Fordia Corruption Perception Index For Tanzania: 2008

CITIZENS’ AWARENESS AND
THEIR PERCEPTION OF
CORRUPTION
Who is not corrupt in

Tanzania?
2008 REPORT
Corruption Perception Surveys Report: TANZANIA 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations v
List of Tables viii
List of Graphs Charts and Figures ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
CHAPTER ONE 8
1.0 INTRODUCTION 8
1.1 COUNTRY CORRUPTION/GOVERNANCE GENERAL OVERVIEW 9
1.2 PUBLIC DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
RATIONALE 13
1.3 MEASURING OF GOOD GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE: VARIOUS
INDICATORS 13
Global governance performance indicators 13
National governance performance indicators 14
LGAs governance performance indicators 22
1.4 PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION:
EFFORTS AND TRENDS 23
Pre-colonial to colonial epoch 23
The post-independent epoch, 1961-1995 24
The period between 1995 and 2005 24
The period from 2005 onwards 25
The role of NSAs 28
Local Government Authorities (LGAs) 30
Corruption in the electoral process 32
Gender dimension of promoting governance and anti-corruption 33
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SURVEYS 34
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SURVEYS 34
1.7 METHODOLOGY 35
1.7.1 SAMPLE SIZE AND DESIGN 36
1.8 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 39
1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 40
CHAPTER TWO 41
2.0 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN TANZANIA 41
2.1 INTERNAL FACTORS 41
Distribution /balance of powers within state organs 41
The Legislature 42
Effectiveness of the legislature in performing its oversight functions 43
The Executive 47
The Judiciary 48
2.2 INFLUENCE OF NSAs ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
ii
POLICY 49
Civil society 49
Media 50
Corporate sector 53
Think tanks and high learning institutions 53
2.3 THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY AGENDA 55
Ruling party 55
Opposition parties 56
2.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS 56
Influence of international financial institutions on anti-corruption policies 56
Influence of intergovernmental instruments on anti-corruption policies 58
2.5 VULNERABILITY OF LGAs ARCHITECTURE TO RESIST CORRUPTION 59
LGAs functional relationship with cooperative societies 62
Business licensing services 63
Poverty vis-à-vis ignorance and weak civic competence 63
CHAPTER THREE 65
3.0 SURVEY RESULTS 65
3.1 THE SAMPLE 65
3.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 65
3.3 LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF CORRUPTION 71
3.4 DRIVING FORCES FOR CORRUPTION BEHAVIOUR AND ACTS 72
Regional level findings on driving forces for corruption 73
3.5 CORRUPTION ACTORS IN THE LGAs 76
3.6 RATIONALE FOR AND ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION ACTORS 77
3.7 ANALYSIS OF MAGNITUDE OF CORRUPTION AS BASIS FOR
PERCEPTIONS 83
3.8 FORMS OF AND EXPERIENCES IN CORRUPTION 88
Means/forms of corruption transactions 91
3.9 ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEMAND FOR AND/OR SUPPLY OF CORRUPTION 92
3.10 SELECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY
AND LEGAL MEASURES IN PRACTICE IN LGAs 94
Assessment of Government efforts to fight corruption in LGAs 96
Determining public support to anti-corruption policy in LGAs 97
Impediments against public determination to fight corruption 98
Recognition of inter-faith potential to fighting corruption 98
3. 11 DETERMINING LOWEST Vs. HIGHEST CORRUPTION PERCEPTION LGAs 98
Prelude to LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception 99
Outcome of analysis of control question data 99
Iteration One 99
A: Household respondents’ corruption perception ranking 100
B: Key informant respondents’ corruption perception ranking 100
iii
C: Combined corruption perception ranking 101

Iteration Two 102
Household respondents’ corruption perception ranking 102
Key informant respondents’ corruption perception ranking 103
Combined respondents’ corruption perception ranking 103
Iteration Three 104
Iteration Four 105
3.12 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FINDINGS 107
Statistics 107
Statistical explanation of the output 107
Conclusions 108
Statistical distribution 108
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR 110
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 110
To the Government 110
To Non State Actors 111
Surveys findings-based policy recommendations 111
SELECTED REFERENCES 115
ANNEX I: DATA TABLES 119
ANNEX II: CONTACTS OF CPS PARTNER/HOST-ORGANISATIONS 132
ANNEX III: LIST OF LGAS 134
ANNEX IV: CPS 2008 LGAs POPULATION 135
iv
List f Abbreviations
ACET Association of Consulting Engineers Tanzania
ATIP Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Project
BEST Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania
CAG Controller and Auditor General
CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCT Christian Council of Tanzania
CDD-Ghana Ghana Centre for Democratic Development
CGG Campaign for Good Governance
CHADEMA Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CHRGG Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance
CoST Construction Sector Transparency Initiative
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CPI Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
CPS Corruption Perception Surveys
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
CUF Civic United Front
CWI Core Welfare Indicators
CWIQ Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire
DECO Development Concern
DED Executive Directors
DfID Department for International Development (UK)
DPP Director of Public Prosecution
DPs Development Partners
EAC East African Community
EPA External Payment Arrears
EPAs Economic Partnership Agreements
ERB Engineers Registration Board
EU European Union
FCS Foundation for Civil Society
FGDs Focus Group Discussion
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
ForDIA Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa
GBI Gender Budget Initiative
GBS General Budget Support
GBS General Budget Support
GGCU Good Governance Coordination Unit
HIV/AIDS Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa
LEAT Lawyers Environmental Action team
LGAs Local Government Authorities
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme
v
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme

LHRC Legal and Human Rights Centre
LSRP Legal Sector Reform Programme
LSRP Legal Sector Reform Programme
MCT Media Council of Tanzania
MDAs Government Ministries Departments and Agencies
MKUKUTA National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NACSAP National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans
NACSAP National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans
NCCR-MAGEUZI National Convention for Construction and Reform-MAGEUZI
NEC National Electoral Commission
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NOLA National Organization for Legal Aid
NSAs Non State Actors
NSGRP National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PAF Performance Assessment Framework
PAF Performance Assessment Framework
PCA Prevention of Corruption Act
PCB Prevention of Corruption Bureau
PCCB Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau
PCIAC Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption
PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
PFM Partnership Framework Memorandum
PFMRP Public Finance Management Reform Programme
PFMRP Public Finance Management Reform Programme
PHDR Poverty and Human Development Report
POP Political Opinion Polls
PORIS African International Group of Political Risk Analysis
PPRA Public Procurement Regulatory Act
PSDA Participatory Service Delivery Assessment
PSRP Public Sector Reform Programme
PSRP Public Sector Reform Programme
PSSS The Policy and Service Satisfaction Survey
PTF Partnership for Transparency Fund
RCS Report Card Surveys
REDET Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania
REPOA Research on Poverty Alleviation
SACST Strengthening Anti-Corruption Strategies in Tanzania
SADC Southern Africa Development Communities
SFO Serious Fraud Office’s
TACECA Tanzania Civil Engineering Contractors Association
TAMWA Tanzania Media Women’s Association
vi
TANESCO Tanzania Electric Supply Corporation

TANGO Tanzania Non-Governmental Organization
TBC Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation
TCCIA Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
TCDD Tanzania Coalition of Debt and Development
TGNP Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
TI Transparency International
TLP Tanzania Labour Party
TNBC Tanzania National Business Council
TPSF Tanzania Private Sector Foundation
UBI Urban Bribery Index
UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDP United National Development Programme
URT Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VEOs Village Executive Officers
WACs Ward Aids Committees
WBI World Bank Institute
WDCs Ward Development Council
WDP Women’s Dignity Project
WEOs Ward Executive Officers
WTO World Trading Organization
vii
List of Tables
Table 1.3: Distribution of PETS activities in Tanzania 16
Table 1.4/1: Summary of corruption cases during in the last five years 25
Table 1.4/2: May 2008 PAF update 27
Table 1.7.1/1: Surveyed LGAs, wards and villages/streets 38
Table 1.7.1/2: Key informants demographic characteristics 38
Table 1.7.1/3: Structure of focus groups 39
Table 3.2: Demographic characteristics of the sample 69
Table 3.4/1: Driving forces to corruption across LGAs 72
Table 3.4/2: The regional dimension of corruption driving forces in LGAs 74
Table 3.6: Overview of corruption actors’ perception ranking 79
Table 3.7: Perception on the extent corruption is shared amongst
LGAs departments 84
Table 3.8/1: Cross tabulation of experience in paying corruption in LGAs 89
Table 3.8/2: Preference and choice of corruption transaction form 92
Table 3.11/1: LGAs which scored lowest or highest corruption perceptions 99
Table 3.11/2: Outcome of control question 100
Table 3.11/3: Outcome of control question with merged values 102
Table 3.11/4: List of first 5 LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception 104
Table 3.11/5: Final LGAs with lowest/highest corruption perception 106
Table 3.12: statistics for measures of central tendency 107
viii
List of Graphs, Charts and Figures

Graph3.2/1: Age distribution of the sample 66
Graph 3.2/2: Literacy level of sample respondents 67
Graph3.2/3: Household occupation structure 68
Graph 3.2/4: Key informants work station distribution 68
Graph 3.2/5: Occupation structure of key informants 69
Graph 3.3: General level of public awareness of corruption 72
Graph 3.4/1: Perceived driving forces to corruption across LGAs 73
Graph 3.4/2: Driving forces for corruption: contending positions of ‘ordinary persons’
and ‘leaders’ 76
Graph 3.6/1: Households’ corruption perception ranking 80
Graph 3.6/2: Key informants’ corruption perception ranking 81
Graph 3.6/3: Overall corruption perception ranking 82
Graph 3.7/1: Key informant qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs 86
Graph 3.7/2: Household qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs 87
Graph 3.7/3: Overall qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs 88
Graph 3.8/1 Confession to have or not paid corruption to access services 89
Graph 3.8/2: Final recipients of actually paid corruption by households 90
Pie chart 3.8: Share of corruption proceeds across LGAs ranks and file 91
Graph 3.8/3: Preference and choice of corruption transaction form 92
Pie chart 3.9: Extent of public confidence to report corruption grievances 94
Graph 3.10/1: Applicability of anti-corruption regulatory framework 95
Graph 3.10/2 Assessment of Government anti-corruption efforts in LGAs 97
Graph 3.12/1: Low corruption perception LGAs 109
Graph 3.12/2: High corruption perception LGAs 109
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report provides details of phase one of Corruption Perception Surveys (CPS)
findings scheduled for systematic annual releases, three years consecutively, ending
2010.The Corruption Perception Survey Project and the subsequent report has
traversed a long journey. Preparation and later planning activities started way back in
January 2007, immediately after the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) had released
the initial project fund. Our first heartfelt gratitude, therefore, goes to the FCS for
financing the CPS project.
The technical support of Dr. Naimani from the Department of Statistics, University of
Dar es Salaam, and that of Mr. Lutta Mutakyahwa from ROMME CENTRE, during CPS
planning for implementation, were indeed invaluable, and to that we feel indebted to
them for their expertise rendered in designing the sample and tools of analysis.
Primarily, CPS anchors on broader stakeholders’ support, mobilisation of which was

very crucial to make the survey a success. ForDIA mobilised CPS stakeholders
across a broad range of State and Non-State Actors (NSAs), locally and nationally.
Both, national and local level stakeholders have remained critical throughout the CPS
implementation stages. Their input, networking and fieldwork support have
contributed immensely towards the successful finalisation of this phase. We thank
them all. On the same note, we would like to specifically mention the following
national level CPS stakeholders as way of recognising their contribution at various
stages towards CPS for their selfless support. the Good Governance Coordination
Unit (GGCU), the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), African
International Group of Political Risk Analysis (PORIS), Economic and Social Research
Foundation (ESRF), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzania Media
Women’s Association (TAMWA), Association of Tanzania NGOs (TANGO) Tanzania
Chamber of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), and HAKIELIMU.
Moreover, on specific terms, we respectively appreciate the technical and networking
support rendered by regional trainers-cum-coordinators and host-organisations in the
regions of Lindi, Ruvuma, Shinyanga Mbeya, Ruvuma, Mtwara and Morogoro for
facilitating training of host-organisations’ staff due to which the latter ably executed
CPS fieldwork activities in LGAs. Specific thanks go to Mr. Audax Lukonge, Mr. Mike
Nshangeki, Mr. Prince Bagenda, Mr. Venance A.M of UNGO-Morogoro, and the
regional and district authorities of PCCB and offices of District Commissioners (DCs)
and District Executive Directors (DED) in the LGAs that hosted phase one of CPS
activities. Moreover, we recognise the good services rendered by Mr. Deus Mogella
of the Department of Statistics of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the
University of Dar es salaam for tirelessly analysing the CPS data, which was
sometimes done under hard conditions. It is the quantitative data analysis, which
enables us today (2008) to state with confidence about the status of governance and
corruption in Tanzania. Last, by no means the least, we appreciate the good services
x
rendered by two persons: Mr. Saifu Kiango for editing the first draft of this report,
and Prof. Issa Kaboko Msoke of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Dar es Salaam for technical
editing of the report.
While appreciating the tireless support of various people and institutions towards
these noble endeavours; promoting good governance and deterring corruption in
Tanzania, the CPS Management Team hopes the cooperation established shall remain
in force and be transcended to the subsequent CPS phases and stages.
Whereas the technical and network support contributed towards production of this
CPS findings report by professionals and stakeholders are ever acknowledged with
thanks, the shortcomings, in the report, shall always remain the responsibility of CPS
Management Team.
Bubelwa Kaiza
Team Leader
xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The consensus from the latest discourse involving several ‘gurus’ on corruption,
including the global anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International (TI), is that
corruption means abuse of ‘public trust for private gain’.
Since early 1990s impeccable evidence attests to Tanzania’s country worsening

corruption status, which is by and large pervasive. To that effect, Tanzania is referred
to as a country largely suffering from poor governance, and tainted by corruption.
According to documented literature in the media, research institutions, and various
reports/statements authored by Development Partners (DPs), multilateral institutions,
inter-faith organisations, political parties, designated Government Ministries
Departments and Agencies (MDAs), core reform programmes, international watchdog
organisations and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Tanzania is marred by
corruption – grand and petty – in the public domain. It is corruption that has thus
persistently undermined the Government and Tanzanians’ efforts to eradicate poverty.
Objectives of the Corruption Perception Surveys (CPS)

CPS is broadly dedicated to promote increased dialogue between political
bureaucracies and leadership, on the one hand, and the civil society and private
sector stakeholders, on the other, in order to attain the following objectives:
i. To measure the magnitude and comprehensive picture of corruption across
villages, wards, constituency and districts in the country, in effect augmenting
efforts initiated to promote good governance and fight corruption at all levels.
ii. To create civic awareness, knowledge and skills (competence) amongst the
electorate at the grassroots level of society by encouraging the citizenry to hold
the government at their level accountable, through existing governance
structures, but maintaining political stability, tolerance, peace and security.
iii. To encourage citizens’ participation in the development policy-making process by
creating and maintaining trust, promotion of demand for accountability and
strengthening stakeholders’ commitment towards improved information flow and
transparency that will eventually act as a ‘deterrent’ to corruption.
Significance of CPS
LGA is the unit of analysis of the survey in which the data is analyzed across the
service delivery sectors. The Analyses are used to assess service users’ perceptions
across sex, age, rural-urban divide, income and employment status in terms of quality
and quantity of deliverables in the health, education, energy, and land allocation,
administration of justice, business licenses and public works sectors. Survey findings
will inform the series of LGAs-coordinated public dialogues. Equally important, CPS
findings will augment public and investigative media, the Government (PCCB, GGCU,
and CHRGG) and Development Partners with authoritative evidence on corruption.
1
Methodology
The standard survey instruments including both qualitative and quantitative social
research methods were used to conduct the study.
Sample size Design

The regions included in the sample are Kagera, Shinyanga, Mtwara, Ruvuma, Mbeya,
Morogoro, Lindi and Coast. LGAs were not sampled; the survey intended to
accommodate all LGAs available in a region. Fifty LGAs were earmarked for CPS year
ONE. Tanzania population census data (2002) was used to design the CPS sample.
The survey sample size was 400 key informants plus 1200 households. Eight key
informants and 24 household respondents were interviewed in every LGA. Two
hundred and fifty (250) focus groups were planned; targeting 5 focus group
discussions per LGA. The sample is considered adequately representative of the
whole population in the LGAs covered by the survey – male and female children,
youth, elders and vulnerable social groups.
Specific variables were considered for sample unit choice in urban, semi-urban or
rural areas. The variables considered include availability of time, transport and
communication facilities (physical accessibility), availability of core social service
facilities (service accessibility) – health, education, energy utility, piped water,
administration of justice – and proximity to economic and administrative centres.
Accordingly, the research survey adopted the methodology, which is largely practical:
the mixture of convenient, judgement, purposeful and systematic random sampling
techniques.
Individual adults were selected randomly by the interval method from both urban and
rural areas – 2 streets or 2 villages1 – in one ward in the LGA; 12 respondents were
chosen from one street or village, meaning 24 respondents were interviewed from
one ward in the LGA. One person was interviewed from one household after every
50th house in the selected streets in urban areas. In the rural areas one person was
interviewed from one household per neighbourhood.
A cluster-like sampling method was adopted, especially in rural areas, but also relying
on systematic random sampling techniques in urban and semi-urban areas.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) participants were chosen depending on the judgement
and convenience of respective focus authority; teachers, ward or village leaders,
employers and opinion leaders.
1
The definition of area coverage of the village or street is consistent with the LGA law that mandates and
determines geopolitical boundaries of the governing authorities in either case.
2
Surveys data was collected from 7 regions, 35 LGAs, 35 wards, 70 streets/villages.

Eight hundred respondents, one from each household, were interviewed. These were
composed of 433 male and 344 female respondents respectively. As regards key
informants, 263 respondents were interviewed constituting 179 males and 70
females. Ninety one (91) focus-group discussions, each composed of between 8 and
12 participants, were conducted.
FACTORS INFLUENCING GOVERNANCE/ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The anti-corruption policy environment in Tanzania consists of both internal and
external factors. The extent to which external factors influence the anti-corruption
policy depends in part on internal features of the Tanzanian state. External factors
include donor agencies, international and regional intergovernmental instruments
against corruption while internal factors consist of particularly political, economic and
social policy architecture of the Tanzanian state. We also need to appreciate that the
effects of external influences depend largely on internal governance policy and
practices. This happens because internal factors favourable to external influence tend
to magnify the effects of external influences whereas, internal conditions unfavourable
to adoption of external influences tend to diminish their effects.
The influence of several factors has manifested istelf in the nomenclature of National
Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan II (NACSAP II) as a policy framework and
mechanism of preventing corruption and promoting good governance in the country.
The configuration of various state anti-corruption institutions such as the Prevention
and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), the Ethics Secretariat, the Financial
Intelligence Unit and the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance is also
the function of power leverage of different actors, forces and the context of
governance in the country. Not the least, is the behaviour of actors, in their actions
and inactions. The anti-corruption struggle is also a function of power balance
between actors and their interests within the existing political context.
SURVEYS FINDINGS
The findings largely represent corruption perceptions, views and experiences of many
ordinary Tanzanians. The sample is largely determined practically; the mixture of
judgement, convenient, purposeful and systematic random sampling techniques.
Sample characteristics include men and women of 18 years and above and residents
of rural and urban areas living under different social-economic conditions.
Respondents in both rural and urban areas had equal chances of being targeted and
selected for interviews. The inference drawn from respondents’ collective views is
believed to represent Tanzania’s public consensus on the country’s status of
governance and corruption. A combination of qualitative and quantitative data is
analysed to establish the surveys findings presented in this report. The margin of
error is plus or minus 5 percent at a 95 percent confidence level.
3
The survey was organised in line with the plan to extract and analyse information from
ten family groups as follows:-
i. Level of public awareness on (civic competence against) corruption;

ii. Driving forces for corruption behaviour and acts;
iii. Corruption actors in the LGAs;
iv. Rationale for and analysis of corruption actors;
v. Attitude towards demand for and/or supply of corruption;
vi. Form of, and experience in, corruption;
vii. Analysis of magnitude of corruption as basis of the perceptions;
viii. Assessment of LGAs current anti-corruption policy/legal measures;
ix. Determining the lowest vs. highest corruption perception LGAs; and
x. Statistical analysis and description of the findings.
Sample description
Households and key informants combined, male representation is 63.8 percent while
36.2 percent constitutes female representation in the sample. Key informants are
adequately literate while peasants (58.2 percent) constitute the majority of
households.
Level of awareness about corruption

Majority Tanzanians are aware of what constitutes corruption; 91.9 percent of
ordinary Tanzanians and 98.8 percent of opinion leaders.
Driving forces for corruption behaviour and acts

Nine against eight reasons were mentioned by ordinary Tanzanians and opinion
leaders respectively, as corruption driving forces. “Greed” and “selfishness” is ranked
the highest driving force by 49.3 percent of ordinary Tanzanians while ‘pressure to
get service’ is ranked the highest (45.2 percent) by opinion leaders.
Corruption actors
Due to LGAs’ role as official social service providers, and in formal contact with
public, leading corruption actors are the departments of education, health, lands and
housing, license and revenue, judiciary, police, office of the District Development
Director (DED), natural resources, water and sewerage, power utility (TANESCO),
TACAIDS, cooperatives, road works, and Ward Development Councils (WDCs). LGAs
were subjected to rigorous governance assessment by household respondents,
representing the views of ordinary Tanzanians, and the key informant respondents,
representing the views of leaders to inform the LGAs performance-based
perceptions.
4
Generally, the perception is that employees in the service delivery sectors are
leading: 83.2 percent (TANESCO), 82.0 percent (Police), 78.5 percent (Licensing &
revenue department), 76.9 percent (Health department), 76.3 percent (Water &
sewerage), 73.5 percent (Natural resources), 71.8 percent (Education), 70.4 percent
(Land & housing). WDCs employees score the least (42.7 percent) corruption
perception rate.
Analysis of magnitude of corruption as basis for perceptions

Overall, police and the Judiciary are perceived the prominent recipients of corruption
proceeds in the LGAs (ranked by 82.8 percent and 80.4 percent of respondents
respectively). Health ranked by 62.7 percent is also the significant recipient of
corruption proceeds in the LGAs. The departments of lands & housing, licensing &
revenue, WDCs, DED office, natural resources, power utility (TANESCO) and road
construction works are also noted as active recipients of corruption proceeds in the
LGAs.
Experience in corruption
Fifty five percent of household respondents replied they had never been involved
while 15.7 percent replied they had been involved once. Eighteen point six (18.6)
percent replied they sometimes had to pay bribes and 8.6 percent replied they
always pay bribes to access service provided by designated LGAs departments. By
implication, 43 percent of ordinary Tanzanians confess to have, at least once, paid
corruption as a means to access services in the LGAs. Moreover, analyses of the
category of staff who actually receive bribes indicate that 50.3 percent is received by
ordinary employees of LGAs departments dealing with services, 34.2 percent goes to
middle level staff, 12 percent is received by senior staff, while 3.5 percent is
indicated to have been distributed across the categories of LGAs staff. Sixty two
point four (62.4) percent of corruption is paid for, and by direct users/beneficiaries of
social services, while 37.6 percent is paid for secondary users of social services,
e.g. children.
Means/forms of corruption transactions

Money, valuables/properties, services, sex and favouritism are the most popularly
mentioned forms/means for transacting corruption. A significant 81.8 percent rank
cash the most preferred form of corruption; 39.6 percent rank sex the second most
preferred form of corruption; while 39.3 percent rank favouritism the third most
preferred form of corruption. Valuables are ranked the rarely preferred form of
corruption. 96.8 percent of household respondents confessed to have paid
corruption by cash. 2.5 percent confirmed to have paid corruption in kind, while 0.6
percent confessed they transacted sex.
5
Attitude towards demand for and/or supply of corruption

78.4 percent are aware corruption offer is against the law, while 21.6 percent are
not aware about criminal liability associated offer bribery/corruption. On the same
note, 95.4 percent of service users are forced to offer bribes/corruption to access
services in the LGAs. Only 4.6 percent of service users pay corruption voluntarily.
Moreover, 73.9 percent of service users transact corruption proceeds directly with
final recipients, while 26.1 percent use agents to facilitate it. 49.3 percent of
corruption transactions have been witnessed by third party.
Selective assessment of current anti-corruption measures

Corruption in the LGAs is increasing amid relatively adequate legislations and policy.
Only 36.8 percent of opinion leaders and 35.4 percent of ordinary Tanzanians are
aware about existing institutional or similar anti-corruption measures. 63.2 percent of
opinion leaders and 40.7 percent of ordinary Tanzanians indicate such anti-corruption
strategy/mechanism do not practically exist or function in their places of work.
However, PCCB is adequately known (76.8 percent–opinion leaders and 76.9
percent– ordinary Tanzanians) as anti-corruption watchdog. Police is ranked by
minority – 8.7 percent.
Public confusion to distinguish between voluntary endeavours of CSOs and

PCCB/police is noted. The public is narrowly informed about CSOs; both the notion
and those on the forefront fighting corruption.
Qualitative assessment of Government efforts to fight corruption in LGAs

71.3 percent of opinion leaders (majority) believe Government anti-corruption efforts
have failed; 45.5 percent, 42.6 percent and 11.9 percent respectively believe the
success is little, medium or satisfactory. However, 66.7 percent are ready to support
establishment of anti-corruption committees in the LGAs; councils, wards and
villages.
Recognition of inter-faith potential to fighting corruption

It is strongly asserted that corruption is positively correlated with immorality. The
strong influence of interfaith organisations as regards human behaviour is considered
potentially important to fight corruption through morality restoration. The majority
94.6 percent of respondents reaffirm preaching is the most useful forum for religious
leaders fighting corruption.
Lowest vs. highest corruption perception LGAs

An examination of corruption trends and ratings across actors is done consistent with
observation and selection of the first ten LGAs with lowest or highest corruption
perception ratings. This approach is only meant to confirm consistency between
outcomes based on the statistical description provided by other data, vis-à-vis
6
outcomes based on the analysis of statistical description of control question. The

control question requested respondents to state whether they perceive corruption to
exist, and at what rate; very low, low, high or very high. Four iterations are applied to
finally conclude the lowest or highest corruption perception status of LGAs.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The policy recommendations are established by both direct recommendations of
interviewees and CPS key findings. The recommendations assign specific role for
Government and NSAs as promoters of good governance and anti-corruption.
Specific policy recommendations details are provided in chapter four of the report.
7
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The consensus from the latest discourse involving several ‘gurus’ on corruption,
including the global anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International (TI), is that
corruption means abuse of ‘public trust for private gain’.
Since early 1990s impeccable evidence on Tanzania’s country corruption status

attests to the fact that it is pervasive. To the effect, Tanzania is referred to as the
country largely suffering from poor governance, and tainted by corruption. According
to documented literature in the media, research institutions, and various
reports/statements authored by Development Partners (DPs), multilateral institutions,
inter-faiths organisations, political parties, designated Government Ministries
Departments and Agencies (MDAs), core reform programmes, international watchdog
organisations and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Tanzania is marred by
corruption – grand and petty – in the public domain. It is corruption that has thus
persistently undermined the Government and Tanzanians’ efforts to eradicate poverty.
On its part, the Government of the United Republic (URT) has taken a lot of corrective
measures. A number of policy, strategies, programmes or projects; legislative,
economic, political or institutional developments have been put in place. The efforts
such as the establishment of the Office of Permanent Commission of Inquiry
(Ombudsman, 1966); enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act No. 16 (1971)
that later set in the Anti-corruption Squad (1975); establishment of the Prevention of
Corruption Bureau (1991); enactment of the Economic Sabotage and Organised
Crime Control Act (1983/4); appointment of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry
Against Corruption (PCIAC, 1996); enactment of the Leadership code of Ethics Act
No. 13 of 1995; design and development of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and
Action Plans (NACSAP); establishment of the Good Governance Coordination Unit
(GGCU, 2001); and lately, the enactment of Anti Money Laundering Act
(2006)/establishment of Financial Intelligence Unit, enactment of Public Procurement
Regulatory Act (2004)/establishment of PPRA and enactment of PCCA
(2007)/establishment of PCCB are examples of the Government’s notable efforts.
Public concern on petty and grand corruption is rife. Corruption has affected the
social service delivery system with obvious repercussions on education, health,
water, administration of justice, and land allocations. The resulting endemic poverty –
income and livelihoods vulnerability is quantitatively noted. The political, social and
economic life of majority Tanzanians is largely at risk. Children, women, youth and
those with disabilities in rural and urban areas are the most affected social groups.
Indeed strategically placed, the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are critical for
augmenting the analysis of the impact of corruption to ordinary people, and possibly
8
recommend appropriate policy reforms. The governance and corruption research

surveys were of the conclusion that LGAs are the best placed units of analysis for the
study and recommending the required policy changes. LGAs-based CSOs and
networks may rightly provide the useful links and backup to governance and
corruption surveys.
This report presents the findings of Corruption Perception Surveys (CPS), which was
conducted with financial support from the Foundation for Civil Society by the Concern
for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA) in 35 LGAs. The report submits findings
on the governance and corruption status pursuant to the 35 LGAs2 in Tanzania
Mainland. CPS has the timeframe of three years, commencing January 2007; and will
cover all 137 LGAs in Tanzania Mainland. Subsequent reports will be published for
years 2008/9 and 2009/10.
During the design, planning and implementation stages of the surveys, ForDIA
mobilised, identified, recruited and contracted the LGAs-based CSOs and/or networks
to augment smooth implementation and ownership of the project in the 35 LGAs.
Fieldwork activities, involving collection of the data commenced in the middle of
February and ended in May 2008, and were immediately followed by analysis of the
survey data, which ended in June, 2008.
Readers and active good governance stakeholders, including political and

bureaucratic executives, media, DPs, CSOs activists, governance and political
researchers, political parties and the interested general public, will in this report, find
the analyses of corruption perceptions as well as identification of the LGAs with
lowest or highest corruption indicators. The policy recommendations and the
proposed way forward activities are also provided at the end of the report.
Governance stakeholders in the LGAs are expected to use the sector-specific findings
to conduct the CSOs-led governance dialogues, to engage with LGAs bureaucrats in a
bid to eventually improve the status of good governance and reduce corruption in the
LGAs in which social service delivery is at stake.
1.1 COUNTRY CORRUPTION/GOVERNANCE GENERAL OVERVIEW

Measures that strengthen governance institutions and systems to ensure best
practices are critical to improve good governance and control of corruption. An
overview of Tanzania country corruption status is basically an examination of policy
and legal measures adopted by Government over time to improve the country’s
governance status.
Citizens and the Government are fully aware of corruption and its negative impact on
national development – undermining economic growth, democracy and social
2
See Annex III for the list of LGAs
9
stability; compromising professional efficiency and competitiveness; and

exacerbating poverty. Cluster III of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of
Poverty (MKUKUTA) is starkly clear about the importance of good governance;
recognition that good governance is the ‘bedrock’ of the other two clusters of
3
MKUKUTA . There are major policy and legal reforms initiated to strengthen
governance institutions, structures and systems – to promote good governance and
deter corruption. The notable reforms are the Public Sector Reform Programme
(PSRP), Public Finance Management Reform Programme (PFMRP), Legal Sector
Reform Programme (LSRP), Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), National
Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP) I & II, Good Governance
Coordination Unit (GGCU), institutional strengthening of the Prevention and Combating
of Corruption Bureau4 (PCCB), and enactment of some specific legislations5. The
reforms equally respond to specific recommendations of the Presidential Commission
of Inquiry Against Corruption, popularly known as, the “Warioba Report”6.
Moreover, consistent with steady Government leadership, Tanzania has domesticated

or ratified existing regional and international intergovernmental conventions7 geared
towards controlling corruption and promote good governance. The African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention), the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Southern African
Development Community Protocol Against Corruption (the SADC Protocol) are noted
in that regard.
Efforts to combat corruption are echoed in various government documents. The

