2
Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus........................................................................................3
Text Box 1....................................................................................................................4
Table 1.........................................................................................................................6
Table 2.........................................................................................................................9
Table 3.......................................................................................................................10
European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010..............................................10
Analysis of ECHR Decision..............................................................................................13
Key Finding...............................................................................................................13
Key Finding...............................................................................................................14
Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling..........................................................................15
Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island..............................................17
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................20
Biblography........................................................................................................................22
1
Summary
The case of the Cyprus conflict differs radically from many other “conflicts”
places like Sri Lanka and El Salvador, the conflict in Cyprus is a frozen conflict
which has devolved into a situation where two populations, Greek and Turkish
pariah state with no international recognition other than that of its patron –
Turkey. The two states are almost completely mono-ethnic and their
left with a situation which defies the neat analysis applied to other conflicts.
Today a situation like the one is Cyprus exists nowhere in the world
(excepting perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Cyprus conflict is not
the military victory of one side or by a peace treaty acceptable to both sides.
Because the conflict has lasted so long (since 1963 and in its most modern
iteration, since the Turkish invasion of 1974) it has become not only a frozen
conflict but one which is also stale1 – lacking in new ideas, energy and
1
I will elaborate on the delineation of “stale” vs. “frozen” later in the report.
2
within the context of contemporary peacebuilding models such as those used
This report will identify and analyze horizontal inequalities and vertical
restricted nature of the analysis the report will try and focus on the human
and in particular focus on the issue of property rights and ownership on both
sides of the divided island. This report will focus, in particular, on the
Cyprus and explore the ability of the decision to act as a “warming agent” on
the conflict –leading to the settlement of long outstanding issues which have
in 1974 the island had only experienced, at that point, a little longer than one
decade of independence. But much like the partition and frozen conflict that
were to follow the independence of Cyprus was also afflicted with frozen
The period after the 1960 independence declaration was supposed to usher
3
communities on Cyprus. Instead, because the Turkish Cypriot community
This decision acted to lock into place the horizontal inequalities which pre-
present in both pre and post independence Cyprus – including the areas of
participation in government and the army and police, the issue of land
holdings and income disparity, the use of resources and both private and
6).
Text Box 1
Horizontal inequalities are more likely to lead to conflict when:
• They’re durable.
• They widen over time.
• Boundaries between groups are “relatively impermeable.”
• When groups are cohesive enough for collective action to emerge.
• When leaders are not coopted into the ruling system and are instead
marginalized.
• When the government is irresponsive or violently repressive.
Source: Stewart 4.
4
The invasion of Turkey acted to separate the two sides of the islands in a
recognized as the legal ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and the other seen as a pseudo-
state, a blank spot on the island of Cyprus occupied by Turkish forces and
then magnified by the situation – with one side availing itself of its legal
unable to gain access to the same resources as their neighbor to the south,
activities like the use of northern Cyprus as a transshipment point for human
The TRNC is often referred to as a “sleepy” state which due to an ECHR ruling
in 1994 which forbade exports from the unrecognized state, was forced to
find other means of income. Yet this synopsis is incorrect – the Turkish
community in Cyprus has long been alienated, even before the invasion of
the long-term horizontal inequalities between the two states (Bryant and
Hatay 3).
5
between the two sides of the island. A recent poll conducted in Cyprus
amongst both communities indicated that 58% of Greek Cypriots and 67% of
began – as well as the continuation of that status after the Turkish invasion in
1974.
Table 1
Action Turkish/Greek Cypriot End Result
Implementation?
Cessation of hostilities Yes, Ceasefire signed Ceasefire remains in
and violence place today. No active
hostilities since 1975
Signing of peace No, attempted but failed Frozen conflict
agreement
Inception of No No demobilization, no
demobilization, disarmament and no
disarmament and reintegration between
reintegration either side in Cyprus.
Return of refugees No – exchange of Both sides are now
refugees nearly monoethnic
6
states.
Establishment of the Yes – separately. Both Horizontal inequalities
foundations of a sides developed (HI) based around
functioning state separate states, locking economic assets,
in the inequalities which incomes and
existed before the 1974 employment and social
Turkish invasion aspects strengthened.
Initiation of No, some small private The two sides remain
reconciliation and efforts but no official separated by a great
societal integration efforts. distance.
Startup of economic In Greek Cyprus – Yes. HIs remain strong
recovery In Turkish Cyprus – No. between the two sides.
