MANINANG vs.

CA

face of the will, that conclusion is not

June 19, 1982

indubitable.

Such

preterition

is

still

questionable.

The Special Proceeding is

REMANDED to the lower court.

FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will
which provides that all her properties shall
be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose
family Clemencia has lived continuously for
the last 30 years. The will also provided
that she does not consider Bernardo as his
adopted son.

Bernardo, as the adopted

son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent

Clemencia

Aseneta,

instituted

[Case Digest!] Mercado vs. Santos

Leave a comment
This case may be assigned in Wills and
Succession.

intestate

proceedings.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Facts re: probate proceedings in blue. Facts

re: criminal case for forgery/falsification
in red.

[May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano

Mercado filed a petition for the probate
of the will of his deceased wife, Ines
Basa, with the Pampanga CFI.

[June
31,
1931] The
will
was
admitted to probate.

[October
27,
1932] Intervenor
Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the
justice of the peace court of San
Fernando,
Pampanga,
a
complaint
against Mercado for falsification/forgery
of the will probated. Mercado was
arrested.
The
complaint
was
subsequently dismissed at the instance
of de Leon herself.

[March 2, 1933] Same intervenor

charged Mercado with the same offense,
this time in the justice of the peace court
of Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was
arrested again. The complaint was
likewise dismissed, again at de Leons
instance.

[February 2, 1934] Same banana as

on
March
2,
1933.
Upon
due
investigation, the case was dismissed on
the ground that the will alleged to have
been falsified has already been probated
and that there was no evidence that
Mercado had forged the signature of the
testatrix but that, on the contrary,
satisfactory evidence was presented that

Was Bernardo preterited?

HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue
that calls for resolution is whether under
the terms of the decedent's Will, private
respondent

had

been

preterited

or

disinherited, and if the latter, whether it

was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance

are

two

diverse

concepts.
Preterition consists

in

the

omission in the testator's will of the forced

heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs

nor

are

expressly

disinherited. Disinheritance is
testamentary
compulsory

disposition
heirs

of

his

depriving
share

in

any
the

legitime for a cause authorized by law.

By virtue of the dismissal of the
testate case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion of the trial court
was that Bernardo has been preterited. The
SC is of opinion, however, that from the

established the authenticity of said

signature.

[April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon

and other intervenors moved ex parte to
reopen the probate proceedings, alleging
lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and
to close the proceedings. This motion
was denied, having been filed ex parte.

[May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal

moved for reinvestigation of the criminal
case for forgery before the Pampanga
CFI. The motion was granted, and for the
fourth time, Mercado was arrested. The
reinvestigation dragged on for almost a
year

[May 24, 1934] A second motion to

reopen and close probate proceedings
was filed, this time with notice to the
adverse party. Same was denied.

[February 18, 1935] until the CFI

ordered the forgery case to be tried on
the merits.

[July 26, 1935] Intervenors motion

was appealed to the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the probate courts order
of denial.

[c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to

dismiss the case, claiming again that the
will alleged to have been forged had
already been probated and, further, that
the order probating the will is conclusive
as to the authenticity and due execution
thereof. The CFI overruled the motion.
Mercado thus filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, which promptly
denied same.

HENCE, THIS PETITION.

ISSUE:
1.

WON the probate of Ines Basas will

is a bar to Mercados criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of
said will.
RULING:

Applicable law: Code of Civil

Procedure (then governing the law
on wills)

Sec. 306 provides, as re: the

effect of judgments: in case of a

judgment/order in respect to the

probate of a will, such judgment/order
is conclusive upon the the will.

Sec.
333
establishes
an
incontrovertible presumption in favor
of judgments declared by the Code to
be conclusive.

Sec. 625 provides, as re:

conclusiveness of the due execution of
a probate will: the allowance by
the court of a will of real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.

Basis for PH law on wills (particularly

Sec. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
Statutes of [the US state of] Vermont.

Decisions of the Supreme

Court of Vermont re: effect of probate
of a will are of persuasive authority in
PH.

Says the Vermont SC in

Missionary Society vs. Eells: The
probate of a will by the probate court
having jurisdiction thereof, upon the
due notice, is conclusive as to its due
execution against the whole world.

