People v.

Echegaray (CRIM1)

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was
dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the
reversal of the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which
the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black
accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme
Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these

statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v.
Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury
to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human
life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally
is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape
through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the
aftermath of Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in
the context of our own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical
privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty
or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during
times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of
deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long
as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a
death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society
what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need
to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed
or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and
order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to
respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value
he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of
the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death,
and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim
is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their
acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice
and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has
a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage
upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

[G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-appellant.
R E S O LUTIO N
PER CURIAM:

The penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan,
Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by this Court in its decision
promulgated on 22 January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court) seeking a modification of the death
sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line with the new Court
rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the
nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia,[1] speaking through then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, ratiocinated that the additional
attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the
crime of rape and, if not pleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.[2]
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:

That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl,
Marites Gallo y Segovia.[3]

The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victims father; accordingly, accused-appellants
relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance.[4]
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accusedappellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until the full
satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final
judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.[5]

[8]

The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration in People vs. Ramos,[6] People vs. Ilao,[7] and People vs. Medina,
came only after almost a year from the promulgation of the instant case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24 August 1999 motion of accused-appellant,
had this to state:
th

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land
(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal
statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and
notwithstanding that final sentence has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the
Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellants prayer for reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion
perpetua.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees merit in its stand to join accusedappellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by
imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to indemnify the victim
the amount of P50,000.00.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the President in
accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the President with a copy of this
resolution for appropriate guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA),
Petitioner,

-versus-

RICHARD BRODETT AND

JORGE JOSEPH,

G.R. No. 196390

Present:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ActingChairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,*and
MENDOZA,**JJ.
Promulgated:

Respondents.

September 28, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the
lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial
and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No.
9165[1]in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
sell, trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos,
contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous
drug.[2]

Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No.
09-209, with the information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white powdery
substance contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy, a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total recorded net
weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence
of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow
folded paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.[3]

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug
Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several
personal non-drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and that
PDEArefused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his personal
effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon verification.[4]

On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection,[5]proposingthereby
that the delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration
of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The
Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the
sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1)
photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the
return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard
S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.[6]

PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of
merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Order of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari,
claiming that the orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,[8]dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:

xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of
Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S.
Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda
Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent
with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Hence, PDEA appeals.

Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the
primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.[10]It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the
Honda Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused
Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that
the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and
that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime.

In hisComment,[11]Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a
review by the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by
PDEA, unless such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; that
PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person must still prove in the trial court that he has no
knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition
for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of the car to
Ms.Brodett.

Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power
to order upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents,
papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused must not profit from
his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act. [12]As
justification for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is

not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband again.
[13]
Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has theright to dispose of property used in the commission
of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs
to a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.[14]
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and
shall pass to the Government.[15] But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such
manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.[16]
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by
authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a
search warrant, the personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that
which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which has been used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. [17] If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure
may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the
commission of an offense.[18] Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized
is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its
possession is but a matter of course, [19]except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.[20]The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the case is finally terminated.
[21]

Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed
as evidence,[22] and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the
property was wrongfully taken from him. [23]In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as
evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the Government. [24] Property
used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is
then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.[25]

II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject
of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to
all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless
they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act. Simply put, the law exempts from the effects
of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the
name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that
said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of
dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative
but to apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that
the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where
a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being
so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is not

consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.[26] (emphases are in the original text)

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and
essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the
Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry
with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the
particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of
Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately
schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties
of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the
same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which
may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and
no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to
pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the

property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.[27]

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to
the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of
the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they
be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose,[28]concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with
rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, it is the sense of this Court
that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car
should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in replevin case. xxx[29]

Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the

third person, for a mere suspicion of that persons participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the
forfeiture of the goods seized.[30]
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August 27,
2009 in the RTC[31]that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there
throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible
evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to
bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial
intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165,[32]and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the
law because it had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that
the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and
that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime. It insists that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the
trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodettsMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009
when the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of
the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20,supra,
expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has
been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should
remain in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any
other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the
judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the
trial in the RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability
as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere
photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTCs assailed orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the
express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It
appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and
Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all
non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar.
The Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the
glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to
the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered
returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both accused
are ordered escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper
disposition. (emphasis supplied)[33]

The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action
upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter
of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the
offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165. [34]This the
Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being
susceptible of repetition in the future.[35]
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170281

January 18, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner,

vs.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the order2 dated October 27, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, dismissing the
complaint for forfeiture3 filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) against
respondents Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. (CSBI).
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for issuance of temporary
restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits in account number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained
by Glasgow in CSBI. The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-107319.
Acting on the Republics urgent plea for the issuance of a TRO, the executive judge 4 of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO dated July 21,
2003. The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
set on August 4, 2003.
After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last known address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to serve
summons by publication. In an order dated October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the issuance of alias summons. However, no mention
was made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve the alias summons. The
Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion for leave of court to serve summons
by publication.