In the Cyprus conflict these seven peace milestones never fully developed
and only three were partly implemented between the two sides (Greek and
was. Refugees weren’t returned – they were exchanged between the two
sides of the islands – creating monoethnic states on each side of the Green
Line and additional massive displacement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
And each state began to set up its own administrative and statebuilding tools
on each side of the island – further increasing the distance between the two
sides.
come by. Nonetheless data does exist which shows wide variances between
the two sides of the divided island in GDP growth, public vs. private sector
inequalities present before and after independence and the Turkish invasion
in 1974. While the Republic of Cyprus is well integrated into the European
7
and global economies the TRNC remains locked out of both and heavily
conflicts within the European theater – specifically the conflict in the north of
Ireland which was solved with the Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998
(Zink 583). While the Republic of Cyprus through its international recognition
and membership in the European Union has been drawn into the core of
Europe its northern part – the TRNC, remains (along with Turkey) on the
remain. Actors in the conflict on both sides of the island have interests which
are threatened by the possibility of peace and many have become defenders
perspective and utilizing the resources of the main actor in the region: the
European Union? It is a fact that the European Union’s body of law and
applicable to all of Cyprus but has been suspended in the TRNC (Nathan
Associates 9). From the point of view of the ease of application of law the
2
Much has been made of the TRNC’s high growth rates during the early part of the decade, which
averaged 10% per year compared to the Greek Cypriot state, which was closer to 2.6%. The TRNC’s
figures are misleading because they were mostly the product of a building boom predicated on illegal
expropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Much like the rest of the world the TRNC is now
experiencing a deep recession brought on by a bust in property values.
8
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on property rights within the
resolution of the issue of property rights on both sides of the island – this is
between the two sides and one where both sides, as of now, have the widest
rights in the TRNC is also one of the greatest horizontal inequalities present
of the Annan plan in 2004 and continuing through today are critical in
Table 2
Perceptions in April 2004 Scope for perceptions to
evolve
North North
South South
The table above is provided to show the perceptions and scope for
9
TYhe matrix below, created by the United States State Department, provides
a useful tool for focusing more intently on the issue of property rights as a
Table 3
Initial Response Transformation Fostering
Sustainability
Evaluate existing laws Establish procedure to Ensure equitable
pertaining to land resolve property rights implementation of laws,
rights, registration of for land and regulations and codes.
the property, and subterranean
collateralization of resources.
movable and
immovable property. Draft laws and codes to
establish or strengthen
Take immediate steps property rights
where needed to including customary or
establish process to traditional concepts
resolve property issues. where appropriate.
Establish process to
reconcile and address
claims of
expropriations.
Utilizing this matrix the report will next focus on the European Court of
Human Rights decision in March 2010 which will be used as a major focus for
10
In March of 2010 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
Cypriots. I intend to examine this ruling in detail and use its legal reasoning
and the structures it put in place as a base from which to examine and
At issue in the case was the matter of the status of properties left behind by
Greek Cypriot refugees who had fled the north of the island in advance of
which are binding on its members, which include 47 states (including Turkey
All of the applicants in this case were claimants of immovable property in the
TRNC. All brought forward their claims because they felt the domestic
remedies provided by the TRNC did not provide an effective remedy for their
claims. Their specific claims were offered under Article 8 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states
the following:
11
The court, after walking through the particulars of the case and referencing
The following is a broad overview of the court’s ruling and focuses on key
• The court found that the claimants had failed to avail themselves of a
horizontal inequalities relating to property in Cyprus is that for the first time
in the history of the court hearing cases on the subject it ruled that an
effective legal remedy now existed and that the claimants should avail
themselves of that remedy before coming to the ECHR for remedy. The
12
• The Court considers that there is an effective remedy for their
[the claimants] provided under the auspices of the respondent
government. The court finds that the [IPC] provides an accessible and
effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about
interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots
• For these reasons the Court decides unanimously to join the
applications; and declares by a majority the applications inadmissible.
court had firmly set barriers around an issue which previously had appeared
open-ended and whose insolvability had plagued the Cyprus issue from 1974
Key Finding
The decision of the ECHR should therefore be cast as a major part of the
solution to the issue of poverty in the north by finally solving the outstanding
issues of property claims (proper ownership of land and immovable property
being a necessary perquisite for any capital-based economy) and removing a
barrier to growth in the north as well as forcing the full financial responsibility
for payment of property claims in the north directly onto the TRNC and
Turkey.
13
It is not only Greek Cypriots who are impacted by the ambiguous state of
property in the north. Turkish Cypriots are also well aware of the difficulties
within the minds of both communities, moving from one which was previously
static to one which is now dynamic, from one which was previously viewed as
a possible costly hindrance on the south and whose solution could act as a
catalyst for solving the overall problem of the division of Cyprus, only one
Key Finding
For the north the decision can act to resolve the ambiguities over property
which have plagued domestic and international ownership for so long. The
14
Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling
While originally caught off-guard by the ECHR decision the government of the
ignore the ruling and asking them not to apply to the IPC for remediation of
their cases.
Stefanou said the ECHR decision did not take away any of the
political and legal arguments supporting the Greek Cypriot
positions concerning the property issue that were submitted in
the negotiations (Cyprus Mail).
