G.R. No.

208169

October 8, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWARD ADRIANO y SALES, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
For review is the conviction of Edward Adriano y Sales (Adriano) for the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5, Article II
of the Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002, by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in a Decision1 dated 29 October 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05182, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dated 23 August 2011 in "People of the Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales", docketed as Criminal Case No. 16444-D.
The Information
That on or about 25th day of October 2008, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, without being authorized by law, sell, deliver, and give away to a poseur buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a
white crystalline substance, commonly known as "shabu" which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Pesos
(Php200.00) and in violation of the above cited law.3 When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the pre-trial
conference on 13 July 2009, the parties stipulated on the following:
1. The identity of the accused as the same person named in the information;
2. The existence of the specimens and documents marked as evidence but with a counter-proposal that the forensic chemist has
no personal knowledge as to the source of the specimen; 3. The qualification of the forensic chemist, P/Sr. Insp. Yelah Manaog;
4. The existence and due execution of the Physical Science Report No. D-334-08;
5. The due execution and genuineness of the FINDINGS on the qualitative examination conducted on the specimens gave
POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug; 4
During trial, the prosecution presented Police Officer 1 Teodoro Morales (PO1 Morales), who testified that acting on a report received from
a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig City, Police Chief Inspector Porfirio
Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the
buy-bust money consisting of tenP100.00 bills with the initials "PC". After briefing, PO1 Morales, together with the informant and his team,
proceeded to North Daang Hari where PO1 Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money
and after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie
Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano.5 The marked money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the police station for investigation,
while the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which was marked with "ESA-251008" 6 at the crime scene was brought to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory by PO2 Vergelio Del Rosario, who also prepared the letter-request. 7
In the PNP Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory examination conducted by Police/Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog confirmed the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.8
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, who testified that on 22 October 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., he was at home, putting
his nephews and nieces to sleep when suddenly two (2) armed men barged into the house and dragged him outside and forcibly took him
to the police station in Taguig City. It was only whenthey arrived at the police station when he learned that he was arrested for illegal sale of
shabu.9
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 23 August 2011, the RTC found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.1wphi1 The RTC gave
credence to the testimony of PO1 Morales based on the presumption that police officers perform their duties in a regular manner because
the defense failed to establish any ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to at least create a dent in the prosecutions case. The
positive identification of Adriano as the perpetrator of the crime charged without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the witness
testifying on the matter, prevails over Adrianos alibi and denial. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Edward Adriano y Sales is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime, as charged, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP500,000.00).10 x x x x
On appeal, Adriano argued that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is inadmissible because of the following reasons: (1) the
warrantless arrest on his person is invalid; and (2) the arresting officers violated Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Adriano asserted that the
warrantless arrest was illegal because there was no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before the
arrest.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution established the elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
Even if the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not render
the seized items inadmissible in evidence. Further, the CA rejected the defenses attempt to debunk PO1 Morales testimony based on the
defenses failure to substantiate its allegation of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers.
The appeal before us maintained thatthe lower courts gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest on the person of Adriano as illegal
and in convicting Adriano despite the police officers noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
We rule in the negative.
Our Ruling
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2) elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or
sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 11
In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established the two (2) elements: (1) to account that the transaction or sale indeed took place, PO1
Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before
the trial court as proof of the identity of the object of the crime and of the corpus delicti. 12
The argument on the arresting officers noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the procedure for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs. The law reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well asinstruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
However, it has been repeatedly noted by the Court, the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer some measure of flexibility through the
proviso, "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said

items". Otherwise stated, non-compliance does not invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized
from him as inadmissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the Implementing Rules allow the prosecution to
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, which in this case, has been duly established by the prosecution. "Chain of
custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 13
The details of the unbroken chain of custody as found by the CA: The first link in the chain of custody is from the time PO1 Morales took
possession of the plastic sachet of shabu from accused-appellant and marked the same with the initials "EAS", to the time the plastic
sachet of shabu was brought to the Police Station. The Certificate of Inventory for the items seized from accused-appellant was signed by
PO1 Morales, PO2 Ronnie Fabroa, and the accused-appellant. The second link in the chain of custody is from the time the plastic sachet of
shabu was brought from the Police Station, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A letter-request was made for the laboratory examination of the
contents of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from accused-appellant. The letter-request, and plastic sachet of shabu, were delivered to
the PNP Crime Laboratory by PO2 Del Rosario. Per Chemistry Report No. D-334-08 prepared by Police Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog,
the contents of the plastic sachet tested positive for shabu. 14
Thus, despite the arresting officersfailure to strictly observe the requirements of Section 21 on the custody and disposition of the seized
items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting officers duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized
items from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, the defenses contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the
validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three (3) instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, oris attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case at bar, Adriano was caught in the
act of committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the
plain view of the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delictoand the police officers conducting the
operation are not only authorized but duty-boundto apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or
used in the commission of the crime."15 In People v. Agulay,16 we discussed buy-bust operation as a form of a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. 17
Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. The presumption may be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence. However, in the case at bar, the defense failed to present any proof to substantiate its
imputation of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers. Contrarily, the prosecution duly proved the existence of the two elements ofthe
crime of illegal sale of shabu and established the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The presumption of regularity in favor
of the arresting officers prevails. WHEREFORE, we find no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the lower court which found Edward
Adriano y Salesguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Court of
Appeal's decision in "People of the Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales", docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05182 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIGESTS:
People of the Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales
G.R. No. 208169, October 8, 2014
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC and the
CA found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Acting on a report received from a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs, the police formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money consisting of ten
P100.00 bills with the initials PC. PO1 Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money and
after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie
Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano.
Accused-appellant avers that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is inadmissible because the warrantless arrest on his person
is invalid and that the arresting officers violated Section 21 of RA 9165.
ISSUE:
Is the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of shabu?
HELD:
YES, the prosecution was able to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following two (2) elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established the two (2) elements: (1) to
account that the transaction or sale indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the
seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before the trial court as proof of the identity of the object of the crime and of the
corpus delicti.
The argument on the arresting officers noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the procedure for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs. The Implementing Rules of RA 9165, however, offer some measure of
flexibility through the proviso, non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. Otherwise stated, non-compliance does not invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the
accused illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the Implementing Rules allow the prosecution to
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, which in this case, has been duly established by the prosecution. Chain of
custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Despite the arresting officers failure to strictly observe the requirements of Section 21 on the custody and disposition of the seized items,
the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting officers duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized items
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping up to presentation in court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, the defenses contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the
validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced for accused-appellant is clearly arrested in flagrante delicto by virtue of the entrapment
proceedings.
As such, accused-appellants guilt of the violation of RA 9165 is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 182601

