Accounting Journal

Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.
) 373402
The determinants of reserves disclosure in the extractive

industries: evidence from Australian rms
Grantley Taylora, Grant Richardsonb, Greg Towera, Phil Hancockc
a
Accounting Discipline, School of Accounting, Curtin University, Perth 6102, WA, Australia
b
Accounting Discipline, Discipline of Accounting and Information Systems, University of
Adelaide, Adelaide 5005, SA, Australia
c
Accounting Discipline, School of Accounting and Finance, University of Western Australia,
Perth 6009, WA, Australia
Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of reserves disclosure (RD) in the Australian extractive industries. Our regression results indicate that RD are positively
associated with variables relating to corporate governance, foreign listing, existence of reserves in foreign jurisdictions, pledging of reserves in debt covenants,
leverage and external (Big 4) auditor, after controlling for rm size, subindustry,
shareholder concentration and development/production stage. Additional regression testing shows that the existence of reserves in foreign jurisdictions is the
most important determinant of RD in Australia. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the extent and rationale behind the RD practices of Australian resource rms.
Key words: Mineral and petroleum reserves; Disclosure; Accounting estimates;
Accounting setting
JEL classication: M41
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00433.x
1. Introduction
The extractive mining and petroleum subindustries are of major global economic importance. A number of large diversied multinational mining and
petroleum rms, including BHP Billiton Ltd., Rio Tinto Ltd., Newcrest Mining Ltd., Woodside Energy Ltd. and Alumina Ltd., are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and other stock exchanges globally. In December
2009, the resources sector accounted for approximately 33 per cent of the
total ASX domestic market capitalisation and 44 per cent of listed rms with
Received 18 January 2011; accepted 30 June 2011 by Steven Cahan (Deputy Editor).
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G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402
in excess of 800 rms involved in exploration, development and production of

a range of metals, industrial minerals and petroleum products (ASX,
2010a,b). The resource sector is typically capital intensive and heavily reliant
on equity markets to provide the required funding for existing and new
developments.
A signicant amount of value of resource rms is derived from reserves1 that
may not necessarily be recorded on the balance sheet (Wise and Spear, 2000;
IASB, 2007c; PWC, 2007). Essentially, reserve and resource assets and associated
income are the drivers of the economic value of resource rms. In fact, reserve
assets are a key driver in determining the market value of a resource rms equity
and accounting prots (Donker et al., 2006). Thus, disclosure of reserve value
and quantity information can potentially have a substantial impact on the share
prices of resource rms and can also assist with the forecasting of earnings and
future share prices.
Reporting of reserve information is value relevant. For many resource rms
that rely on the reserves from a stand-alone operation, the risks and uncertainties
of reserves estimation and valuation data are critical to their very existence.
Reserves can represent their only signicant asset on the balance sheet. As
reserves may have a signicant inuence on the share prices of resource rms,
inadequate disclosure of this information and decient accounting regulation
could cause signicant losses to uninformed investors and can result in misleading analyst forecasts (Donker et al., 2006). This is especially relevant considering
the importance of reserves to resource rms in achieving forecast cash ows,
meeting debt covenant terms and in achieving growth forecasts. For smaller
resource rms, the continuation of these rms as a going concern is closely tied
to the successful delineation and extraction of reserves. Disclosure of reserve estimates is thus necessary for investors to make informed economic decisions about
the underlying value of resource rms.
To date, major accounting standard setting bodies, such as the Australian
Accounting Board (AASB), Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), have not developed a complete and consistent set of recognition, measurement and disclosure criteria of
accounting issues applicable to the extractive industry. Resource rms have
diverse accounting treatments in terms of the recognition of pre-production
costs, reserves and resources (e.g. historical cost, fair value or current value), the
expensing or capitalisation of exploration and evaluation costs, revenue recognition and the disclosure of reserves. Depreciation and impairment of reserves will
vary according to the categorisation of reserves as being either probable or
proven. The resulting diversity of accounting practices is evident not only
1
AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources denes economically

recoverable reserves as: the estimated quantity of product in an area of interest that can
be expected to be protably extracted, processed and sold under current and foreseeable
economic conditions (AASB, 2004a).
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between resource rms that operate in Australia but also between resource rms
that operate internationally in the major resource provinces of Canada, South
Africa and the US (IASB, 2007a).
The accounting treatment of reserves: in particular, issues about the disclosure
of reserves represent critical nancial reporting issues. Currently, there is no Australian accounting standard that mandates disclosure of reserve and resource
information in the annual report. However, there is an active IASB research project on the extractive industries presently being undertaken by the AASB. Existing reserve disclosure practices are largely discretionary in nature and are likely
to be event-driven (e.g. takeover and merger activity, and investment decisionmaking events) or activity-driven (e.g. the delineation of new reserves and variability in production schedules) (IASB, 2007c). Current reserve disclosures made
by Australian ASX listed resource rms in the annual report are undertaken in
an ad hoc manner (Wise and Spear, 2000). In fact, the Corporations Act 2001
does not require the recognition or disclosure of reserve quantities or values in
the annual report, although the ASX listing rules require rms to comply with
The Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources
and Ore Reserves (JORC).2 Considerable diversity currently exists in terms of
reserve classications (e.g. proven, probable and possible), input factors relating
to reserves (e.g. geostatistical models, assay data, royalties, discount rates,
reserve depletion and replacement data), current and expected production volumes, production costs and changes in reserves over time (Wise and Spear,
2000).
Resource rms are subject to a range of operational, production and nancial
risks3 that arise regarding the estimation of mineral and petroleum reserves. Critical accounting assumptions and estimates relating to reserve estimation have a
signicant risk of causing a material adjustment to the carrying amount of assets
and liabilities on the resource rms balance sheet, and the risk of achieving revenue forecasts and revenue transparency (Lee, 2007). Reserve estimates are imprecise and depend on statistical inferences drawn from drilling, geochemical and
geophysical data which may prove to be unreliable and are dependent on market
prices, mining, processing and inventory costs. Estimates of recoverable quantities of proven and probable reserves include assumptions about commodity
The JORC sets-out the minimum standards, recommendations and guidelines for the
public reporting in Australasia of exploration results, mineral resources and ore reserves.
The JORC and the Combined Reserves International Reporting Standards Committee
(CRIRSCO) have been working to create a set of standard international denitions for
reporting mineral resources and mineral reserves. Specically, these bodies have established principles governing transparency, materiality and competence of publicly released
information relating to disclosure of mineral resources and reserves.
Risk can be dened as any event (e.g. nancial, organisational or operational) that, if it
occurs, will have a material impact on the ability of a rm to achieve its objectives (Abraham and Cox, 2007).
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prices, exchange rates, discount rates, production and transportation costs for
future cash ows. Moreover, reserve delineation requires interpretation of geological and geophysical models to estimate the size, shape, depth and quality of
reserves and their anticipated recoveries. The economic and technical parameters
used to estimate reserves may vary from period-to-period and from operationto-operation. Changes in reported reserves can impact asset carrying amounts,
the provision for restoration, and the recognition of deferred tax assets owing to
changes in expected future cash ows. Finally, reserves are also integral to the
amount of depreciation and amortisation charged to the resource rms income
statement (IASB, 2007a).
This study evaluates reserves disclosure (RD) within the annual reports of
Australian listed mining and petroleum resource rms and in doing so addresses
the following important research questions:
1 What is the extent of reported reserve disclosures by Australian resource
rms?
2 What are the determinants of reported RD by Australian resource rms?
Reserve disclosure information is considered to be value relevant (Berry and
Wright, 2001). In fact, the AASB and IASB framework also indicates that nancial reporting should provide information that allows users to assess the
amounts, timing and uncertainty of a rms future cash inows and outows
(AASB, 2004b). To make such an assessment of a rms cash generating ability,
users need to be provided with information on the nature of reserves and
resources (IASB, 2007a).
Based on a sample of publicly listed Australian mining and petroleum rms
that have a dened mineral or petroleum reserve for the 2007 nancial reporting
year, our regression results show that RD are positively associated with variables
pertaining to corporate governance, foreign listing, existence of reserves in foreign jurisdictions, pledging of reserves in debt covenants, leverage and external
(Big 4) auditor, after controlling for rm size, subindustry, shareholder concentration and development/production stage. Our additional regression testing
indicates that the existence of reserves in foreign jurisdictions is the most important determinant of RD in Australia.
Research on the mineral and petroleum reserve accounting of rms is negligible. The original study by Craswell and Taylor (1992) examined the disclosure
levels of reserves for 98 Australian resource rms and related this to leverage,
size, cash-ow risk, auditor, shareholder concentration and proprietary costs of
disclosure. Cash-ow risk and auditor type were found to be signicantly associated with reserve disclosure in this research. Mirza and Zimmer (2001) analysed
the disclosure of reserve quantum by 150 Australian resource rms. They found
that the extent of reserve information disclosures in the annual report was a
function of the stage of the rms operations, use of project nancing and cost of
measuring reserves. They also found that managerial disclosure policies were
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considered to relate to production activities, litigation, proprietary costs and

