere

grazing of surface

Issue: Whether or not rape is consummated

5. Child denied penetration occurred People v.

Villamor consummation even when penetration
doubted: pains felt, discoloration of inner lips of
vagina or red labia minora or hymenal tags not
visible. Now seen in case, Medico legal officer,
though penetration not needed to prove contact,
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual
contact. Hymen intact

Held: Rape was consummated. Perfect

penetration is not essential. For the
consummation of rape, any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient to
qualify as having carnal knowledge. In the crime
of rape, from the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim, he actually
attains his purpose and from that moment, the
essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished
People vs. Campuhan
329 SCRA 270
Facts:
Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four
year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Campuhan was
caught by childs mother on April 25, 1996 at
around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of
Corazons brother was allegedly kneeling in front
of the child with both their pants downa dn child
was crying ayoko, ayoko while Primo forced
his penis into childs vagina
Issue:
WON crime is rape?
Held:
No. Modified to attempted rape
1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not e
ssential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape.
Meretouching of external genitalia considered
when its an essential part of penetration not just
touching in ordinary sense(People v. Orita).
Labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated (People v. Escober)
2. Attempted

3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred.

Mothers testimony questionable with regards to
her position relative to Primo and child. They
failed to establish how she could have seen
actual contact in her position
4. Mans instinct is to run when caught. Primo
could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even
if seeing Corazon

Valenzuela vs. People

G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007
Petitioner: Aristotel Valenzuela
Respondents: People of the Philippines and
Hon. Court of Appeals
Ponente: J. Tinga
FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post at
the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw
the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a
push cart loaded with cases of detergent and
unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy
Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned
inside the supermarket, and later emerged with
more
cartons
of
detergent. Thereafter,
Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the
cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave,
the security guard asked Valenzuela for the
receipt of the merchandize. The accused
reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The
trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since he was not
able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated
stage.
HELD:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a felony is consummated when all
the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of
theft, the following elements should be present:
(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. The
Court held that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with
intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since he has already committed
all the acts of execution and the deprivation from
the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage,
and can only be attempted or consummated.
People vs. Lamahang
62 Phil 703
Facts:
Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an
iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods in
Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was
unfastening another when a patrolling police
caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping
inside store as it was early dawn. Convicted of
attempt of robbery
Issue:
WON crime is attempted robbery?
Held:
No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt
should have logical relation to a particular and
concrete offense which would lead directly to
consummation. Necessary to establish
unavoidable connection & logical & natural
relation of cause and effect. Important to show
clear intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we
can only infer that his intent was to enter by
force, other inferences are not justified by facts.
Groizard: infer only from nature of acts
People vs Salvilla

April 26, 1990Melencho Herrera, J

Facts:
Petitioner: Bienvenido Salvilla
April 12, 1986, at about noon time Petitioner,
together with Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio
(all surnamedCanasares), staged a robbery at
the New Iloilo Lumber Yard. They were armed
with homemade guns and a hand grenade

On their way inside the establishment, they met

Rodita Habiero, an employee there who was on
her way out for her meal break, and informed
her that it was a hold-up.

They went inside the office and the petitioner

pointed his gun at Severino Choco, the owner,
and his two daughters, Maryand Mimmie. They
informed Severino that all they needed
was money.

Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein

he placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the
defense) and handed it to the petitioner.

Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and

wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his
2 daughters and Rodita were kept inside the
office.

According to the appellant, he stopped Severino

from getting the wallet and watches.

At about 2:00 of the same day, the appellant told

Severino to produce P100,000 so he and the
other hostages can be released. Severino told
him it would be hard to do that since banks are
closed because it was a Saturday

The police and military authorities had

surrounded the lumber yard. Major Melquiades
Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo
City, negotiated with the accused and appealed
to them to surrender. The accused refused to
surrender and release the hostages.

Rosa Caram, OIC Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the

negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a
coaster, and some raincoats. Caram offered
P50,000 instead. Later, the accused agreed to
receive the same and to release Rodita to be
accompanied by Mary in going out of the
office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor
Caram and with the key, Mayor Caram unlocked
the door and handed to Rodita P50,000, which
Rodita gave to one of the accused.


Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded
back to the office.

The police and military authorities decided to

assault the place when the accused still wouldnt
budge after more ultimatums. This resulted to
injuries to the girls, as well as to the accused
Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Marysright
leg had to be amputated due to her injuries.

The appellant maintained that the money, wallet

and watches were all left on the counter and
were never touched by them. He also claimed
that they never fired on the military because they
intended to surrender.
Issues:

WON the crime of robbery was consummated

WON there was a mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender
Ratio:

Yes. The robbery shall be deemed

consummated if the unlawful taking is
complete.
o
Unlawful taking of personal property of another
is an essential part of the crime of robbery. The
respondent claimed that none of the items
(money, watches and wallet) were recovered
from them. However, based on the evidence, the
money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of
theappellant and his co-accused and thus the
taking was completed.
o
It is not necessary that the property be taken
into the hands of the robber or that he should
have actually carried the property away, out of
the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or
that he should have made his escape with it.

No. The surrender of the appellant and his coaccused cannot be considered in their favour to
mitigate their liability.
o
To be mitigating, a surrender must have the
following requisites: that the offender had not
been actually arrested, that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
his agent, and that the surrender was

voluntary. The surrender by the appellant and

his co-accused hardly meets these
requirements. There is no voluntary surrender to
speak of.
Note: The nature of the linked offenses
(robbery with serious physical injuries and
serious illegal detention) was also discussed.
The detention in the case at bar was not only
incidental to the robbery but was a necessary
means to commit the same so thenature of the
offense was affirmed
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 157057 June 26, 2007
Justice Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo)
and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan),were walking
to their respective homes after spending time at
the house of Crisaldo's father.
Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house
followed a narrow pathway along the local
shrubs called banganga, Allan walked ahead of
Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing
thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which
caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick
turn around and saw his attacker, petitioner, also
known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner
stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter's
left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry,
he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused
petitioner to run away. Allan then brought
Crisaldo to his father's house where Crisaldo's
wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo
was then brought to the Peaplata Hospital
where he was given first aid and then
transferred to the
Davao Medical Center where he stayed for three
weeks to recuperate from his wounds.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged with
Frustrated Murder. During his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial.
On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision
convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed
his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the
decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated
murder.
HELD:

No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity

of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated,
but whether the assailant had passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the
offense
In the present case, the intent to kill is very
evident and was established beyond
reasonable doubt through the unwavering
testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of
execution
of the attack as well as the number of wounds
he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from
behind by petitioner. When Crisaldo turned
around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting
Crisaldo on the left arm as the latter tried to
defend himself. The treacherous manner in
which petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown
not only by the sudden and unexpected attack
upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the
deliberate manner in which the assault was
perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to
perform all the acts of execution, because Allan
came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was
forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily
desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop
stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo
and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective
phase of the crime had not been completed

People vs. Sy Pio

Facts: Sy Pio shot three people early in the
morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong Kiap,
Ong Pian and Jose Sy. Sy Pio entered the store
at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz Manila and started
firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot
was Jose Sy. Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose
Sy, Tan asked what is the idea? thereupon,
Sy Pio turned around and fired at him as well.
Tan was shot at his right shoulder and it passed
through his back. He ran to a room behind the
store to hide. He was still able to hear gunshots
from Sy Pios pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran
away. Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the
Chinese General Hospital where his wound was
treated. He stayed there from September 3-12,
1949. He was released upon his request and
against physicians advice and was requested to
return for further treatment which he did 5 times
in a period of 10 days. His wound was
completely healed; he spent P300 for hospital
and doctors fees. Sy Pio was found by the
Constabulary in Tarlac. Lomotan, a police from