8
2007 Poverty and Human Development Report (PHDR) indicates some positive
trends towards improving governance practices in the social service delivery domain.
The Views of the People (VOP) Surveys (2007), Controller and Auditor General’s (CAG)
Report, Natural Resources Participatory Management Strategy, and Access to
Governance Information in Local Governments are similarly showing a positive
3
MKUKUTA page 31 (June , 2005)
4
PCCB, which until April 2007 was known as the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), has extended its physical
presence from only regional headquarters, 1991, to cover all 127 districts by 2007.
5
The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA, 1991) was narrow (4 offences) focusing on corruption in the public
service domain; Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA, 2007) – the new legislation, is relatively
comprehensive (24 offences) focusing on corruption in the public and private domains. Another legislation is the
Public Procurement Act (PPA) No.21 of 2004
6
PCIAC was established by former President Benjamin Mkapa in 1996, to help analyse corruption and advise
Government on appropriate policy options for addressing corruption and improving governance practices. The
Commission was headed by former Prime Minister and First Vice President, Joseph Sinde Warioba.
7
The URT ratified the AU Convention on February 22nd 2005. The Convention came into force on 5th August
2006. URT again, signed the UNCAC on 9th December 2003 and ratified it on 25th May 2005. UNCAC came into
force on 14th December 2005. URT also signed on the SADC Protocol in 2001, and ratified it on 20th August
2003. SADC Protocol is not yet fully ratified by member states so as it comes into force
8
Annual reporting on corruption trends are reported under MKUKUTA Cluster III: Governance and Accountability.
10
picture. However, the administration of justice sector (police and the legal system) is
still reported as a more corrupt sector.
The Afro-barometer Briefing Paper (April 2006) is probably more conclusive by

stating that its overall findings suggest that the Government (Tanzania) could be
achieving at least modest success given efforts to combat corruption and promote
good governance. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre suggests that perception
of corruption in the police force has declined from 80% in 2003 to 72% in 2005 (U4
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Report, 2007). The Research on Poverty Alleviation
(REPOA)9 indicates ordinary citizens as number one perpetrators of corrupt
behaviour, followed by local government officials while police occupy third position
(REPOA, 2007). The findings of Core Welfare Indicators (CWI)10, focussing on and
collecting raw data from households (grassroots), reveal interesting results about the
general picture of governance and corruption in Tanzania. Conducted between the
second half of 2006 and the first half of 2007 in five districts, the CWIs indicate that
citizens are generally complacent with governance practices as then exercised within
Local Government structures. The World Bank Institute’s governance indicators11
(1996 to 2006) also indicate that Tanzania has gained momentum, and place the
country in a group of countries that are improving towards good governance
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2007). In the same vein, the Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) indicates that Tanzania has
improved, gaining momentum from 2.9 score points in 2005 to 3.2 score points by
200712.
Despite the gains highlighted above, significant evidence still indicates a gloomy
picture of the status of Tanzania governance and anti-corruption. The Tanzania
Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST)13, indicates the rising incidence of
corruption in the construction sector (according to assessment of key stakeholders,
the consulting engineers and contractors) (CoST, 2007). The Tanzania Civil
Engineering Contractors Association (TACECA) estimates 90% of contractors pay
10%-15% of contract value in bribes. The sector is worth about 30% of GDP or
US$1885 million. Moreover, in 2004, the Engineers Registration Board (ERB) and the
Association of Consulting Engineers Tanzania (ACET) estimated that over 90% of
9
“Citizens Demand Tougher Actions on Corruption in Tanzania,” REPOA-conducted study findings
10
CWI surveys were conducted in Bukombe district, Bukoba rural district, Korogwe district, Dodoma Municipality
and Temeke Municipality. CWI is sponsored by Government (PMO-RALG), and carried out by Economic
Development Initiatives (EDI)
11
WBI’s governance indicators: ) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, iii)
Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption.
12 th th th
Tanzania ranked 88 in 2005 CPI (globally) and 14 (regionally-Africa); the rankings were 94 in the 2007 CPI
th
(globally) and 14 in the region (Africa).
13
CoST is currently piloted in Tanzania, Zambia, Vietnam and the Philippines with financial support from DfID –
designed to function in the constructive industry function the way EITI functions in the extractive industry.
11
construction contract awards and about 70% of consultancy assignments were

secured through corruption.
Another U4 report14, quoting various authentic documents, underlines the existence of

a complex corruption network at the highest level of political leadership. The report
confirms systemic, grand and large-scale corruption, and state capture with specific
reference to revelations from the in-depth study of governance in the forestry sector
(Traffic International, 2007), and corruption in the wildlife sector. The forestry report
reveals an estimated colossal (annual) loss of US$ 58 million or 96% of the potential
revenue from forestry resources. The energy sector and the Bank of Tanzania have
been in the media for over a year now, implicated in grand corruption scandals –
including the grossly inflated and corruptly procured construction of the twin towers,
the new building for the Central Bank; misappropriation of over US$133 million in the
External Payment Arrears (EPA) Account; corruptly procured emergency power
service contract worth US$173 million (Richmond LLC); illegal acquisition of Kiwira
Power Project worth US$4 billion; and the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) revelation
(with possibility for indictment) indicating the former Tanzania Attorney General
15 16
pocketed US$1 million as bribe from BAE Systems of UK . Brian Cooksey reveals
relatively high corruption perception associated with inefficiency and waste in
HIV/AIDS spending in Tanzania (Brian COOKSEY, 2006), stressing that HIV/AIDS
spending is lacking clarity in exactly how the funds are spent in drugs and supplies,
and staff allowances and travel. Another revelation marks the difficulties associated
with obtaining a coherent picture of health income and expenditure at district hospital
and council level (Health Sector PER report update, 2003)17.
The media in Tanzania have been instrumental in reporting/uncovering numerous

grand corruption scandals, including those discussed in the preceding paragraphs
and others not discussed. Judicial proceedings, Parliamentary debates proceedings
(live and Hansards), Parliamentary/Presidential Select Committees’ official reports,
specific governance/policy research reports, MKUKUTA implementation status and
progress reports (Cluster Working Group III),18 and corporate sector annual reports,
to mention only a few, remain the impeccable sources for mainstream media
reportages on grand corruption in Tanzania.
14
The report, authored in 2007, is titled, “Tanzania Anti-Corruption Policy Making in Practice”
15
Apparently against the public opinion, in 2002 the Government controversially procured the quasi-military-ware
aviation watchdog (radar) from the UK.
16
Health and corruption in Tanzania by Brian Cooksey (2006)
17
Tanzania Public Expenditure Review Multi-sectoral Review: HIV-AIDS 2003 update
18
Performance analysis and status reports consistent with ongoing governance policy reforms; PSRP, LSRP,
LGRP, NACSAPII, and other public accountability reforms across Government Ministries, Departments and
Agencies (MDAs)
12
1.2 PUBLIC DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:

RATIONALE
Public demand for accountability and good governance is rationalised by the
convention and inherent consensus that modern democratic states are obligated to
provide entitlements to citizens; provision of public goods to people, which
constitutes the raison d’être for state existence. The realisation that peace, security,
infrastructure, education, collective clean environment, and other similar public goods
cannot be consumed in isolation or bought from the market, makes it mandatory for
citizens to pay taxes to states so that the latter ensures equitable provision of public
goods. People expect governments to coordinate, direct, control and supervise
allocation and distribution of resources, optimally and fairly. According to this view,
governments are obligated to indiscriminately provide entitlements, including social
services, to citizens. However, this is possible only if the state is entirely reliant on its
citizens for revenue through taxation in exchange for policy influence19 (Maal, 2007).
The less a government is dependent on its citizens for revenue through taxation, the
less it is likely to be accountable to the electorate. State revenue sources that are
independent of the citizens’ taxes compromise accountability of the former to the
latter. Tanzania has a very narrow tax base; taxation only accounts for 12 percent of
20
its GDP (Maal, 2007). By 2008 there were 370 direct taxpayers , mainly medium
and large formal sector businesses that pay over 70% of domestic taxes. The large
share of state revenue in Tanzania comes from foreign aid and the natural resource
sector. The state is almost independent of ordinary citizen taxpayers for its revenue,
rationalising public perceptions that there is waste, mismanagement and corruption in
the country. The situation is even more worse in the LGAs, which almost entirely rely
on Central Government subventions and subsidies.
1.3 MEASURING OF GOOD GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE: VARIOUS INDICATORS

CPS recognises the existing methods, techniques and tools that attempt to measure
good governance performance and corruption status. There are national and global
indicators developed to measure governance performance and corruption status.
Global governance performance indicators

These are the conventional “good governance” indicators developed and applied
nationally but across countries to measure relative governance best practices.
Common amongst others is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published annually
by Transparency International (TI). CPI scores relate to perceptions of the degree of
corruption as seen by business people, and country analysts, and ranges between 10
19
See many similar arguments in Simen Jansen Maal; Masters of Economics thesis (unpublished), Department of
Economics, University of Oslo, 2007
20
EastAfrican No. 726 September 29-October 5, 2008, page 3 story: Cellphone firms under scrutiny over tax
planning.
13
21 22
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) . Afrobarometer is another measure for good
governance, giving a comparative series of national public attitude surveys on
democracy, markets and civil society in Africa. Afrobarometer annual reports have
not been regular. The initiative is coordinated and published by the Department of
Political Science, Michigan State University in collaboration with African counterparts
– the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Ghana Centre for
Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). Another global scale measure of governance
is the World Bank Institute (WBI) governance indices, which apply the country data
based on six aggregate governance indicators, namely Voice & Accountability,
Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption to measure the quality of
governance practices. The WBI index for 1996-2006 indicates Tanzania to be
improving (WBI, June 2007) on governance best practices23.
The Global Integrity uses independent information on governance and corruption to

assess good governance index across countries. It assesses the existing
mechanisms to fight corruption, after which countries are ranked as “very weak”
+ + +
(below 60%), “weak” (60 %), “moderate” (70 %), “strong” (80 %) or “very strong”
+
(90 %). Using a comprehensive methodological process, ten indicators, namely Civil
Society Organizations, Media, and Public Access to Information, Voting & Citizen
Participation, Election Integrity, Political Financing, Executive Accountability,
Legislative Accountability, Judicial Accountability and Budget Processes are
scrutinised to reach the Global Integrity Index on good governance. Tanzania scored
little above 60%, thus ranking “weak” in the 2007 Global Integrity Index24. The
Freedom House is also on records for global governance performance indicators:
population, capital, political rights and civil liberties – rated as “Free”, “Partly Free”, or
“Not Free”.
National governance performance indicators

Tanzania started the core policy reforms during third phase Government. The reforms
are meant to improve efficiency in Government institutions, hence promote good
governance and deter corruption. The notable core reforms include the Public
Finance Management Reform Programme (PFMRP), Legal Sector Reform Programme
(LSRP), Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), Public Sector Reform
Programme (PSRP) and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans
(NACSAP). The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) is the
21
TI released 2008 CPI on Tuesday 23rd September, 2008. Tanzania has scored 3.0; 102nd least corrupt
country out of 180 countries. Information available at http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2008_press.html,
accessed September 26, 2008.
22
Afrobarometer is more like opinion polling on attitudes to democracy and elections across countries in Africa.
Specific information available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.
23
Full report available at http://www.govindicators.org and http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/.
24
More information is available at http://www.globalintegrity.org
14
mainstream policy defining the direction for core reforms, to reduce poverty (income)
and boost social-economic wellbeing. Capability to carry out the core policy reforms
to successful levels is eventually critical to measure improving governance
performance status in the country. Specific agreed targets in the General Budget
Support (GBS) Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) are seen as indicators to
25
help measure good governance performance in Tanzania .
The Policy and Service Satisfaction Survey (PSSS) is another indicator that measures
good governance performance at national level. The survey is used to investigate
public knowledge and perceptions about the Government’s pro-poor policy initiatives
(REPOA, 2003). PSSS also documents people’s views on the availability, quality and
cost of basic social and economic services26. However, REPOA has not published
subsequent PSSS reports findings since release of the first results/report in 2003.
Participatory Service Delivery Assessment27 (PSDA) is noted as a mechanism to
measure good governance performance status. Although so far there is no
documented evidence of PSDA findings in Tanzania – at TANGO or UNDP – the
initiative is intended to track social service delivery thus ensure qualitative and
quantitative delivery of the services to ultimate users at local level. National level
PSDA report would inform the status of good governance in the country.
Despite capacity limitation, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) is probably

the current most popular national governance performance indicator amongst civil
society and development partners. Supported by over 8 development partners, 26
CSOs have implemented over 112 PETS activities in 77 districts in 21 regions in
Tanzania since 2006. PETS create the opportunity for stakeholders (citizens) to
track, trough the participatory and transparent process, execution of budgets
expended at local level in the LGAs expenditure system. PETS compare budgetary
allocations to actual spending, hence ‘following the money’ to where it is spent,
comparing budgetary allocations with records of transfers and receipts at each level
of government. Finally PETS show how much of the funds intended for public service
providers actually reach the intended beneficiaries and therefore identify the leakage
or diversion and the level at which the leakage takes place. PETS’ findings are shared
amongst stakeholders across the horizontal and vertical accountability architectures
in the LGAs. However, perhaps because of its newness, there is no documented
evidence yet, indicating the impact of PETS on governance status in the LGAs. Table
1.3 below indicates the distribution of PETS activities so far implemented in Tanzania
since 2006.
25
NACSAP II progress report, PCCB/GGCU, update to CWG III, May 2008
26
Policy and Service Satisfaction Survey: Main Results document, REPOA 2003
27
TNAGO had on many occasions during 2007 PMO-RALG-CSO Core Group meetings in Dar es Salaam reported
to have collaborated with UNDP to implement PSDA in Kilosa and Same districts. See PMO-RALG/CSO Core Group
th
meeting minutes dated 10 December 2007.
15
Table 1.3: Distribution of PETS activities in Tanzania

S/N LGA of Specific Sector Implementing Region Technical /
implement CSO Financial*
ation Village/ Street/
Ward/ Council/ or
combination
Support
1 Arusha Data not available Health HAKIKAZI Arusha PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
2 Bukoba DC Data not available HIV/AIDS FOGOTA Kagera PACT/MCA,

USAID*
3 Bukoba Data not available HIV/AIDS FOGOTA Kagera PACT/ MCA,

TC USAID*
4 Chamwino Data not available Health, AFNET Data not PACT/ MCA,
Education, available USAID*
Water
5 Chato Data not available Health SAHRINGON- Data not PACT/ MCA,
TZ available USAID*
6 Chunya District, Wards Data not available CGG Mbeya Embassy of Finland
7 Chunya Data not available Education MVIWATA Mbeya PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
8 Dodoma Data not available Education, CCT Dodoma PACT/ MCA, USAID
DC Water,
Agriculture
9 Dodoma District, Wards Data not available CGG Dodoma Embassy of Finland
DC
10 Dodoma Data not available Data not available TCDD Dodoma Policy Forum
MC
11 Bagamoyo Data not available Data not available CGG Coast USAID
12 Bunda Data not available Data not TCDD Data not Policy Forum
available available
13 Hai Data not available Prioritisation District Kilimanjaro DED (German

decided at Networks Development
village assembly (through Service)
meetings Pamoja
(intended) Trust)
14 Handeni Village and Ward Prioritization Institute for Tanga DED (German
level (intended) decided at Cultural Development
village assembly Affairs (ICA) Service)
meetings and other
(intended) CSOs in
Handeni
15 Ilala MC Data not available Data not available TCDD Dar es Policy Forum
Salaam
16
16 Iramba Data not available Education, CCT Dodoma PACT/ MCA,

Water, USAID*
Agriculture
17 Iringa DC Data not available TCDD Iringa Policy Forum
18 Iringa DC Data not available Natural LEAT Iringa PACT/ MCA,

Resources USAID*
19 Iringa MC Data not available Data not available TCDD Iringa Policy Forum
20 Bukoba Data not available Data not available UNA Kagera Policy Forum
21 Kahama Village: Education SHINGONET Shinyanga SNV*

&SPC
Ward:
22 Karagwe Village: Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

Nyakagoyegoye KPC
Ward: Kiruruma
23 Karagwe Village: Nyakayani Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

KPC
Ward: Nyaishozi
24 Karagwe Village: Rukuraijo Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

KPC
Ward: Nkwenda
25 Kasulu Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
26 Kibaha Data not available Data not available Youth Action Coast Policy Forum
Volunteers
27 Kibondo Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
28 Kilombero Data not available Natural JET Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

Resources USAID*
29 Kilombero Data not available Data not available Leadership Morogoro Policy Forum
Forum
30 Kilombero District, Wards Data not available CGG Morogoro Embassy of Finland
31 Kilosa Data not available Natural JET Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

Resources USAID*
32 Kilwa Data not available CGG Lindi USAID
33 Kigoma Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT / MCA,

DC USAID*
34 Kigoma ? Data not available Data not available Leadership Kigoma Policy Forum
Forum
35 Kinondoni Data not available Data not available LUMBESA Dar es Policy Forum
MC Salaam
17
36 Kinondoni Data not available Data not available TGNP Dar es Policy Forum
MC Salaam
37 Kinondoni Data not available Data not available Youth Action Dar es Policy Forum
MC Volunteers Salaam
38 Kisarawe Data not available Data not available TGNP Coast Policy Forum
39 Kisarawe 4 Wards (Kibuta, Data not available Development Coast Embassy of Finland
Musimbu, Kisarawe, Concern
Kiluvya), 11 villages (DECO)
40 Kiteto Data not available Data not available TCDD Manyara Policy Forum
41 Kongwa Data not available Data not available AFNET Dodoma Policy Forum
42 Kongwa Data not available Health, Leadership Dodoma PACT/ MCA,

Education, Forum USAID*
Water
43 Korogwe Village and Ward Prioritisation CETA Tanga DED (German

DC level (intended) decided at Development
village assembly Service)
meetings
(intended)
44 Lindi DC Health TACOSODE Lindi PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
45 Lindi TC District, Wards CGG Lindi Embassy of Finland
46 Longido Data not available Health HAKIKAZI Arusha PACT/MCA,

USAID*
47 Lushoto Data not available Data not available CGG Tanga USAID
48 Mafia Data not available Data not available CGG Coast USAID
49 Magu Data not available Data not available CGG Mwanza USAID
50 Magu Data not available Data not available REPOA Mwanza REPOA
51 Manyara Data not available Health SAHRINGON- Manyara PACT/ MCA,

TZ USAID*
52 Mara Data not available Data not available UNA Mara Policy Forum
53 Masasi Data not available Health TACOSODE Mtwara PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
54 Maswa Village: Water SHINGONET Shinyanga SNV*

& SPC
Ward:
55 Mbeya CC Data not available Data not available TGNP Mbeya Policy Forum
56 Mbeya Data not available Data not available TCDD Mbeya Policy Forum
57 Mbeya Data not available Data not available Leadership Mbeya Policy Forum
Forum
18
58 Mbozi Data not available Data not available TCDD Mbeya Policy Forum
59 Mbozi Data not available Health MVIWATA Mbeya PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
60 Meatu Data not available Data not available Leadership Shinyanga Policy Forum
Forum
61 Mkuranga Data not available Data not available CGG Coast USAID*
62 Monduli Data not available Data not available Hakikazi Arusha Policy Forum
63 Monduli Data not available Data not available TCDD Arusha Policy Forum
64 Monduli Data not available Health HAKIKAZI Arusha PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
65 Morogoro Data not available Data not available TCDD Morogoro Policy Forum
DC
66 Morogoro Data not available Health UNGO Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

DC USAID*
67 Morogoro Data not available Data not available REPOA Morogoro REPOA/Policy
MC Forum
68 Morogoro Data not available Health UNGO Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

MC USAID*
69 Moshi 12 Villages in 4 Varies. The Civic Kilimanjaro DED (German

Rural Wards Village Education Development
Assemblies Teachers Service)*
prioritise Association
(CETA)
70 Moshi Data not available HIV/AIDS KINSHAI Kilimanjaro PACT / MCA,

Rural USAID*
71 Moshi Data not available Data not available Leadership Kilimanjaro Policy Forum
Forum
72 Mpwapwa Data not available Health, AFNET Dodoma PACT/ MCA,

Education, USAID*
Water
73 Mtwara District, Wards Data not available CGG Mtwara Embassy of

MC Finland*
74 Mufindi Data not available Data not available TCDD Iringa Policy Forum
75 Mufindi Data not available Health SAHRINGON- Iringa PACT/ MCA,

TZ USAID*
76 Muleba Data not available HIV/AIDS FOGOTA Kagera PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
77 Muleba Data not available Data not available Leadership Kagera Policy Forum
Forum
78 Muleba Village: Kangantebe Education & KANGONET & Kagera SNV*
19
Ward: Mulutwe water KPC
79 Muleba Village: Kishoju Education & KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

water KPC
Ward: Mubunda
80 Muleba Village: Itongo Education & KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

water KPC
Ward: Nshamba
81 Mwanga Data not available HIV/AIDS KINSHAI Kilimanjaro PACT/MCA,

USAID*
82 Mwanza Data not available Data not available REPOA Mwanza REPOA
City
83 Nachingw Data not available Data not available Leadership Lindi Policy Forum
ea Forum
84 Newala Data not available Health TACOSODE Mtwara PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
85 Njombe Data not available TCDD Mbeya Policy Forum
86 Pangani Data not available Natural LEAT Coast PACT/ MCA,

Resources USAID*
87 Rombo Data not available Data not available District Kilimanjaro DED (German
Networks Development
(through Service)*
Pamoja
Trust)
88 Rombo Data not available HIV/AIDS KINSHAI Kilimanjaro PACT/ MCA,

USAID*
89 Rufiji Data not available Natural LEAT Coast PACT/ MCA,

Resources USAID*
90 Rukwa Data not available Data not available Mbeya
91 Same Data not available Prioritisation District Data not DED (German
decided at Networks available Development
village assembly (through Service)*
meetings Pamoja
(intended) Trust)
92 Sengerem District, Wards Data not available CGG Mwanza Embassy of

a Finland*
93 Siha Data not available Prioritisation District Data not DED (German
decided at Networks available Development
village assembly (through Service)*
meetings Pamoja
(intended) Trust)
94 Singida Data not available Data not available TCDD Singida Policy Forum
95 Songea Data not available Data not available TCDD Ruvuma Policy Forum
DC
20
96 Songea District, Wards Data not available CGG Ruvuma Embassy of

DC Finland*
97 Songea Data not available Data not available TCDD Ruvuma Policy Forum
TC
98 Songea Data not available Data not available CGG Data not USAID*
available
99 Songea Data not available Education CGG Data not PACT/ MCA,
available USAID*
100 Sumbawa District, Wards Data not available CGG Rukwa Embassy of Finland
nga
101 Tanga MC Data not available Prioritisation Not yet Tanga DED (German
decided at identified Development
village assembly Service)*
meetings
(intended)
102 Tarime Data not available Data not available Leadership Mara Policy Forum
Forum
103 Temeke Data not available Data not available TCDD Dar es Policy Forum
MC Salaam
104 Temeke Data not available Data not available Youth Action Dar es Policy Forum
MC Volunteers Salaam
105 Ukerewe Data not available Data not available Leadership Mwanza Policy Forum
Forum
106 Ulanga Data not available Health UNGO Morogoro PACT/MCA,

USAID*
107 Urambo Data not available Education, CCT Tabora PACT/ MCA,
Water, USAID*
Agriculture
108 Babati Data not available Agriculture PAMOJA Manyara PACT/MCA,

USAID*
109 Chunya Data not available Agriculture MVIWATA Mbeya PACT/ MCA,
USAID*
110 Hanang Data not available Agriculture PAMOJA Data not PACT/ MCA,
available USAID*
111 Mbozi Data not available Agriculture MVIWATA Mbeya PACT/MCA,

USAID*
112 Mbulu Data not available Agriculture PAMOJA Data not PACT/ MCA,
available USAID*
Source: PMO-RALG-CSO Core Group
Moreover, depending on the tools used to implement PETS, there are different names
used to imply the same thing. The Report Card Surveys (RCS) is used synonymously
21
to PETS. HakiKazi Catalyst uses RCS to implement the PETS project in Monduli
district in Arusha. Political Opinion Polls (POP) is yet another governance indicator.
POP is popular amongst democracy think tanks that use it to test the level of public
support (popularity) of state policy. POP is also used to test support to political office
elective contenders during elections campaigns. The Research and Education for
Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) is in record for conducting POP and releasing its
findings to the general public28.
LGAs governance performance indicators

The governance indicators elucidated in the preceding sub-section above are noted
as being also applicable in the LGAs. However, other governance indicators meant to
specifically measure governance performance and/or corruption status in the LGAs
exist. The Core Welfare Indicators are in record for LGA exclusive applicability in
Tanzania. As noted on page 11 above, experts use the Core Welfare Indicator
Questionnaire (CWIQ) to collect raw data from households in the LGAs. The data are
then analysed and disaggregated across key social indicators to determine the level,
and if users are satisfied with changes in the delivery of social services; education,
health, water, public health infrastructure, employment level, land allocation, political
leadership and administration of justice, and status of food security and social
wellbeing. Governance specific elements are reflected in the reasons cited for
dissatisfaction with policy decisions in which corruption, accountability, transparency,
favouritism, lack of policy impact and bureaucratic unilateral decisions are rated. The
findings29 of the CWIs conducted between the second half of 2006 and the first half of
2007, in Bukombe, Bukoba rural, Dodoma municipality, Korogwe and Temeke
municipality generally portray improvement in good governance performance and
corruption status in those LGAs.
The Urban Bribery Index (UBI) is another indicator that measures corruption status in
urban LGAs. Unlike PETS and PSDA, there is no empirical evidence showing UBI
results in any of the LGAs in Tanzania. UBI indicators are based on the information
provided on organizations/departments in which service users encounter bribery, if
bribes were actually paid, monetary value of the bribery paid and the service/goods
for which bribery was paid. UBI is vital for measuring the status of petty corruption in
mostly urban LGAs. The key bribery information blocks (purpose) for UBI data include
law enforcement (avoiding the legal consequences of wrong doing, or harassment by
the relevant authority); regulatory compliance (e.g. obtaining licenses); access to
services (e.g. health, school places, utilities); business (e.g. to obtain a contract or
expedite payment); and employment (e.g. to get a job, promotion, transfer, training).
28
REDET is the Programme of the Political Science and Public Administration in the Faculty of Arts of the
th
University of Dar es Salaam. See Mwananchi No. 02732of 5 December 2007 for the latest release of POP
findings “Government popularity falling down”
29
For additional information visit http://www.edi-africa.com CWIs reports also available at LGRP and PMO-RALG
22
The UBI data are used to construct six indicators that capture different dimensions of
30
the magnitude and impact of problem as follows :
i. Incidence: This ranks an organization/department according to the likelihood
(probability) that a person visiting the organization/department will be asked, or
feel it is necessary, to offer a bribe.
ii. Prevalence: This ranks organizations/departments in order of the percentage of
population affected by bribery in them.
iii. Severity: This captures the level of impunity, that is, whether service is denied for
declining to bribe.
iv. Frequency: This ranks organizations/departments according to the level of bribery
activity, measured by the average number of bribes paid per person per year.
v. Cost: This ranks organizations/departments according to the estimated proceeds
from bribes, and can be interpreted as the “bribery tax” per adult citizen.
vi. Size: This ranks organizations/departments according to the average size of
bribes paid, and is reflective of the cost to the individuals who pay the bribes.
1.4 PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: EFFORTS AND

TRENDS
Efforts to promote good governance and checking of corruption are not new in
Tanzania. A historical epoch observation traces these efforts from the pre-colonial
era, during colonial and post-independence periods.
Pre-colonial to colonial epoch

There is evidence showing that corruption existed in communities during the medieval
Tanzania. This is vindicated by vernaculars across tribes with translation of corruption
in tribal dialectics not connected to alien languages originating from contacts with the
colonialists. Amongst the Wachagga (sile), Wamatumbi (luboko), Wagogo (rusuo),
Wahaya (kyemenyo) and Wapare (mbuta), to mention only a few ethnic groups in
Tanzania, do have the local, non-Kiswahili-connected linguistic for corruption. This
infers to existence of corruption in the early Tanzanian societies even before advent
of colonial rule; formation and influence of modern state.
The British colonialists, in the mid 1930’s, had to amend the penal code so as to
criminalise acts of corruption, which were rampant at the time. Also, latter in 1958,
the British colonial government again had to enact the Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance, Chapter 400, in response to rampant acts of corruption. Receiving
30
This section is derived from The Kenya Bribery Index 2004 report available at Transparency International-Kenya
http://www.tikenya.org/
23
commissions and rewards by civil servants in the colonial public offices were
31
declared offences under the law and therefore outlawed .
The post-independent epoch, 1961-1995

Corruption was one of the challenges facing Tanzania immediately after
independence. The political leadership, social service delivery and administration of
justice were invariably challenged. Amongst other measures, the Government
responded by drafting the Bill in 1971 to enact the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA)
No. 16 of 1971. Later in 1975, through Government Notice (GN) Number 17, the
Government established the National Anti-corruption Squad, which was later in 1991
transformed into the Prevention of Corruption Bureau32 (PCB) after amending the PCA
and the GN No. 17. However, the PCA was narrow, confining corruption in the public
sector alone – recognising only four corruption offences33. The offences, as noted
under the PCA, are giving and receiving, attempting to give or receive bribes; use of
documents intended to mislead principal; public officer obtaining advantage without
consideration or inadequate consideration; and being in possession of property
obtained corruptly (ESRF/FACEIT, 2002:30).
An analysis of efforts and policy decisions taken during the period indicates two
salient features; firstly, that the Government was the sole role player in the anti-
corruption field, and secondly, that legislation is seen as the only Government
strategy to combat corruption and promote good governance.
In 1966 the law to establish the Office of Permanent Commission of Inquiry

(Ombudsman) was enacted, and in 1983/4 the law to control Economic Sabotage
and Organised Crime was enacted34.
Observation: establishment of the legal and institutional framework to fight corruption

is the only remarkable anti-corruption achievements by 1995.
The period between 1995 and 2005

Corruption was the powerful political election campaign agenda of Benjamin William
Mkapa, who won the presidency in the 1995 general elections. Immediately after the
elections, President Benjamin William Mkapa appointed the Presidential Commission
31
NATPP phase one report available at ForDIA and PTF website,
http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/completed%20projects/natppannualprogressreport2005%2
0Main%20text%2016may06.pdf
32
PCB was since placed in the President’s Office, and mandated to investigate, apprehend and prosecute
corruption offences; conduct operational research to inform analyses and building of corruption data base; and
undertake community education to mobilise and empower the general public fighting against corruption.
33
Restated in the 2002 Annual report, pg. 30: The State of Corruption in Tanzania compiled by ESRF and FACEIT
34
The Economic Sabotage and Organised Crime Act was Government response to public hording against then
rationing policy for scarce goods and services due to post Uganda war economic crisis, early 1980s.
24
of Inquiry against Corruption (PCIAC). The commission submitted the findings of its
inquiry in November 1996. The Government could not implement the PCIAC
recommendations in full, but it is also true that subsequent policy, legal and
institutional reforms intended to promote good governance and anti-corruption status
that the Government has been implementing originate from PCIAC recommendations.
Between 1995 and 2005 the Government strengthened the institutional capacity of
PCB, Ethics Secretariat (Public Leaders Ethics Act, 1995) and the Ethics Inspectorate
Unit. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP, 2001) was
launched and has since guided the preventive side of Tanzania’s anti-corruption
measures. The establishment of the Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU),
constituting the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG), and
enactment of the Public Procurement Act, No. 21, 2004 are certainly noted as yet
Government’s attempts to counteract corruption and promote good governance
during the period. However, the principal Government strategy to counteract
corruption was apprehending and prosecuting the corrupt elements. Table 1.4.1
below provides the summary of concrete corruption cases between 2003 and 2007.
The elements are generally petty corruption cases presumably involving low ranking
officials. Also worth-noting, the summary indicates declining trend between corruption
information received by PCCB and the executed convictions.
Table 1.4/1: Summary of corruption cases during in the last five years
Year Information received Completed New filed cases in Conviction cases
investigation files court recorded
2003 2,285 540 51 9
2004 2,223 458 60 6
2005 3,121 540 50 6
2006 6,320 1688 71 18
2007 8,235 2014 195 35
TOTAL 22,184 5240 427 74
Source: APRM Democracy and Political Governance in Tanzania consultant report
The period from 2005 onwards

