SPECIAL ARTICLE

High Speed Rail in India

Importance of National Policies
Anjali Goyal

India appears poised to induct high speed rail through

bilateral credits or foreign direct investment on the
public-private partnership mode. A federal country, with
the fourth largest railway network and legacy of
indigenised railway technology, India may make costly
mistakes in pursuing HSR, an extremely expensive and
complex technology, without enacting a national policy
on HSR as a new mode of transport and adopting a policy
for the acquisition of advanced rail technology with a
strong focus on indigenisation and innovation.

This article was written and edited before the presentation of the
Railway Budget on 8 July 2014.
Anjali Goyal (angelgoyal@yahoo.com) is Adviser, Project Appraisal
and Management Division, Planning Commission.
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ndia is moving closer to ushering in high speed rail (HSR),

with two corridors in relatively advanced stages of planning the Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor, planned by the
Ministry of Railways (MoR), and the Trivandrum-Kasargod
corridor, announced by Kerala. The Government of Kerala
incorporated Indias first HSR Public Enterprise called Kerala
High Speed Rail Corporation (KHSRC) (Balakrishnan 2012) a
year before the central government set up the High Speed
Rail Corporation of India, as a subsidiary of the Ministry of
Railways public-sector unit, Rail Vikas Nigam Limited
(RVNL) (Sharma 2012). The emerging strategy is partnership
with HSR technology-owning countries willing to provide bilateral credit, such as Japan, France and China. India is likely
to choose a Contractual Model of HSR infrastructure
induction, making financial closure the only aim. Cheaper,
bilateral funding is prescribed as ridership revenue estimates
are low, and cost of infrastructure is high. This approach is
being justified on casual comparisons between the designedfor-slow-speeds Metro Rail Projects and HSR designed to
compete with Air Services at ultra-high speeds above 300
kilometres per hour (kmph). Such comparisons are odious.
Laxity in assimilating Advanced Rail Technology (ART),
required for servicing and maintaining trains running at
very high speeds, can result in mass deaths. While funds for
the initial construction and procurement are an issue for
HSR, equally important for commercial, operational sustainability is the technology induction route India will adopt.
At this stage, fundamental issues need to be examined.
Should India procure HSR through one or two geographically
fragmented, medium-distance intercity connections? Should
India not consider (i) a national policy on HSR as a mode of
transport, (ii) a national policy on technology with Buy India
provisions, to encourage technology residency and facilitate
indigenised manufacture? Is Indias current approach of pursuing projects driven by financial closure on the strength of
bilateral agreements, foreign direct investment (FDI), or publicprivate partnership (PPP), an optimal one? Fifteen countries in
the world have commercially operated HSRs, defined as rail
corridors with trains running at speeds of 250 kmph and above.
Two more countries have corridors under construction. India
is one of 10 other countries planning for HSR. It is educational
to look at international experiences on HSR while seeking
answers for India.
These issues are explored in two parts. The first part of the
article deals with issues of national policies on HSR as a mode
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SPECIAL ARTICLE

of transport, and the second part looks at policy on Advanced

Rail Technology.

Figure 1: Seven Pillars of Chinas HSR Strategy

Importance of National Policy

Indias Approach to HSR: Starting from the Railway Budget

Speech for 2000-01, there have been periodic statements on
the intent to usher HSR in India, and several feasibility reports
have been commissioned. In 2007-08, pre-feasibility studies
were proposed for the construction of high-speed passenger
corridors equipped with state-of-the-art signalling and train
control systems, for running trains at speeds of 300-350 kmph.
In 2010-11, a National High-Speed Rail Authority was proposed
for planning, standard setting, implementation, and monitoring of high-speed rail projects. In 2012-13, besides MumbaiAhmedabad-Pune, Chennai-Bangalore, Hyderabad-Chennai,
Kolkata-Haldia, Delhi-Amritsar and Chennai-Ernakulam, feasibility of HSR corridors for Delhi-Jaipur-Ajmer-Jodhpur was
announced. Indian Railways are also exploring the upgradation of track speeds for passenger trains to 160-200 kmph.
Corridors considered desirable are Delhi-Mumbai, MumbaiKolkata, Chennai-Bangalore, Delhi-Jaipur and AhmedabadMumbai. Thus, there is simultaneous planning for trains on
new, dedicated HSR tracks and trains at speeds of 160-200
kmph on existing conventional tracks, on the same routes,
competing with each other. A commonly expressed concern is
the highly capital intensive nature of these HSR corridors, and
thus the need for PPP and innovative financing. The need for
state government cooperation was mentioned for the first
time in the 2012-13 budget speech. In the midst of this,
besides Kerala, Karnataka (Government of Karnataka 2013)
has announced its intent to take up studies for HSR for the
Chennai-Bangalore-Mysore, Kasaragod-Mangalore-Udupi, and
Bangalore-Hubli-Belgaum corridors. None of these government
budgets reflect a national policy on HSR.
Policy on HSR International Examples: Countries with extensive, legacy railway networks, like the US, USSR and China,
are planning HSR very differently from India. These countries
have anchored HSR in national objectives beyond faster train
services. The Chinese strategy stands out as a sterling success
of state-led determined coordination across multiple objectives.
This author has coined the approach as the Seven Pillars of
HSR success in China. These Seven Pillars have reinforced
each other to deliver the extraordinary HSR Chinese network
in a matter of a decade (Figure 1).
Pillar 1: Planning for Railway Expansion and Speed
Upgrades: China announced and implemented planned speed
upgrades on its railways while expanding the network. From
1997, speeds of express trains were steadily increased from 140
kmph to 200 kmph by 2004. The Mid-to-Long-Term Rail Network Plan (2004) (China Railway Construction Corporation
Limited 2008) included the expansion of the railway network
to 1,00,000 km (later revised to 1,20,000 km) by 2020, and the
creation of around 12,000 km of Dedicated Passenger Lines
156

HSR
export
market
strategies
(7)
Geographic and
economic
rebalancing
(2)

Localisation
of ART
(6)

Advanced rail
technologyacquire,
absorb,
innovate
(5)

Planning:
Railway
expansion and
speed upgrades
(1)
Massive
finding
with
government
support
(3)

Statedirected
focus on
R&D
(4)

between major provincial centres, on which the target traffic

speed will typically be 250-300 kmph. Upon completion of this
scheme, a fast passenger railway network totalling more than
12,000 km was to be established, with the target speed of the
trains exceeding 200 km/hour.
Pillar 2: Geographic and Economic Rebalancing of Provincial Growth: HSR expansion is linked to the speedy integration of the developed eastern seaboard with the central and
western provinces Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Hunan, Jilin,
and Hubei are the five inland emerging provinces (China Briefing 2010). HSR addresses multiple objectives labour migration from the western and central provinces to the eastern and
coastal regions, as urbanisation reaches 67% by 2030 and
nearly 280 million people are to be shifted to cities in two
decades (Kwan 2010), improving market access, encouraging
population mobility, and enhancing logistics efficiency and
attracting many industries towards the labour pool and
customer base in Chinas smaller cities.
Pillar 3: Gigantic Funding Support for HSR Expansion with
Firm Government Commitment: The Chinese government
laid out a clear funding plan for HSR through a Railway Construction Fund (RCF) and bank loans. The Railway Construction Fund of MOR is funded by a surcharge on railway freight
(World Bank 2009). In 2005, social security funds began to be
invested in new construction, and in 2006 and 2007, there
were substantial contributions from the proceeds of the sale of
shares in the Daqin and Guangshen lines. Total investments in
new rail lines, including HSR, reached $100 billion in 2010. The
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-15) envisages an investment of
$280 billion (1.875 trillion) to build 16,448 km HSR, at the
rate of $17 million per kilometre.
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Pillar 4: State-directed Focus on Advanced Rail Research

and Development: The Chinese government has systematically developed an in-house capacity to absorb ART and produce HSR products. Engineers were sent to France and Japan
to learn high-speed technology in 1990, state-owned enterprises (SoE) were encouraged to develop capabilities for
designing and manufacturing produce-carbon steel, stainless
steel, and aluminum alloy coaches, preparing them for the ART
digest project (Li Y 2010). Overseas and domestic HSR
technologies and trains (Takagi 2011) were tested on the
Qinhuangdao-Shenyang test track. The integration of ART and
fundamental research is reflected in the close partnership
between Chinas array of Railway Academies,1 R&D institutions, and universities, which continuously work on improving railway designs and higher education in railways. The
National Medium and Long-Term Program for Science and
Technology Development (2006-20) provides priority for R&D
in key HSR technologies rail line construction, system integration, and operation control. The Ministry of Science and
Ministry of Railways agreed in 2008 to develop a new generation
of China Railway High-speed (CRH) trains with a top operational speed of 380 kmph2 through independent innovation.
In October 2010, China declared research on super-speed
railway technology, to increase the average speed of trains to
over 500 kmph (Want China Times 2010).
Pillar 5: National Interest Motivated State-led Acquisition
of Advanced Rail Technology: In 2004, China placed orders
to procure technology for high-speed multiple units with a
design speed of 200 kmph, from all major HSR manufacturers
Alstoms Pendolino, Siemenss Velaro, Kawasakis series
E2-1000, and Bombardiers Regina family. Around 5% train
sets were imported, 10% were assembled in China, and the
remaining 85% were made by Chinese local manufacturers
with some imported components (Lou et al 2011). For ballastless track, China introduced Japanese and German slab track
systems, and mastered the technologies to create the Chinese
systems (Takagi 2011). China exercised its monopsony power
to extract on its own terms HSR technology from nations that
practised techno-commercial hoarding of HSR technology.
Chinas national contracts were designed to insist on the
formation of joint ventures with Chinas SoEs for full transfer
of designs and detailed engineering, citing China-specific
requirement and safety; thus, firms had to supply technology
along with HSR coaches, develop local supply chains for train
set components, and train Chinese workers (Atkinson 2012).
Pillar 6: Localisation of Advanced Rail Technology Products Manufacture: Chinese national policies ensured that foreign suppliers had to team up with local manufacturers and
transfer series production as well as much of the technology.
The multinational corporations (MNCs) stake was capped at
49% (Atkinson and J E S 2012), with provision for 70% localisation of components. Thus, China was able to absorb HSR
technology and leverage its home-grown independent R&D
strength described under Pillar 4 to innovate and develop
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Chinas indigenous HSR brands. The Chinese courts offer

strong protection. Today, China can independently manufacture both major parts and the full-vehicle, high-speed multiple
units (Lou et al 2011). Figure 2 captures the stages of Chinas
carefully choreographed strategy on acquiring HSR technology. The massive expertise built up through Pillars 4, 5 and 6
enabled China to leapfrog on the flying geese model.3
Figure 2: Steady Steps to Enter ART Residency Club Acquire, Observe,
Absorb, Prototype , Innovate, Patent
Entice world players with
unusually large HSR market.
Pay and Legally Acquire HSR
Train Sets for relatively older
threshold speed of 250 kmph

Insist on submission of
Designs and Drawings
through contracts for
formal safety clearances
by Chinese govt

Observe, Absorb and Digest

Technology-through SOEsRolling Stock Corp- Release
D&Ds for private component
manufacturers reverse
engineering

Localise/Indigenise
Manufacture create
domestic surrogate OEMs for
foreign Rolling Stocks MNCs
develop strong supply
chain base

Encourage Chinese
companies/OEMs to
Innovate continuously to
catch up with New Gen HSR
versions. Again Innovate
and File numerous patents
in China and Overseas bring
down costs of Rolling Stock

Try to capture a share in

HSR market as leader in HSR
technology with residency

Pillar 7: HSR Export Market Strategies Predatory Pricing,

Easy Export Credit Improve Return on Investments: On the
strength of its low-cost, large HSR network, China is aggressively pursuing a share in the world HSR market. High-end
products like EMUs, metro vehicles, and AC locomotives comprise more than 80% of its overseas trade volume. It is exporting its key products to developed countries and regions like
Europe, Singapore and Australia, giving competition to companies like Bombardier and Siemens in global competitive bids
(China South Locomotive 2013). China is now filing patent
applications for its HSR technologies in the US, Brazil, Europe,
Russia and Japan, an indispensable step towards tapping overseas markets (Dingding 2011). The China National Machinery
Import and Export Corporation (CMC), mandated for foreign
trade of machinery and electronic products and overseas construction projects, provides a liberal financial package 2-2.5%
pa with 15-20 year repayment supplemented by technology
back-up of the China Railway Construction Corporation
(CRCC) in operation and maintenance, engineering design,
civil works, etc.
The Chinese HSR experience and success lies in the interplay of the Seven Pillars. The size of the Chinese HSR market,
which Pillar 1 announced, and the committed funding under
Pillar 3, successfully enticed all European majors based in
France and Germany, like Siemens, Alsthom and Bombardier,
as well as in Japan (Kawasaki). While Pillar 4 made it possible for ART to flourish in China, once it was transplanted,
Pillars 5 and 6 ensured that the HSR investments came on
Chinas terms. Pillar 2 provided the rationale for the huge investment that HSR entailed, by focusing on domestic concerns
of economic rebalancing across regions. Pillars 4, 5 and 6
paved the way for the success of Pillar 7, which has helped
China to start recovering the massive investments it has made
in HSR technology acquisition. The spin-offs of ART technology extend beyond HSR products to metros, coaches and
track infrastructure for lower speeds.
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National Policy on HSR: US and Russia

Apart from China, nations like Russia, the US, Korea and the
UK, too, have seen the importance of a national policy on HSR.
Korea enacted a legislation to pursue HSR on 31 December 1996
Koreas Act for Promoting Construction of HSR (The Korea
Transport Institute 2012). The UK introduced the Channel
Tunnel Rail Link Act 1996 to provide for the construction of a
high speed rail link between London and the Channel Tunnel.
The US (US Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration) and Russia (JSC Russian Railways), too, have
stated HSR policies.
The US, Russia and Korea have defined HSR in their respective national policies. Russia describes train speeds at 200-400
kmph as high speed, but has covered speed up to 250 kmph on
several stretches of upgraded track. The US defines the threshold speed for HSR as trains that can reasonably be expected to
reach speeds of at least 110 miles per hour (176 kmph). This
covers Acela Express, which attains speed up to 240 kmph.
The Korean Act defines HSR as a railway that allows trains to
ply on certain sections at 200 kmph and above.
The US and Russia have anchored HSR policy in nationally
relevant objectives, declared at the highest decision-making
levels. The USs Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement
Act, 2008 (PRIIA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009 (ARRA) established $8 billion Federal Grants
for states for planning and construction of HSR (there was a
later announcement of $53 billion) (Ashiabor and Wei 2012),
giving statutory backing to HSR, seen as a means to address
capacity constraints on congested highways and give a boost
to economic growth. On 17 June 2008, the Russian Federation
approved the Development Strategy of the railway transport
till 2030, linking HSR with the acceleration in social and economic development, increase in employment, higher living
standards, and mobility of the population.4 Russias vision
envisages the formation and development of an integrated
system of intermodal hubs: airports-high-speed railways-urban transport (JSC Russian Railways), and reaching out to international markets in Europe and Asia on railways.
Being subcontinental in size, these nations have stated corridor selection criteria.
The US has opted for a mega region-based approach, with
corridors planned for easing road congestion in areas of dense
economic activity and stringing high population centres. Individual states, like California, are pursuing their own HSR intrastate corridors. Thus, for the purpose of Federal funding, the
US has adopted three categories of criteria for corridor selection:
(i) Public return on investment, measured in terms of transportation benefits. (ii) Project readiness and sustainability of
benefits. (iii) Cross-cutting selection criteria balancing
projects against national priorities geography, economic conditions, innovation and technology, and the existence of multistate agreements.
Russias vision for HSR, at speeds up to 400 kmph, is based
on faster connectivity across all seven regions of the Russian
Federation, targeting the average travel time between the
capitals of these regions as one hour by 2030. The proposed
158