Manila Police Department went to Tarlac to get

Sy Pio. He admitted to Lomotan that he shot the
victims and handed him the pistol used in the
shooting. According to Sy Pios declaration,
some months prior to the incident, he was
employed in a restaurant owned by Ong Pian.
Sy Pios wife, Vicenta was also employed by
Ong Pians partner. When he tried to borrow
money from Ong Pian fpr his wifes sick father,
Ong Pian only lent him P1. his wife was able to
borrow P20 from her employer. D2013 | Criminal
Law 1 | Prof. I. M. Gutierrez III | 8 Afterwards,
defendant-appellant was dismissed from his
work. Ong Pian presented a list of Sy Pios
debts and these were deducted from his wifes
monthly salary. Sy Pio could not remember
incurring such debts. As such, he was resentful
of Ong Pians conduct. In Tan Siong Kiaps case,
a few months before Sept3, Sy Pio was able to
realize the sum of P70 and he put his money in
a place in his room. The next day, Sy Pio found
that his money was gone. Tan tolf Sy Pio that he
had probably given the money to his wife.
Thereafter, Sy Pio could hear that he had lost
his money gambling. ASo early in the morning of
Sept 3, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman who has a
pistol was away, he got his pistol and went to a
restaurant in Ongpin where Ong Pian worked
and shot him. Afterwards he went to Sta Cruz
and shot Jose Sy and Tan.
Issues: Trial court erred in not finding that Tan
received the shot accidentally from the same
bullet that had been fired at Jose Sy. The
evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment
of conviction. Lower court erred in sentencing
him to pay an indemnity of P350. Defendantappellant should only be found guilty of less
serious physical injuries instead of frustrated
murder.
Held:
1. Sy Pio had to turn around to shoot Tan Siong
Kiap.
2. There is sufficient proof. (Uncontradicted
testimony of the victim, admissions made to
Lomotan, testimony of physician, etc.)
3. Assignment of error must be dismissed.
Offended party spent P300 for the hospital fees.
4. The fact that he was able to escape which
appellant must have seen, must have produced
in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he
was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the
body. The defendant appellant knew that he had
not actually performed all acts of execution
necessary to kill his victim. Under these

circumstances, it cannot be said that the

subjective phase of the acts of execution had
been completed.
People vs. Ravelo
202 SCRA 655

of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while

the victim is not placed in a position to defend
himself.
People VS Kalalo
59 Phil 715
Facts:

Facts: The accused-appellants are members of

the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)
stationed at a checkpoint near the airport of
Tandag. At approximately 6:30 PM of May 21,
1984, accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped
by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano. They
then detained Gaurano at the house of Pedro
Ravelo, one of the accused. Thereafter, they
assaulted, attacked, and burned Gaurano, with
the intent of killing the latter. Reynaldo Gaurano
died on May 22. At about 1AM of May 22, the
accused-appellants also kidnapped by means of
force Joey Lugatiman. The latter was also
brought to Ravelo's house where he was
tortured. At 5AM, Lugatiman was transferred to
the house of accusedappellant Padilla. There he
was tied to the wall with a nylon line and was
told he would be killed at 9AM. Shortly after,
accused-appellants had to attend to Gaurano;
Lugatiman was thus left alone. He was able to
escape. He reported what happened to him and
to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC
convicted the accused-appellants of murder of
Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman. In
this appeal, counsel for the accused aver that
the lower court erred in finding that accusedappellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
Counsel further contends that there can be no
frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to
kill, which is an essential element of the offense
of frustrated murder. The trial court merely relied
on the statement of the accused-appellants
stating they would kill Lugatiman to establish
intent to kill.
Issue: Whether the statement by the accused
stating that Lugatiman would be killed is
sufficient proof of intent to convict a person of
frustrated murder
Held: No Ratio: In a crime of murder or an
attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must
have the intent or the actual design to kill which
must be manifested by external acts. A verbal
expression is not sufficient to show an actual
design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be
shown not only by a statement of the aggressor,
but also by the execution of all acts and the use

On November 10, 1932, the appellants namely,

Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, and
Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Batangas
jointly with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica
and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858,
6859 and 6860, the first two for murder, and the
last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of
the parties said three cases were tried together
and after the presentation of their respective
evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro
Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica,
and sentenced the other appellants.
Issue:
W/O accused-appellants are liable of the crimes
of murder and discharge of firearms?
Held:
The first case is, for the alleged murder of
Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with
the corresponding accessory penalties, and to
indemnify the heirs of the said deceased
Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of P1,000, with
the costs.
The second case is, for the alleged murder of
Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with
the corresponding accessory penalties, and to
indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the
deceased Arcadio Holgado, in the sum of
P1,000, with the costs.
In the third case, that is, the court held that the
crime committed was simply that of discharge of
firearm, not frustrated murder, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced to one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional and to pay the proportionate part of
the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and
Juan Kalalo, as well as their co-accused Fausta
and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and
Alejandro Garcia, were acquitted of the charges
therein.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in

the said three cases are hereby affirmed without
prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with
one-half of the time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment, in
accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. So ordered.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Rape.
Rulings:
Yes.
Rape is committed:

People vs. Jonie Dominguez GR. No. 191065

Facts:
The accused Jonie Dominguez was charged with
two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) other
counts of simple rape.
AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001
when she was only nine years old, and second
on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was
allegedly done under the circumstance of
intimidation with a knife. The second instance of
rape was allegedly committed by the accused
through threats and the use of moral
ascendancy over AAA.
BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped
seven times. The rape was allegedly committed
through force, violence and intimidation, and
moral ascendancy.
AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the
instances of rape, until their mother accidentally
discovered the commission of the crimes from
the accused himself. Overhearing Dominguez in
one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the
children's vaginas were already wide, she
confronted her daughters and asked them about
the remark. The children reluctantly confided to
her what had happened.
During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against
Dominguez by narrating the lascivious acts he
had done to them. According to their
testimonies, the accused had employed trickery
so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone
with him and thereafter raped, with threats of
harm to her person or her family.

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge

of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GUERRERO, J.
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of
December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, the
above-named accused, being then an applicant
for probation after he was convicted of an
offense feloniously give to the complainant, Mr.
Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the
sum of P100.00 in a paper bill under
circumstances that would make the said City
Probation Officer, liable for bribery.
Issue: Whether or not the accused violates Art.
212 of Revised Penal Code.

Held: No. We can fairly deduce that the

procedure for processing petitioner's application
for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles
City was not precise, explicit and clear cut and
since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and
quite unfamiliar with probation rules and
procedures, there is reason to conclude that
petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that

his act of providing and advancing the expenses

for whatever documentation was needed further
to complete and thus hasten his probation
application, was understandably innocent and
not criminal. WHEREFORE, accused acquitted

People vs Hernandez
54 Phil 122

Facts: Defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez

is a bonafide member of Congress of Labor
Organizations. CLO is an affiliate of Hukbong
Magpalayang Bayan, a known group performing
rebellious activities. Hernandez was charged
and convicted of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robbery
and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Prosecution maintains that capital punishment
may be imposed for the crime he was convicted
of. Defense contends that there is no complex
crime in the crime of rebellion. It was deemed
best not to disturb the course of action taken by
the lower court, which denied bail to Hernandez,
hence the motion to post bail.

Issue: Whether or not equal protection was

observed in the administration of justice?

Decision: Motion for bail granted. The

ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately there
from. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each

one of said offenses put together. In directing

that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than
to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate
of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit
of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he
commits said crimes thru separate and distinct
acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave than
the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense.

Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the

PhilippinesGR no. 141066, February 17, 2005
Facts:
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline
Ladonga, petitioner, becamethe regular
customer of Alfredo Oculam in his pawnshop.
Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a loan from him, guaranteed by check
of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by
Adronico. On last week of April 1990and during
the first week of May 1990 the spouses obtained
additional loan guaranteed by UCPD. And
between May and June 1990, the spouses
obtained the third loan guaranteed by UCPD.
The three checks bounced upon presentment for
the reason that the account was closed. When
the spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal
complaint against them. While admitting that the
checks issued by Adronico bounced
becausethere was no sufficient deposit or the
account was closed, the spouses claimthat the
checks were issued only to guarantee the
obligation, with anagreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they
mature, and, that petitioner is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in
theissuance thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the
issuer of the three checks that bounced, could
be held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 as conspirator.

that being the expert in criminal law

administration.

Ruling:
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that a conspiracy exist
when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To be held liable
guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
the accused must be shown to have perform an
overt actin pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. It was not proven by direct evidence;
petitioner was merely present at the time of the
issuance of the checks. However, this inference
cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with
the criminal design. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence.