information asymmetry.
Our study extends the previous Australian studies of Craswell and Taylor
(1992) and Mirza and Zimmer (2001) in several important ways. First, we examine the propensity of Australian listed resource rms to disclose reserve information using a comprehensive index of 75 items. Previous studies (see, e.g. Mirza
and Zimmer, 2001) relied heavily on a single variable (e.g. quantity of reserves
disclosed) as the dependent variable which may not fully capture the complete
range of information on reserves4 that could be considered as value relevant or
useful to stakeholders. Indeed, a comprehensive index of reserve disclosure information has not previously been examined in the literature.
Our reserve disclosure index comprises information relating to reserve characteristics, including categorisation as proven or probable, valuation inputs used to
calculate reserve quantity and grade, historical performance factors (e.g. capitalised pre-production costs, past production and operating costs,), future performance factors (e.g. production schedules, reserve replacement ratios), reserve
risks (e.g. reliability or precision of reserve estimates, reserve reporting changes,
reserve accounting attributes), regulation compliance (e.g. the existence of a
competent persons statement and a statement of JORC compliance) and corporate governance factors pertaining to reserve reporting. Provision of such
information by resource rms in the annual report is informative to stakeholders
as such information has a direct impact on the rms nancial statements, including the recognition of signicant assets to these entities and the current and
future ability of these rms to derive cash ows from reserve production (ASX,
2007, 2009).
Second, we also analyse whether variables concerning the strength of governance structure, existence of reserves internationally and pledging of reserve
assets in debt covenants are signicant determinants of reserve disclosure practices. These variables are critical to any investigation of reserve disclosure practices which have not been considered in previous studies. For instance, strength
of corporate governance structure (CGS) is important as it provides the framework for internal control and risk management which has a direct impact on
reserve reporting for resource rms. In fact, the ad hoc or incomplete disclosure
of potentially valuable information about reserves may be a reection of ineective or non-existent governance tools, charters, systems and procedures. Similarly, the existence of a pledge of the rm against reserve assets in debt
covenants may have signicant explanatory power. Resource rms commonly
undertake hedging against uctuations in foreign exchange rates, interest rates,
credit risk and variability in commodity prices. To negate these risks, hedging is
mandated by nancial intermediaries of rms that borrow to develop resources,
The calculation and reporting of reserves requires an integrated set of information relating to category, grade, assumptions and production.
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expand reserves and for production. Reserve disclosures are thus closely tied-in
with the indebtedness of rms, pledging of reserve assets and monitoring by
nancial intermediaries owing to the existence of hedge contracts and loans.
Third, we also document the nature and extent of both mandatory and discretionary reserve disclosures in our study unlike in previous research (see, e.g. Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Mirza and Zimmer, 2001). ASX listed resource rms are
required to disclose information concerning reserve category and a statement of
compliance with the JORC, and details of a competent person who calculated
the reserves. Nevertheless, the bulk of information about reserves, such as revision in reserve estimates and valuation inputs and associated risks, is discretionary in nature.
Fourth, we also outline what types of reserve information could potentially be
value relevant to stakeholders which has not been adequately considered in previous literature. In fact, reserve disclosure is currently a topical issue which is
being investigated by regulatory authorities and accounting standard setters
around the world (IASB, 2007a,b,c; ASX 2009). This research is contemporaneous with recent surveys by the Australian Stock Exchange that have found that
listed resource rms have not been disclosing critical reserve information as
required under the JORC and ASX listing rules (ASX, 2009).
Finally, the results of our study are likely to be of interest to investors as they
provide a basis for assessing the nature and extent of reserve information disclosed in the annual report. Investors attempting to assess the true worth and
current and future performance of resource rms must base their judgments on
reserves and production from these reserves. While announcements of reserve
information are regularly provided on a resource rms website under the ASXs
continuous disclosure requirements, the information provided may be selective
or brief in nature and may not provide an adequate overview of the rms global
reserves, including implications of reserve upgrades or downgrades to the rms
operations and nancing position. Our results may also be potentially useful to
rm management and the board of directors because they provide guidance on
the reserve reporting process that the rm should pay careful attention to, so the
information provided to nancial intermediaries and investors is credible.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briey evaluates
current corporate reserve disclosure practices. Section 3 contains a discussion on
theory and the development of hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the research
design. Section 5 summarises and analyses the empirical results. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. Current reserve disclosure practices
Reserve values are based on various factors, including volume, grade, recovery, and economic, legal, environmental and social constraints. Because of the
unique features of reserve assets, this can lead to subjective valuation estimates
(IASB, 2007a,b,c). Presently, there are many inconsistencies in reserve and
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resource reporting disclosure practices of resource rms both in Australia and

internationally. For example, reserve disclosure practices dier by jurisdiction,
and between the mining and petroleum subindustries. Moreover, the varying
roles and responsibilities of accounting standard setters, securities regulators and
stock exchanges, which require reserve and resource disclosures, impact signicantly on existing reserve reporting practices. It is possible that consistency could
be better achieved internationally if the IASB set disclosure requirements for
reserves and resources (IASB, 2007c).
The Australian Securities Exchange reviewed the published annual reports of
800 mining rms for the 6 months to 31 March 2009 with a view of determining
whether there was compliance with the JORC (ASX, 2009). The ASX survey
found that 176 mining rms failed to disclose (or adequately disclose) a competent persons statement and 11 rms disclosed either combined reserve categories
or did not specify reserve categories whatsoever. These results are indicative
of the high degree of non-compliance with mandated disclosures required in
accordance with the JORC.
3. Theory and hypotheses development
We argue in this paper that mineral and petroleum reserve disclosures will vary
signicantly based on rm specic variables, including the strength of CGS, overseas listing status, the occurrence of reserves in overseas jurisdictions, whether
reserves have been pledged within debt covenants, the amount of leverage and
auditor type. We now consider the relevant theory concerning these various rmspecic variables and reserve disclosures and develop hypotheses thereafter.
Agency theory provides a theoretical framework for examining reserve disclosures in the annual report of listed resource rms. In fact, the extant literature
(see, e.g. Welker, 1995; Douglas, 2003; Monem, 2003; Liang, 2004; Cheng and
Wareld, 2005) employs agency theory to explain managerial disclosure decision-making. Managements disclosure decisions aect their credibility with
investors and other stakeholders (Mercer, 2005).
Many determinants of disclosure patterns within the annual report have been
driven by economic or welfare considerations (Godfrey et al., 2006). Management as self-interested agents normally have access to economic information
which is not made available to shareholders or bondholders (as principals).
Hence, they can engage in opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Determination of the level of detail of reserve information to be disclosed
requires the exercise of judgement by rm management and the board of directors. The decision to disclose information can be dependent not only on the relative importance of reserve information to the business objectives of the rm but
also on managements personal welfare considerations to disclose that information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In fact, Cheng and Wareld (2005) report that
managers with equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or
exceed analysts forecasts.
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Managerial opportunistic behaviour can be reduced through a range of

mechanisms designed to align the interests of agents to principals. For example, accounting covenants can be used to control adverse managerial investment decision-making (Douglas, 2003). Debt contracting may impact on
voluntary changes made to accounting methods (Beatty and Weber, 2003).
Compensation arrangements, auditors, audit committees and governance mechanisms are other devices that may lead to ecient contracting (Emanuel et al.,
2003).
Theoretical models explaining disclosure patterns can also be developed from
an information economics and contracting perspective (see, e.g. Akerlof, 1970;
Verrecchia, 1990, 2001; Core, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001). This broader view
of agency theory is important as additional disclosures are expected to be more
informative and valuable to capital market participants (Beekes and Brown,
2006). Additional disclosures can also mitigate information asymmetry issues
relating to adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970).
Corporate governance policies, systems, tools and charters are designed to
ensure that reserve-related risks are identied, assessed, addressed and monitored
to enable the achievement of rm objectives. An eective corporate governance
framework provides the foundation for managing the reserve reporting arrangements, capital raisings to acquire or delineate reserves and control over areas of
reserve estimates and uncertainty. Firms with an eective CGS in place are thus
expected to disclose more information about mineral and petroleum reserves.
We thus test the following hypothesis:
H1: All else being equal, there is a positive association between the strength of corporate governance structure and the extent of reserve disclosures by Australian
listed resource rms.
Dierences in the regulatory environment associated with the jurisdiction in
which the reserves are located and overseas listing status represent further potential determinants of managerial reserve disclosure practices. Firms listed on multiple stock exchanges do so to raise additional capital, and to increase their
overall business and investment prole internationally (Dhanani, 2003). Moreover, rms that have reserves in the international context may be subject to
greater regulation associated with the listing rules of each jurisdiction and reserve
disclosure rules unique to each jurisdiction, e.g., the JORC in Australia and FAS
69 Disclosures about Oil and Gas Producing Activities in the US (IASB, 2007c).
Finally, rms with multi-jurisdictional listings are likely to have more sophisticated reserve disclosure policies and procedures, and to disclose more information about reserves. We thus test the following hypothesis:
H2: All else being equal, there is a positive association between those rms that are
listed in more than one jurisdiction and the extent of reserve disclosures by
Australian listed resource rms.
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Firms with reserves in foreign jurisdictions have additional policies and procedures for complying with legal, nancial and operational requirements of the
jurisdiction in which it operates (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). These requirements
have associated risks that may provide further impetus to disclose reserve-related
information in the annual report. This is consistent with the argument by Cahan
et al. (2005) who claim that information asymmetry and agency costs arising
from global diversication of operations, raises the incentive to increase disclosure levels by rms voluntarily. We thus test the following hypothesis:
H3: All else being equal, there is a positive association between the occurrence of
reserves in jurisdictions outside of Australia and the extent of reserve disclosures by
Monitoring devices such as debt covenants are employed by security holders
(or their trustees) who estimate rm performance and commitment to meet obligations by way of measurement and analysis of accounting information (Ahmed
and Courtis, 1999). Financial institutions often require resource rms to implement sucient commodity hedging to cover repayments of project nancing with
these conditions being stipulated in debt covenants (Mirza and Zimmer, 2001;
PWC, 2005). As part of the commodity hedge arrangements, the quantum of
mineral or petroleum reserves are pledged as security against borrowings and are
thus normally stipulated within these debt covenants. To ensure credibility of
loan arrangements and to reduce uncertainty for investors, management has the
incentive to include reserve information in the annual report. Firms that have
their reserves explicitly pledged as security within debt covenants are more likely
to disclose reserve information in the annual report. We thus test the following
hypothesis:
H4: All else being equal, there is a positive association between the existence
of pledged reserves in debt covenants and the extent of reserve disclosures by
It is also possible that highly leveraged rms incur greater monitoring costs
and seek to reduce these costs by disclosing additional information in the annual
report (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watson et al., 2002). Stakeholders may also
demand more information to assess the likelihood of the rm meeting its debt
obligations. So as leverage increases, the demand for information about reserves
also increases given that stakeholders require assurance that cash ows from
exploitation of reserves are used to meet debt obligations (Craswell and Taylor,
1992). Research by Mirza and Zimmer (2001) shows that resource rms regularly
undertake project-specic nancing to delineate reserves and ultimately to derive
a cash ow from those reserves. During the course of feasibility studies and
development and production stages, a rm is likely to provide an account of
reserve information in the annual report as support for project-specic loans.
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Thus, rms that have greater debt in their capital structure are more likely to disclose information about reserves in the annual report. Increased reserve disclosures may also be necessary as debt covenants require the hedging of reserves.
Financial intermediaries that are involved in the hedging arrangement usually
monitor the net change in reserves and the derivation of cash ows from these
reserves (Malone et al., 1993). In such instances, agency theory predicts that the
benets of reserve disclosure outweigh the costs of non-disclosure. We thus test
the following hypothesis:
H5: All else being equal, there is a positive association between leverage and the
extent of reserve disclosures by Australian listed resource rms.
The external auditor is expected to assess the nature of the accounting policies
used and accounting estimates made by rm management. Auditors are also
required to assess the reasonableness of assumptions, methodologies and disclosures of accounting information, why audit adjustments have been made, managements role in the audit process and an assessment and evaluation of the
integrity of the rms annual report. An important element of nancial reporting
integrity is transparency and disclosure of information. Big 4 audit rms may
suer greater reputational damage compared to non-Big 4 audit rms if inadequate information is disclosed in a rms annual report (Chalmers and Godfrey,
2004). We expect that where a resource rm employs a Big 4 audit rm to verify
the integrity of its annual report, it is likely to disclose additional information
about reserves. Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Mirza and Zimmer (2001) both
nd that reserve disclosures and Big 6 audit rms are positively associated. Mirza
and Zimmer (2001) argue that rms with high contracting costs have an incentive to employ a Big 6 auditor to reduce the costs of debt and equity. This incentive is achieved by providing information that is perceived to be credible. It is
thus possible that resource rms that employ a Big 4 audit rm tend to disclose
more information about the accounting policies, accounting estimates and uncertainties and assumptions on reserves. We thus test the following hypothesis:
H6: All else being equal, there is a positive association between the use of a Big 4
audit rm and the extent of reserve disclosures by Australian listed resource rms.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample
Our study focuses on a sample of publicly listed Australian mining and petroleum rms that have a dened mineral or petroleum reserve for the 2007 nancial reporting year. The 2007 year was considered especially relevant within
which to assess the nature, extent and usefulness of reserve disclosures in the
annual report for several reasons. First, the Australian Securities and Investment
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Commission (ASIC) and the JORC conducted an investigation of the compliance of resource rms with the JORC to specically address rumours, assumptions, quality of reserve reporting and extent of disclosed information in the
annual report based on its own requirements for reporting and the Corporations
Act 2001. Second, the IASB in 2006 and 2007 launched a series of projects covering the denition of resources and reserves, how resources and reserves are to be
recognised and measured, and disclosure of resources and reserve information
within nancial statements (IASB, 2007a,b,c). Concurrent with these IASB projects, the US Securities and Exchange Commission drafted a concept release on
possible revisions to the disclosure requirements relating to oil and gas reserves
mandated in FASB statement No. 69. Third, IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources, issued in December 2007, does not specically address
disclosure requirements of resources and reserves. The aforementioned events
that occurred around the 2007 year show the growing realisation that current
resource and reserve disclosures are ad hoc, inconsistent globally, are not always
addressed in current accounting pronouncements, and may be non-compliant
with existing regulatory and statutory body requirements.
Our sample consists of 113 publicly listed Australian rms that represent the
entire population of publicly listed Australian mining and petroleum rms with
dened mineral and/or petroleum reserves. Firms in the sample are at dierent
stages of development and production and ranged from rms with advanced feasibility work and preliminary production to rms with well-established production from several mine sites or petroleum elds. Many rms have one or two
operations from which they are heavily reliant on cash ows, while a small number of rms (e.g. BHP Billiton Ltd., Rio Tinto Ltd. and Woodside Petroleum
Ltd.) have several diversied extractive operations internationally. Finally, all
nancial statement data used to compute our variables were manually collected
from the annual reports because the majority of this information is not readily
available from publicly available databases.
4.2. Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is represented by the extent of mineral and petroleum
RD, which is measured using the RD index (RDI). The RDI comprises 75 separate reserve disclosure items. These items include reserve categorisation and
grade, signicant assumptions, valuation inputs, historical performance, future
performance factors, reserve risks, reserve reporting changes, reserve accounting
attributes, regulation compliance and corporate governance factors pertaining to
reserve reporting and reserve recognition.5 The index was developed based on a
thorough review of the extant literature (see, e.g. Craswell and Taylor, 1992;
Teall, 1992; Spear, 1994, 1996; Berry and Wright, 2001; Mirza and Zimmer,
The 75 items used to construct the RDI are summarised in Appendix.
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2001; Donker et al., 2006), discussions undertaken by the IASB about their
reserve denition, disclosure, measurement and recognition project (see, e.g.
IASB, 2007a,b,c), and relatively recent ASX and JORC announcements about
mandatory reserve disclosure requirements under the ASX Listing Rules and the
information these rms should be disclosing under the continuous disclosure
provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (ASX, 2007, 2009). The information
required to be disclosed under the ASX Listing Rules and the JORC comprises
reserve categorisation, a competent persons statement about the calculation of
reserves and a statement of compliance with the JORC (2004). The remainder of
the information comprising the reserve disclosure index is discretionary in
nature.
For each item disclosed by a rm in its annual report, a score of 1 is assigned,
or 0 otherwise. Each item is treated equally in the scoring. In fact, previous
research indicates that both weighted and un-weighted scores provide essentially
the same results where there are a large number of items under consideration
(see, e.g. Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004). The focus of our study
is not on one particular user group per se, thus weighting of disclosure scores
was not carried out. Cooke (1989) argues that one class of user will attached different weights to an item than another class of user. The development of
weighted disclosure indices also involves subjective judgment which could signicantly (and unjustiably) alter the empirical ndings (Marston and Shrives,
1991; Beattie et al., 2004). Thereafter, we compute an RDI score by summing
together all of the information items disclosed in the annual reported divided by
the maximum number of items that could be disclosed in the annual report. The
RDI score is thus represented in our study as follows:
RDIjt
Total number of items disclosed

