ABRAMS V UNITED STATES

Brief Fact Summary. The defendants convictions for distributing leaflets advocating
strikes during the Russian Revolution were upheld because their speech was not
protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution) based on the clear and
present danger test.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable
for the effects, which their acts are likely to produce.
Facts. The Defendants, Abrams and others (Defendants) were Russian immigrants.
The Defendant were self-proclaimed revolutionists and anarchists who wrote and
distributed thousands of circulars advocating a general strike and appealing to
workers in ammunitions factories to stop the production of weapons to be used
against Russian revolutionaries. They were convicted under 1918 amendments to
the Espionage Act that prohibited the curtailment of production of materials
necessary to the prosecution of war against Germany with intent to hinder its
prosecution.
Issue. Whether the Defendants speech was protected by the First Amendment of
the Constitution?
Held. No. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects
which their acts are likely to produce. The plain purpose of Defendants propaganda
was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection, sedition, riots and as they
hoped, revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible
defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. Therefore, their speech is
not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Dissent. In this case, sentences of twenty years have been imposed for the
publishing of two leaflets that the Defendants had as much right to publish as the
Government had to publish the Constitution.
Discussion. Clear and present danger supposedly assures special attention to the
time dimension. Speech may not be curtailed until there is an immediate risk of an
evil. Speech with a remote tendency to cause danger may not be curtailed.

BAYAN V ERMITA
Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally
was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police.
KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa
No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to
implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored

was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M.
Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several
of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in
front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them
along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985,
some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well
as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no
permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional
as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that
alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being
void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided
are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second,
the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require
instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to
the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic rerouting to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in
the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives
the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the
permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P.
No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is,
likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared
null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in
the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with
Section 15 of the law.

ABS CBN V COMELEC

FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to
stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by

the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN
(Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage
of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall
be broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the
Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was
directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

ISSUE:
ban exit polls

W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely

ABS-CBN:
The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to
promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to
protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence
the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people
and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which
in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity
of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation
of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by
petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of
its police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and
present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends
that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official

count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a
clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process."
SUPREME COURT:
set aside

The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the
official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to
who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data
gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent
from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all,
the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them.
Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is
without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly,
the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.
[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters
cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create
disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is
restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general
would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day
and other factors on voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ballot Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity
and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek
access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue
here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through
voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their
official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting
distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out
the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled
or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the
association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the
votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result
cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential
disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore,
the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary.
Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress
incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.##
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or
groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an
election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted
for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey
are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance
overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the
electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until
the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

SWS V COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit
polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling:

No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities,
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.

BORJAL V CA
FACTS: Private respondent filed for damages against petitioners for the series of
articles written by the latter in a newspaper column, which dealt with alleged
anomalous activities without naming or identifying private respondent. Petitioners
contends that the right to free press is a privilege communication.
ISSUE: WON commentaries on matters of public interest are privilege.
HELD: Yes. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending
publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications
implicit in the freedom of the press.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN

OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositors.
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of
the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom
of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of
public concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live
radio and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and

television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring
the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by
then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties right
to due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to
avoid miscarriage of justice.
Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to
information of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of
the accused.
Ruling :

The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press

and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings
to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action;
nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to
suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object
of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any
outside force or influencebut only by evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious
effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for
a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open
to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as
to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

BURGOS, SR vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF- AFP, ET AL

Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants
issued on December 7, 1982 by Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano of the then CFI of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper,
were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.
Issue: Was the closure of WE Forum a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence
of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print.
This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth
of the citizenry.

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. DANS

137 SCRA 628
Facts:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.

The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the
mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It
alleged that no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual
basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why
administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action
was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of
the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It
appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to
commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was
the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public
affairs.
ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press?
RULING:
Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom
of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media. Yet the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution
The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this
Court in AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed
before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.

ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales
was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the
authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution.
The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation
and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also
asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful
persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful
on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich
and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or
affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court
then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that
he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It
is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity
and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must
be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he
alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to
the Zaldivar case.
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in
facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension
to take effect immediately.

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ,

FACTS:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution filed by the Petitioner : a Motion,
dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M.
Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and a
Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the
filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the
media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter,
petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article which appeared in
the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe."
ISSUE: Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech
towards the Court?
RULING:
No. The Court begins by referring to the authority to discipline officers of the court
and members of the Bar. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes
as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice
the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other
persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court.
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the
Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of
lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of
rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to
us, and that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than
that of a layman.
While the Court may allow criticism it has In Re: Almacen held: Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a

misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to render
respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.