Anda di halaman 1dari 23

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE :
PAGE NO:
1. QUINTO VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. 189698

.. 1
2. MERCADO VS. MANZANO G.R. NO. 135083, MAY 26,
1999..... 3
3. TANO VS SOCRATES G.R. NO.

110249. 5
4. NAVARRO VS CA G.R. NO. 141307
7
5. FARINAS VS BARBA G.R. 116763
8
6. BORJA VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. 133495

. ..9
7. ALDOVINO JR. VS COMELEC

G.R. NO.

184836.10
8. LA CARLOTA VS ROJO G.R. NO. 181367
....11
9. ZAMORA VS CABALLERO G.R. NO. 147767
12
10. BFI VS PROVINCE OF AKLAN G.R. NO. 196870
.14
11. GARVIDA VS SALES

G.R. NO.

12489316.
12. MARQUEZ VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. 112889

..17
13. MAGNO VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. 147904

.18

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 1

PUBLIC CORPORATION
14. SALALIMA VS GUINGONA

CASE DIGESTS 2015


G.R. NO. 117589

2021

Submitted by:
ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

QUINTO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698
FACTS: On Dec. 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436, entitled An act authorizing the
commission on elections to use an automated elections system in the May 11, 1998 National or
Local Elections and in subsequent National and Local Electoral exercises, providing funds
thereafter and for other purposes, Sec. 11 thereof reads.
Official Ballot The commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of COC shall not be later than 120 days before
election. Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when the issued
assailed resolution. They aver that the advance filing of COCs for the 2010 elections is intended
merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations.
Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the COC a candidate at the
moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him candidates. They should be considered resigned
only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law already considered as candidates.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 2

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

On the procedural aspect of the petition, the office of the Solicitor General, representing
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit.
Petitioners have not yet filed their COCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision
in the COMELEC Resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for
judicial determination. Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their CDCs
for coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is this merely speculative and
contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the
wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the
latters rule-making power. Certiorari under rule 65 is then an improper remedy.
ISSUE: WON the resolution enacted by Congress and Sec. 66 of OEC were based on provisions
dating back to the American occupation is violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING: The court nevertheless, finds that while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. The Court
believes that both candidates and voters may challenge on grounds of equal protection, the assailed
measure because of its impact on voting rights. In order there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the 4 requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)

It must be based upon substantial distinction;


It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
It must apply equally to all members of the class
Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 2nd proviso in the 3rd paragraph

of Sec. 13 of RA 9369, Sec. 66 of the OEC and Sec. 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as unconstitutional.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 3

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Mercado vs. Manzano


G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Dual allegiance. vs. Dual citizenship
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: repudiation of other citizenship

FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place.
However, Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
on the ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14,
1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code
(sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that
Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was
registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American
passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC
found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 4

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office
RULING: The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646. Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be counted. If for
any reason, a candidate is not declared disqualified, and he receives the winning number of votes,
the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after
this court has ruled upon the issues raised in this in start petition that the disqualification case
originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality. The use of foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
rationality and citizenship, it does not duress Filipino citizenship recognized by repatriation but
recants the oath of renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Arnados act
of using his U.S. passport after his renunciation clearly violates the oath he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a U.S. Citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by
ensuring that its existence respects the rule of law. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in Maguiling is not a second placer as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
Petitioner is granted. Arnado is disqualified from running for any elective position.
Maguiling is hereby declared the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. The decision
is immediately executory.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 5

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

TANO vs SOCRATES
G.R. No. 110249
FACTS: On Dec. 15, 1992 the SP of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 w/c took
effect on Jan. 1, 1993 entitled An ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster
outside Puerto Princesa City from Jan. 1, 1993 to Jan. 1, 1998 and providing exemptions, penalties
and other purpose thereof.
To implement said city ordinance, the City Mayor Lucero issued an office order directing
authorized personnels to check and conduct inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobsters
being shipped from Puerto Princesa or any part w/in the jurisdiction of the City to any point of
destinations either via aircraft or seacraft.
On Feb. 19, 1993, the SP, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Res. No. 33 entitled
A resolution prohibiting the catching and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms.
Petitioners filed this petition contending that:
1.) The ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade.
2.) Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition under which the Mayors
permit could be granted or denied, in other words, the Mayor and the absolute authority
to determine whether or not to issue the permit.
3.) Ord. No. 2 prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping
of live marine coral dwelling organisms, the ordinance took away the right of
petitioners fisherman to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.
4.) As Ord. No. 2 of the SP is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon agains
petitioner Tano and the others have to be dismissed.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 6