In view of the provisions of Secs. 306,

333 and 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a criminal action will not
lie against the forger of a will which
had been duly admitted to probate
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Disposition: Mercado is entitled to
have the criminal proceedings against
him quashed; CA judgment is reversed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Francisca Alsua-Betts, Joseph O. Betts, Jose
Madareta, Esteban P. Ramirez, And The
Register Of Deeds For Albay Province,
Petitioners
v.
Court Of Appeals, Amparo Alsua Buenviaje,
Fernando Buenviaje, Fernando Alsua,
Represented By His Guardian, Clotilde S.
Alsua And Pablo Alsua, Respondents

FACTS: A notarized Escritura de Particion

Extrajudicial was entered on the properties
of spouses of Don Jesus Alsua, wife Doa
Florentina, and all their remaining four (4)

living children, on November 25, 1949. On

January 5, 1956, both of the spouses made
their holographic wills with the provisions
conforming to the implementation of the
extrajudicial partition. Codicils amending
and supplementing the spouses respective
holographic wills on 1956 and eventually
admitted to probate. Don Jesus became
executor on the death of Doa Florentina
and cancelled his previous holographic will,
appointed daughter Francisca as executrix,
and collated the properties to be donated to
his four children. At the death of their
father, Francisca filed a petition of probate
of the 1959 will and was opposed by
brother respondents.

probate court denied their motion. The

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the corporations
and/or their assets should be included in
the inventory of the estate.
HELD: No.

As

regards

the

assets,

the

corporations were able to present their

respective Torrens Titles over the disputed
assets. It is true that a probate court may
pass upon the question ownership albeit in
a provisional manner but still, a Torrens Title
cannot be attacked collaterally in a probate

ISSUE: Is
acceptable?

the

probate

of

the

will

proceeding, it must be attacked directly in a

separate proceeding.
As regards the corporations, to include

HELD: Yes. The 1959 will amended the

1949 settlement and rendered latter as
void. "A will may be revoked by the testator
at any time before his death. (Art. 828,
Civil Code) When it will not prejudice any
heirs, he is not forced to follow any only one
will.

them in the inventory is tantamount to the

piercing of the veil of corporate fiction
because

the

probate

court

effectively

adopted the theory of Rufina. This cannot

be done. Firstly, the probate court is sitting
in a limited capacity. Secondly, Rufina was
not able to present sufficient evidence that
indeed the corporations are mere conduits

Rufina Lim vs Court of Appeals

of Pastor. Mere ownership by a single

stockholder or by another corporation of all
or nearly all of the capital stock of a

323 SCRA 102 Business Organization

Corporation Law Piercing the Veil of

corporation is not of itself a sufficient

reason

for

disregarding

the

fiction

of

Corporate Fiction

separate corporate personalities. The veil

In 1994, Pastor Lim died. His wife, Rufina

cant be pierced without any showing that

Lim petitioned with the lower court, acting

as a probate court, for the inclusion of 5
corporations

into

the

inventory

of

the

estate of Pastor Lim. The 5 corporations

were:

Auto

Truck

Corporation,

Alliance

Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing,

indeed the corporation is being used merely

as a dummy. To disregard the separate
juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrong-doing
convincingly

must

be

established.

clearly
It

cannot

and
be

presumed.

Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action

Company. Rufina alleged that the assets of
these corporations were owned wholly by
Pastor; that these corporations themselves
are owned by Pastor and they are mere
dummies of Pastor. The corporations filed a
motion for exclusion from the estate. They
presented proof (Torrens Titles) showing
that the assets of the corporations are in
their respective names and titles. The

In re Estate of Johnson
summary: Past case. This is the case where
one of the daughters in the first marriage
wanted to invalidate the will so that
intestate proceedings may instead be
conducted (i.e. she will be an heir). Will was
earlier probated, allegedly in accordance
with Illinois law (TC judge took JN of the law
just based on an annotation), and is sought
to be nullified on the grounds that it was
not made in accordance with Illinois law

and that the decedent is an RP resident.

