[2016] 1 LNS 310

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: S-05-22-01/2013]
BETWEEN
BASAH BAKHTIAR @ JOHAN

... APPELLANT

AND
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

... RESPONDENT

(In the Matter of High Court of Sabah & Sarawak at Sandakan

Criminal Trial No: SDK-45-07-2010)
Between
Public Prosecutor
And
Basah Bakhtiar @ Johan

CORAM:
ROHANA YUSUF, JCA
IDRUS HARUN, JCA
ZAMANI A RAHIM, JCA

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JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]

Basah bin Bakhtiar @ Johan, the appellant, was charged in the High

Court at Sandakan, Sabah with the murder of one Hung Wai Tong,
(the deceased) on 30.9.2009, at about 12.10 am at a roadside at
Kampung Pukat, Bandar Nam Tung, Sandakan, an offence under
section 302 of the Penal Code. The charge reads as follows:
The Charge
That you, 30th day of September 2009, at about 12.10 am, at a roadside,
Kampung Pukat, Bandar Nam Tung, in the District of Sandakan, in the
State of Sabah did commit murder by causing the death of one Hung Wai
Tong, I/C No. 580714-12-5619 and that you have thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 302 of the Penal Code.

The Prosecutions Case

[2]

On 30.9.2009 at about midnight, Roslinda binti Tahir (PW5) and

the deceased closed the Hsiang Garden coffee shop where both of them
were working. When PW5 was about to leave the coffee shop, the
appellant approached her. The appellant requested for a lift to a place
called Tanah Merah. PW5 and the appellant entered the car. PW5 took
the front passenger seat, next to the deceased. The deceased was the
driver of the car. The appellant took the back seat, behind the deceased.
The deceased drove the car towards Tanah Merah.

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While in the car, the appellant changed his mind twice. He did not

wish to get down from the car at a place called Pappillion and also at the
first roundabout. At the request of the appellant, the car was driven to
the second roundabout. Before reaching it, the appellant informed the
deceased and PW5 that he wanted to get down the car. The deceased
then slowed down the car to stop. At this juncture, the appellant
suddenly grabbed the deceaseds face with his left hand from behind the
drivers seat. The deceased was struggling to liberate himself. The
deceased used both of his hands to free himself, so much so that he had to
release his grip on the steering wheel of the car.
[4]

On seeing this, PW5 had repeatedly hit the appellants hand

angrily so that he would release his grip on the deceaseds face. At the
same time, she yelled and cursed the appellant. In response, the
deceased asked PW5 to run away from the car.
[5]

The car finally crashed into the bushes at the left side of the road.

The appellant released his grip on the deceaseds face. The appellant
threatened PW5 not to tell anyone of the incident, otherwise her family
could suffer the same fate as the deceased. PW5 then asked the
appellant Kenapa kau buat kami begini, apa salah kami? The
appellant did not reply. He remained silence. PW5 cried for help. The
deceased had leaned towards her. She noticed the deceaseds neck
was bleeding. PW5 hugged the deceased and pleaded him to wake up,
but no response.
[6]

The appellant alighted from the car. He rushed towards PW5s

door via the rear of the car. He attempted to open the door of the car.

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She locked the doors of the car from inside. The appellant could not
open the door. She screamed for help. The appellant fled from the car.
[7]

PW5 came out of the car and cried for help. A motorcyclist and his

pillion rider, Constable Mohammad Firdaus bin Usop (PW6) passed by.
PW6 noticed the crashed car and a man was running away from the said
car. PW6 identified the appellant as the escapee at an identification
parade. PW6 met PW5 who informed him that the man (appellant) who
ran away had stabbed her boyfriend (the deceased). PW6 then
informed the police station of the accident (car crashed). In the
meantime, PW5 received the call from the appellant who warned her not
to tell anyone, otherwise her child would be killed. She was scared.
[8]

The investigating officer (I.O), ASP Mohd Naeem (PW8) was

notified of the case. He visited the scene where preliminary

investigation was conducted. The deceased body was removed to the
Duchess of Kent Hospital, Sandakan. PW5 was also taken to the police
station where a police report was lodged vide Sandakan Report No.
12330/09, exhibit P8.
[9]

On 2.10.2009, a post-mortem was conducted on the deceased

body by Dr. Jessie Hin @ Jessie Dorey Hin Chen Chen, (PW7). A postmortem report was issued as exhibit P10. On external examination of
the deceaseds body, PW7 found the following injuries:
(1)

A very superficial incised wound measuring about 1.4 cm

orientated transversely on the right side of the neck;

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(2)

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A very superficial incised wound measuring about 1 cm

orientated transversely on the lower right side of the neck;

(3)

A stab wound measuring about 11 x 2.5 cm orientated

sagittally on the medial aspect of the right shoulder (near the
right side of the neck). The margins were irregular. The
posterior end of the wound was sharply cut. The anterior half
of the wound was directed to the left and upward cutting the
underlying neck muscles. The right carotid artery and the
right jugular vein were completely cut. The posterior part of
the wound was directed to the back cutting muscle. The
average depth of the wound was 6 cm. The wound was
associated with soft tissue haematoma.

(4)

An L-shaped superficial incised wound on the right

shoulder. The long limb measured about 1 cm and the short
limb measured 0.5 cm;

(5)

Multiple abrasions and bruise measuring an area of about 2 x

1 cm on the lateral aspect of the right shoulder.

[10] PW7 had confirmed that the cause of death was due to excessive
loss of blood due to the cut on the right carotid artery and the right
jugular vein caused by the stab wound on the medial aspect of the right
shoulder. PW7 also concluded that the stab wound was the only fatal
injury. The conjunctivae of the deceased eyes and the internal organs
were pale indicating loss of blood.

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[11] PW7 further explained that the stab wound was fatal and there
was no chance of survival. PW7 opined that the injuries suffered by the
deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
[12] As part of police investigation, an identification parade was
conducted by Insp. Yau Wai Peng, PW4. PW5 had identified the
appellant as the person who had murdered the deceased, whilst PW6
had identified the appellant as the person who had run away from the
the scene of crime. At any rate, PW5 and PW6 had identified the
appellant in court in the course of giving evidence in the trial. This is
known as dock identification.
Findings Of The Trial Judge At The Close Of The Prosecutions
Case
(1)

The deceased was one Basah bin Bakhtiar @ Johan. The

deceased body was identified by PW5 and PW8 before the
post-mortem was conducted by PW7. The cause of death
was due to loss of excessive blood from the stab wound
inflicted by the appellant;

(2)

The death of the deceased was caused by the appellant.

This was narrated by PW5 who witnessed the incident in the
car. When the car crashed into the bushes, the appellant ran
away from the car. The appellant was accosted by PW6 who
talked to him. PW6 too could identify the appellant in the
identification parade conducted by PW4;

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(3)

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PW5 had known the appellant as Johan about 3 months

before the incident. And PW6 could identify the appellant as
he was talking to him and he could see his face clearly;

(4)

Initially PW5 said that certain parts of his police report, in

exhibit P8 was not true because she was scared of the
appellant who threatened to murder her and her family, if she
disclosed the incident to anyone. The appellant was at large
then. When the appellant was arrested, on her own volition,
PW5 told the true story to the police. The trial court found
her

explanation

was

reasonable

and

accepted

her

explanation;
(5)

Hence on a maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by

the prosecution at the close of its case, the trial judge found
that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing a prima
facie case against the appellant as charged. His defence was
called.

Defence Case
[13] The appellant testified on oath. He came from Zamboanga, the
Phillipines. He was a married man with 3 children - a daughter aged 18
years, two sons aged 12 years and 6 years respectively. He came from
a poor family. He was a farmer.
[14] The appellant and his family moved to Sandakan illegally. At first
they lived at Batu 16 and a year later they moved to Bandar Leila. This
was in 1997. He was a fishmonger in Sandakan market. He obtained

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the fish supply from the boat daily at about 2.00 am and sold the fish at
Sandakan market until 4.00 pm.
[15] He went to bed at about 10.00 pm daily as he had to wake up at
about 2.00 am to go and buy the fish.
[16] The appellant did not know PW5. He had only seen PW5 once.
He had no intimate relationship with PW5.
[17] The appellant could not remember his whereabouts on 30.9.2009
at about 12.10 am (the time stated in the charge). Normally he was
asleep at about 12.10 am. At about 2.00 am, he woke up and went to
buy fish.
[18] He denied that he was at the scene of the crime on 30.9.2009.
[19] The appellants second witness was his wife, Nasira Abdullah
Sakilan, DW2. She worked as an operator at a factory, Inovwood Sdn
Bhd. She could not remember her whereabouts on 30.9.2009 between
12.00 midnight to 2.00 am.
[20] DW2 was a hopeless witness for the defence. In examination-inchief, DW2 was asked and she answered as follows:
Q1258

I put to you that you are lying in court today. Do you

agree?

Setuju

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Q1259

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:

I put to you that you are protecting your husband today.

Do you agree?

Setuju

[21] In re-examination, DW2 answered as follows:

Q126

Kamu tadi dicadangkan kamu berbohong di Mahkamah.

Kamu setuju kamu berbohong di Mahkamah. Boleh kamu
tolong jelaskan?

Saya tidak boleh jelaskan. Saya tidak faham masalah ini.

Q1261

Kamu kata kamu setuju melindungi suami kamu dan boleh

kamu jelaskan kenapa kamu kata kamu melindungi suami
kamu?

Kan dia suami saya.

Q1262

Kamu fahamkah apa itu melindungi dalam kontek ini?

Saya faham, saya melindungi dia.

[22] The third witness called by the defence was Zaidi bin Sudin, DW3.
On the night of the murder, DW3 was riding a motorcycle with Firdaus.
At Karamunting petrol station, DW3 took over from Firdaus as the rider
of the motorcycle. DW3 noticed a male was running. He then lost sight
of him. He could not identify him.
Findings Of The Trial Judge At The Conclusion Of The Trial
(1)

It would appear that the appellant had put up a defence of

alibi. The appellant had not filed the notice of alibi under

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section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) within

the stipulated time;
(2)

The evidence of the appellant that he could not remember

his whereabouts at the time of the murder and that he could
not be outside his house was not supported by the evidence
of DW2 and DW3. The appellant assertion was a mere
denial and an afterthought;

(3)

Though DW3 could not identify the appellant, the appellant

was however positively identified by PW5 and PW6. At all
material times, the appellant was proved to be present at the
scene of crime;

(4)

The trial judge found the evidence of the appellant, DW2 and
DW3 had not cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecutions
case. The prosecution, therefore, had proved its case
against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He was
found guilty, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.

The Appeal
[23] Learned counsel for the appellant had advanced two issues before
us. Firstly, the credibility of PW5 was questionable as there was a
serious discrepancy between her evidence in court and her police report
ie, Sandakan Report No. 12330/09, exhibit P8.
[24] Secondly, the identity of the appellant as the murderer of the
deceased was not satisfactory. The identification evidence by PW6 that

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the appellant was the person absconding from the scene of the murder
was doubtful. Thus, learned counsel invited us to discharge and acquit
the appellant of the charge.
Our Decision
[25] The prosecutions case is solely dependent on one eye witness,
PW5 who witnessed the murder of the deceased by the appellant. PW5
was said to be unreliable witness. This was untrue. PW5 had
extensively narrated the events on the night in question which was
reproduced by the trial judge in his judgment at paragraphs 6 to 10 at pp
221-224 of the Appeal Record, Vol. 1.
[26] However, PW5 readily admitted that there was a discrepancy
between her evidence in court and the contents in her police report,
exhibit P8. In court, PW5 said that the appellant was all the time with
her and the deceased, when they left the Hsiang Garden coffee shop.
However, in exhibit P8, PW5 reported that Apabila kereta kami
sampai di kawasan depan UMW Toyota, seorang lelaki Melayu
umur dalam lingkungan 40an telah menahan kereta kami.
[27] In his examination-in-chief at p.68 of Appeal Record, Vol. 1, PW5
conceded that she lied when she lodged exhibit P8. The reason being
that she was in fear when the appellant threatened to harm her and her
child. PW5 said saya takut Johan ataupun Basah bin Bakhtiar
membunuh anak saya.
[28] It was in evidence that the appellant had threatened her twice.
The first time he threatened her in the car, right after the murder when