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Respondents commented that SP defended the validity of Ord. No. 2 as a valid exercise of
power under the general welfare clause. They as well maintained that there was no violation of due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance enacted by the SP of Puerto Princesa is constitutional
RULING: Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, LGUs have power, inter alia to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. The duty to enact urgently
needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment is imposed upon the SP, SB and
the Sanguniang Panglungsod.
The nexus than between the activities barred by Ord. No. 15-92 and Ord. No. 2 is painfully
obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinance may not the be converted.
We find nothing therein violative of any constitutional provisions. This case was brought to this
Court on the barebones of the ordinances, on the mere claim of petitioner Tano and his 83 co
petitioners who are charged with violation of said ordinances and the invalidation of which could
undermine the ongoing trial.
It is hereby commended that SP of Puerto Princesa shall now be roused from their lethargy
and be more vigilant in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this
time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not,
irreversible.
The instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit and TRO issued on Nov. 11, 1993 is lifted.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 7

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

NAVARRO vs CA
G.R. No. 141307
FACTS: In the May 11, 1997 local elections. Cesar M. Calimlim got the highest number of votes
for the Mayority position. On March 25, 1999, he died and a vacancy was thus created in the office
so by operation of the law, Vice Mayor Baltazar Aquino succeded him and the topranking SB was
elevated to the Vice Mayor position. This was petitioner by Danny Tamayo. Thereafter Gov.
Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed herein petitioner Purto Navarro as member of the SB.
Private respondents filed an action to nullify the appointment of Navarro and prayed for a
motion for TRO and for the inhibition by Judge Laron, w/c was denied. Hence, this petition.
Navarro contended that the Vice Mayors succession of the Mayors position has created a
permanent vacancy in the SB and that the appointee must come from the same party where the Vice
Mayor belonged; Thus Navorros appointment is valid.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners appointment is valid.
HELD: We give due course to the petition under Sec. 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises
when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, removed from office,
fails to equally or is permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. The reason
behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy
representation as willed by the people in the election.
The last vacancy in the SB refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly
occupying the next higher in rank. The term last vacancy is used to differentiate it from the other
vacancy previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position w/c
occurred w/ the election of Rolando Lalas to the 7th position.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 8

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

This contention is w/o merit. Verification is merely a formal and not a jurisdiction requisite
w/c does not affect the validity of the pleading of the court.
Petition is granted. The appointment is valid.

FARINAS vs BARBA
G.R. 116763
FACTS:
Carlito Domingo was an SB Member of Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he
resigned after going to the U.S. w/o leave.
To fill the vacancy, Mayor Barba recommended to Gov. Farinas the appointment of
respondent Edward Palafox. A similar recommendation for this appointment was made by the SB to
Mayor Barba, w/c later on substantial to the SP of Ilocos in compliance of the LGC. The SP
disapproved the resolution on the ground that Governor. Accordingly, SP recommended to the
Governor the appointment of petitioners Al Nacino, Vice Carlito Domingo as SB Members of San
Nicolas. Petitioner Governor appointed Nacino and swore him in office that same day.
On the other hand, Mayor Barba appointed Edward Palafox to the same position the same
day, then Palafox took his oath the next day.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of Edward Palafox by the Mayor is valid.
HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC upholding the appointment of Palafox by
respondent Mayor Barba under case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member
who does not belong to any political party, the local Chief Executive shall upon the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. The
local chief executive specifically mentioned in said provision is not the governor, for there would
have been no need for the law making body to have specifically stated in the law if iy had intended
that the Governor is that one and the same local Chief Executive vested with power to appoint.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 9

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Wherefore, the decision of the RTC insofar as it dismiss petitioners action for quo warranto
and prohibition is affirmed, but for different reasons from those given by the trial court in its
decision.

BORJA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495
FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Capco Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros for a term from Jan.
18, 1998 ending June 30, 1992. On Sept. 2, 1989, he became Mayor by operation of law upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of
3 years w/c ending on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of
3 years ending June 30, 1998.
On Mar. 27, 1998, respondent Capco filed a COC for Mayor of Pateros for the May 11,
1998 elections w/c petitioner Borja Jr. was also a candidate for the same position. Borja sought
Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as Mayor for 3
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after
that. On April 30, 1998 COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified,
COMELEC en banc reversed the decision on the ground that the 3 term limitation did not make any
reference to succession to an office w/c he was not elected. Capco, who succeded to the position of
Mayor by operation of law served only for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently
such succession is no counted as one term under the Constitution and the LGC.
ISSUE: WON the succession of a vice-mayor to the Office of the Mayor by operation of law is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the 3 term limit.
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Private respondent Capco is qualified to run again in the election
because he was not elected to the Office of Mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 10

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the
service, interrupted by the death of the deceased Mayor.
To consider Capco ineligible to run a third time for re-election would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
The people must be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about.

ALDOVINO JR. vs COMELEC


G.R. No. 184836
FACTS: Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive
terms, 1998-2001; 2001-2004; and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In Sept. 2005, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. However, this was lifted by his Court, hence he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term.
Upon his filing of COC for the 2007 elections, petitioner Aldovino sought to deny it on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for 3 terms, and his candidacy would be violative of
the rule under Sec. 8, Art X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC. COMELEC thereafter
ruled against the petitioner stating that the 3 term limit rule does not apply because of the
suspension ordered by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON preventive suspension is an interruption of the 3 term limit rule and is considered
involuntary renounciation of Office as contemplated in Sec. 43 (b) of R.A. 7160.
HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious. The Court signaled how zealously it guards the 3
term limit rule. It teaches us how to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.
Clearly, the Constitution prohibits an immediate re-election for fourth term following 3
consecutive terms, it does not prohibit re-election for a 4 th term as long as it is not immediately after
the end of the 3rd consecutive term.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 11

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Preventive suspension is an interim measure to address the situation of an official who have
been charged administratively or criminally where the evidence of guilt is strong, and there is a
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witness or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Notably in all case of preventive suspension, the suspended official is only barred from
performing the functions of his office but does not vacate and lose title to his office. Hence, Asilos
term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension. Wherefore petition is granted, Asilo is
declared disqualified.

LA CARLOTA vs ROJO
G.R. No. 181367
FACTS:
On March 18, 2004 the then Vice Mayor of La Carlota City, Rex R. Jalandon appointed
Atty. Rex Rojo as SP Secretary. The status of his appointment was permanent. On April 14, 2004,
the Civil Service Commission permanently withdrew and recalled the appointment of Rojo for not
complying with the document requirements. Jalandoon brought the matter to CSC Regional Office
by way of an appeal and averred that CSC La Carlota refused to sign the appointment documents.
Regional Office ruled the period of the election loan and his resignation from the SP was valid
having been tendered the majority of the council in attendance.
Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed to the CSC and the latter dismissed said
appeal for the appellants were not the appointing authority and were therefore improper parties to
the appeal. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of respondent was issued contrary to existing civil service rules and
regulations
HELD:
Petition is denied. Records show that Atty. Rojos appointment was transmitted to the
CSCFO by Gelongo w/o his certification and signature at the back. The position of Atty. Rojo was
published and deliberated by the SP Members and Personnel Selection Board. The certification
issued by Vice Mayor Jalandoon, as the appointing authority was in accordance with the limitations
ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 12

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

under Sec. 325 of R.A. 7160 and was received and found in order pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule V of the
Omnibus Rules.
Clearly, appointment of respondent on March 18, 2004 was validly issued considering that
he was considered resigned as SP member effective March 17, 2004, he was fully qualified for the
position of SP Secretary; and there was substantial compliance w/ the appointment requirements.

ZAMORA vs CABALLERO
G.R. No. 147767
FACTS: Petitioner Zamora, SP member of Compostela Valley seeks to invalidate all acts and
resolutions issued by the SP during its session held on Feb. 8 & 26, 2001 for lack of quorum;
Feb. 6, 2001, Vice Gov. Navarro sent a written notice of a special hearing w/c was reset on
Feb. 8, 2001 upon request by Gov. Caballero w/o written notice. Feb. 8, 2001, the SP held a special
session to allow the Gov. to deliver his State of the Province address, but no resolution was
considered because there were only 7 out of the 14 SP members were present.
Feb. 26, 2001, SP held its 4th regular session during w/c it issued Res. No. 5 declaring the
entire province under state of calamity and Res. No. 7 authorizing the Gov. to on behalf of the
province, enter into a construction contract w/ Allado Construction Company. During the same
session, the SP accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation of Board Member Theresa Sotto. Only
8 memberd present but record/journal showed 13 members attended.
Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of the acts of the SP on Feb. 26, 2001
where the Journal indicated 13 members were present as only 7 of its 14 members were actually
present when the resignation of one member was noted; the motions to declare the entire province
under a State of Calamity; and to authorize the Governor to enter into the contract with Allado
Const. Company were approved.
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since BM Sotto was it the U.S., the actual
number of the BMs then in the country was 13 w/c should be the basis of the quorum of 7 members.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 13

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

ISSUE: WON Res. Nos. 05 and 07 of SP of Compostela Valley are valid and having to constitute a
quorum during such resolutions were approved.
HELD:
Board Member Theresa Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum
when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted. For the same reason, Res. Nos. 5 and 7 are of
no legal effect. Sec. 53 (a) of LGC provides that. A majority of all members of the Sanggunian who
have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. The acts of
only a part of the Sangunian done outside the parameters of the legal provision aforementioned are
legally inform, highly questionable and are more importantly null and void.