In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to serve the alias summons
on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve the Republics motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
declaring:
Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action on [the Republics] motion for leave of court to serve summons
by publication would be untenable if not premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs return dated June 30,
2004 stating that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address since July
2002 and left no forwarding address.
Meanwhile, the Republics motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the
Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It
alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on it; (2) the complaint was premature
and stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was
failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a
precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It
denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed order. It dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) improper venue as it
should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was located; (2)
insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI
to release to Glasgow or its authorized representative the funds in CA-005-10-000121-5.
Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition.

On November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO restraining Glasgow and CSBI, their agents, representatives and/or persons acting upon
their orders from implementing the assailed October 27, 2005 order. It restrained Glasgow from removing, dissipating or disposing of the
funds in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any transaction on the said account.
The petition essentially presents the following issue: whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed on grounds of
improper venue, insufficiency in form and substance and failure to prosecute.
The Court agrees with the Republic.
The Complaint Was Filed
In The Proper Venue
In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds raised by Glasgow in support of its motion to dismiss:
1. That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the person of Glasgow considering that no [s]ummons has been served upon it, and it
has not entered its appearance voluntarily;
2. That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is premature because of the absence of a prior finding by any tribunal that Glasgow was
engaged in unlawful activity: [i]n connection therewith[,] Glasgow argues that the [c]omplaint states no cause of action; and
3. That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up to now, summons has yet to be served upon Glasgow.5
But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could the trial court
have dismissed the complaint for improper venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court6 (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v.
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City),7 this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by [the] trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error.
(emphasis supplied)
At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.
On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation,
and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money

Laundering Offense under RA 9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republics
complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account in CSBI has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal. Thus, the
Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the Republics complaint. 8 Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule
of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case." 9
Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court
of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an
unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in Manila or of
the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the
judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money
laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital
Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila
is one of the RTCs of the NCJR,10 it was a proper venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account.
The Complaint Was Sufficient In Form And Substance
In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the Republics complaint to determine its sufficiency in form and substance:
At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds, takes the opportunity to examine the [c]omplaint and determine whether it is sufficient
in form and substance.
Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil Forfeiture of Assets filed by the [AMLC], represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General[,] against Glasgow and [CSBI] as necessary party. The [c]omplaint principally alleges the following:
(a) Glasgow is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office address at Unit 703, 7 th Floor, Citystate
Center [Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,] Pasig City;

(b) [CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Citystate Center Building, No. 709 Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig City;
(c) Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28 deposited with [CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;
(d) As events have proved, aforestated bank account is related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code;
(e) The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction Reports;
(f) After appropriate investigation, the AMLC issued Resolutions No. 094 (dated July 10, 2002), 096 (dated July 12, 2002), 101
(dated July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August 2, 2002), directing the issuance of freeze orders against the bank accounts of
Glasgow;
(g) Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze Orders Nos. 008-010, 011 and 013 were issued on different dates, addressed to the
concerned banks;
(h) The facts and circumstances plainly showing that defendant Glasgows bank account and deposit are related to the unlawful
activities of Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation Code, as well as to a money laundering offense [which] [has] been
summarized by the AMLC in its Resolution No. 094; and
(i) Because defendant Glasgows bank account and deposits are related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code, as well as [to] money laundering offense as aforestated, and being the subject of covered transaction
reports and eventual freeze orders, the same should properly be forfeited in favor of the government in accordance with Section 12,
R.A. 9160, as amended.11
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. 12 The
determination is confined to the four corners of the complaint and nowhere else. 13
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are
true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court
could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. 14 (emphasis ours)
In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 4. Contents of the petition for civil forfeiture. - The petition for civil forfeiture shall be verified and contain the following
allegations:
(a) The name and address of the respondent;
(b) A description with reasonable particularity of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds, and their location; and
(c) The acts or omissions prohibited by and the specific provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, which
are alleged to be the grounds relied upon for the forfeiture of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds; and
[(d)] The reliefs prayed for.
Here, the verified complaint of the Republic contained the following allegations:
(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein, Glasgow;15
(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgows unlawful activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof, account no. CA005-10-000121-5 in the amount of P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;
(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA 9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture of the said
proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and violation of
the Securities Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the proceeds of the unlawful activities were
transacted and deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 thereby making them appear to have originated from
legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC
subjected the account to freeze order and
(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in favor of
the government as well as other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

The form and substance of the Republics complaint substantially conformed with Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture.
Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions.
(a) Civil Forfeiture. When there is a covered transaction report made, and the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose ordered
seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised Rules of
Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.
In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied. When there is a SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED
TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and the court has, in a petition filed
for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said
report, the Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by the AMLC
and
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report.