Moscow-Kazan HSRL link will reduce travel time from 14 hours

to three-and-a-half hours, linking Moscow Region, Vladimir
Region, Nizhny Novgorod Region, Chuvash Republic, Mari El
Republic, and the Republic of Tatarstan. The further development of the line provides for its extension to Yekaterinburg
(JSC Russian Railways 2013). Travel time from Nizhny Novgorod
to Kazan will be an hour and a half.
The USs Buy America (US Department of Transportation,
Federal Railroad Administration) clause provision applies to
all PRIIA authorised spending, including all ARRA funds.
Projects are eligible for PRIIA funding only if the steel, iron and
manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the
US. The implications are evident. General Electric (GE) and
Chinese Rolling stock majors like China South Locomotive and
Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR) plan to form a joint venture in
the US to manufacture high and medium-speed electric multiple
unit trains (International Business Times 2011). In turn, GE will
manufacture locomotives for China and provide components
for locomotives. The Chinese Ministry of Railways and GE
have signed a letter of intent, expanding an existing strategic
partnership to bring Chinese HSR technology to the US. A press
release indicates an expectation of new business opportunities
up to $1.4 billion, with an estimated $360 million in US export
content, supporting up to 200 GE transportation jobs (Government of the US 2011). Even though Russia introduced the faster
Sapsan train services in 2009 using German designed (Siemens)
rolling stock, it had already been able to test a home-grown
high-speed train, Sokol (Hawk), which achieved speeds up
to 236 kmph, on the Moscow-St Petersburg route. Russian R&D
has focused on the engineering, design and construction of
high-speed tracks. The Research and Development Council of
JSC Russian Railways, convened in April 2009, was tasked
with preparing engineering concepts for incorporation into
the design of the track, according to the Western approach
(JSC Russian Railways). This project is included in two strategic state programmes the Russian Federation Transportation
Strategy and the Strategy for the Development of Rail Transport through 2030. The Russian Railways is also targeting
organising the production of ultra-high-speed rolling stock
capable of speeds of up to 400 kmph, and high-performance
construction equipment in Russia (JSC Russian Railways 2013).
India presents a stark contrast in pursuing HSR merely as
faster train services, rather than a strategic investment, as is
the case for other large railway network nations.
What Would a National Policy on HSR Do for India?

It would address important issues, like:

(i) Public Expenditure Alternatives: A 600 km HSR corridor
connecting at best two large cities and three to four large
townships can cost more than Rs 1,00,000 crore. Should India
adopt HSR as a mode of passenger travel in competition with
the already beleaguered domestic airlines (Mishra 2013)? Do
we build airports in, say, 40 cities instead of an HSR corridor?
Do we plan such an expensive transport infrastructure without a national debate?
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(ii) Corridor Selection and Network Planning: In the absence

of a national policy, a federal country like India will face
demands from all states and regions for HSR. Should HSR link
53 cities with a million-plus population, starting with urban
conglomerates, or all 35 state/UT capitals? Or should the priority be for planned intense economic activity corridors like the
Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor or the Bangalore-Mumbai
Economic Corridor? Do we permit states like Kerala to plan
their own corridors and alignments? India may witness varying
tariffs and technologies being adopted in each corridor. Kerala
is confident of operating HSR with fares as low as about $0.07
(Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd 2011) per kilometre,
whereas the latest report on the proposed Mumbai-Ahmedabad
HSR corridor, planned by the central governments HSR Corporation, projects a per kilometre fare of $0.18 (Dastidar 2014).
(iii) Speed: Should speeds be limited to 200 kmph or 250-300
kmph and above? Do track speed upgrades for 160-200 kmph
trains on the existing railway network constitute HSR for India
(Banerjee 2011)?
(iv) Need for Enactments on HSR: The HSRC of India has
been created as a subsidiary of the RVNL, a front-running construction corporation of the MoR. Can this substitute for a High
Speed Rail Authority/Commission created under a National HSR
Act of Parliament? Would planning along the existing railway
network be optimal, when HSR requires straight tracks with
minimal curves? Given the pace at which states and the MoR
are planning HSR, India may soon face a demand for nearly
10,000 km of HSR, requiring an investment of Rs 15 trillion. A
national policy would give the correct market signal to the HSR
industry and enable appropriate terms of procurement for India.
(v) Technology Acquisition: The current technology base
does not permit the indigenous introduction of trains running
at even speeds of 200 kmph. Would the import of HSR technology on the buy off the shelf route be most optimal?
(vi) Public Consultation: While we pursue the FDI or bilateral
credit route, we do not have public consent for billions of dollars
worth of financing of HSR, eventually to be recovered through
higher/less affordable fares than the conventional trains/air
fare. Have environmental impacts, noise pollution concerns,
ground wave vibrations on track, etc, been shared with citizens?
Is climate change concern high on Indias citizen radar, as it is
in Europe? The answer is clear. Wherever governments fail to
engage citizens panels and communities, conducting patient,
elaborate and formal open public hearings as part of an intense, prolonged public consultation process, especially before
rushing to announce such mega-projects, public resistance can
become intense. Right now, this is happening in Kerala.
(vii) Spin-off Benefits: A strategic policy would highlight the
transformational impact of HSR on economic activities and
regions, and spin-off benefits in manufacture and employment
across high-end technology industries.
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National Policy on Advanced Rail Technology

Very high speed rail systems, at maximum operational speeds
above 300 kmph, command extremely complex and exacting
engineering standards and technology applications for
dedicated tracks, signalling, and trains control, and Overhead
Electric Catenary systems. The complexity of HSRs ART is reflected in the approach and choices on technology ownership
and mercantilism made by different countries. This authors
analysis of 23 nations HSR-related national policies or declared objectives shows that they can be categorised into four
different blocks.