For a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be valid, the
vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian and not only of those present during the
session, is required in accordance w/ Sec. 468 of the LGC in relation to Art. 107 of its implementing
Rules.
Petition is granted. Res. Nos. 06 and 07 declaring the entire Province of Compostela Valley
under a state of calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor into a general
construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 14

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

BFI vs PROVINCE OF AKLAN


G.R. No. 196870
FACTS: Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. is a duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation.
Its primary purpose is to foster a united, concerted and environment conscious development of
Boracay Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty and ecological
balance marking the island as the crown jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in
Asia and the whole world. It has members of at least 60 owners and representatives of resorts,
hotels, restaurants and at least 5 community orgazations; and several environmentally conscious
residents and advocates.
Respondents are: the Province of Aklan represented by Gov. Marquez; PRA formerly called
PEA (Public Reclamation Authority and Public Estate Authority respectively), is a government
entity created by PD 1084 for purposes of reclaiming land including foreshore and submerged
areas; DENR Region VI in Visayas authorized to issue compliance certificate regarding projects
that require the environments protection and management in the region.Presidential Proclamation
No. 1801 declared a tropical paradise, the Island of Boracay are of the countrys most tourist
destinations; a tourist zone and marine reserve. It was declared in 1973 comparing 3 barangays
namely, Manoc-Manoc, Balabag and Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay.
On April 25, 2008, the SB of Caticlan, Malay issued a Resolution stating that it had learned
that respondent Province had filed an application with the DENR for a foreshore lease of areas
along the shoreline of Caticlan, and manifesting its strong opposition to said application as the
proposed foreshore lease will technically diminish its territorial jurisdiction, once granted, thereby
depriving its constitutes of their statutory right of preference in the development and utilization of
the natural resources within its jurisdiction. Furthermore the province acted in bad faith in not
conducting consultations with the SB of Caticlan regarding the proposed foreshore lease.
On Nov. 20, 2008, the SP approved a resolution authorizing Gov. Marquez to enter into
negotiations with the following priority projects: a.) renovation & b.) reclamation of a portion of
Caticlan foreshore for commercial purposes. Respondent province included the proposed expansion
of port facilities in its 2009 Annual Investment Plan Gov. Marquez senta letter to PRA on March 12,
2009 expressing interest of respondent Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 15

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

foreshore of Caticlan. In 2009, respondent Province won in the bidding and entered into an
agreement w/ the Financial Advisor for the rehabilitation of Caticlan Jetty Port.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
2. WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case.
3. WON respondent province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations
based on the scope and classification of the project.
4. WON respondent province complied w/ all the requirements under pertinent regulations.
5. WON there was proper, timely and sufficient public consultation for the project.
HELD: The petition is partially granted. The TEPO issued by this court is hereby converted into a
writ of continuing mandamus specifically as follows:
1. Respondent DENR-EMBRO VI shall visit and review the following matters:
a.) Its classifications of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project.
b.) Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the projects as a mere expansion
of the existing jetty post in Caticlan, instead of classifying it a new project,
c.) The impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated and
comprehensive studies, w/c should forthwith be ordered by respondent DENR-EMBRO VI.
2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the ff:
a.) fully cooperate w/ respondent DENR-EMBRO VI in its review of the reclamation;
project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
b.) secure approvals from LGUs and hold proper consulation w/ NGOs and other
stakeholders and sectors concerned as required by Sec. 27 in relation to Sec. 26 of the LGC.
3. Respondent PRA (Philippine Reclamation Authority) shall closely monitor the submission by
respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by respondent DENR-EMBRO VI in
connection to the environmental concerns raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate w/ respondent
Province in no defying the MOA, if necessary, based on the finding of respondent DENR-EMBRO
VI.
4. The petitioner BFI and the respondents, the Province of Aklan, respresented by Gov. Marquez,
the PRA and the DENR EMBRO VI are mandated to submit their respective reports to this Court
regarding their compliance w/ the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than 3 months
from the date of promulgation of this Decision.
5. In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractors and their agents, representatives or
persons acting in their place or stead, shall immediately cease and desest from continuing the
implementation of the project covered by ECC R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this
court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within 5 days to this court the status of the
project as of their receipt of this Decision.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 16