It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which brings it within the reach of the judicial process. 16 It is actually within the courts
possession when it is submitted to the process of the court. 17 The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-005-10000121-5 from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their representatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed
under the control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA
9160, as amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC, properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful activities is an
evidentiary matter that may be proven during trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or allege that Glasgow had been
implicated in a conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding
of guilt for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering.
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as herein
defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under
this Act without prejudice to the freezing and other remedies provided. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as defined
under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under
the AMLA without prejudice to the application ex-parte by the AMLC to the Court of Appeals for a freeze order with respect to the
monetary instrument or property involved therein and resort to other remedies provided under the AMLA, the Rules of Court
and other pertinent laws and rules. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary. No prior criminal charge, pendency of or conviction for an
unlawful activity or money laundering offense is necessary for the commencementor the resolution of a petition for civil
forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money laundering, an action
for civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.
There Was No Failure
To Prosecute
The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged failure to prosecute the case. Nothing could be more erroneous.
Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial court ordered its deputy sheriff/process server to serve summons and notice of the
hearing on the application for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The subpoena to Glasgow was, however, returned
unserved as Glasgow "could no longer be found at its given address" and had moved out of the building since August 1, 2002.
Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing, dissipating or
disposing of the subject bank deposits and CSBI from allowing any transaction on, withdrawal, transfer, removal, dissipation or disposition
thereof.
As the summons on Glasgow was returned "unserved," and considering that its whereabouts could not be ascertained despite diligent
inquiry, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to serve summons by
publication on October 8, 2003. While the trial court issued an aliassummons in its order dated October 15, 2003, it kept quiet on the prayer
for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case for failure of the Republic to cause the service
of alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to cause the service of
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it deferred its action on the Republics motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication until a return was made on the aliassummons.
Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain information from other government agencies on the whereabouts or current
status of respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts, however, proved futile. The records on file
with the Securities and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other inquiries yielded negative results.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the sheriffs return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the aliassummons had been returned
"unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding address. Still, no action
was taken by the trial court on the Republics motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the
Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to dismiss by way of special appearance which the Republic vigorously opposed. Strangely,
to say the least, the trial court issued the assailed order granting Glasgows motion.
Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to prosecute the complaint for civil forfeiture? While there was
admittedly a delay in the proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to the Republic. That Glasgows whereabouts could not be
ascertained was not only beyond the Republics control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office address without
informing the Securities and Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department
of Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
In Marahay v. Melicor,18 this Court ruled:
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under
the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the
absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory

requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than
wield their authority to dismiss. (emphasis supplied)
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the Republics complaint.
Service Of Summons
May Be By Publication
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,19 this Court declared that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actionsin rem. While that case
involved forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since
both cases do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties either acquired illegally or related to
unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. 20 In actions in rem orquasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res.21 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. 22 For this
purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.23
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service. - (a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the same manner as service of summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:
1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief prayed for; and
3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary period, the court shall
hear the case ex parte and render such judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting
evidence.

(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication of the notice
of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order. In the
event that the cost of publication exceeds the value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication
shall not be required. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October 27, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil
Case No. 03-107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11, 2005 motion to dismiss of Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
is DENIED. And the complaint for forfeiture of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council,
is REINSTATED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the case pursuant to
the provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. Pending final determination of the case, the November 23, 2005 temporary restraining order issued
by this Court is hereby MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code?

Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming
that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed
on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said

respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without
first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972

NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor
Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band and sentences Bonifacio
Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6)
years, prision correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the offended party, Ignacio Peaflor in the sum of P80.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of the principal penalty and the accused
Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the
spouses Ignacio Peaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and all three to pay the proportionate part of the costs.
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio
Peaflor , the owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of nature, heard
the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up
husband Ignacio Peaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to take a look. As he
approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them
holding and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon receiving
from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men.
The fact, however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the house. One of the robbers
asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor for money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor ,
realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and
delivered them to the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of Mrs.
Casimira L. Peaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets and
left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and
Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peaflor . The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of
Hermosa and to the Philippine Constabulary.
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found
owner Ignacio Peaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was ransacked and things scattered around. It
appears that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance.
According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they removed the adobe stone and that is the place where they passed through"
(tsn. 24, I). In that same morning, policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing suspicious characters passing through

a nearby field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5 bullets and a pistol
with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la
Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario
Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as
they are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As
subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la
Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in said information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben
de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy
Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with the intent to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2)
revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEAFLOR
and CASIMIRA L. PEAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack,
assault and hit Ignacio Peaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him
unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same accused approached Casimira L. Peaflor ,
threatened her at gun point and demanded money; that the same accused while inside the said house searched and
ransacked the place and take and carry away the following cash money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio
Peaflor and Casimira L. Peaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at
P350.00, One (1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the
damage and prejudice of said spouses in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS,
(P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and
Flores, 1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the offended parties, Ignacio Peaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman
Peaflor , Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police
of Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre and
Malana, respectively, admitting their participation in the commission of the crime charged.

Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under
which the affidavit Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramento dwelt on
the investigations conducted by them and the circumstances under which said defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk
of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were subscribed and sworn to before
them by defendants Satimbre and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he
was in his house in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the
crime charged and said that, although reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the advice of his wife Engracia
Mendoza who sought to corroborate him and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a
robbery that took place in Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and
De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance,
insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis
alleges that said court has erred .
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-judicial confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the evidence on record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been sufficiently identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime
charged. In support of this contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peaflor was due to a picture of appellant taken by
Lt. Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then

brought to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peaflor identified him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from
the picture she had seen before he was taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not have recognized
appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the same was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then
focused downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that the authorities were notified immediately after the
occurrence; that, soon after, peace officers Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento repaired to the house of Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor
and investigated them; that based upon the description given by Mrs. Peaflor , one individual was apprehended and then presented to
Mrs. Peaflor , who said that he was not one of the thieves; that another person subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peaflor was,
similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought
Mrs. Peaflor to the offices of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of police characters on file therein; that among
those pictures, she noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore, arrested
and brought to Mrs. Peaflor , who positively identified him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peaflor , through the aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the
thieves. It was she who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peaflor readily
exonerated the first two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she were
not reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it was he who demanded money from her and to whom she
delivered P2,000 in cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it was he who tied
her hands and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in her presence, consumed sufficient time from 10 to 20 minutes
to allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the robbers. The night was dark; but, there
were two flashlights switched on, namely, that of her husband, and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focused
downward, it had to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein,
and when he opened and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peaflor . Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by other circumstances presently
to be mentioned, in connection with the consideration of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise that appellant's conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession
and that the same had been made under duress.

Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in
concluding that the evidence for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth. Besides,
appellant's confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals had the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peaflor 's identification, we have the extra-judicial confession of
appellant Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said accused on October 26, 1956, 25 days after the
occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946, was the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His testimony shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in
the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he understood it to which appellant Napolis answered "yes"; inquired whether he
was coerced to which he replied "No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his (Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further
testified that he saw no signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant who appeared normal in his appearance
(tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio Bededia (still-at-large) who
pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio Peaflor and who hit him (Peaflor ) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben
de la Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested Peaflor 's revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis admitted that it
was he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor and it was he who got the money bag. The loot, according to him, was split
from which he received a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned appellant Bonifacio
Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the one who got Peaflor 's revolver from the hands of co-accused Ben de la
Cruz. ... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision
are final, except .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of
credence. Counsel for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peaflor said that the thieves had entered his house by forcing its door
open, Mrs. Peaflor testified that their entry was effected through an excavation by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed

that the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The
house of Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store,
which had a door leading thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peaflor testified that the culprits had entered the store by removing an
adobe stone from a wall thereof, and this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that the malefactors had, also,
removed a piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Peaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to
the dwelling proper, as distinguished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the
trial Judge, who had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the first three (3) assignments of error are
untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by
armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in
accordance with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peaflor , and intimidation against
his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes
the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said
Article 299, although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had previously
ruled .
... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the
controlling qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the
theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary
robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is
greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs.
Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under article
294 is lighter than that which would result from the application of article 299. ... . 3

Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly
weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable
under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. 4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decision, 5 if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in
subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be much lighter. 6 To our mind,
this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to
justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but,precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the
cases above cited reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it amore
serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of
person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both provisions are present, that the crime is
a complex one, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum
period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum
period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal owing to the presence
of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos 7 and applied in U.S. v.
Manansala, 8 U.S. v. Turla, 9 People v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is hereby abandoned and appellant herein
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to nineteen (19) years, one (1)
month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against herein
appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took part.

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple
murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2)
Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the
sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the
following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from
Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour
older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two
boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have money for his
expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children.
He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they
took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the
train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter,
had given them, they were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's
daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's establishment.
Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right
pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense.
From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that
evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and
another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side
by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the
window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon
Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the
seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat
woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her
daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which they put aside.
The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly
in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not able to get up
anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed
her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through
the palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed
everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. 2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on
duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him
that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching
coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform
separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He
shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A)
upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward)
and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform
where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw
Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he received the information that there were
killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw
Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3).
Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another
person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped

and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to
him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the
custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba.
Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to
Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C
to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to
P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:

(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to
M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and
Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba
Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was
confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one
month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials
valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet,
Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North
General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. He
retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in
the train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound
to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was taking his
money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from
him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.

When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other"
(Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped.
Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal
complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against
the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three
persons who died after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Naawa rendered the
judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in selfdefense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at
the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To
pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two
brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making
signs. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat
on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the
four men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other two seated
themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly
stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money.
Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was
still very far.

When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from
the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who
was picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa
(Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another person from behind
allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead
and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money
was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the
abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep
wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell down and became
unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered
consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of
January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest
wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh.
10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were
discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several
innocent persons, made the following observations:

What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused travelled long
over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from
his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in
Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite some people to stare or
gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as having evil intention
towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of
evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated them
to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach,
their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins
must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their
humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage
of their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers. Their
pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin
for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on
the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of
identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn
September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed
one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one
who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial
court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is
erroneous.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors
which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber
whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit
suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the
medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued
after the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in
his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility. The controlling
fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's decision. He argues that the
testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing
himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and
prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify
that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify
that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel
and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga,
L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did
not observe the same events and their powers of perception and recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed
a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was
confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.

On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt
as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to
mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not
bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from
beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion
prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable
that two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have
made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the
other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S.
Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as
we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood
without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the
evidence. We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died due to stab wounds, should
be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to
inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and
Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head,
body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths.
The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the
accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the
proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their
deaths.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in
so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L.
T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of
death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is
responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already named precludes the imputation of
criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries
suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for
lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery
(alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who
did not anticipate that the twins would act likejuramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have
had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their
co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a
complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o
mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los
resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los
delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro,
who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two
attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen
separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate
homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs.
Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil.
1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185;
People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by
means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium
period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the
attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose
Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight
(8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of
heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total
indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the
penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 86163

April 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO
SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City, *dated 29 August 1988, in
Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed Canasares, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY
WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art, 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
conspiring and confederating among themselves, working together and helping one another, armed with guns and handgrenade
and with the use of violence or intimidation employed on the person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita

Hablero did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with intent of gain, cash in the amount of
P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and
assorted jewelries, all valued at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary Choco suffered serious
physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and Reynaldo
Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo Lumber
Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is a
minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on the occasion of the robbery,
the accused also asked and were given a ransom money of P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by aggravating
circumstances of band, and illegal possession of firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of
P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, two (2) lady's wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade were
recovered from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00.
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about
two days before. The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment, they met
Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was
made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and
Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his
daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant.
Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead,
accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded
to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating while the others stood
guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino answered that he
could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio Station
Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with the
assurance that no harm would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused refused to surrender
or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused, which lasted for
about four hours, Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the
difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by
Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief,

gave a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter,
in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender peacefully but they
refused. UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive
and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo
Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical
certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several
major operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."
1wphi1

For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the lumber yard and
demanded money from the owner Severino Choco He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he placed on the
counter of the office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office.
He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all
left on the counter, and were never touched by them. He claimed further that they had never fired on the military because they intended to
surrender. Appellant's version also was that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but
he himself was hit by a bullet and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to surrender but that they
gave themselves up only much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of the accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs."
Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and in not holding that the same was merely
attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires asportation or carrying
away, in addition to the taking, In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the
carrying away or asportation And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted" (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records,
p. 317).

There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is known as the
element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and
without the animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no
robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he nor his three co-accused
touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those
items were recovered from their persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant,
Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet
and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her
after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was,
therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were
within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.
The State established a "taking" sufficient to support a conviction of robbery even though the perpetrators were interrupted by
police and so did not pick up the money offered by the victim, where the defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and a
club respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk of a convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their
instructions and placed money from the register in a paper bag and then placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men;
these actions brought the money within the dominion and control of defendant and completed the taking. (Johnson vs. State, 432
So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an
instant, constitutes asportation (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray, 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs.
Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [Emphasis supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect
the nature of the crime, From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of
the same, the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary
that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical
presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it" (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs.
State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in order.

It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking because the place was dark since the doors were closed and
there were no windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe the unfolding of events.
Her failure to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost
always incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R.
No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that she was actuated
by any improper motive in testifying against the accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are
entitled to great weight as it was in a superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza G.R. No. L56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate
their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R.
No. L-62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to surrender by the police
and military authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of circumstances when they
knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as
when he gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan et al., G.R. Nos. L-18523-26, 30
April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as
it was motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not
despite several opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved and the penalty imposed
by the Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention
("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with Art. 267, RPC )and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court that a complex
crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal
Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetua to death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is reclusion temporal.

Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other." The term "necessary means"
does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to
facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J.,
Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by
Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused
were convicted of Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the detention is absorbed in
the crime of robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed, one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal
Detention. In the present case, only one Information was filed charging the complex offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already
been consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where the
detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further, inAstor, the detention was only incidental to the
main crime of robbery so that it was held therein:
. . . were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the police at the scene of the crime, they would have not
anymore detained the people inside since they have already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but
to resort to detention of these people as security, until arrangements for their safe passage were made. This is not the crime of
illegal detention punishable under the penal laws but an act of restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace
officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People v. Uday 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337).
Where the victims in a robbery case were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery (P. v.
Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery, and although in the
course thereof women and children were also held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be considered as a separate
offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery.
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to commit the same. After
the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The victims were then taken as
hostages and the demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was not
because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims held as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a
matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and
other authorities arrived only much later after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his coaccused to surrender, they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to them. They even
considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as inadequate.
1wphi1

The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for no other purpose
than to prevent the victims from reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085 [1953] where the victims were
taken to a place one kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953];

People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases were cited in Astor and where the victims were only incidentally detained so
that the detention was deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims were
illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were
among those detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267
(last parag.) not only from the detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means employed to facilitate it,
the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 127663 March 11, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO VALDEZ, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of
the First Judicial Region stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on October 24, 1996 sentencing him to death for the complex crime of Multiple

Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
The information against accused-appellant, Bernardo Castro, and one John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of September 17, 1995, at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian, municipality of
Manaoag, province of Pangasinan, and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
simultaneously attacked and fired their caliber .30 carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta, Sandra
Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while they were on board a tricycle, on their way to a dance party, hitting them
in the different parts of their bodies which caused the instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy
Acosta and Sandra Montano, to the damage and prejudice of then respective heirs, and inflicting fatal injuries to William
Montano and Randy Tibule, in the different parts of their bodies, having thus performed all the acts which would have
produced the crime of murder with respect to both but which did not by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given the said victims William Montano and Randy Tibule, which
prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6 of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions permently averred:
That on or about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of September 17, 1995 at Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay, Nalsian, Municipality of
Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control, a firearm, to wit: Caliber .30 carbine without
first having secured the proper license thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing the offense of multiple
murder and double frustrated murder.
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.

(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8739)

The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly summarized in the People's brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean
Maria Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June
11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and
Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18,
1996. pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan they met appellant Rolando Valdez and his
companions who were armed with guns. The tricycle's headlight flashed on their faces. Without warning, they pointed their
guns and fired at Montano's group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, "nataydan, mapan tayon" (They are already dead.
Let us go), Valdez and companions left (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN June 11, 1991,
pp. 14-16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the nipple right through and through trajecting the middle lobe of the
lungs, it ventricle of the heart, middle lobe of the lung, left with point of exit 1 inch in diameter 1 inch lateral of the nipple, left.
(
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t
s
B
)
Ramon Garcia:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance ear canal left thru and thru trajecting the skull brain substance with
point of exit temporal area light.
another gunshot wound .5 cm in diameter point of entrance anterior axilliary line left at the lable nipple trajecting the lung
(left) heart ventricle and lung (right) with point of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral the nipple right.
(
E
x
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b
i
t
C
)
Sandra Montano:
gunshot wound .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the temporal area left, penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain
substance (right) (tempral regis) where the slug lodge.
(
E

x
h
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i
t
D
)
Willie Acosta:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and
thru trajecting the upper third of the stomach of thoracic vein with the point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7th
thorasic vertebrae.
(
E
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E
)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could
have caused their death were it not for the timely medical attention given them (TSN July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained
several gunshot wounds on the left arm, two on the left upperback, another on the left shoulder and middle right finger (TSN
June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant (stomach) and the other at the
left periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).

(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)

In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding and disposing:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747:
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER
WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the
Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of which is in the maximum, and with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby sentences him the
ultimum suplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay
the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and the
injured victims WILLIAM MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows:
1). To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, Jr.:
a) P50,000 as indemnity
b) P53,116.00 as actual damages
c) P500,000.00 as moral damages.
2) To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA:
a) P50,000 as indemnity
b) P26,358.00 as actual damages
c) P500,000.00 as moral damages
3) To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA:
a) P50,000 as indemnity

b) P500,000 as moral damages

4) To the heirs or the deceased Sandra Montano:
a) P50,000 as indemnity
b) P48,269.80 as actual damages
c) P500,000.00 as moral damages
5) To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:
a) P38,133.92 as actual damages
b) P 100,000.00 as moral damages
6) To the victim RANDY TIBULE:
a) P36,233.65 as actual damages
b) P100,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs.
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749:
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: "Dura lex, sed lex," translated as: "The law is harsh, but that is the law!"
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 180-l81, Rollo.)

Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal on the following assigned errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATERIAL SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND
SIGNIFICANT, DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THEIR
TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RECANTATIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY
OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;
IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF BERNARDO
CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO APPRECIATE AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS
DELIBERATE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED THE
INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
VI THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT DENY
THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT ALLEGEDLY
TOUCHED IT IN HIS MEMORANDUM.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate consideration of the arguments of accused-appellant, the Court does not find
enough basis to reverse.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court in failing to consider what he says are material, substantial, important and significant
discrepancies between the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies in court. Accused-appellant points to the Statement of
William Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, record), and the Statement taken on September
24, 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City where William Montano specifically named Bernard Castro as

the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle he and the other victims were riding. This, he claims, is inconsistent with his testimony
during the where he stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsian, Manaoag Pangasinan?.
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten to fifteen meters, somebody plugged
(sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was immediately recognized by me, sir.
Q. Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the bench for the accused, and when asked his
name, gave his name as Ronaldo Valdez.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 1, 1996)

We are not persuaded.

In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden
by the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a "Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong
ng Demanda" where they disclaimed having been Bernard Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that after a more thorough
consideration of what transpired, they have realized that the filing of the complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake and the result of
misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually happened. In his testimony in court, William, however, identified accused-appellant
as the person illuminated by the headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily recognized him. We, therefore, find nothing
inconsistent between his declarations during the investigation and his testimony in court. The lack of precision with which he distinguished
between the person who flagged down the tricycle and the other person whom he recognized because of the headlight of the tricycle
cannot be considered as inconsistency at all. The same holds true with discrepancies between the statement of Randy Tibule during the
investigation and his testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the withdrawal or retraction of the accusation of several witness against Bernard Castro,
these same witnesses' accusation against accused-appeallant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of his brief to the sworn declaration of prosecution witnesses made during the
investigation of the case. Bernard Castro may have been identified and named as one of the gunmen. It may readily be noted in these very
same references, however, that all these prosecution witnesses referred to two other companions, then unidentified, of Bernard Castro.
Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit "7") referred to in page 11 of the brief, the police investigators categorically referred to "Bernard Castro y
Nazareno, alias Toti as one of the suspect or assailants involved in the shooting incident" (p. 112, Rollo). The logical conclusion that may be
drawn therefrom is that there is at least one other assailant in addition to Bernard Castro, and as it developed, accused-appellant was
subsequently and positively named as such. Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-appellant's ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed
to Bernard Castro as one of the perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that accused-appellant cannot be one other and additional
perpetrators anymore. Accused-appellant's reasoning on this point is absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious withdrawal of the victims' charges against Bernardo Castro. He insinuates that
such recantation should not have been given any consideration. But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway, even in the remotest posibility
that the retraction of the accusation against Bernardo Castro may be reversed, it does not get accused-appellant of the hook. Considering

that accused-appellant had himself been positively identified, together with Bernard Castro, as one of the other perpetrators of the crime,
his conviction may still stand independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is indicted or remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro who had the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the motorized tricycle,
mistaking one of the occupants thereof for Isidro Capistrano, Castro's former classmate and with whom he earlier had an altercation. It is
very clear in his brief, however, that accused-appellant predicates this argument on the mistaken premise that he was not positively
identified in the case at bar although he admits that it is established that it is established that he was at the scene of the crime (p.
114, Rollo). This argument will not hold simply because it is settled that accused-appellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses
and victims William Montano and Randy Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for conviction only when
there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when accused has been positively identified as in the present case (People vs.
Caggauan, 94 Phil . 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be
noted that lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecution's deliberate intentional failure to present the investigating police officers and their
Joint Affidavit (Exhibit "7") constitutes culpable suppression of evidence which, if duly taken into account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself was able to present the police officer and Exhibit "7" (p.116,Rollo). It is to be
further noted that as earlier pointed out, the declaration of SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did not categorically rule out the possibility of
convicting other persons as co-principal of Castro. On the contrary, it is clear from such affidavit that there was more than just one
perpetrator of the crime. It even confirms and corroborates the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule pointing to
accused-appellant as one of the other companions of Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and every piece of evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to depart from the
trial court's accord of credence to the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule who positively identified accusedappellant as one of the persons who shot and fired at them and their companions that fateful night. We agree with the trial court that
evidence points beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was one of those principally responsible for the death of the four victims
in this case and the wounding of two others. There is also sufficient evidence that the aggravating circumstances of treachery attended the
killing, thus, qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender employs
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that

treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if its is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself
against attack. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any showing of
evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant. While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation between
Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious
outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must
not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation" (People vs. Tojeras, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following have to be proved: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the existence of evident
premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their act of arming
themselves wit caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed victims at ambush position may have also indicate that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second element). More important that these two elements id the proof that a sufficient
period of time had elapsed between the outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense (the third element). There must
have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This element is indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation to
aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only when there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a
tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. There must be 'an opportunity to coolly and serenely think
and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough for the
conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme....
(p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had stressed the importance of sufficient time between the criminal act
and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, affording such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
Obviously, this element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the supposed heated argument between Bernard Castro and Capistrano,

Castro and company went to get the firearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault. There was no chance for the anger to subside.
The culprits in the case at bar had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the very basic and
elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery (People vs.
Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial courts' premises on the complex nature of the
crime committed, the death sentence, being the maximum penalty for murder, would still have been the impossible penalty under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. The Court however, finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for the complex
crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions) to four counts of reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate sentences of prision mayor to reclusion
temporal (for the 2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the People's brief that accused-appellant should instead be convicted of four counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Records: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may
be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found
a prima facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101-102, Ibid.) Too, the same investigating judge in his Resolution dated October
31, 1995 found prima facie for two counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint
Resolution dated November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder

resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than
one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act
of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet shell recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that
several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative position of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the
motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have
been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We
therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the
four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be
four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out
an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day of prison mayor to maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
perpetua for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellant's conviction for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was
recently held in the case entitled People vs. Molina (G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated inPeople vs. Feloteo (G.R. No.
124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which
in part, provides:
If homicide or murders is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on July 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar
were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have
prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive
application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for the

crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal
Possession of Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as meaning
that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are
involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case
No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of
murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial
to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the
character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to Criminal Case No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of reclusion
perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate
sentences, each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment relating to the civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. U-8747 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is hereby dismissed.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisma, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22,
1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer
in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3 after
which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
I

The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco
Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt.
Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team, together with their
informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities andbarangay officers thereof. When they reached
the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had
marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly
thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then
scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon,
Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred
that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the
other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired between
Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the
custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant,
however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the
confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he
placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his
entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were
personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the
results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the
person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him

to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for
the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he
was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly
arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with
them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on board, he was
told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he
was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried
marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so
since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later,
he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three
days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing
abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's
arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three
days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of
slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the
latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated)
inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13

At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not
being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view
thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does
not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell means to give, whether
for money or any other material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that
appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to
how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight
and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment,
extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and
arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duty. 21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having
been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PCINP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted

that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he
signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of
the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of
appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an
error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he
did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in the legalseizure or confiscation thereof as the
investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing
purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations. 28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in
his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation you do not anymore
provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold
of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking that kind of material in
our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that powder because they,
themselves, are using that in their own work, sir. 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of
rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a

broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification
purposes, which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the
lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official
or police authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a
relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught
appellant inflagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and
the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same
manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the
marked bills from him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents
are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by
counsel. 34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing
and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is
not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal
participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the
present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to once again
reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at
any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there
may be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as
the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this
case.

Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from
Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents
earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution 45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on
the person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering even before
his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his
brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49 Significantly, he also did not even report the matter
to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of
counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM
agents were determined to arrest him at all costs. 51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his
isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was
further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this
case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos

shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime.
The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and,
in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable
provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190
to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22
thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. 54 The execution in said article would not apply to
those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification. 55

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case,
a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved
in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they
are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions
relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final
and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the
aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be
applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that
is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range fromprision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts
should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under
the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon

the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form
a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex
penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted,
that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be
considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not
altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the
quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter
be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are
compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting
quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid
periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently
indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in
the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be
imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty ofprision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it

would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of
the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could
not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the
scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would
be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the penalties provided in our
Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as
imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special
law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the
Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing nonpayment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be
considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to

those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and
shall be punished in the same manner as therein provided. 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named
and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties
ranged from arresto mayor to
death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential
Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal,
reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and
4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not
more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to
death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative
intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term
under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot
suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as
other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the
former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties
for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on

penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit
proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of
penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said
therein that
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems
clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of
large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this
case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special
laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for
the offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the
application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience
in the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in
the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will
now be explained.

While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we
have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and
the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the
rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68
should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four
preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of
one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which
follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor,destierro and arresto mayor.
There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only
the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties,
or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower
than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted
so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug
offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to
be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year
of imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We
hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken
from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the
"offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary
because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in
Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied,
and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding
is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised
Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of
said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the
same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a
prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of thepenalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera
haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of
its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not
the penalty imposable under the law, 70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation,
which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law
and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case
shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of
Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation. 71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be
allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still
has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may
be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal
grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly
worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin
Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would beprision correccional pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the penalty
next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or
of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account
the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code
in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous
Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:

if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law:
(1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled
CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said
Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter
imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished
by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a
penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug
cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also
bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of
a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We
cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an
offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be
imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act isprision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.

II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of
Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of
the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of
the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty should
be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should
be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the
imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved by two degrees, or to prision
correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under
circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the
fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
beyondprision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph involving the same
range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The
reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the

Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.

No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper
penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion temporal may only be
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an
accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the
former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty
as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we
can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would beprision correccional pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the range of the penalty
next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or
of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account
the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code
in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous
Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law:
(1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).

The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled
CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said
Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter
imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished
by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a
penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug
cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also
bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of
a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We
cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an
offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be
imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act isprision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug

subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of
Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of
the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of
the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty should
be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should
be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the
imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved by two degrees, or to prision
correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under
circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the
fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
beyondprision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph involving the same
range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The
reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper
penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion temporal may only be
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an

accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the
former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty
as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we
can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.