November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision 1dated January 21, 2008 and
the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey
M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners
and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident. 4Acting on this report, Desk
Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to
render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez,
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to
Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso
fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by
then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the ground that they had not been
lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they
were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. 14 The court
likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. 16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the
Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners
to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for
failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008; 18hence, the present petition.

The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE
POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO
STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only
as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have
undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it
was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that
the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding
warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have
evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the
right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. " 23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces
its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under
oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the
King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties 26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any
otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We
will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and
seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must
also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the
common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws. 34 These court rulings likewise
justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting
officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police
officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to
arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason. 40 It
further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code 41which directed municipal policemen to exercise
vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a
warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone
changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its
roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws
then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which
provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to
believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the
circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the
authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court
competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed
against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such
unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police
officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there
is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court
defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a
reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement.
Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have
knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to
probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. 48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way
the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid
warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to
be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the
1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated
from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the
validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus,
removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the
offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section
6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More
importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have
been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information
indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause"
as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable
changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a
person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of
the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to
minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the
elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and
circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests
without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, 53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was
discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which
warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but
whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable
grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable
judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless
arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is
based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable
cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act.
It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including
his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a
mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the
arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer
need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in
preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat. 60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause

as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted
documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses. 62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge
is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates
the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts
or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. 65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public
prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the
case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their
respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although
these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules,
upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge
must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must personally
gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the
urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not
presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act
in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. 67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113: The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken
together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that
Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to
arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said

that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence,
the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos
forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PCINP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that
there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the
commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained
from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not
just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman
who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which
turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had
knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim.
The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime.
The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who
pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson, 76 there
was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the
accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal
knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One
of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers,
who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the
nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a
logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He
dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was
wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for
Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police

headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to
his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a
shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the
petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's
appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or
accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the
determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within
which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers
have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would
have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of
information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand,
with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were
within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for
evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our
jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just
committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts
and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of
the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is
whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were
complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a valid
warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision. 81From a review of the
records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present
case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners
were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15
a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police
station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that
the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the
petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph
Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate 84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the
same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident,
showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma,
left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant.
Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty.
Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police
officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community
where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
and, notably, the petitioners85and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the
time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that
the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the
victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson,
the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More
than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had
another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement
of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02
Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed.1wphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence
at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case)
and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the
parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper.
Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is
defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application
of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners
following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to
follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if
the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the
crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random
act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the
charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary
investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the
said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is
legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state
all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the
case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system
would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as
it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

DIGESTS:
JOEY M. PESTILOS, et. al.v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014,

Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between petitioners Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight
Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Roland Muoz and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The police officers arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then
pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him, which prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners for investigation. At
the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Consequently, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested as there was no valid warrantless arrest since the police officers
had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular
procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the petitioners' Motion.
On petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant
RULING:
The petitioners were validly arrested. In light of the discussion on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:
1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence
of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the
police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible
for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although
they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour
from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests.
These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer,
SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did
not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge
that a crime had been committed.

G.R. No. 200334

July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to
evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous
drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to
uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified
the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accuseds whereabouts
was sent through a text message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the
contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate
"stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or
coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There
being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San
Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer" 2 that one Marvin Buya (also
known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" 3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a
member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando
City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint. 7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled
to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. 8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not
know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin. 12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." 14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao
and brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" 16inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty
their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a
brick of suspected marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. 21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the
objects obtained were indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams. 24 The
marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams. 26 A total of
17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos bags. 27
According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him" 28to the Poblacion of San
Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brothers friend. 30 Upon arrival at the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying his
things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." 32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1
Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not
know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. 35Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested

Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. 36 These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was
standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended. 37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." 38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what
was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total
weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union. 42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The
case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional
Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest." 47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered
illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such
irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." 50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision. 52 The
Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac,
[he] voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS. 54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2)
whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous
drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its
protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule,
searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the
warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched. 58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. 59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful
arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. 60 This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured." 61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches
incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons,
as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk"
search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there
is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be
given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and
criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing drugs. 70 When they
arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner." 71 The suspicion increased
when the man avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs. 73 These
were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate." 74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. 76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
"homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking
in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla
wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer
but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should
not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85 Anything less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects.
IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In
Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. 87 (Emphasis
supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." 88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion. 90 It
has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: 92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 97 Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. 98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for
warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin
Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag
to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his
belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason"
requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. 100 As in
Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. 103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. 104 The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that
she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107The bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded
Arutas arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. 112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed the police that Cogaed
was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip,
naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was

disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be
marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving information that the accused
was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the
police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police
immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chuas situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that
"[t]here was no validstop-and-frisk."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be
either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements must
concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 130 Both elements were missing
when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in
possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open
his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural
reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.
In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac
during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of
hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. 133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos questions:
COURT:
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat frightened.1wphi1 He was a little
apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "whats that," and he answered, "I dont know
because Marvin only asked me to carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be
known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a
waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate
this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given
to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and
effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of
that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the
resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our societys fundamental values
enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor
some other legal grounds. No costs. SO ORDERED.