G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006

FACTS:
At around 1:25 am of October 11, 1996, the victim Joselito
Bautista, who was a member of the UP Police Force, took
his daughter, who complained of difficulty in Breathing

People vs. Simon

234 SCRA 555
Facts: Oct. 22, 1988, Pampanga. Martin Simon
was convicted of violating RA 6425 AII 4
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) through a
NARCOM poser-buyer. It was appealed for
reversal alleging it was a frame-up (testimonies
& evidence proved otherwise) & evidence was
inadmissible (held, because there was no
counsel).
Issue: WON correct penalty applied?
Held: No. Conviction modified. There was
overlapping error in the law thus the SC had to
harmonize conflicting provisions by providing for
degrees of graduation.
Rule: degrees applied depending on quantity
then apply mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. Least penalty should be prision
correccional so as not to depreciate seriousness
of crime. Justified in applying RPC provisions
because law adopted penalties under RPC in
their technical terms thus significations and
effects will also apply. It rules in people v. Tsang
Hin Wai that when special law grants discretion
to SC to apply penalties, Code wont be held.
Otherwise, SC should be guided by rules in RPC

Manaban vs. CA and People of

the Philippines

People vs Alconga
78 Phil 366
Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion,
the banker of the card game, was playing black
jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and
Alconga were partners in the game, they had
one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion
and he gave signs to De
Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the
game, found this out and he expressed his
anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright
this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga
was doing his job as ahome guard. While the
said accused was seated on a bench in the
guardhouse, Barion came along and said
Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a
swing of his pingahan, a bamboo stick.
Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the
ground under the bench with the intention to
crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was
given by Barion but failed to hit the accused,
hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to
go out of the guard house by crawling on his
abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the
3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver,
causing him to stagger and hit the ground. The
deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and
directed a blow to the accused who was able to
parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to
handfight ensued. The deceased, looking
already beaten and having sustained several
wounds ran away. He was followed by the
accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased
received a mortal bolo blow, the one which
slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face
downward besides many other blows delivered.
Alconga surrendered.

Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used

as a defense by Alconga

The appellant testified that during her marriage

she had tried to leave her husband at least five
times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The appellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The appellant, after being interviewed by
specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with
a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her
husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.

Held:
No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga
guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to
inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after,
upon the other hand, having been
wounded with one revolver shot and several
bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury
upon him has ceased absolutely/
Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or
injure. He could have only attacked if there was
reason to believe that he is still not safe. In the
case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who
is the superior fighter and his safety was already
secured after the first fight ended. There was no
more reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and
independently. Under the first fight, self-defense
would have been valid, but that is not the case in
the second fight. In the second fight, there was
illegal aggression on the part of Alconga and as
a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no
mitigatingcircumstance (MC) of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must
be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.
It should be proportionate to the act committed
and adequate to stir one to its commission

People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

(1)
(2)

Issues:
Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense
failed to establish all the elements of selfdefense arising from battered woman syndrome,
to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered
persons mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life,
and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable not necessarily
immediate and actual grave harm to the
accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.

Subject Matter: Applications of the

provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code

SENOJA V. PEOPLE
GR. No. 160341

Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15,
1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the
appellant, she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night and it was her
husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to
make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

Facts: Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja (they were

brothers), Jose Calica and Miguel Lumasac
were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal.
Leon Lumasac suddenly barged in, holding a
bolo and was looking for his brother Miguel
whom he suspected of drying up the ricefield he
was plowing. However, when Senoja (Exequiel)
approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so
he embraced Leon and Jose took Leons bolo.
After the confrontation, Leon wanted to get his
bolo back because he wanted to go home. After
getting it back, Leon walked out of the place

followed by Senoja. Suddenly, Senoja stabbled

Leon at the back. When Leon turned around,
Senoja continued stabbing him until he fell to the
ground. Then petitioner ran towards the
barangay road and threw away the knife he
used to stab Leon. Petitioner admitted killing the
victim but invoked the affirmative defense of selfdefense. His version said that after the
commotion inside the house, Leon left but with a
threat that something will happen to Senoja.
Senoja followed Leon as the latter was making
his way home. When Leon realized that Senoja
was following him, Leon walked back towards
him and suddenly hacked Senoja at the left side
of his head and right thigh. Unable to evade the
treacherous attack by Leon, Senoja drew his
colonial knife and stabbed Leon in self-defense,
inflicting upon him multiple wounds which
caused his death.

Leon who was armed with a bolo and 2) When

Leon demanded for his bolo because he wanted
to go home already after the commotion inside
the house, and then eventually left with a threat.
Quoting the appellate court, the SC said that the
victim had already left the hut. At that point in
time, the victim was simply walking toward his
home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It
was Senoja who wanted a confrontation this
time. It was Senoja who was now the unlawful
aggressor in this second phase of their
confrontation.

People v. Dela Cruz

Issue: W/N Senoja merely acted in self-defense
G.R. No. 120988
Held: No, Senoja is guilty of HOMICIDE. The
affirmative defense of self-defense may be
complete or incomplete. It is complete when all
the three essential requisites are present; it is
incomplete if only unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and any of the two essential
requisites were present. Unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non
to self-defense, complete or incomplete. The
right of self-defense proceeds from necessity
and limited by it. The right begins where
necessity does, and ends where it ends. There
is however, a perceptible difference between
necessity and self-defense. Selfdefense
excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity
justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is
essential to self-defense that it should be a
defense against a present unlawful attack. Selfdefense is an act to save life; hence, it is right
and not a crime. x x x It is a settled rule that to
constitute aggression, the person attacked must
be confronted by a real threat on his life and
limb; and the peril sought to be avoided in
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. But
what then is the standard? We rule that the test
should be: does the person invoking the defense
believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or
limb is in danger? Hence, when an
inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist,
the one making a defense has no right to kill or
injure the former aggressor. After the danger has
passed, one is not justified in following up his
adversary to take his life. IN THIS CASE, there
were two events concerned: 1) The arrival of

August 11, 1997

Lessons Applicable: consummated crime

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
September 27, 1994 11:30 am: Cecilia
Caparos, a neighbor of Whiazel Soriano, waiting
for her two children inside the compound of the
Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School when she
saw Whiazel held on the hand and being led
away by Rosemarie de la Cruz. Knowing that
Whiazel was enrolled in the afternoon class, she
went after them and asked de la Cruz where she
was going with Whiazel. De la Cruz answred
that she was asked by Rowena Soriano,
Whiazels mother, to bring Whiazel to her. Then,
Caparos asked Whiazel the same question,
Whiazel said to look for De la Cruz child.
During this time, Whiazel told De la Cruz that
she wanted to go. But De la Cruz refused and
held her hand. The inconsistent answer,
scratches on Whiazels face and terrified look
made her suspicious so she told De la Cruz to
bring Whiazel to the teacher was surprised and
reasoned out but soon agreed. When they
arrived, Whiazel cried.
When Eufemia Magpantay, guidance
teacher, asked De la Cruz what she was doing
with Whiazel, De la Cruz told her she was
looking for the school dentist. This was also her
answer when they went to the principal.
Gorgonia Nieva, De la Cruz mother-in-law:
on the day prior to the incident, De la Cruz

asked her to look for Dr. Luisa Medina, a dentist

because her daughter was sick. Since Nieva
heard that Dr. Luisa Medina may be found at the
Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School, she
accompanied De la Cruz there at around 11:00
am.
De la Cruz: she asked; guard where the clinic
was. The guard gave her directions, and told her
to pass through the same gate on her way out.
When she got to the clinic, no one was there so
she left. On her way out, she saw Whiazel and
who walked with her. She did not hold, look or
even smile at the child. But, before she could
get out she was seen by Caparos.
RTC: kidnapping and serious illegal detention
of a minor
ISSUE: W/N there is a consummate crime.
HELD: NO. MODIFIED attempted kidnapping
and serious illegal detention
the felony committed is kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of a minor in the
attempted stage only
The attempted phase of a felony is defined
as when the offender commences the
commission of a felony, directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance (Article 6, Revised
Penal Code).
The overt act must be an external one which
has direct connection with the felony, it being
"necessary to prove that said beginning of
execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically
and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense"
already commenced her criminal scheme by
taking hold of Whiazel by the hand and leading
her out of the school premises
People vS Jaurigue
76 Phil 174
Facts:
Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist
Church, Amado Capina sat beside the appellant
and with the greatest of impudence, placed his
hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On
observing this highly improper and offensive
conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her
personal dignity and honor, pulled out a fan knife

and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left

side of the
neck
Amado Capina died from the wound a few
minutes later. Appellant Avelina Jaurigue
was subsequently tried and convicted of the
crime of Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the
legitimate defense of her honor and that she
should be completely absolved of all
criminal responsibility
Ruling:
No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The
attempt torape a woman constitutes an unlawful
aggression sufficient to put her in a state of
legitimate defense inasmuch as a woman's
honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as
precious, if not more than her very existence;
and it is evident that a woman who, thus
imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should
be afforded exemption from criminal liability,
since such killing cannot be considered a crime
from the moment it became the only means left
for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301;
People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil.,
504). As long as there is actual danger of being
raped, a woman is justified in killing her
aggressor in the defense of her honor. When the
deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the
same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel
and placed his hand on the upper portion of her
right thigh without her consent, the said chapel
was lighted with electric lights, and there were
already several people inside the chapel,
including her own father and the barrio
lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances,
there was and there could be no possibility of
her being raped. And when she gave Amado
Capina a thrust at his neck, inflicting upon him a
mortal wound and causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in
the defense of her honor was evidently
excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally
declared completely exemptfrom criminal liability
People vs Oriente
GR No. 155094

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case is about Manuel Orientes appeal of
his conviction for the crime of homicide. The
appellant w/ other persons, attacked and
assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a lead
pipe on different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal). In
the case there was one witness for the
prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court
(C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two
mitigating circumstances were present, namely,
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party, so the court modified the penalty
imposed by the R.T.C.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
[in this particular case there are a number of
issues, but the most compelling is the 2nd and
4th issues]
DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT
APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF
THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED
BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME
WAS REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELFDEFENSE
RULING
- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
show that the killing is legally justified. It must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. The
appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must
concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine
qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to
make use of his gun after being hit in the
forehead by the weapon of the appellant as
alleged by the defense makes their claim of selfdefense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were
extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the
existence of the gun, that was alleged to have
constituted the unlawful aggression

People vs. Apolinar

38 OG 2870
Facts:
Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant
and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong
was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land
owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La
Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a
shotgun, Atong was looking over said landwhen
he observed that there was a man carrying
abundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a
thief (of palay), the defendant called his attention
but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the air
and then at the person. The man, identified as
Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his
house and consequently narrated to Angel
Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been
wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then
showed the two wounds - one in each side
of the spinal column - which wounds were
circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter
of an inch, according to the medical report of Dr.
Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he
sustained. The defendant surrendered to the
authorities immediately after the incident and
gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the
Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23,
1936.
Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by
defense of property
Held:
No; the right to property is not of such
importance as right to life, and defense of
property can be invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it is coupled with an
attack on the person of one entrusted with said
property.
US vs. Bumanglag
14 Phil 644
Facts: On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael
Bumanglag noticed that 40 bundles of palay
which were kept in his granary were missing. He
searched for the missing palay the following
morning and found them in an enclosed field
which was planted with sugar cane, at a
distance of about 100 meters from his granary.
For the purpose of ascertaining who had done it,
he left the palay there, and that night,
accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio
Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near
the said field for the person who might return to

get the palay. Guillermo Ribis appeared and

attempted to carry the palay away him, but at
that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao
assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and
cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the
struggle which ensued, Ribis fell down and died
instantly.
Issue: WON there is defense of property.
Held: NO. Defense of property can be invoked
as a justifying circumstance only when it is
coupled with an attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. (People v. Apolinar)
The bolo worn by the deceased was in its
sheath and hanging from his waist. It cannot be
concluded that the deceased even intended to
assault his murderers with his bolo either before
he was attacked by them or during the fight.
Without unlawful aggression and the other
requisites which would exempt the accused from
criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two
companions assaulted Ribis with sticks and
cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds, and therefore, the
said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide
as co-principal by direct participation, fully
convicted, together with his codefendants who
are already serving their sentence.
People vs. Narvaez
121 SCRA 339
Facts: In the afternoon of August 22, 1968,
GRACIANO JUAN, JESUS VERANO, CESAR
VERANO, CESAR IBANEZ, GEORGE
FLEISCHER and FLAVIANO RUBIA were
fencing the land of George Fleischer, situated in
MAITUM, SOUTH COTABATO. At the place of
fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant
MAMERTO NARVAEZ. At that time appellant
was sleeping and was awakened by the sound
of the chiseling of the walls of his house. He
then arose and saw the fencing. If the fencing
continued appellant would be prevented from
entering his house and rice mill bodega. So he
addressed the group, through Rubia to stop and
talk things over. To which Fleischer answered no
and continued the fencing. At this instance,
appellant lost his equilibrium and got his gun
and shot Fleischer, hitting him. Rubia ran
towards the jeep, and knowing that there is a
gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia likewise
hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died
Issue: WON the aggression was unlawful

Held: YES, it was unlawful. The angry order of

Fleischer to continue the fencing would have
resulted in the further chiselling of the wall of
appellants house as well as the closure of the
access to and from his house and rice mill is an
aggression against appellants property rights.
However, when the appellant fired his shotgun
from his window, killing his two victims, his
resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
The third element is also present. There was no
provocation on the part of the appellant, since
he was asleep at first and was only awakened
by the noise produced by the victims and
laborers. His plea for the deceased and their
men to stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all. Appellants act in killing the
deceased was not justifiable, since not all the
elements for justification are present. The crime
committed is HOMICIDE on two counts
mitigated by the privileged extenuating
circumstance of incomplete self defense as well
as by two generic mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and obfuscation. He was
sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment and
considering that appellant has been under
detention for 14 years since his voluntary
surrender, his immediate release was ordered.
People vs. Chua Hiong
Facts: Cesario Gocheco, nephew of Federico
Chua Hiong (accused-appellant), published an
article in the Manila Chronicle on February 11,
1952 entitled Doubtful Citizenship
questioning the latters citizenship. Aside from
that, Gocheco also filed various charges against
the appellant with different government
agencies. To answer this, on February 21, 1952,
Chua Hiong published an article in the Manila
Chronicle accusing Cesario Gocheco of
persecution mania and sending the appellant a
threatening letter under the pseudonym Benito
Solipco. Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco
was trying to damage his reputation to retaliate.
In an earlier case, Gocheco and his family lost
2/3 of the inheritance left by his father. Chua
Hiong was behind the prevailing parties, helping
them with the expenses of the case. Thus, for
the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and
found guilty of the crime of libel.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant was
justified by virtue of defense of reputation when
he published article in the Manila Chronicle
dated the February 21, 1952 containing libelous
material 1.

Held: In a physical assault, retaliation

becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased,
because there would be no harm to repel. But
that is not the case when it is aimed at a
persons good name. Once the aspersion is
cast, its sting clings and the one defamed may
avail himself of all necessary means to shake it
off. He may hit back with another libel, which, if
adequate, will be justified. (emphasis supplied)
Note: However, it is justified as self-defense only
when it is clearly intended to explain or deny
what was previously said of the one making the
libelous statement. (People vs. Pelayo)
Appellant acquitted with costs de-officio.
People vs. Pelayo
64 OG 1991
Facts: On Nov.15, 1956 Pelayo told Atty.
Clapano in his office and within hearing distance
of three other people that upon his investigation
about the existence of gambling in the
community, a Chinese operator named Lim
Peng told him that then Gov. Alejandro
Almendras (now Senator) used to receive from
him P500 protection money. The following day,
Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in city
council session wherein he did not directly
mention but insinuated through his
interpellations that the governor was receiving
tongs. Pelayo admits having the said
conversation with Clapano.
Issues:
(1) WON the conversation was said in
confidence and covered by the rule on privileged
communication
(2) WON the crime charged which is serious
slander should only be intriguing against honor
(3) WON words were uttered in Self Defense to
what the governor had said about him previously
Held: (1) NO this contention of confidence is
inconsistent with contention of self-defense,
there were others who heard the remarks he
made to Clapano thus could not have given the
communication in confidence. (2) NO - it cannot
be Intriguing against honor because the source
of the information can be pin-pointed= Lim Peng.
When the source can be determined and the
information was passed for the purpose of
causing dishonor, the act is slander (3) NO
even if on a previous occasion the governor
made derogatory remarks against Pelayo, the
retaliation with scurrilous words cannot be selfdefense. It will only exist of the defendant did not

go beyond explaining what was previously said

of him for the purpose of repairing the effect of
the damage caused to him. There is no
justification for him to hit back of make the same
imputation of accusation because this is not an
act of defense but an aggression itself
Art 23
Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al.G.R. No.
L-4160 July 29, 1952
Facts:
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. ordered the delivery of
gasoline to the Rural Transit Company on May
13, 1949. Unfortunately, thegasoline tank-truck
trailer used in the delivery accidentally caught
fire. JulitoSto. Domingo, the driver, with Igmidio
Rico,moved the truck and abandoned it in the
middle of the street resulting to the destruction
of buildings within the area. BothSto. Domingo
and Rico were acquitted of criminal charges
because it cannot be proved that it was their
negligence thatstarted the fire. Anita Tan, the
plaintiff, was one of the owners of the houses
destroyed during the accident. Tan filed a
caseagainst the two companies as well as the
two employees involved for the damages she
suffered. However, the defendantsfiled separate
motions for the dismissal of the plaintiffs
allegation.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are liable for the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Held:
The Court, based on Article 23 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, decided that Rural Transit
Company is with no doubt liablefor damages.
With Sto. Domingo moving the truck to avoid a
greater harm, it was the Rural Transit Company
which benefitedthe most. The fire should have
caused the explosion of the companys
gasoline deposit yet it was avoided. And under
Article23 of the Civil Code, the defendant is held
liable as long as he gets benefited even if the
act or event that caused damage isnot his fault,
thus it applies to the companys situation.
People v. Beronilla
Facts: The accused was a military major of La
Paz , Abra in 1941. He received an order form
the regional commander of an infantry of the

Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to

prosecute Arsenio Borjal for treason and to
appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury found
Borjal guilty of the charge and the
recommendation of the jury was approved by
the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the
execution of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted
for murder. The accused acted upon orders of
superior officers which turned out to be illegal.
Issue: WON Beronilla can be considered to be
acting upon a call of duty and thus, covered by
justifying circumstances which would warrant
acquittal
Held: Yes; Criminal intent not established; he
was acting pursuant to orders of his superiors in
the City (orders given through letters/telegrams).
As a military subordinate, he could not question
the orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the
orders in good faith without being aware of their
illegality, without any fault or negligence on his
part.
People vs Barroga
Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private
document, thedefendant appeals from the
judgment sentencing him to one year,eight
months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, to indemnifythe Compaia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum
ofP10,857.11, with subsidiary imprisonment, the
accessaries of law, andthe costs.The errors
attributed by the appellant to the trial court are:1.
In considering the evidence of the prosecution
more worthy of creditthan that of the defense.2.
In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the
crime of falsificationof private documents, and in
imposing upon him the penalty of oneyear, eight
months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, toindemnify the Compaia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sumof
P10,857.11, and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs of the trial,notwithstanding
the insufficiency of the evidence adduced by
theprosecution.The defendant freely admits that
he prepared the falsified documentswith full
knowledge of their falsity; but he alleges that he
did so fromdata furnished by his immediate
chief, the now deceased BaldomeroFernandez,
and only in obedience to instructions from him
People vs. Ambal

Facts: In the morning of 20 January 1977, the

barangay captain found Felicula (Feling), 48 and
married to Honorato Ambal, under some
flowering plants near the couples house in
Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin. She was
mortally wounded, having 7 incised wounds in
different parts of her body. She asked for
drinking water and medical assistance. She was
placed in an improvised hammock and brought
to the hospital. She died 40 minutes later.
Honorato admitted to killing his wife. After
leaving their child to a neighbor, he went to the
house of the barangay captain and told the
latters wife that he had killed Feling. Then, he
took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, again confessing
that he killed his wife. The policeman
confiscated his long bolo, the tip of which was
broken. His shirt was torn, he was bespattered
with blood, and he appeared to be weak. The
two had been married for 15 years, and
quarreled and bickered a lot. Feling sometimes
didnt stay in the home and spent the night in the
poblacion of Mambajao. They had 8 children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a
fight, because Feling had not bought medicine
for Honorato, who then had influenza. She told
him that he was better off dead (Mas maayo
ka pang mamatay.) so he attacked her. He
was charged with parricide on 27 January 1977
in the municipal court, and was elevated to the
CFI on 4 March 1977. He pleaded not guilty. His
defense was insanity. Two doctors were
brought to the stand: o Dr. Maximino Balbas, Jr.,
the municipal health officer, found him to be
have suffered from psychosis due to short
frustration tolerance during the commission of
the crime but was normal before and after the
commission. He also said that Ambal was a
passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable,
explosive or inadequate personality. o Dr.
Cresogono Llacuna, who undertook a 2-month
observation of mental cases and treated around
100 cases of mental disorders, said that Ambal
suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system
which is NOT INSANITY. He was normal but
nervous, and HAD NO MENTAL DISORDER.
Ambal said that he knew that his wife was dead
because he was informed of it, but that he didnt
know that he had killed his wife because at the
time of the killing, he didnt know what he was
doing, not being in full possession of his normal
mental faculties. He said that his wife was
irritable and they used to quarrel a lot, and that

he remembered riding on a tricycle when he

surrendered on the day of the killing. He
remembered that a week before the incident, he
got wet while plowing, and thats how he got
sick. Trial court concluded that his behavior
immediately after the incident showed he wasnt
insane and that he acted like a normal human
being.
Issue: Should Ambal be exempted from criminal
liability by reason of insanity?
Held and Ratio: No; Trial Courts decision is
affirmed. Courts should be careful to
distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The
State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People vs. Bonoan) o Imbecile:
person marked by mental deficiency; must
be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time
of committing the crime. (People vs.
Formigones) o Insane person: one who has
an unsound mind or suffers from a mental
disorder; there must be complete deprivation
of intelligence in the commission of the act or
that the accused acted without the lease
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (People
vs Cruz, People vs. Renegado) o Insanity: a
manifestation in language or conduct of disease
or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of
the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or
disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition. (Revised Administrative
Code). The popular meaning of the word
crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms
insane, non compos mentis, unsound
mind, idiot, or lunatic. (US vs. Vaquilar)
Passion and motives of anger, hatred, etc, is not
insanity either. Neither is being weak-minded.
Brief history lesson on pleading insanity given:
In medieval times, insanity wasnt a defense.
Gradually, insanity was allowed, but only witin
narrow limits. Then the limits of the defense
were expanded The killer was excused if the
disease of the mind was such that he was
incapable of appreciating the difference between
right and wrong not the right and wrong of
particular case, but right or wrong generally or in

the abstract, the difference between good and

evil. Later, this was modified in favor of the
prisoner so that capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong generally
would not charge with responsibility if there was
no capacity to understand the difference in
relation to the particular act, the subject of the
crime. The court presumes that a person is of
sound mind unless there is positive proof stating
otherwise. In this case, no such proof has been
given. Barredo, J, concurring: Agrees with
decision based on jurisprudence. Abad Santos,
J, concurring: Adds the observation that Feling
was a shrew, and that the worst thing that can
happen to a person is to have an unbearable
spouse. She was also neglectful and even
had the gall to tell him that he was better off
dead. This, plus the mental disorder, should
entitle him to two additional mitigating
circumstances: obfuscation and illness. But
under the circumstances, appellant is deserving
of executive clemency, and so he recommends
it.
People vs. Puno
Facts: Ernesto Puno, 28, is a jeepney driver.
At about 2pm of 8 Sept 1970, he entered a
bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), 72, who is a widow. The house is in Little
Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling
Kikay was in bed. He said Mangkukulam ka,
mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog then
slapped her and struck her several times on the
head with a hammer until she was dead. There
were two witnesses: Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, and
Lina Pajes, 27. According to them, his eyes were
red, and his look was baleful and menacing. He
threatened the two and told them not to go to the
police. He then went to his parents house in
Barrio Tugatong, then to his second cousins
(Teotino Punos) house in Barrio San Jose,
Calumpit, Bulacan. (It was flooded there then;
records dont show how he got there). Lina
went to the police anyway and told Corporal
Daniel B. Cruz what happened. He found her
body, took the statements of the witnesses down
at the police station. Autopsy showed that Aling
Kikay had lacerated wounds on her right
eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by
a hard instrument. COD: intracranial, traumatic
hemorrhage. Punos father surrendered him to
the police. He was brought to National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong on 10 Sept 1970. He

was charged with murder in the municipal court

and was indicted in the Circuit Criminal Court at
Pasig on 21 Oct 1970. Court cited as
aggravating circumstances evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex. Puno testified that he didnt
remember killing Aling Kikay. He believes that
there are mangkukulam, mambabarang and
mabubuyog and that one harmed by a
mambabarang might have a headache or a
swelling nose and ears and can be cured only
by an herbolaryo. It is also necessary to kill the
mangkukulam and mambabarang. Zenaida
Gabriel, his wife, 30, testified that on the night
before the murder, his eyes were reddish and
that he complained of a headache. The following
day, while he was feeding pigs, he said that a
bumblebee was coming towards him and he
warded it off with his hands, but Zenaida didnt
see any bee. Puno then went upstairs and got
the cord of the religious habit of his mother, then
asked for another rope when Zenaida told him
not to use it. Puno tied their dog to a tree and
repeatedly boxed it. Aida Gabriel, who saw this
happen, also said that his eyes were bloodshot
and he had a ferocious expression about him.
According to Teotimo, when Puno came to his
house on 8 Sept, he was cuddling a puppy that
he called Diablo and when asked to eat,
didnt eat but fed the puppy instead. Puno
introduced him to the puppy and sang an
English song, and refused to change his clothes
(which were wet because of the flood). Later, he
tried on Teotimos fathers clothes and when told
that Teos father had been dead for a couple of
years, he just stared at Teotimo. While lying
down, he started singing again, then made a
moaning sound until he fell asleep. In the
morning, he was awakened by the sound of
people in the flood, and Ernesto thought they
were his fellow cursillistas. Defense brought 3
psychiatrists, who all testified that Puno acted
with discernment: o Dr. Araceli Maravilla from
the Psychiatry Section of Dr. Jose R. Reyes
Memorial Hospital: Puno was an outpatient who
could very well live with society although he was
afflicted with schizophrenic reaction, Puno
knew what he was doing and that he had
psychosis. o Dr. Reynaldo Robles of National
Mental Hospital: symptoms were not socially
incapacitating and that he could adjust to the
environment. Agrees with Maravilla.
o Dr. Vicente: not suffering from any delusion
and was not mentally deficient. He wouldnt