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the appellant uttered the words Kalau kau tunjuk aku, aku bunuh
juga keluarga kau macam ini. PW5 was threatened by the appellant
the second time when the latter called on her handphone and said
Jangan kau cakap saya yang buat, jangan kau tunjuk aku, kalau
tidak anak mu aku bunuh.
[29] Because of the threats alluded above, PW5 was too scared to tell
that the appellant was in her company in the car from the Hsiang Garden
coffee shop. That was why PW5 stated in her police report, in exhibit P8
that they gave a lift to a Malay man who stopped their car in front of
UMW Toyota.
[30] Be that as it may, the rest of her report was true. PW5s fear,
however, had disappeared when the appellant was arrested. Having
learned that the appellant was captured, PW5 informed PW8 that part of
her police report, exhibit P8 as alluded in paragraph 26 above was a lie.
PW5 voluntarily informed PW8 without any prompting. She had
succintly explained to the court the discrepancy between her testimony
in court and her police report, exhibit P8. The explanation was accepted
by the trial judge.
[31] As regards the blood stain of the deceased which was not found
on PW5s clothing, the evidence disclosed as follows. She sat on the
front passenger seat on the left of the deceased (driver). The appellant
was grabbing the deceaseds face. The deceased struggled. Then the
deceaseds tilted onto her right shoulder. The deceased was injured and
bleeding on the right side of his neck. She hugged the deceased. Her
clothing was stained with the blood. While on the way to the police

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station, PW5 stopped at her house. She changed to a new clothing.

The blood stained clothing was surrendered to the police.
[32] In cross examination, learned counsel attempted to impeach the
credibility of PW5 but failed. She was found to be a credible witness by
the trial judge. In paragraph 30 of his judgment at p 232 of the Appeal
Record, Vol. 1, the trial judge found as follows:
[30] The evidence given by PW5 and her demeanour when she gave
her evidence showed that she is a truthful in her evidence. Hence, I find
that that PW5 is a credible witness and I accept her testimony.

[33] It is trite law that the appellate court is slow to disturb the finding of
credibility of a witness, as the trial judge in this case, because His
Lordship had an audio visual advantage of seeing and hearing the
witness, that is, PW5.
[34] The next issue advanced by the defence was the evidence of
identification of the appellant. PW5 testified that it was the appellant
who killed the deceased in the car. The identification of the appellant in
the identification parade as the killer was satisfactory. Again PW5
identified the appellant in the course of the trial by way of a dock
identification. It would appear that the identification of the appellant in
the identification parade was superfluous as the appellant was familiar
and recognised by PW5. PW5 had known the appellant for 3 months
prior to the murder of the deceased. PW5 knew the appellant as
Johan.

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[35] As regards PW6, he was a police constable attached at Balai Polis

Sandakan. PW6 had identified the appellant in the identification parade
as the man whom he had met and subsequently fled from the scene of
the murder. PW6 also identified the appellant in the dock when he
testified in court. The trial judge at paragraph 25 p.230 of the Appeal
Record, Vol. 1 had evaluated the evidence of PW6 and found as follows:
PW6 testified that he can identify the accused as he had the opportunity
to look at his face while he asked him about the accident that he thought,
had occurred. PW6 had seen the accuseds face clearly at the night of
the incident, he identified the accused at the said identification parade and
had also identified the accused in the court. Hence, there is strong
evidence that the accused was the assailant that had caused the injury to
the deceased which had caused his death.

[36] However, learned counsel had submitted that the trial judge ought
to be prudent with the identification evidence of PW6. His Lordship
ought to test PW6s identification evidence with prudence and accepted it
only when it was so highly probable that its truth can safely be accepted.
The test excludes from its orbit blind faith of a true believer, because
prudence and credulity do not go together: per Raja Azlan Shah J (as
his Majesty then was) in K.S. Roberts v. PP [1970] 2 MLJ 137.
Moreover an honest witness may make mistake on identity.
[37] On the issue of identification, it is pertinent at this stage to refer to
the case of Arumugam Muthusamy v. PP [1998] 3 CLJ 592 where two
questions of identification evidence were brought to the Federal Court
under reference. The facts are these. The applicant was convicted for
theft of a motorcar and was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment. In
convicting the applicant, the trial Magistrate had relied, inter alia, on the

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evidence of PW1 and PW2 who identified the applicant from the dock.
The trial Magistrate was of the view that the dock identification evidence
was sufficient. The trial Magistrate did not warn herself of an
uncorroborated evidence of identity as postulated in R v. Turnbull
guidelines, thus occasioned a clear miscarriage of justice. The trial
Magistrates finding and conviction was affirmed by the High Court.
Following this, two questions of identification evidence were raised in the
reference to the Federal Court as follows:
(1)

Whether dock identification in court after a long lapse of time

without holding an identification parade can be a sufficient basis
for a conviction (Question 1); and

(2)

Whether in a case dependent solely on dock identification the

failure by a magistrate to direct himself with regard to the visual
evidence of identification in accordance with the established
guidelines in R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 All ER 549 resulting in a
conviction based on uncorroborated evidence of identity being
quashed would constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice
(Question 2).

[38] The question, as framed in Question 1 was lacking in precision or

essential facts for a definite answer. The facts such as the length of time
lapse before identification, the circumstances under which the witness
has seen the accused, the distance between him and the accused, the
quality of lighting, how long the witness sees the accused, any
conversation between them and whether the witness has known or seen
the accused before the incident etc.

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[39] A dock identification of the accused for the first time in court at the
trial is undesirable. It is a good practice to hold an identification parade.
To require identification parade in all circumstances is too stringent.
[40] Therefore, the answer to Question 1 depends on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case.
[41] As regard Question 2, the presence of the words whether,
resulting in a conviction, being quashed, would constitute a
substantial miscarriage of justice, the answer is clearly that such a
conviction would not constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice.
[42] In this case, as found by the trial judge, PW6 had seen the
appellants face clearly on the night of the incident. He identified the
appellant at the identification parade and at the trial in court. The crime
was perpetrated by the road side in the midnight on 30.9.2009 at
Kampung Pukat, Jalan Pasir Puteh. The scene of crime was bright from
street light. PW6 had accosted the appellant. Both of them stopped. He
talked with the appellant for about one minute. He asked the appellant
what had happened. However, the appellant did not reply. He remained
silent. PW6 did not see the appellant in a splitting glance under pressing
circumstances or his view of the appellant was blocked. This is not the
evidence of visual identification as envisaged in the R v. Turnbull.
Therefore, the R v. Turnbull guidelines do not apply.
[43] The appellant was arrested a mere two days after the murder
which occurred on 2.10.2009. Then he was detained in the lockup at
Balai Polis Sandakan. Before PW6 identified the appellant in
identification parade, he was on duty as a lockup sentry at all material

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times. The lockup sentry was stationed in the charge room where a list
was posted in the said room. The list contained among others, the name
of the detainees, the sections of the law under which the detainees were
detained, their police report numbers and the names of the investigating
officer (I.O). PW6 knew that the appellant was arrested and detained in
the said lockup. PW6, too, knew that ASP Naaem was the I.O of the
appellants case.
[44] The identification parade was held on 7.10.2009, that is, 5 days
after the appellants arrest. At the risk of repetition, PW6 identified the
appellant. It was not a long lapse of time after the murder. The
appellants face was still fresh in PW6s mind. It is pertinent to reproduce
the relevant questions and answers relating to this issue during an
examination-in-chief of PW6. This is found in p.115 of the Appeal
Record, Vol. 1 as follows:
Q686 :

Adakah kamu berpeluang melihat tertuduh sebelum kamu

melakukan kawad cam pada hari pengecaman?

Ya

Q687 :

Dimana kamu lihat dia?

Semasa di tahan di lock up

Q688 :

Bagaimana kamu boleh melihat beliau di lock up?

Saya melihat semasa saya masuk kerja (on duty)

sebagai pengawal lock up.

Q689 :

Pengecaman yang kamu lakukan sewaktu kawad cam

terhadap tertuduh, adakah ianya kerana kamu

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berpeluang melihat beliau sewaktu di lock up ataupun
sewaktu kamu melihat di Jalan Pasir Puteh?

Kedua-dua, semasa di Pasir Puteh dan sewaktu

bertugas di lock up.

[45] As can be seen from the answer to Q689 in bold above, PW6 was
able to identify the appellant on both occasions firstly, at the scene of
the crime at Jalan Pasir Puteh and secondly, while on duty at the lockup
where the appellant was detained. The identification of the appellant by
PW6 in the identity parade was good, satisfactory and safe to rely upon.
Having sight of the appellant in the lockup by PW6, it was not a pre-plan,
a collusion or deliberate. PW6 saw him in the lockup due to the
exigencies of his duty as a lockup sentry. He further identified the
appellant in court which corroborated his identification of the appellant
in the identification parade.
[46] The ability of PW6 to identify the appellant as the man who ran
away from the scene of the murder soon after the murder, coupled with
the evidence of PW5 who positively identified the appellant as the man
who stabbed the deceased, had satisfactorily proved the identity of the
appellant as the murderer beyond any reasonable doubt. We see no
cogent reasons to interfere with the decision of the trial judge on this
issue.
[47] Further, PW5s evidence that the appellant was the assailant was
supported by the evidence of PW6. When PW6 met PW5 at the scene of
crime, PW5 straight away told PW6 that the person who ran away was the
man who stabbed her boyfriend (the deceased). In this respect, the
supportive evidence of PW6 lend credence to PW5s evidence. PW6

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firmly disagreed with learned counsel who put to him in cross

examination that PW5 did not inform him that the escapee was the man
who stabbed her boyfriend (the deceased). The relevant cross
examination of PW6 at p.121 of the Appeal Record, Vol. 1 runs as
follows:
Q736 :

Setujukah saya katakan kepada kamu bahawa wanita di

tempat kejadian (ie, PW5) tidak ada bagi tahu kamu yang
lelaki berlari dari tempat kejadian yang menikam teman lelaki
dia. Setuju?

Saya tidak setuju.

[48] To put the other way, PW6 agreed that PW5 had informed him at
the scene of crime that the man who ran away from the scene had
stabbed her boyfriend (the deceased). Thus, the credibility of PW5
implicating the appellant was fortified by the evidence of PW6.
[49] The contemporaneous conduct of the appellant who ran away after
stabbing the deceased was relevant and admissible by virtue of section 8
of the Evidence Act 1950. We are aware that in a number of cases it has
been said that absconding from the scene is not in itself evidence of
guilt. The editors of Sarkars Law of Evidence (15 th Ed) have this to
say:
Mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion
of guilty mind. The act is a relevant piece of evidence to be considered
along with other evidence but its value would depend upon the
circumstances of each case.

[50] In this case, the appellants conduct of absconding from the scene
was not the sole evidence indicating his guilt. There are other

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admissible evidence against the appellant as discussed above. Even the

distressed condition of PW5 amounted to corroboration: see R v.
Redpath [1962] 46 Cr. App. R 319. PW5 had cried for help after the
appellant stabbed the deceased and he ran away.
[51] The appellant had advanced an alibi defence. But no alibi notice
under section 402A of CPC was given: see Vasan Singh v. PP [1979] 2
CLJ 402. The appellant had called his wife, DW2 in support of his alibi
but it must be excluded for non-compliance of section 402A of CPC. At
any rate, she was a most unreliable witness. DW3 was also unhelpful to
the appellant. The appellants evidence would therefore be evidence of a
bare denial. The defence had failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the
prosecutions case. The prosecution had, therefore, proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
[52] In conclusion, having regard to the totality of the evidence, we were
of the unanimous view that the trial judge had not erred in law and fact
warranting our intervention. The appellants conviction is safe. The trial
judge decision is affirmed.
Dated: 12 MAY 2016

(ZAMANI A RAHIM)
Judge
Court of Appeal
Malaysia

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Counsel:
For the appellant - Sharatha Masyaroh John Ridwan Lincon; M/s
Lincon & Co
Advocates & Solicitors,
Lot 83A, 1 s t Floor, Block D1,
Lorong BU 8/1,
Utama Place, Bandar Utama,
Mile 6, Jalan Utara,
90000 Sandakan,
Sabah.
For the respondent - Norinna Bahadun, Deputy Public Prosecutor,
The Attorney Generals Chambers
No. 45 Persiaran Perdana,
62100 Putrajaya.
Case(s) referred to:
Vasan Singh v. PP [1979] 2 CLJ 402
KS Roberts v. PP [1970] 2 MLJ 137
Arumugam Muthusamy v. PP [1998] 3 CLJ 592
R v. Redpath [1962] 46 Cr App R 319
Legislation referred to:
Criminal Procedure Code, s. 402A
Evidence Act 1950, s. 8
Penal Code, s. 302

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