Maximum number of items
where: RDIjt = reserve disclosure index for rm j in year t.

The extant literature (see, e.g. Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997)
adopts several approaches to examine the narratives in the annual report. The
implicit underlying construct of interest is generally the quantity or extent of disclosure. Our study assumes that more extensive reserve information disclosures
are more informative to investors, analysts, industry and government. Items of
information that comprise the RDI are assumed to be applicable to all sample
rms. The issue of applicability of disclosure to all sample rms has been largely
overcome by focussing on those rms that belong to the extractive industry.
Accordingly, the disclosure items that make-up the disclosure index will be applicable to each of the rms in the sample. We also assume that disclosure items
are communicated in the annual report. However, this may not always be the
case because a rm can disclose information in a variety of media (e.g. ASX
announcements, interim reports, quarterly reports, media releases, announcements over the internet and analyst briengs). While the use of disclosure indices
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inevitably involves several limitations, they have proved to be a valuable research

tool in the area of corporate disclosure research (Marston and Shrives, 1991).
4.3. Independent variables
The independent variables for our study are denoted by CGS, overseas listing
of the rm (OVLIST), occurrence of reserves outside of Australia (INTRES),
reserves pledged in debt covenants (PLEDGE), rm leverage (LEV) and the
existence of a Big 4 auditor (AUDITOR).
We constructed a proxy measure for the strength of corporate governance in
resource rms. Specically, 13 corporate governance variables derived from the
ASX Councils corporate governance principles and recommendations (ASX
Corporate Governance Council, 2003, 2006, 2007)6 were used to develop a single
measure of the strength of corporate governance for each rm in our sample.
These 13 corporate governance variables include standard items, such as the
composition and structure of the board of directors, as well as items dealing with
nancial reporting integrity, nancial expertise, risk oversight and the existence
of formal governance tools (e.g. policies, procedures, committees and charters).
The 13 corporate governance variables used to construct CGS are reported in
Table 1.
A rm received a CGS score ranging from 0 to 13 depending on the number
of conditions it satised. Each corporate governance variable is treated equally
in the development of the CGS. Support for construction of the CGS using the
13 corporate governance items is provided by the corporate governance literature
(see, e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Beekes and Brown, 2006) which frequently
addressed a specic corporate governance characteristic (e.g. board of director
structure). The ASX Corporate Governance Councils recommendations provide
an authoritative and objective source for the selection of corporate governance
attributes of rms in our sample. The extant literature (e.g. Beekes and Brown,
2006) shows that better governed rms make more informed disclosures in the
annual report. In fact, the development of corporate governance constructs has
been used successfully in other studies that entail an assessment of CGS (see, e.g.
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Brown and Caylor,
2006; De Silva Rosa et al., 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2009).
The development of our CGS is facilitated by the requirement for all ASX
listed rms to address compliance with the ASXs 10 principles and 28 recommendations on corporate governance factors. The application of key ASX
principles and recommendations of eective corporate governance to develop
a corporate governance score in this study adds to the credibility of this
6
While there are 10 principles and 28 recommendations considered by the ASX Council
(2003, 2006, 2007) to represent eective corporate governance, only 13 items were selected
to construct the CGS in our study as these items are considered to be the most relevant to
the resource industry and nancial risk management disclosure practices.
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construct given that these principles and recommendations are well known to
industry, analysts, investors and accounting, nance and regulatory bodies
and are applied by each rm based on their individual circumstances with
results discussed in the annual report (ASX Corporate Governance Council,
2003, 2006, 2007).7
In terms of our other independent variables, OVLIST is measured as a dummy
variable in our study with a score of 1 is given to a rm that is listed on both the
ASX and an overseas stock exchange during the sample year, or 0 otherwise.
INTRES is measured as a dummy variable where the occurrence of reserves held
by the rm internationally is given a score of 1, or 0 otherwise.8 PLEDGE is also
measured as a dummy variable where a score of 1 is given to a rm which stipulates that reserves are pledged as security against its borrowings, or 0 otherwise.
LEV is measured as debt divided by debt plus total equity. Finally, AUDITOR
is measured as a dummy variable with a score of 1 given to a rm which employs
a Big 4 auditor, or 0 otherwise.
4.4. Control variables
We include a number of control variables in our regression model to control
for other eects. They are represented by rm size (SIZE), subindustry (SUBIND), shareholder concentration (TOP20) and development/production phase
(PROD).
SIZE is used as a proxy measure for susceptibility to political scrutiny (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). It is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Previous research (e.g. Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Watson et al., 2002) shows
that larger rms tend to disclose more information than smaller rms.
SUBIND refers to the mining vis-a`-vis petroleum subindustries and is measured as a dummy variable (equals 1 for rms engaged in mining, or 0 otherwise)
to represent operational dierences between subindustries. Previous research
(e.g. Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) shows that rms reporting disclosures are
likely to be correlated with industry classication. The reason for this is that
rms belonging to the petroleum subindustry tend to have far greater revenue
derived from exploitation of reserves and have fundamentally dierent opera-
The ASX Corporate Governance Council that devised these governance principles and
recommendations comprises representatives from 21 industry bodies, such as the Group
of 100, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia, CPA Australia, the Business
Council of Australia and the Australian Institute of Company Directors.
Information about the existence of reserves as part of foreign operations is always

emphasised by these resource rms because of the ASX continuous disclosure requirements, the additional risk imposed on operating overseas (particularly in Africa or parts
of South-East Asia), and the fact that these rms may be subject to additional reporting
requirements. For some rms, their only reserve base and operation is located in an overseas jurisdiction.
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387
Table 1
Corporate governance items that comprise the corporate governance score (CGS)
Item no.
Description of the corporate governance items
CG1
CG2
CG3
CG4
CG5
Is chairman of the board an independent director?

Are the roles of the chairman and chief executive ocer performed by dierent persons?
Is the board of directors largely (>70%) made up of independent directors?
Does the nomination committee have a policy for the appointment of directors?
Has the board adopted a formal code of conduct that deals with personal behaviour of
directors and key executives relating to insider trading, condentiality, conicts of
interest and making use of corporate opportunities (property, information, position)?
Does the rm have a formal plan, policy or procedures in respect of equity (shares and
options) based remuneration paid to directors and key executives?
Does the rm have a remuneration policy that outlines the link between remuneration
paid to directors and key executives and corporate performance?
Does the audit committee have at least one member that has nancial expertise (i.e. is a
qualied accountant or other nancial professional with experience of nancial and
accounting matters)?
Has the board adopted a formal integrated risk management policy that deals with risk
oversight and management and internal control?
Has the CEO/CFO stated that the rms risk management, internal compliance and
control systems are operating eectively and eciently?
Does the rm have an audit committee charter?
Does the rm have a formal written continuous disclosure policy?
Does the rm have a nance committee, charter or policy?
CG6
CG7
CG8
CG9
CG10
CG11
CG12
CG13
tions to that in the mining subindustry. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) observe
that disclosure incentives of rms operating in the oil and gas or mining sectors
can be conicting, so no sign prediction is made for SUBIND.
TOP20 refers to the percentage of ordinary share capital held by a resource
rms top 20 shareholders at the end of the nancial year. Previous research (e.g.
Malone et al., 1993; Shailer, 2004) claims that dispersed shareholder ownership
results in increased scrutiny of managerial decision-making processes, thereby
protecting the interests of shareholders and bondholders, which leads to
enhanced disclosures (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Malone et al., 1993; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The predicted sign for TOP20 is positive.
PROD refers to the stage (i.e. development or production) of a rms
reserve lifecycle. This variable is controlled for given that rms in the development or feasibility stage have less certainty about reserve estimates as compared to rms that are in the production phase (Mirza and Zimmer, 2001).
The reason for this is that rms in the production phase are able to reconcile
between reserve estimates and grade, recovery and volume data derived from
production. PROD is measured as a dummy variable where a score of 1 is
given to a rm that is engaged in production or 0 otherwise. We expect
PROD to have a positive sign.
2011 The Authors
388
4.5. Base regression model

To test the association between the dependent variable (RDI) and independent
variables (CGS, OVLIST, INTRES, PLEDGE, LEV and AUDITOR), the
following base ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is estimated:
RDIjt a0 b1 CGSjt b2 OVLISTjt b3 INTRESjt b4 PLEDGEjt
b5 LEVjt b6 AUDITORjt b7 SIZEjt b8 SUBINDjt
b9 TOP20jt b10 PRODjt jt
where: RDIjt = reserve disclosure index for rm j in year t; CGSjt = CGS score
for rm j in year t; OVLISTjt = 1 if rm j is listed on the ASX and at least one
overseas exchange in year t, 0 otherwise; INTRESjt = 1 if rm j has reserves
located in jurisdictions outside of Australia in year t, 0 otherwise; PLEDGEjt = 1 if rm j has reserves pledged in debt covenant in year t, 0 otherwise;
LEVjt = debt divided by debt plus total equity for rm j in year t; AUDITORjt = 1 if rm j uses a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise; SIZEjt = natural
log of total assets for rm j in year t; and SUBINDjt = 1 if rm j is engaged in
mining in year t, 0 otherwise; TOP20jt = percentage of ordinary share capital
held by rm js top 20 shareholders in year t; PRODjt = 1 if rm j is engaged
in production activities in year t, 0 otherwise; and ejt = error term for rm j in
year t.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (RDI), independent variables (CGS, OVLIST, INTRES, PLEDGE, LEV and AUDITOR)
and control variables (SIZE, SUBIND, TOP20 and PROD). For the dependent
variable, RDI has a mean (median) of 37.805 per cent (38.667 per cent) and a
range from 6.667 per cent to 78.667 per cent. These data show acceptable diversity of disclosure of reserve information. The proximity of mean and median values of RDI is indicative that normality conditions hold for our dependent
variable.
As mentioned previously, the RDI comprises 10 subcategories of information
relating to reserve categorisation, valuation inputs, historical and future performance factors, risks, changes in reported reserves, reserve accounting attributes,
regulation, codes and governance and reserve recognition in the nancial statements. The percentage disclosure of each of these subcategories is presented in
Table 3. Disclosure of a competent persons statement about reserve calculation
and a statement of compliance with the JORC are disclosed approximately 70.39
per cent of the time. This information is required to be disclosed in accordance
2011 The Authors
389
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
RDI
CGS
OVLIST
INTRES
PLEDGE
LEV
AUDITOR
SIZE
SUBIND
TOP20
PROD
Mean
Median
SD
Minimum
Maximum
37.805
68.550
0.327
0.398
0.212
0.360
0.708
19.173
0.743
65.435
0.778
38.667
69.231
0
0
0
0.339
1
19.069
1
66.890
1
15.802
19.081
0.471
0.492
0.411
0.248
0.456
1.723
0.438
18.438
0.417
6.667
0.000
0
0
0
0
0
15.752
0
13.610
0
78.667
100.000
1
1
1
1.364
1
24.787
1
97.460
1
Variable denitions: RDI = reserve disclosure index; CGS = corporate governance score; OVLIST = 1 if rm j is listed on the ASX and at least one overseas exchange in year t, 0 otherwise; INTRES = 1 if rm j has reserves located in jurisdictions outside of Australia in year t, 0 otherwise;
PLEDGE = 1 if rm j has reserves pledged in debt covenant in year t, 0 otherwise; LEV = debt
divided by debt plus total equity; AUDITOR = 1 if rm j uses a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise;
SIZE = the natural log of total assets for the rm; SUBIND = 1 if rm j is engaged in mining in
year t, 0 otherwise; TOP20 = the percentage of ordinary shareholding in the rm held by the top 20
shareholders at the end of the nancial year and PROD = 1 if rm j is engaged in production activities in year t, 0 otherwise. N = 113 for all variables.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of reserve disclosure subcategories
Reserve information subcategory
Mean disclosure (%)
% of RDI
(a) Reserve quantication

(b) Valuation inputs
(c) Historical performance
(d) Future performance
(e) Risks
(f) Reserve quantum changes
(g) Accounting attributes
(h) Regulation and codes
(i) Governance issues
(j) Reserve recognition
Total
43.927
41.316
55.757
29.276
21.754
43.750
50.478
70.395
18.750
48.684
37.625
16.455
6.239
10.126
15.189
18.987
5.06
13.924
2.531
10.126
1.265
100.000
Disclosure of information relating to categories (a) and (h) is mandatory under the JORC and ASX
Listing Rules, while the remaining categories of information that comprise the reserve disclosure
index are discretionary. N = 113 for all variables.
with the ASX listing rules. However, we note that there are still a signicant
proportion of resource rms that have not complied with these regulations.
Reserve quantication, reserve recognition, historical performance and reserve
2011 The Authors
390
accounting attributes are moderately disclosed with percentage disclosure in the

order of 4356 per cent. Far less information is provided in the annual report
about future performance factors, reserve risks and governance issues for our
sample rms.
5.2. Correlation results
The Pearson pairwise correlation results are presented in Table 4. Signicant
correlations (with predicted signs) are found between RDI and CGS, RDI and
OVLIST, RDI and INTRES, RDI and LEV, RDI and AUDITOR, RDI and
SIZE and RDI and PROD. However, we nd no signicant correlations between
RDI and SUBIND, RDI and PLEDGE and RDI and TOP20. Additionally,
Table 4 also indicates that only moderate levels of collinearity exist between the
explanatory variables used in this study. Finally, we also compute variance ination factors (VIFs) when estimating our base OLS regression model to test for
signs of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. We nd that no
VIFs exceed ve, so multicollinearity is not problematic in our study (see, e.g.
Lind et al., 2004).
5.3. Regression results
Table 5 reports the coecient estimates and t-statistics of the base OLS regression model that consider the determinants of reserve disclosure of rms in the
Australian extractive industry. We winsorise RDI at the 1 per cent level prior to
including it in the regression model to control for potential outliers. Finally, we
correct standard errors in our regression model using the White (1980) procedure.
In terms of the signicance of the regression coecients for the independent
variables, we nd that CGS has a signicant positive association with RDI
(p < 0.05), providing support for H1. This nding shows that resource rms
with strong CGSs have more extensive processes and systems in place as a catalyst to eectively manage the reporting of their reserve positions. This is reected
as enhanced reserve disclosures. Our result should be of particular interest to regulatory bodies such as the ASX and ASIC as it clearly shows an association
between eective governance structures and the extent of RD for Australian
resource rms. This association also provides evidence on the role of corporate
governance in diminishing agency-related conicts between managers and shareholders. We also observe that OVLIST has a signicant positive association with
RDI (p < 0.10), as expected. This nding provides support for H2. It appears
that the multiple listing of rms has a positive impact on the extent of disclosure
of reserves by resource rms. We also nd that INTRES has a signicant positive association with RDI (p < 0.01), which provides support for H3, indicating
that rms having reserves in other countries have a positive impact on reserve
disclosures. For PLEDGE, it has a signicant positive association with RDI
2011 The Authors
2011 The Authors

1.000
0.524***
0.321**
0.405***
0.226*
0.283*
0.423***
0.496***
)0.121
0.065
0.491***
1.000
0.262**
0.271**
0.124
0.316**
0.395***
0.581***
)0.103
0.147
0.404***
CGS
1.000
0.318**
)0.040
)0.026
0.199
0.357**
)0.022
0.026
0.281*
OVLIST
1.000
0.020
0.002
0.284*
0.320**
)0.060
0.141
0.129
INTRES
1.000
0.225*
0.048
0.128
)0.042
0.085
0.225*
PLEDGE
1.000
0.182
0.286*
0.002
0.158
0.317**
LEV
1.000
0.327**
)0.021
0.110
0.408***
AUDITOR
1.000
)0.110
0.307**
0.351**
SIZE
1.000
0.193
)0.216*
SUBIND
1.000
)0.095
TOP20
1.000
PROD
Variable denitions: RDI = reserve disclosure index; CGS = corporate governance score; OVLIST = 1 if rm j is listed on the ASX and at least one overseas exchange in year t, 0 otherwise; INTRES = 1 if rm j has reserves located in jurisdictions outside of Australia in year t, 0 otherwise; PLEDGE = 1 if
rm j has reserves pledged in debt covenant in year t, 0 otherwise; LEV = debt divided by debt plus total equity; AUDITOR = 1 if rm j uses a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise; SIZE = the natural log of total assets for the rm; SUBIND = 1 if rm j is engaged in mining in year t, 0 otherwise;
TOP20 = the percentage of ordinary shareholding in the rm held by the top 20 shareholders at the end of the nancial year; and PROD = 1 if rm j is
engaged in production activities in year t, 0 otherwise. N = 113 for all variables. *, **, *** Signicance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The
p-values are one-tailed for the directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise.
RDI
CGS
OVLIST
INTRES
PLEDGE
LEV
AUDITOR
SIZE
SUBIND
TOP20
PROD
RDI
Table 4
Pearson correlation results

391
392
Table 5
Base ordinary least squares regression model results
Intercept
CGS
OVLIST
INTRES
PLEDGE
LEV
AUDITOR
SIZE
SUBIND
TOP20
PROD
Adjusted R2
F-value
N
Predicted sign
Coecient
t-Statistic
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
+
+
)12.841
0.154
2.566
7.467
4.486
0.988
5.769
1.404
)0.743
)0.091
7.816
)0.890
2.132**
1.318*
2.924***
1.727**
1.672**
2.078**
1.573**
)0.548
)1.132
2.063**
0.442
9.882***
113
Variable denitions: RDI = reserve disclosure index; CGS = corporate governance score; OVLIST = 1 if rm j is listed on the ASX and at least one overseas exchange in year t, 0 otherwise; INTRES = 1 if rm j has reserves located in jurisdictions outside of Australia in year t, 0 otherwise;
PLEDGE = 1 if rm j has reserves pledged in debt covenant in year t, 0 otherwise; LEV = debt
divided by debt plus total equity; AUDITOR = 1 if rm j uses a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise;
SIZE = the natural log of total assets for the rm; SUBIND = 1 if rm j is engaged in mining in
year t, 0 otherwise; TOP20 = the percentage of ordinary shareholding in the rm held by the top 20
shareholders at the end of the nancial year; and PROD = 1 if rm j is engaged in production activities in year t, 0 otherwise. *, **, *** Signicance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The
p-values are one-tailed for the directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise.
(p < 0.05), as predicted. This nding provides support for H4 and shows that
rms which have stipulated that reserves are pledged as security against borrowings disclose more reserve information. We also observe that LEV has a signicant positive association with RDI (p < 0.05), as expected. This nding
supports H5 and indicates that rms that have proportionately higher amount of
debt in their capital structure disclose more reserve information. For AUDITOR, it has a signicant positive association with RDI (p < 0.05) as predicted,
thus providing support for H6. The existence of a Big 4 audit rm has a positive
impact on reserve disclosures. Finally, for our control variables, we nd that the
regression coecient for both SIZE and PROD has a signicant positive association with RDI (p < 0.05). However, the regression coecients for SUBIND and
TOP20 are not signicant.
Overall, our regression results indicate that rms with strong CGSs, multiple stock exchange listings, the occurrence of reserves located outside of
Australia, reserves pledged in debt covenants, greater debt in their capital
structures, and Big 4 audit engagement have more extensive RD in the annual
report.
2011 The Authors
393
5.4. Robustness checks

We perform several robustness checks to evaluate the reliability of the regression results reported in Table 5. First, we dropped all of the control variables
from the base regression model and obtain similar results for CGS, OVLIST,
INTRES, PLEDGE, LEV and AUDITOR in terms of sign and statistical signicance. Second, we entered the control variables consecutively into the base
regression model, and our statistical results remain unchanged. Overall, the
regression coecients for CGS, OVLIST, INTRES, PLEDGE, LEV and AUDITOR are stable and statistically signicant in our additional regression models.
Third, we computed the Hausman specication test when estimating our regression model to test for signs of endogeneity for the independent variables (see,
e.g. Hausman, 1978; Greene, 2008). The Hausman specication test results are
not signicant for the independent variables (p > 0.99), so endogeneity is not
problematic in our study. Finally, we perform a robustness check to control for
the inuence of potential outliers in the explanatory variables. We winsorise all
variables that are more than four standard deviations from their respective
means and re-run our regression model. The regression results remain
unchanged, so our ndings are not aected by outliers. Taken as a whole, the
results reported in Table 5 are reliable.
5.5. Additional analysis
We also developed several additional OLS regression models to test the association between the various subindices of reserve disclosure items (Appendix) and
the independent variables. Specically, the subindices consist of (i) reserve quantication; (ii) reserve valuation inputs; (iii) reserve historical performance; (iv)
reserve future performance; (v) reserve risks; (vi) reserve accounting; (vii) compliance; (viii) changes in reserve volume and grade and (ix) reserve governance
information. Each subindex has a dierent number of disclosure items.9 The
rationale for testing the association between the eight subindices (dependent variables) and the independent variables is to determine whether these associations
are consistent with the base regression model results presented in Table 5, and
also to determine which of the independent variables are the most important in
terms of RD in the annual report.
Table 6 reports the OLS regression results (coecient estimates and t-statistics in parentheses) that investigate the association between the subindices of
reserve disclosure items and the independent variables. These additional regression results show that they are consistent with the base regression model
results reported in Table 5 above. Furthermore, we also nd that INTRES is
For example, the reserve valuation disclosure subindices contain ve valuation inputs
normally used in constructing valuation models of mineral and petroleum reserves.
2011 The Authors
Intercept
CGS
OVLIST
INTRES
PLEDGE
LEV
AUDITOR
SIZE
SUBIND
TOP20
PROD
Variable
)32.410
()1.349)
0.371
(2.869)***
1.465
(0.321)
2.409
(0.566)
5.518
(1.151)
)11.032
()1.292)
1.122
(0.233)
2.495
(1.666)**
0.554
(0.123)
)0.046
()0.406)
10.007
(1.736)**
(C)
Reserve
historical
performance
)14.453
)22.144
()0.403)
()0.886)
0.427
0.189
(2.217)**
(1.409)*
)2.036
2.101
()0.299)
(0.443)
12.378
12.250
(1.949)*
(2.675)***
3.963
10.888
(0.554)
(2.183)***
13.831
4.914
(1.086)
(0.553)
8.116
13.597
(1.129)
(2.713)***
0.668
1.660
(0.299)
(1.066)
5.765
3.293
(0.857)
(0.702)
)0.195
)0.038
()1.145)
()0.317)
9.379
13.613
(1.091)
(2.271)***
(B)
(A)
Reserve
valuation
Predicted Reserve
sign
quantication inputs
Table 6
Ordinary least squares regression results for additional models
0.195
(0.010)
0.018
(0.178)
3.571
(1.010)
5.286
(1.599)**
9.348
(2.513)**
6.036
(0.911)
5.699
(1.524)*
1.338
(1.151)
)5.513
()1.576)
)0.044
()0.499)
)3.099
()0.683)
)14.380
()0.858)
0.094
(1.041)
7.531
(2.370)***
10.314
(3.474)***
0.132
(0.040)
11.558
(1.942)**
0.805
(0.240)
0.899
(0.861)
)0.504
()0.160)
)0.019
()0.236)
0.964
(0.240)
(D)
Reserve
(E)
future
Reserve
performance risk
(G)
Reserve
compliance
(H)
Reserve
changes
(I)
Reserve
governance
attributes
25.237
)20.481
)52.654
)19.777
(1.206)
()0.439)
()1.436)
()1.101)
)0.022
0.487
0.339
0.052
()0.199)
(1.942)**
(1.721)**
(0.540)
2.121
)8.725
0.112
0.283
(0.543)
()0.986)
(0.016)
(0.083)
6.412
6.395
12.943
4.498
(1.729)**
(0.774)
(1.992)**
(1.356)**
1.576
)0.196
3.242
2.742
(0.377)
()0.021)
(0.443)
(0.765)
12.648
)2.020
)0.609
)1.645
(1.701)** ()0.122)
()0.047)
()0.258)
5.413
)1.728
)0.931
2.188
(1.290)*
()0.185)
()0.127)
(0.607)
0.761
0.600
3.140
1.682
(0.583)
(0.206)
(1.374)*
(1.502)*
)2.660
39.582
)11.749
)2.406
()0.677)
(4.523)*** ()1.708)*
()0.714)
)0.002
0.100
)0.129
)0.103
()0.023)
(0.450)
()0.743)
()1.205)
12.468
14.112
20.397
10.705
(2.484)**
(1.262)*
(2.320)***
(2.485)**
(F)
Reserve
accounting
attributes
394
2011 The Authors

2011 The Authors

Predicted
sign
0.196
3.736***
4.922***
(B)
Reserve
valuation
inputs
0.259
(A)
Reserve
quantication
9.019***
0.417
(C)
Reserve
historical
performance
3.418**
0.235
(D)
Reserve
future
performance
5.583***
0.290
(E)
Reserve
risk
4.128***
0.218
(F)
Reserve
accounting
attributes
3.101***
0.158
(G)
Reserve
compliance
5.176***
0.271
(H)
Reserve
changes
3.096***
0.157
(I)
Reserve
governance
attributes
Variable denitions: RDI = reserve disclosure index; CGS = corporate governance score; OVLIST = 1 if rm j is listed on the ASX and at least one overseas exchange in year t, 0 otherwise; INTRES = 1 if rm j has reserves located in jurisdictions outside of Australia in year t, 0 otherwise; PLEDGE = 1 if
rm j has reserves pledged in debt covenant in year t, 0 otherwise; LEV = debt divided by debt plus total equity; AUDITOR = 1 if rm j uses a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise; SIZE = the natural log of total assets for the rm; SUBIND = 1 if rm j is engaged in mining in year t, 0 otherwise;
TOP20 = the percentage of ordinary shareholding in the rm held by the top 20 shareholders at the end of the nancial year; and PROD = 1 if rm j is
engaged in production activities in year t, 0 otherwise. Coecients with t-values in parentheses are shown. N = 113 for all variables. Panel A and panel G
information is mandatory under the JORC and the ASX Listing Rules. The other categories of information are discretionary. *, **, *** Signicance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The p-values are one-tailed for the directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise.
Adjusted
R2
F-value
Variable
Table 6 (continued)

395
396
consistently associated with more extensive discretionary RDs (Panels B, C, D,

E, F, G and I in Table 6), irrespective of the particular subindices of reserve
information being considered. This possibly reects increased regulatory pressure and/or reputation pressure to disclose this type of information by
resource rms in the annual report. CGS is consistently associated with the
extent of mandatory reserve disclosures as reected by reserve categorisation
(Panel A in Table 6) and compliance subindices (Panel G in Table 6). The
strength of CGS provides the framework for adhering to statutory requirements for disclosing this information in accordance with the ASX Listing
Rules and the JORC. Furthermore, CGS is an important determinant of specic discretionary disclosures (e.g. reserve valuation inputs and historical performance). LEV is also an important determinant of reserve valuation inputs,
historical performance, reserve risks, reserve accounting disclosures and reserve
governance factors. It is possible that the strength of corporate governance
and the rms indebtedness are key drivers of disclosure. We nd that AUDITOR is associated with the reserve disclosure subindices (Panels B, C, D, F
and H in Table 6). However, PLEDGE is associated only with the historical
and future performance subindices. It appears that these forms of monitoring
are important in contributing to enhanced disclosures of forward-looking
information about reserves in the annual report. Finally, we observe that OVLIST is associated with only one of the disclosure subindices (i.e. reserve risk),
indicating that overseas listings are not an important driver of reserve disclosures.
6. Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of RD in the extractive industries based
on a sample of publicly listed Australian resource rms. Our regression results
show that RDs are positively associated with variables pertaining to the strength
of corporate governance, foreign listing, existence of reserves in foreign jurisdictions, pledging of reserves in debt covenants, leverage, external (Big 4) auditor,
after controlling for rm size, subindustry, shareholder concentration and development/production phase.
Although it is a requirement to disclose specied information on reserves
under the JORC (e.g. category and grade), this information may not always be
disclosed by resource rms in practice (ASX, 2007, 2009). The disclosure of both
proved and probable reserve disclosures is a requirement under the JORC and
provides useful information about the condence that the rm has in those
reserves and is thus a potential reection of the condence in future cash ows
of the rm. Spear (1994) notes that if rms disaggregated changes in quantity of
reserves into proven and probable components, this conveys additional information to the market that is signicant in inuencing returns. Indeed, Donker et al.
(2006) observe that disclosure of both proven and probable reserves is signicant
in explaining abnormal returns of petroleum rms.
2011 The Authors
397
Disclosure of reserve valuation models and valuation inputs and associated

assumptions is relevant and would assist with the calculation and validation of
reported reserve volumes by sophisticated users. Reconciliation of reported
reserve volumes between the current year and preceding year, including an explanation of additions to or depletion of reserve volumes, assists in validating
reported reserve volumes. Provision of information about reserve replacement is
important in ensuring continuity of cash ows (Spear, 1996). In fact, Berry and
Wright (2001) nd that provision of additional reserve disclosures conveys information about a resource rms eort and ability to discover reserves, and that
these factors are signicant in explaining the market value of full cost rms.
Finally, there could be diering opinion about the extent to which accounting
standard setters should require disclosure of reserve information in the annual
report. The IASB is likely to be exposed to these diering opinions when they
seek responses and reactions to the exposure draft on accounting for the extractive industries. The extent and pace of change in the mining and petroleum
industry, and recent public and regulatory concern that industry practice is misaligned with critical reporting requirements is likely to lead to considerable revision in reserve reporting in the near future.
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2011 The Authors

Appendix
Reserve disclosure index items
Reserve quantication
1. Provides denition of reserves
2. Discussion of importance of reserves to entity
3. Nature of Reserves i.e. probable, proven, degree of condence
4. Level of disaggregation: mine or eld
5. Reserve quantity
6. Reserve grade/units
7. In-ground contained mineral or petroleum equivalent
8. Statistical method/model to measure reserves
9. Geological/geophysical model
10. Valuation method
11. Valuation Model
12. Statement of assumptions concerning reserves
Valuation inputs
13. Valuation inputs: commodity or selling prices
14. Valuation inputs: discount/interest rates
15. Valuation inputs: exchange rates/foreign exchange translation
16. Valuation inputs: taxation
17. Valuation inputs: royalty
Historical performance
18. Production costs
19. Capital and operating costs
20. Capitalised pre-production costs
21. Production volume
22. Production grade
23. Recovery
24. Additions to reserves through purchase, new discovery
25. Depletion or dilution of reserves
Future performance
26. Production schedules/growth of reserves
27. Start-up dates
28. Development costs
29. Investment decision analysis
30. Forward projections reserve calculations
31. Reserves replacement ratio
32. Reserve replacement cost
33. Project maturity/mine or eld life
34. Expected future cash ows
35. Sale agreements of mine/eld output
36. Future production costs
37. Announcement dates and events relating to reserves
Risks
38. Uncertainties in estimates
39. Reliability/precision of estimates
40. Independent valuations
41. Hedging of reserves or not
42. Sensitivity tests/estimates
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402
Appendix continued
43. Discussion of reserves risks
44. Quantify risks
45. Measurement problems with reserves
46. Reconciliations between production and reserves
47. Economic risks
48. Environmental risks
49. Political & social risks
50. Legal risks
51. Geological/metallurgical risks
Reserve quantum changes
52. Reserves quantum change from period to period
53. Production quantum change from period to period
54. Reserves % change from period to period
55. Production % change from period to period
Accounting attributes
56. General accounting policy
57. Discussion of impairment
58. Timing of impairment
59. Quantity of impairment
60. Provision for restoration
61. Deferred tax/income tax expenses
62. Depreciation/amortisation
63. Carrying amount of reserves
64. Discussion of recoverable amount of reserves
65. Expected prot (or revenue)/unit of reserve
Regulation/codes
66. Competent personnel
67. Statement of compliance/codes
Governance issues
68. Reserves committee or meeting concerning reserves?
69. Evaluation of reserve reporting process
70. Separate reserves section within annual report?
71. Separate production section in annual report?
72. Discussion that reserve, cost or production reports produced separately to annual report
73. Reference to management accountability re reserves
74. Policies/procedures for reserve estimation
Reserve recognition
75. Recognition in nancial statements
2011 The Authors


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Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.

The determinants of reserves disclosure in the extractive

G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402

in excess of 800 rms involved in exploration, development and production of

AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources denes economically

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G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402

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considered to relate to production activities, litigation, proprietary costs and

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G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402

resource reporting disclosure practices of resource rms both in Australia and

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Managerial opportunistic behaviour can be reduced through a range of

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The 75 items used to construct the RDI are summarised in Appendix.

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G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402

Total number of items disclosed

where: RDIjt = reserve disclosure index for rm j in year t.

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inevitably involves several limitations, they have proved to be a valuable research

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Information about the existence of reserves as part of foreign operations is always

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G. Taylor et al./Accounting and Finance 52 (2012 Suppl.) 373402

Description of the corporate governance items

Is chairman of the board an independent director?

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4.5. Base regression model

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Mean disclosure (%)

(a) Reserve quantication

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accounting attributes are moderately disclosed with percentage disclosure in the

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5.4. Robustness checks

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consistently associated with more extensive discretionary RDs (Panels B, C, D,

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Disclosure of reserve valuation models and valuation inputs and associated

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ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2006, Analysis of corporate governance practice

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Shailer, G. E. P., 2004, An Introduction to Corporate Governance in Australia (Pearson

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