have reached third year HS if he were. o The

report of the three doctors submitted on 14 Dec
1970 said that he is presently free from any
social incapacitating psychotic symptoms. The
amnesia of several isolated accounts do
not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic
process. [Schizophrenics] may retain some
residual symptoms impairing their judgment but
not necessarily their discernment of right from
wrong of the offense committed. Trial Court
said he knew what he was doing at the time and
that he would be punished for it, which was why
he threatened the witnesses. If he were truly
insane at the time, he wouldve killed the two
witnesses as well. Puno was convicted of
murder and sentenced him to death.
Issue: Was Puno insane at the time of the
commission, given that he had been suffering
chronic schizophrenia before the crime was
committed?
Held and Ratio: No. Death Penalty set aside to
Reclusion Perpetua. Insanity, to be pleaded,
must be characterized by total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
(People vs. Ambal) Puno was not legally insane
when he killed Aling Kikay, and he was not
completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will, as shown by the facts and findings of the
psychiatrists. Murder is correct because there
was abuse of superiority (as in, ang nasabi na
lang ni Aling Kikay ay Diyos ko. ) There
wasnt any premeditation proven, nor disregard
of sex, therefore, penalty should only be in
medium terms. Makasiar, J, dissenting:
Appellant had been ailing with a psychotic
disorder medically known as chronic
schizophrenia even before he committed the
crime. The said ailment is characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Articles cited by Makasiar
shows that social recovery is not the same as
being cured: By this it is meant that the
patient is able to return to his previous social
environment and to previous or equivalent
occupation, but with minor symptoms and
signs What happened was a relapse.
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does
not recover fully in two months time. His
condition may simply be in remission which
term means social recovery. His records
never showed that he was cured, only that he

was improving and treatment not

completed. According to Dr. Vicente, his
power of control over his will to commit a crime
is affected in such a way that one who has the
impulse to kill will kill when he is affected by
such an ailment. Vicente also said that he
couldve been suffering from an onset of the
schizo reaction at the time. It was also barely a
month and 15 days since his last attack, so the
interval was not sufficient time for his full
recovery. He was convinced that a
mangkukulam was inflicting harm on him, so he
killed her in self-defense. The victim was a
mere consequence of his mental delusion. He
killed the mangkukulam as personified by
the victim; he did not kill Aling Kikay herself.
People vs. Dungo
Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and
3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office
at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit,
Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a
knife from the envelope he was carrying and
stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which
he departed from the office with blood stained
clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained
14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal. Rodolfo
Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that
sometime in February 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife
was requiring so many documents from him.
Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the
DAR. The accused, in defense of himself, tried
to show that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense:
Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's
wife noticed that he appears to be in deep
thought always, maltreating their children when
he was not used to it before. There were also
times that her husband would inform her that his
feet and head were on fire when in truth they
were not. On that fateful day, Rosalino
complained of stomachache but they didn't
bother to buy medicine as the pain went away
immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the
store. But when Andrea followed him to the
store, he was no longer there. Worried, she
looked for him. On her way home, she heard
people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw
her husband in her parentsin-law's house with
people milling around. She asked her husband
why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered,

"That's the only cure for my ailment. I have

cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in
a number of days, I would die. That same day,
the accused went to Manila. Dr. Santiago and
Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental
Health testified that the accused was confined in
the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court
dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of
their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was
psychotic or insane long before, during and after
the commission of the alleged crime and
classified his insanity as an organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident
or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the
accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and
Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered
dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a
series of medical treatment in their clinic.
Issue: WON the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime charged.
Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of
criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that he acts without the least
discernment and that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite
test or criterion for insanity. However, the
definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the
Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In
essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties, which is manifested in language or
conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of
his act. Evidence of insanity must refer to the
mental condition at the very time of doing the
act. However, it is also permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period before and after the time of
the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can
only be known by outward acts. It is not usual for
an insane person to confront a specified person
who may have wronged him. But in the case at
hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From
this, it can be inferred that the accused was
aware of his acts. This also established that the
accused has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr.
Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant
could have been aware of the nature of his act
at the time he committed it when he shouted
(during laboratory examination) that he killed
Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly

doubtful that the accused was insane when he

committed the act. The fact that the accused
was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal
weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the
incident after he stabbed the victim several
times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest,
indicate that he was conscious and knew the
consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.
(This was taken from the trial court's decision).
Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED.
People vs. Taneo
Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in
his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On
January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated
in the said barrio and guests were entertained in
the house, among them were Fred Tanner and
Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano
went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly
got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon
meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded
her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and
Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7
months pregnant at that time, died five days
later as a result of the wound. The trial court
found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It appears from
the evidence that the day before the commission
of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a
glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who
invited him to come down and fight. When he
was about to go down, he was stopped by his
wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, had a severe
stomachache that's why he went to bed in the
early afternoon. The defendant stated that when
he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was
trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila held
his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to
him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down; he armed himself with a bolo and left the
room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed
to say to him that she was wounded. Then, he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
seemed to multiply around him, he attacked
everybody that came his way.
Issue: WON defendant acted while in a dream.
Ratio: Yes. The defendant acted while in a
dream & his acts, therefore, werent voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability. The

apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal

act does not necessarily mean that there are
none, but that simply they are not known to us.
Although an extreme moral perversion may lead
a man to commit a crime without a real motive
but just for the sake of committing it. In the case
at hand, the court found not only lack of motives
for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of (read: he loved his wife dearly, he
tried to attack his father in whose house the
lived and the guests whom he invited), but also
motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica,
an expert witness in the case, stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of a hallucination and not in his right
mind. The wife's wound may have been inflicted
accidentally. The defendant did not dream that
he was assaulting his wife, but that he was
defending himself from his enemies. Judgment:
defendant not criminally liable for the offense. It
was also ordered that he be confined in the
government insane asylum and will not be
released until the director thereof finds that his
liberty would no longer constitute a menace
PEOPLE v. ESTEPANO [307 SCRA 707 (1999)]
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental w/c found
thedefendants guilty of the crime of MURDER
Facts: Enrique Balinas was stabbed &
hacked to death for w/c Dominador, Rodrigo,
Ruben,Rodney, Dante & Rene, all surnamed
Estepano were charged w/ murder. Rodrigo died
during the trial & before judgment could be
rendered. Dante was never apprehended hence,
as against him, the case was never archived.
After trial, Dominador was acquitted on
reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney &
Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the 3
were sentenced to reclusionperpetua & ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the
amount of P100K for moraldamages & P9.5K for
actual damages w/o subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. As to the crime: The case
was woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio
Tayco, that on April16, 1991 at around 10 pm, he
was on his way home in Barangay IV
Himamaylan with LopitoGaudia and Enrique
Balinas. En route, they met Dominador at the
BM Trucking compound.Lopito than talked to
Dominador while he and Estepano stood nearby.
Suddenly, Rodrigoappeared without any
provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with
a guinunting (fightingbolo). Ruben armed with a

cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each

armed with a bolo followed suit in hacking
Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador
told his companions You better kill him! Lopito
confirmed the testimony of Florencio.
Dominadors version: That on April 16 1991 at
10pm, he was at home w/ his wife & son
Roberto. They were about to eat supper when
he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his
sonRodrigo to come down. He peeped through
the window & saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique.
WhenEnrique fell to the ground, Rodrigo fled.
Robert Hautea & Luz Cuepas, both residents
of Barangay IV corroborated the testimony of
Dominador. Accused Ruben, Rene & Rodney
invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that he was at the
provincial hospital attending to his wife who
earlier underwent a caesarian operation. Rene &
Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they
were at home sleeping when the killing
occurred. Rene, who was only 13 then, testified
that he came to know about the incident
that same night when his mother awakened him.
Rodney on the other hand, was awakened
by shouts that his father killed Enrique Balinas.
Issues
1. WON the lower court erred in giving credence
to the testimony of prosecution witnessFlorencio
Tayco Findings of the TC is binding & conclusive
on the appellate court unless some facts
or circumstances of weight & substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended
or misinterpreted, w/c isnt true in the present
case. Florencios testimony is clear &
convincing, ashe was only 2 arms length away
from the victim as well as from the assailants.
Alibi of appellants were not supported by
any pieces of evidence & thus were not sufficient
to outweigh their positive identification by 1 of
the prosecution witnesses.
2. WON conspiracy had taken place Conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode and manner in
w/c the offense was committed and concerted
acts of the accused to obtain a common criminal
objective signifies conspiracy.
3. WON the appellants are guilty of murder (parti
cularly Rene, who was 13)With respect to
accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records
show that he was only 13 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense. Under
A12. par. 3 of the RPC, a person over 9 years of
age & under 15 is exempt from criminal liability

unless it is shown that he actedwith

DISCERNMENT. Scrutiny of records show that
prosecution failed to prove that Rene acted w/
discernment, what was only established was his
presence & his supposed participation
in thekilling.* Damages of P100K were also
modified and reduced to P50,000, considering
that the purpose of such award is not to enrich
the heirs but to compensate them for the injuries
to their feelings. Wherefore, the decision
appealed from is modified and accusedappellants Ruben and Rodney are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, Rene Estepano is
ACQUITTED.

Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong,
Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's
branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and
the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at
the department store. Criselda was signing her
credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and beheld her daughter
pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter
structure. She was crying and shouting for help.
He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where
she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners
the reimbursement of the hospitalization,
medical bills and wake and funeral expenses
which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages,
P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for
attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for
loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter
was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
It found that petitioners were negligent in

maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.

The counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous. It also ruled that the child was
absolutely incapable of negligence or tort.
Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this
decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was
accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether
the same was attributable to private respondents
for maintaining a defective counter or to
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside
the store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event
in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event
or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens." On the other
hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Negligence is
"the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution
and
vigilance
which
the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." The test in
determining the existence of negligence is: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements
made to a physician are generally considered
declarations and admissions. All that is required
for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is

that they be made or uttered under the influence

of a startling event before the declarant had the
time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court.
Under the circumstances thus described, it is
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such
tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
doctor whom she trusted with her life. We
therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH
performed no act that facilitated her tragic death.
Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence
or omission to secure or make stable the
counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another
store supervisor were personally informed of the
danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy
the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's
employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus,
as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence
required of a good father of a family. Anent the
negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we
attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH
and assume that she climbed over the counter,
no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail sixyear old could not have caused the counter to
collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by
both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was
heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area
and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too,
should be absolved from any contributory
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit
card slip. At this precise moment, it was
reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of
her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot
away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both
significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and

did not loiter as petitioners would want to

impress upon us. She even admitted to the
doctor who treated her at the hospital that she
did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

His primary argument was that the term

discernment connotes intent under the
exempting circumstance found under Article 12,
Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no
minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be
convicted of quasi offense under Article 265
which is criminal negligence.

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,

vs.

On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied

with respect to the first and third grounds relied
upon decision on and part was deferred until
evidence shall have been presented during trial.

HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR,

respondent.
FACTS:

A petition for certiorari was filed.

On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was
then 11 years old was playing with best friend
Teodoro Almine Jr. and three other children in
their backyard. The children were targetshooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters
away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD
BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME
OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE, AND

In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a

pellet on his left collar bone which caused his
unfortunate death.
The examining fiscal after investigation
exculpated petitioner due to his age and
because the unfortunate appeared to be an
accident.
Victims parents appealed to Ministry of
Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against
petitioner for Homicide through reckless
imprudence.
On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to
quash the said information on the following
grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an
offense
b) Information contains averments which if true
would constitute a legal excuse or justification
c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged and the person of defendant

HELD:
1.

Yes.
Intent and discernment are two different
concepts. Intent means: a determination to do
certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such
intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and
wrong.
The second element of dolus is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from
an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because
the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of
culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable,
namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and
negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such
felonies. However, intelligence remains as an
essential element, hence, it is necessary that a
minor above nine but below fifteen years of age
be possessed with intelligence in committing a

negligent act which results in a quasi-offense.

For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of
age but below fifteen may be held liable for a
quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A
reading of the said Article would reveal such fact
as it starts off with the phrase Any person. . .
without any distinction or exception made. Ubi
lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without
criminal capacity; but this presumption may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were
capable of appreciating the nature and
criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/
discernment.
Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.

PEOPLE V. SARCIA (GR. No. 169641,

2009)
Facts: Sarcia was charged with rape.
AAA was the five year-old victim.
Some rape details: In 1996, appellant
removed AAAs shorts and underwear.
He also removed his trousers and
brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to
lie down on her back. Then, he lay on
top of her and inserted his penis into
[AAAs] private organ. Appellant made
an upand-down
movement("Nagdapadapa tabi"), AAA
felt severe pain and exclaimed Aray.
Saricas conviction was then affirmed
upon appeal, crediting AAAs
testimony and her cousins as well,
despite certain inconsistencies.
Relevant Fact: Meanwhile, when
accusedappellant was detained at the
New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this
Court, (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC
decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January17, 2003 and
July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of

conviction of accused handed down by

the RTC was not suspended as he was
about 25 years of age at that time, in
accordance with Article 192 of (P.D.)
No. 603, The Child and YouthWelfare
Code, etc. He is now 31 years of age.
Thus, the retroactivity of RA 9344 is at
issue which affords the accused , so
long as he was under 18 at the time of
the criminal incident. Automatic
suspension of sentence is also
available even if the child reached 18
at the time of the promulgation of
judgment(Sec. 38). Relevant
Issue: WON RA 9344 still applies in
favor of accused?
Held:
NO. But death penalty reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Case remanded to
court a quo for appropriate disposition
under Sec.51. Firstly, Section 38 does
not distinguish WON child is guilty of
capital offense or a lesser one, and so
automatic suspension of sentence can
be afforded even in a heinous crime.
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if
the child in conflict with the law is
already (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21. Since he is now
already 31 years old, the question on
the suspension of sentence is now
moot and academic. However, he is
still entitled to the disposition measure
in Section 51 which reads:.
Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities.A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and

other training facilities that may be

established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD
PP v ALLEN MANTALABA
RTC: found guilty for violation of RA 9165, Art II
(Secs. 5 and 11) = Dangerous Drugs Act 2002
CA: Affirmed
SC (GUILTY but modified penalty due to
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority)
FACTS:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime
Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report that Allen
Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was
selling shabu. A buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy
Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseurbuyers with two (2) pieces of P100 marked
bills. The two poseur-buyers
approached Allen who was said to be in the act
of selling shabu. The appellant handed a sachet
of shabu to one of
the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the
marked money to the appellant. The poseurbuyers went back to the police
officers and told them that the transaction has
been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon
rushed to the place
and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving
the place.
After the operation, the police officers made
an inventory of the items recovered from the
appellant: (1) one big sachet
of shabu; (2) one small sachet of shabu; and (3)
two pieces of P100 marked money and a P50
peso bill.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were
filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of

Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165

(COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002).
RTC Butuan (GUILTY) CA (GUILTY) SC
(GUILTY but modified penalty due to privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority)
ISSUE: WON there should have been a
suspension of sentence by reason of minority
HELD:
YES. The appellant was seventeen (17) years
old when the buy-bust operation took place or
when the said offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision. It must be noted that RA
9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the
RTC promulgated its decision on this case
on September 14, 2005, when
said appellant was no longer a minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in
accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare
Code and The Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that
were applicable at the time of the promulgation
of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
The appellant should have been entitled to a
suspension of his sentence under Sections 38
and 68 of RA 9344

US vs. Caballeros
Facts: Four American schoolteachers
were murdered and buried. Robert
Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were
convicted as accessories to the crime
of assassination or murder, having
buried the corpses of the victims to
conceal the crime. They were
allegedly coerced. Roberto Baculi, one
of the accused and it appears that he

took part in the burial of the teachers

because he was compelled to do so by
the murderers. According to a witness
named Teodoro Sabate, Baculi was not
a member of the group and that he
was in the banana plantation
gathering some bananas when
Damaso and Isodoro called Baculi and
by by striking him with the butts of
their guns forced him to bury the
corpses. Another accused by the name
of Apolonio Caballeros confessed by
the promise that nothing would be
done to them.
Issue: WON the defense under
Art12(5) is tenable
Held: Yes. Not only is Baculis
confession that he only assisted in the
burial of the corpses because he was
compelled by the murderers, but this
was corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Sabate.
Sabate said that he was present when
the Americans were killed; that Baculi
was not a member of the group of
murderers but he was in the banana
plantation gathering some bananas;
that when he heard the shots he
began to run; that he was, however,
seen by Damaso and Isidro, the
leaders of the band; that the latter
called to him and striking him with the
butts of their guns forced him to bury
the corpses. As for Caballeros, there
was no proof that he took any part in
the execution of the crime; there was
conclusive proof to the contrary.
Sabate and Baculi declared that
Caballeros did not take any part in the
burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor
was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place.
Their failure to report the crime is not
an offense punished by the Penal
Code.
US vs. Exaltacion

Facts: On March 26, 1903, Liberate

Exaltacion and Buenaventura
Tanchinco were charged with rebellion
willfully and illegally bound
themselves to take part in a rebellion
against the government of the US,
swearing allegiance to the Katipunan
Society (whose purpose was to
overthrow the government by force of
arms). Exaltacion and Tanchinco claim
that they were captured by armed
bandits and were compelled to sign
documents (containing oath taken in
the name of God and a covenant to
carry out superior orders of the
Katipunan Society and never disobey
them until their death in the defense
of the mother country) under threat of
death. Exaltacion and Tanchinco
reported the incident to the governor,
lieutenant of volunteers and the
president of Meycauayan. Witnesses
testified to this fact as well.
Issue: Having signed the said
documents, are the defendants guilty
of the crime of rebellion? Or did
defendants incur criminal liability
when they signed the documents?
Held: No. The evidence for the
prosecution and the documents signed
by the accused is not sufficient to
prove the guilt of the latter or to justify
the imposition upon them of the
penalty inflicted by the judgment of
the court below. The facts, established
by the evidence, that the defendants
were kidnapped by brigands who
belonged to the Contreras Band, and
that they signed the said documents
under compulsion and while in
captivity, relieve them from all
criminal liability from the crime of
rebellion of which they are charged.
The conduct of the defendants in
presenting themselves to the
authorities as soon as they were
released is corroborative of their
innocence. Guilt of defendants was not

established beyond reasonable doubt.

Judgment: Decision of the lower court
REVERSED. Defendants ACQUITTED
Pomoy vs. People
Facts: Victim: Tomas Balboa, teacher
at Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
January 4, 1990, 7:30 AM: policemen
arrived at Concepcion College to arrest
Balboa, allegedly in connection with a
robbery. Balboa was taken to
Headquarters and detained in the jail
thereat. Later that day, a little past
2:00 PM: petitioner Pomoy, a police
sergeant, directed Balboa to come out
of detention for tactical interrogation
at the investigation room. At that
time, petitioner had a gun (.45 caliber
pistol) tucked in a holster which was
hanging by the side of his belt; gun
was fully embedded in its holster, with
only the handle of the gun protruding
from the holster As he was holding the
doorknob with his right hand to open
the door, the victim suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun;
he held the handle of his gun with his
left hand, released his right hand from
the doorknob and, with that right
hand, he held the handle of his gun;
Tomas Balboa was not able to take
actual hold of the gun because of
petitioners efforts in preventing him
(Balboa) from holding the handle of his
gun; he used his left hand to parry the
move of Balboa; after he held the
handle of his gun with his right hand,
in a matter of seconds, he felt
somebody was holding his right hand;
he and Balboa grappled and in two or
three seconds the gun was drawn from
its holster as both of them held the
gun; more grappling followed and five
seconds after the gun was taken from
its holster it fired, the victim was to his
right side when the attempt to grab
his gun began and was still to his right
when the gun was drawn from its

holster until it fired, as they were still

grappling or wrestling; His gun was
already loaded in its chamber and
cocked when he left his house, and it
was locked when it fired; during the
grappling he used his left hand to
prevent Balboa from holding his gun,
while the victim used his right hand in
trying to reach the gun; after the gun
fired, they were separated from each
other and Balboa fell and died as a
result
Issue:
1. Whether the shooting of Tomas
Balboa was the result of an accident
2. Whether petitioner was able to
prove self-defense.
Ruling:
1. Yes, it was the result of an accident.
2. He was not; however, it was
unnecessary for him to do so
Ratio: 1. Presence of All the Elements
of Accident a) accused was at the time
performing a lawful act with due care
At the time of the incident, petitioner
was a member of the PNP o it was in
lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer that he fetched
the victim from the latters cell for a
routine interrogation. o Also in the
lawful performance of his that
petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the
victim suddenly tried to remove it
from his holster b) resulting injury was
caused by mere accident; and
Petitioner cannot be faulted for
negligence. He exercised all the
necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing
accidental harm to others. He had kept
his service gun locked when he left his
house; he kept it inside its holster at
all times, especially within the
premises of his working area c) on the
part of the accused, there was no fault
or no intent to cause the injury. At no

instance during his testimony did the

accused admit to any intent to cause
injury to the deceased, much less kill
him. Nicostrato Estepar, guard in
charge of the detention of Balboa, did
not testify to any behavior on the part
of petitioner that would indicate the
intent to harm the victim while being
fetched from the detention cell.
consequences of circumstances
beyond the control of petitioner.
Petitioner not in control of gun when it
fired during the scuffle. - deceased
persistently attempted to wrest the
weapon from him, while he resolutely
tried to thwart those attempts - in the
course of grappling for the gun, both
hands of petitioner were fully engaged
his right hand was trying to maintain
possession of the weapon, while his
left was warding off the victim.
Release of the guns safety lock and
firing of the gun both accidental though .45 caliber service pistol was
equipped with a safety lock that,
unless released, would prevent the
firing of the gun, a semi-automatic
pistol is prone to accidental firing
when possession thereof becomes the
object of a struggle. - two shots fired:
a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol,
when fired, immediately slides
backward throwing away the empty
shell and returns immediately carrying
again a live bullet in its chamber.
Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in
succession. Verily, the location of, and
distance between the wounds and the
trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly
with the claim of the petitioner 2. SelfDefense Self-defense is inconsistent
with the exempting circumstance of
accident (no intent to kill) Since the
death of the victim was the result of
an accidental firing of the service gun
of petitioner a further discussion of
whether the assailed acts of the latter
constituted lawful self-defense is
unnecessary.

People vs. Ural

Facts: Ural was convicted of murder
by the Zamboanga CFI sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and orderinh im
to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola,
in the sum of P12K and to pay the
costs. The judgment of conviction was
based on the testimony of Brigido
Alberto, former detention prisoner who
witnessed what happened. Ural, a
policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix
Napola, a detention prisoner, inside
the jail. As a consequence of the fistic
blows, the deceased collapsed on the
floor. The accused stepped on the
prostate body and left. After a while he
returned with a bottle poured its
contents on the recumbent body of
the deceased, ignited it with a match
and left the cell again. As a
consequence, the victim later on died
of the burns. The crime committed by
appellant Ural was murder by means
of fire (incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC)
Held: The trial court correctly held
that the accused took advantage of his
public position (Art 14(1), RPC) but it
failed to appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of "no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that
committed." (Art.13(3), RPC). The
intention, as an internal act, is judged
not only by the proportion of the
means employed by him to the evil
produced by his act, but also by the
fact that the blow was or was not
aimed at a vital part of the body. Thus,
it may be deduced from the proven
facts that the accused had no intent to
kill the victim, his design being only to
maltreat him, such that when he
realized the fearful consequences of
his felonious act, he allowed the victim
to secure medical treatment at the
municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong offsets the
generic aggravating, circumstance of
abuse of his official position. The trial
court properly imposed the penalty of

reclusion perpetua which is the

medium period of the penalty for
murder (Arts 64(4) and 248, RPC) Par.
4: SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ACT
Provocation must be: (1) sufficient, (2)
originate from the offended party, (3)
immediate to the act Sufficient:
adequate enough to excite a person to
commit the wrong and must be
accdgly proportionate to its gravity.
Depends on: (1) act constituting the

provocation, (2) the social standing of

the person provoked, (3) time and
place provocation took place.
Immediate: If there was an interval of
time, the conduct could not have
excited the accused to the commission
of the crime, he heaving had time to
regain his reason and to exercise selfcontrol. But the threat should not be
offensive and positively strong. If this
is the case, then it gives rise to selfdefense, a justifying circumstance.