DIGESTS:
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he
rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaeds bag; the police officer then approached
Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he
was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of
marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are
reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1)
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2)
Seizure of evidence in plain view,
(3)
Search of a moving vehicle;
(4)
Consented warrantless search;
(5)
Customs search;
(6)
Stop and frisk; and
(7)
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a stop and frisk search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers
should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect
the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness
present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the
purposes of the stop and frisk exception.
The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement
for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of
Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected
with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the
arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime.
There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to
open his bags. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
this rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional

injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and
effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the
illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

G.R. No. 204589

November 19, 2014

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision 1 and the November 20,
2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez),
affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation
of Section 11, Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay
a fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.4
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information,5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10745-03.
The accusatory portion of the Information indicting Sanchez reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated
on the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory examination; 2]certification
issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic sachet containing small
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance. 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)in its Comment 7 on the petition is
as follows:
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang," was selling drugs to tricycle
drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was
dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted
a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested
Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.

SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta
found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a
regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted to this
office for laboratory examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic pack, marked "Mar. 19, 2003."
(net wt. = 0.1017 gm)
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of filing the case. 8
Version of the Defense
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a different version of the events that transpired in
the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand. He testified that on the date and time in question, he,
together with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a
passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked
him and Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting officers told him that they had just bought
drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was
brought to the Imus Police Station where hewas further investigated. The police officer, however, let DarwinReyes go. On crossexamination, the accused admitted that it was the first time that he saw the police officers at the time he was arrested. He also
disclosed that he was previously charged with the same offense before Branch 90 of this court which was already dismissed, and
that the police officers who testified in the said case are not the same as those involved in this case. 10
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual possession of
shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous
drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1 Amposta) because there was no showing that he
had been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against Sanchez. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay
a fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC for giving undue weight on the
testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the said arresting
officer. He insisted that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was probable cause for

the police officers to believe that Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he was seen leaving the
residence of a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It
concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA
then went on to write that non-compliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecutions causesince its
integrity and evidentiary value had been duly preserved. The falloof the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated October 1,
2007 in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding accused appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November 20, 2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for "certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored on the
following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HENCE,A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE
SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.14
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the absence of
probable cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. He also contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
renders the seized item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt. By way of Comment 15 to the petition, the
OSG prays for the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless search and
seizure of the subject narcotic were justified under the plain view doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Courts Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
proper remedy to question the CA judgment,final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 16 By filing a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in
accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules.17 The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to treat this
petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. 18 Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the
petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on
certiorari.

Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and
not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. But an
exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would have affected the case. 19 After going over the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some
facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the
guilt of Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest under
paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers qualifies as a valid search following a lawful operation
by the police officers. The law enforcers acted on the directive of their superior based on an information that the owner of the
residence where Sanchez came from was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said residence, the law
enforcers had probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that illegal drug-related activities were
perpetrated in the place where he came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the police officers action were justified to
inspect the same. The search therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of
Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue of an
information that a person having been previously described by the informant, accosted Valdez and upon inspection of the bag he
was carrying, the police officers found the information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug
and lunch box inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial courts ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.1wphi1 A crime was
actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not
armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there
committing a crime. The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant appeal as in this case, Sanchez, coming from the
house of the identified drug dealer, previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards the
direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the seizure of the match box containing shabu was a reasonable course of
event that led to the valid warrantless arrest since there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he was in.
(Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest withthe stop-and-frisk principle, a
wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused view
that one and the other were indistinct and identical. That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's conviction.
The Court must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry20 stop- and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be
confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals 21:
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed.
At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.

xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment x x x
x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delictoarrest nor the stop- and-frisk principle was applicableto justify the warrantless
search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this case shows
that the search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas testimony on direct examination is revelatory,
viz:
Pros. Villarin:
Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, Mam.
Q: Where were you? A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite? A: We were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
Q: Who were with you? A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
Monzon.
Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?
A: Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers buying drugs from "Intang" or Jacinta Marciano.
Q: What did you do after that?
A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of "Intang" and when the passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d] them.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the passenger alighted from the tricycle.

Q: What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?

A: I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q: What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box?
A: I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q: Did he allow you?
A: Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
A: The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q: After that what did you find out?
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance.23
A search as an incident to a lawfularrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings; the process cannot be reversed.25
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under
Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 26 Even casting aside the petitioners version and basing the
resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the
person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him. It appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after
they caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match
box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it
over to him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box.
Evidently, what happened in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the
evidence produced by the search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless search and seizure must be struck down
as illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has
committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds
of the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by
the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of
Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange
acts, or at the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied with in this
warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought
shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has
been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 28 The police officers in this case had
no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution
evidence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police
officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he
came out of the house. In other words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in
thiscase was more imagined than real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on what constitutes "stop-andfrisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua 29 wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had
been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 31 a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of
the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he
tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost
Manalili to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a
haven for drug addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop and frisk the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that his companions fled whenthey
saw the policemen; and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons where roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples isthe presence of more than one seemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion
that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without
more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police
officer of any belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer.

There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious
manner. There was no showing either that he tried toevade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when the police
officers approached him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable suspicion on
the part of the police officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the accused, the
Court ruled that the questioned act of the police officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation. Cogaed was a mere
passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious behavior
sufficient to justify the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity. Worse, the assessment of suspicion was
made not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the police officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of
the illegality of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana confiscated from the accused was held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 34 The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does notfall within the plain
view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was
not inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box
being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand
from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search warrant is in violation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, there
being no lawful warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the accused must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item presented
during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there wereseveral lapses in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which,
when taken collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 36 The function of
the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so
that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. 37 Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold
purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts
as to the identity of the evidence.38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was
allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO 1
Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police officers
brought Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their investigator. The prosecution evidence did not
disclose where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in
possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the police station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20, 2003,
issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for
laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of the police investigator to whom SPO 1 Amposta
and his group turned over the seized shabu. The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI laboratory and the
person who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in
court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the

seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice. SO ORDERED.

DIGESTS:

G.R. No. 196005

October 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.
DECISION
The Case
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the
Joint Decision2 dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U10053, U-10054, and U-10055.
The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in conspiracy with others for
the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA,
EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder
with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds
which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2
Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294. 3 The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054
reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA,
EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of
Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his
instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294. 4
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and
FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound, Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed
firearm with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away
one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without the latters knowledge and consent, which
accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended. 5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Gancea, Dionisio Badua, Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto
Reyes, SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland Malenab,

Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col.
Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
(JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2
Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to
open all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa
and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration
building to answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head towards the nipa hut and
saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of
the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took
the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After seeing the inmates run
out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number CDY-255
belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the lattersknowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the
way. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When
they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field.
Police authorities surrounded the cane field and arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the death was caused by shock and
hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno also testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was
possible that the shooting was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the death was caused by cardiac
tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldads Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and ordered him to clean the administrative
offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but
he could not find the jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa
told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of
the compound, while Fieldad continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the other inmates playing basketball. The
ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got
nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid
again when he heard the exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for
help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed
JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and
took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him. Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail
compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive
the vehicle. Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentels Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He proceeded to the basketball court for the
headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the
morning. When he saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the
jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire. Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his armalite downward several times. Pimentel
approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel
boarded the jeep because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were.
Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle
turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornistas Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning the jail compound. He was shocked
and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa,
JO1 Bacolor, Leal and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards lying
down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight
but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined
them along the way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the other
vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND
EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00 and moral damages of
Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
6
SO ORDERED.
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died. 7 They assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2
REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE
TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TESTIMONIES. 8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos.
U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalties of imprisonment imposed on
Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between right and wrong and
knowing fully well the consequences of his acts." 10 The Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish
discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latters head clearly demonstrated his discernment. He
took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously
knew would weaken the latters defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate
clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be
excused from criminal liability.11
Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals decision. In the interim, Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a Resolution 13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to
Cornista on 5 October 2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs 15 filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs in this case. 16
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to
maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might take.18
In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:

x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim
was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the
case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on the right breast,
one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first
disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot
at close range, thus insuring his death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to
maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order.
In that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the sudden attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad
and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad
teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot JO1
Bacolor.
Fieldads Identity was Established
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity
and complicity in the killings were not established. However, contrary to his contention, Fieldads identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053
and U-10054 was proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and
recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?
A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there were persons grappling possession of the
armalite, sir.
Q With whom?
A Charlie and Cornista, sir.
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath and you
saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?
A Bacolor, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him, you step down?
A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when asked his name he answered Felmer
Fieldad).
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Do you know Charlie?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?
A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).
COURT
Warden what is the name?
BJMP WARDEN JACABAN
Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan Cornista).
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of Jail Guard Bacolor?
A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
A Cornista, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?
A Bacolor fell down, sir.
xxxx
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?
A He fell down, sir.
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?
A They got his gun, sir.
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
A Charlie, sir.

COURT
What kind of firearm?
A 9 MM, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.23 Positive identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused. 24
In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.25 True, the conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused beyondreasonable
doubt, conviction is in order.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A careful examination of the record
reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldads active participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of the latters armalite gun,
and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him at back of the head; 26
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor; 27
3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor, testified that because of the
abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded by a fight between the victim and the shooter; 28
4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut before heading out the main gate; 29
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but moments before the gun shots rang; 30
6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts 31 of the hands of Fieldad;32 and
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldads hands was positive for the
presence of gun powder nitrates,33 as contained in her report.34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We
note that Fieldads counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance of counsel,
contrary to the right of the accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test
results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3 March 2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the
accused against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa,37 we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not
conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent
counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This
constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this
case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.38 (Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. 40 Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his
agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of
circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of each deceased the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased
to P30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crimes.42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts
of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss
of earning capacity, applying the formula
Net earning capacity =

{2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [gross

annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses]}43

However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using the monthlyincome. Hence, we
multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping

Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.44 The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the
vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things.45
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it.
The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for being hearsay because he was
merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the
place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
xxxx
COURT
What is the description of your tamaraw?
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?
A Red, sir.
Q Plate number?
A CDY 255, sir.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
A In my name, sir.
Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
COURT
Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera: 47
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in
any other sense may be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from
jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending,
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. 50 A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in
equal combat.52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to
the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to
transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court ofAppeals is
quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who
was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had
every opportunity to escape individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable.53
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstance. 54The circumstances under which appellants
participated in the commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously
concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:

SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act,
shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping
is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years
and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law,
and the minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed.55 Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from
fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years and two months is in order.
The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 to the owner of the
vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated. 56 Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 57 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. 58
The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order.1wphi1 However, we delete the award of moral damages since there was no
showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any similar injury.
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 59
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943,
affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and
U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary
damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity
awarded to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;
5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is
increased to P2,142,000.00;
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid. SO ORDERED.

DIGEST:
People of the Philippines v. Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar Pimentel
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar Pimentel are detention prisoners who are charged for the murder of two jail
guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the CA found petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.
Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. JO2
Niturada answered the telephone in the administration building and upon returning, he saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2
Gamboa, who was seated, and Chan shot the latter with a short firearm.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of
the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the
armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin Bauzon,
without the latters knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. The group then transferred to
a Mazda pick-up truck. Eventually they abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field where they were arrested.
Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of carnapping, they allege that they were under the influence of uncontrollable fear
from Leal, who forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail. With regards to the crime of murder, accusedappellants allege that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that there can be no treachery in the case
since the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and carnapping?
HELD:
YES, the guilt of the petitioners are proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant argue that there can be no treachery since the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound. This argument is
untenable.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might take.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad
and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad
teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot JO1
Bacolor. Hence, there is treachery.
Anent the crime of carnapping, the prosecution likewise proved all the elements of the offense in this case. The elements of the crime of
carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle
belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it.
The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
The defense of uncontrollable fear is likewise untenable. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarily followed him
to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped
to transfer vehicles. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of the carnapping would not justify in any
way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish
the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the
consent of its owner.
Hence, with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and of carnapping.

G.R. No. 178343

July 14, 2014

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,

vs.
ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Respondent.
.
The Facts
In October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc. through Josephine Boright, applied for a medium term loan financial facility with GSIS
Investment Management Group to finance the construction of its condominium project in Ermita. 5 The loan application was denied
due to the following grounds: (a) the collateral was insufficient; (b) Ecobel did not have the needed track record in property
development; and (c) the loan was sought during the Asian financial crisis. 6
Ecobel then applied for a surety bond with the GSIS to guarantee the re-payment of the principal loan obligation to be procured with
the Philippine Veterans Bank which was then APPROVED in principle subject to analysis/evaluation of the project and the offered
collaterals."
In a Memorandum, Alex M. Valencerin, submitted Ecobels Guarantee Payment Bond application for evaluation and endorsement of
the GSIS Investment Committee. Valencerina made it appear that Ecobels application was fully secured by reinsurance and real
estate collaterals, and that its approval was urgent to which it was endorsed by GIG Senior VP, Amalio A. Mallari.
On March 1998, the INCOM approved Ecobels application and GSIS Surety Bond was issued indicating the following parties:
Ecobel, represented by Boright, as principal, PVB as obligee, and Mallari, as representative of GSIS General Insurance Fund.
On November, 1998, GSIS President and General Manager Federico Pascual issued a memorandum suspending the processing
and issuance of guaranty payment bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a cancellation notice to Ecobel for Mallaris signature,
but was told that the subject bond could no longer be cancelled because it was already a "done deal."

Despite the issuance, Ecobel paid its yearly premium only through a postdated check and submitted the certificates of title for the
collaterals but was eventually found to be spurious.
Despite the bond cancellation notices, Ecobel was still able to secure a US$10,000,000.00 loan from BSIL using the subject bond.

Ecobel defaulted in the payment of its loan, prompting BSIL to serve upon it a notice of default and its intention to recover the
repayment amount under the terms of their loan agreement and the subject bond. The GSIS was similarly advised. 26
In a Certification, PVB Executive President and Chief Operating Officer Florencio Z.Sioson declared that PVB did not accept the
proposal for it to be named obligee under the subject bond and that there was no contract between Ecobel and PVB. 27
The GSIS through FFIB conducted an investigation on the circumstances surrounding the processing and issuance of the subject
bond and issued a Report, recommending the filing of appropriate criminal and administrative charges against the concerned GSIS
officials including Valencerina for Gross Neglect of Duty, and Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties
before the OMB.

The OMB Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B (PIAB-B) found Valencerina, among others, guilty of
gross neglect of duty, and inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and ordered his dismissal
.Dissatisfied, Valencerina moved for reconsideration and then filed before the CA a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

The CA issued a 60-day TRO which expired on January 21, 2006. 38

Subsequently, on June 8, 2006, the GSIS informed Valencerina that he is "deemed dismissed from the service as of the close of
office hours" that day. Valencerina then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the CA,
which, finding the necessity to preserve the status quo between the parties, granted the same. Consequently, the corresponding writ
of preliminary injunction44 was issued and GSIS directed Valencerina to return to work.
At odds with the return directive, the OMB filed a motion for Reconsideration which was denied then filed the instant petition for
certiorari.

The Issue
Whether or not the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman, imposing the penalty of removal, are final and executory.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman 49 (Section 7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the offices decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be
executed as a matter of course and shall not bestopped by an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalentto
one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall
be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension
or removal.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he
is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
It is clear that the OMBs Order imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina was immediately executory, notwithstanding the
pendency of his appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

DIGESTS:

G.R. No. 170046

December 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., BURT B. FAVORITO, FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q. QUARTO, AGERICO C. PALAYPAY,
NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO C. PLANTA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY, NORMA A. VILLARMINO,
RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ, MELISSA T. ESPINA, VIOLETA R. TADEO, JESSICA J.
CATIBAYAN, VIOLETA C. AMAR, RON ALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N.
DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NO NETTE H. FULLIDO,
VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V. EDEM, .AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR., JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated
January 20, 20051 and October 12, 20052 of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case No. 27969 dismissing the same for lack of
probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against respondents. The factual
antecedents follow.
On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Simeon Datumanong,
issuedDepartment Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a committee for the purpose of investigating alleged anomalies and illegal
disbursements in connection with the repair of DPWH-owned motor vehicles and equipment. 3 As a result of the investigation, it was
discovered thatduring the period of March 2001 to December 2001, the emergency repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH
vehicles, approved and paid for by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about One Hundred ThirtyNine Million Pesos (P139,000,000.00).4
On August 7, 2002, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH and member of the committee, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended, in relation
to Sections 20 and 9 of the General and Special Provisions, respectively, of the General Appropriations Act, Memorandum of the
Secretary on the Guidelines on Purchases of Spare Parts and Repair of Vehicles dated July 19, 1997, Department Order No. 33,
Series of1988 of RA 6770, as amended by RA No. 3018, COA Circular 85-55 A, Seriesof 1985, COA Circular 76-412, Series of 1976
on splitting of RSE, PO, vouchers and payrolls, against the several officials/employees of the DPWH, including respondents herein. 5
On March 1, 2004, the Special Prosecution Officer, Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman, filed an Information6 with respondent Sandiganbayan accusing Maximo A. Borje, Jr., Burt B. Favorito, Florendo B.

Arias, Erdito Q. Quarto, Agerico C. Palaypay, Napoleon S. Anas, Danilo C. Planta, Luisito S. Dela Rosa, Rogelio L. Beray, Norma A.
Villarmino, Ricardo M. Juan, Jr., Nelson Umali, Maria Luisa T. Cruz, Melissa T.Espina, Violeta R. Tadeo, Jessica J. Catibayan,
Violeta C. Amar, Ronaldo G. Simbahan, Felipe A. San Jose, Rolando C. Castillo, Conchita N. Dela Cruz, Janette A. Bugayong,
Jesus D. Capuz, Rodellia D. Uy, Romeo C. Fullido,Nonette H. Fullido, Victoria M. Go, Carmelito V. Edem, Augusto C. Capuz,
Vicente Santos, Jr., of the crime of Plunder defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINO, a public officer,
being then the Chief of the Motorpool Section of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Port Area, Manila, by himself and in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, ERDITO QUARTO y
QUIAOT, AGERICO PALAYPAY y CORTES, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, DANILO PLANTA y CALUYA, LUISITO S. DELA
ROSA, ROGELIO BERAY y LAGANGA, NORMA VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI, RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA
LUISA CRUZ y TALAO, MELISSA ESPINA y TANGPUZ, VIOLETA TADEO y RAGASA,JESSICA CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL, VIOLETA
AMAR y CASTILLO, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, and JOHN DOESand JANE
DOES, who are his officemates being likewise officials and employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
two of whom are high ranking public officers, namely: BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, Director III, Administrative and Manpower
Management Services [Salary Grade 27] and FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, Assistant Director, Bureau of Equipment [Salary Grade
27], and in further connivance/conspiracy with his other coaccused private individuals engaged inthe business of motor vehicle and
spare parts supply, namely: CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELLIA UY y DEL
ROSARIO, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NONETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA GO y MANIEGO, CARMELITO EDEM y VARGAS,
AUGUSTO CAPUZ y CO, VICENTE SANTOS, JR., as well as other JOHN DOESand JANE DOES, with evident bad faith and intent
to defraud and cause damage to the government, and taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, connection or
influence as such public officer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally, amass, accumulate and acquire, by himself, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY-TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE AND 38/100 PESOS (P82,321,855.38), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense and
to the damage of the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines inthe aforestated amount, through a series and/or
combination of overt orcriminal acts or similar schemes or means, consisting of misappropriations, conversions, misuses, diversions
and/or malversation of public funds and/or raids on the public treasury, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed
prior to, or simultaneously with, the fraud, by falsifying public, officials and/or commercial documents, such as Job Orders, PreRepair Inspection Reports, Post-Repair Inspection Reports, Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE), Certificates of
Emergency Purchases/Repair, Waste Material Reports, Certificate of Acceptance, Certificates of Fair Wear and Tear, Price
Verifications, Requests for Obligation Allotment and Disbursement Vouchers, and such other falsified documents, untruthfully
narrating therein material facts on fictitious emergency repairs of various DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts,
which are, in truth, imaginary or spurious transactions, and by using such falsified documents of said imaginary or spurious
transactions for said accused to unlawfully cause the undue releases of public funds and obtain undue payments on 4,406
transactions, more or less, for said fictitious emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, thereby
misappropriating, converting, misusing, diverting and/or malversing the proceeds thereof for MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINOs
personal use and benefit.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause. On March
19, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order7 giving respondents a period within which to submit their memoranda of authority. In
its Omnibus Comment/Opposition8 of even date, petitioner questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to act on
respondentsmotions, arguing that the same had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents and, hence, it had
no authority to hear and decide their motions. Petitioner also alleged that it successfully established probable cause justifying the
issuance by the respondent court of a warrant of arrest.
On January 20, 2005, respondent Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution 9 upholding its authority to act on respondents
motions for their filing of the same may be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and dismissing the
case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against the accusedrespondents. Itruled that as the records reveal, not all elements of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed illgotten wealth of at least P50 million. It further denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution 10 dated October 12,
2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition invoking the following grounds:
I.

THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN
INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE PROSECUTION.
II.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN ITS
DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE.
Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an executive, not a judicial
function. As such, it asserts that respondent Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and determination of
probable cause in their preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner faulted the respondent court for taking into consideration the
findings of Atty. Irene Ofilada of the Investigating Committee that it was not respondent Borje who encashed the checks but the
respondent-suppliers, by virtue of a blanket authority given by the former to the latter. It posits that said findings cannot bind the
Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of the existence of probable cause.
Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly dismissed the case for the evidence clearly shows the absence of certain
elements of the crime. They maintain that while investigating officers have a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of
probable cause, which deserves respect from the courts, the acts of the Ombudsman in disregarding essential pieces of evidence
are tantamount to an abuse of discretion authorizing the dismissal by the court of the case.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. On the one hand, executive
determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court. 11 It is a function that properly pertains to
the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and should be held for trial. 12 On the other hand, judicial determination of
probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. It is one made by a judge who must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented, there is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends of
justice will not be frustrated.13
Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for thatmatter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered to
determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the
crime as defined by law.14
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause believing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 15 This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions
of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 16
The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an information against
respondents.1avvphi1 For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 17 A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 18 Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause was done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the same. 19

In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against respondents by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records clearly reveals that accused
Borje, Jr. was the payee of 4,406 checks amounting toP82,321,855.38 covering the reimbursements of the supposed payments for
the anomalousand questionable repairs of the DPWH vehicles. While there may havebeen evidence presented which may lead to
an inference that the end-receiver of the amounts covered by the checks is not actually accused Borje, Jr., but the accused private
individuals suppliers, the fact that the name of accused Borje, Jr. appears on the subject checks cannot be denied. Indeed,
merebelief that respondents probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable cause. Whether they are, in fact, guilty of
plunder is a different matter, which can properly be determined at a full-blown trial on the merits of this case. 20 As this Court has
ruled in People v. Castillo:21
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a determinative finding prior tothe parties
presentation of their respective evidence that there was no bad faith and manifest partiality on the respondents part and undue
injury on the part of the complainant. In Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, we held that "it is well established that the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits." Also, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the
conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the nature and objective of a
preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman differs from the findings of Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal
Audit Service of the DPWH, who conducted the initial investigation, falls short of being capricious or arbitrary. It has consistently
been held that there is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.22 The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely performing his duty as mandated
by the Constitution23 and by law.24 Filing an Information against respondents in this case based on sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be
whimsical or despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the Ombudsmans charge was not at all baseless for the link between the
respondents and the anomalous transactions herein has been satisfactorily established. In the absence, therefore, of any showing
that the questioned acts of the Ombudsman were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise
of his constitutionally mandated powers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated January 20, 2005 and
October 12, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case No. 27969 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated January 7, 2004 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-02-0507-H, finding probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of plunder is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207950

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.
DECISION
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the accused has committed the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove "the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide [was] actually carried out" 1 !n order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The
accused may nevertheless be convicted of the separate crime of homicide once the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable
doubt the accused's culpability for the victim's death.
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide:
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then
and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by reason thereof, accused took, robbed
and carried away the following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
Two (2) pcs. Necklace

One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to said ELMER DUQUE y OROS
@ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
Contrary to law.2
Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to trial. The prosecution presented
Angelo Peamante (Peamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo
T. Salen (Dr. Salen), and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole witness. 3
The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.
On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood City.4 When he was
about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and
black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, just six meters across Peamantes house.5
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that he was able to see
the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6
Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he dropped something that he was
holding and fell down when he stepped on it. 7 He walked away after, and Peamante was not able to determine what Chavez was
holding.8 Peamante then entered his house and went to bed. 9
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. She was joined by PO3 Rex
Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint technician. 10 They conducted an initial survey of the crime
scene after coordinating with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section. 11
The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbies dead body inside. 12 They took photographs
and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbies left
hand.13 They documented the evidence then turned them over to the Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was
called to conduct an autopsy on the body.14
At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed
his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m. 15
At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was approximately 12 hours prior
to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbies body 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp
bladed instrument, and one incised wound was caused by a sharp object. 17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal. 18
The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. Peamante described to SPO3
Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbies parlor.19
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the police station. 20 Chavez
was then 22 years old.21 His mother told the police that she wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbies death. 22
SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. However,
Chavezs mother still gave her statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco. 23She also surrendered two cellular
phones owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez. 24
The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw leaving Barbies
house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006. 25 Peamante immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter
executed his written statement.26 There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.
On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages withBarbie on whether
they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with

Barbies boyfriend, Maki.28 When Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at around 1:00
a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed him to enter the house, and he went home after.30
On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicideand hereby sentences him to suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as death indemnity and
another P75,000 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.32
On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial courts decision.34 Chavez then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to
Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, elevating the case with this court. 35
This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both parties filed manifestationsthat
they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals. 36
In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and misapplied some facts of
substance that could have altered its verdict."37 He argued that since the prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt on the part of Chavez. 38 In this case, even if Peamante saw him leaving Barbies
house, Peamante did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time. 39
As regards his mothers statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother was not presented before the
court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-examination. 40 He added that affidavits are generally rejected as hearsay unless
the affiant appears before the court and testifies on it. 41
Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies wounds were caused by two sharp bladed instruments, thus, it was
possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also possible that the assailants committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbies
house.43 Given that many possible explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be
favored.44
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution isestablishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken chain of
events leading to no other conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing and robbing Barbie. 46
On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers statement was inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial
court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the statements made by Chavezs mother. 47
Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there weretwo assailants, Dr. Salen equally
testified on the possibility that there was only one.48 The sole issue now before us iswhether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.
I
Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robberywith the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. . . .49

Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions evidence is purely circumstantial
and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt. 50
The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the conviction of an accused:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 51
The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other conclusion than the
commission by Chavez of the crime charged:
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death,
nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the
conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first,
it has been duly established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00 oclock in the
morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too;
second, the victims two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola) without
sim cards and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings of the victim, were handled to SPO3 Steve
Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05 November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered,
accompanied by his mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 oclock in the morning, witness Angelo
Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying something and about toget out of the door of the
house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but the said person was not
able to successfully do so. He later positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON CHAVEZ y
BITANCOR @ NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with
the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salens testimony that the body of the victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours)
when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.
The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the accused had indeed killed the
victim.52
Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the
findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.53
Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for
the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide is actually carried out."54 In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide. 55
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily establish an original criminal
design by Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavezs mother in her statement as follows:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa
akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sabahay ay inihulog niya sa
manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling
kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang. 56(Emphasis supplied)
However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never presented as a
witness during trial to testify on her statement.57
An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds in various
parts of Barbies body.58
The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of the nature and circumstances of
the crime committed.
This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a total of 36 stab wounds in his
front and back, this court noted that "this number of stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a strong indication that appellants made
sure of the success of their effort to kill the victim without risk to themselves." 59
This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as indicative ofthe accuseds intention
to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others. 60
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of
the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d)
to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime." 61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number of
stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbies personal property.
In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide and theft for failure of the
prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim:
But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its allegations of the presence of criminal
design to commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to commit homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim
occurred by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on accused-appellants primary criminal intent. Did
he intend to kill the victim in order to steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters
personal property being merely an afterthought? Where the homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio. 63
II
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the separate crime of homicide.
First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki. Nevertheless, Chavez described his
friendship with Barbie to be "[w]ere like brothers." 64 He testified during cross-examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbies
parlor that he cannot recall how many times he had been there. 65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.
Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle his misunderstanding with
Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend:
MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2) treated each other like
brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship with Maki Aover, Barbies boyfriend for six (6) months,
which resulted in a misunderstanding between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent
on the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at

around 1:00 oclock in the morning. Barbie let him in and they tried to talk about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was
not fixed so he decided to gohome. Later on, he learned that Barbie was already dead. 66
This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to kill, 67 and a confrontation with the
victim immediately prior to the victimsdeath has been considered as circumstantial evidence for homicide. 68
Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.The prosecution
proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of Barbies body and that a kitchen knife was found in a
manhole near Chavezs house at No. 536, 5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila. 69
The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavezs mother. This provides, among others, her sons
confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole near their house:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa
akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa bahay ay inihulog niya sa
manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling
kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang. 70(Emphasis supplied)
Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted still led tothe unearthing of the
kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near Chavezs house. 71
Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual findings giving credence to 1) Peamantes positive identification of
Chavez as the person leaving Barbies house that early morning of October 28, 2006 72 and 2) the medico-legals testimony
establishing Barbies time of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00
a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73
All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide.
III
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him."74 Thus, when a person has possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the theft. 75
Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied by the
defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular phones. 77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a cellular phone
has become a necessary accessory, no person would part with the same for a long period of time, especially in this case as it
involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbies kababayan, witness Raymond Seno[f]a." 78
However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship having been established, there is still a possibilitythat these cellphones were
lent to Chavez by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-examination that the police
made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?
A: No, sir.

Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.

Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?
Witness: No, Your Honor.
Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?
A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.
Q; No sim card and batteries?
A; Yes, Your Honor.
Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over to the Public Prosecutor, no markings?
A: No markings, Your Honor.79
The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these weretaken by Chavez. The
statement of Chavezs mother mentioned that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces ["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya
mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City" 80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere hearsay.
In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items. 81 The lower court made no factual findings on the
value of the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring,
two pieces necklace, and one bracelet.
At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not remember the model of the Motorola
fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more or less. 82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no
personal knowledge on how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.
These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her son committed a heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on November 5, 2006 for investigation, 83 and his
mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her
son"84 and "perhaps the accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting nearer to him." 85 Nevertheless, during cross-examination,
SPO3 Casimiro testified:
Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son, according to you she tried to help her son,
is that correct?
A: That is the word I remember, sir.
Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?
A: Maybe, sir.86
Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that said cellphones belong[ed] to
victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their
residence."87 The records are silent on whether Chavez objected to his mothers statements. The records also do not show why the police
proceeded to get his mothers testimony as opposed to getting Chavezs testimony on his voluntary surrender.

At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was informed by the investigating officer at the police station of the consequences in
executing a written statement withoutthe assistance of a lawyer.88 She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her
sons confession of the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:
Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you mentioned?
A: She was with some neighbors.
Atty. Villanueva
Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.
Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit?
A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.
Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?
A: Yes, sir.90
The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional rights and nature of charges
imputed against him, accused opted to remain silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days
after Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a
court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and
(d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. 92
The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement thatany waiver of the right to counsel
must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel." 93
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation
and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements." 94
It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such as during an arrest. These rights are
intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,
to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to
resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. 95 (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice ofissuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law."97
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same
pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of
homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in that "as prayed for, the said police officer
is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained
thereat pending trial of this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court." 98 The order of commitment dated September 28, 2011 was
issued after his trial court conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.
Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the trial.1wphi1 This period may be
credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with
the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing
with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided,
however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the
coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.99
V
Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not properly handled, and no results coming from
the forensic examinations were presented to the court. There was no examination of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved
from the manhole near the house of Chavez.100 There were no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands found with the knife
and those in the clutches of the victim. Neither was there a comparison made between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no
report regarding any finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the victim or Chavezs.
The results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court level had all these been done. In many cases,
eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable or would have been belied had object evidence been properly handled and presented.
We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life whether it be the victims or the accuseds is valuable. The Constitution and our
laws hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and
more dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and
presented before the courts. The publics confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we
promulgate against the accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and take this to heart.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby
declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was
not attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.