Yet the government of the Republic of Cyprus failed to mention that the IPC
November 2011. While the government’s position is that its citizens should
not avail themselves of the remedies the IPC offered, it has not (nor could it –
legally) prevented its citizens from doing so. The statement also represents
This occurs from within the political elites on both sides of the island and is
agreements since 1977, which all state that the return of every refugee to
3
Furthermore the manipulation of the expectations of refugees has been a powerful tool used by elites on
both sides of the island to win elections. We see this in other frozen conflicts as well – Palestine and
Western Sahara are two prime examples of this.
15
As the Department of State essential tasks matrix shows the issue of property
dealing with the issue. The IPC commission meets these standards and thus
property claims. The issue, therefore, is moved from the sphere of the
political (dealing with claims through the negotiation and bargaining process
– as in the Annan plan) to that of the judicial (ameliorating the issue through
utilization of the IPC is designed with the short and medium-term interests of
the rule of law within the TNRC and align its legal system with that of the
To accomplish this it is then recommended that the TRNC begin the process
When Cyprus was admitted to the European Union the acquis communautaire
was suspended in the north. By beginning the process of adopting the acquis
European Union member and signal to the south that the destiny of the two
16
states is beginning to converge. The TRNC should also work to make sure the
EU-Turkey Customs Union is implemented fully. The Customs Union has been
held up by the refusal of Turkey to open its ports and airspace to Greek
Cypriot ships and aircraft. The TRNC can act as a mediator in this dispute and
there also exist vertical dilemmas which must be mitigated for any successful
Annan plan showed us – without the support of elites the masses will not
strategy for dealing with this issue – particularly within the Greek-Cypriot
community where an almost entirely united front (excepting the trade unions
and a few civic society-based actors) opposed the Annan plan with
devastating consequences for the agreement. Actors in the TRNC were more
17
Negotiations in Cyprus have traditionally followed the “top down” approach
as seen below:
to bring both sides of the island together. In particular UNFICYP, the United
and it already has a long record of working with elites on both sides of the
island. The top-down approach has also enabled elites who may have an
when next renewing the mission of UNFICYP, should change its mandate from
18
carries out peacebuilding activities in the Cyprus by bringing together both
sides on issues relating to the dividing line – these meetings usually take
its mandate the UNSC can act to utilize UNFICYP as a warming agent on the
frozen conflict in Cyprus. After nearly 40 years on the island the United
forward on the utilization of its mission to build and strengthen the mission of
peace in Cyprus.
The image above is used to illustrate the role UNFICYP could play in
diplomacy organization UNFICYP could fulfill the role of warming agent in the
frozen conflict. Possible other actors in this role could include the European
19
Union or the Non-Aligned Movement. But because UNFICYP is viewed as a
neutral agent by both sides it would be the ideal candidate for this role.
Conclusion
This report has recommended two courses of action on Cyprus in order to
as not just a frozen conflict but one which is “stale,” stale being the opposite
means that the conflict requires aggressive new approaches in order to inject
the “aura” of citizen and civic society activity which surrounds any
place around and from within the society involving the negotiating parties.
Examples of this include the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept the IPC as a
with the European Union unless they were treated as a state on equal footing
amelioration of the issue of property rights, which were a large factor in the
defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. By acting on the issue of frozen dynamics
20
in negotiations and utilizing UNFICYP to ameliorate the role of vertical
on the island.
locked into their view of the “other.” But peacebuilding requires risk and it
unfreeze and ripen the conflict in order to push it more aggressively towards
settlement the recommendations within this report are acting within the best
campaign to convince Greek Cypriots to utilize the IPC and continuing with
already on the ground in Cyprus this report and its recommendations are
plagued Cyprus.
21
Biblography
Application Nos 46113/99. Grand Chamber - The European Court of Human
Rights. 14 Mar. 2010. Print.
Bryant, Rebecca, and Mete Hatay. Suing for Sovereignty: Property, Territory
and the EU's Cyprus Problem. Rep. Istanbul: Istanbul Kultur University, 2010.
Print. Global Political Trends Center.
Collier, Paul, V.L Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol,
and Nicholas Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap. Rep. Vol. 26121.
Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford UP, 2003. Print.
Hadjipavlou, Maria. Root Cause of Conflict, Challenges at the Micro Level and
Implication in Post Conflict Cyprus. Department of Social and Political
Sciences - University of Cyprus, Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Apr. 2010.
Hemmer, Bruce, Paula Garb, Marlett Phillips, and John L. Graham. "Putting the
"Up" in Bottom-up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of Peace
Negotiations." International Negotiation (2006): 129-62. Web. 1 May 2010.
Mavrou, Eleni, Rasit Perev, and Michael Moller. "Cyprus: "A Cold Peace""
Interview by David Berruti. Rivista 4 Feb. 2008: 21-35. Print.
22
"Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-War Reconstruction." CRISE
Working Paper 7: 1-37. Web.
Psyllides, George. "Stay Away from the IPC." CyprusMail, 29 Apr. 2010. Web.
1 May 2010.
23