Block 1: HSR Technology Leaders with cutting-edge technocommercial innovation capability. These countries invest
deeply in the domestic HSR network, carefully nurtured
through research and development ecosystems to showcase
ART residency. Overt and covert state subsidies promote HSR
technology projects and products-based techno-mercantilism
(Figure 3).
Figure 3: Block I HSR Technology Leaders, Techno-Commercial Innovators
Objective: Domestic Mode of Transport- eye on
Innovation Mercantilism-Nurture own GDP and
leverage Export of Product/Projects
Exclusive Residency of Technology Leadership,
Commercial Success Robust Domestic
Manufacturing Industry base

France
1967

Japan
1964*
Germany
1985

Italy
1988

Spain
2002

Method: Develop Nation Wide Network,

Established HSR Technology Residency
Commercial Success
Built up National Wealth through Export,
Retained Technology Leadership through R&D

South
Korea
2004

China
2002

Block 2: An enigmatic group of a few high-income countries

the US, the UK and Russia pioneers in rail technology, but
have shown limited interest in HSR for decades. Although
these nations have now adopted national policies on HSR, they
are cautious with HSR technology development policies and in
their attitudes towards HSR technology mercantilism. However,
these nations, with several rail construction giants (Bechtel,
Balfour Beatty, Carillion, Fluor, Kier, Laing ORourke) and advanced rail rolling stock leaders (GE, EMD), can swiftly attain a
higher degree of perfection than China in migrating to electric
traction-based HSR products and services, once they decide to
Figure 4: Block 2 Countries The Enigmatic Railway Giants
Objective: Hitherto
unstated/Non-committal
Commercial Intentions/
Technological Mercantilism
Strong legacy of tech
residency in dormancy
now can revive for HSR
tech leadership anytime in
near future

Method: Adopt HSR only to

gain access to EU/
Establish Limited Domestic
Network as a Transport
mode

Russia

USA

Objective: Reluctant pursuit of HSR

corridors for stimulating economy
UK
Operated
High
Speed
Diesel
Train @
201 km/h
in 1976

Outlook: leadership in Railway Freight

Watchful Oil Lobby/Boeing Aircraft
Industry

Method: State based Regional

Networks being debated
GE on the technology prowl-tie up
with China
Buy America Clause invoked- with
no technology statement

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enter the HSR turf. Techno-mercantilist intentions are already surfacing in the early move by GE partnering with
China Rolling Stock builders to manufacture HS train sets in
the US. The UK, after implementing the High Speed 1 Project
from St Pancras to Eurotunnel some 20 years ago, is poised
for HS2 as a catalyst for the construction majors of the UK
(McLoughlin 2013) (Figure 4, p 159).
Block 3: Smaller players, with some techno-commercial appetite for ART rolling stock, track and signalling systems. They
have adopted HSR primarily for seamless access across the
European Union (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Block 3 Countries Driven by EU Directives and Market Access
Objective: Access to EU International
Connectivity within EU and pass through
domestic network with an eye on smaller
degree of Techno- Commercialism by a few
countries like Austria, Netherlands

Austria

Norway

Sweden
Belgium

Turkey

Netherland
Portugal

Method: Adopt HSR only to gain access to

EU/ Establish Limited Domestic Network
as a through transport mode

Switzerland
Poland

Greece

Block 4: See HSR as a faster transport mode, and build HSR

projects through the procurement route, with no stated technology or network policy. These nations are diverse in their
geographic locations, but the objective is the same procurement of HSR as imported transport systems with no desire for
technology residency (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Block 4HSR Only a Transport Mode through Procurement
of Projects

Objective: Limited Domestic

Corridors- No Technology
capabilities, No TechnoCommercial ambitions

Taiwan

Malaysia

Saudi
Arabia

Morocco
Thailand

Method: Buy and Operate

mode
At various Stages of Planning
and implementation

INDIA
Brazil

The question that strikes immediately is: What is India, with

the fourth largest railway network in the world and second
highest rail passenger traffic, doing in Block 4? While India
may not possess HSR tech-residency as of now, the striking
similarities with countries like China and the US make it difficult to understand Indias current approach to HSR. Can a subcontinent-sized country like India build HSR corridors with no
legislated national policies on HSR covering speed definition,
corridor selection criteria, funding, technology acquisition
and residency, or implementation strategy?
The Need for a Policy on ART Technology for HSR

HSR corridors are politically high-profile infrastructure

projects. Thus, in many countries, there is a rush towards finalising the financial closure of these projects, with government/
public authorities tending to overestimate HSRs ridership and
160

related socio-economic benefits, and understating costs. Such

decision-making often underestimates the need for developing
an indigenous ART capability.
Nations which adopted HSR without technology transfer
and localisation are facing operational, maintenance and
financial troubles, often warranting heavy government subsidies in support. HSR projects in Taiwan (Bodman 2012), HS1
part of CTRL (UK) (Butcher 2011), and The Netherlands HSL
Zuid (Roumeliotis 2011) faced financial distress, not only
because construction costs and ridership forecasts went awry,
but also due to operational and sustainability issues, arising
from an absence of technology assimilation and localisation.
The financially distressed High Speed Alliance (owned by
Dutch railway and KLM airlines), a train operator on the 385-km
Amsterdam-Brussels route, bears the burden of paying hefty
access charges across Europe (Gilligan 2014). An independent
review of train sets imported from Italy without technology
transfer highlighted the mechanical and software deficiencies
which The Netherlands is unable to tackle indigenously
(PlanYourCity 2013).
Mega-acquisitions like HSR come with high technology gear,
characterised by strong knowledge and a leading-edge technical skill component. Infra-projects like ports, airports, complex bridges/tunnels/expressways pose challenges only during their construction phase. However, in HSR, the O&M of the
track system and rolling stock fleet over the techno-economic
life is a far more complex and costly task, and can make or
break an HSR organisation, given the kind of multi-billion dollar financial exposure required. HSRs technical intensity
makes it more difficult than airways. The need for low gradients and avoidance of sharp curves on the routes results in
more tunnels, bridges and culverts. Safety requirements are
more demanding than airside management of airport infrastructure. Zero-error margins permitted in a permanent way
demand an absolutely stable track geometry for each day of
operation, and the six-hour time for corridor maintenance
protocols has to be used with military precision. Perfect
symmetry is required across a variety of high-tech infrastructure systems complex track, signalling and automatic train
control systems, power supply to the distributed propulsion
system, train sets moving at 300-80 kmph, on-board and
off-board telecommunication, ground to train interfaces, etc.
The grim question is: Can the safety of 25,000-35,000 passengers, travelling in 25 to 30 daily HSR trains, be left in the
hands of any rail infrastructure provider and operator in the
country, without localisation of this complex technology
within our shores?
Nurturing Domestic GDP

Techno-complex mega projects, built with tied soft loans,

often deny full technology transfer with localisation. Projects
that fail to internalise and innovate upon the technology
locally, with a view to driving down the costs of O&M, are
likely to end up as citations in the confessions of many future
Economic Hitmen (Wikipedia 2013), providing perfect
evidence of Gigantic Infrastructure creations which serve to
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nourish the economic growth of the HSR project-funding and

technology exporting nation, at the expense of the importer
nation. Such projects do not add to the development or wealth
creation process of importing nations. In matters of imported
high technology products and projects, not localised, no
matter how sweet the deal, India would be paying heavily
and continually to keep the fleet afloat decade after decade.
Pure economic considerations dictate the need for technology
residency and development within local shores, under the
protective umbrella of the government, when the target is
sustainable growth in the context of efficient, affordable rail
transport systems. If a country with a national policy to
acquire HSR as a mode of transport fails to concurrently adopt
a national technology policy to internalise and assimilate
such technology locally, highly expensive HSR projects can
never become a part of that importer nations development or
wealth creation process.
Indias Approach on ART for HSR

The financial closure-based approach of India towards HSR

projects, in the absence of a national, legislated policy, can
have serious implications for sustainable HSR in India. Running such a complex technology-based train service without
an indigenous knowledge base, relying on the fulfilment of
contractual obligations, will make India heavily dependent on
external players. The experience of the Airport Express Line
from New Delhi to Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport is
a case in point. Dependence on detailed design consultants
and selective recourse to construction specialists; selection of
track (viaduct) designs without examination of alternatives
and proof checking by independent consultants; no expertise
for viaduct inspection all led to an early need for corrective
repairs, delaying continuous operation by months. This was
for a speed up to 120 kmph HSR is far too complex to pursue
this route. India will have to recognise that the wearing components of the system, which call for very intensive periodic
attention (continuous, hourly, daily, and longer interval periodic overhauls) cannot be economically viable on purely international AMC contracts.
Indian Railways (IR) has demonstrated the capacity to
absorb, innovate and localise gains from the transfer of technology (ToT). However, the opportunities given by the government to IR through state-directed and monitored investment
in ART have been few and far between.
Importance of Access to Key Components of Technology:
IR procured three-phase technology-based electric locomotives from ABB Transportation (later ADtranz and finally Bombardier Transportation), based on MICAS-S25 platform. By the
time the first locomotives rolled out of Chittaranjan Locomotive Works (CLW), the OEM had stopped manufacturing
locomotives on the MICAS-S2 platform, placing it in Service
mode, thereby only servicing the platform. Working on
German DOS (with DOS already on its way out in commercial
space) and dBase routines posed a challenge for IR, to decipher,
take over, and maintain the basic enabling environment by
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basic porting of software on more current platforms as they

emerged. Enduring solutions were needed as the life of the
locomotives is at least 35 years. This was possible as CLW was
the final integrator and system engineering skills were developed at CLW, enabling CLW to address the dynamic needs of IR
as a transporter, like adding more coaches in trains, higher
speeds, etc. Through system integration information, CLW
could take up projects with research institutions under the National Mission on Power Electronics (NaMPET) to develop the
locomotives uppermost layer of control, which integrates all
the sub-systems and defines the locomotives characteristics
on open platforms and third-party development and operating
systems. When the acquired platform was pushed to Service
mode, the new tool called for making basic changes in the
locomotive application software, which had the potential to
derail all ongoing vendors developed indigenously, creating a
monopolistic situation. This situation was fortunately averted
with imaginative and creative solutions, in turn creating a
domestic source of technology to fill the gap when the international OEM migrated to higher platforms.
Cost Reduction: Localisation of the 2.25 MW power converters
used in electric locomotives brought down the cost from Rs 8
crore to close to Rs 2 crore in a few years, through better
understanding of the product. This further created a benchmark for diesel locomotive propulsion and became the ballpark figure for all new acquisitions.
Vendor Development: A successful ToT occurred when IR
took Hitachi technology for the DC Traction Motor (TM) in the
1980s. This TM powered IRs quest to haul heavier and faster
trains for at least 25 years. The motor was manufactured by
CLW under the design supervision of RDSO; BHEL was commissioned to manufacture this TM. BHEL subsequently brought
in multiple modifications to make the TM survive Indian operating and maintenance practices. The manufacturing of the
motor gave a fillip to several small companies that specialised
in components and smaller parts of the motor. The design was
mastered by some Indian companies in the private sector,
enabling them to take up business in repairs and component
supplies in the global market. Some of these companies are
now in a position to innovate on these components to suit
client demand, or the advanced technology demands of IR.
However, all these developments were not the product of a
superior understanding of locomotive technology or system
engineering approach per se. The approach has been to adopt
better sub-systems, and not foreseeing and initiating development ab initio. Atomisation and product-based designs and
localisation were sufficient only to lower costs through multiple vendors. Prices crashed as vendors of monopolistic products became aware that IR engineers understood the technology sufficiently to develop second sources this applied to all
the sub-systems, most notably to Brake Systems and Compressors in new-generation locomotives. The Indian Rail Research
Organisation, government-owned production units, and
private-sector component manufacturers (locally developed
161

SPECIAL ARTICLE

OEM/ODMs) have shown no serious interest in building on the

assimilated technology base or in innovations to attract any
national or international attention. The main complaint of
local manufacturers, to whom the technology gets passed on,
has been that major systems cannot be designed without a viable market. Also, while local development is possible for major capital sub-systems like power converter, control electronics, etc, a clear superior supervision is needed to make sure
that organisational interest does not become subservient to
the product developing industry. This calls for an extremely
competent and nuanced understanding of the involved technologies, down to the product topology, involved systems and
a sound theoretical grounding. Government procedures laid
down for indigenous vendor development do not encourage
technology development and innovations. Beyond acquiring
technology, India has to take a decision on the technology
assimilation and innovation strategy.
Is FDI or Joint Venture Route the Answer?

It may be argued that ToT will take place in India through the
joint venture (JV) route, or through the newly announced FDI,
or traditional technology transfer, which is what IR had carried out in electric traction with ABB, or the long-standing collaboration with EMD in Diesel Heavy Haul Locomotive. India is
not a newcomer to these approaches. Suzukis automobile
technology came to India through the JV route with Maruti
(Bhargava and Seetha 2010). Bombardier, Alsthom and Siemens have opened shop in India for Metro coaches, EMUs, and
other Electricals and Signalling rail products. However, none
of these approaches match the well-structured nationally legislated policies of Technology Transfer and Localisation
adopted by Korea or China, which can make a significant

difference to outcomes. China initially relied on technology

transfer and indigenisation of the imported components,
which was only partially successful. Ultimately, China went in
for aggressive technology acquisition with insistence on the
transfer of state of the art technology, joint design and production, and development of the local vendor base. The core technology covered all key components bogie, body shell, traction converter, traction motor, traction transformer, traction
control system, network control system, braking system, and
above all, system integration (Chan and Aldhaban 2009).
China developed its own version of faster HSTs, which threaten
to edge past competitors and partially recover the massive investments made on HSR. Concentrated involvement of academic and research institutes in all technology transfers made
further technology innovation and upgradation possible in
both China and Korea. Before China launched even the threshold speed HSR, international journals were flooded with papers
on ART by Chinese experts. After acquiring TGV technology from
Alstom (France), the Korean government initiated the indigenous
development of higher speeds in HSR through collaboration
between the Korea Railroad Research Institute (KRRI), the Korea
Institute of Industrial Technology (KITECH), and rolling stock
manufacturer Rotem. It is the KRRI that has now unveiled a
next-generation bullet train with a maximum speed of 430 kmph,
the HEMU 430X (The Chosunilbo 2014). India is the only other
country that could compete effectively with China in HSR technocommercialism, if only India would adopt this approach.
ART Acquisition and Localisation

Despite the presence of a robust rail products industrial infrastructure addressing IRs massive annual demands of 3,500
passenger coaches, 18,000 wagons, 450 locomotives (with a

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management of forests, the states rehabilitation policies, and the Forest Rights Act and its implications. It presents diverse
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162

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

fair share of 6,000 HP locos), and other products, India seems

to have squandered away its opportunities for ART development. In the post-Nehruvian era, the tremendous advantages
of the acquisition of ART and the impact of localisation on
Indias industrial sector have not been properly highlighted
before policymakers. The economic importance of railways
was relegated to the position of a mere Transport Operator
and not an Advanced Technology flag-bearer, with the potential to export of high-tech products and services. This approach is intriguingly in contrast with Indias quest for indigenous advanced technology development and residency in
spheres like Cryogenic technology the most complex among
rocket propulsion technologies. After the successful Mars
Mission 2013 and the launch of the indigenous GSLV, many
nations regard India as a leader in Space Science and Technology. Even Japan (in 1998) and China (2011) failed in their attempts at Mars Missions. The world marvels at Indias inexpensive Space Project Costs, a result of the success of Indias
own resident technology in space R&D. From a currently costeffective port for the commercial launching of lightweight
satellites through PSLV for many countries like Denmark,
Switzerland, Korea, Italy, the UK, etc, India can become the
worlds most cost-effective heavy satellite commercial launching country (Asokan 2013).
While India frittered away its chances for further ART development after 1965, almost all the HSR nations with ART
France, Japan, Germany, Italy, South Korea and China were
nurturing their national GDPs to eventually become exporters
of HSR technology products and services. For example, French
railway manufacturing industries contribute as much as 1
billion through exports and 2 billion to the home market. The
HSR market is expected to register an exponential growth,
and that is why three players from the EU region (France,
Germany, Spain) and three Asian players (Japan, South Korea
and China) are in the HSR market. China exports rail components to Europe and has signed a JV with GE to manufacture
high speed train-sets, and is offering to finance HSR in the US
and elsewhere. However, even the moderate export openings
for rail products and services that India had in African nations like Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and
Mozambique, and in other nations like Bangladesh, Malaysia,
Iraq, and Bolivia in the 1980s-90s have completely dried up,
due to Indias zero investments in technology upgradation.
A Strategy for ART in India: Role of the Government
Making Indias rail system sustainable through the adoption of
new technologies for localisation and further innovation
would require an altogether new governmental direction and
reforms in government procurement rules. Some suggestions are:
(i) Establishing a national consensus that the rail sector shall
be driven by resident technology.
(ii) The government should promote advanced track-building
technology to safely withstand ground waves vibrations
while train speeds cross Critical track Velocity (beyond 350
kmph). Although similar to sonic booms when aircrafts cross
the sound barrier, ground waves on track can be potentially
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vol xlix no 28

more dangerous. The government must provide, on priority,

R&D infrastructure like HSR test track. The aim should be not
only the assimilation of initial technology, system integration
and know-how, but also developing indigenous R&D ecosystems to carry out innovations and technology advancements
in rolling stock with advanced vehicle guidance systems, signalling and overhead power equipment systems, etc.
(iii) Thematic research ecosystems will need to be identified
and nurtured across universities and multiple national institutes to create a continuous supply of high quality engineering
and technology human resources, and dedicated research labs
to take over sensitive research.
(iv) Atomise the platform break it down to its components.
For example, for electric locomotives/distributed propulsion
train-sets bogies, current collection system, traction motors,
converters, transformers, air supply systems, brakes, driver interfaces, etc decide which can be sourced from the domestic
industry to develop component vendors. Select ToT partners
through a rigorous competitive process based on suitability,
capacity to invest, and a genuine desire to be in rail component
manufacturing, thereby building upon Indias existing industrial manufacturing base. Leading world-class manufacturers
of train-sets/locomotives have entered into such tie-ups in
China and South Korea, and would be willing to enter into
similar tie-ups with Indian manufacturers.
(v) Large, complex technology induction, like converters,
should be entrusted only to IRs Production Units or PSUs like
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), Bharat Earth Movers
Limited (BEML), etc.
(vi) Government procurement rules for high technology products and critical software developments have to match the
complexity of the acquisition when it comes to high-tech component and vehicle guidance system software, which developed countries tend to hoard. Too much reckless competition
in the name of annual contracts can kill tech-based OEM segments, as viable volumes are a must to sustain companies who
want be ToT partners.
(vii) Corporatise rail production units CLW, Diesel Locomotive Works, Varanasi (DLW), Rail Coach Factory, Kapurthala
(RCF), Integral Coach Factory, Chennai (ICF), etc and enable
them to acquire the rail transportation units of BHEL and BEML,
and also allow all other new locomotive and coach factories to
merge with the new giant corporates CLW, DLW and RCFs.
(viii) Government bodies Ministries of Finance and Planning, and constitutional authorities responsible for government audit and accountability oversight offices need to keep
the large picture in sight. Public procurement rules for leading
edge technology acquisition eventually meant for acquiring
patent rights, global commercial mercantilist competitiveness,
and to nourish their national GDP cannot be the same as for the
procurement of gumboots for trackmen.
(ix) A national legislation like the Buy India Bill (similar to
the Buy America clause or the licensing system in China for
inviting advanced technologies) may need to be moved in Parliament. This would facilitate a spirited and open public consultation process on such sensitive policies.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE

Notes
1 The China Academy of Railway Sciences, Railway Survey and Design Institutes, seven major
Chinese railway universities (now mainstreamed), and the China Railway Society
Chinas national institution of railway science
and technology.
2 MoR then launched three projects: CRH1-350
(Bombardier and BST, designated as CRH380C/
CL), CRH2-350 (CSR, designated as CRH380A/
AL), and CRH3-350 (CNR and Siemens, designated as CRH380B/BL), to develop a new generation of CRH trains with a top operational
speed of 380 kmph. Four hundred new-generation trains were ordered.
3 Flying geese model: technology transferred
from an advanced to a developing economy,
enabling the advanced economy to free up resources to focus on newer technologies and industries.
4 ECE-TRANS-WP5-2008-21-inf12strategy_e (by
order of the Government of the Russian Federation from 17 June 2008, 877-p).
5 Microcomputer Automation System-Series-2.
Available at http://clw.indianrailways.gov.in/
works/uploads/File/121114.001_Specification%20for_TCN_VCU_website.pdf

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