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

GARVIDA vs SALES
G.R. No. 124893
FACTS:
SK elections nationwide was scheduled on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner
applied for Registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Brgy. San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers however denied her application on the ground
that she exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down in Sec. 3 (b) of COMELEC Res. 2824.
In her petition w/ the MCTC, the court found that she is qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her COC for the chairman position and respondent
Election Officer Rios disapproved petitioners COC again due to her age. Upon appeal by petitioner
to the COMELEC, the latter set aside the order and allowed petitioner to run.
On May 6, 1996, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against respondents votes of 76. In
accordance w/ May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the election tellers did not proclaim
petitioner as the winner. Hence this petition for certiorari was filed.
On June 2, 1996 the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner w/o
prejudice to any further action by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Garvida is eligible in running for a position being over 21 years of age at
the time of the election.
HELD:

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 17

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Petitioners age is admittedly beyond the limit set on Sec. 3 of COMELEC Res. 2824,
however she argues that so long as she did not turn 22 years old, she was still 21 years of age on
election day.
A closer look at the LGC will reveal distinction between the maximum age of a member and
the maximum age of an elective SK official. Sec. 424 sets members max. age at 21 only but no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21. On the other hand, Sec. 428 provides
the max. age of an elective SK official is 21 years old. On the day of the election. He must not more
than 21 years old election day. In this case, petitioner was already 21 years and 9 months old on
election day.
Petition is dismissed. Petitioner Garvida is declared ineligible ordered to vacate her position.

MARQUEZ vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 112889
FACTS: Petitioner, Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for an elective position in the
Province of Quezon during the May 11, 1992 elections, filed this petition for certiorari praying the
reversal of the COMELEC resolution w/c dismissed his petition quo warranto against the winning
candidate herein respondent Eduardo Rodriquez, for being a fugitive from justice.
Respondent Rodriquez at the time of his filing of COC, a criminal charge of 10 counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles. A warrant of arrest was issued and has yet to be served but on this account, private
respondent flew from that country. Since Rodriquez had already been proclaimed the duly elected
Governor, the court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer available at this point and
should be dismissed. The proper remedy therefor of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification
suit in a separate proceeding.
ISSUE: WON respondent Gov. Rodriquez is a fugitive from justice and should be disqualified from
running for an elective position.
HELD: The Court reversed and set aside the dismissal of the disqualification case by the
COMELEC and ordered the latter to proceed and resolve the case.
Sec. 40 of R.A. 7160 provides for those persons who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position and one of them is a person fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here and abroad. Petitioners position is perspicuous and to the point when he asserverates a
clear provision of the law w/c needs no familiar interpretation and construction. Fugitive from
ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 18

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. When clearly, there is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written.
The Court itself, not bring a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand to the COMELEC
the case for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

MAGNO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 147904
FACTS: Private respondent, Carlos Montes failed for a disqualification suit against Mayoralty
candidate, Petitioner Nestor Magno, of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections
on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of direct
bribery penalized under Art.210 of RPC. Petitioner Magno was sentenced to suffer the penalty 3
months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision
correctional as maximum for each of the 4 courts of direct bribery. On May 7, 2001, COMELEC
disqualified petitioner from running citing Sec. 12 of BP 881 or the OEC. His petitioner motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by COMELEC on May 12, 2001.
Petitioner argues in the petition that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude,
citing Sec. 40 of R.A. 7160. He insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998
when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the 2 year disqualification period
imposed by Sec. 40, R.A. 7160 expired on March 5, 2000.
On June 19, 2001, petitioner filed a supplemental petion and assailed that the proclamation
of Sonia Lorenzo was not valid only because his disqualification case was still under review.
Petitioner likewise asked this court to declare him as the duly elected Mayor instead of Lorenzo. On
July 18, 2001, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation and agreed w/ petitioner that
COMELEC should have applied Sec. 40 of the LGC.
ISSUES:

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 19

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

1. WON the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude thus making petitioner
disqualified to run for any elective position.
2. Whether it is the OEC or the LGC that should apply in this situation.
HELD: The Court adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary of moral turpitude as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties w/c a man owes his fellow men or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, but it depends on the circumstances of the
case. We need not review the facts relating to the came as petitioner in effect, by apply for
probation, admitted all the elements of said crime.
It should be noted that OEC (BP 881) was approved on Dec. 3, 1985 while LGC took effect
on Jan. 1, 1992. It is basic statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between 2
laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis
posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. On the other hand, Sec. 12 of BP 881 seeks of
disqualification of candidates for any public officers, while Sec. 40, R.A. 7160, in so far as it
governs the disqualification of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law
w/c ought to prevail. The reduction of the disqualification period from 5 to 2 years is manifest
intent.
Therefore although his crime of bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections as his disqualification ceased as Mar. 5,
2000. Unfortunately, however neither this court nor the case has proper forum to rule on the validity
of Sonia Lorenzos proclamation and the declaration of petitioners as the rightful winner.
In asmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the
legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest.
Wherefore petition is partially granted. The challenged resolutions of the COMELEC are
hereby reversed and set aside. The petitioner prayer for his proclamation as the winner not being
within our jurisdiction is denied.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 20

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

SALALIMA vs GUINGONA
G.R. No. 117589
FACTS: Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaint, against the petitioners who were
elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed w/ the Office of the President. Acting thereon,
the President issued AO No. 94 creating an ad hoc committee to investigate on the charges and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations.
On Aug. 26, 1994, after conducting hearings the Ad Hoc Committee promulgated AO No.
153 w/ their findings and recommendations.
1. In OP Case No. 5470: Case filed by Mayor Coral of Tiwi against Albay Gov. Salalima. The
MOA entered into by Province of Albay and Napocor w/c specifies the sharing scheme of
the real property tax among the province, city or municipality and the National Government
was violated when. The remittance of the NPC of the P40,724,471.74 were not shared w/ the
municipalities of Tiwi, Daraga and other barangays and the National Government in
violation of PD 464.
2. In OP Case No. 5469: Admin complaint against Gov. Salalima. The Committee holds that
respondents committed abuse of authority under Sec. 60 (e) of LGC, for the following:
herein private lawyers in violation of Sec. 481, LGC to handle the case of the Province of
Albay before the SC disbursing public money in violation of COA rules and regulations;
Paying Cortes & Reyna Law Firm Public Money although it was only Atty. Cornago who
was the counsel of record in the SC case; authorizing an unreasonable and grossly
disadvantageous attorney fees of P38.5 million; and additionally, as to respondent not only
w/ the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also w/ Atty. Cornago these exceeding his authority
ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 21

PUBLIC CORPORATION

CASE DIGESTS 2015

under Res. No. 1-90 passed by the SP. After taking all the attendant circumstances into
consideration, the committee recommends that the following penalties of suspensions w/o
pay be metedout: a.) Respondents Salalima 6 months; b.) all the others 4 months.
3. In OP Case No. 5471: Admin Complaint against Gov. Salalima for abuse of authority and
oppression under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160. The OP has no jurisdiction over complaints filed
against elective municipal officials. It shall be filed before the SP whose decision may by
appealed to the OP.
4. In OP Case No. 5450: Admin charges filed by Mayor Demetrion of Tobaco against Gov.
Salalima. After premises considered this Committee finds respondent Gov. Salalima. After
premises considered, this Committee finds respondent Gov. Salalima guilty of abuse of
authority and gross negligence. A suspension of 5 months shall be meted out. Same sanction
was approved by the President.
ISSUE: WON petitioners were deprived of their respective offices w/o procedural and substantive
due process upon their suspension of periods ranging from 12 months to 20 months w/c was clear
violation of Sec. 60 R.A. 7160.
HELD: We agree that petitioners Gov. Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in
OP Case No. 5450 nor could they beheld liable in OP Case No. 5469 because public officials cannot
be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed deering a prior term as
held in Pascual vs. Prov. Board of Nueva Ecija.
We now come to the main issue of the controversy the legality of disciplinary an elective
official of a wrongful act committed during his term of office. The Court should never remove a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
We thus rule that any admin. Liability w/c petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the
execution of the retainer contract in OP Case 5469, and the incidents related therewith and in the
execution of a contract for additional rehabilitation worked for Tobacco Market in OP Case No.
5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the May 11, 1992 synchorinized elections.
Wherefore, the instant special action for certiorari is hereby partly granted. The suspension
orders are hereby reversed and set aside, w/o prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal
action against them of warranted by the attendant circumstances.

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

Page 22

PUBLIC CORPORATION

ANGIE LOUH S. DIOSO

CASE DIGESTS 2015

Page 23