Court held that since no Illinois law showed
(to prove that it was indeed not made in
accordance with Illinois law) and since what
matters is that the decedent is a CITIZEN of
Illinois and since she did not contest the
taking of JN of the TC of a foreign law w/o
the proof required, then deemed admitted
that the will was in accordance with Illinois
law.
Facts:
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden

proved under the law of such state or

country.
-IT IS APPLICABLE: the "state" would
include US, and the operation of law is not
limited to wills of aliens.
-if Johnson was at the time of his death a
citizen of US and of the state of Illinois, his
will was provable under this section in the
courts of the Philippines, provided the
instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under laws of the
State of Illinois
1

-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death

YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he

was indeed a national of Illinois. Petition
merely contests the residence of the
decedent to be in the Philippines, but not
the nationality

-made a WILL
>in RP
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not
conform with Section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of the Philippines, which
required 3 witnesses)
-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will
was executed in accordance with the laws
of Illinois (he was a citizen of Illinois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and
admitted it to probate (TC judge relied on
Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes
of Illinois, as exhibited in vol.3 of Starr
& Curtis' Annotated Illinois Statutes,
2nd ed, p.426)
--after will probated, her daugher from first
marriage, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the
annulment of the decree, saying:
1. will was not executed
accordance with Illinois law

in

1. the decedent was not a

resident of the state of Illinois
1

Decedent a national of Illinois (to

warrant the application of Illinois
law)

WON Section 636 of the Code of

Civil Procedure is not applicable
to wills of aliens residing in RP?

Section 636: authorizes probate by our

courts of a will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, when such will is
executed in accordance with the law of
the state or country of which the testator
is a citizen of subject, and which might be

Why
contested
residence: US
naturalization laws require residence of at
least 5 years in US and 1 year w/n the State
or territory where the court granting the
naturalization papers is held to grant the
certificate of naturalization
-still, no other proof to rebut the
presumption that he was indeed naturalized
as a US citizen (particularly of Illinois)
1

WON will executed in conformity

with the State of Illinois

NOT
REALLY
SURE,
BUT
THE
PETITIONER CANNOT DO ANYTHING
ABOUT IT.
-Courts cannot take JN of Foreign
laws: TC
merely
relied
on
the presentation of Section 1874 of the
Revised
Statutes
of
Illinois
as
exhibited
in
a
volume
of
an
annotation and assumed that he could
take JN of the laws of Illinois. But it was
WRONG!!!
-proper rule is to require proof of the
statutes of the States of the American
Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action
litigated in the Philippine courts.
-still,
(1) petition does not state any fact from
which it would appear that the law of Illinois
is different from what the court found

(2)petition did not raise any assignment of

error to question the supposed taking of JN
of the court
UV
Extrinsic Validity of JOINT wills
Art818: prohibition against Joint wills
Joint wills
-1 will made by 2 persons (in 1 document)
for

Reciprocal benefit

Benefit of a third person

-considered VOID in RP: against PUBLIC

POLICY
1

Will
purely
personal
and
unilateral act: di na ganito if 2
persons make 1 will

Wills should be revocable: If

you're one of the testators and
you revoked the will, the other
testator would have no will left

This may expose a testator to

undue influence and danger of
death (papatayin nung isa ung
isa) - PREVENT POTENTIAL
OVERREACHING

IF MUTUAL: there might

be undue influence on
the part of the more
aggressive testator to
dictate the terms of the
will for his or her own
benefit or for that of 3P
whom he or she desires
to favor
IF
RECIPROCAL:
one
might kill the other

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the
crime of murder but was convicted by the
RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He
appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then
he field an application for admission to bail
pending appeal, due to his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part.

The CA denied his application on the

ground that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass
for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison
facility.

On this matter, Levisete questioned the

ruling of the CA and averred that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in the
denial of his application for bail considering
that none of the conditions justifying denial
of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. That when the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more
than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances in the abovementioned provision are absent, bail must
be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the
application for bail of Leviste.

Ruling:

Case Digest: Leviste vs CA GR No 189122

Leviste vs CA

No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is

discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty
impose is more than 6 years the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, or

GR No 189122
March 17, 2010

has committed the crime aggravated

by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or violated the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification;
3. that he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

5. that there is undue risk that he may

commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be
discretionary pending appeal and it cannot
be said that CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. After conviction by the trial
court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends, from then
on the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion.