Volume 19: Number 1

February 2012

RISK WATCH

The Britannia Steam Ship

Insurance Association Limited

CLAIMS AND LEGAL

a supplement for Members claims handlers

and legal departments

Navigation
and seamanship
1 SAMCO EUROPE collision with
MSC PRESTIGE
4 Another heavy weather death reported
on a container ship in ballast/lightship
condition

SAMCO EUROPE
collision with
MSC PRESTIGE

Risk management
4 Enclosed spaces

container lashings influencing helm orders

unnecessary VHF exchanges
give way ship altering to starboard but still attracting majority blame.
Safety
8 Poor rigging fails to prevent
predictable accident

Crew matters
4 Myanmar seamans books

A English recent law report illustrates how

court experts (Elder Brethren) analyse the
factual circumstances leading up to a
collision and offers useful guidance as to
what the watch officers should do to comply
with the collision regulations.
The collision occurred in the Gulf of Aden in
conditions of good visibility of approximately
10 nautical miles. The MSC PRESTIGE, a
container ship, was heading for Mauritius on
a course of 101 and making about 24 knots.
The SAMCO EUROPE, a laden VLCC, was
heading for Rotterdam on a course of 300
at 16.5 knots. Neither ship was entered with
the Association.
The Court separately reviewed the conduct
of both ships

The Second Officer of the MSC PRESTIGE did

not actively monitor the SAMCO EUROPE until
the ships were 9 miles apart. The VDR data

showed that the SAMCO EUROPE was acquired

on ARPA when the ships were 14 miles apart
but the Second Officer stated that he did not
observe the ship until 9 miles apart. At 9
miles apart, 14 minutes before the collision
(C minus 14), the SAMCO EUROPEs echo was
about a point on the starboard bow of the
MSC PRESTIGE. VDR records show that MSC
PRESTIGE altered course to starboard at C
minus 11 over a period of one and a half
minutes until settling on a heading of 107
(C minus 9.5) which was maintained for
another two and a half minutes. The Court
decided that this alteration was undertaken
in order to avoid another ship in the vicinity
of SAMCO EUROPE. The Court noted the
SAMCO EUROPE remained on the starboard
bow of the MSC PRESTIGE.
The Second Officer then, at C minus 7,
ordered another alteration of course to
starboard such that by C minus 5 she was

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Navigation and seamanship

SAMCO EUROPE ARPA

SAMCO EUROPE collision with MSC PRESTIGE (continued)

heading about 117. It is at this time, between
C minus 7 and C minus 5, that a voice
recording on the bridge of the MSC PRESTIGE
evidences some confusion on the part of the
Second Officer as to what the SAMCO EUROPE
was doing. He was heard to state wait, wait,
waitthis fellow iswhat is he doing? is
he altering to port?(profanities uttered)
Immediately thereafter, at C minus 5, the MSC
PRESTIGE called SAMCO EUROPE on the VHF.
MSC PRESTIGE repeated twice a request for a
passing red to red. Confusingly the Second
Officer of SAMCO EUROPE replied Ah yes, Ive
already altered to port. Thank you. MSC
PRESTIGE replied Thank you.
Shortly after, at C minus 4 , the SAMCO
EUROPE (SE) called the MSC PRESTIGE (MSC P):
SE: MSC P, you are not giving me any CPA, Im
altering to port. Im still getting this just 1
cable. Are you altering?
MSC P: Im going to starboard right now,
starboard.
SE: Im altering to port, youre coming to
starboard, youre coming towards me.

According to VDR data, he should have been

able to do so at C minus 6. At C minus 4 the
heading of the MSC PRESTIGE was about 121
and by C minus 3.5 it was about 125 i.e. was
still altering course to starboard. Only shortly
before the collision was hard to starboard
rudder ordered.
The Second Officer of the SAMCO EUROPE
observed the MSC PRESTIGE quite early at a
range of 16-17 miles, one point on the port
bow, 27 minutes before the collision (C
minus 27). The Second Officer acquired the
MSC PRESTIGE as a target when 12 miles
distant. He had correctly assumed the ship
was a container ship and it would have been
apparent she was doing 24 knots crossing
ahead from port to starboard with a CPA of 4
cables. The Second Officer would have been
aware of several other targets, particularly
target number 11 on the starboard bow
proceeding in a similar north-westerly
direction at a faster speed than the SAMCO
EUROPE. At C minus 16 MSC PRESTIGE was still
bearing one point on the port bow and at a
distance of 10 miles. From the ARPA he
observed a small alteration of course to
starboard by MSC PRESTIGE and he assumed
it was to increase the port-to-port passing
distance between MSC PRESTIGE and the
previously mentioned target number 11.

MSC P: I told red to red.

SE: For red to red you have to alter to port.
MSC P: Yeah OK, I maintain my course, you go
to port please.
It was apparent that the Second Officer of the
MSC PRESTIGE was intending to pass SAMCO
EUROPE port-to-port and he continued with
that intention after the VHF exchanges. It was
unclear as to whether the Second Officer had
observed SAMCO EUROPEs green light opening.

By C minus 7.5 the ARPA was indicating that

MSC PRESTIGE would pass ahead with a CPA
of about 2 cables. The Second Officer of the
SAMCO EUROPE decided to alter course to port
but only slightly, such that at C minus 7 she was
heading 295. The intention was to increase
the CPA. At C minus 6 he again altered course
slightly to port such that the bearing of the
MSC PRESTIGE passed from the port bow to
the starboard bow. Immediately thereafter
the MSC PRESTIGE called on the VHF (the C
minus 5 VHF exchange referred to above).

The Second Officer of the SAMCO EUROPE

again ordered a small alteration of course to
port so that by C minus 4 she was heading
285. The CPA by this stage had actually
decreased to less than a cable, starboard-tostarboard, but it is unclear as to whether the
Second Officer had registered this fact.
Shortly after C minus 4 the Second Officer
was surprised to observe the mast headlights
of the MSC PRESTIGE narrow and to see both
side lights when previously he had only seen
the green side lights. He immediately called
the MSC PRESTIGE on the VHF (the C minus 4
VHF exchange referred to above). The Second
Officer subsequently accepted that he was
mistaken in saying that for a red to red
passing MSC PRESTIGE would need to go to
port. He admitted to being confused in the
heat of the moment.
The Second Officer continued to alter course
to port and by C minus 3 was on a heading
of 278. There followed another confusing
exchange by VHF and the Second Officer
called the Master to the bridge. By C minus 1
the ship was heading at 264.
The Courts findings of fault

Both sides accepted that MSC PRESTIGE was

the give way ship. MSC PRESTIGE contended
that her action to avoid collision in altering
course to starboard was timely but seemed
to admit that it was not substantial (as
required by Rule 8(c) and Rule 16). On this
point the Judge asked the Elder Brethren to
advise on when good seamanship would
require that the MSC PRESTIGE take action
pursuant to Rules 15 and 16.Their advice was
as follows:
In accordance with the Rules and good
seamanship MSC PRESTIGE should have
altered course to starboard at about C minus
12 (23:35:00) when SAMCO EUROPE was one

MSC PRESTIGE ARPA

point on his starboard bow at 8.1 miles

The alteration of course to starboard (early
and substantial) should have been at least
20 in order to show a broad red aspect.
Accordingly, the Court decided that the
Second Officer of the MSC PRESTIGE was at
fault for not making a substantial alteration
of course to starboard at C minus 12. He
failed to keep a good radar lookout on
SAMCO EUROPE (whilst he was busy taking
action in respect of other ships) and failed to
keep a good visual lookout by observing the
green light of SAMCO EUROPE open at C
minus 5.5 as she was turning to port.
A discussion arose as to what MSC PRESTIGE
would have been expected to do had she
observed the SAMCO EUROPE green light
open at C minus 5.5 (at a distance of over 3
miles). The Elder Brethren advised that MSC
PRESTIGE should have continued her turn to
starboard but with the application of full
starboard rudder (and take a turn round to
starboard) and reduced speed. Instead of
putting the rudder hard to starboard the
Second Officer decided to call the SAMCO
EUROPE on the VHF.
Court dismisses the influence of
lashing limits

Somewhat unusually, MSC PRESTIGE interests

made a direct submission to the Court (not
via their lawyers) urging the Court not to
accept the 20 alteration suggested by the
Elder Brethren. They claimed it would be
excessive because it would put undue stress
on the container lashings. The owners also
added that they ordered their junior officers
to alter course gently. The Court, accepted
the Elder Brethrens advice, stating that they
believed a 20 alteration of course could be
achieved quickly by applying a limited
amount of helm and that it was unlikely that

container lashings would be unduly stressed

as a result (no evidence was produced by
MSC PRESTIGE to support their assertion). The
Courts view was that, by raising this issue, the
owners had introduced a question of unseaworthiness in respect of their own ship.
VHF conversations: both Officers to blame

that makes MSC PRESTIGEs fault in failing to

apply hard starboard helm at and after C
minus 5.5 more blameworthy.
When the VHF conversation was resumed
by SAMCO EUROPE (the C minus 4 VHF
exchange) SAMCO EUROPE mistakenly
requested MSC PRESTIGE to alter to port
which led to MSC PRESTIGE agreeing to
maintain her course rather than substantially
alter course to starboard, i.e. contrary to the
Collision Regulations. This resumption of the
VHF conversation and mistaken request by
SAMCO EUROPE makes SAMCO EUROPEs fault
of going to port to more blameworthy.
It was decided that the use of VHF by each
ship was inappropriate and, in relative terms,
increased each ship's culpability by about
the same extent.

English Courts make a distinction in collision

cases between cause and blameworthiness.
The Courts decision will be based on the
degree of blame attributed to the faults and
how causative those faults were. Whilst they
consider that VHF exchanges can determine
blameworthiness, it is navigational action, or
inaction, in breach of the Collision Regulations,
which causes collisions. In deciding how
blameworthy those VHF conversations were,
the Courts will consider whether VHF
exchanges were appropriate in the
circumstances i.e. whether their content or
intent conflicted with the Collision Regulations.

The Decision: MSC PRESTIGE must accept

majority of blame

It was argued that the Second Officer of MSC

PRESTIGE contacted SAMCO EUROPE by VHF
(the C minus 5 exchange) in order to inform
SAMCO EUROPE of his intention to pass red
to red and that this action was appropriate
because it confirmed what the Collision
Regulations required. However, the Court
was of the view that the VHF conversation
was commenced at a time when MSC
PRESTIGE ought to have been applying hard
starboard helm. Instead of taking the action
required of her by the Collision Regulations
she chose to commence a conversation by
VHF when the ships were closing each other
at a combined speed of 40 knots and were
only about 3 miles apart. At such times VHF
conversations may result in valuable time
being lost, lead to confusion and distract
from adherence to the Collision Regulations
and for that reason the VHF conversations
were inappropriate. To some extent therefore

The Court concluded that the dangerous

close quarters situation was brought about
by the fault of both ships but the fault of
MSC PRESTIGE in not taking early and
substantial action to keep out of the way of
SAMCO EUROPE had the greater causative
effect. Each ship failed to take the
appropriate action to avoid collision at C
minus 5.5. Overall, MSC PRESTIGE was more at
fault though the extent of the disparity was
reduced by SAMCO EUROPEs greater
culpability at C minus 5.5. Thus MSC
PRESTIGEs fault was greater than that of
SAMCO EUROPE both in terms of cause and
blame. However, the Court, having
considered all the circumstances, did not
consider that MSC PRESTIGE was twice as
much to blame as SAMCO EUROPE and
therefore concluded that MSC PRESTIGE
should bear 60% responsibility for the
collision and that SAMCO EUROPE should
bear 40% responsibility for the collision.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Navigation and seamanship

Another heavy weather death reported on a

container ship in ballast/lightship condition
In June 2010 Risk Watch included an article on the tragic death of a
watch keeper who had been thrown violently from one side of the
bridge to another as a result of extraordinary acceleration forces on
board a container ship (The CHICAGO EXPRESS) which had been
required to leave Hong Kong in a partially loaded condition, because
of an impending typhoon.
The investigating authority, the Federal
Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
(the BSU), has recently reported another two
similar incidents, one of which again resulted
in the death of a watch keeper. Both
incidents involved container ships in light
ship or ballast condition.
In September 2009 The CNNI GUAYAS (The
GUAYAS) a modern 2,468 teu container
ship was required to leave her lay up
anchorage in Hong Kong due to the arrival of
typhoon Koppu. Eleven hours later, in
conditions of Beaufort (Bf )10 - Bf12 winds
and significant wave heights of around 6
metres, the Third Officer, an able seaman (AB)
and the Master were on the bridge. The Third
Officer was standing mid ships near the radio
work station apparently holding firmly on
with both hands whilst the Master sat on the
starboard side holding on to a hand rail. A
considerable number of objects, e.g. papers
and books, had fallen to the floor and the
Third Officer was observed bending down to
pick up something. Shortly afterwards he was
heard to scream and was observed to slide
to the port side where he struck the radar
responder and a radiator. He tried but failed
to hold on to the radiator before sliding

across to the starboard side of the bridge

and striking the bridge door with his face. He
then started to slide to the port side again
before being grabbed by the Master and
secured in the area of the Masters chair. The
Third Officer subsequently died of his injuries.
The GUAYAS had on board 6,400 tonnes of
ballast with a metacentric height (GM) of
5.617 metres. The low draught created a
considerable windage area and she had
difficulty maintaining her course. The
heading and the course over ground differed
in the order of 90-100. The GUAYAS was
only able to maintain two knots over ground
and at times propeller immersion was
virtually nil. The bridge inclinometer pointer
reached the limit stop at 35 and roll periods
were in the region of 8 seconds. Transverse
acceleration in the region of 12 M/S/S (1.3g)
were calculated in computer simulations of
The GUAYAS motions.
It should be noted that the possibility of
parametric rolling was investigated but
discounted, the motion of the ship was
thought to arise from direct excitation
moments from the swell. A description of
the wave encounter speeds and directions

giving rise to the motion is beyond the

scope of this article but is well illustrated in
the form of polar coordinate diagrams in the
BSU report. The particular seagoing
behaviour of modern container ships at very
shallow draught in relation to the swell was
deemed to be the cause of the accident.

Unfortunately, this ballast free condition

(which the BSU determined would have
provided a solution for the Master) would
in fact have breached Classification rules,
namely those rules requiring forward
perpendicular immersion to a certain depth
in order to avoid slamming.

The investigating authority was clearly

concerned about the options the Master had
in reducing the GM and thereby the motions
of the ship whilst at the same time improving
steerage. In addition to highlighting the
problem of the high GM, the very slow speed
of the ship was noted to contribute to the
violent motions. In The CHICAGO EXPRESS
case the slow speed of the vessel was to
some extent by choice and, although the
Master was not to know it at the time, the
reduced damping at very slow speed was
causative of heavy and quick rolling.

The BSU observed that Class approved

stability books are drawn up with the
intention of avoiding capsizing accidents
but without taking sufficient note of the
dangerous consequences of too much
stability. The BSU also highlighted what
appears to be a lack of coordinated overall
safety assessment with regard to excessive
stability in container ships, implying that the
safety rules contained in the stability book
and the cargo securing manual are not fit
for purpose in terms for setting up an upper
limit for stability.

It was determined in computer simulations

that if The GUAYAS had carried no ballast
whatsoever the circumstances would have
improved significantly. Although the GM
itself would not have been reduced (GM in
any event not being a good indicator of
stability at large angles of roll), the BSU
investigations determined an improvement
in roll angles and roll period in circumstances
where the ship had virtually no forward
draught i.e. the forward perpendicular was
no longer immersed, the prominent bow flair
no longer wetted in swell. This significantly
reduced the roll moment applied to the ship
by the swell.

The incident involving The GUAYAS took

place in the sea area off Hong Kong as did
the incident on The CHICAGO EXPRESS, but
incidents of this type are not confined to
those waters. The ship FRISIA LISSABON (a
ship of very similar design to The GUAYAS),
suffered a similar incident in October of the
same year. The BSU report details a very
similar set of circumstances in terms of ship
condition and weather to that of The
GUAYAS. This incident took place in the
North Sea.

Again, in common with the report into The

CHICAGO EXPRESS incident, the design of the
bridge and specifically the hand bars and
lashing points were questioned.
Masters and Officers may wish to familiarise
themselves with the particular difficulties of
container ships in light ship or ballast
conditions in heavy weather and would be
well advised to read the full report of the
BSU at:
http://tiny.cc/u140f

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Risk management

Enclosed spaces
The Club has recently handled a claim where a stevedore died in an enclosed space.
There can be few aspects of personal safety
on board ships that have received more
attention than the importance of following
the correct procedures before entering an
enclosed space. Unfortunately, it is clear that
the measures which have been put in place
have failed to prevent the death of many
seafarers and third parties on board ships.

Accidents in enclosed spaces continue to be

all too frequent within the maritime sector
and many of the incidents across the
industry are due to:
complacency leading to lapses in
procedures
lack of knowledge

At the 27th Assembly of the International

Maritime Organisation (IMO) meeting in
London in November 2011 a resolution was
adopted to amend SOLAS with respect to
enclosed space entry and rescue drills. The
draft amendments will be forwarded for
review by various sub-committees before
submission to the Maritime Safety
Committee for adoption.
The draft amendments are aimed at
reducing fatalities linked with enclosed
space entry and would require crew
members with enclosed space entry or
rescue responsibilities to participate in an
enclosed space entry and rescue drill at least
once every two months.
At the 27th Assembly, the IMO also
adopted Resolution 1050 containing a set
of revised recommendations for entering
enclosed spaces.
Each enclosed space entry and rescue drill
should include the checking and use of
personal protective equipment required for
entry, of communication equipment and
procedures, of rescue equipment and
procedures, and instruction in first aid and
resuscitation techniques.

potentially dangerous spaces not being

identified; and,
would-be rescuers acting on instinct and
emotion rather than knowledge and training.
The current IMO Recommendations for
Entering Enclosed Spaces on board ships is
contained in the Resolution A.864 (20)
adopted 27 November 1997 and this has
now been replaced by Resolution A.1050(27).
Under the definitions of enclosed spaces, the
Resolution states:
2.1 Enclosed space means a space which has
any of the following characteristics:
2.1.1 limited openings for entry and exit;
2.1.2 inadequate ventilation; and
2.1.3 is not designed for continuous worker
occupancy,
and includes, but is not limited to, cargo
spaces, double bottoms, fuel tanks, ballast
tanks, cargo pump-rooms, cargo compressor
rooms, cofferdams, chain lockers, void spaces,
duct keels, inter-barrier spaces, boilers,

engine crankcases, engine scavenge air

receivers, sewage tanks, and adjacent
connected spaces. This list is not exhaustive
and a list should be produced on a ship-byship basis to identify enclosed spaces.
The incident handled by the Club involved
third parties on board the ship carrying out
cargo operations. Many cargo spaces on
board ships fall within the definition of an
enclosed space and it is extremely important
that the crew remain vigilant during loading
and discharge operations and that access by
stevedores and other third parties is carefully
monitored and controlled in compliance
with standard operational procedures and
with the ships enclosed space entry
procedures.
Cargo spaces may also be deficient in
oxygen and/or contain flammable or toxic
fumes, gases or vapours.
In this incident, the stevedore had entered a
cargo hold while the ship was discharging a
cargo of coal. A fully enclosed spiral ladder
was fitted at the aft bulkhead of the hold and
the lower opening of the ladder was
immersed in the cargo and harmful gases
entered the spiral ladder space. The
stevedore succumbed to the presence of
harmful gases and a lack of oxygen in the
spiral ladder space.
Procedures and arrangements before any
entry into an enclosed space:

1) Risk Assessment: carry out a risk

assessment.
2) Permit To Work: ensure that the Companys
Approved Enclosed Space Entry Form or
Checklist is available and completed by
authorised personnel, including the Master.

3) Safety Briefing: ensure that all personnel

are aware of what is being undertaken.

10) Check in and Out: ensure that personnel

entering the space are checked in and out.

4) Atmosphere: ensure that appropriate

ventilation has been carried out as required
and maintained where considered necessary.

11) Secure: ensure that the space has been

closed and/or fenced off as appropriate after
all personnel have exited.

5) Atmosphere: ensure that the space has

been tested for the presence of gases and
oxygen content, and is tested at regular
intervals thereafter, with a certificate issued
by a qualified person where appropriate. The
atmosphere in adjacent spaces should also
be verified if there are any potential concerns
or doubts.

12) Documentation: records of entry into

enclosed spaces should be maintained as
required. Procedures for entering enclosed
spaces is one of the key shipboard
operations for safety of personnel and the
ship within the ISM Code provisions. Audits
must be carried out to ensure that
procedures for entry into enclosed spaces
are compliant.

6) Communications: ensure that

communications with the duty officer have
been established and permission obtained
for entry to be effected.
7) Rescue: ensure that recovery equipment is
readily available at the entry/exit point, and
that sufficient qualified personnel are present
to assist.
8) Competency: ensure that the personnel
entering the space are qualified to do so
and/or accompanied by qualified personnel.
The IMO revised recommendations requires
an attendant a person who is suitably
trained within the safety management
system to be present to keep watch and
maintain communication with those
entering the enclosed space areas.
9) Personal Safety: ensure that personnel
entering the space are wearing the right
safety equipment, appropriate to the space
being entered, including helmets, clothing,
safety shoes, torches, walkie-talkies, breathing
apparatus or Emergency Escape Breathing
Devices (EEBD), harnesses etc.

Entry into enclosed spaces has been a

feature of Britannias technical seminar
programme over the past two years and a
paper on this subject is being prepared for
the 2012 programme.
Videotel Marine International has recently
joined forces with Mines Rescue Marine to
produce and launch a training package
entitled Entry into Enclosed Spaces.
Details from:
www.videotel.co.uk
sales@videotelmail.com

Britannia RISK WATCH

Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited

Regis House
45 King William Street
London EC4R 9AN
Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588
Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942
www.britanniapandi.com

Safety

RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam

Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be
found at www.britanniapandi.com/en/publications
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association
Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watch
to be reproduced but would ask that written
permission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Crew matters

Poor rigging fails to prevent

predictable accident
The July 2011 edition of Risk Watch included
two articles on unsafe accommodation
ladders. Continuing that theme, we now draw
the attention of crew to a recent incident
reported to the Association.
A Quarantine Officer slipped on the ships
accommodation ladder while disembarking
at a port near Shanghai. He fell into the water
between the ship and the quay. Thankfully
the Officer was rescued from the water with
only minor injuries.
As can be seen from the photograph, no
stanchion (with accompanying hand
rails/ropes) existed on the outboard corner of
the leading edge of the lower platform of the
gangway. Thus no support or prevention
existed for persons falling or slipping in the

direction of the leading edge i.e. in the

direction of the gap between the ship and
the quay. There appeared to be no fitting for
such a stanchion on this design of
accommodation ladder. Further , the cargo
net should have extended from the ships
side to the quay (especially where , as in this
case , the accommodation ladder was not
placed on the quayside but was hanging
freely above the water).

Myanmar seamans books

Any equipment used for the purpose of

access and any safety net must be fit for its
purpose and properly maintained. All access
equipment should be inspected by a
competent person at appropriate intervals.

On making further enquiries with our

Yangon correspondent we have been
advised that it is not uncommon for
Myanmar seamen to have two CDC books.
The genuine book is used to enter and leave
Myanmar. The forgery will have additional
(fictional) endorsements, including the
names of ships the seaman claims to have
served on, and is used when the seaman
joins the ship.

The rigging of accommodation ladders

is addressed in the IMO publication
MSC.1/Circ.1331.

The Association has recently been advised of

two separate instances of the authenticity of
Myanmar Continuous Discharge Certificates
(CDCs or Seamans books) being questioned.
In both cases, one in China and the other in
Indonesia, the immigration authorities
cancelled the Seamans Books because they
were forgeries.

We understand that forged seamans books

do not have a working hologram affixed to
the seamans photograph. Masters should
also compare the quality of the pages and
the bindings to other Myanmar CDC books
held by the ship.

Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within
Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk