http://www.gov.

ph/featured/declaration-of-martial-law/
Declaration of Martial Law
The anniversary of the declaration of martial law is on September 23 (not September 21)
FM Declares Martial Lawthe headline of the September 24, 1972 issue of the Sunday Express, which was the Sunday edition of Philippines Daily Express. The Daily Express was the only newspaper allowed to circulate upon
the declaration of Martial Law
President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081 on September 21, 1972, placing the Philippines under Martial Law. Some sources say that Marcos signed the proclamation on September 17 or on September 22but, in
either case, the document itself was dated September 21.
Throughout the Martial Law period, Marcos built up the cult of September 21, proclaiming it as National Thanksgiving Day by virtue of Proclamation No. 1180 s. 1973 to memorialize the date as the foundation day of his New
Society. The propaganda effort was so successful that up to the present, many Filipinosparticularly those who did not live through the events of September 23, 1972labor under the misapprehension that martial law was
proclaimed on September 21, 1972. It was not.
The culmination of a long period of preparation
The facts are clear. A week before the actual declaration of Martial Law, a number of people had already received information that Marcos had drawn up a plan to completely take over the government and gain absolute rule. Senator
Benigno S. Aquino Jr., during a September 13, 1972 privilege speech, exposed what was known as Oplan Sagittarius. The Senator said he had received a top-secret military plan given by Marcos himself to place Metro Manila and
outlying areas under the control of the Philippine Constabulary as a prelude to Martial Law. Marcos was going to use a series of bombings in Metro Manila, including the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing, as a justification for his
takeover and subsequent authoritarian rule.
In his own diary, Marcos wrote on September 14, 1972 that he informed the military that he would proceed with proclaiming Martial Law. Even the U.S. Embassy in Manila knew as early as September 17, 1972 about Marcos plan.
[1]
This was indeed the culmination of a long period of preparation: As early as May 17, 1969, Marcos hinted the declaration of Martial Law, when he addressed the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Association:
One of my favorite mental exercises, which others may find useful, is to foresee possible problems one may have to face in the future and to determine what solutions can possibly be made to meet these problems.
For instance, if I were suddenly asked, to pose a given situation, to decide in five minutes when and where to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, I have decided that there should be at least five questions that I would
ask, and depending on the answers to these five questions, I would know when and where to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The same thing is true with the declaration of martial law [] It is a useful mental exercise to meet a problem before it happens.
In his memoir, then Justice Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile recalled that on a late afternoon in December 1969, Marcos instructed him to study the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief under the provisions of the 1935
Constitution. Marcos made this instruction as he [foresaw] an escalation of violence and disorder in the country and [wanted] to know the extent of his powers as commander-in-chief. [2] The President also stressed that the study
must be done discreetly and confidentially.[3]
At about the same time, Marcos also instructed Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and Jose Almonte to study how Martial Law was implemented in different parts of the world. Marcos also wanted to know the consequences of
declaring Martial Law. The result of their study stated that, while Martial Law may accelerate development, in the end the Philippines would become a political archipelago, with debilitating, factionalized politics. Almonte recalled
that their findings led to the conclusion that the nation would be destroyed because, apart from the divisiveness it would cause, Martial Law would offer Marcos absolute power which would corrupt absolutely. [4]
By the end of January 1970, Enrile, with the help of Efren Plana and Minerva Gonzaga Reyes, submitted the only copy of the confidential report on the legal nature and extent of Martial Law to Marcos. A week later, Marcos
summoned Enrile and instructed him to prepare the documents to implement Martial Law in the Philippines.[5]
In his January 1971 diary entries, Marcos discussed how he met with business leaders, intellectuals from the University of the Philippines, and the military to lay the groundwork that extreme measures would be needed in the future.
On May 8, 1972, Marcos confided in his diary that he had instructed the military to update its plans, including the list of personalities to be arrested, and had met with Enrile to finalize the legal paperwork required.
On August 1, 1972, Marcos met with Enrile and a few of his most trusted military commanders to discuss tentative dates for the declaration of Martial Lawto fall within the next two months. All of the dates they considered either
ended in seven or were divisible by seven, as Marcos considered seven his lucky number.[6]
The last days of democracy
Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. delivers a privilege speech on the Senate floor on September 21, 1972two days before Martial Law was declared and implemented. (From A Garrison State in the Make, p. 353)
On September 21, 1972, democracy was still functioning in the Philippines. Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was still able to deliver a privilege speechwhat would be his final onein the Senate. Primitivo Mijares, among others,
recounted the functioning of the House of Representatives and the Senate, with committee meetings scheduled for that night. Senate and House leaders agreed not to adjourn on this day, as earlier scheduled. They decided to extend
their special session to a sine die adjournment on September 23.[7]
That afternoon, a protest march in Plaza Miranda was sponsored by the Concerned Christians for Civil Liberties. The rally was attended by more than 30 civic, religious, labor, student, and activist groups [] [and] a crowd of
30,000, and received coverage from newspapers, radio, and television.[9]
A mass rally organized by the Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL) was held at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. (Photo courtesy of Philippines Free Press Magazine)
In his diary, Marcos wrote that he, together with members of his Cabinet and staff, finished the preparation of Proclamation 1081 at 8 PM, September 21.
On September 22, 1972, a day after the final speech of Ninoy Aquino, newspapers still came out: they featured the rally held the previous day in Plaza Miranda. Mijares recounted that Marcos was agitated by a statement reported in
the Daily Express that if Martial Law were declared, Aquino said he would have to be arrested soon after or he would escape to join the resistance.
The Enrile ambush as pretext for Martial Law
The pretext for Martial Law was provided later in the evening of Friday, September 22, 1972, the convoy of Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed in Wack-Wack as he was on his way home to Dasmarias Village in
Makati before 9 p.m. Enrile recalled his convoy was driving out of Camp Aguinaldo when a car opened fire at his convoy and sped away.
A contrasting account came from Oscar Lopez, who lived along Notre Dame Street, Wack Wack Village, stated that he heard a lot of shooting and that when he went out to see what was happening, he saw an empty car riddled with
bullets. Lopezs driver, who happened to see the incident, narrated that there was a car that came and stopped beside a Meralco post. Some people got out of the car, and then there was another car that came by beside it and started
riddling it with bullets to make it look like it was ambushed.[10]
This ambush, as Enrile later revealed in 1986, was staged by Marcos to justify Martial Law.
Excerpt from the diary of Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 22, 1972. From the Philippine Diary Project.
Marcos, in his diary entry for September 22, 1972 (time-stamped 9:55 p.m.) wrote, Sec. Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed near Wack-Wack at about 8:00 pm tonight. It was a good thing he was riding in his security car as a
protective measure This makes the martial law proclamation a necessity. His diary entry for September 25, 1972 mentions conditions after two days of Martial Law, also indicating martial law in reality is dated to September 23,
1972.
Primitivo Mijaresa former journalist for Marcos who would later write against Marcos and disappear without a trace in 1973claimed that the Enrile ambush was fake as it was made as the final excuse for Marcos to declare
Martial Law.[11] Mijares also claimed that the ammunition planted by the Presidential Guard Battalion in Digoyo Point, Isabelawhich was later confiscated by the Philippine Constabulary on July 5, 1972was used to connect the
ambush with alleged Communist terror attacks.
In the biography of Chino Roces, Vergel Santos questioned the elements of the Enrile ambush: Why inside a village and not on a public street, and why in that particular village? Possibly for easier stage-managing: the family of
Enriles sister Irma and her husband, Dr. Victor Potenciano, lived there, in Fordham, the next street in the Potenciano home and got the story straight from him, as officially scripted.[12]
September 21 or September 23?

When Marcos appeared on television at 7:15 p.m. on September 23, 1972 to announce that he had placed the entire Philippines under Martial Law by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081, he framed his announcement in legalistic
terms that were untrue. This helped camouflage the true nature of his act to this day: it was nothing less than a self-coup.
Marcos announced that he had placed the entire country under Martial Law as of 9 p.m. on September 22, 1972 via a proclamation which, he claimed, hed signed on September 21, 1972.
Yet accounts differ. David Rosenberg, writing in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (The End of the Freest Press in the World, Vol. 5, 1973) chronicled that about six hours after the ambush, Marcos signed Proclamation No.
1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law, placing the signing at around 3 a.m. on September 23. Raymond Bonner, in his book Waltzing with the Dictator, narrated his interview with Enrile, during which the former
Defense Secretary recalled that he and Acting Executive Secretary Roberto Reyes witnessed Marcos sign Proclamation No. 1081 in the morning of September 23, 1972. The Bangkok Post asserted in a series of articles called The
Aquino Papers, published from February 20 to 22 of 1973, that Proclamation No. 1081 had been signed even earlier, on September 17, 1972, postdated to September 21. Mijares also mentioned in his book that Marcos said as much
in an address to a conference of historians, in January 1973.
Two things emerge: first, whether they conflict or not, all accounts indicate that Marcos obsession with numerology (particularly the number seven) necessitated that Proclamation No. 1081 be officially signed on a date that was
divisible by seven. Thus, September 21, 1972 became the official date that Martial Law was established and the day that the Marcos dictatorship began. This also allowed Marcos to control history on his own terms.
Day one of the Marcos dictatorship
The second is that the arbitrary date emphasizes that the actual date for Martial Law was not the numerologically-auspicious (for Marcos) 21st, but rather, the moment that Martial Law was put into full effect, which was after the
nationwide address of Ferdinand Marcos as far as the nation was concerned: September 23, 1972. By then, personalities considered threats to Marcos (Senators Benigno S. Aquino Jr., Jose Diokno, Francisco Rodrigo and Ramon
Mitra Jr., and members of the media such as Joaquin Roces, Teodoro Locsin Sr., Maximo Soliven and Amando Doronila) had already been rounded up, starting with the arrest of Senator Aquino at midnight on September 22, and
going into the early morning hours of September 23, when 100 of the 400 personalities targeted for arrest were already detained in Camp Crame by 4 a.m.
In the meantime, the military had shut down mass media, flights were canceled, and incoming overseas calls were prohibited. Press Secretary Francisco Tatad went on air at 3 p.m. of September 23 to read the text of Proclamation
No. 1081. The reading of the proclamation was followed by Marcos going on air at 7:15 p.m. to justify the massive clampdown of democratic institutions in the country.
Marcos would subsequently issue General Order No. 1, s. 1972, transferring all powers to the President who was to rule by decree.
[View our infographic: The Day Marcos Declared Martial Law]
The New York Times reported about these events in an article titled Mass Arrests and Curfew Announced in Philippines; Mass Arrests Ordered in Philippines in their September 24, 1972 issue. The Daily Express itself announced in
its September 24 issue that Marcos had proclaimed martial law the day before, September 23, 1972.
Never again
After the declaration and imposition of Martial Law, citizens would still go on to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1081. Those arrested filed petitions for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. But Marcos, who
had originally announced that Martial Law would not supersede the 1935 Constitution, engineered the replacement of the constitution with a new one. On March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its final decision in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, which essentially validated the 1973 Constitution. This would be the final legitimizing decision with on the constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court
dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that Martial Law was a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect,
replacing the 1935 Constitution.
Martial Law would officially end on January 17, 1981 with Proclamation No. 2045. Marcos, however, would reserve decree-making powers for himself.
Today, the 1987 Constitution safeguards our institutions from a repeat of Marcos Martial Law regime. The Supreme Court is empowered to review all official acts to determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion. Congress
cannot be padlocked. Martial Law is limited in duration and effects, even if contemplated by a president. Section 18 of Article VII of the current Constitution provides:
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Bibliography
Almonte, Jose T. and Marites Daguilan Vitug, Endless Journey: A Memoir.Quezon City: Cleverheads Publishing, 2015.
Bonner, Raymond, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy. New York: Times Books, 1987.
Enrile, Juan Ponce, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir. Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012.
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. and John Thayer Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post- Colonial Trajectories. London: Routledge, 2005.
Mijares, Primitivo, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I. New York: Union Square Publications, 1986.
Rodrigo, Raul, Phoenix: The Saga of the Lopez Family Volume 1: 1800 1972. Manila: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Inc., 2007.
Santos, Vergel O., Chino and His Time. Pasig: Anvil, 2010.
Endnotes
[1] Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987), p. 3.
[2] Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p. 275.
[3] Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p. 275.
[4] Jose T. Almonte and Marites Daguilan Vitug, Endless Journey: A Memoir (Quezon City: Cleverheads Publishing, 2015), p. 77.
[5] Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir, (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p. 276.
[6] Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987), p. 95.
[7] Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I. (New York: Union Square Publications, 1986), p. 54.
[9] Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John Thayer Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post- Colonial Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 129.
[10] Raul Rodrigo, Phoenix: The Saga of the Lopez Family Volume 1: 1800 1972, Manila: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Inc., 2007), p. 377
[11] Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I. (New York: Union Square Publications, 1986), p. 166
[12] Vergel O. Santos, Chino and His Time, (Pasig: Anvil, 2010), p. 16
http://hanbadilles.blogspot.com/2013/09/martial-law-era.html
Martial Law Era
MARTIAL LAW ERA
(1972 1981)

Introduction:
For the first time since gaining our freedom in 1946, the Filipinos experienced the impact of martial law (1972-1981). President Marcos used martial law in order to prolong his stay in power. He claimed other reasons
in public to save the Republic and reform the society but these objectives were secondary to his primary aim of becoming a dictatorial president and establishing a political dynasty.
Thus, the strong powers assumed by Marcos eventually did far more harm than good, because under the New Society which he established, the Philippines suffered the worst political, economic and moral decline in
its post war history.
The following terrible events prepared the country for the drastic measures taken by President Marcos in declaring martial law:
1.

Plaza Miranda Massacre on August 20, 1971

2.

Demonstrations and rallies by militant students, workers, intellectuals and religious groups

3.

Terrorist bombings of public and private property and residences

4.

Dramatic proof that the dissidents received military aid from foreign sources

5.

Assassination attempts on Marcos and another national leaders (September 22, 1972- Ambush on the official car of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile)
I. PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW
*September 23, 1972, 7:30 PM: formal announcement of Marcos that he placed the entire Philippines under martial law as of 9 PM of the previous day, September 22, 1972 by implementing Proclamation No. 1081, which was
signed earlier on September 21, 1972
*Martial Law: an extraordinary measure taken by the head of the state to defend or to protect the people from extreme danger due to lawless violence, anarchy, rebellion or invasion (Article VII Section 10, Paragraph 2 of 1935 Phil.
Constitution)
*Advanced contingency plan by the President and his military advisers, code named Plan Sagittarius.

1.

Anti-Marcos were arrested

2.

All newspapers, television and radio stations , printing press and other means of mass media were closed and placed under military control

3.

Vital public utilities and industries, including PLDT and Iligan Integrated Steel Mill were seized and placed under control of the government

4.

Prohibition of student rallies and demonstrations

5.

Travel ban abroad

6.

Confiscation of arms

7.

Congress of the Philippines was abolished

II. 1973 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Among salient features of this constitution, favorably suit to the desire of Marcos of a constitutional authoritarianism:

a.

Established for the first time in Philippine history a parliamentary government, a Prime Minister and a President. Both were elected by the National Assembly

b.

Legislative powers would have been vested in a unicameral National Assembly elected by the people

c.

Emphasized duties and obligations of the citizens

d.

Termination of parity rights between Americans and Filipinos

e.

Legalized all decrees, proclamations and orders of President

1.

Restoration of peace and order

2.

Crime rate greatly reduced

3.

Mailed fists policy against the rebels (NPA and MILF)

4.

Policy of attraction for the Muslim Filipinos by granting them economic, political and socio-cultural reforms

5.

Reorganization of government

ACHIEVEMENTS

6.

Military emerged as a major partner in the governing process

a.

Fabian C. Ver: appointed Major-General and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, also headed the National Intelligence and Security Agency

7.

Educational system was reformed by means of Educational Decree (P.D. No. 6-A) of Sept. 29, 1972
III. FOUNDATION OF NEW SOCIETY
Aside from saving the Republic, President aimed to form a New Society a society which would be disciplined, self-sufficient, peaceful and self-reliant. For martial law to be of lasting benefit to the nation, according
to him, there must be great reforms in all spheres of national life. Marcos also said that the conquest of mass poverty and the democratic distribution of wealth and property were among the major economic goals of the New Society.
He promised to strengthen the national economy, expand and improve government services to the people, institute land reform and redistribute incomes and opportunities.
ACHIEVEMENT:

1.

Land Reform: greatest achievement

2.

Establishment of National Economic Development Authority (NEDA): super policy-making body to plan and supervise the national economic development program

3.

Infrastructure: construction of roads, bridges, ports, airports, dams, irrigations, schools, hospitals, housing projects and communication facilities

4.

New sources of energy were tapped

5.

Double increased of both local and foreign investments

6.

Number of tourists increased

7.

Strengthened the ASEAN and relations to other foreign countries

1.

Worst political and economic crises

2.

Heavy tax structure

3.

Economy became more dependent on foreign creditors and foreign investors

4.

Indulged in image building and a degree of corruption

PROBLEMS:

*April 7, 1978: first national election under martial law

* KilusangBagongLipunan (KBL or New Society Movement)
* Lakasng Bayan (Laban or Peoples Power): Senator Benigno Aquino Jr.
* June 12, 1978: Inauguration of Interim BatasangPambansa (Provisional National Assembly)
New Motto: IsangBansa, IsangDiwa (One Nation, One Spirit)

*January 17, 1981: Marcos signed Proclamation No. 2045 ending 8 years and four months of martial law
*April 7, 1981: Ratification of the Amended Constitution which established a strong presidency in a mixed presidential-parliamentary form of government
1.

President became the head of the State and chief executive.

2.

He may run for as many six-year terms as he wished.

3.

In case of the Presidents death and incapacity, a group called Executive Committee would exercise the executive power until a successor is elected.

4.

Creation of a regular parliament called BatasangPambansawhich could only check the prime minister and not the President.
*June 30, 1981: Inauguration of the Fourth Republic and Marcos hailed as the President.
*August 21, 1983: Assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr.who returned from a three-year exile in the United States
*October 14, 1983: independent board of inquiry (Agrava Board) created for the investigation of Aquinos murder
*Minority Report (October 23, 1984): Military conspiracy with a soldier as assassin, not Rolando Galman
implicated Brig. Gen. Luther Custodio and six other soldiers
*Majority Report : Military conspiracy with a soldier as an assassin but implicated 26 men in crime,
including General Ver, Maj. Gen. Olivas, Brig. Gen Custodio and others
Conclusion:
After the end of eight years of Martial Law, the government of Philippine Republic changed drastically from the intended parliamentary democracy to a mixed presidential-parliamentary dictatorship under Marcos.
This was done through a thorough revision of 1973 Constitution. Later changes in 1981 gave birth to what President Marcos called the New Republic or historically speaking, the Fourth Philippine Republic. However grand was
the dream of Marcos for the new government, he plunged the country into the worst political and economic crisis in its postwar history after the assassination of his political rival, ex-Senator Benigno Ninoy S. Aquino, Jr.
Posted by Hannee Badilles at 9/05/2013 12:22:00 AM
Minsan
Minsan sa may kalayaan tayo'y nagkatagpuan
May mga sariling gimik at kaya-kanyang hangad sa buhay
Sa ilalim ng iisang bubong
Mga sekretong ibinubulong
Kahit na anong mangyari
Kahit na saan ka man patungo
Chorus
Ngunit ngayon kay bilis maglaho ng kahapon

Kahit na anong gawin

Lahat ng bagay ay merong hangganan
Dahil ngayon tayo ay nilimot ng kahapon
Di na mapipilitang buhayin ang ating pinagsamahan
Ngunit kung sakaling mapadaan baka
Ikaw ay aking tawagan
Dahil minsan tayo ay naging
Tunay na magkaibigan

Sana'y huwag kalimutan ang ating mga pinagsamahan

At kung sakaling gipitin ay laging iisipin
Na minsan tayo ay naging
Tunay na magkaibigan
Minsan ay parang wala nang bukas sa buhay natin
Inuman sa magdamag na para bang tayo'y mauubusan
Sa ilalim ng bilog na buwan
Mga tiyan nati'y walang laman
Ngunit kahit na walang pera
Ang bawat gabi'y anong saya
Repeat chorus
Minsan ay hindi ko na alam ang nangyayari

http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft0199n64c&chunk.id=d0e2422&toc.id=d0e2422&brand=ucpress
Martial Law and the Bangsamoro Rebellion
When President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972, the principal reasons offered for its imposition were the existence of armed conflict between Muslims and Christians and a Muslim "secessionist
movement" in the Philippine South (Marcos 1972). The information available from that period provides scant justification for such an emergency measure. Sectarian violence was on the wane, with no serious incidents reported in the
previous six months. There had also been no public pronouncements or activities by Datu Udtug and the MIM for more than a year.[20] The imposition of martial law was, in fact, the proximate cause, not the consequence, of an
armed Muslim insurgency against the Philippine state, and it led to an unprecedented level of violence and disruption in Cotabato and all of Muslim Mindanao. By 1977, the government estimated that there were as many as million
displaced civilians in the South and at least two hundred thousand additional refugees who had fled to Sabah (Mercado 1984, 162).
The martial law regime immediately moved to collect all unauthorized guns in the Philippines by ordering the surrender of civilian firearms. Three weeks after declaring martial law, President Marcos announced that he was prepared
to commit an entire division of troops to the South to "annihilate" outlaws if all guns were not turned in by the 25th of October. A few days before the deadline, Marawi City, in the province of Lanao, was attacked by more than four
hundred armed Maranaos. They held strategic positions in the city for three days until overpowered by superior army forces.[21] One week later, fighting began between Muslim rebels and government soldiers in Cotabato, and in
mid-November Marcos sent thousands of troops to Mindanao (Mercado 1984). By late November, fierce clashes between government units and separatist rebels were occurring throughout the South (Schlegel 1978).
The Activation of the Moro National Liberation Front
Martial law, with its ban on political groups, caused the dissolution of such aboveground Muslim organizations as the MIM and Nurul Islam, and the activation of the underground Moro National Liberation

157
Front. By the end of 1972, the developing Muslim insurgency began to coalesce under its banner. The MNLF never controlled all of the rebels fighting the government and was, in fact, a loosely knit group, with the borders between
those fighters who were members of, aligned with, or exterior to the MNLF never very clear. Nevertheless, the MNLF was the principal, and by far the most important, armed separatist organization, largely because it became the
major supplier of arms and ideological support for the insurgency. One of the reasons for the loosely knit character of the MNLF was the fact that virtually its entire core leadership was, by 1973, operating from outside the country,
far from local commanders. Nur Misuari, with a large reward offered for his capture, escaped from Manila to the South after martial law was declared, from there to Sabah, then on to Libya (George 1980; Majul 1985).
The MNLF was formally organized into two parallel structures: one political, the other military. The political wing was composed of a central committee, various bureaus, and a system of provincial and village committees. The
military wingthe Bangsa Moro Armyhad an overall field marshal, provincial field marshals, and zone commanders at the municipality level (Noble 1976). The chairman of the central committee, almost all of whose members
were in Tripoli by 1974, was Nur Misuari. The vice-chairman, by 1974, was Hashim Salamat. In his 1977 interview, Salamat states that he and his companions were forced underground when, immediately after martial law, Datu

Udtug signed an "affidavit" against them and turned it over to the Philippine Army (Mindanao Cross , February 12, 1977). A short while later, his group joined forces with Nur Misuari, and Salamat then made his way to Tripoli.
Abulkhayr Alonto, member of a prominent Maranao family, was overall field commander of the Bangsa Moro Army and one of the few top leaders to remain in the Philippines. Although all estimates remain only rough guesses, the
MNLF probably came to have between ten thousand and thirty thousand men in its military branch[22] (Noble 1976; Majul 1985). The authority over rebel fighters enjoyed by the MNLF derived at least partly from its access to
critical resources, particularly weapons, from outside the Philippines. Before the removal from power of Tun Mustapha in late 1975, the primary conduit of weapons was by boat from Sabah (Noble 1976). The weapons arrived in
Sabah from Libya and other Muslim nations. The MNLF also controlled political and military training, propaganda, and diplomatic contacts with Muslim, primarily Arab, states. Before considering the

158
ideological and diplomatic strategies of the MNLF, a description of the armed struggle in Cotabato is in order.
The Insurgency in Cotabato
Cotabato was the site for some of the earliest and most extensive armed collisions between government troops and Muslim insurgents. Despite the defensive and seemingly spontaneous nature of the earliest clashes, the insurgency in
Cotabato quickly took on the appearance of coordination and centralized planning. In early 1973, in a "blitz-like operation" rebels simultaneously attacked at least eight municipalities in Cotabato and controlled them for some time
(Abat 1993, 37). Cotabato City and its airport complex were ringed by MNLF-controlled areas and Datu Adil remembers that for lack of traffic, "grass grew on the main highway" linking the city and airport. After recovering from
their shock at these coordinated assaults, Philippine Army commanders began to retake rebel-held areas by making use of their superior weaponry. In some cases, army counteroffensives were particularly brutalreminiscent of the
slaughters committed by the American army seventy years earlier. In a two-month siege of Tran, a rebel mountain stronghold in the Tiruray Highlands, hundreds of Muslim civilians were reportedly killed in repeated air
bombardments.[23]
Both rebel and Muslim civilian casualties were heavy throughout 1973 due to a lack of training on the part of rebels and their reliance on the traditional but questionable strategy of creating fixed bases and attempting to hold them
with relatively large contingents of fighters (Ahmad 1982). As a consequence, the rebels conceded the advantage of mobility to the army, which moved its troops in helicopters and troop carriers. In Tran, Reina Regente, and
elsewhere, the Philippine Army conducted siege operations that left the rebels outmaneuvered and outgunned (Abat 1993; Ahmad 1982). By early 1974, however, the rebels had switched to a war of mobility and surprise, using
guerrilla tactics and taking advantage of their familiarity with local marshes and jungles. Philippine Army strategy gradually shifted in response. In January of 1974 the Pulangi River was closed to all civilian traffic to impede the
movements of Muslim guerrillas, and two months later all of the waterways in the newly created Maguindanao Province were closed by the military.[24] The government also gradually increased the number of military personnel
deployed in Cotabato, and it adopted such Vietnam War tactics as the creation of strategic hamlets, new sur-

