The object of the present paper is to remove some of the misunderstandings likely to be caused by Rajendra Prasad's misrepresentation'-both in history and in analysis-of the logic of Indian theory of purusarthas, the ultimate goals of man's existence. The atte~nptof Rajenda Prasad in analyzing the concept of moksa is certainly praiseworthy in so far as not much work has been done in the logical analysis of the basic concepts which are common to all, or peculiar to individual, systems of Indian thought. For example, expressions like vyapti, samanya, samavaya, Karma, avidya, etc. are those which are employed by most of the systems, but they still suffer from a lack of clear definition. Similarly, in the sutra works such characteristic terms are used which are basic to and indicative of a particular school, as, for instance, maya is for the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara. We can go a long way in apprehending the true spirit and significance of the different systems if their basic concepts and key terms are logically reasoned out. However, the aim of thz present paper is not to deal with this task but to point out some of the logical pitfalls in Rajendra Prasad's paper. The paper under discussion begins with an examination and refutation of an argument advanced by some peopleZ for maintaining the superiority of Indian philosophy over Western philosophy. Though I myself do not subscribe to the view that Indian philosophy is superior to Western, or vice versa, nor do I justify the validity of the ,argument in question, yet I would like to point out that Rajendra Prasad's explication of the argument does not seem to be logically satisfactory. The argument, as worded by him, is as follows: "The goal of Western philosophy is acquisition of knowledge, where as acquisition of knowledge, for Indian philosophy, is only a means to self-realization (moksa). That is, Indian philosophy goes 1 2
"The Concept of Moksa," Philosophy and Phenome~otogica~
Research, March 1971. Rajendra Prasad has not referred to their names and works.
much further or deeper than Western philosophy. It begins where
the latter ends."3 While explicating this argument he brings out the following assumptions on which, he thinks, it. is based: 1. that self-realization is the proper or real goal of philosophy, 2. that knowledge can be and is a means to self-realization, 3. that it is more competent than knowledge to be a philosophic goal, 4. and that the self-realization talked about in Indian philosophy is better or more genuine than that to which one may find reference in Western philosophy. A faithful analysis of the argument reveals that no assumption, except number two, is in any way relevant to it. The argument does not assume that bare self-realization is the philosophic goal but that self-realization which is brought about by knowledge. The third assumption, for this very reason, is equally irrelevant and misconceived. The legitimate assumption should have been, self-realization brought about by knowledge is more competent than mere knowledge to be a philosophical goal. The fourth assumption is not only irrelevant to the argument but also contrary to its very spirit. The argument asserts that Western philosophy aims only at knowledge and not at self-realization, whereas this assumption implies that it aims at self-realization also. What Rajendra Prasad should have pointed out was that the argument involved a false premise. It is not true to say that the goal of western philosophy is knowledge alone because one does find there references to self-realization. Not only has Rajendra Prasad failed to lay hand on the real assumptions but he has also indulged in self-contradiction. On the one hand he writes, "I am not going to question or examine here any one of these assumptions." On the other hand, in the same sentence he opines, "the truth of none of them is obvious." Such a judgment should only be an outcome of an objective examination which evidently the author has not undertaken. Further, it is not at all obvious what criterion of obviousness the author has resorted to. The paper attempts to belittle the importance of the practical 3 What the advocates of this argument presume is that whereas Western philosophy has only "knowledge," Indian philosophy has "knowledge leading to best living" as the goal, and in this wider perspective lies the superiority of the latter. The ideal of "knowledge for the sake of best living," they maintain, is more comprehensive than the ideal of "knowledge for the sake of knowledge."
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character of Indian philosophy. I do share its author's feelings
when he suggests that in the study of Indian philosophy logical, epistemological, ethical, and semantical issues should be paid due attention, but this does not justify him in playing down its practical character. His thinking (and for that matter his analysis of the concept of moksa) seems to be prejudiced by his philosophical preconception that the task of philosophy is not to provide speculative trurns but only to do a conceptual analysis or mapping. That is why he argues that problems of practical character are not "really philosophical in the current sense of the term." Such a narrow position, though acceptable to a logical analyst, cannot be acceptable to a speculative metaphysician or to an existentialist thinker. It is stated in the paper that "the religious end is always spiritual" but the instance of Hinduism, for example, having material well-being (abhyudaya) as one of the goals falsifies it. Perhaps Rajendra Prasad is unmindful of the popularly accepted definition of religion given by Kanada, the author of the Vaisesika sutras, which unequivocally declares that religion is that which brings about material well-being as well as spiritual enhancement.4 Postulation of arlha and kama as the ends of human life, the importance given to worldly and social duties of the individual, the emphasis on the sa~nskaras(sacraments) and grhasthasrama (stage of householder's life) etc. amply prove the falsity of his statement. Instead of making a general statement he should have stated that "the religious end is mainly spiritual," but then the point that he wanted to make would have been rendered baseless. In the paper there is a strange remark that "seeking of artha and kama are contrary to the general spirit of Indian systems." But this is true neither historically nor logically. That historically it is not so is quite evident from the place given to sex in Hindu culture, in literature, art, and architecture. Nonacquisition of artha and kama has never been enjoined in the Hindu tradition. The well-known convocation address of the Taittiriya upanisad5 enjoins upon the students to lead the life of a householder and not to break the line of progeny. The concept of pitr rna, unpermissibility of balasamnyasa (child-recluse), the rule of leading worldly life till a grandson is born, etc. are sufficient to testify that artha and kama were never despised. Nor is this true logically because complete 4 5
Vaisesika sfitra 1.1.2.
Prajdtantum ma vyavacchetsi.
renunciation and extreme austerity have never been the ideals in
Hindu tradition, though they have been inculcated in the sister tradition of the sramanas, especially the Jaina. The seeking of artha and kama is in full conformity with the Hindu ideal of moksa which is a state of perfection and bliss. Of course artha and kama are not acceptable in their gross form, but certainly they are not unacceptable in their transformed form. The very definition of Brahma, the ultimate reality, as bliss (Raso vai sah) belie Rajendra Prasad's assertion. It may be true for a part of Indian culture but on that basis one cannot justifiably make a sweeping statement about the whole. Rajendra Prasad is either uninformed of the distinction between the brahmana and the sramana traditions of Indian culture or he commits the fallacy of mixing up the two, taking the characteristics of the latter as those of the former as well. The term purusartha is understood in the paper to mean "that which is sought" whereas it really is employed to mean "that which ought to be sought." Indian theoreticians were not ignorant, as has been alleged, of the fact that there could be no legitimate passage from the descriptive to the prescriptive and had enough sense to discern the logical difference of "ought" from "is." However, they were also not oblivious of the fact that there is no unbridgeable gulf between the "actual" and the "ideal." While discussing the interrelation of the four purusarthas Rajendra Prasad himself mixes up "artha is sought" with "artha ought to be sought," a fallacy which he is at great pains to point out as allegedly committed by the Indian thinkers. It is true that artha is sought both as a means and as an end, but from this he cannot be warranted to draw the conclusion that according to Indian thinkers artha ought to be sought both as a means and as an end. In the fourfold classification of the purusarthas there are two intrinsic values, viz., kama and moksa, dealing respectively with empirical (material) and transcendental (spiritual), and there are two instrumental values, viz., artha and dharma, artha leading to kama and dharma to moksa. From this it is quite clear that artha ought to be sought only as a means to kama, and Rajendra Prasad is mistaken in holding that according to them it is to be sought as an end also. Rajendra Prasad regards this fourfold classification of human goals as logically unneat, on the ground that it is based on two principles instead of one. First, he is wrong in singling out kama for subjugation to dharma. In fact artha has also been subjugated to dharma as is testified by the Mahabharata saying, "Tato
artham dharma samyutam." Secondly, it should not be overlooked
that it is only to ensure the needed smooth and even realization of all the goals that the subsidiary principle of justified-justifier has been introduced, along with the principle of means-end, and also that the former principle is not independent of the latter. Simply because apparently two principles, neither incoherent nor independent, are resorted to does not render it logically unneat. Such a remark would have been justified had these been incoherent or independent, or had there been a better substitution based on a single principle. Rajendra Prasad discusses some possible amendments, but, as he himself admits, none of them makes any sense. And for this reason his claim that "their introduction would bring about a modification which would be greatly detrimental to the Indian theory" appears meaningless. Though Rajendra Prasad appreciates the subjugation of kama to dharma, he apprehends a possibility (which does not seem to be possible) of one and the same pleasure being approved by one moral rule and disapproved by another, or the same rule approving two different sorts of pleasures. Such a situation is possible when the moral system is ill-formed, but if it is a well-knit system with no inner contradictions these possibilities are inconceivable. The issue of the relation between morality and religion has been discussed in the paper. It should be remembered here that in India morality and religion were always considered as one coherent system and that is why their common designation, viz., dharma, was so understood as to rule out all the possibilities of conflict between morality and religion. That is why there was no need for them to search for any logical distinction between them, a distinction which did not exist in their notion of dharma. Rajendra Prasad seems to be uncharitable in accusing them of not searching the black cat in the dark, which in fact does not exist there. Rajendra Prasad raises the question of justification of dharma and fails to find any. In Indian thought, however, there is a twofaceted justification. To the question, "Why should I do what the dharma prescribes?", one facet of the answer is because it is the command of the scriptures whose authority is obligatory; and the other facet is, because it is a means to moksa, the adequacy of the means being guaranteed by the scriptures. Rajendra Prasad seems to be misled when he writes that according to Prabhakara morality is its own justification. What Prabhakara denies is only motivational justification and not any justification. Also for him morality needs
justification from scriptural authority.6 It is the scriptural authority
which has its own justification. The logicality of the introduction of the concept of moksa in the Indian theory of values has also been questioned on the ground that being a descriptive term it cannot provide justification for that which is normative. But it is wrong to take moksa as descriptive. Simply because in Indian metaphysics there exist several theories about the nature of moksa does not preclude it from being normative. No cogent reason has been put forth which can justify the ousting of this concept from the class of normative concepts. Therefore, the point that moksa cannot stand in justification of dharma holds no water. The question, "Why should I seek moksa?" has also been raised. While discussing the question, "Why should I do what the dharma prescribes?" Rajendra Prasad seems to be inclined towards the Bradleyan position that morality, being an end in itself, does not need any extraneous justification. But likewise, can it not be argued that moksa being an end in itself is self-justifying?" It has been asked why moksa should be regarded as an ultimate value. This is not merely because it is the ultimate reality but also because it alone can provide the fullest efflorescence to man's existence, his needs and aspirations. The ultimate reality is also an ultimate value, is an assumption, but it is not an unfounded one because the reality is regarded as ultimate not only in existence but also in bliss and in other respects. Rajendra Prasad denies the status of obvious truth to it, but he cannot do so without assigning any valid reason. He also indulges in an unwarranted hairsplitting over the phrase, "eternal bliss." The state of bliss is eternal by its very definition and the adjective, eternal, is quite superfluous. He cannot therefore be allowed to make any capital out of it. His counter argument, viz., "it may be that bliss is desirable because of a contrast with pain which is on the other hand undesirable; therefore, eternal bliss, because when achieved it will annihilate all pain, may no longer remain desirable," is not only vague insofar as it fails to convey any precise meaning, but it is also invalid, since the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Similarly, in arguing that honesty is superior in value to profit-making, he commits the fallacy of equivocation because the term honesty is taken in two different senses. In fact the entire controversy re6
See his commentary on the sutra 1.1.2.
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garding the superiority of moksa over dharma and reduction of it
to a sort of ethical intuitionism is misconceived since in Indian philosophy reason has never been given the task of establishing this superiority which has always been accepted on the authority of the scriptures. Of course this may open it to the charge of dogmatism, which Rajendra Prasad could have justifiably pointed out. The basic fallacy which pervades the entire paper is that a reference has nowhere been made as to whose views are being referred to or whose thesis and arguments are being examined. No advocate of the concept of moksa has argued in the way in which Rajendra Prasad has put the arguments for them. A t many places fictitious positions have been constructed, illogically explicated, and attacked in the name of logicality. S. R. BHATT. UNIVERSITYOF DELHI.