CASE DIGEST

TANADA vs TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985
FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government officials to publish and/ or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The
petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also invoking that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must
be published in the Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal standing to carry out such petition since they are not personally and directly prejudiced by
the non-publication of the issuances in question. Respondents also contended that the publication in the
Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which provide their own affectivity date. Since the
issuances in question contain the date of effectivity, publication is not necessary.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry out the instant petition and
whether publication is necessary for laws which have its own effectivity date.
HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizens legal personality since the right sought to be enforced by the
petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution.
The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would be no adequate notice to the
general public of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. It would
render injustice to punish or burden a citizen for the transgression of law which he had no notice.
It is the respondent officials duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is mandated by law. Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor
ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
SUMMARY:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years
from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
FACTS:
1.
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo, of 23
years.
2. The son, Adrian Bernabe was born on September 18, 1981. Fiscal Bernabe died on August
13, 1993, and his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year,leaving Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
3. May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
a legitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given share in Fiscal Bernabes estate.
4. RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code (took effect on
1988) as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. CA, the complaint is now barred.
5. RTC granted Ernestinas Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had
barred the action.

6. the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian
Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged
father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
ISSUES:
1.
W/N Family Code should be applied retroactively
W/N Adrian Bernabe, an illegitimate son, has a right to be recognized
HELD:
1.
NO. FC should not be applied retroactively
a. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which
allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
majority.
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
a. Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
b. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. (FC did not apply
retroactively because it will impair this vested right)
2.
RTC said that the father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing. The action
for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity
to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative
parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil
Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or
taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Adrian was only 7 y/o when the Family Code took effect and only 12 when his alleged father died in
1993. The minor must be given his chance to exercise his right.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a
verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of
its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by
aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.
Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time
of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who
are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition
for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although
denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law
prevailing before the Family Code.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person
of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.

REPUBLIC vs. CA AND BOBILES

GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since
4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with
copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also
posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment
declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its
favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in Court of Appeals, Family Code took
effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory

ISSUE:
Whether the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.
HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its
favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in Court of Appeals, Family Code took
effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will
have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and
thus vested and must not be prejudiced.
A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the
time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his
wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
LAHOM VS SIBULO
Posted by kaye lee on 7:49 PM
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she
averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their
surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern
prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously
issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on
adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998,
wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no
longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional

guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to
nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.
Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 143989, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA
GR 166738, August 14, 2009
FACTS: Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married. However, they never lived together in one
habitat because their marriage was a secret to Edward's family. Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage
due to psychological incapacity. She alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent
reneged on his promise to be true with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial
support to her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he represented himself as single in his transactions;
and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman.
The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of required certifications
from the Solicitor General. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to
prematurity thus denied the nullification of the parties' marriage. Rowena, then filed a petition to
the Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's decision be set aside and RTC's decision be
reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically
incapacitated according to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RULING: No. The testimony of Dr. Tayag, together with her report, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except
in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short
on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was
already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are
critical to the success of the petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what
the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the
respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course,that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations, and about events on or about the
time of the marriage and immediately thereafter.

G.R. 180764 January 19, 2010

Titus B Villanueva,-petitioner vs Emma M Rosqueta-Respondent
Fact:
The petitioner, ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent spite respondent who remained in the
eyes of the Law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented
her from assuming the duties of the position.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner be liable in damages to respondent for ignoring the preliminary injunction
order the RTC issued in the quo warranto case?
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner is liable to respondent for she suffered from severe anxiety on account of the
speculation over her enjoyment status, and that stated on art 19 and art 20 a.Article 19 of Civil Code, a
person must, in exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good health b.Article 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnity the letter for the same.
G.R.143989 July 14, 2003
Lahom vs Sibulo
Fact:
Mrs Lahom applied for a petition to rescind the adoption before the RTC, Branch 22, of Naga Ciity for
reasons there is no more basis for existence, this petition for revocation.
Issue:
Whether or not admitting the facts alleged of the petitioner?
Ruling:
No. As long a petition for adoption in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the
time it was filed, the court requires jurisdiction and retains it until disposes the case.
G.R. 160273 jan 18, 2008
CCCI petitioner vs Elizagaque respondent
Fact:
The CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondents application for proprietary membership was differed
and the respondents received a letter from CCIs corporate secretary informing the respondent the Board
disapproved
his application for proprietary membership.
Issue:
a.Whether or not disapproving on respondents application for propriery membership with CCCI b.Wether
or not their liability is joint or several?
Ruling:
No. In rejecting respondents application for propriery membership, we find that the petitioner violated the
rules and governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the ability of social order.