GALURA vs.

MATH AGRO
FACTS: Spouses Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers from Math-Agro Corporation
(MAC). The Spouses Galura paid MAC P72,500. Despite several demands, they failed to pay
the P353,500 unpaid balance. MAC engaged the services of a certain Atty. Pasamba for the
purpose of collecting the unpaid balance from the Spouses Galura. A demand letter was sent to
spouses Galura wherein it stated that they were giving them 5 days upon receipt of the letter, to
pay the unpaid balance plus interest; that failure to pay would result in an action in court.
Because of non-payment after demand was made, MAC filed a complaint with the RTC praying
that the court would order spouses Galura to settle the balance plus attorneys fee and litigation
expenses. In their complaint, MAC provided for their address where summons may be served to
them. Clerk of Court Ortega issued the summons.
1st SERVICE: went to 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights , Quezon City where he was
informed that the Spouses Galura were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang
Sora, Q.C.
2nd SERVICE: went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona , Tarlac to
serve the summons, however he learned that the property had been foreclosed and that the
Spouses Galura no longer resided there.
3rd SERVICE: went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City , to serve the
summons. Sildo served the summons on Teresa L. Galuras sister, Victoria Lapuz.
The Spouses Galura failed to file their answer. RTC declared them in default and allowed MAC
to present its evidence ex parte.
RTC ruled in favor of MAC and ordered the Spouses Galura to pay the unpaid balance,
attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation. Subsequently, RTC issued a writ of execution to
implement its Decision.
Thereafter, Spouses Galura received from their parents-in-law a copy of the 10 November
2004 Order. Spouses Galura filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and final
order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, claiming that the RTCs Decision and Order were void
beacuse the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted
service of summons was invalid, and there was extrinsic fraud because MAC made them
believe that it would not file a case against them - MAC, despite the commitment of its owner
not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the part of Math-Agro and its owner constitutes
extrinsic fraud, as it prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action lodged with
the RTC.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that there was a valid
substituted service of summons, that the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that
the Spouses Galura should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or
petition for relief. The Spouses Galura filed a MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Was there a valid substituted service of summons? NONE.
2. Should have they availed first of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for
relief? NO.

HELD:
1.
Sildo, in his Rertun, did not state that his attempts to serve the summons by personal
service at the Tierra Pura Subdivision address failed, and that the same could not be made
within a reasonable time. He likewise failed to state facts and circumstances showing why
personal service of the summons upon the petitioners at the said address was impossible.
Finally, he also failed to state that Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with whom he left the
summons, was a person of sufficient age and discretion, and residing in the said Tierra Pura
address.
The requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is
impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the
person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to
whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and (5) pertinent
facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service. In Sandoval,
the Court held that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and
fully observed.
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot
be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the
proof of service in the Return. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of
the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of
personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was
served, was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the
Spouses Galura. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
Spouses Galura, and thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTCs Decision and Order.

2.
When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through
no fault of his or her own.
In a case where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege
in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order an any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches

REICON REALTY vs DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY

The Facts:
In a case for breach of contract with damages filed by Diamond Dragon Realty and
Management, Inc., (Diamond) against Reicon Realty Builders Corporation (Reicon) and several
other defendants, Reicon filed a Motion to Dismiss thru a special appearance, alleging as
grounds improper service of summons since the summons in the case was served not on the
president and any of the other persons designated in the rules, as well as lack of legal capacity
to sue , Reicon alleging that Diamonds juridical personality had been revoked by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In its comment to the motion to dismiss, Diamond alleged that
improper service of summons is not a ground for a motion to dismiss; likewise, its corporate
name is Diamond Dragon Realty & Management, Inc., while the corporation whose certificate
of incorporation was revoked was known as Diamond Dragon Realty & Mgt. Inc. At any rate,
the personality of the corporation may only be assailed in a quo warranto position.
Resolving the motion to dismiss, the RTC denied it. Improper service of summons is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss the case. On the other hand, only thru a quo warranto may the
personality of the corporation (Diamond) be resolved. Its motion for reconsideration denied,
Reicon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to assail the denial of its motion to
dismiss.
In a Resolution, the CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should
not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, as private
respondent, as required under Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules. It appears that the CAs earlier
Resolution dated January 5, 2011 addressed to Diamond, with address at Suite 305, AIC
Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., cor[.] Garnet Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City was
returned to it, with the notation RTS-Moved Out. In response, Reicon alleged that Diamond
always used the address of record of the latter in the action below, Suite 305, AIC Burgundy
Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. It had not
submitted any pleading attesting to its change of address. Thus service of the petition at the
latter address should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it prayed that summons be served
on Diamonds counsel, Atty. Marqueda at his office address.
By way of special appearance, Diamond thru its counsel alleged that the petition for
certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of
record (i.e., Atty. Marqueda). It cited the rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice
of proceedings must be served upon said counsel to constitute valid service.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Reicon on the following grounds: a) noncompliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party
through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. Its motion for reconsideration denied,
Reicon elevated the dismissal of the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Reicon for failure to
acquire jurisdiction over Diamond.

The Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
I.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally filed 1 before the CA,
provide as follows:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The
petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents,
a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the
grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on
the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner,
and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are
referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. x x x.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before
the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts 2 as
well as the affidavit of service and/or filing 3 of the person who filed and served the
petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicons
certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at
Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City,4 in compliance with Section 13,5 Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.6
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business
address7 in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it
had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting
the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement
under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of
the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original
and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in
the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. 8 Hence, at the preliminary point of serving
the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for
respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section

2,9 Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicons certiorari petition outright for non-compliance
with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel
under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the
respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.
II.
On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had
already been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation
dated May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had
consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before
this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to
such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the CAs resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e., the Resolution
dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was returned with the notation RTSMoved Out, the alternative mode of Diamonds voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to
acquire jurisdiction over its person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking the
convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere special appearance, considering
that it affirmatively sought therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made,
and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Courts
jurisdiction. Here, Diamonds special appearance cannot be treated as a specific
objection to the CAs jurisdiction over its person for the reason that the argument it
pressed on was about the alleged error in the service of Reicons certiorari petition, and
not the CAs service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the said pleading.
Properly speaking, this argument does not have anything to do with the CAs acquisition of
jurisdiction over Diamond for it is the service of the appellate courts resolution indicating its
initial action, and not of the certiorari petition itself, which is material to this analysis.
Note that the conclusion would be different if Diamond had actually objected to the CAs service
of its resolution indicating its initial action; if such were the case, then its special appearance
could then be treated as a proper conditional appearance challenging the CAs jurisdiction over
its person. To parallel, in ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial courts
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party specifically objects
to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If
the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of
the complainants initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to
the courts jurisdiction over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory
pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial courts service of summons
same as the CAs service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition
which remains material to the matter of the courts acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendants/respondents person.

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,10 it was ruled that [a]s a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1
)

Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary

appearance;

(2
)

Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of

the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and

(3
)

Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the

court,especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.11

Considering that the tenor of Diamonds objection in its special appearance had actually no
legal bearing on the CAs jurisdiction over its person (that is, since it objected to the propriety of
Reicons service of its petition, and not the CAs service of its order indicating its initial action), it
cannot be said that the proper objection to the appellate courts jurisdiction, as abovediscussed, had been made by Diamond. Thus, by asking for an affirmative relief,i.e., the
dismissal of Reicons certiorari petition, bereft of the proper jurisdictional objection, the Court
therefore concludes that Diamond had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
In fine, the proper course of action would be for the CA to reinstate Reicons certioraripetition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845, given that it had already acquired jurisdiction over
Diamonds person. In order to ensure that Diamonds due process rights are protected, Reicon
should, however, be directed to submit proof that the service of its petition had actually been
completed in accordance with Rule 1312 of the Rules.13 Diamond, in the meantime, should be
ordered to furnish the CA the details of its current address and confirm whether or not Atty.
Marqueda would be representing it as its counsel of record in the main (and not only through
special appearance); if Diamond will be represented by a different counsel, it must so notify the
appellate court. Henceforth, all pleadings and papers should be addressed to such counsel and
would equally bind Diamond as client. Throughout the proceedings, the CA is exhorted to bear
in mind the judicial policy to resolve the present controversy with utmost dispatch in order to
avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012 and November
21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA
is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845
under the parameters discussed in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Maria Imelda M. Manotoc vs. CA and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate
of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
FACTS:
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and
on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc for Filing,
Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment, to which Respondent Trajano seeks the
enforcement of the foreign courts judgment against Manotoc.
Based on the complaint, trial court effected summons to the address of petitioner in
Pasig City which was received by Manotocs caretaker. When petitioner failed to answer, trial
court declared her in default. Petitioner Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an
invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the
address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling,
residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
(2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee,
nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and
substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and
(5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
The trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that
her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was based on the documentary evidence of
respondent Trajano. The trial court ruled that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the
regular performance of official duty. Trial court denied the MR of petitioner, hence, Manotoc filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
CA affirmed the findings of the trial court. CA also rejected petitioners Philippine
passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed the dates of her departure
from and arrival in the Philippines without presenting the boilerplates last two (2) inside pages
where petitioners residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those pages
as suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old
Revised Rules of Court. CA further denied petitioners MR.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO. A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of
material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. It
cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed,
as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and

circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the
Return or Certificate of Service as required under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
(dated November 9, 1989).

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a person of suitable
age and discretion residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and
(2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant, the Return of Sheriff Caelas
did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.