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[Full Size]
7.
Cotabato MNLF fighters in the field, circa 1975. Although the Philippine
military closed all major rivers in Cotabato to civilian traffic in 1974 to impede
guerrilla activities, MNLF fighters were able to move largely unhindered on the
innumerable small waterways of the region. As pictured, MNLF fighters were
typically quite young, and many wore their hair long in keeping with the
fashion of the period. Photograph by Larry Johnson.
veillance techniques, and assassination squads (Ahmad 1982). The rebels, nonetheless, fared better than they had in 1973. Casualties lightened and morale increased. By February 1975 they were steadily harassing army positions at
the edge of Cotabato City and shelling the city with mortars. Rice production in the region fell to less than 20 percent of normal yield (Kiefer 1987). Threatening the city, however, proved to be the maximum extent of rebel military
capabilities, and by 1976 the war in Cotabato was stalemated, with neither side able to inflict a critical defeat on the other.
Rebel Leadership in Cotabato
Precise information on the organizational structure of rebel resistance in Cotabato is unavailable, but it is possible to discern some general outlines. Rebel leadership revolved around the MNLF but there also existed some
independent or mostly autonomous commanders. The top MNLF leadership in the province was overwhelmingly young, most of them college students or recent college graduates when they joined the rebellion. These were, for the
most part, the former members of the MIM youth section, both al-Azhar-graduated clerics and college-educated students or professionals. A number of them attended

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classes at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City just prior to martial law. Some were members of prominent datu families, others were not.
Local rebel commanders were of two general types. Some were young and relatively well trained, having learned military skills in the army, the ROTC, or in the MNLF's Malaysian training camps. Others were former outlaws,
possessing the two requisites for insurgencyguns and the inclination to use them against agents of the stateand finding common cause with the antigovernment stand of the MNLF. Two of the best-known rebel commanders in the
province, Datu Ali Sansaluna and Disumimba Rashid (the same man who fought against the Tiruray), were outlaws as well as sons of nonprominent datu families before joining the MNLF. Both had acquired popular (if not entirely
deserved) reputations as social bandits prior to becoming rebels. Datu Ali attained a high position in the provincial command of the MNLF but was assassinated as the result of an internal power struggle in 1974. Disumimba
surrendered personally to President Marcos in 1980 for the promised sum of 1 million pesos (see chapter 8).
Support from elite noncombatants is also somewhat difficult to assess. Some established datus supported the rebels clandestinely, a few did so openly; most, as we shall see, did not support them. There was one new elite group that
provided quite substantial financial, logistical, and even military support to the rebels. They were the former cigarette smugglers of the Cotabato coast. Those engaged in cigarette smuggling had generally prospered from the trade,
and the most successful of them had shifted fairly easily to legal enterprises, investing in maritime transportation, fishing, urban real estate, or agricultural land. When the insurgency erupted, the former smugglers were positioned, as
well as inclined, to aid the rebels. For one, they possessed the resources, skills, and contacts to smuggle arms from Sabah through Sulu to Cotabato. They were also well positioned to help rebel commanders in Cotabato coordinate

activities with fellow rebel leaders in Sulu and those in self-imposed exile in Sabah. Very few of the former smugglers had been involved with national party politics and most were strongly opposed to the Philippine state, and to
Ferdinand Marcos in particular, because of the forced curtailment of smuggling. In addition, they had no strong ties with the prominent datu families of the province, most of whom regarded them as parvenus. A number of the former
smugglers provided very substantial support for the separatist rebellion in Cotabato in the form of supplies, shelter, transportation, and smug-

161
gling services. Many former smugglers and, more commonly, sons of smugglers also fought actively in the rebellion.
Magindanaon Datus and the Rebellion
Individual members of prominent datu families were faced with severe political constraints during the rebellion. If they supported the martial law government they risked rebel retaliation and the loss of political legitimacy. If they
supported the rebels, they invited government reprisals and the forfeiture of their political positions. Given those pressures, the established Muslim political elite of Cotabato responded to the insurgency in three general ways. One
segment reacted by denouncing the rebels outright and pledging loyalty to the martial law state. This group was composed, first, of Nacionalista datus such as the Sinsuats and Ampatuans. At the first indication of insurgency in
Cotabato in early 1973, the Sinsuat family issued a "manifesto" in which they denied any part in the rebellion, pledged their loyalty to President Marcos and the republic, and predicted the "ultimate triumph of the military forces"
(Mindanao Cross , March 31, 1973). However, that sort of response was also publicly made by a number of their former Liberalista foes, including the two most prominent ones. Datu Udtug met with President Marcos in early
January 1973, well before any concerted rebel activity in Cotabato, to pledge his cooperation with the martial law regime. A few months later, after the insurgency had intensified, Datu Udtug publicly denounced the rebels, expressed
ignorance of their motives, and stated that he was "against them" because they did "not listen to and cooperate with the datus of Lanao, Sulu, and Cotabato" (quoted in Mindanao Cross , March 31, 1973). Udtug made similar public
statements throughout the rebellion, charging the rebels as outlaws and condemning "unscrupulous" Islamic clerics associated with the rebellion.
While the response of Datu Udtug was motivated (at least in part) by his loss once again of influence and authority, the reaction of Salipada Pendatun illustrates the more ambivalent reaction of an opposition Muslim politician left
suddenly with neither power nor a familiar forum. Pendatun remained in Manila (and spent some time in the United States) for two years after the declaration of martial law. In late 1973, in his one public statement on the rebellion
published in Cotabato, he urged Muslim support for the martial law regime. In late

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1974 he returned to Cotabato, he announced, in order to "get involved in the restoration of peace and order in Maguindanao" (quoted in Mindanao Cross , November 9, 1974). Pendatun arranged a series of meetings with city leaders
soon after his arrival to try to stop the fighting, which had become quite intense and close to the city. The major result of those meetings was a joint statement calling for, among other things, the withdrawal of the military from
Cotabato. A few weeks later, four grenades were thrown into the Pendatun compound in Cotabato City and a short time after that Pendatun left the country for the Middle East. There he joined with Rashid Lucman and together they
offered their assistance to Nur Misuari, who created an advisory council for them to head (George 1980, 262). By 1977, however, the two former congressmen were attempting to take control of the MNLF away from Misuari. Not
succeeding at that, they formed their own organization, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The BMLO took precedence over the MNLF, stated Pendatun and Lucman, because their
early support of Misuari had been crucial for the formation of the MNLF. Notwithstanding their claims, the BMLO garnered little support in the Philippines and almost none in Arab capitals (Majul 1985). In 1980, Pendatun returned
to the Philippines and publicly pledged his services to President Marcos and the martial law government. Within weeks he was back in Cotabato making speeches where he "reminded the Muslims of the many good things done for
them by President Marcos" (Mindanao Cross , January 10, 1981).
A second group of datus, mostly young and educated at Manila universities, were less obviously but more actively compliant to the martial law regime. These individuals professed sympathy with many of the grievances of the rebels
but rejected violence or secession as legitimate means to redress those wrongs. They accepted government money or took government positions and, as sponsored intellectuals or government officials, cooperated with the martial law
state.
A third segment chose active rebellion. Those who initially chose this course were often the junior members of datu families, many the sons or younger brothers of those who followed the first two strategies. Some became local field
commanders and others attained high positions in the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee, the provincial leadership body of the MNLF. The most notable feature of the traditional elite leadership of the rebellion in Cotabato was its
rapid rate of defection. Datu commanders surrendered earlier and in greater num-

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bers than any other rebel leaders. The defections of the most prominent datu commanders appear directly linked to the efforts of other datus (often close relatives of the former) working with the martial law regime. Datu Guiwan
Mastura, the nominal leader of a segment of the Tran insurgents and the former mayor of Lebak, was the first prominent datu commander to surrender. In June of 1973, Datu Guiwan and twelve other ostensible rebelsall prominent
datuspersonally surrendered to President Marcos. Their surrender reportedly was arranged by Simeon Datumanong, who, a few months later, was appointed by Marcos as governor of the newly created province of Maguindanao
(Damaso 1983). In March 1975, Peping Candao, an MNLF commander and son of a prominent Muslim politician in Cotabato City, surrendered with his men. One year following his return, his brother, Zacaria Candao, was appointed
governor of Maguindanao Province to replace Datumanong who had taken a higher position with the government. In January 1976, the director of the political bureau of the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee defected to the
government, and one month later his older brother became executive director of the Regional Commission for the newly created Region 12, a multiprovince governmental division covering central Mindanao. By 1980, virtually all
members of the traditional elite had abandoned the rebellion. Most former outlaws had also surrendered for cash rewards, thus leaving, in the words of a current rebel commander, "mostly the poor remaining" to carry on the armed
revolt.[25]