The general public view is such that the fourth phase government that came to power
in December 2005 has since been rocked in the scandals of grand corruption –
energy procurement, central bank procurement and fund misappropriation, mining
contracts, to mention only the few known scams. However, and as the Global
Integrity report on Tanzania puts it, unfolding of the scandals does not necessarily
mean corruption has increased, instead what has increased is transparency (Global
Integrity, 2008).
In December 2006 the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania launched the
Second Phase of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP II),
which ends at the end of 2010. The new and relatively more comprehensive
25
legislation; the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA) No 11 of 2007

with 24 corruption offences, was enacted during the first quarter of 2007. The
Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) of 1971 was repealed by the new law. The
oversight role of the Auditor and Controller General (CAG) has been strengthened,
and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) has been established at the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Affairs with legal mandate to inhibit money laundering.
The Government has been revisiting the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act in
response to the State House policy directive to stop mingling public and private
business interests meant to allay the risk of “conflict of interest”. Moreover plans are
underway to review and amend the Political Parties Act No 5 of 1992 and the
National Elections Act No. 1 of 1985 in order to control money in politics, including
political campaigns and political party funding. The Whistle Blowers Protection Bill and
the Freedom of Information Bill are in the pipeline (GGCU, 2008). The project for
Strengthening Anti-Corruption Strategies in Tanzania (SACST) meant to strengthen the
national integrity institutions (PCCB, DPP, and GGCU), the Parliament, the Judiciary,
NSAs and the core policy reforms has been launched. Other projects put up in order
to augment the implementation of NACSAP II are as noted below;
i. The Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Project (ATIP) - 2007-2017
ii. Ethics, Accountability and Transparency Project (Facility) 2007-2010
iii. The National Governance and Corruption Survey - 2008
iv. Millennium Challenge Account Project - 2006 - 2008
v. Deepening Democracy in Tanzania - 2007-2010
vi. Tackling Corruption Project - 2008 - 2012
vii. The APRM process 2008 – 2009
viii. Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST)
Moreover, the URT Government has signed the Partnership Framework Memorandum
35
(PFM) governing General Budget Support (GBS) for implementation of MKUKUTA
(MoFEA, 2006). The terms of Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) for GBS
agreed between the Government and development partners are intentional to
enhance good governance and integrity in the budgetary allocations predefined by
MKUKUTA and MDGs.
Furthermore, there are six key areas of GBS performance (PAF) earmarked for
concurrent implementation to improve good governance standard. The said areas are
the 3 Clusters of MKUKUTA – growth and reduction of income poverty, improvements
of quality of life and social well being and governance and accountability; Resource
allocation and budget consistency; Public financial management; and Macroeconomic
stability.
35
14 DP members signed the PFM for GBS: African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland,
Japan, Germany/KfW, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and World Bank
26
The quarterly MKUKUTA Clusters’ meetings are attended by stakeholders from the
Government, DPs and CSOs. The GBS review meetings are held once annually to
allow stakeholders review progress. However, the participation of civil society
representatives in the GBS is hitherto insignificant due to Government disapproval.
36
During the 2007 GBS Review meeting CSOs were denied full participation, against
37
which the latter issued a strong statement . Table 1.4.2 below presents updates in
line with PAF targets for GBS.
Table 1.4/2: May 2008 PAF update

Temporary Response on Outstanding
Underlying Outcome Responsible
Process PAF Update Actions from last CWG 3
Process Indicator Party
Action Meeting
NACSAP (II)
The PCCB will continue to
provide update of number
of cases on Grand
Corruption as they are
submitted for sanctioning
Number of by the DPP
A minimum of
Grand
5 grand NACSAP:
Corruption
corruption Annual Anti-Corruption Form
38 cases
cases are to take place in October
Prosecuted
either ready 2008
as a
for
Percentage TPA:
prosecution or Anti-Corruption Bills still
of 5 cases have been
have been being discussed by PCCB
investigated submitted to the DPP
dismissed for stakeholders are the MOJCA
cases
reasons which Whistleblowers Bill and
proposed by
have been Freedom of Information Bill
PCCB to the
made public
Director of
by September NACSAP:
Public
2008 The steering committee has
Prosecutions been appointed by the GoT
ON TRACK which incorporates members
from all sectors involved in the
Governance Group (Private
Sector, Civil Society, Media,
DPs, and GoT). Members of
the steering committee will
report on SACST on time for
the GBS annual Review.
Source: May 2008 CWG III updates
36
In the 2007 GBS Review Report available at http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/GBS/GBS%20Report%20CEF.pdf
37
40 CSOs signed on the Statement. Policy Forum coordinated the process.
38
The cases mentioned include the dubious tax exemptions extended to the Alex Stewart Assayers gold auditing
company, the Buzwagi mineral development agreement, the procurement of aviation radar, the
TANGOLD/Meremeta scam, Deep Green Finance deals, the Richmond LLC/Dowans emergence power
procurement and Kiwira Coal Power Project.
27
The role of NSAs

The term Non-State Actors (NSAs) is used to explain a terrain of governance actors
operating outside the government domain. NSA is in itself not a formal institution but
a pro-good governance alliance of organisations and individuals from civil society,
private/corporate sector and the media. It is noted in this report that until 2003
corruption was an exclusive domain of Central Government. Only the media, though
inadequately too, could investigate and report on mere petty corruption cases.
The media, with information that creates and maintains public awareness, ideally
dominated by state through a number of strategies, has remained crucial even before
independence. Only a few state controlled media outlets existed between 1965 and
1992 when Tanzania was a one party state. The Media Bill that the Government
drafted in 1993 to control the media39 was vehemently opposed by a handful but
strong independent media professionals and emerging pro-democracy elements. By
2006 private media had grown to more than 785 publications40 – newspapers, in-
house publications, and periodicals, including 14 active dailies and more than 20
weeklies. About 33 radio stations and nine television stations, including 16 cable
networks, most of them broadcasting in Dar es Salaam and a few other urban areas
exist on the Mainland Tanzania. All radio and television stations are privately owned
except the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) radio and television outlets.
The Newspaper legislation of 1976 bestows powers to the Government Minister to

control the media. The Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) that formally started to
operate in 1996 has been instrumental, supporting the media to promote
transparency and expose corruption. In 2006 MCT successfully halted another
Government attempt to enact the law to control freedom of information in Tanzania.
Tanzania National Media Policy was published since 2005. The current Tanzania
41
media trend has been the emergence of investigative journalists and tabloids with
specific editorial policy to expose and report on corruption. This has resulted into
increasing public confidence in the media reports. The ESRF/FACEIT report of 2002
notes that 60 to 66 percent of the respondents interviewed were confident in the role
of the media as frontline fighters against corruption42; feeding the public with credible
messages to create awareness about corruption in the country (TI, 2003:26).
However, the media have sustained many challenges including the legal constraints,
poor working environment, lack of commitment to fight corruption on the part of
some media owners, and poor rural-urban information networks.
39
Ndimara Tegambwage, a senior journalist, press freedom activist and then amongst leaders of pro-democracy
pressure groups, mobilized journalist to oppose the Media Bill the effect of which resulted into formation of the
current self regulation none-statutory Media Council of Tanzania (MCT). The state Media Bill amongst other
regulatory strategies intended to establish the statutory Media Council to regulate media activities in the country.
40
World Association of Newspapers – World Press Trends 2007, page 688
41
The weeklies This Day, Kulikoni and MwanaHalisi, registered in 2006, are noted.
42
Quoted from the Transparency International National Integrity Systems Country Study Report for Tanzania 2003.
28
The civil society in its broadest sense; trade union, cooperatives, inter-faith-based
organisations, community-based organisations and the thematic non-governmental
organisations have been instrumental in promoting good governance and
counteracting corruption in Tanzania. The trade union and cooperative movements
are on record for their struggles against colonialism, and latter, promotion of good
governance and anti-corruption in Tanzania. The documented evidence about the
theme-based contemporary civil society organisations, NGOs inclusive, indicates
rapid growth from an estimated 100 or less registered CSOs/NGOs by mid- 1980s,
rising to over 200 in early 1990s, over 2,700 by 2000 and over 400043 by 2007
(FCS and UDSM, 2008:19).
The increasing quantitative trend of civil society since mid 1990s is associated with
their overly involvement in promoting good governance and fight corruption. The
United National Development Programme (UNDP) had, in 2004, funded about 13
44
CSOs to carry out various project activities . The Partnership for Transparency Fund
(PTF)45 had also, during the same period, funded about 4 CSOs to carry out
governance promotion and anti-corruption project activities, including PETS, research
and advocacy (PTF, 2006). The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), has during
the last seven years, done and documented recommendable reports, including
leading public litigations, following up and reporting on acts of human rights violations
– event-specific and on the annual basis. The inter-faith organisations have at different
occasions, issued strong statements condemning corruption and poor governance
practices in public institutions46. By way of carrying out training and advocacy
activities based on findings from research, CSOs have, painstakingly, supported the
on going core policy reforms in Tanzania, especially the LGRP, LSRP and NACSAP.
Paradoxically, some CSOs have themselves been accused of facilitating corruption

(TI, 2003:27). The report of the 11 member Presidential Advisory Committee on
Reviving and Advancing Cooperatives, appointed after the national cooperative revival
conference47 in Mwanza, published in 2001, cited corruption and poor governance as
key reason for cooperative failures in Tanzania (Ministry of Cooperatives and
marketing, 2001). The once strong cooperative societies (movement) are virtually
weak and rocked into corruption and the public strongly feels the state is involved.
43
The literature gives contradictory figures, partly because of definitional problems and the fact that NGOs/CSOs
[and CBOs] are registered in at least six different places and under different laws. Mushi and Killian (2002) gave an
estimate of 4,000 by 2001 which was probably on the high side by then. Kiondo’s (2001) estimate put the
number of NGOs at 3,700, and estimates by Ndumbaro and Mvungi (2007:21) put the figure for NGOs at 3,880.
44
The CSOs groups were funded under NACSAP I as strategy to bring civil society into the scheme.
45
Through online communication and negotiation PTF funded governance project activities for RIRA, VETO, PORIS
and ForDIA.
46
Between 1994 and 2008 CCT, TEC and BAKWATA issued timely strong statements concerned with governance
deterioration
47 th th
The conference was convened by then President Benjamin Mkapa on 24 -25 March 2000 to chart out way
forward to revive erstwhile dwindling cooperatives.
29
Generally, the civil society sector is still nascent and weak, which partly explains the
existence of a weak social movement in the country. Civil society in the country is still
characterised by networks defined by geopolitical divisions and functional themes i.e.
education, human rights, gender and HIV/AIDS. There are no clearly discernible anti-
corruption networks or movement in the country. Weak institutional capacity – poor
knowledge, skills and experience base – is noted as being the key exogenous causal
factors for the failures of civil society to attain strong internal governance structures,
financial sustainability and public support. This has in turn, undermined the legitimacy
of CSOs to mastermind strong anti-corruption networks and social movements.
Moreover, the Non-Governmental Organisations Act (No.24 of 2002) is too narrow to
help civil society grow into strong anti-corruption social movements.
Similarly, the private sector in Tanzania is also nascent, suffocated by red-tapping,

and struggling to emerge, survive and grow, and therefore still too weak to withstand
corruption. Some principal elements in the private sector are conventionally known as
significant corruption actors standing on the supply side of corruption in a supply-
demand conceived equation. There is strong perception amongst the general public
that a significant number of Foreign Direct Investments have tended to supply
corruption to key Government officials. However, the Tanzania Chamber of
48
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) have been vocal and have come out
with a clear strategic plan to counteract corruption.
Local Government Authorities (LGAs)

The local government system in the country is based on Articles 145 and 146 of the
National Constitution. There is a uniform system of local government based on Acts
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 as amended from time to time. The Regional Administration Act
No. 6 of 1999 provides for, among other things, a relationship between the central
and local government (TI, 2003:28).
During the pre-colonial era, Tanzania had a system of local government in most
communities that was based on councils of elders. These councils deliberated on
important matters that affected tribal security and welfare including serious diseases,
famine, environmental conservation, and management of wild animals. There are
certain elements of local government in Tanzania today which can be traced back to
the period of colonial administration (Liviga, 2007). With the onset of German colonial
rule the country was ruled “Directly” but the colonial government introduced limited
local government in some urban areas mainly to address issues of concern to the
expatriate community. The British government introduced the Native Authorities,
which were not democratically constituted and which were groomed to prop the
colonial system.
48
TCCIA is a party in the NACSAP Triangular Partnership Programme (NATPP) launched by ForDIA October 2004
and a member of the NSAs Committee for implementing NACSAP II also coordinated by ForDIA, February 2007.
30
A comprehensive system of Local Government was introduced in 1953 with the

passing of the Local Government Ordinance that established Municipal, Town and
District Councils (PMORALG). The Ordinance had racial overtones with voters being
compelled to vote for three candidates: an African, a European and an Asian in each
constituency. In urban areas services were provided on racial lines.
Since independence in 1961, local governance in Tanzania can be divided into four
major phases as follows:
i. The first decade of independence (1961–1971) during which chiefdoms were
abolished to consolidate independence and nationhood, a revolutionary system of
socio-economic development known as Ujamaa-socialism was introduced and,
which among other things, involved the re-organization of rural settlements into
communal villages and the supremacy of the one Party in all aspects of political
and economic life of the country.
ii. The Decentralization period (1972-1982), which was characterized by the
abolition of local governments (66 district councils and 15 urban councils), and
49
the merging of the central and local government functions . According to official
government explanation, the aim was to decentralize power to the population by
involving the population in planning, which was to be centrally coordinated.
iii. The re-instatement of Local Governments (1983/84 – 1995) was done through
the instigation of the ruling “Chama cha Mapinduzi” political party leading to the
establishment of Village Councils, Township Authorities and District Councils in the
rural areas and Town, Municipal and City Councils as Local Authorities in urban
areas through a series of Acts50.
iv. The reform period (1996 to-date); The Local Government Reform Agenda (URT,
1996) and the Policy Paper on Local Government Reform (URT, 1998) are
important policy documents to understand (study) the local council governance
oversight role in Tanzania. The Local Government Policy Paper notes that local
government would be free to make policy and operational decisions consistent
with the laws and government policies. The Policy Paper mentions that the local
49
It was not local governments only that were abolished in 1972; the once strong cooperative
unions were also abolished, and re-introduced back in 1984. Studying the combined impact of
trends in both the weak local governments and cooperatives could appropriately inform policy
option. Having recollected his previous mistakes, Founder of the Nation, Julius K. Nyerere, once
remarked: “There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the
abolition of Local Government, and the other is the disbanding of cooperatives... We had these two
useful instruments of participation, and we got rid of them.”
50
Local Authorities in Tanzania were re-established in 1984 after several laws were passed in 1982
and 1983; i.e. i) The Local Government (District Authorities), Act 1982 (Act No.7 of 1982).ii) The
Local Government (Urban Authorities), Act 1982 (Act No. 8 of 1982). iii) The Local Government
Finance Act, 1982 (Act No.9 of 1982). iv), The Local Government Service Act, 1982 (Act No.1 0 of
1982). v) The Urban Authorities Rating Act, 1983 (Act No.2 of 1983). Moreover, these laws had
been consistently amended in 1992, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2006
31
government system is to be based on political devolution and decentralization of

functions and finances (ibid.).
Although the grassroots elections are competitive, involving all, including the ruling
party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the elections are directly controlled and
managed by central government, [de facto the ruling party], under the ministry
responsible for local government, which has tended to oscillate between the Prime
Minister’s Office and the President’s Office. Unlike grassroots elections, ward
councillors, the local government political representatives (leaders), are elected
during the normal general elections calendar, managed by National Electoral
Commission (NEC).
The LGAs legal set up is such that, unlike wards, village councils are corporate
bodies (Act No.7 of 1982) guaranteed by law to continued existence (Ngware and
Haule, 1993). LGAs, as a governance system are noted by Warioba Commission
(1996) for being tarnished by corruption. According to the report, corruption occurs
in human resource management sector through bribery that takes place during staff
recruitment, promotions and deployment; land allocation and issuing of business
trading licenses; in the award of tenders; allocation of plots and marketing stocks;
and in the procurement of goods and services.
Following the report by the Warioba Commission, LGAs have taken a number of anti-
corruption measures, consistent with the reforms carried out within the LGRP, and
the NACSAP II51 framework. However, social service delivery has not yet been
expanded, improved and liberalized enough to reduce incidences of corruption in
education, health land allocation and administration of justice in the LGAs geopolitics
(TI, 2003:29). The past and latest reports of the Controller and Auditor-General
provide ample evidence implicating LGAs in that regard.
Corruption in the electoral process

Political corruption, which due to its nature, has in recent years been referred to as
“state capture”, is by and large synonymous to grand corruption. Although the CPS
tools were not designed to capture issues of grand corruption, and therefore political
corruption, it is worth-noting that in the future, CPS expands to encompass
assessment of political corruption indicators in the LGAs. Prince Bagenda, in his
interim report to PTF,52 notes the need to expand governance research with a focus
on political corruption (PORIS, 2004:8), which in effect starts with corruption in the
electoral process.
51
LGAs have to design and implement their own anti-corruption plans as spelled out in the NACSAP II document.
52
PTF had in 2004 funded the project proposed by the African International Group of Political Risk Analysis (PORIS)
to conduct research on Corruption in the Electoral Process.
32
Gender dimension of promoting governance and anti-corruption

The gender dimension of governance and corruption is basically a description of
social service delivery in relation to gender. Evidence based on empirical literatures
indicates ‘gender’ as a factor for organising division of labour, control over resources
and decision making. The women-men dichotomy places corruption in a gender-
specific experience, which is expected to affect men and women differently. Women
and men are subjects and objects of different corrupt practises and behaviour
(Maaria Seppänen and Pekka Virtanen, 2008)53.
Both Government and gender activists support the mainstreaming of gender policy
destined to increase the number of women in decision-making positions. However,
empirical revelations indicate the contrary. It is eventually concluded that putting in
place mechanisms of accountability within the political system is more important in
fighting corruption than increasing the number of women decision-makers. This
conclusion is based on observations that in countries where the levels of corruption
declined due to increasing the number of women in the higher positions of power it
was due to the fact that such opportunities for women tend to be commensurate with
a social and political structure that is generally more open and accountable towards
all social groups, including women. That it is actually the presence of liberal
democratic institutions which promote both gender equality and good governance
that is the factor at play in reducing corruption. Increasing the number of women in
public office alone does not resolve the problem of corruption. The relatively high
percentage of women in parliament or the high proportion of women in the justice
department does not seem to have changed the corruption status of Tanzania. As
gender is always a social construction, the differences between men and women in
their attitudes and behaviour towards corruption are more likely to reflect their social
roles, powers and positions.
Many women-rights focused organisations and networks are implementing the health,
education, land, budget and HIV/AIDS projects; carrying out anti-corruption and good
governance advocacy for improved delivery of social services. The Tanzania Gender
Networking Programme (TGNP) is implementing the Gender Budget Initiative (GBI)
project and the HIV/AIDS resources campaign project intended to attain equitable
redistribution of resources to users of social service delivery. Gender equity is seen
as rationale for almost all projects that TGNP has been implementing. Women’s
Dignity Project (WDP) is involved in advocacy and capacity-building supporting women
to address the Fistula malady, and other maternal health services perturbing many
women in the country. The Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) is currently
implementing the advocacy campaign addressing corruption in allocations of plots
and land management generally. Although it is generally felt that there is inadequate
53
Maaria Seppänen and Pekka Virtanen are the authors of Corruption, Poverty and Gender with Case Studies of
Nicaragua and Tanzania, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland
33
good governance; transparent information flow and accountability in the management

of HIV/AIDS resources, no meaningful anti-corruption advocacy project has been
executed to the effect.
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SURVEYS

The survey is broadly dedicated to promote increased dialogue between the political
bureaucracies and leadership, on one hand and civil society and private sector
stakeholders on the other hand, in order to attain the following objectives:
i. To measure the magnitude and comprehensive picture of corruption across
villages, wards, constituency and districts in the country, in effect augmenting
efforts initiated to promote good governance and fight corruption at all levels.
ii. To create civic awareness, knowledge and skills (competence) amongst the
electorate at the grassroots level of society by encouraging the citizenry to hold
the government at their level accountable, through existing governance
structures, but maintaining political stability, tolerance, peace and security.
iii. To encourage citizens’ participation in the development policy-making process by
creating and maintaining trust, promotion of demand for accountability and
strengthening stakeholders’ commitment towards improved information flow and
transparency that will eventually act as a ‘deterrent’ to corruption.
iv. To share information and engage the community in open dialogues with LGAs so
that the views of the citizens get reflected and influence development policy
decisions, making LGAs responsive and accountable to public/users of social
service delivery.
v. To promote transparency and encourage openness in the LGAs, build ownership
of development policy decisions and social development programmes/projects.
vi. To nurture and empower, through capacity-building and collaboration, the LGAs-
based CSOs whose capacity-building support is crucial for supporting the
respective NSAs-led dialogues given the findings of the CPS on governance and
corruption status of LGAs.
vii. To promote the LGAs-based networks for good governance and anti-corruption
involving activists and stakeholders supporting CPS project annual functions in
the LGAs.
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SURVEYS

LGA is the unit of analysis of the survey in which the data are analysed across the
service delivery sectors. The Analyses are used to assess perceptions of service
users across sex, age, rural-urban divide, income and employment status as regards
the quality and quantity of deliverables in health, education, energy, land allocation,
administration of justice and business licenses. This is meant to find out the extent of
public perceptions as regards the existence of corruption in the LGAs. The research
findings will inform the series of LGAs-coordinated public dialogues. The dialogues will
zero-in counteracting corruption in the public service delivery sectors perceived as
34
highly corrupt. CPS project host-organisations in the LGAs are charged with
organising and coordinating the public dialogue forums and engaging strategic
stakeholders in the LGAs to carryout CPS subsequent functions.
The public dialogue forums will take the form of seminars, symposia, and workshops;
media briefs, press conferences, press releases; and paying official visits to full
council meetings, heads of departments and the office of the Executive Directors
(DED) in the LGAs. The activities carried out following the CPS findings will inform the
entire monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system of the project.
Equally important, the surveys findings will also be used by public and investigative
media to report about the status of corruption in the country. The national integrity
system bodies; PCCB, the police, the Commission for Human Rights and Good
Governance, GGCU and the Ethics Secretariat will use the surveys findings to
evaluate the impact of core policy reforms (LSRP, LGRP, PFMRP, PSRP and NACSAP
II). Moreover, development partners will most likely find the surveys findings as useful
input for engagement with Government on the MKUKUTA/GBS PAF.
The findings are also expected to immensely contribute to professional and activist
engagements; research, training, lobbying and advocacy activities involving such
entities as human rights groups, broad policy reform groups, PETS coalitions, private
sector groups and others in Tanzania and beyond. The quality, quantity and pattern of
social service delivered by LGAs are intended to change from the conditions
perceived undesirable to better ones. LGAs are expected to adjust and transform into
the accountable and transparent governance structures consistent with CPS
recommendations and LGRP targets.
1.7 METHODOLOGY
The simultaneously standard survey instruments, namely qualitative and quantitative
methods were used to conduct the study. The quantitative instruments comprised
two categories of questionnaire; household and key informant questionnaires. Both
questionnaires are very long and loaded so as to extract enough data. The household
questionnaire has 39 principal probing items while the key informant questionnaire
has similar 38 items.
Focus-Group Discussions were used to explore the corruption perceptions of ordinary

people. The basis of analysis was the personal experiences in relation to
accessibility; quality and quantity of social services delivery, which eventually help to
explain the responsiveness and accountability of existing governance structures, or
behaviour of governance systems in LGAs. Social services delivery is the foundation
of CPS assessment, focussing on health, education, land allocation, administration of
35
justice, business licensing, HIV/AIDS resources, functions of cooperative societies’

and civil (road) construction.
The quantitative method used included questionnaires, which were used in conducting
face to face interviews with key informants and individual households’ members.
Interviews with key informants explored institutional specific determinants of
corruption (bribery, nepotism, negligence, fraud and embezzlement), accountability
and transparency. The household questionnaires used a combination of open and
closed questions from which respondents selected responses that best matched
their views or experiences; giving inference on corruption in the LGAs. The use of
questionnaire to extract perceptions is rationalised by citizens’ role as intended
ultimate users of public services, abiders of law and regulations, and clients of
licenses and permits. Desktop research (literature review) has augmented the study
with is additional data and information.
Quantitative data was analysed by the SPSS package, whereas qualitative data
transcripts were translated into the social service delivery categories that LGAs are
mandated to provide. Analysis from focus group discussions has been noted, given
tentative titles, and grouped with demonstrative quotes from participants’ views along
with preliminary interpretations. The analyses on the themes were clarified, refined
and summarized for infusion into the quantitative data analysis.
1.7.1 SAMPLE SIZE AND DESIGN

The regions included in the sample are Kagera, Shinyanga, Mtwara, Ruvuma, Mbeya,
Morogoro, Lindi and Coast. LGAs were not sampled since the survey intended to
accommodate all LGAs available in a region. Fifty (50) LGAs were earmarked for
study during the first year of study. Tanzania population census data (2002) was used
to design the CPS sample. The survey sample size was 400 key informants plus
1200 households; 8 key informants and 24 household respondents in every LGA. A
total of 250 focus groups were planned targeting 5 focus group discussions per
LGA. The sample is considered adequately representing the whole population in the
LGAs covered by the survey – men and women, children, the youth, elders and the
vulnerable social groups.
Variables used/considered in the selection of sample units in urban, semi-urban or

rural areas include availability of time, transport and communication facilities (physical
accessibility), availability of core social service facilities and proximity to economic
and administrative centres. To that effect, the research survey adopted the
methodology, which is largely practical, i.e. the mixture of convenient, judgement,
purposeful and systematic random sampling techniques.
36
Household surveys were conduced by means of ‘face to face’ interviews; respondents

were selected randomly by the interval method from both urban and rural areas – 2
54
streets or 2 villages – in one ward in an LGA. The sample comprised 12
respondents chosen from one street or village, totalling 24 respondents who were
interviewed from one ward in each LGA. Respondents were both men and women at
or above the age of 18 years in the household. One person was interviewed from one
th
household after every 50 houses in the selected streets in urban areas. In the rural
areas one person was interviewed from one household per neighbourhood in the
sampled neighbourhoods of the sampled villages.
Key informants were conveniently selected for interviews from the same wards, which
were sampled for household questionnaire administration, in a cluster-like sampling
pattern especially in rural areas. The survey also relied on systematic random
sampling techniques in urban and semi-urban areas. The contacts for interviews relied
on availability of leadership in the departments or institutions, across the board of
social and political spectrum, with leaders above the age of 18 years.
Participants in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were selected on the basis of the
judgement and convenience of respective heads; teachers, ward or village leaders,
employers and opinion leaders. Students’ groups targeted secondary schools in rural
or urban areas, involving students from form I to form VI over the age of 16 years.
Pupils were drawn from amongst standard 5 to 7 with the age bracket ranging
between 12 and 17 years. Female and male groups were targeted and selected from
amongst the adults over the age of 18 years in urban, semi- urban or rural areas. The
employees’ focus groups were targeted and selected from amongst the public and
private sector employees, aged 18 years and above, in urban and semi-urban areas.
Surveys data were collected from 7 regions, 35 LGAs, 35 wards, 70 streets/villages.

Data collection from the Coast region was later dropped due to logistical mishap. The
list of LGAs, wards, and villages/streets in which the data were collected is indicated
in table 1.7.1/1 below. Data from the field was collected by strategically targeted,
selected, recruited, contracted, trained and deployed assistants from LGAs-based
host organizations or networks. The fieldwork activities were conducted for three
months (mid February-mid May 2008).
54
The definition of the area coverage of the village or street is consistent with the LGA law that mandates and
determines geopolitical boundaries of the governing authorities in either case.
37
Table 1.7.1/1: Surveyed LGAs, wards and villages/streets

# of targets Surveyed Un-surveyed
Percentage
S# Region LGAs wards Village LGA Wards Villages/ LGAs Wards Villages/s
reach
s/stree s streets treets
ts
1. Kagera 6 6 12 4 4 8 2 2 4 66.7
2. Mtwara 5 5 10 4 4 8 1 1 2 80.0
3. Ruvuma 5 5 10 3 3 6 2 2 4 60.0
4. Lindi 6 6 12 6 6 12 0 0 0 100.0
5. Mbeya 8 8 16 8 8 16 0 0 0 100.0
6. Shinyanga 8 8 16 6 6 12 2 2 4 75.0
7. Coast 6 6 12 0 0 0 6 6 12 0.0
8. Morogoro 6 6 12 4 4 8 2 2 4 66.7
Total 50 50 100 35 35 70 15 15 30 68.5
All in all, 800 household questionnaire respondents were interviewed, consisting of

433 male and 344 female respondents, while 23 respondents went unmarked. As for
key informants, 263 respondents were interviewed consisting of 179 male and 70
female, while 14 respondents went unmarked. The key informants were amongst
them, the inter-faiths leaders; Government officials (the police, judiciary workers,
social workers, health workers, ward and village officers and teachers); traditional
militias (Sungusungu); and trade union leaders. Table 1.7.1/2 below presents a
comprehensive picture of the key informants interviewed during the surveys:
Table 1.7.1/2: Key informants demographic characteristics

Lindi Kagera Ruvuma Shinyanga Mtwara Mbeya Morogoro
Tota Tota Tota Tota Tota Tota Tota
% % % % % % %
l l l l l l l
SEX
85.7 62.5 87. 87.5
Male 6 5 6 75 8 100 3 75 7 7
1 0 5 0
14.2 37.5 12. 12.5
Female 1 3 2 25 0 0 1 25 1 1
9 0 5 0
Total 7 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 4 100 8 100 8 100
AGE
Under 18 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.
62.5 12.
18 – 25 0 0.00 5 1 2 25 2 25 4 50 2 25
0 5
57.1 37.5 12. 12.5
26 – 35 4 3 6 75 3 37.5 3 37.5 1 1
4 0 5 0
14.2 12. 12.
36 – 45 1 0 0 1 3 37.5 2 25 1 3 37.5
9 5 5
28.5 12.5
46 – 55 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 25 2 25
7 0
Above 55 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 7 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100
EDUCATION
Informal 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Primary 57.1 12. 42.8 37.
4 0 0 1 3 4 50 3 2 25
level 4 5 6 5
Not 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38
complete
d primary
Secondar 87. 42.8 37.
0 0.00 7 100 7 3 3 37.5 3 1 12.5
y level 5 6 5
Not
complete
d 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
secondar
y
Above
secondar 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
y level
Vocational 42.8 14.2 62.5
3 0 0 0 0 1 1 12.5 2 25 5
education 6 9 0
Total 7 100 7 100 8 100 7 100 8 100 8 100 8 100
MARRIAGE
87.
Married 7 100 6 75 7 7 87.5 7 87.5 6 75 6 75
5
Not 12.
0 0 2 25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12.5
married 5
Divorced 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12.5 1 12.5 2 25 0 0
Widowed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12.5
Total 7 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100 8 100
Ninety (91) focus-group discussions were conducted; each involving between 8 and
12 participants. The groups’ discussions lasted about 2 hours. Table 1.7.1/3 below
indicates the structure of the focus groups, disaggregated by sex, group type, rural-
urban divide and age groups.
Table 1.7.1/3: Structure of focus groups

Focus Group Total participant by location divide Total participant by age group
type
Rural Urban Semi-urban Total <18 ≤25 ≤35 ≤45 ≥46 Total
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Male 17 - - - - 164 - 164 - - 28 - 42 - 35 - 59 - 164
Female 22 - - - - - 207 207 - - - 36 - 57 - 67 - 37 207
Employee 16 - - 81 98 - - 179 - - 6 7 23 28 26 32 26 31 179
Secondary 19 112 97 - - - - 209 85 75 27 22 - - - - - - 209

school
Primary 17 106 85 - - - - 191 88 60 18 25 - - - - - - 191
schools
Total 91 218 182 81 98 164 207 950 173 135 79 90 65 85 61 99 85 68 950
1.8 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Collaboration and networking with LGAs-based CSOs/CBOs or networks, institutions
and Government departments was smooth but indeed also challenging. Many
stakeholders supported the project while inconsistencies were also experienced with
some few of them, basically because of the political sensitive nature of the project.
To that effect, fieldwork activities could not be conducted in 15 LGAs.
39
A few public officials refused to disclose corruption-related information because they

were of the opinion that that violated their employment code of confidentiality. In the
same vein, due to fears of victimisation, some respondents felt too insecure to be
interviewed, unless immediate bosses granted permissions. Moreover, due to lack of
confidence, rationalised by patriarchy, some female respondents could not be
interviewed unless permission was granted by husbands.
1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report is organised in six sections as indicated below. The first section covers
the Executive Summary in which a summary of the goal, methodology, major findings
and recommendations are covered. This is followed by Chapter One, an
introductory chapter of the report, setting the CPS conceptual framework, thus
covering an overview of Tanzania country governance and corruption status, the
rationale for public demand for good governance and accountability, various
indicators for measuring good governance performance, efforts and trends to
promote good governance and anti-corruption in Tanzania, objectives and
significance of the CPS project, significance of the corruption perception surveys,
methodological issues, including sample size design; and the limitations of the study.
Chapter Two looks into factors influencing the governance and anti-corruption policy
environment in Tanzania. Chapter Three draws and presents the CPS findings,
principally based on the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Chapter Four
presents the recommendations based on the findings; lessons and policy
implications. Annexes are attached to deepen the readers’ insight of the CPS
findings.
40
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY
ENVIRONMENT IN TANZANIA
The anti-corruption policy environment is a complex phenomenon involving
interactions of different factors within and without a particular political system. It
involves dynamic interactions of actors and factors involved in the country’s
governance system. This policy environment is, thus, a complex scenario with
multiple factors and institutions in the country’s governance system. The influence in
which each actor has on the formulation and implementation of the country’s anti-
corruption policy depends on the leverage, which a group of actors wields over
others. This chapter discusses the main factors which influence the governance and
anti-corruption policy environment in Tanzania. Both internal and external actors will
be explored.
2.1 INTERNAL FACTORS

Distribution /Balance of Powers within State Organs
One of the basic tenets of democratic governance in a society is the existence of
checks and balance system among the principal state organs. The checks and
balance system of government entails separation of powers among the three
branches of government (the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) to deter abuse of
power by any of the principal organs.
The modern division of state power into executive, judicial and legislative powers
owes its origin to the French, Political Philosopher, Montesquieu (1689-1755). In this
regard, he posits thus:
‘’ when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or in the
same body of magistrates, there can not be liberty, because apprehensions may rise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws and execute them in
tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if judicial power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with legislative, the life and liberty of
subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
and oppression. There would be an end of everything were the same man or the
same body, whether nobles or the people, to exercise these three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the cases of
individuals’’55
Tanzania is a united Republic formed by formerly independent countries namely

Tanganyika (now Tanzania mainland) and Zanzibar. The doctrine of distribution of
55
Montesquieu, 1978. L’Espirit des Lois, Book xi. The quotation is from Finer, Herman, 1965. Theory and Practice
of Modern Government. London: Methuen& Co Ltd, pp 94-95.
41
powers among principal state organs is enshrined in the country’s constitution. The
union constitution states, categorically, that;
‘’All state authority in Tanzania shall be exercised and controlled by two organs
vested with executive powers, two organs vested with judicial powers and two
organs vested with legislative and supervisory over the conduct of public affairs. The
Organs vested with executive powers shall be the Government of the United Republic
of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Tanzania Zanzibar; the organs
vested with judiciary powers shall be the judiciary of the United Republic and the
Judiciary of Tanzania Zanzibar; and organs vested with legislative and supervisory
powers over public affairs shall be the Parliament of the United Republic and the
56
House of Representatives of Zanzibar’’.
Union organs also have jurisdiction over all affairs of Tanzania mainland .The subject
matter of the study was corruption which is a non-union matter. As a result, we only
examined the role of the Government, the Judiciary and the Legislature of the United
Republic of Tanzania in influencing anti-corruption policies in the country. These
organs will, henceforth, be referred as the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature,
respectively.
We now move to examine the powers of each organ in influencing governance and
anti-corruption policy in Tanzania.
The Legislature
The Legislature is the arm of government that is charged with the responsibility of
making laws for the governance of the country. The legislature is the principal organ
of the state in the United Republic of Tanzania as it represents the voice and
57
sovereignty of the people . Functionally, the legislature is made up of two distinct
parts namely the National Assembly and the President. That is to say, every Bill
discussed and adopted by the National Assembly becomes law only after being
assented by the President of the United Republic. It is the two organs that form the
legislature58. Therefore, any reference to the control of the Executive by the
legislature actually refers to the National Assembly in this regard. In the course of
explaining various issues in this chapter, the term legislature will be used to mean the
National Assembly/Parliament.
The Parliament in Tanzania is an important and powerful institution. It approves the

name of the person appointed by the President to hold the position of the Prime
Minister. Therefore, although it has not happened up to now, practically, the
legislature can block appointments to this important office if the person appointed is
56
The Constitution of United Republic o Tanzania,1977, chapter 1,part 1, Article 4, sub-articles 1-2.
57
See article 63(2) of URT constitution
58
It is also popularly known as the parliament. The two words will be used interchangeably
42
not, in their opinion, suitable to the appointment. Also, the Parliament can impeach
the President or the Vice-President when the holders of these top offices in the
country contravene the Constitution or the provisions of the Public Leaders Ethics
Act, 1995 or contravenes the ethics regarding registration of political parties or if
any of them does things, which bring their offices to disrepute. This power of
impeachment does not end with the holders of the two top officers of the State only.
The Prime Minister also falls under parliamentary scrutiny and may be removed from
office through the vote of ‘no confidence’ if she or he behaves ultravires. The
Constitution provides elaborate procedures to be followed when the Parliament
intends to invoke these powers.
The National Assembly is empowered vide Articles 4 (2) and 63 (2) (3) to enact laws,
and to oversee and advise the government and all its organs in the discharge of its
various functions. This can be done through the following ways:
First, through standing committees of the Parliament, various ministries, agencies
and departments can be called to account for their performances on various activities
under their jurisdictions. The legislature has, thus, powers to hold, accountable, the
executive on ultravire actions. These committees cover the whole range of activities
and areas in which the executive operates.
Second, accountability can be sought through questions posed in plenary sessions of

the Parliament. Each Member of Parliament (MP) is allowed to ask questions to the
ministries. The procedure, the nature and conditions of exercising this right is
explained in Section 33 of the Parliamentary Standing Orders, the main requirement
being that the question must be lodged with the Clerk to the National Assembly in
writing, not less than 21 days before the date on which a reply is sought. Under
Section 37A, Ministers are duty bound to answer the questions asked thoroughly
including the addition questions added on the floor either by the original questioner or
other Members of the House.
Third, enacting legislation where policy implementation requires legislation. The

legislature also deliberates upon and ratifies all international treaties and agreements
in which the United Republic is a part.
Effectiveness of the legislature in performing its oversight functions

Most laws, which are enacted by the National Assembly, emanate from the executive
through its ministries. It is rare for Bills to come from individual members of the
house. On one occasion a member of parliament tabled a private Bill aimed at
curbing corruption in elections but it did not go far.
MPs are unable to fully utilize their position in the House to initiate Bills, not because
of lack of knowledge and issues to raise, but because of poor facilities available to
43
them. The Bunge library in Dodoma is virtually empty and legislators are not given
support staff for both research and follow up of issues they would like to pursue.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that they have the right to access all the
information they desire from the government, under Act No. 3 of 1998, they are
incapable of fully utilizing that existing facility. Thus, their contributions to debate
remain to be of very general nature. However, major exception to this rule are the
few opposition legislators, particularly Dr. Wilbroad Slaa and Zitto Kabwe, who from
time to time come with “some bombs” – well-researched and as a result often put
the Government under its knees.
There are practical and legal problems, which the House experiences and thus
undermining its capacity as a people’s representative organ. The main problems
inhibiting the Parliament from optimum functioning include the following. Firstly, the
very existence of the House is dependent on the whims of the President. Article 90
(2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 provides for various
situations in which the President can actually dissolve the Legislature. Of particular
interest is a situation where the Legislature refuses to approve a Budget Bill
proposed by the Government; when it refuses to pass a Bill which the President is of
the opinion that it is important; and when it refuses to pass a motion considered of
fundamental importance to Government policies. The fact that the President can
dissolve Parliament instils fear in Legislators and this limits their argument with the
Executive.
Secondly, is the party affiliation. Political parties nominate the candidates to be

59
elected to the legislature. There are no independent candidates in the Tanzanian
electoral process so far. Thus, the legislators are supposed to tow the party line
when it comes to critical issues. A legislator can only ignore the party dictates –
particularly when it comes to voting on an issue in the plenary at his or her own peril.
This is because loss of party membership goes hand in hand with loss of the
parliamentary seat. This indirect coercion by the party undermines the independence
of Legislators to discuss and initiate motions of interests to their constituencies. In
other words, the party takes precedence over the voters. A case in point is the tug-of-
war between the government and the people of Tanzania over the legitimacy of giving
the management of the Tanzania Electric Supply Corporation (TANESCO) to the South
African Net Group Solutions Company. Several MPs from the ruling party – Chama
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – had registered with the Speaker requesting for a debate in
the House over the issue. The Chairman of the ruling party, who is also the President
of the United Republic of Tanzania, visited them in Dodoma60. All he did was to remind
them that as they oppose his Government, they should not forget that he would be
59
The issue of private candidates is still contested in Tanzanian politics. There are currently legal wrangles in
courts of law between the government and human rights activists on private candidates phenomenon
60
By then the office holder was President Benjamin William Mkapa
44
around in 2005 scrutinizing their applications when seeking for re-election. That was
the end of the debate about TANESCO and Net Group Solutions Company in the
House. Party discipline becomes a real huddle to the effectiveness of the legislature
in influencing governance and policies particularly because it is overwhelmingly
61
dominated by one party- Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) .
Thirdly, the use of ‘certificate of urgency’ by the government is another technique of

limiting the ability of the Legislators in performing their oversight functions effectively.
It happens quite often that when there is a very sensitive issue, instead of adhering to
the normal legislative process, bills will be sent to the legislature under the ‘certificate
of urgency’. This procedure is allowed under the law and therefore, Legislators will
have no alternative when faced with this ‘fait accompli’ but debate and pass the Bill
without any preparation. More often than not, the Government will achieve what it had
intended.
Fourthly, is the capacity of the Government to bulldoze the Legislators at committee

level. Although MPs are supposed to assist the Government through discussions in
the committees, there are limitations to this exercise. In the first place, the
committees are not supposed to change the Bills they scrutinize. Furthermore, the
Government can choose to ignore any recommendations made by the committees
and take the Bill in the plenary the way they like. It will still be discussed and passed.
The most absurd situation is where the Government decides to print the final law
completely ignoring what was agreed upon in the plenary. This happened in relation
to the National Bank of Commerce Bill. When queried about this in subsequent
sessions of the House, the Attorney-General rudely told the Legislators that they can
do nothing about it. This forced the Prime Minister to intervene and apologize on
behalf of the government. The issue as to who is actually in charge of the process,
between the Executive and Parliament, had already been delivered.
Under the Constitution and the law, the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania
is supposed to approve and fully supervise both taxation and public expenditure
(fiscal policy). At the same time, the Constitution prohibits the Legislature from
dealing with legislation in financial matters, save only when the President has
proposed, through a minister or deputy minister, that the matter be dealt with the
Legislature. The Legislature is restricted from, among other things, enacting a law for
the levying of taxes or altering of taxation other than by reduction; the imposition of
any charge upon the consolidated fund or any other public funds of any moneys not
charged thereon, or any increases in the amount of such payment, issue or
withdrawal; the composition or remission of any debt for payment to the United
61
Over 80% of legislators are members of the ruling party CCM
45
62
Republic . The influence of the Legislature over policies is thus, minimal as this
terrain largely remains the preserve of the Executive branch of the State.
The last time the Parliament attempted to argue with the Executive over taxation
policy was in 1973. The arguments generated into a serious acrimony with the then
President threatening to dissolve Parliament in order for him and the Members of
Parliament (MPs) to go back to the people and seek fresh mandate. The MPs
surrendered and accepted what the Government was recommending.
Once in a while, one comes across questions in Parliament over tax holidays and
other forms of relief given to investors but nothing much about taxation policy. In
fact, there are situations where the Government has introduced new taxes and then
referred the matter to the Parliament later for ratification. For instance, at the end of
1982 the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Julius
K. Nyerere, announced new taxes without any legal basis. They were to apply
immediately and get parliamentary blessings later. In his New Year Message
broadcast live on Radio Tanzania on 31st December, 1982, Mwalimu explained: You
will already have heard of the new taxes which come into force tomorrow, the first of
January, 1983. These tax measures will be debated in Parliament in its next sitting,
but in the meantime they have to be paid by everyone.
The President knew what he was talking about. The Parliament can discuss the new
taxes, praise or condemn them, but at the end of the day it will endorse them. When
it comes to approve and supervising public expenditure, the Parliament benefits
immensely from the work done by the office of the Controller and Auditor-General.
The Controller and Auditor-General (CAG), on behalf of the Parliament examines,
inquires into and audits accounts submitted to him under Section 25 of the Public
Finance Act, 2001. CAG has a duty to ensure that all expenditure or public moneys
has been properly authorized and applied to the purposes for which they were
appropriated.
In conclusion suffice it to point out that although constitutionally the Parliament is

supposed to be a ‘supreme’ watchdog institution over other branches of the
government, it falls short of performing its role effectively because there are several
legal encumbrances which compromise its independence. There is thus a need to
enhance its independence for it to be able to have its deserved influence on the
country’s anti-corruption policies. An independent and effective Legislature is also one
of several key institutions for controlling corruption since it plays an important role in
identifying corrupt practices, and passing legislation to limit its corrosive impact on
both governance and everyday life.
62
See Article 99(1)(2)(a) and (d)
46
The Executive
The Executive branch of Government works under the President of the United
Republic of Tanzania. The President is the Head of State, the Head of Government
63
and the Commander –in- Chief of the Armed Forces . The Constitution, vide Article
33(27) and Article 35(1) has that all executive functions of the state shall be
discharged by the President and any other officers on behalf of the President.
Recruitment and management of officers of this branch, as a principle, follows a
strict merit based system.
The Constitution has empowered the President to constitute and abolish any office in
the service of the Government as well as to promote, to remove, to dismiss and to
discipline officers in the service of the government. The major organs and officers
that mainly discharge executive duties include: the Cabinet, which consists of the
President of the United Republic as its chair, the Vice President, the President of
Zanzibar, the Prime Minister and the ministers. Other offices include the Office of
Regional Commissioner and District Commissioner which represent the President at
regional and district level, respectively. Others include security and armed forces
organs like the police force led by the Inspector General of Police assisted by
Regional Police Commanders, the Chief of Tanzania People’s Defence Forces, Chief
of Intelligence Service, Principal Commissioner of Prisons and the like.
The Executive branch discharges its functions and responsibilities drawing from, and
depending heavily on, the professional competence of the Public Service. To
guarantee that, the Public Service is supposed to be professionally competent, its
recruitment is, in most cases, based on competence or merit whereby experience
also counts. However patrimonial and clientelistic connections are also influential in
the recruitment process of public servants. The public service sector is currently
under reforms in order to improve the quality of service delivery to the public.
All anti-corruption agencies, including the Prevention and Combating of Corruption

Bureau (PCCB), the Ethics Secretariat, the Commission for Human Rights and Good
Governance and the Intelligence Unit are structurally under the arm of the Executive.
As a result, these agencies have been frequently proved to be ineffective in dealing
with corruption in high levels of government due to conflicts of interests of the actors
of these organs. As a result, these agencies have been accused of working as public
relations instrument of the Executive rather than being effective anti-corruption
64
watchdogs .
63
See Article 36 and 37 of the Union Constitution of 1977.
64
See the comments of the Parliamentary Investigative Committee on Richmond scandal on PCCB, see also the
comments of Jingu (2006) Civil Society and the Politics of Public Accountability; University of Dar es Salaam.
47
The executive has wide discretionary powers and controls most of the resources
needed by other organs to influence governance and policy processes in the country.
As we saw above, it also controls the coercive apparatus of the state. The practice
shows that the executive dictates policy processes in Tanzania and it uses such
65
powers to control other organs, through ultravires actions, without reprisal from
other organs. Although, there are many formal and informal instruments under the
disposal of the Executive in influencing other organs, imbalance of powers between
the three organs of the State, gives undue leeway to the Executive in influencing
governance and anti-corruption policy in the country. Until recently66, the Legislature
has always acted as an agent of the Executive. Furthermore, powers of the Executive
are reinforced by the fact that Tanzania is a defacto one party state67. Although,
Tanzania has eighteen registered political parties, it is CCM which has, not only won
all three presidential elections since 1995 when the country embarked on a multi
party system, but it has also won more than two thirds of parliamentary seats. CCM
uses its control of the Government and the Parliament to dictate and manipulate
policy processes to work at its advantage and the interests of the people who control
it, and impliedly, at the expense of public interests.68
The Judiciary
An independent, impartial and informed judiciary has a central role in anti-corruption
crusade in a country. The judiciary power of reviewing actions taken by the Executive
and its various agents requires a strong, independent, and responsible judiciary,
which is accessible to all members of the society.
The powers of the judiciary in checking other organs of the state depend on the
ability of citizens to challenge the actions and decisions of other organs in the courts
of law. This is because courts do not initiate cases but rely on actions of citizens to
challenge abuse of power practices by the two organs. The courts of the land are
relatively free to decide sensitive cases against the other two organs. For example, in
2006, the High Court struck off Section 98(2) and 98(3) of the Elections Act of 1985
as amended by the Electoral Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act Number 4 of
2000. Sections 130(b) and (c) were also nullified on the argument that the Act
legalized electoral corruption in the name of African Hospitality (Takrima). The
legislation was widely condemned by members of civil society as the
65
Actions done outside the authority given by the country’s constitution or law legislated by Parliament.
66
The Legislature formed a committee to investigate the corruption scandal related to the contract with Richmond
Development Company LLC contract. The company was awarded a contract by the Government to produce
energy. The Parliamentary Committee came to the view that the contract was awarded under corrupt
th
circumstances. This scandal led to the resignation of the Prime Minister on 7 February, 2008 followed by two
former cabinet ministers and subsequent sacking of the entire cabinet by the President.
67
See Makulilo A., (2007), Tanzania a De Facto One Party State?, University of Dar es Salaam.
68
Until, recently, CCM never tolerated any motion to criticize the government in the parliament. Its members of
parliament were required to defend the Government under all circumstances even when it is against public
interest.
48
institutionalization of the culture of buying voters during elections. However, the

Executive has more than often ousted courts’ decisions through a ruling party-
dominated Parliament. For example, in 1993 Reverend Christopher Mtikila
challenged, successfully, the provisions in the Election Act No. 1 of 1985, which
subjected candidature to any political post to membership of a political party.
In some cases, the Executive can influence the judicial system, using covert
punishment threats, such as appointments to less attractive locations in distant parts
of the country, or can completely ignore court decisions. Using its control of the
Legislature, the Executive can also enact ouster clauses in the constitution and other
laws to restrict the courts from exercising its authority. For example, Article 74(12),
of the Constitution forbids any court to inquire anything done by the Electoral
Commission when discharging its functions in accordance to the Constitution. This
provision in effect, limits the ability of the judiciary in dealing with corruption practices
done by the commission while performing it functions. There are several such ouster
clauses in the constitution and other laws in Tanzania. The Judiciary is also
dependent on the Executive on its resources. Such dependence compromises its
independence and effectiveness.
In summary, it is important to appreciate that the doctrine of separation of powers is

enshrined in the country’s Constitution. The Constitution provides for separation of
powers guaranteeing the independence of the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary,
as well as a system of checks and balances enabling them to oversee the actions of
one another and prevent abuse of power by agents of each organ. However, in
practice, the system of checks and balances has been working in favour of the
Executive with the two other organs, failing to adequately ensure public accountability
of the executive and the legislature. As a result, anti-corruption policy in the country
has been largely initiated and work in favour of Executive interests.
2.2 INFLUENCE OF NSAs ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY

Civil society
No combination of formal democratic institutions will bear fruit in the anti-corruption
crusade, without a strong civil society, which enables social groups – trade and
professional associations, community groups – to function as “whistle-blowers”.
Although formal institutions have more power and authority to address the incidence
of corruption, the importance of informal institutions and civil society should not be
underestimated. Neither the internal control mechanisms nor the Judiciary is immune
from corruption, and more importantly, they often need incentives to function
properly. An independent and self-motivated press, responsive opposition groups and
well-established non-governmental organizations can express themselves given that
civil liberties exist to secure free access to information on government operations. In
49
many empirical studies political and civil rights organisations have been found to have
69
a positive impact on governance .
There are relatively well established non-governmental organizations like HakiElimu,

Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Lawyers Environmental Action Team,
TAMWA, which are playing a significant role in monitoring corrupt practices by state
agents70. For example, EAT and LHRC and National Organization for Legal Aid (NOLA)
successfully moved the high court in 2006 to strike off Section 98(2) and 98(3) of the
Elections Act of 1985 as amended by the Electoral Law (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Act number 4 of 2000. Sections 130(b) and (c) were also nullified on the argument
that the Act legalized electoral corruption in the name of African Hospitality (Takrima).
Media
The role of media in promoting good governance and controlling corruption can not
be overemphasised. Free media does not only raise public awareness about
corruption, its causes, consequences and possible remedies but it also carries
investigations and reports incidences of corruption and other forms of bad
governance practices. The effectiveness of the media, in turn, depends on access to
information and freedom of expression, as well as a professional and ethics-abiding
cadre of investigative journalists.
The media in Tanzania is relatively free. There are several independent newspapers,
radio and TV stations, which play a big role in revealing corrupt practices by public
officials. Such revelations often prompt investigations by official oversight bodies. For
example, revelation by media of corrupt cases has moved the Prevention and
Combating of Corruption Bureau to initiate investigations on some of such cases. The
cases in point include the Radar deal with BAE, Bank of Tanzania Twin Tower scandal,
Alex Stewart (ASSAYERS), Buzwagi Mining contract, Mchuchuma mining deal,
Mwananchi Gold deal, Meremeta Limited, Tangold Limited, Mwananchi Trust Co. Ltd,
Chimela Co. Ltd and VMB holdings Co and the 172.9bn/- worth emergency power
generation contract with Richmond LLC.
The media also provides space for members of civil society to pressurize for change
of laws and regulations that create a climate favourable to corruption. It also provides
space to pass on views for redressing governance/maladministration practices.
Indeed, the media has been, as a matter of routine, scrutinizing the activities of state
agencies from various standpoints. Currently, the media fraternity is in the forefront in
advocating for freedom of information in the country. However, the influence of
media on the governance and anti-corruption policy environment is limited by the
69
See for example, Jingu (2006) Civil Society and the Politics of Public Administration in Tanzania: University of
Dar es Salaam
70
ibid
50
existence of laws which inhibit their freedom. Such laws include the Newspaper Act of
1976 and the National Security Act of 1970.
Newspapers are registered and regulated by the Newspaper Act of 1976.

Newspapers in this case also include magazines and tabloids. The Newspaper Act of
1976 is restrictive on journalistic freedom and independence of the media in
investigating the government apparatus. The Act provides criminal sanctions for libel,
for any organ, which publishes information considered by the government to be
offensive. The Act’s heavy-handedness may also be viewed from the point of the
overwhelming powers it gives to the Minister of the time being responsible for
information to suspend or ban publications. Some of the newspapers which were
suspended or banned from 1996 todate on the argument that the suspension or ban
was in the interests of the public include; Michapo, Cheka, Arusha Leo, Kasheshe,
Nyundo, Chombeza, Majira, Motomoto, and Tanzania Daima, and very recently,
MwanaHalisi. In reality, the suspension or ban of these newspapers had nothing to do
with public interests but only because the newspapers were critical of the
government. The banning of Majira, for example was due to its criticism of the then
Zanzibar President, Salmin Amour. The editorial of the paper had condemned the
detention without trial, of CUF members who had protested against election results.
The paper also covered a story on the alleged burning of CUF offices by CCM
supporters. Tanzania Daima, on its part, was banned in December 2005 for using
caricatures to criticize the performance of the then President of United Republic of
Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa. Recently, the Minister has used such powers to suspend
the publication (and circulation) of MwanaHalisi newspaper for three months. The
paper is renowned for its boldness in exposing especially grand corruption practices
in the government and ruling party.
Another law, which seriously infringes upon the freedom of the press in Tanzania is
the National Security Act, 1970 CAP 47. The Act gives absolute powers to the
government to define what should be disclosed or withheld from access by the public
and makes it a criminal offence to investigate, obtain, possess, comment on, pass on
or publish any document or information, which the government considers to be
classified. Classified matter means “any information or thing declared to be
classified by an authorized officer”. It includes documents or information related to
any entity such as parastatal organizations, the ruling party and its affiliated leaders,
a company duly registered under companies Act, Cap 212 of laws, R.E,2002 whose
50 percent shares are owned by the Government or Local Government Authority.
Further, the Act provides sanctions against any person who provides or receives
classified matters. The Act provides the penalty of up to twenty years of
imprisonment if found guilty of offending this law (URT, 1970).
51
The National Security Act further threatens the freedom of expression by criminalizing
contacts with foreign agencies such as news agencies, trade unions and international
agencies. Section 12(1) of the Act states that “communication with or attempts to
communicate with a foreign agent in the United Republic or elsewhere” will be
presumed to be “for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
Republic” and “directly or indirectly useful to a foreign power”. Unless an accused can
prove the contrary, she/he will be held to be guilty. Furthermore, refusing to provide
information to investigators is punishable by an imprisonment of a term not exceeding
five years.
The Act vests too much power on some individuals to define and interpret the term
‘national security’ and absolute powers to define some matters as ‘classified’. Lack
of proper definitions and interpretation of terms may lead to abuse of discretionary
powers either deliberately or accidentally, but in either case such abuses are done at
the expense of freedom of access to information, and freedom of expression.
Indeed, the vague concept “classified matters” may be used to protect the
government from embarrassment or exposure of ultra vires behaviours or to conceal
information about the abuse by entrusted powers. The example of the case of Adam
Mwaibabile in the matter of Republic Vs Adam Mwaibabile, High Court of Tanzania,
Criminal Appeal No 1 of 1997 (Unreported) is relevant. The Appellant was first
arrested and then sentenced to one year in jail by the District Court in Songea for
possessing a ‘classified matter’ related to national security. In reality and as it came
to be known later on, it was a letter written maliciously under the order of the
Regional Commissioner to deny him a business license due to personal grudges
between him and the appellant. The letter, however, was defined as a classified
matter, though it had no connection whatsoever to national security.
Further, the law denies journalists the right to professional secrecy in relation to the
source of the information published or broadcast. It thus makes many, a would-be
source of information on abuse of power to refrain from doing that, given the fact
that the law shifts the burden of proof to the accused. Lack of guarantee on
professional secrecy on the part of journalists undoubtedly is inhibitive of journalists
and media houses in carrying investigative journalism (Jingu, 2006).
Therefore, although the media is increasingly becoming influential on positively

shaping the governance and anti-corruption policy environment in the country, there
are laws which inhibit its effectiveness. As a result of such inhibitive laws, journalists
who uncover dubious undertakings of government agencies and their compatriots run
the risk of being criminally prosecuted or their respective news medium banned.
52
Corporate sector
The corporate sector is now thriving in Tanzania. A significant portion of activities that
used to take place entirely inside the State are now organized in the private sector. It
is on this ground that the corporate sector now constitutes one of the key forces in
the country. Corruption has a corrosive effect on the ability of businesses to flourish.
As such, corruption must be addressed to make the business environment conducive.
The corporate sector has been advocating for the reform of Government regulation
and bureaucracy in order to create an environment where fewer opportunities for
corruption exist, as well as reducing the demand side of corruption (from Government
officials). The corporate sector has been using the established structures based on
their cooperation with the Government to advocate for reforms on problem areas.
Such structures include Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC).
TNBC is a forum for public/private sector dialogue to improve the business

environment in the country. Its ownership is 50% public and 50% private, with
President of the country as the Chair. The Vice Chairperson of the Council is the
Chairperson of Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, under which corporate entities,
local and international, meet at round table discussions. At the national level, the
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) has been established as a focal point for
advocacy and lobbying the Government on behalf of its members for governance and
anti-corruption policy environment in Tanzania. Through this forum, the corporate
sector identifies the pathologies in a bureaucratic system, which often provide the
basis for corruption to occur. Such pathologies include complicated tax codes, red-
tape in the issuance of business licenses, inefficient judicial system and existence of
laws and regulations conducive to corruption. The Government has been addressing
the concern of corporate sector as part of the Business Environment Strengthening
for Tanzania (BEST).
However, we know that corporate the sector is not a monolith entity. In every
economy, there are small and medium companies, large firms, state-owned
companies and multinational corporations. Amongst them, there are those which
thrive through corruption. There are, thus, some sections of the corporate sector in
Tanzania that negatively affect the governance and anti-corruption policy environment.
Usually, these sections of corporate sector consist of big businesses, which seek not
only to buyoff officials in charge of new regulatory authorities created to manage the
excesses of the unregulated market, but also to outright capture of key political and
bureaucratic officials through corrupt payoffs.
Think tanks and high learning institutions

Think tanks and academic institutions conduct research and offer consultancies with
the view of informing national policy processes. These institutions should also inform
the citizenry about civic rights and obligations. They also carry out activities of
53
empowering the citizenry in order to enable it utilise its entitlements. In the view of
promoting good governance and fight corruption, think tanks and academic
institutions develop different initiatives, which seek to promote transparency and
accountability of public institutions and empower citizens to exercise their democratic
responsibility of promoting public accountability.
The cases of Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), a non-profit think tank and
Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), a research unit of the
Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Dar es
Salaam, attest to the contribution of the said think tanks in influencing the governance
and anti-corruption policy environment in Tanzania.
REPOA has initiated what is known as Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys for Public
Funds as a strategy of dealing with corruption and mismanagement of funds. Public
Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) literally means following money where it goes to
be spent. It includes comparing budgetary allocations and actual spending. This
strategy is one of the most effective ways of checking whether budgetary resources
have reached the intended beneficiaries. As a strategy, PETS also contributes to a
national debate about how to ensure that public money reaches intended
beneficiaries.
REPOA also maintains the Tanzania Governance Notice Board to facilitate effective
use of existing information on governance in the LGAs, which is useful in national
policy processes. It also maintains a database, which consists of strategic data
useful for informed policy dialogue. It also trains media, civil society organisations
and Members of Parliament on effective use of notice boards, to facilitate effective,
expenditure tracking, policy monitoring and perform their oversight functions. REPOA
also carries studies on various aspects of corruption and bad governance in the
country. For instance, REPOA had on behalf of the URT Government, during 2007,
conducted the study (Views of the People 2007) to evaluate people’s opinion and
inform the Government of the consequences of the implementation of MKUKUTA at
the household level.
REDET, on its part, has been carrying studies and providing information on various
aspects of democracy since the introduction of liberal politics in the early 1990s.
REDET activities are geared towards the widening of democratic space and hence
promote public accountability in the country. REDET programmes, for example, seek
to promote political tolerance, promote political competence of citizens and
strengthen political/governance institutions in the country.
In short, think tanks are in the business of policy analysis. They market that analysis
and attempt to sell their views to the public and Government. For example, both
54
REDET and REPOA maintain a reputation for reporting results of their research
through books and other forms of publications. They also carry out several initiatives,
which seek to strengthen both the demand and supply side of public accountability.
For example, through training activities, they empower the citizenry to be active
participants in governance processes and, hence, strengthen demand side of public
accountability. On the other hand, training of public officials creates readiness and
ability to be responsive to public needs and demands.
In both ways, think tanks/academic institutions have contributed significant inputs to

the development of good governance and the anti-corruption policy environment in
Tanzania. In that regard, think tanks/academic institutions tend to stimulate
enlightened policy decisions. However, the sector is still largely undeveloped and
wanting. The country still has only a handful of active actors in this area. The
contribution of the sector to governance and policy processes could be improved by
increasing the number of active think-tank organisations.
2.3 THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-

CORRUPTION POLICY AGENDA
Ruling party
CCM still maintains a strong fusion with the State as the boundary between the two is
to a large extent porous. This situation makes Tanzania a defacto one party state.
The party is dominated by a cartel of core elites of the country (business figures,
groups of influential politicians, members of academia, top bureaucracy and civil
society organizations). In that regard, the party controls the political space of the
country. CCM has successfully created makeshift institutions to manage change
without affecting its dominance in the politics of the country. As a result, the
political institutions and policy options in the country are largely the reflection of CCM.
CCM has the power to make and unmake any governance institution or policy.
The interpenetration of the party and state affects the ability of opposition parties and
other civic groups in the country to influence formation of an effective anti-corruption
policy. This political context has largely affected the design and behaviour of anti-
corruption agencies, news media, civil society organisations and academics in
pushing for changes in governance systems and anti-corruption policy framework for
fear of risking their survival. By being critical of the Government and the party,
members of civil society risk being termed ‘opposition members’ and thereby cutting
themselves out of the patronage and other benefits assumed to be accruing from the
State. In this regard, the ruling party has a strong influence I shaping the governance
and anti-corruption policy of the country.
55
Opposition parties
The Opposition political parties, particularly the loose coalition of the four main
opposition parties in Tanzania, namely CHADEMA, CUF, TLP and NCCR-MAGEUZI have
been in the forefront in uncovering corrupt practices in the country within and outside
the Legislature. Exposition of the External Payment Arrears (EPA) account, a
corruption scandal in the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) in 2007 and the emergency-power
procurement (Richmond LLC), which culminated into historic dissolution of the cabinet
in 2008 following the forced resignation of Prime Minister and two ministers, were
vehemently pressurised by the opposition. The major weakness of the opposition
political parties is their limited number of representation in the Legislature. Their
dismal number (44 against 279) makes it absolutely impossible to successfully move
any motion in the Legislature without the consent and support of the ruling party.
Unfortunately, the ruling party members have always supported the Government
against all motions moved by opposition members, particularly those, aimed at
exposing corruption deals involving the Executive branch.
The success of opposition political parties and civil society organizations in

reinforcing the corruption agenda in Tanzania’s politics is largely owed from the work
of the media in exposing corruption deals in the management of public affairs.
2.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS

Influence of international financial institutions on anti-corruption policies
Corruption is bad for donor business. As a result donor agencies, like International
Financial Institutions, pay attention to corruption. Two most important institutions in
International Finance are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).The
role that the twin Bretton Woods Institutions play in the architecture of governance
policy in Tanzania has greatly influenced anti-corruption policies in the country. For
example, the twin institutions, in collaboration with other donors, made the enactment
of anti-corruption legislation as one of the conditionalities for budgetary support.
Further, the governance condition for Tanzania to qualify for ‘Heavily Indebted Poor
Counties (HIPC)’71 Initiative was straight forward – adoption of a National Action Plan
for the Control of Corruption72.
Bilateral agreements between donor agencies/governments and a recipient country

have also brought large influence on anti-corruption policies in Tanzania. The World
Bank, for example, designed what it termed as Perceived Areas of Comparative
Advantage in Combating Corruption, which were given as conditionality to parties in
the agreement like Tanzania. Areas of comparative advantage include public
71
This is an initiative which was designed to reduce debt burden to the levels that the highly indebted countries
could comfortably service their debts through export earnings, aid, and capital inflows.
72
‘see, the decision point document. http:www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-cases/Tanzania/Tanzania-FIN.pdf.
th
Accessed on 27 January 2003
56
economics (economic analysis of the role and functioning of the public sector),
decentralization of government functions, public service reforms, including public
expenditure tracking and management. Areas in which the support recipient country
shares expertise include, revenue policy and administration, legal and judicial reform,
73
other oversight institutions like ombudsmen and anti-corruption agencies .
Other Bilateral Donors have, in many occasions, also come up with their perceived
areas of comparative advantage in combating corruption. For instance, UNDP area of
comparative advantage is the political side of anti-corruption work; USAID – Civil
society; DfID – the political side of anti-corruption work; DIDC (Finland) – Provides
example of best practice in the public sector; NORAD (Norway) – unique expertise
and network of ‘resource-persons’; SDC (Switzerland) – has not stated comparative
advantage. Donors even publicly debate the effectiveness of their own work in the
fight74 against corruption.
It appears that both bilateral and multilateral agreements have a great influence in the
nomenclature of the current anti-corruption policies. Tanzania is a state party to the
WTO agreements. Among other things, members are supposed to abide to a
75
multilateral framework on the so-called Singapore issues that include investment and
competition policy, trade facilitation and liberalization and transparency in
government procurement. Transparency is aimed at, among other things,
contribution to efforts aimed at the reduction of corruption. However, much as
foreign direct investment and liberalization of government procurement may enhance
economic growth and prevent corruption respectively, the former has been accused
of being the cloak for corruption. Indeed, most foreign direct investment in African
countries uses corrupt means to win business deals by means of bribing state
officials. Consequently, most mega corruption scandals in the country have an
international dimension76.
The EU and ACP countries have been participating in negotiations to enter into
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by early 2008. However, most ACP
countries have been hesitant to sign the agreements. Notwithstanding that, the
European Commission initialled the interim Economic Partnership Agreements with
SADC, East and Southern Africa and key trading partners in the Pacific by the end of
2007. These interim agreements cover market access and other areas, including
development cooperation. Furthermore, on 23rd November 2007 in Uganda, the
73
Source: World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance: A World Bank
Strategy. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 62.
74
Marquette, H. (2001) Bilateral Donors and Anti-Corruption Work: The Myth of ‘Comparative Advantage’. Paper
presented at the Leeds University Centre for African Studies (LUCAS) Seminar Series
75
A far-reaching set of institutional reforms that Europe linked to market liberalization, they were first introduced
into trade negotiations by rich nations at the WTO meeting in Singapore in 1996.
76
See Jingu (2008) State Capture in Tanzania: Dar es Salaam (mimeo)
57
European Commission and the East African Community (EAC) initialled an interim EPA
agreement. This agreement applies to the EU and members of the EAC, namely
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Tanzania is a member of both EAC
and SADC.
The Cotonou Treaty and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the
EU and ACP countries is made up of World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible
agreements. The economic partnership agreements between EU and ACP countries
put the world’s most advanced economies against the world’s poorest economies.
The Agreements should serve as an opportunity to accelerate the ACP global and
regional trade integration, as an important tool for development and the eradication
of poverty. However, the huge economic imbalance between the European Union and
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, works to the advantage of the former.77
Unfortunately, liberalization of trade have led to weakening of governments and
entrenched poverty to the vast majority of African countries, thus rendered inability to
prevent and combat corruption. Indeed, the EPAs are more of a Trojan horse that
could wreck Africa’s economic development and add very little to its political self-
determination. It is on this ground that critics have accused EPAs to be a ‘‘blank
cheque’’ for European business to profit from African economies without
guaranteeing ‘‘a positive balance sheet for development’’ in return78. The ultimate
impact of implementation of EPAs is loss of independent policy space for the pursuit
of development strategies such as anti- corruption policies by poor countries.
Influence of intergovernmental instruments on anti-corruption policies

Tanzania is a signatory and party to several international anti-corruption instruments.
One among those is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC,
2003). The convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 31st October 2003 at UN headquarters in New York. Tanzania signed it on 09
th
December 2003, and then ratified it on 25 May 2005. UNCAC came into force on
14th December 2005. The second instrument is the African Union (AU) Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU convention). This instrument was adopted
by the General Assembly of the AU on 11 July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique.
Tanzania signed it on 5 November 2003 and ratified it on February 22nd 2005. The
AU Convention came into force on 5th August 2006. The other instrument is The
SADC Protocol Against Corruption. This instrument was adopted by the SADC Heads
of State and Government at their August 2001 Summit held in Malawi, making it the
first sub-regional anti-corruption treaty in Africa. The Protocol was signed by Heads of
State and Government of all 14 SADC member States. It became operational in July
77
Trade arrangements between Europe and its former colonies have historically worked in the advantage of the
former and in the expense of the latter.
78
See the position of Dr Sanoussi Bilal, co-coordinator of the European trade co-operation programme for the
European Centre for Development Policy Management, who has been an observer on EPAs negotiations.
58
2005, 30 days after its ratification by two thirds of the member states. Tanzania
ratified the protocol on 20th August 2003.
All these instruments stipulate the ideal design of anti-corruption policy, legislation
and institutions. The ratification of these instruments means that they have significant
influence on the nomenclature of national anti-corruption policies. Enactment of the
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA, 2007) is meant to align the
national anti-corruption framework with specific provisions in the UNCAC and the AU
convention79.
2.5 VULNERABILITY OF LGAs ARCHITECTURE TO RESIST CORRUPTION

The Tanzanian local government system is based on political devolution and
decentralization of administrative and fiscal functions within a unitary state80.
Empirical evidence suggests that decentralization has managed to open up greater
opportunities for reducing corruption due to increased people’s voice and choice and
thereby making the public sector more responsive and accountable to
citizens/voters. The potential for enhancing the reduction of corruption comes with
the potential for increased accountability at local level. Accountability becomes
better at the local level, since local citizens who are better informed about
government performance can vote these governments out of office at the next
elections.
On its part, administrative decentralization has increase efficiency, in effect relieving

lower-level staff from corruption-motivated arbitrary interference of seniors.
Moreover, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption since, following the act
of decentralization, corrupt agents are duty-bound to bear the consequences of their
actions. In addition, increased fiscal decentralization is associated with enhanced
quality of governance as measured by citizen participation, political and bureaucratic
accountability, social justice, improved economic management and reduced
corruption by local people.
Furthermore, local government authorities reduce the scope of powers and the
probability of engaging in massive corruption due to inter-jurisdictional competition.
The realization of these potentials for reduced corruption has different manifestations
to different local authorities depending on the level of awareness of the local people
as to their civic rights and responsibilities.
79
See A Brief Report on the Review of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP II) 2008 –
2011, GGCU State House, May 2008.
80
Refer to policy paper on local government reform,1998
59
On the other hand, decentralization has made Local Government Authorities highly
vulnerable to corruption and the promise of reduced corruption in some authorities is
sometimes hollow and counterproductive due to various reasons.
First, decentralization brings officials in close contact with citizens. This in effect
promotes personalisation and may reduce professionalism due to arms-length
relationships. Personalisation in this view breeds corruption as officials pay greater
attention to individual needs sometimes at the expense of public interests.
Second, decentralization at some authorities have led to increased influence of

interest groups at local level81, greater discretion available to local officials and long
tenure of local officials at the same place making it easier to establish corrupt
relationships82. Third, decentralization also reduces impediments to corrupt practices
as local politicians and bureaucrats collude to advance narrow self-interests while the
influence of media and anti-corruption agencies wanes. All specialized anti-corruption
agencies, save for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, the Ethics
Secretariat, the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Commission for Human Rights and
Good Governance are controlled by the Central Government, and do not have a wide
presence at local level.
Local governments also have the responsibility for social development and public
service delivery. However, most local government authorities lack the necessary
financial and human resources to effectively discharge their responsibilities. Lack of
adequate resources creates scarcity in public service delivery, which also increases
the potential for corruption as a means of service distribution among many
competing users. Shortage of resources also means that remuneration for local
government personnel is inadequate. Poor remuneration also contributes to
corruption at local level. This is because the respective staff find it necessary to
engage in corrupt practices in order to make the ends meet for their lives.83
The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) aims at making local government
authorities effective agencies of good governance and quality service delivery. Local
government authorities are thought to be in a better position to identify people’s
needs by encouraging citizens’ participation in democratic governance, and thus
provide the appropriate form and level of public services. The Local Government
covers issues related to citizens as service users, participation in formulating and
implementing plans for local development. Other issues, which should be carefully
analysed include Local Government autonomy in staffing, working relations between
81
For example, the influence of business groups has led to corruptly selling of open spaces.
82
Annual reports of the Controller and Auditor General have, for several years, shown massive misuse and
unaccounted expenditure, which suggests widespread corruption at local authorities.
83
See also Warioba Commission report on causes of corruption in Tanzania
60
council staff and elected councillors, improving transparency and accountability in

management of public affairs at local level. Significant progress has also been
recorded over the process of involving citizens in Local Government planning and
decision-making processes. The major huddle appears to be the technicality of the
existing planning and budgeting processes. The technicality of council plans and
budgets means that many citizens at local level can not comprehend the information
contained therein. Moreover, some local authorities consider council health plans as ‘’
state secret’’ and thus deny accessibility to the very citizens who are supposed to
follow-up the implementation of the same. Lack of transparency is also enhanced by
lack of effective ‘voicing’ mechanism at local level.
As it was pointed earlier, corruption is a serious problem at local level in Tanzania.

Average citizens directly experience corruption more at Local than at Central level of
government as most public services are provided at the former level. Existing studies
show that corruption at local level thrives because the respective officers are
unwilling or unable to provide the needed information84 to the citizens. Studies also
show that in most Local Government Authorities in Tanzania, once the funds are
provided to local authorities, issues of priority are not considered at all and instead,
85
funds are used in accordance to the personal wishes of leaders . Furthermore,
previous studies have shown that corruption at local level occur due to weak internal
control systems by most local authorities, weak accounting mechanisms, mostly due
to lack of competent personnel and lack of any effective monitoring by oversight
institutions86. An analysis of expenditure on ‘other charges’ for education and health in
several authorities show that most of funds at local authorities do not reach the
intended targets. In most authorities, less than 50% of funds are spent on activities
that benefit service delivery stations including items such as ‘examinations’ and
‘school material’, ‘training’, and ‘medical supplies’ and ‘equipment’.87
On top of that, the evidence collected in the course of development of Tanzania

National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan Two (NACSAP II 2006-2010)
indicates that corruption and abuse of power is widespread at the local level. Sectors
pointed out to be mostly affected, include health,88 education89, staff recruitment and
transfers, management of funds collected by Local Government Authorities, and land
allocations90. The reports of the Controller and Auditor General on Local Government
84
See Odd-Helge Fieldstad, Einar Braathen and Amon Chaligha (2006) on Local Government Authorities in
Tanzanial Government Reform in Tanzania 2002 - 2005:Summary of Research Findings on Governance, Finance
and Service Delivery
85
See PWC 1999, 23
86
See USAID (2004) Public Expenditure and Service Delivery Monitoring in Tanzania
87
This also confirms the findings from the 1999 survey noted above.
88
Youth Action Volunteers 2007 survey also revealed massive corruption in health service delivery at local level
89
Several findings by HakiElimu routinely show that there is widespread corruption in Education sector.
90
See NACSAP II page 47 and 50. See also Afrobarometer surveys accessed from
http://www.repoa.or.tz/documents_storage/PART%20I.pdf.
61
Authorities have always identified gross misuse and misappropriation of funds by

91
local authorities due to bad governance practices
There are also several other surveys which show that the menace of corruption is
widespread at the local level. Corruption in service delivery is pointed to be
particularly widespread in the administration of justice, education, health, land
allocation, issuing of business licences and on HIV/AIDS funds92. It also affects the
quantity, quality and equity of services provided by Local and Central Government. In
understanding the gravity of the problems at the local level, the Government, within
the National Framework for Good Governance, the National Anti-corruption Strategy
and Action Plan (NACSAP) has been reviewed and reformulated to address the
problem of corruption and accountability at local level. The guidelines have been
developed for Local Governments under NACSAP II (2006-2010). However, a
comprehensive data on the current status of corruption at the local level is not yet
available.
LGAs functional relationship with cooperative societies

Tanzania's cooperatives have a long history which goes back to the early 1930s. In
the first decade of independence, the cooperative societies were strong, with a
complex structure of primary cooperative societies, secondary cooperative
organizations and a national cooperative union. Since then, however, the history has
become less responsive to the needs and demands of its members mostly due to
corruption, theft and poor leadership.
Empirically, there is evidence in history of existing regular informal interface and

swapping of political and cooperative leadership in most LGAs. Local Government
Authorities have the role of supporting the cooperative societies and promotion of
cooperative activities in order to promote incomes of their people. Likewise,
corruption at the local level has compromised the ability of cooperatives to promote
income generation activities of the people, particularly the peasants, due to
interfaces between corruption at LGAs and the cooperatives.
Several local leaders are associated with maladministration or corruption when it

comes to their dealings with cooperative societies. It is for this reason that the image
of cooperatives in the country has continually become negative. Indeed, for many
people in the country, cooperative societies are seen as nests of corruption.
Incidences of embezzlement or misuse of cooperative funds are common stories in
the country. Surveys of several credit and thrift/savings cooperative societies at local
91
See for example, the report of the controller and auditor general on the financial statements of local
th
government authorities for the year ended 30 June, 2007.
92
See Cooksey, Brian (2006), Corruption and Governance in Tanzania. What Does Literature Say? HakiElimu
Special Paper. REPOA 2003.
62
level show that most of them lure citizens; most of them being low income earners
like school teachers and peasants, to invest their hard –earned incomes and savings
with promises of attractive returns and profits. This is often done in collaboration with
and facilitation by, local authority officials.
Business licensing services

Local Government Authorities have the mandate of issuing business licences within
their areas of jurisdiction. Corruption often thrives during the issuance or regulation of
business licences as a result of the discretionary powers bestowed upon the said
LGAs officials and lack of adequate transparent and efficient regulatory environment.
Lack of clear complaint mechanisms (if a business licence request is denied or unfair
penalties are given), also encourages corruption at the local level.
The problem of corruption in the granting of business licenses is also exacerbated by

lack of proper records in apprehending and prosecution of the perpetrators. Business
people are often compelled to ‘grease up the wheels’ a little in order to speed up the
process of getting through the maze of bureaucratic red tape, which might otherwise
take a protracted length of time to get business licences sorted out.
On the other hand, most local officials engage in corrupt practices in issuing licences
as a means of supplementing their meagre incomes in order to make ends meet.
However, there are also some officials who receive bribes in order to provide licence
services out of greed for accumulation of wealth and egoistic pontification.
Poverty vis-à-vis ignorance and weak civic competence

In summary, as the foregoing discussion shows, the anti-corruption policy
environment in Tanzania consists of both internal and external factors. The extent to
which external factors influence the anti-corruption policy depends in part on internal
features of the Tanzanian state. External factors include donor agencies, international
and regional intergovernmental instruments against corruption while internal factors
consist of political, economic and social policy structure of the Tanzanian State. We
also need to appreciate that the effects of external influences depend largely on
internal governance policy and practices. This is basically a function of the fact that
internal factors favourable to external influence tend to magnify the effects of external
influences whereas internal conditions unfavourable to adoption of external influences
tend to diminish their effects.
The influence of several factors has manifested itself in the nomenclature of National
Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan II (NACSAP II) as a policy framework and
mechanism of preventing corruption and promoting good governance in the country.
The structural design of various state anti-corruption institutions such as the
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), the Ethics Secretariat, the
63
Financial Intelligence Unit and the Commission for Human Rights and Good
Governance is also the function of power leverage of different actors, forces and the
context of governance in the country. Not least, is the behaviour of actors, in their
actions and inactions. The anti-corruption struggle is also influenced by the balance of
power between actors and their interests within the existing political context.
64
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 SURVEY RESULTS
The details in this chapter conform to narratives in section 1.7.1 on sample size and
design. On the basis of the sample, the findings largely represent corruption
perceptions, views and experiences of many ordinary Tanzanians. The structure or
composition of the sample is largely determined by the mixture of judgement,
convenient, purposeful and systematic random sampling techniques. Sample
characteristics include men and women of 18 years and above from both rural and
urban areas living under different social-economic conditions. Respondents in both
rural and urban areas had equal chances of being targeted and selected for
interviews. The inference drawn from respondents’ collective views is believed to
represent Tanzania’s public consensus on the country’s status of governance and
corruption. A combination of qualitative and quantitative data are analysed to
establish the surveys findings presented in this report. The margin of error is plus or
minus 5 percent at a 95 percent confidence level.
3.1 THE SAMPLE

A total of 800 household and 263 key informant questionnaires were administered in
35 LGAs; 35 wards, 70 villages/streets. The survey was organised according to the
plan to extract and analyse information from ten family groups, which the surveys
intended to get information from. Variables looked into include the following:-
i. Level of public awareness on (civic competence against) corruption;
ii. Driving forces for corruption behaviour and acts;
iii. Corruption actors in the LGAs;
iv. Rationale for and analysis of corruption actors;
v. Attitude towards demand for and/or supply of corruption;
vi. Form of and experience in corruption;
vii. Analysis of magnitude of corruption as basis of the perceptions;
viii. Assessment of LGAs current anti-corruption policy/legal measures against
corruption;
ix. Determining the lowest vs. highest corruption perception LGAs; and
x. Statistical analysis and description of the findings.
Given the different roles played by respondents, the household and key informant
questionnaires probed similar questions. The information extracted from data analysis
underlies the basis for the CPS findings, policy recommendations and the lessons
learned presented in this and the subsequent chapter.
3.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

The sample is constituted by 800 household respondents and 263 key informants.
Those participating in the focus group discussions were 950 participants in total
comprising of 463 men and 487 women. For the combined household and key
65
informant respondents, male representation is at 63.8 percent while 36.2 percent

constitutes female representation in the sample.
The smallest representation of age group in the sample, indeed also from the
combination of the two categories of respondents, is less than (<) 18 years, which
counts 2.7 percent, while the second smallest age group representation in the
sample is the 46-55 years, which accounts for 12.6 percent. The largest age group
representation in the sample is the 26-35 years, which accounts for 30.15 percent,
while the second largest age group representation in the sample is the 36- 45 years
age group, which accounts for 29.45 percent. The 18-25 years age group accounts
for 18.8 percent in the sample. There is no key informant above the age of 55 years
in the sample, while 12.5 percent of household respondents represent the age group
above 55 years. Graph 3.2/1 below indicates the age distribution of the sample.
Graph3.2/1: Age distribution of the sample
Age distribution of the sample
40
35
Percentage rating
30
25
Household
20
Key informants
15
10
5
0
<18 18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 Above 55
Age groups
The overall picture of literacy level amongst key informants constituting the sample is
such that 24.8 percent are primary school educated, 52.8 percent are secondary
school educated and 22.4 percent are trained above secondary education. As for the
household respondents, 9.1 percent do not have formal education, 49.2 percent
have not gone beyond primary education level, 5.5 percent did not finish primary
school education, 23.3 percent ended at secondary education level, 3.4 percent
failed to accomplish secondary education, 7.4 percent are educated above
secondary education, and only 2.2 percent have technical education. Graph 3.2/2
below presents the literacy level of respondents in the sample.
66
Graph 3.2/2: Literacy level of sample respondents

Literacy level of the sample
Percentage ranking
60
50
40 Household
30
20 Key informant
10
0
l
y
al
ed
ed
y
y
na
ar
ar
ar
rm
et
et
ti o
nd
nd
im
fo
pl
pl
ca
co
Pr
co
m
m
In
Vo
se
co
co
Se
e
ot
ot
ov
N
Ab
Levels of education
Another important characteristic of the sample is the diversity of occupations and

place of work of respondents. Peasants constitute the largest part of the sample and
they account for 58.2 percent of household respondents. Business entrepreneurs are
the second largest, accounting for 17.5 percent while workers, meaning those
formally employed, are only 12.8 percent of the sample. Students are 7 percent of
the sample while 4.4 percent are those considering themselves as ‘unemployed’ or
jobless. As for key informants, 37.8 percent are district level workers, while 30.9
percent are ward level workers. Those functioning at neighbourhoods, villages and
streets levels are 5.2 percent, 18.5 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively. Key
informants were composed of teachers, court clerks, community development
officers, village government chairpersons, Village Executive Officers (VEOs), faith
leaders, clinical officers, militias, ward councillors, police, agricultural officers, health
officers, Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), magistrates, office attendants, political
leaders, parastatal & co-operative officers and others (land, wildlife, finance, etc). Of
this group, the teachers, VEOs, faith leaders and political leaders are relatively
dominant. The sample is drawn from the geopolitical area with total population of
8,643,586 – in which 4,199,481 are male while 4,444,105 are female93. As noted
above, 70 wards and 140 villages/streets are covered in the sample.
Graphs 3.2/3 – 3.2/5 below present the occupation structure of households, work
station distribution of key informants and the occupation structure of key informants
respectively.
93
Reference: Tanzania Population and Housing Census General Report, 2002
67
Graph3.2/3: Household occupation structure
Household occupation structure
70.0
Percentage rating
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
-
ss
er
t
s
ee
en
es
m
e
oy
ud
bl
sin
ar
/jo
pl
St
/f
Bu
Em
nt
ed
a
oy
as
pl
Pe
m
ne
U
Occupation
Graph 3.2/4: Key informants work station distribution
Work station of key informants
40
Percentage ranking
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Neighbourhood Village Street Ward LGA
Work station
68
Graph 3.2/5: Occupation structure of key informants
Key informant occupation structure

Percentage ranking
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Te
Cli
Mi
Ag
WE
Of
Po
Pa
Co
Co
Ch
VE
Fa
Wa
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ras
he
ith
l ic e
urt
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ai r
al t
O
gi s
O
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ea
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cal
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rs
al
pe
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tat
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Co
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il dl
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p.
lop
i fe
...
...
Occupation
The other descriptive indicators of the sample, combining a number of characteristics

of both households and key informants, are summarised in table 3.2 below. The
inference on the status of governance and corruption of Tanzania is drawn from the
analysis of respondents’ views and comments.
Table 3.2: Demographic characteristics of the sample

CPS sample characteristics by Regions
Lindi
Kagera Ruvuma Shinyanga Mtwara Mbeya Morogoro
Tota Tota Tota Tota Tota Tota
l % l % l % l % Total % l % l %
SEX
46.
male 70 49.6 48 54.5 29 46.8 65 58.6 62 66 116 61.7 43 2
58.
female 71 50.4 40 45.5 33 53.2 46 41.4 32 34 72 38.3 50 8
10
Total 141 100 88 100 62 100 111 100 94 100 188 100 93 0
AGE
10.
Under 18 4 2.8 1 1.1 3 4.3 0 0 1 1.1 6 3.1 10 5
25.
18-25 15 10.6 14 15.2 10 14.5 12 10.5 18 18.9 23 12 24 3
17.
26-35 40 28.2 26 28.3 15 21.7 26 22.8 19 20 62 32.5 17 9
23.
36-45 41 28.9 29 31.5 15 21.7 35 30.7 21 22.2 56 29.3 22 2
12.
46-55 25 17.6 15 16.3 16 23.2 23 20.2 18 18.9 24 12.6 12 6
10.
Above 55 17 12 7 7.6 10 14.5 18 15.8 18 18.9 20 10.5 10 5
69
10
Total 142 100 92 100 69 100 114 100 95 100 191 100 95 0
EDUCATION
Informal 19 13.5 11 12.4 3 4.8 8 7.3 13 14.9 11 6 5 5.3
36.
Primary level 75 53.2 51 57.3 31 50 46 42.2 54 62.1 86 46.2 35 8
Not completed primary 18 12.8 4 4.5 5 8.1 5 4.6 4 4.6 2 1.1 4 4.2
37.
Secondary level 19 13.5 14 15.7 16 25.8 28 25.7 11 12.6 55 29.5 36 9
Not completed 3 2.1 1 1.1 1 1.6 7 6.4 2 2.3 10 5.4 2 2.1
Secondary
10.
Above secondary level 4 2.8 6 6.7 2 3.2 13 11.9 3 3.5 19 10.2 10 5
Vocational education 3 2.1 2 2.3 4 6.5 2 1.8 3 1.6 3 3.2
10
Total 141 100 89 100 62 100 109 100 87 100 186 100 95 0
MARRIAGE
55.
Married 87 61.3 66 75 36 62 79 69.9 71 76.3 134 73.2 52 9
Not married 33 23.2 10 11.4 9 15.5 17 15 16 17.2 34 18.6 40 43
Divorced 12 8.5 3 3.4 6 10.3 8 7.1 4 4.3 4 2.2
Widowed 10 7 9 10.2 7 12.1 9 8 2 2.2 11 6 1 1.1
10
Total 142 100 88 100 58 100 113 100 93 100 183 100 93 0
HOUSEHOLD STATUS
Head of households 81 57 56 62.2 39 62.9 78 70.3 66 69.5 123 64.7 38 40
31.
Household member 50 35.2 34 37.8 18 29 29 26.1 27 28.4 57 30 30 6
28.
Children 11 7.8 5 8.1 4 3.6 2 2.1 10 5.3 27 4
10
Total 142 100 90 100 62 100 111 100 95 100 190 100 95 0
OCCUPATION
43.
Farmer 88 62.9 52 55.3 44 64.7 61 55.5 70 75.3 103 54.5 41 6
Business 30 21.4 25 26.6 5 7.4 21 19.1 13 14 36 19 8 8.5
21.
Employed 11 7.9 10 10.6 3 4.4 19 17.3 4 4.3 34 18 20 3
24.
Student 6 4.2 2 2.2 7 10.3 3 2.7 2 2.1 12 6.4 23 5
Jobless 5 3.6 5 5.3 9 13.2 6 5.5 4 4.3 4 2.1 2 2.1
10
Total 140 100 94 100 68 100 110 100 93 100 189 100 94 0
Source: CPS data sheet
3.3. LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF CORRUPTION

It is important to know the extent to which the public is aware about corruption before
rightly gauging the perception. Responses from key informants, households and
focus groups helped to assess the level of public awareness on corruption in
Tanzania. When asked the question, ‘do you know what corruption is all about’, the
implication of responses is such that 91.9 percent of the respondents said they did,
while only 8.1 percent said they did not. As for key informants, 98.8 percent of
opinion leaders said they were aware about corruption, while only 1.2 percent of
70
them said they were not. The assessment of the focus groups on the level of
awareness about corruption indicates over 99 percent of focus groups’ members
indicated satisfactory level of awareness about corruption.
However, the LGAs-specific analyses indicate diverging levels of awareness of

corruption across LGAs. Households’ respondents in Bukoba urban, Muleba, Misenyi,
Bukombe and Shinyanga urban indicate 100 percent level of awareness, implying full
public awareness about corruption in those LGAs. The second largest corruption
awareness level score is 95.8 percent, which includes Ruvuma, Kilosa, Bukoba rural,
Kilwa and Kahama LGAs. The third largest corruption awareness score is 91.7
percent with Kishapu, Mbozi, Mbinga, Ulanga and Mvomero on the list. The level of
corruption awareness in the rest seven LGAs seems to range between 91.3 percent
(Lindi rural) and 70 percent (Nachingwea). With an average of 80.4 percent score,
LGAs in Lindi are noted to show the lowest corruption awareness level. Only Chunya
with 66.7 percent scores the bottom level of awareness about corruption. As for key
informants’ level of awareness, all respondent (100 percent) in 22 LGAs are generally
knowledgeable and aware about corruption. 87.5 percent of respondents in Mbinga,
Lindi rural and Chunya are aware about corruption, while the level of awareness of
key informants in Liwale and Lindi urban is only 85.7 percent.
Certainly, the general conclusion drawn from this section is that the majority of both
ordinary people and opinion leaders (public office bearers) are aware of corruption
related transactions in which money changes hands to compromise official
procedures by bypassing laws and regulations governing social services delivery in
the LGAs. Graph 3.3 below presents the general picture of the level of public
awareness about corruption as represented by household and key informant
respondents.
71
Graph 3.3: General level of public awareness of corruption
Public awareness about corruption
120
Percentage ranking
100
80
Yes
60
No
40
20
0
Household Key informant
Sample category
When asked if they believe the public is really aware of corruption, 48.3 percent of
the key informants said the public has little knowledge about corruption, while only
12.5 percent of them believe the public has adequate knowledge and awareness of
the issues surrounding governance and specifically corruption. The divergence can
be partly attributed to many observable ‘policy gaps/incorrect policy options’ as well
as by incorrect predictions of powerful leaders and professionals with little or no
consideration of ordinary people’s real governance concerns.
3.4 DRIVING FORCES FOR CORRUPTION BEHAVIOUR AND ACTS

The reasons driving people to cherish corruption practices is one of the riddles that
CPS sought to demystify. When household, key informants and focus groups were
asked to mention what they considered critical reasons for indulging in corruption,
household respondents mentioned nine reasons while key informants mentioned only
eight reasons. As indicated in the table below, the highest score reason mentioned by
household respondents is greed and selfishness, rating 49.3 percent. As for key
informants, the reason mentioned with highest rating is the ‘pressure to get service’
with 45.2 percent. Greed and selfishness is rated second on the list with 17.2
percent. Table 3.4/1 and the corresponding graph below illuminate on what are
perceived to be the driving forces for those engaging in corruption across LGAs.
Table 3.4/1: Driving forces for corruption across LGAs

Respondent Driving forces by percentage rating
category Greed Immorality/ Pressure Shortcut Weak civic Insufficient Poverty Abuse Scar Meagre
selfishness Foreign to get behaviour competence awareness: of city salary
influence service corruption power
Households 49.3 5.2 3.3 6.7 0.2 - 17 1.8 - 16.5
Key 17.2 - 45.2 16.7 5.9 4.6 8.4 1.7 0.4 -
informants
72
Graph 3.4/1: Perceived driving forces for corruption across LGAs
Perception on driving forces to corruption

Perception rating
60
50
40 Household
30
20 Key informant
10
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Driving forces
The LGA-specific analyses of corruption driving forces are more insightful, and useful
in identifying LGAs in which the driving forces are particularly mentioned. This could
be imperative for informing the policy dimension of CPS.
The views of ordinary Tanzanians in 23 LGAs (Rwangwa and Kilwa, Nachingwea,

Mbozi, Kyela, Mbarali, Rungwe, Newala, Mtwara urban and Mtwara rural to mention
only a few) significantly indicate that ‘greed’ and ‘selfishness’ as most significant
driving force to corruption in the LGAs. ‘Meagre salary’, as driving force to corruption,
is mentioned by ordinary Tanzanians only in Lindi urban, Lindi rural, Kahama and
Misenyi. Another significant corruption driving force as mentioned by ordinary
Tanzanians is poverty, which appears frequently mentioned in Muleba and Mbeya
rural.
The LGAs-specific analyses of key informants indicate frequent mention of the

corruption driving force, ‘pressure to get service’, topping the rest driving forces in
15 LGAs, including those in Lindi, Kagera, and three LGAs in Shinyanga. However,
key informants in Namtumbo, Mtwara urban and Mtwara rural are of the view that
‘greedy and selfishness’ is the most significant driving force to corruption. Poverty is
mentioned as most significant driving force in Muleba, while shortcut behaviour
appears the most significant driving force in Kahama and Meatu (Shinyanga).
Regional level findings on driving forces for corruption

Regional level-based findings on the driving forces of corruption are provided in table
3.4/2 below. The analyses attempt to postulate corruption driving forces considered
73
as significant by ordinary Tanzanians and opinion leaders (public office bearers) in the
LGAs in a particular region.
Table 3.4/2: The regional dimension of corruption driving forces in LGAs

Category by region Significant forces by percentage rating
Greed Immor Pressu Laxi Shor Weak Insuffici Poverty Abus Sca Mea Total
and ality/ re to ty tcut civic ent e of rcity gre
selfishn Foreign get beha compe awaren pow sala
ess influen service viour tence ess: er ry
ce corrupt
ion
Lindi 39.5 11.8 0 1.3 0 0 0 21.1 0 0 26.3 100
Mbeya 36.4 11.1 0 16. 1 0 22.2 0 0 13.1 100
2
Shinyanga 54.2 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 13.9 0 0 19.4 100
Kagera 45.2 9.6 0 7.1 0 0 0 17.9 0 0 20.2 100
Household
Ruvuma 82.9 4.9 0 4.9 0 0 0 4.9 0 0 2.4 100

Mtwara 71.8 4.9 0 7.7 0 0 0 5.1 0 0 10.5 100
Morogoro 43.2 13.5 0 5.6 0 0 0 24.3 0 0 13.5 100
Lindi 14.3 0 77.1 0 8.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Mbeya 13.6 3.4 37.3 0 25.4 10.2 3.3 5.1 0 1.7 0 100
Key informant
Shinyanga 12.1 0 33.3 0 30.3 6.1 9.1 9.1 0 0 0 100

Kagera 10.7 0 42.9 0 14.3 0 10.7 21.4 0 0 0 100
Ruvuma 28.6 0 28.6 0 4.8 14.3 4.8. 14.1 4.8 0 0 100
Mtwara 25.8 0 48.4 0 9.7 0 6.5 6.5 3.1 0 0 100
Morogoro 21.9 0 46.9 0 12.4 9.4 0 9.4 0 0 0 100
Source: CPS data sheets
As indicated in the table above, the corruption driving forces considered as significant
by ordinary Tanzanians in each region, are as follows:-
i. Lindi – greed and selfishness (39.5 percent), followed by meagre salary (26.3
percent).
ii. Mbeya – greed and selfishness (36.4 percent), followed by poverty (22.2
percent).
iii. Mtwara – greed and selfishness (71.8 percent), followed by meagre salary (10.3
percent).
iv. Morogoro – greed and selfishness (43.2 percent), followed by poverty (24.3
percent).
v. Shinyanga – greed and selfishness (54.2 percent), followed by meagre salary
(19.4 percent).
vi. Kagera – greed and selfishness (45.2 percent), followed by meagre salary (20.2
percent).
vii. Ruvuma – greed and selfishness (82.9 percent), remotely followed by poverty and
pressure to get service ranked (4.9 percent) each.
However, from the perspectives of key informants, the driving forces to corruption in
the regions are as follows:-
i. Lindi – pressure to get service (77.1 percent), followed by greed and selfishness
(14.3 percent).
74
ii. Mbeya – pressure to get service (37.3 percent), followed by shortcut behaviour
(25.4 percent).
iii. Mtwara – pressure to get service (48.4 percent), followed by greed and
selfishness (25.8 percent).
iv. Morogoro – pressure to get service (46.9 percent), followed by greed and
selfishness (21.9 percent).
v. Shinyanga – pressure to get service (33.3 percent), followed by shortcut
behaviour (30.3 percent).
vi. Kagera – pressure to get service (42.9 percent), followed by poverty (21.4
percent).
vii. Ruvuma – pressure to get service (28.6 percent), which ties exactly with greed
and selfishness.
The contestation between the ordinary persons’ and leaders’ points of views on the
significant driving forces for corruption is obvious. Whereas the former consider
greed and selfishness (of those entrusted to oversee social service delivery in the
LGAs), followed closely by either meagre salary or poverty, as significant driving
force to corruption, the latter consider pressure to get service, followed closely by
greed and selfishness, poverty or shortcut behaviour to get service as significant
driving forces to corruption. The difference is attributed to weak governance
information flow to service users; leaders could be exactly expecting pressure from
service users because they know, for sure, the inadequacy of quantities available.
Graph 3.4/2 below indicates the contending positions of the driving forces for
corruption between the household and key informant respondents in the regions.
75
Graph 3.4/2: Driving forces for corruption: contending positions of ‘ordinary persons’
and ‘leaders’
Driving forces for corruption: contending positions of 'ordinary persons' and 'leaders'
90
80
70
Corruption driving forces ranking
60
Greed&selfishness
50 Short-cut behaviour
Pressure to get service
40 Poverty
Meagre salary
30
20
10
0
Mbeya
Shinyanga
Mbeya
Shinyanga
Mtwara
Mtwara
Kagera
Ruvuma
Morogoro
Kagera
Ruvuma
Morogoro
Lindi
Lindi
Household Key Informant

Regions
3.5 CORRUPTION ACTORS IN THE LGAs

For convenient purposes, corruption actors in the LGAs, , are referred to as ‘a set of
persons, organisations, institutions, departments and/or agencies’ with interest in the
governance functions across LGAs. A set of questions were targeted to the two
major groups of the respondents starting with the household respondents. These
were asked whether they thought corruption was a socially bad or negative
phenomena and to give the basis of their responses. A total of 71.6 percent said it
was a socially bad phenomenon. Of these, 30.4 percent said it was bad because it
denied people of their erstwhile rights to access and use the social services. They
were followed by another 22.8 percent who said corruption diverted/eroded public
trust in the judicial system while another 18.4 percent said it was bad because it
made them pay bribes to access social services, which are supposed to be provided
free of charge.
When key informants were asked the same question, their responses were such that
34.1 percent hate corruption because it denies people of their basic rights; the
opinion of 26.6 percent was that corruption further discriminates against the poor;
and that corruption exacerbates poverty and it is against the law (17.1 percent and
76
13.9 percent respectively). The message emanating from these responses is that
corruption actors are full aware about the negative effect and impact that corruption
causes to society, which indeed, is against to the tenets of good governance.
In the same vein, 91.4 percent of key informants (leaders) believe the citizens know
that corruption is rampant in the LGAs, and therefore, a social problem. However,
only 3.4 percent of the key informant respondents believe the cooperation of non-
state actors with the Government is the right strategy to eliminate corruption from
the society. But 20.7 percent of the same category considers corruption as normal
act that gives option for those who afford to pay to get the social services they need.
When asked about whether and the extent to which the departments under their
charge are suspected of corruption by the public, 49.2 percent confirmed the
suspicions, while 50.8 percent rejected. For those who conceded, 25.4 percent rate
such suspicions as ‘very little’, 34.5 percent rate them as ‘little’, while 28.2 percent
are aware that the suspicions are ‘significant’, with 12 percent rating corruption
suspicions against their departments as ‘above tolerable level’. When household
respondents were asked to opine whether or not corruption is on the increase or is
declining, 84.6 percent responded that it is increasing, while only 15.4 said it is
going downwards.
3.6 RATIONALE FOR AND ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION ACTORS

Relying on the existing literature, including media reports, the
departments/institutions charged with social service and ‘public goods’ delivery in the
LGAs were primarily targeted and selected as potential corruption actors in the LGAs.
To that effect, there is an underlying assumption that provision of public goods or
delivery of social services brings the public (users) and LGAs (Government) into
regular contacts in which the application of good governance principles is considered
critical. To this end, the departments, agencies organisations and institutions in the
LGAs are considered as potential corruption actors under CPS. The rigorous
assessment measures are then applied to evaluate the practices, systems and
structures of governance in the LGAs departments, institutions, agencies and
organisations. The departments of education, health, lands and housing, license and
revenue, Judiciary, police, office of the District Development Director (DED), natural
resources, water and sewerage, power utility (TANESCO), TACAIDS, cooperatives,
road works, and Ward Development Councils (WDCs) were subjected to evaluation by
household respondents, representing the views of ordinary Tanzanians and the key
informant respondents representing the views of leaders.
When requested to rank those they consider principal final recipients of proceeds of
corruption in each sector/department, household respondents ranked employees in
the power utility (TANESCO), police, licensing/ revenue and health departments
amongst the frequent recipients of bribes. The respective percentage rankings were
77
86.7 percent, 84.3 percent, 82.2 percent and 80.8 percent. This means therefore,
LGAs corruption perception is basically due to the reception of bribes by employees
in the respective departments, institutions, agencies and organisations in LGAs.
Public office bearers at higher level of LGAs and their counterparts in the wards and
villages are perceived as second and third frequent recipients of the proceeds of
corruption/briberies. The trend of perceptions changes only in the WDCs, indicating
ward/village-level public office bearers the frequent recipients of corruption
proceeds/bribery, followed by employees in the LGAs departments, and finally LGAs
office bearers in the offices of the DED. Leaders of political parties were perceived
the least corrupt across all sectors. Their rating of corruption perception is between
2.8 percent in the judiciary, and 10.3 percent in the cooperatives. The higher
percentage in the latter could be attributed to the historical relationship between
politics and cooperatives in Tanzania.
The perceptions of key informants are tallying exactly with those of ordinary
Tanzanians, again pointing-out employees in the power utility (TANESCO), police,
licensing/revenue and health departments as being amongst the frequent recipients
of corruption proceeds, with the respective ranking of 79.6 percent, 79.7 percent,
74.8 percent and 72.9 percent. However, unlike the perceptions of ordinary
Tanzanians, 74.5 percent of key informants rank employees in the water and
sewerage agency, among the frequent recipients of corruption proceeds. Also unlike
the perceptions of ordinary Tanzanians, key informants view public office bearers in
the wards and villages under WDCs as less corrupt than are employees in the top
most level of LGAs sectors/departments. The latter are ranked 45.4 percent while
the former are ranked 31.6 percent. Generally, the perceptions of key informants
retain similarities with those of perceptions of ordinary Tanzanians as noted above.
The leaders of political parties again have the lowest corruption perception score,
ranking of 4.6 percent for police, and 10.1 percent for cooperatives.
Finally, the data was collated to get the full picture of corruption perception. The
general picture of corruption perception is such that employees in the power utility
(TANESCO) are leading, ranked by 83.2 percent, followed in descending order by
police (82.0 percent), licensing & revenue (78.5 percent), health (76.9 percent),
water & sewerage (76.3 percent), natural resources (73.5 percent), education (71.8
percent) and land & housing (70.4 percent). WDCs employees ranked by 42.7
percent, score the least corruption perception across departments in LGAs. There is
conspicuous low ranking corruption perception for office bearers in the wards,
villages, LGAs (top most level) and for leaders of political parties across the actors.
This principally indicates existence of weak accountability mechanisms across LGAs.
Table 3.6 and the corresponding graphs below present the overview of corruption
perception ranking across actors – departments, institutions, organisations or
78
agencies in the LGAs together with analyses of final recipients of proceeds of

corruption/bribes.
Table 3.6: Overview of corruption actors’ perception ranking

percentage ranking
Office
Respondent Office Political
Actor Department bearers-
category bearers- parties Total
employees ward/village
LGAs level leaders
level
Education 75.2 14.2 5.3 5.3 100
Health 80.8 12.2 4.1 3 100.1
Land & housing 70.2 12.1 14.1 4.2 100.6
Licensing & revenue 82.2 7.1 7.2 4.0 100.5
Judiciary 78.4 13.8 5.8 2.8 100.8
WDCs 39.9 10.4 43.7 6 100
Household Police 84.3 6.7 5.5 4 100.5
DED office 62 14.4 17.7 5.9 100
Natural resources 75.2 10.4 9.5 4.9 100
Water & sewerage 78.1 6.9 10.5 4.6 100.1
Power utility/TANESCO 86.7 5.7 3 4.6 100
HIV/AIDS 74.9 11.6 8.2 5.3 100
Cooperatives 59 12.3 17.8 10.8 99.9
Education 68.4 17.2 6.2 8.2 100
Health 72.9 16.2 5.8 5.2 100.1
Land & housing 70.6 15.2 6 8.3 100.1
Licensing & revenue 74.8 12.8 3.4 9.0 100
Judiciary 68.2 17.5 6.4 7.9 100
WDCs 45.4 14.6 31.6 8.4 100
Key informant Police 79.7 10.8 5.6 4.1 100.2
DED office 55 17.7 18.6 8.6 99.9
Natural resources 71.7 17.8 4.7 5.8 100
Water & sewerage 74.5 11.4 7.2 6.9 100
Power utility/TANESCO 79.6 11.2 2.9 6.4 100.1
HIV/AIDS 57.7 18.1 14.3 9.9 100
Cooperatives 70.6 12.2 7 10.1 99.9
All Education 71.8 15.7 5.75 6.75 100
respondents Health 76.85 14.2 4.95 4.1 100.1
Lands & Housing 70.4 13.65 10.05 6.25 100.3
Licensing & Rev. 78.5 9.95 5.3 6.5 100.2
Judiciary 73.3 15.65 6.1 5.35 100.4
WDCs 42.65 12.5 37.65 7.2 100.0
Police 82 8.75 5.55 4.05 100.4
DED Office 58.5 16.05 18.15 7.25 100.0
Natural Resources 73.45 14.1 7.1 5.35 100.0
Water & Sewerage 76.3 9.15 8.85 5.75 100.1
Power Utility/TANESCO 83.15 8.45 2.95 5.5 100.1
HIV/AIDS 66.3 14.85 11.25 7.6 100.0
Cooperatives 64.8 12.25 12.4 10.45 99.9
Source: CPS Data sheets
79
Graph 3.6/1: Households’ corruption perception ranking
100
90
80
70
Percentage ranking
60
Dept. employees
Public office bearers (LGA)
50
Public office bearers (W&V)
Political (parties) leaders
40
30
20
10
0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Power Utility/TANESCO
Education Health Judiciary WDCs Police DED Office HIV/AIDS Cooperatives
Actors/LGAs departments
Graph 3.6/2: Key informants’ corruption perception ranking
100
90
80
70
Percentage ranking
60
Dept. employees
50
40
30
20
10
0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Education Health Judiciary WDCs Police DED HIV/AIDS Cooperatives
Office
Graph 3.6/3: Overall corruption perception ranking
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
Percentage ranking
60.0
Dept. employees
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
DED Office
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Cooperatives
Education Health Judiciary WDCs Police HIV/AIDS
Actors/LGAs department
82
3.7 ANALYSIS OF MAGNITUDE OF CORRUPTION AS BASIS FOR PERCEPTIONS
Sufficient evidence is the basis of making any conclusion about the corruption
perception status of LGAs. To this end, respondents were required to respond to the
question specifically designed to gauge their assessment of the magnitude of
corruption in the LGAs. Respondents were asked to qualitatively assess the
magnitude of corruption, i.e. if according to their assessment, corruption in the LGAs
(departments, institutions, agencies or organisations) is ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘average’,
‘high’ or ‘very high’. The frequencies of ‘very low’ and ‘low’ valuations as well as those
for ‘high’ and ‘very high’ were then merged in order to get the low-high outcome
dichotomy.
As indicated in the table and corresponding graphs in this section below, prevalence
of corruption in the departments/sectors, institutions, agencies or organisations
across LGAs is noted. Key informants indicate that corruption in the police and
judiciary is alarmingly on the higher side (ranked by 80 percent and 78.7 percent
respectively). The analysis also indicates that corruption is significantly high in the
health, lands & housing, licensing & revenue and power utility (TANESCO) (ranked by
57.4 percent, 55.3 percent, 54.2 percent and 48.7 percent, respectively). The
sectors/departments in the LGAs in which opinion leaders perceive corruption to be
on the low side are education ranked by 43.6 percent, WDCs, 40.4 percent, DED
office, 27.7 percent, water & sewerage, 29.1 percent and cooperatives, 27.7
percent.
Moreover, the findings note salient trend regarding the extent to which corruption
proceeds are shared within LGAs departments. The perception in the department of
education is such that those believing corruption is on average tally with those
perceiving corruption is on the high side (23.4 percent and 24.7 percent
respectively). Also interestingly, a good number of opinion leaders are not aware as
to whether or not there is corruption in the respective departments of natural
resources (19.1 percent), water & sewerage (21.8 percent), power utility (TANESCO)
(23.6 percent), HIV/AIDS (36.4 percent) and cooperatives (33.7 percent).
The analytical perspective of reasons for a significant number of opinion leaders to

lack awareness of whether or not there is corruption in the aforesaid departments, is
possibly due to Central Government excessive control of the departments (for
example, natural resources) in which the Central Government is the defacto sole
regulatory authority. Another reason could probably be due to uneven distribution of
the services in question. Water & sewerage and power utility departments, for
example, are phenomenally urban life utilities, hence becoming difficult to opinion
leaders living in rural areas to know whether or not there is corruption in those
departments. Another reason could be weak visibility/influence of institutions or
organisations, cooperatives and HIV/AIDS committees (CMACs, WACs and VACs), for
example, do not seem to function effectively and therefore visible, in the wards and
villages. Cooperatives, the once strong peasantry-economy backbone of Tanzania,
have been dwindling since mid 1990s, apparently because of undue Government
interventions and corruption. The HIV/AIDS committees, at the apex level of LGAs
(CMACs), ward level (WACs) and village level (VACs), established in 2003, have been
regarded as white elephants due to inherent institutional governance weakness, poor
planning and financing (dependence) and irrelevance (as viewed by PLHAs).
As for perceptions of ordinary Tanzanians’ on how corruption is shared within LGAs

departments, institutions, agencies or organisations, the trend is similar to
perceptions of key informants, except for road construction works, which was
originally not covered in the list of actors for assessment by key informants. A
significant percentage of ordinary Tanzanians (29 percent), point out high corruption
in the road construction department. A significant 45.2 percent are indifferent on
whether there is corruption or not in the road construction department in LGAs.
Similar reasons cited above for such ambivalence may prevail; road construction
works is the technical domain – only very few people are involved in the formal
business of road construction in the LGAs.
The overall perception about the extent to which corruption is shared amongst the
LGAs’ departments, institutions, agencies or organisations is presented by a
combination of respondents’ rankings. The combination indicates the police and the
judiciary being perceived as prominent recipients of corruption proceeds in the LGAs
(ranked by 82.8 percent and 80.4 percent, respectively). Health, ranked by 62.7
percent is also a significant recipient of corruption proceeds in the LGAs. The
departments of lands & housing, licensing & revenue, WDCs, DED office, natural
resources, power utility (TANESCO) and road construction works are also noted as
active recipients of corruption proceeds in the LGAs. They are respectively ranked by
52 percent, 50.8 percent, 30.5 percent, 36.1 percent, 35.2 percent, 47.9 percent
and 29.0 percent.
Table 3.7: Perception on the extent corruption is shared amongst LGAs departments
Respondent Actors Qualitative ranking

category Low Average High Indifferent Total
Key Informant Education 43.6 19.8 25.4 11.3 100.1
Health 17.6 18.3 57.4 6.8 100.1
Lands & Housing 17.2 18 55.3 9.6 100.1
Licensing & Rev. 15.4 13.2 54.2 17.2 100
Judiciary 7.8 7 78.7 6.6 100.1
WDCs 40.4 16.3 27.5 15.9 100.1
Police 6.0 8 80 6 100
DED Office 27.7 28.9 33.2 10.2 100
84
Natural Resources 23.9 21.7 35.2 19.1 99.9

Water & Sewerage 29.1 23.6 25.5 21.8 100
HIV/AIDS 21.5 17.8 24.3 36.4 100.1
Cooperatives 27.7 15.8 22.8 33.7 100
Road construction 0.0 0 0 0 0.0
Household Education 34.8 26.9 24 14.3 100
Health 10.1 17.2 67.9 4.8 100
Lands & Housing 15.9 18.7 48.7 16.6 99.9
Licensing & Rev. 16.6 16.4 47.4 19.6 100
Judiciary 4.8 8.1 82.1 5.1 100.1
WDCs 33.1 14.3 33.4 19.4 100.2
Police 4.8 6 85.5 3.7 100
DED Office 25.3 17.8 39 17.9 100
Natural Resources 25.7 16.4 35.2 22.7 100
Water & Sewerage 27.6 13.9 17.7 40.9 100.1
Power Utility/TANESCO 11.1 9.6 47.1 32.2 100
HIV/AIDS 15.2 9.8 24.4 50.6 100
Cooperatives 21.5 14 20.6 43.9 100
Road construction 16.2 9.7 29 45.2 100.1
Key Informant & Education 39.2 23.4 24.7 12.8 100.1
Household Health 13.9 17.8 62.7 5.8 100.2
combined Lands & Housing 16.6 18.4 52.0 13.1 100.1
Licensing & Rev. 16.0 14.8 50.8 18.4 100
Judiciary 6.3 7.6 80.4 5.9 100.2
WDCs 36.8 15.3 30.5 17.7 100.3
Police 5.4 7.0 82.8 4.9 100.1
DED Office 26.5 23.4 36.1 14.1 100.1
Natural Resources 24.8 19.1 35.2 20.9 100
Water & Sewerage 28.4 18.8 21.6 31.4 100.2
HIV/AIDS 18.4 13.8 24.4 43.5 100.1
Cooperatives 24.6 14.9 21.7 38.8 100
Road construction 16.2 9.7 29.0 45.2 100.1
Source: CPS data sheets
85
Graph 3.7/1: Key informant qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs

100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
Qualitative ranking
60.0
Low
Average
50.0
High
Indifferent
40.0
30.0
20.0
0.0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
DED Office
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Cooperatives
Road construction
86
Graph 3.7/2: Household qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs

100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
Qualitative ranking
60.0
Low
Average
50.0
High
Indifferent
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
DED Office
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Cooperatives
Road construction
87
Graph 3.7/3: Overall qualitative ranking on share of corruption in LGAs
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
Qualitative ranking
60.0
Low
Average
50.0
High
Indifferent
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Lands & Housing
Licensing & Rev.
DED Office
Natural Resources
Water & Sewerage
Cooperatives
Road construction
3.8 FORMS OF AND EXPERIENCES IN CORRUPTION

Another variable of the survey was to determine whether the responses of
interviewees’ were based on personal experiences in corruption or hearsay about it.
Moreover, it was imperative to examine, the forms through which corruption is
regularly transacted. When asked if one had been involved in corruption transactions,
55 percent of household respondents replied they had never been involved, with 15.7
percent saying they had been involved once, while 18.6 percent replied they
sometimes had to pay bribes, and 8.6 percent replied they always pay bribes to
access service provided by designated LGAs departments.
Implication: 43 percent of ordinary Tanzanians confess to have, at least once, paid a

bribe as means to access services in the LGAs.
Graph 3.8/1 and the table below present the household confessions to have or not
paid corruption.
88
Graph 3.8/1: Confession to have or not paid corruption to access services in LGAs
Confession to pay corruption: Household
60
50
40
Percentage
30
ranking
20
10
0
No, never Yes, only once Yes,seldom Yes, always
Confession
Table 3.8/1: cross tabulation of experience in paying corruption in the LGAs

Region LGA Frequency (percentage)
Mtwara Never Yes, once Sometimes Always Total
Mtwara Urban 65.5 8.2 19.1 7.3 100.1
Newala 62.5 16.7 12.5 8.5 100.2
Mtwara Rural 70.8 12.5 12.5 4.2 100
Tandahimba 78.9 5.3 15.8 0 100
Morogoro Morogoro urban 47.8 17.4 21.7 13 99.9
Ulanga 100 0 0 0 100
Mvomero 87.5 8.3 0 4.2 100
Kilosa 50 12.5 29.2 8.3 100
Shinyanga Bukombe 62.5 29.2 8.3 0 100
Kishapu 58.3 12.5 20.8 8.3 99.9
Meatu 53.3 20 20 6.7 100
Kahama 45.5 27.3 9.1 18.2 100.1
Bariadi 44.4 0 44.4 11.1 99.9
Shinyanga urban 56.3 12.5 31.3 0 100.1
Ruvuma Tunduru 75 4.2 12.5 8.3 100
Mbinga 54.2 25 8.3 12.5 100
Namtumbo 35 15 45 5 100
Kagera Bukoba rural 0 0 75 25 100
Bukoba urban 4.2 33.3 37.5 25 100
Muleba 16.7 70.8 4.2 8.3 100
Missenyi 9.5 14.3 42.9 33.3 100
Lindi Ruangwa 83.3 8.3 8.3 0 99.9
Lindi urban 66.7 8.3 8.3 16.7 100
89
Kilwa 56.5 8.7 21.7 13 99.9

Lindi rural 52.2 30.4 13 4.3 99.9
Liwale 81 4.8 9.5 4.8 100.1
Nachingwea 87.5 4.2 4.2 4.2 100.1
Mbeya Mbozi 54.5 9.1 13.6 22.7 99.9
Ileje 76.2 14.3 9.5 0 100
Chunya 70.8 4.2 16.7 8.7 100.4
Mbeya urban 87.5 0 8.3 4.2 100
Kyela 52.4 23.8 23.8 0 100
Mbarali 47.8 34.8 13 4.3 99.9
Rungwe 52.4 19 19 9.5 99.9
Mbeya rural 39.1 26.1 34.8 0 100
Responding to a question on the specific LGA department that actually receive

proceeds of corruption, 51.4 percent of households ranked the health department as
the most dominant recipient, 21.1 percent ranked the police department as second
dominant recipient, and 9.9 percent ranked the Judiciary department as third
dominant recipient of proceeds of corruption. The three departments are also
mentioned in other sections above ranked by high corruption perception. The LGA
department mentioned to have received the least proceeds of corruption is the
natural resources department ranked by only 0.3 percent. Graph 3.8/2 below
indicates the ranking and the extent to which corruption actually paid to service users
is distributed across the receiving service departments; namely police, health,
education, Judiciary, licensing & revenue and other service providers.
Graph 3.8/2: Final recipients of actually paid corruption by households
LGAs Dept. destinations of actually paid corruption
60
50
40
Percentage ranking 30
20
10
0
Police Health Education Judiciary Licensing Others
& revenue
LGAs departments (Actors)
When further asked to state what actually was received in exchange for corruption
payments, 53.1 percent pointed out medical treatments, 14.2 percent said to get
90
court bails, 8.2 percent said were acquitted by courts, and 7.9 percent said they got
school posting clearance. Eighteen types of services were mentioned to attract
corruption, including administration of estates (1.6 percent), employments (1.3
percent), permits (3.8 percent), to mention only a few. Personal issues, tender,
pension and water utility are ranked by only 0.3 percent for attracting corruption.
Moreover, analyses of the category of staff who actually receive bribes indicate that
50.3 percent is received by ordinary employees of LGAs departments dealing with
services, 34.2 percent goes to middle level staff, 12 percent is received by senior
staff, while 3.5 percent is indicated to have been distributed across the categories of
LGAs staff. But when asked if they paid corruption for self or on behalf of others, the
ranking is such that 62.4 percent of corruption is paid for individual own direct
benefit, while 37.6 percent is paid on behalf of other service users.
Pie chart 3.8 below indicates the extent to which proceeds of corruption are shared
amongst the LGAs’ rank and file, and staff.
Pie chart 3.8: Share of corruption proceeds across LGAs rank and file
Corruption shares across LGAs staff levels
4%
12%
Rank and file level of staff

Middle level of staff
50%
High level of staff
All staff across levels
34%
Means/forms of corruption transactions

Money, valuables/properties, services, sex and favouritism are the mentioned popular
forms/means for transacting corruption. As indicated in the combined analysis of
household and key informant respondents, (table: 3.8/2 below), when asked to
comment on the forms of transaction, 81.8 percent ranked cash the most preferred
form of corruption; 39.6 percent ranked sex the second most preferred form of
corruption; while 39.3 percent ranked favouritism the third most preferred form of
91
corruption. Valuables are prominently the ‘very rare’ or ‘rare’ preferred forms of
corruption, ranked 32.8 percent or 47.2 percent. Similarly, services ranked by 38.5
percent or 40.5 percent are also ‘very rare’ or ‘rare’ preferred forms of corruption.
Cash is the most preferred form of corruption transaction ranked by 96.8 percent of
household respondents confessed to have paid corruption by cash. 2.5 percent
confirmed to have paid corruption in kind, while 0.6 percent confessed they
transacted sex.
Table 3.8/2: Preference and choice of corruption transaction form

Corruption form Preference ranking in percentage
Very rare Rare Frequent total
Money 5.2 13.0 81.8 100.0

Valuables/properties 32.8 47.2 20.0 100.0
Services 38.5 40.5 21.0 100.0
Sex 25.9 34.6 39.6 100.0
Favoritism 28.1 32.6 39.3 100.0
Graph 3.8/3: Preference and choice of corruption transaction form
Preference of corruption form

Percentage rating
90
80
70 Very rare
60
50 Rare
40
30
20 Frequent
10
0
Mo
Va
Se
Se
Fa
vo
lua
rvi
x
n
ey
riti
ble
es
sm
s/ p
r.. .
Corruption form
3.9 ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEMAND FOR AND/OR SUPPLY OF CORRUPTION

Good governance scholars and activists consider political behaviour of people the
necessary factor to evaluate corruption trends if one has to devise strategy to
promote good governance. To this end, household respondents, who confessed had
paid corruption, were probed about awareness of illegality of the practice. The
outcome ranking was such that 78.4 percent knew it was against the law, while 21.6
percent never knew the criminal liability associated with their acts of offering bribery.
92
Holding true the assumption that paying corruption is not a business of amateurs but
one is forced into it, household respondents were further asked the question meant
to substantiate the environment under which corruption is transacted. The outcomes
are such that 4.6 percent of Tanzanians pay corruption because they volitionally feel
to do so; 56.8 percent are forced to pay corruption in response to the bureaucratic
design that service users are subjected to; 33.1 percent are enticed by
staff/employees in the LGAs’ service delivery outlets to pay corruption; and 5.5
percent pay corruption because they are hinted (whispered) by friends to do so.
Interpreting the above findings, 95.4 percent of service users paying corruption to
access services in the LGAs do so forcefully, only a few corruption amateurs,
accounting to 4.6 percent, do so voluntarily.
Moreover, when asked about the strategy used to facilitate corruption transactions,
the outcome was such that 73.9 percent of service users disburse corruption
proceeds direct to final recipients, while 26.1 percent use agents to facilitate it. The
latter finding is critical because it exposes existence of informal
institutionalisation and networking for corruption (agencies) in the LGAs.
Furthermore, 49.3 percent of household respondents conceded to have witnessed
LGA staff, on various occasions, transacting corruption.
Public abhorrence against corrupt persons in the LGAs is but rife. When asked to give
views on how the public perceive persons receiving or paying corruption; 96 percent
of household respondents said they hate persons receiving corruption, while 88.9
percent said they hate persons paying corruption. Corrupt persons are generally
regarded as useless and socially unwanted. Only 1.7 percent indicated they would
tolerate corruption demanding persons, while 7.2 percent would similarly tolerate
those funning to pay corruption.
Similarly, key informants were asked a question meant to essentially evaluate whether
or not persons aggrieved by corruption have enough confidence to report grievances
to public office bearers in LGAs. The outcome was such that 65.2 percent of leaders
had never received any corruption-related complaints from individual members of the
public; 22.8 percent have seldom received the corruption-related complaints from
individual members of public; while 12 percent said they regularly receive corruption-
related complaints. Interpreting the findings, it means that substantial public
confidence and fearlessness to report corruption to public office bearers in the LGAs
exist (ranked by 34.8 percent). Pie chart 3.9 below indicates the extent to which
aggrieved citizens have reported corruption incidents to public office bearers in the
LGAs.
93
Pie chart 3.9: Extent of public confidence to report corruption grievances
Reporting of corruption-related matters to public office

bearers in LGAs
12%
No, not yet received
complaints
23% Yes, seldom receive
complaints
65% Yes, regularly receive
complaints
Despite corruption grievances reported to the public office bearers, including bribes
demand by employees (10.8 percent), favouritism (13.8 percent), landed property
(13.8 percent), health services (12.3 percent), police bail (7.7 percent), subsidised
agricultural input (6.2 percent), business contracts (6.2 percent), and other
complaints (13) constituting (27.2 percent), there is little or no policy-specific
measures taken to address the complaints. The aggrieved public who reported cases
of corruption to senior staff in the LGAs were the ordinary citizens (56.7 percent),
and lower cadre employees (35.8 percent). So far, no measures have been taken to
deal with the reported grievances against the police (16.2 percent), service delivery
in-charge (16.2 percent), or service delivery employees (26.5 percent). When asked
about the measures actually taken to address the reported corruption cases, the
implication is such that 52.9 percent of suspects are merely warned, 19.1 percent of
complaints went through with ‘no measures taken’ and 5.9 percent of complaints
were simply ignored because ‘the matters were forwarded to superiors’. There seems
to be no policy frame in place to guide the LGA institutional/functional coordination of
reporting corruption to PCCB or NACSAP focal persons.
3.10. SELECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY AND

LEGAL MEASURES IN PRACTICE IN THE LGAs
As evidenced earlier in this report, the majority of ordinary Tanzanians and leaders
are well aware of corruption as well as its social, political and economic implication.
The Government has put in place appropriate legislations including the PCCA, the
Economic and Organised Crime Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, the PPA and other
94
legislations. Moreover, institutions to enforce public compliance with the laws are in
place and functioning. The NACSAP II is in its third year of implementation.
The irony of increasing trend of corruption in the LGAs despite the prevalence of
relatively adequate legislations and policy can only be explained in terms of persistent
failure or inability of existing legal, policy and institutions to serve the proactive
public. Responding to a pertinent question in that regard, only 36.8 percent of key
informants and 35.4 percent of household respondents indicate to be aware of
existing institutional mechanisms and regulatory framework designed to counteract
corruption in their communities. The majority (63.2 percent of key informant and 40.7
percent of household respondents) indicate that such anti-corruption
strategy/mechanism or similar arrangements do not practically exist or function in
their places of work. Still, 24 percent of household respondents are not aware
whether such institutional, policy or legal mechanisms for counteracting corruption do
exist at all. Graph 3.10/1 below presents public awareness on availability and
utilisation of legal, policy or institutional tools for counteracting corruption in their
everyday life.
Graph 3.10/1: Availability and applicability of anti-corruption regulatory framework

and institutional mechanism
Awareness on availability and application of legal and

policy (anti-corruption) backup tools
Percentage ranking
120
100
80 63.2 Key informant
60 36.8
40 Household
20 35.4 40.7 0
24
0
Yes No Don't know
Households and key informants confirmations to
availability and applicability of legal or similar
arrangements
When asked to mention institutions or departments they consider relevant to fight

corruption, PCCB was singled out by the majority (76.8 percent of key informant and
76.9 percent of household respondents). Police is ranked by a minority (8.7 percent
and 3.8 percent) of key informants and household respondents respectively. WDCs
and village committees are recognised by household respondents, (ranking them by
7.1 percent, and 3.8 percent respectively), as the official institutions available to
95
which to report corruption. Moreover, 7.2 percent of key informant respondents

indicate the existence and functioning of anti-corruption committees in the health
service department.
Though slightly noted, there seems to be some public confusion when it comes to
distinguishing between the voluntary initiative of CSOs and the official enforcement of
anti-corruption laws. One percent and 6.7 percent of household respondents
mistakenly refer to ForDIA and SKUVI as official institutions assigned to counteract
corruption.
When asked to mention NSAs known in the field of fighting corruption, very few CSOs
are mentioned. This implies weak visibility of NSAs fighting corruption. Only 7 out of
800 household respondents said they know ForDIA, and 6 said they know TNIB.
HakiElimu and TGNP each, was mentioned by one out of 800 respondents. Only a few
FGD members confirmed to know TAMWA. This trend is indeed repeated by key
informant respondents, 25 percent of which confirm to know CSOs fighting
corruption, while a significant 54.3 percent have never heard about CSOs fighting
corruption. Also, interestingly, 20.7 percent of key informants are completely
unaware about the CSOs notion; leave alone their voluntary engagement to fight
corruption. Whereas 58 key informant respondents indicated to know the CSOs,
which are active fighting against corruption, only 32 of them could mention the
names of CSOs they claim to know (HakiElimu by 18.8 percent, inter-faith
organisations by 6.3 percent, ForDIA by 28.1 percent and SKUVI by 9.1 percent).
Assessment of Government efforts to fight corruption in LGAs

To rightly contextualise perceptions, the closely-related questions were thrown to
household and key informant respondents. Household respondents were required to
state if they are aware of the current and past Government efforts to fight corruption,
and together with that, key informant respondents, they were further required to
assess the performance of current Government efforts to fight corruption. Whereas
64.8 percent (compared to 35.2 percent of key informants) of household
respondents are well aware of the current Government efforts to fight corruption,
those mentioned as known efforts include establishment of the institutional hierarch
of PCCB at national, regional and district levels (54.7 percent), prosecution of
corruption suspects (11.6 percent), and the Government directives/announcements
on corruption through the public media (26.9 percent). Only 6.8 percent of household
respondents reckon community anti-corruption information Education and
Communication (IEC) as Government efforts to fight corruption.
However, 71.3 percent of key informant respondents (compared to 28.7 percent of

households) are of the view that Government anti-corruption efforts have failed. And
when requested to assess the extent to which they believe the Government has
96
succeeded in fighting corruption, the rankings are such that 45.5 percent, 42.6
percent and 11.9 percent, respectively, believe the success is ‘little’, ‘medium’ or
‘adequate’. Regarding what the key informants consider Government’s remarkable
achievements so far, 46.2 singled out ‘the establishment of institutional hierarch of
PCCB followed by 38.5 percent who pointed out ‘community mobilisation through
public media’ and 13.4 percent pointed out ‘the prosecution of corruption suspects’.
Graph 3.10/2 below presents public assessment of Government efforts to fight
corruption in LGAs.
Graph 3.10/2: Public Assessment of Government anti-corruption performance in LGAs
120
100
Percentage ranking
80
46.2
Key informant
60
Household
40
54.7 38.5 0
20
13.4
26.9
11.6
6.8
0
PCCB hierarch Prosecution of suspects Community education Announcements (media) on
corruption
Performance indicators
Determining public support to anti-corruption policy in LGAs

It is important to note public readiness to fight corruption in the LGAs. When
requested to advise on what to do and if public office bearers in LGAs feel
strategically placed to support anti-corruption efforts, the ranking is such that 66.7
percent said they were ready to support the Government by establishing anti-
corruption committees in the LGAs (councils, wards and villages) while 19.6 percent
said they were ready to volunteer to facilitate civic education to that effect.
On the other hand, 92.9 percent of ordinary people acknowledge that it is the duty of
the citizenry to fight corruption. On that, 95.1 percent reaffirm their commitment to
cooperate with LGAs to fight corruption while 61.6 percent are even ready to support
reporting of corruption incidences to PCCB. Only 3.6 percent are not ready to
97
support anti-corruption efforts for various reasons, including fear of risk of personal
security/safety due to foreseeable retribution.
Impediments against public determination to fight corruption

Practical and policy impediments against public support to fight corruption are noted.
Interviewees mentioned such impediments as low prevalence of CSOs with genuine
cause to fight corruption. Other respondents mentioned ‘lack of political commitment
on the part of Government to genuinely and fearlessly fight corruption’. Lack of legal
protection and incentives to ‘whistleblowers’ are cited as obstacles counteracting
public support in the fight against corruption. When key informants were asked to
comment on the views of weak political will, which is regarded as impediment to fight
corruption, the ranking was such that 57.1 percent believe it is because the political
leadership is itself involved in the breeding of corruption. Another 13.7 percent cited
fears of reprisals noting current social, political and economic equilibrium is still
controlled by networks of corrupt business and political elites across Central
Government and LGAs.
However, both household and key informant respondents are relatively aware of the
current Government proposed ‘Whistleblowers’ Protection Draft Bill (23.7 percent of
ordinary people and 37.6 percent of key informants reaffirm such awareness, about
the Whistleblowers Protection Draft Bill). A significant 76.3 percent of household and
62.4 percent of key informant respondents are not aware about the legal protection
initiative for whistleblowers. But both key informants and household respondents are
strongly supportive of the proposed law (65.9 percent household and 69.5 percent
key informant respondents respectively).
Recognition of inter-faith potential to fighting corruption

There is strong assertion that corruption is positively correlated with immorality. The
strong influence of interfaith organisations to human behaviour is considered
potentially important to fight corruption through morality restoration. When requested
to state if religious leaders are on the forefront fighting corruption, 68.9 percent of
household respondents were affirmative, while only 17.4 percent believe the
statement is away from truth. On a similar note, 94.6 percent of respondents reaffirm
preaching is the most useful forum for religious leaders fighting corruption.
3. 11. DETERMINING LOWEST Vs. HIGHEST CORRUPTION PERCEPTION LGAs

One of the principal objectives of the CPS project was to identify LGAs with lowest or
highest corruption perception. It was also the underlying rationale of selecting the
LGAs as units of CPS analysis. Interview questions were designed in such a way that
household, key informant or focus groups respondents would finally be required to
respond to a question demanding each respondent to conclude/confirm his/her
perception on whether or not corruption exists in the LGA of own experience, and at
98
what extent. That was expected to be reflected in the control question demanding the
respondents to state if corruption does exist in the administrative machinery of LGAs.
Assuming respondents responded to the same question under similar environment,

and data analysis equally conducted, the outcome is expected to equally gauge
corruption trends and provide corruption status in each of the 35 LGAs, hosting CPS
fieldwork activities.
Prelude to LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception

Before determining LGAs with either lowest or highest corruption perception status,
an assessment of the trends of corruption perceptions was conducted consistent
with outcomes in sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. An examination of corruption trends and
ratings across actors is done consistent with observation and selection of the first
ten LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception ratings. This approach is only
meant to confirm consistency between the outcomes based on the statistical
description provided by the collated data, vis-à-vis the outcomes based on the
statistical description and analysis of the control question data. In the control
question, respondents were requested to state whether they think corruption does
exist, and at what rate; ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘high’ or ‘very high’. Table 3.11/1 below
indicates the findings from observations in sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 to identify the
first ten LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception ratings.
Table 3.11/1: LGAs which scored lowest or highest corruption perceptions
S/N LGAs with lower corruption perception LGAs with higher corruption perception
1. Tunduru Muleba
2. Liwale Missenyi
3. Kilwa Mtwara urban
4. Tandahimba Mbozi
5. Nachingwea Newala
6. Chunya Mbeya urban
7. Mbinga Meatu
8. Ruangwa Namtumbo
9. Ulanga Bariadi
10. Rungwe Bukoba urban
Outcome of analysis of control question data

Four iterations are applied to finally conclude the lowest or highest corruption
perception status of LGAs.
Iteration One
This step underscores household, key informant and focus group respondents’
corruption perception ratings of ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘high’ or ‘very high’ separately
analysing the data to determine the percentage ranking trend in each LGA. However,
99
given the qualitative nature of data from focus group respondents, their analyses are
not directly included in the assessment, but are used to balance-check consistency of
the outcomes from analyses of the quantitative data drawn from rankings by
household and key informants.
Again, the first ten LGAs with ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘high’ or ‘very high’ corruption
perceptions are noted reflecting the rankings of household and key informant
respondents. The findings are indicated by table 3.11/2 below:
Table 3.11/2: Outcome of control question

A: Household respondents’ ranking of corruption
S/N Name of LGA Ranking S/N Name of LGA Ranking (%)

(%) status status
Very low Low
1. Ulanga 62.5 1 Ruangwa 58.3
2 Nachingwea 43.5 2 Mtwara Rural 58.3
3 Tandahimba 40 3 Mbinga 58.3
4 Liwale 36.4 4 Tunduru 56.5
5 Kilwa 33.3 5 Shinyanga Urban 56.3
6 Mtwara Rural 33.3 6 Chunya 54.2
7 Kilosa 25 7 Liwale 50
8 Namtumbo 25 8 Mbeya Rural 50
9 Tunduru 21.7 9 Tandahimba 50
10 Mbinga 20.8 10 Nachingwea 43.5

(%) status status
High Very high
1 Mbarali 75 1 Bukoba Rural 82.6
2 Muleba 73.9 2 Mbeya Urban 66.7
3 Newala 62.5 3 Meatu 53.3
4 Bukombe 62.5 4 Mtwara Urban 50
5 Bukoba Urban 62.5 5 Mbozi 45.8
6 Namtumbo 55 6 Missenyi 42.9
7 Lindi Rural 52.2 7 Lindi Rural 34.8
8 Ileje 50 8 Lindi Urban 33.3
9 Kyela 45.8 9 Ileje 31.8
10 Kishapu 43.8 10 Kilwa 29.2
B: Key informant respondents’ corruption perception ranking

(%) status status
Very low Low
2. Shinyanga Urban 100 1 Tandahimba 83.3
100
2 Kilosa 87.5 2 Mbeya Rural 75

3 Rungwe 62.5 3 Liwale 66.7
4 Mtwara Rural 50 4 Nachingwea 66.7
5 Mvomero 50 5 Ruangwa 62.5
6 Bukombe 50 6 Kyela 62.5
7 Tunduru 50 7 Morogoro Urban 62.5
8 Lindi Rural 37.5 8 Ulanga 62.5
9 Chunya 37.5 9 Mbarali 57.1
10 Ulanga 37.5 10 Mtwara Urban 57.1

(%) status status
High Very high
1 Muleba 87.5 1 Mbozi 66.7
2 Newala 75 2 Bariadi 66.7
3 Chunya 62.5 3 Bukoba Rural 60
4 Bukoba Urban 62.5 4 Kahama 33.3
5 Kishapu 57.1 5 Namtumbo 28.6
6 Missenyi 50 6 Meatu 25
7 Kilwa 37.5 7 Missenyi 25
8 Mvomero 37.5 8 Nachingwea 16.7
9 Bukombe 37.5 9 Mbeya Urban 16.7
10 Mbozi 33.3 10 Mbarali 14.3
C: Combined corruption perception ranking – household & key informant respondents
Ranking Ranking (%)

S/N
S/N Name of LGA (%) status Name of LGA status
Very low Low
1 Kilosa 56.25 1 Tandahimba 66.65
2 Shinyanga Urban 56.25 2 Mbeya Rural 62.5
3 Ulanga 50 3 Ruangwa 60.4
4 Mtwara Rural 41.65 4 Liwale 58.35
5 Rungwe 40.35 5 Nachingwea 55.1
6 Tunduru 35.85 6 Mbinga 54.15
7 Mvomero 32.5 7 Morogoro Urban 48.65
9 Kilwa 29.15 9 Tunduru 40.75
10 Mbinga 29.15 10 Kyela 39.6
Ranking Ranking (%)

S/N
S/N Name of LGA (%) status Name of LGA status
High Very high
1 Muleba 80.7 1 Bukoba Rural 71.3
2 Newala 68.75 2 Mbozi 56.25
3 Bukoba Urban 62.5 3 Bariadi 43.35
4 Kishapu 50.45 4 Mbeya Urban 41.7
5 Chunya 50 5 Meatu 39.15
101
6 Bukombe 50 6 Missenyi 33.95

7 Mbarali 44.65 7 Mtwara Urban 32.15
8 Missenyi 44.05 8 Kahama 29.7
9 Namtumbo 41.8 9 Lindi Rural 23.65
10 Mvomero 38.75 10 Ileje 22.15
Iteration Two
Step two is similar to step one, except that so long as the CPS is interested in the nil
corruption in the LGAs, the third (high) and forth (very high) columns are merged
reducing the number of columns to three; namely ‘very low’, ‘low’ and ‘high’. The ‘high’
column is the result of merging the ‘very high’ and ‘high’ columns, while the first two
columns are retained. Then the process similar to that in iteration one is repeated (to
identify the first ten on the list), and the results are as indicated in the table 3.11/3
below;
Table 3.11/3: Outcome of control question with values in the two columns merged
A (ii): Household respondents’ corruption perception ranking

(%) status status
Very low Low
1 Ulanga 62.5 1 Ruangwa 58.3
3 Tandahimba 40 3 Mbinga 58.3
4 Liwale 36.4 4 Tunduru 56.5
5 Kilwa 33.3 5 Shinyanga Urban 56.3
6 Mtwara Rural 33.3 6 Chunya 54.2
7 Kilosa 25 7 Liwale 50
8 Namtumbo 25 8 Mbeya Rural 50
9 Tunduru 21.7 9 Tandahimba 50
10 Mbinga 20.8 10 Nachingwea 43.5
S/N Name of LGA Ranking (%)

status
High
1 Bukoba Rural 95.7
2 Mbeya Urban 91.7
3 Mbarali 91.7
4 Mbozi 87.5
5 Mtwara Urban 87.5
6 Lindi Rural 87
7 Muleba 87
8 Meatu 86.7
9 Bukombe 83.3
10 Ileje 81.8
102
B (ii): Key informant respondents’ corruption perception ranking

(%) status status
Very low Low
1 Shinyanga Urban 100 1 Tandahimba 83.3
2 Kilosa 87.5 2 Mbeya Rural 75
3 Rungwe 62.5 3 Liwale 66.7
4 Mtwara Rural 50 4 Nachingwea 66.7
5 Mvomero 50 5 Ruangwa 62.5
6 Bukombe 50 6 Kyela 62.5
7 Tunduru 50 7 Morogoro Urban 62.5
8 Lindi Rural 37.5 8 Ulanga 62.5
9 Chunya 37.5 9 Mbarali 57.1
10 Ulanga 37.5 10 Mtwara Urban 57.1

status
High
1 Mbozi 100
2 Bariadi 100
3 Muleba 100
4 Bukoba Rural 80
5 Newala 75
6 Missenyi 75
7 Kishapu 71.4
8 Kahama 66.7
9 Chunya 62.5
10 Bukoba Urban 62.5
C (ii): Combined respondents’ corruption perception ranking

(%) status status
Very low Low
1 Kilosa 56.25 1 Tandahimba 66.65
2 Shinyanga Urban 56.25 2 Mbeya Rural 62.5
3 Ulanga 50 3 Ruangwa 60.4
4 Mtwara Rural 41.65 4 Liwale 58.35
5 Rungwe 40.35 5 Nachingwea 55.1
6 Tunduru 35.85 6 Mbinga 54.15
7 Mvomero 32.5 7 Morogoro Urban 48.65
9 Kilwa 29.15 9 Tunduru 40.75
10 Mbinga 29.15 10 Kyela 39.6
103

status
High
1 Mbozi 93.75
2 Muleba 93.5
3 Bukoba Rural 87.85
4 Bariadi 80
5 Missenyi 78
6 Newala 70.85
7 Kishapu 70.1
8 Meatu 68.35
9 Mtwara Urban 65.2
10 Bukoba Urban 64.6
Iteration Three
The fact that some LGAs appear more than once in the C and C (ii) tables above, is
an indicator that results therein are too impure to produce one LGA with lowest or
highest corruption perception. This informs the need to further process the data until
one LGA in either extreme direction is identified; hence step three.
This step attempts to establish an LGA with lowest or highest corruption perception
by drawing from the A – C (ii) tables, the first five LGAs from which to determine the
one that features most frequently in either extreme direction – ‘’lowest’’ or ‘’highest’’
corruption perception. The process focuses on the frequencies, temporarily ignoring
the percentage ranking values in the ‘low’ or ‘high’ columns, although they are treated
separately by implication through positioning. This step is basically the confidence
assurance indicator that the two extreme LGAs should at least appear once in the
lists. The first five most frequenting LGAs are listed in table 3.11/4 below.
Table 3.11/4: List of first 5 LGAs with lowest or highest corruption perception
Qualitative rank status LGA Frequency Position
Very low - top five Shinyanga Urban 1 1
Kilosa 1 2
Ulanga 1 3
Rungwe 1 4
Mtwara Rural 1 5
Low - top five Ruangwa 2 1
Tandahimba 1 2
Liwale 1 3
Nachingwea 1 4
Mbeya Rural 1 5
High - top five Muleba 2 1
Bukoba Urban 2 2
Mbarali 2 3
Bukombe 1 4
104
Newala 1 5
Very high - top five Bukoba Rural 2 1
Mbozi 2 2
Bariadi 1 3
Mbeya Urban 1 4
Meatu 1 5
As noted earlier, this step does not help us to concretely identify one LGA with lowest
or highest corruption perception, but to only identify a set of LGAs presumed to
contain those with “lowest” or “highest” corruption perceptions. This calls for
iteration furtherance; hence, advancing to step 4.
Iteration Four
Step 4 is a combination of the preceding three iterations destined to identify one LGA
perceived positively with “lowest” or “conversely”, with highest corruption perception.
To this end, the procedure is such that ‘very low’ and ‘low’ column values in table C (ii)
are merged, and together with values in the ‘high’ column in the same table are
arranged in a descending order so as to set and determine high values with
corresponding LGAs in the two columns.
Unlike the findings in step 3, the outcome in step 4 is determined by the magnitude of
percentage ranking. The LGAs noted are closely similar to LGAs identified in the
groups in steps 1, 2 and 3. This confirms the consistency of data and the findings
because the elements in step 1 are based on those other than the control question
response (data).
There is no repetition; every LGA appears once in each column with a complementary
data element in the corresponding column. The expectation is that respondents’
answers to the control question in each LGA constitute 100 percent valuation. This
means, therefore, if λ%, of respondents feel corruption is low, then (100-λ)% of
respondents in the same LGAs must feel and indicate that the state of corruption is
high. The findings are conclusively indicated in table 3.11/5 below.
At the later stage, using the advanced statistical data analysis tools, an attempt will
be made to merge the columns so as instead of two, the findings of the lowest or
highest corruption perception LGAs are plotted and presented in a descending or
ascending linear presentation model.
105
Table 3.11/5: Final determination of LGAs with lowest/highest corruption perception
LGA (low) % rate LGA (high) % rate

Tandahimba 95 Mbozi 93.75
Mtwara Rural 89.55 Muleba 93.5
Ulanga 87.5 Bukoba Rural 87.85
Nachingwea 85.2 Bariadi 80
Liwale 84.9 Missenyi 78
Shinyanga (U) 84.4 Newala 70.85
Mbinga 83.3 Kishapu 70.1
Ruangwa 77.05 Meatu 68.35
Tunduru 76.6 Mtwara Urban 65.2
Mbeya Rural 75 Bukoba Urban 64.6
Rungwe 73.3 Kahama 63.8
Kilosa 66.65 Mbeya Urban 62.5
Morogoro Urban 61.4 Namtumbo 61.05
Kilwa 60.4 Bukombe 60.4
Kyela 58.35 Mbarali 60.15
Lindi Urban 50.35 Ileje 59.65
Chunya 47.95 Lindi Rural 56
Mvomero 45 Mvomero 55
Lindi Rural 44 Chunya 52.1
Ileje 40.3 Lindi Urban 49.7
Mbarali 39.9 Kyela 41.65
Bukombe 39.6 Kilwa 39.6
Namtumbo 38.95 Morogoro Urban 38.6
Mbeya Urban 37.55 Kilosa 33.35
Kahama 36.25 Rungwe 26.7
Bukoba Urban 35.4 Mbeya Rural 25
Mtwara Urban 34.8 Tunduru 23.35
Meatu 31.7 Ruangwa 22.9
Kishapu 29.95 Mbinga 16.65
Newala 29.15 Shinyanga Urban 15.65
Missenyi 22 Liwale 15.15
Bariadi 20 Nachingwea 14.85
Bukoba Rural 12.15 Ulanga 12.5
Muleba 6.5 Mtwara Rural 10.4
Mbozi 6.25 Tandahimba 5
Source: CPS data sheet Source: CPS data sheet
106
Given the findings as indicated in table 3.11/5 above, Tandahimba is the LGA ranked
with lowest corruption perception by 95 percent, while conversely, Mbozi is the LGA
ranked with highest corruption perception by 93.75 percent.
3.12 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FINDINGS

Statistics
Table 3.12: statistics for measures of central tendency
Low corruption perception LGAs High corruption perception LGAs

1. Mean 51.6100 48.3971
2. Median 45.0000 55.0000
3. Mode - -
4. Std. Deviation 25.56465 25.57023
5. Variance 653.55144 653.83690
6. Skewness .053 -.053
7. Std. Error of skewness .398 .398
8. Kurtosis -1.077 -1.078
9. Std. Error of Kurtosis .778 .778
Statistical explanation of the above output

Given the data in table 3.12 above, the measures of central tendency that is (mean
median and mode) show different result due to the character of the data; the mode
for both low and high corruption perception LGAs does not exist because there is no
more than one model, and therefore there can’t be explanation.
i. Mean
The mean for ‘low’ corruption perception LGAs is 51.61 percent and that for ‘high’
corruption perception LGAs is 48.39 percent. Therefore, using the mean, the result
shows that on average for all regions and LGAs, high corruption perception is below
50 percent; meaning that more than half the population believe corruption is not
pervasive, or conversely, less than half the population believe corruption is pervasive.
ii. Median
The median for low corruption perception LGAs is 45 percent and that for the high
corruption perception LGAs, is 55 percent, therefore, by using the median as
measure of central tendency the results indicate that in all the regions and LGAs, over
half the population believes corruption is high or conversely less than half the
population believe corruption is low.
107
Conclusions
Given the two results above, the different results based on the mean or median is
obvious. This difference is due to the kind of the data. It is, therefore recommended
to use median as measure of central tendency and conclude that the corruption
perception in LGAs is high on average. This is due to the fact that the data are
affected by the extreme value, which by observation indicates that there is very high
value and very low value (extreme value).
iii. Standard deviation and variance

The standard deviation of the low corruption perception LGAs is 25.56 with the
variance of 653.55, while that for high corruption perception LGAs is 25.57 with the
variance of 653.84. This means that there is a big variation across the high and low
corruption perception LGAs.
iv. Skewness
The coefficient of skewness for low corruption perception LGAs is 0.053, and its
standard error of 0.398. If the standard error is multiplied by two the answer is
0.796. And the coefficient of skewness must lie between negative 2 standard error
and positive 2 standard error, from (-0.796 and 0.796), then since 0.053 is between
these two values or 0.053 is not far from zero then suffices to say that the data is
symmetrically distributed. Also for high corruption perception LGAs the data is also
symmetrically distributed since -0.053 is near to zero and it lies between (-0.796 and
0.796)
However, the coefficient of kurtosis is -1.077 and -1.078 for low and high corruption
perception LGAs respectively. These show that data form a leptokurtic distribution
because numerical value of kurtosis is negative and far from zero.
Statistical distribution
Using skewness and kurtosis therefore, shows that although the data is symmetrical
distributed, they are not following a normal distribution due to the fact that they have
high negative value of kurtosis that form (leptokurtic) and therefore, concluding that
the data are not normally distributed.
108
Graph 3.12/1: Low corruption perception LGAs (Symmetrical but Leptokurtic)
10
2
Frequency
Std. Dev = 25.57

Mean = 48.4
0 N = 35.00
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0
Graph 3.12/2: High corruption perception LGAs (Symmetrical but Leptokurtic)

10
2
Frequency
Std. Dev = 25.57

Mean = 48.4
0 N = 35.00
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0
109
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A number of policy recommendations are noted on the basis of CPS key findings
throughout the sections 3.3 to 3.12. These will be discussed immediately after the
first category of recommendations, distinctively extracted from interviewees.
Respondents in the FGD and questionnaire-based respondents were in the course of
interviews, were required to give recommendations with implication to policy reform,
helping to improve good governance practices thereby hence deterring corruption.
The recommendations extracted from respondents are designed in a way that they
set assignments to role players – the Government and Non-State Actors. They are
restated below.
To the Government
It is hereby recommended:
4.1 That the Government should ensure that anti-corruption laws, policy and
strategies, as they exist now, are fully and indiscriminately implemented
across the LGAs and Central Government structures;
4.2. That the Government should put in place a policy to guide the establishment of
anti-corruption committees/departments at each level of governance hierarchy
in the LGAs and MDAs with mandate to oversee compliance to anti-corruption
laws, and report to corresponding PCCB authorities;
4.3. That the Government should internally source, budget and allocate enough
resources to ensure adequate financing to the locally conceived governance
and anti-corruption projects/programmes in the LGAs and MDAs that do not
necessarily depend on DPs’ financial assistance, which is noted as sometimes
erratic, sporadic and unreliable;
4.4 That the Government should ensure that all public sector personnel including
the rank and file, middle cadre staff and senior executives receive decent
salaries adequate to cater for a decent living as means to quench falsified
claims of ‘meagre salary’ as excuse for corruption, thereby severely punishing
indecent corrupt personnel and staff;
4.5 That the Government should establish and enforce implementation of the legal,
policy and institutional regime that establishes and ensures rigorous
compliance to leadership ethical standards across the terrain of politics,
business and bureaucracy; and
4.6 That the Government establishes conducive legal, policy and institutional
environment to backup public scrutiny – monitoring and evaluation of integrity
institutions, such as PCCB and police to ensure that they are accountable to
public.
110
To Non State Actors

It is hereby recommended:
4.7 That NSAs devise collective anti-corruption or good governance agenda,
strategies, plans and activities intended to harmonise and facilitate similar and
coordinated engagements in LGAs and MDAs, through civic education, social
movements, outreach to grassroots/rural areas, and M&E (compliance to
leadership ethics);
4.8 That collectively, NSAs undertake critical self assessment to identify strategic
entry points of cooperation with LGAs/MDAs so as to eradicate corruption and
promote good governance;
4.9 That NSAs restore/reinforce public credibility/trust, promote their unique
identity and visibility through media and community participatory projects and
programmes meant to combat corruption and promote good governance;
4.10 That inter-faith leaders maintain ardent preaching against corruption in order
to restore socially-acceptable morals, accountability, and good governance
practices; and
4.11 That the general public resist tendencies for corruption demand or supply, but
instead volunteer reporting corruption criminal offences to designated public
institutions/organisations/departments across the LGAs and MDAs hierarchy.
Surveys findings-based policy recommendations

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the second category of policy recommendations
is based on the surveys’ analyses and findings across the sections 3.3 through 3.12,
as follows:
4.12 As confirmed by findings, the majority public members are aware of
corruption, in which case the relevant policy implication is for the Government
and NSAs to strategically shift away from IEC activities towards focussing on
specific and direct corruption reduction actions.
4.13 The forces driving people into corruption are largely related to weak
governance structures/systems in the LGAs. The policy recommendation in
this regard is to ensure legal guarantee to public access to information to
strengthen public demand for accountability, transparency and rule of law, as
well as obligate the bureaucracy in the LGAs and MDAs to release governance
pertinent information on demand or otherwise, augmenting public demand for
accountability. In this regard, LGAs should adopt the ongoing national-level
underlying MKUKUTA PAF dialogue structure as an interim strategic framework
for information exchange with NSAs.
4.14 The outcome of the analyses of corruption trends across actors, and indeed
examining the internal elements perceived as seeking and directly
appropriating the rent of corruption in the sectors/departments, point to
existence of weak accountability in the administrative structures and systems
of LGAs’ departments, institutions, agencies or organisations. Whereas we
111
recommend carrying-out an evaluation of the existing horizontal and vertical

accountability systems in the LGAs in order to take appropriate corrective
measures, the Government should immediately devise and fix the policy to
strengthen [LGAs service delivery] users’ demand for accountability through
improving the system of information flow, transparency and participation in
policy-design.
4.15 [3.7 Policy implication recommendations]:
i. The fact that the police and the Judiciary are the principal corruption
shareholders in LGAs, the implication is that keeping law and order in the
LGAs is at stake. Elimination and permanent control of corruption from the
police and the judiciary will bear positive results in fighting corrupt
elements in other departments of the LGAs. An anti-corruption policy
strategy specifically designed for police and the judiciary is imperative;
ii. Although the legal sector policy reform programme (LSRP) and the LGRP
are being concurrently implemented, the imperative is to devise and fix the
strategy that ensures harmonisation of the two reforms clearly focussing
on LGAs; and
iii. PSRP is an overall public sector reform initiative with little or no specific
strategy to overhaul the police force, which unfortunately, over the past 47
years it still retains and maintains the core philosophy, principles, and
structures of the antiquated colonial state police. Because of the
functioning ‘top-down’ disciplinary code of command, it is impossible for
the ‘rank and file’ to check corruption within the police force from below,
but instead, many low-ranking police officers have tended to ‘cope’ with it.
It is therefore recommended to overhaul the police force, replacing its
current philosophy, principles and structures with those for police service.
The legitimate state policing should solely rely on professional practices
rather than receiving and enforcing orders from political power holders.
4.16 Public readiness to counteract corruption exists amid preponderant weak legal
and policy instruments to empower the citizenry to accomplish it duty in that
regard. The Government should recognize such public readiness as
formidable potential to design a policy that equally strengthens PCCB and
similar institutions within the Government together with efforts to coordinate,
accommodate and enhancing capacity of NSAs fighting corruption in the
LGAs. Merely mentioning that NACSAP recognises NSAs is inadequate. In this
regard, the areas requiring urgent Government policy and legal attention are
noted to include:
i. Activating the functional and institutional coordination structure to guide
anti-corruption actors in LGAs to coordinate reporting of corruption to
PCCB;
112
ii. Review of PCCA with the goal of accommodating public litigation as

strategic incentive to mobilise public support in the fight against
corruption;
iii. Enactment of the whistleblowers protection law;
iv. Launching of LGAs-NSAs Dialogues through a number of strategic entry-
points/engagements, including participatory budgeting process [planning,
allocation review, monitoring and evaluation] and governance surveys
findings/reports, e.g. CPS findings – aimed at reducing corruption and/or
promoting good governance in the LGAs;
v. Launching of efforts and specific programmes dedicated at enhancing
civic competence across communities in the LGAs; and
vi. Enactment of legislation to enforce public access to pertinent governance
information in the LGAs.
4.17.1 Weak institutional link between PCCB and LGAs governance structures is
observed as pervasive. There is little understanding/misconception or non
awareness about the role and significance of CSOs involvement in fighting
corruption, and how CSOs’ role differs from that of Government and LGAs in
particular. This state of affairs calls for specific policy recommendations as
follows:
i. Need to put in place an efficient governance coordination structure and
system practically linking the structures of PCCB with those across the
levels in the LGAs; and
ii. Reinforce the strategy enabling the CSOs to disseminate appropriate and
relevant information about how similar or different is their anti-corruption
role and significance in relation to that of Government.
4.17.2 The proposed whistleblowers protection legislation by Government is the
positive move and, should therefore be supported. However, enabling the
NSAs to effectively use the law when enacted and assented is imperative. This
calls for supporting NSAs to translate and disseminate the Kiswahili version of
the law. The policy direction is therefore needed to guide LGAs, NSAs and
PCCB develop and adopt the collective strategy against corruption.
4.17.3 The strategic inclusion of inter-faith organisations to fight corruption is a noble
innovation. However, the strategy must be comprehensive and holistic across
different religions. This calls for the Government to lead the process to design
the policy for cohabiting LGAs with inter-faith organisations across governance
structures and levels of the former. Central Government should proactively put
the policy in place to establish and formalise anti-corruption working
relationship between inter-faith organisations and LGAs. To that end, we
recommend establishment of the Joint Corruption Information Centres (CIC)
coordinated by inter-faith organisations at different levels, responsible for
113
collecting pertinent information from public and equally feeding the same to
the PCCB and LGAs governance structures.
114
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ANNEX I: DATA TABLES

(i): Corruption perception ranking across actors in LGAs
LGA Actors Percentage ranking
Political Public office Public office Dept.
(parties) bearers (LGA bearers employees
leaders high office) (W&V)
Education 0.0 31.0 18.5 50.6
Health 0.0 24.3 32.7 43.1
Lands & Housing 0.0 25.0 33.3 41.7
Licensing & Rev. 12.5 37.5 41.7 8.4
Judiciary 0.0 22.2 69.5 8.4
WDCs 0.0 22.2 66.7 11.1
Ruangwa Police 4.8 19.7 51.2 24.4
DED Office 24.3 20.0 48.6 7.2
Natural Resources 0.0 25.0 62.5 12.5
Water & Sewerage 0.0 33.4 50.0 16.7
Power Utility/TANESCO 0.0 33.4 66.7 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 25.0 75.0 0.0
Cooperatives 0.0 20.0 80.0 0.0
Education 27.6 51.3 6.8 14.3
Health 2.3 74.4 6.8 16.6
Lands & Housing 4.8 21.9 23.8 49.6
Licensing & Rev. 23.8 40.5 11.9 23.9
Judiciary 15.2 51.1 21.0 12.7
WDCs 5.3 64.7 10.6 19.6
Lindi Urban Police 25.0 52.4 14.3 8.4
DED Office 2.5 15.0 35.0 47.5
Water & Sewerage 0.0 52.5 22.5 25.0
HIV/AIDS 7.5 55.0 12.5 25.0
Cooperatives 13.2 67.5 9.4 10.0
Education 6.3 8.7 8.7 76.4
Health 0.0 4.6 11.4 84.1
Lands & Housing 0.0 80.4 5.0 14.7
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 77.0 5.3 17.8
Judiciary 0.0 50.0 6.3 43.8
WDCs 0.0 90.0 10.0 0.0
Kilwa Police 0.0 81.5 0.0 18.5
DED Office 0.0 74.3 0.0 25.8
Water & Sewerage 0.0 58.4 25.0 16.7
HIV/AIDS 0.0 16.7 33.4 0.0
Lindi Rural Education 2.5 76.7 15.9 5.0
Health 8.4 86.4 2.7 2.7
Lands & Housing 8.4 75.0 16.7 0.0
119
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 91.2 8.8 0.0

Judiciary 20.0 72.9 4.8 2.4
WDCs 11.3 57.4 28.4 3.0
Police 8.4 69.5 19.5 2.8
DED Office 8.4 65.5 22.7 3.6
Water & Sewerage 20.2 64.3 15.5 0.0
HIV/AIDS 12.5 81.3 6.3 0.0
Education 0.0 81.3 6.3 12.5
Health 10.0 80.0 0.0 10.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 12.5 87.5 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 90.0 0.0 10.0
WDCs 0.0 96.7 3.4 0.0
Liwale Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 75.0 12.5 12.5
Water & Sewerage 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 75.0 0.0 25.0
Cooperatives 0.0 71.5 16.1 12.5
Education 8.4 60.4 0.0 31.3
Health 0.0 61.7 8.4 30.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 90.0 10.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 76.2 0.0 23.8
Judiciary 7.2 61.5 12.2 19.3
WDCs 0.0 51.2 23.8 25.0
Nachingwea Police 8.4 68.8 8.4 14.6
DED Office 0.0 41.7 16.7 41.7
Water & Sewerage 0.0 91.7 0.0 8.4
HIV/AIDS 0.0 66.7 16.7 16.7
Mbozi Education 0.0 90.4 0.0 9.7
Health 0.0 92.9 0.0 7.2
Lands & Housing 0.0 92.9 0.0 7.2
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 92.9 0.0 7.2
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 0.0 89.5 10.6 0.0
Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
120

Education 0.0 45.0 2.5 52.6
Health 0.0 89.0 0.0 11.0
Lands & Housing 7.2 79.8 7.2 5.9
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 86.4 2.7 11.0
Judiciary 0.0 82.9 0.0 17.1
WDCs 18.8 29.2 0.0 52.2
Ileje Police 2.8 97.2 0.0 0.0
DED Office 7.2 33.6 0.0 59.3
Water & Sewerage 0.0 84.2 0.0 15.9
HIV/AIDS 0.0 76.9 10.0 13.2
Education 0.0 87.5 12.5 0.0
Health 6.3 85.4 8.4 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 83.4 16.7 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 97.9 2.2 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 91.5 8.5 0.0
WDCs 0.0 13.8 86.3 0.0
Chunya Police 0.0 92.9 7.2 0.0
DED Office 10.0 80.0 10.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 30.0 20.0 0.0
Education 0.0 84.6 0.0 15.5
Health 0.0 91.7 0.0 8.4
Lands & Housing 0.0 91.7 0.0 8.4
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 83.4 0.0 16.7
Judiciary 0.0 83.4 0.0 16.7
WDCs 0.0 25.5 52.0 22.6
Mbeya Urban Police 0.0 83.4 0.0 16.7
DED Office 0.0 60.7 3.6 35.7
Water & Sewerage 0.0 75.0 0.0 25.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 80.0 0.0 20.0
Kyela Education 5.0 72.5 10.0 12.5
Health 0.0 89.6 8.4 2.1
Lands & Housing 6.3 60.7 18.8 14.3
Licensing & Rev. 7.7 92.3 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 97.9 2.1 0.0
WDCs 2.8 46.5 50.8 0.0
Police 0.0 93.2 6.8 0.0
DED Office 13.4 30.0 35.3 21.5
121

Water & Sewerage 7.7 66.5 18.7 7.2
HIV/AIDS 12.5 83.7 3.9 0.0
Cooperatives 15.0 65.0 20.0 0.0
Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mbarali Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 5.9 76.1 11.8 6.3
Health 0.0 83.4 11.9 4.8
Lands & Housing 8.4 54.8 33.4 3.6
Licensing & Rev. 3.0 62.2 24.8 10.1
Judiciary 0.0 70.1 30.0 0.0
WDCs 13.8 37.2 49.1 0.0
Rungwe Police 0.0 66.8 30.3 3.0
DED Office 7.2 28.6 60.7 3.6
Water & Sewerage 20.0 50.0 30.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 12.5 67.9 19.7 0.0
Education 0.0 81.8 2.8 15.5
Health 0.0 97.9 0.0 2.2
Lands & Housing 0.0 41.7 23.4 35.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 79.2 10.9 10.0
Judiciary 0.0 93.2 2.3 4.6
WDCs 9.7 12.2 53.6 24.7
Mbeya Rural Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 11.3 7.5 38.8 42.5
Water & Sewerage 0.0 92.3 7.7 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 45.5 50.0 4.6
Cooperatives 0.0 50.0 25.0 25.0
Mtwara Urban Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 97.8 2.3 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
122
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0

WDCs 7.2 30.2 62.7 0.0
Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 90.5 9.6 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 85.7 14.3 0.0
Education 0.0 70.9 5.6 23.7
Health 0.0 84.5 0.0 15.5
Lands & Housing 0.0 97.8 0.0 2.3
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 39.6 0.0 60.4
WDCs 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Newala Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 41.3 16.3 42.5
Education 0.0 86.9 13.4 0.0
Health 0.0 74.4 14.2 11.5
Lands & Housing 0.0 97.8 0.0 2.3
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 0.0 25.0 75.0 0.0
Mtwara Rural Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
Education 0.0 59.5 25.0 15.5
Health 0.0 84.2 12.5 3.4
Lands & Housing 0.0 76.5 10.0 13.6
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 60.0 5.0 35.0
Judiciary 0.0 77.5 12.5 10.0
WDCs 10.0 40.0 32.5 17.5
Tandahimba Police 0.0 67.9 8.4 23.8
DED Office 0.0 71.5 7.2 21.5
Water & Sewerage 25.0 68.8 0.0 6.3
HIV/AIDS 16.7 25.0 33.4 25.0
Cooperatives 62.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
123
Education 6.3 32.5 0.0 61.3

Health 0.0 21.8 8.4 69.9
Lands & Housing 14.8 6.8 15.9 62.5
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 25.6 10.9 63.6
Judiciary 6.3 19.6 10.6 63.6
WDCs 0.0 15.4 19.9 64.8
Morogoro Urban Police 0.0 37.0 6.8 56.3
DED Office 5.0 18.8 17.5 58.8
Water & Sewerage 0.0 24.5 13.1 62.5
HIV/AIDS 6.3 31.3 8.5 54.0
Cooperatives 11.2 33.3 11.1 44.5
Education 0.0 89.9 3.0 7.2
Health 0.0 93.8 0.0 6.3
Lands & Housing 0.0 82.8 2.4 14.9
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 93.8 0.0 6.3
Judiciary 0.0 76.5 2.4 21.2
WDCs 0.0 62.7 21.1 16.3
Ulanga Police 0.0 70.3 8.7 21.2
DED Office 0.0 55.0 33.8 11.3
Water & Sewerage 0.0 84.9 8.9 6.3
HIV/AIDS 6.3 87.5 0.0 6.3
Cooperatives 0.0 66.7 16.7 16.7
Education 26.6 50.0 23.5 0.0
Health 2.1 56.3 37.5 4.2
Lands & Housing 13.7 53.7 32.8 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 21.5 45.3 26.2 7.2
Judiciary 8.7 50.5 16.5 24.3
WDCs 8.4 18.8 60.4 12.5
Mvomero Police 2.1 65.4 28.4 4.2
DED Office 19.7 28.0 43.9 8.4
Water & Sewerage 29.2 66.7 4.2 0.0
HIV/AIDS 20.9 16.7 37.5 25.0
Cooperatives 28.6 46.5 25.0 0.0
Kilosa Education 0.0 91.7 8.4 0.0
Health 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 86.9 10.6 2.7
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 85.9 14.2 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 91.3 2.5 6.3
WDCs 5.3 28.6 66.2 0.0
Police 0.0 97.6 2.4 0.0
DED Office 0.0 87.9 12.2 0.0
124
Water & Sewerage 0.0 92.9 7.2 0.0

HIV/AIDS 7.2 89.8 3.2 0.0
Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 10.0 65.0 25.0 0.0
Bukombe Police 16.7 81.2 2.2 0.0
DED Office 0.0 80.8 19.3 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 31.3 50.0 0.0 18.8
Health 37.5 37.5 0.0 25.0
Lands & Housing 29.6 26.2 22.8 21.6
Licensing & Rev. 31.3 50.0 0.0 18.8
Judiciary 31.3 43.8 6.3 18.8
WDCs 30.0 21.5 21.5 27.2
Kishapu Police 22.2 50.0 5.6 22.2
DED Office 28.4 53.4 10.0 8.4
Water & Sewerage 25.0 62.5 0.0 12.5
HIV/AIDS 25.0 62.5 0.0 12.5
Cooperatives 25.0 62.5 0.0 12.5
Education 3.6 48.8 0.0 47.6
Health 0.0 55.1 3.9 41.1
Lands & Housing 7.2 48.8 3.6 40.4
Licensing & Rev. 4.2 91.7 0.0 4.2
Judiciary 0.0 68.0 0.0 32.1
WDCs 30.6 11.1 16.7 41.7
Meatu Police 4.2 75.0 0.0 20.8
DED Office 0.0 36.7 5.0 58.3
Water & Sewerage 8.4 58.4 8.4 25.0
HIV/AIDS 12.5 43.8 6.3 37.5
Cooperatives 25.0 25.0 12.5 37.5
Kahama Education 55.6 30.6 2.8 11.1
Health 0.0 87.5 0.0 12.5
Lands & Housing 0.0 47.1 0.0 3.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 2.8 44.5 0.0 2.8
125
WDCs 3.9 15.4 30.8 0.0

Police 0.0 44.1 0.0 5.9
DED Office 2.7 29.0 2.7 15.8
Water & Sewerage 7.2 42.9 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 16.7 16.7 16.7
Cooperatives 0.0 11.1 11.1 27.8
Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 5.6 94.5 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 7.2 92.9 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 83.4 16.7 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 20.0 16.7 43.4 20.0
Bariadi Police 5.6 83.4 11.1 0.0
DED Office 25.0 50.0 8.4 16.7
Water & Sewerage 0.0 70.0 20.0 10.0
HIV/AIDS 10.0 70.0 10.0 10.0
Education 22.2 61.2 16.7 0.0
Health 18.2 48.5 16.7 16.7
Lands & Housing 50.0 33.3 0.0 16.7
Licensing & Rev. 16.7 61.2 5.6 16.7
Judiciary 22.8 43.9 16.7 16.7
WDCs 21.5 31.0 31.0 16.7
Shinyanga Urban Police 22.8 77.3 0.0 0.0
DED Office 26.7 41.7 31.7 0.0
Water & Sewerage 12.5 52.1 35.4 0.0
HIV/AIDS 20.0 20.0 10.0 50.0
Education 33.4 66.7 0.0 0.0
Health 33.4 66.7 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 25.0 62.5 12.5 0.0
WDCs 12.5 66.7 20.9 0.0
Tunduru Police 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 33.4 64.0 0.0 2.7
Water & Sewerage 33.4 66.7 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 12.5 87.5 0.0 0.0
Cooperatives 33.4 31.0 35.7 0.0
Mbinga Education 8.4 62.5 20.9 8.4
126
Health 0.0 77.1 0.0 22.9

Lands & Housing 8.4 50.0 8.4 33.4
Licensing & Rev. 7.2 69.1 0.0 23.9
Judiciary 0.0 62.5 4.6 33.0
WDCs 0.0 46.5 26.3 27.2
Police 0.0 91.5 0.0 8.5
DED Office 0.0 61.2 7.2 31.7
Water & Sewerage 0.0 78.5 0.0 21.5
HIV/AIDS 0.0 59.6 4.6 35.9
Education 3.0 88.3 0.0 8.8
Health 2.7 89.5 2.7 5.3
Lands & Housing 5.6 80.6 5.6 8.4
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 94.1 0.0 5.9
Judiciary 12.5 76.4 2.8 8.4
WDCs 20.6 51.4 15.7 12.5
Namtumbo Police 6.3 83.2 5.3 5.3
DED Office 0.0 86.7 6.7 6.7
Water & Sewerage 3.9 77.5 11.0 7.7
HIV/AIDS 17.1 67.6 6.3 9.1
Cooperatives 20.9 58.3 12.5 8.4
Education 19.1 80.9 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 70.0 30.0 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 10.0 90.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 0.0 75.0 25.0 0.0
Bukoba Rural Police 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
DED Office 0.0 75.0 25.0 0.0
Water & Sewerage 0.0 35.7 14.3 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
Bukoba Urban Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 87.0 13.1 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 96.5 3.6 0.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 97.6 2.4 0.0
WDCs 0.0 13.4 72.3 14.3
Police 0.0 97.9 2.2 0.0
DED Office 0.0 62.5 31.3 6.3
Water & Sewerage 0.0 85.7 14.3 0.0
127

HIV/AIDS 0.0 62.5 37.5 0.0
Education 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 97.1 0.0 3.0
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
WDCs 0.0 97.1 3.0 0.0
Muleba Police 3.0 97.1 0.0 0.0
DED Office 20.6 61.8 8.8 8.9
Water & Sewerage 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Education 0.0 86.9 13.2 0.0
Health 0.0 97.2 2.8 0.0
Lands & Housing 0.0 42.9 46.5 10.7
Licensing & Rev. 0.0 90.7 9.4 0.0
Judiciary 0.0 84.2 7.9 7.9
WDCs 3.2 34.4 56.3 6.3
Missenyi Police 2.7 89.5 5.3 2.7
DED Office 0.0 72.8 22.8 4.6
Water & Sewerage 0.0 90.0 10.0 0.0
HIV/AIDS 0.0 56.7 26.7 16.7
(ii). Qualitative assessment of status of corruption: Households
Region LGA Ranking

District Very Low Low High Very High
Ruangwa 8.3 58.3 16.7 16.7
Lindi Urban 12.5 16.7 37.5 33.3
Kilwa 33.3 25 12.5 29.2
LINDI
Lindi Rural 4.3 8.7 52.2 34.8
Liwale 36.4 50 4.5 9.1
Nachingwea 43.5 43.5 13 0
MBEYA Mbozi 0 12.5 41.7 45.8
Ileje 13.6 4.5 50 31.8
Chunya 4.2 54.2 37.5 4.2
Mbeya Urban 4.2 4.2 25 66.7
Kyela 12.5 16.7 45.8 25
Mbarali 4.2 4.2 75 16.7
128
Rungwe 18.2 40.9 22.7 18.2

Mbeya Rural 12.5 50 25 12.5
Mtwara Urban 0 12.5 37.5 50
Newala 12.5 20.8 62.5 4.2
MTWARA
Mtwara Rural 33.3 58.3 4.2 4.2
Tandahimba 40 50 0 10
Morogoro Urban 13 34.8 26.1 26.1
Ulanga 62.5 12.5 25 0
MOROGORO
Mvomero 15 25 40 20
Kilosa 25 20.8 33.3 20.8
Bukombe 0 16.7 62.5 20.8
Kishapu 18.8 12.5 43.8 25
Meatu 6.7 6.7 33.3 53.3
SHINYANGA Kahama 17.4 21.7 34.8 26.1
Bariadi 20 20 40 20
Shinyanga
Urban 12.5 56.3 25 6.3
Tunduru 21.7 56.5 17.4 4.3
RUVUMA Mbinga 20.8 58.3 16.7 4.2
Namtumbo 25 10 55 10
Bukoba Rural 0 4.3 13 82.6
Bukoba Urban 0 33.3 62.5 4.2
KAGERA
Muleba 0 13 73.9 13
Missenyi 9.5 9.5 38.1 42.9
(iii). Qualitative assessment of status of corruption: Key informants
Region LGA Ranking

District Very Low Low High Very High
Ruangwa 25 62.5 12.5 0
Lindi Urban 28.6 42.9 28.6 0
Kilwa 25 37.5 37.5 0
LINDI
Lindi Rural 37.5 37.5 12.5 12.5
Liwale 16.7 66.7 16.7 0
Nachingwea 16.7 66.7 0 16.7
Mbozi 0 0 33.3 66.7
Ileje 12.5 50 25 12.5
Chunya 37.5 0 62.5 0
Mbeya Urban 16.7 50 16.7 16.7
MBEYA
Kyela 25 62.5 12.5 0
Mbarali 14.3 57.1 14.3 14.3
Rungwe 62.5 25.5 0 12.5
Mbeya Rural 12.5 75 12.5 0
MTWARA Mtwara Urban 0 57.1 28.6 14.3
129
Newala 12.5 12.5 75 0

Mtwara Rural 50 37.5 12.5 0
Tandahimba 16.7 83.3 0 0
Morogoro Urban 12.5 62.5 25 0
Ulanga 37.5 62.5 0 0
MOROGORO
Mvomero 50 0 37.5 12.5
Kilosa 87.5 0 12.5 0
Bukombe 50 12.5 37.5 0
Kishapu 28.6 0 57.1 14.3
Meatu 0 50 25 25
SHINYANGA Kahama 16.7 16.7 33.3 33.3
Bariadi 0 0 33.3 66.7
Shinyanga
Urban 100 0 0 0
Tunduru 50 25 12.5 12.5
RUVUMA Mbinga 37.5 50 12.5 0
Namtumbo 0 42.9 28.6 28.6
Bukoba Rural 0 20 20 60
Bukoba Urban 0 37.5 62.5 0
KAGERA
Muleba 0 0 87.5 12.5
Missenyi 0 25 50 25
(iv). Qualitative assessment of status of corruption: Households + Key informants
Region LGA Ranking

Very
District Very Low Low High High
Ruangwa 16.65 60.4 14.6 8.35
Lindi Urban 20.55 29.8 33.05 16.65
Kilwa 29.15 31.25 25 14.6
LINDI
Lindi Rural 20.9 23.1 32.35 23.65
Liwale 26.55 58.35 10.6 4.55
Nachingwea 30.1 55.1 6.5 8.35
Mbozi 0 6.25 37.5 56.25
Ileje 13.05 27.25 37.5 22.15
Chunya 20.85 27.1 50 2.1
Mbeya Urban 10.45 27.1 20.85 41.7
MBEYA
Kyela 18.75 39.6 29.15 12.5
Mbarali 9.25 30.65 44.65 15.5
Rungwe 40.35 33.2 11.35 15.35
Mbeya Rural 12.5 62.5 18.75 6.25
MTWARA Mtwara Urban 0 34.8 33.05 32.15
Newala 12.5 16.65 68.75 2.1
130
Mtwara Rural 41.65 47.9 8.35 2.1

Tandahimba 28.35 66.65 0 5
Morogoro Urban 12.75 48.65 25.55 13.05
Ulanga 50 37.5 12.5 0
MOROGORO
Mvomero 32.5 12.5 38.75 16.25
Kilosa 56.25 10.4 22.9 10.4
Bukombe 25 14.6 50 10.4
Kishapu 23.7 6.25 50.45 19.65
Meatu 3.35 28.35 29.15 39.15
SHINYANGA
Kahama 17.05 19.2 34.05 29.7
Bariadi 10 10 36.65 43.35
Shinyanga Urban 56.25 28.15 12.5 3.15
Tunduru 35.85 40.75 14.95 8.4
RUVUMA Mbinga 29.15 54.15 14.6 2.1
Namtumbo 12.5 26.45 41.8 19.3
Bukoba Rural 0 12.15 16.5 71.3
Bukoba Urban 0 35.4 62.5 2.1
KAGERA
Muleba 0 6.5 80.7 12.75
Missenyi 4.75 17.25 44.05 33.95
131
ANNEX II: CONTACTS OF CPS PARTNER/HOST ORGANISATIONS

1. Organization: Mtwara Region NGOs network (MRENGO)
Name: Mr. Allan Peter Mkopoka
Field Title: CPS Project host organization
Region: Mtwara
P.O.Box: 395
Region: Mtwara, Tanzania
E-mail: mtwararegionngos@yahoo.com
Tel.: +255 232 334 298 or +255 784 355 201
2. Organization: Lindi NGO Network (LINGONET)

Name: Mr. Sharif. Maloya
Region: Lindi
P.O. Box: 92 Lindi
E-mail: smaloya22@yahoo.com or lingonetlindi@yahoo.co.uk
Tel.: +255 232 202 630 or +255 787 187 008
3. Organization: Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU)

Name: Mr. Joseph Yangole
Field Title: CPS Project host organization contact
Region: Shinyanga
P.O. Box: 189 Shinyanga
Tel.: +255 282 763 260 or +255 756 032 919
4. Organization: Union of NGOs in Morogoro (UNGO)

Name: Mr.Venance A. Mlali
Region: Morogoro
P.O.Box: 6075 Morogoro
E-mail: venancem2000@yahoo.com
Tel.: +255 232 600 362 or +255 754 310 762
5. Organization: Malezi Alive Pioneers (MAP) / ForDIA Coordinator

Name: Mr. Ulimboka Mwakilili
Region: Mbeya
Postal Box: 2034 Mbeya
E-mail: ubkmwakilili@yahoo.com
Tel.: +255 713 521 533 or +255 713 521 533
6. Organization: Nindai Poverty Alleviation Association (NIPAA)
132
Name: Mr. Michael Wilson Sadiki

Region: Ruvuma
P.O. Box: 150 Ruvuma, Tanzania
E-mail: sadiki_nipaa@yahoo.com
Tel.: +255 252 600 222 or +255 713 570 861
7. Organization: Gerlaidina Orphanage& Education Centre

Name: Mr. Thaddeus Mashebe
Region: Kagera
E-mail: tmutarubukwa@yahoo.com
Tel.: +255 787 579957
133
ANNEX III: LIST OF LGAs

1. Bariadi
2. Bukoba Rural
3. Bukoba Urban
4. Bukombe
5. Chunya
6. Ileje
7. Kahama
8. Kilosa
9. Kilwa
10. Kishapu
11. Kwela
12. Lindi Rural
13. Lindi Urban
14. Liwale
15. Mbarali
16. Mbeya Rural
17. Mbeya Urban
18. Mbinga
19. Mbozi
20. Meatu
21. Missenyi
22. Morogoro Urban
23. Mtwara Rural
24. Mtwara Urban
25. Muleba
26. Mvomero
27. Nachingwea
28. Namtumbo
29. Newala
30. Ruangwa
31. Rungwe
32. Shinyanga Urban
33. Tandahimba
34. Tunduru
35. Ulanga
134
ANNEX IV: CPS 2007/8 LGAs POPULATION
No Region District / LGA Population Total
1 Shinyanga Male Female

Shinyanga urban 66,835 68,331 135,166
Kishapu 120,802 119,284 240,086
Kahama 295,578 300,878 596,456
Bukombe 197,122 199,301 396,423
Bariadi 286,785 318,724 605,509
Meatu 119,721 129,228 248,949
Total 1,086,843 1,135,746 2,222,589
2 Lindi Ruangwa 59,993 64,523 124,516
Lindi urban 20,300 21,249 41,549
Lindi rural 102,530 113,234 215,764
Kilwa 82,817 89,033 171,850
Liwale 36,804 38,742 75,546
Nachingwea 78,915 83,166 162,087
Total 381,359 409,947 791,312
3 Mbeya Mbozi 245,151 270,119 515,270
Ileje 51,786 58,408 110,194
Chunya 103,762 102,853 206,615
Mbeya urban 126,679 139,743 266,422
Kwela 83,342 91,128 174,470
Mbarali 115,280 119,628 234,908
Rungwe 145,611 161,659 307,270
Mbeya rural 119,214 135,683 254,897
Total 990,825 1,079,221 2,070,046
4 Mtwara Mtwara urban 45,122 47,480 92,602
Newala 84,916 99,014 183,930
Mtwara rural 96,869 107,901 204,770
Tandahimba 94,026 110,622 204,648
Total 320,933 365,017 685,950
5 Morogoro Morogoro urban 113,639 115,224 228,863
Ulanga 95,915 98,294 194,209
Mvomero 131,256 129,269 260,525
Kilosa 244,201 245,312 489,513
Total 585,011 588,099 1,173,110
6 Ruvuma Namtumbo 91,070 94,061 185,131
Mbinga 198,405 206,394 404,799
Tunduru 120,597 127,379 247,976
Total 410,072 427,834 837,906
7 Kagera Bukoba rural 191,364 203,766 395,130
Bukoba urban 40,822 40,399 81,221
Muleba 192,252 194,076 386,328
Missenyi
Total 424,438 438,241 862,679
Source: National Census 2002 Report
135

Fordia Corruption Perception Index For Tanzania: 2008

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Fordia Corruption Perception Index For Tanzania: 2008

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CITIZENS’ AWARENESS AND

Who is not corrupt in

C: Combined corruption perception ranking 101

LGRP Local Government Reform Programme

TANESCO Tanzania Electric Supply Corporation

List of Graphs, Charts and Figures

Primarily, CPS anchors on broader stakeholders’ support, mobilisation of which was

Since early 1990s impeccable evidence attests to Tanzania’s country worsening

Objectives of the Corruption Perception Surveys (CPS)

Sample size Design

Surveys data was collected from 7 regions, 35 LGAs, 35 wards, 70 streets/villages.

FACTORS INFLUENCING GOVERNANCE/ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY ENVIRONMENT

i. Level of public awareness on (civic competence against) corruption;

Level of awareness about corruption

Driving forces for corruption behaviour and acts

Analysis of magnitude of corruption as basis for perceptions

Means/forms of corruption transactions

Attitude towards demand for and/or supply of corruption

Selective assessment of current anti-corruption measures

Public confusion to distinguish between voluntary endeavours of CSOs and

Qualitative assessment of Government efforts to fight corruption in LGAs

Recognition of inter-faith potential to fighting corruption

Lowest vs. highest corruption perception LGAs

outcomes based on the analysis of statistical description of control question. The

Since early 1990s impeccable evidence on Tanzania’s country corruption status

recommend appropriate policy reforms. The governance and corruption research

Readers and active good governance stakeholders, including political and

1.1 COUNTRY CORRUPTION/GOVERNANCE GENERAL OVERVIEW

stability; compromising professional efficiency and competitiveness; and

Moreover, consistent with steady Government leadership, Tanzania has domesticated

Efforts to combat corruption are echoed in various government documents. The

The Afro-barometer Briefing Paper (April 2006) is probably more conclusive by

construction contract awards and about 70% of consultancy assignments were

Another U4 report14, quoting various authentic documents, underlines the existence of

The media in Tanzania have been instrumental in reporting/uncovering numerous

1.2 PUBLIC DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:

1.3 MEASURING OF GOOD GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE: VARIOUS INDICATORS

Global governance performance indicators

The Global Integrity uses independent information on governance and corruption to

National governance performance indicators

Despite capacity limitation, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) is probably

Table 1.3: Distribution of PETS activities in Tanzania

1 Arusha Data not available Health HAKIKAZI Arusha PACT/ MCA,

2 Bukoba DC Data not available HIV/AIDS FOGOTA Kagera PACT/MCA,

3 Bukoba Data not available HIV/AIDS FOGOTA Kagera PACT/ MCA,

7 Chunya Data not available Education MVIWATA Mbeya PACT/ MCA,

13 Hai Data not available Prioritisation District Kilimanjaro DED (German

16 Iramba Data not available Education, CCT Dodoma PACT/ MCA,

17 Iringa DC Data not available TCDD Iringa Policy Forum

18 Iringa DC Data not available Natural LEAT Iringa PACT/ MCA,

21 Kahama Village: Education SHINGONET Shinyanga SNV*

22 Karagwe Village: Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

23 Karagwe Village: Nyakayani Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

24 Karagwe Village: Rukuraijo Water KANGONET & Kagera SNV*

25 Kasulu Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT/ MCA,

27 Kibondo Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT/ MCA,

28 Kilombero Data not available Natural JET Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

31 Kilosa Data not available Natural JET Morogoro PACT/ MCA,

32 Kilwa Data not available CGG Lindi USAID

33 Kigoma Data not available Agriculture KIKANGONET Kigoma PACT / MCA,

42 Kongwa Data not available Health, Leadership Dodoma PACT/ MCA,

43 Korogwe Village and Ward Prioritisation CETA Tanga DED (German