Estafa and Blg.

22; Complaint w/
laws and jurisprudence.
I wish to share a criminal complaint for Estafa and BP 22 that I prepared recently,
with focus on the legal research aspect thereof, for the information of my regular
readers, to wit:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
X x x CITY

X x x,
Complainant,
-

I.S. No. _______

versus
and

For: ESTAFA
B.P. Blg. 22.

Xxx
(Alias: x x x),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------x

COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:
1. COMPLAINANT. The complainant is x x x, of legal age, married, Filipino and,
for purposes of this criminal complaint, with postal address at:
Xxx
2. RESPPONDENT. The respondent is x x x, aka, of legal age, married,
xxx national, and with the following three (3) addresses, where summons and
notices may be served, to wit:

X x x.
3. NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. - This is a criminal complaint
for ESTAFA and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) arising from various checks issued by the respondent to the
complainant.
4. ULTIMATE FACTS.
X x x.
4.11.

For the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and reference, attached
hereto are copies of the following supporting documents, to wit:
X x x.

5. DISCUSSION.
5.1.

(a)

APPLICABLE LAWS
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa) provides any
person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned therein shall be
punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any
of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without
prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended

(b)

5.2.

5.3.

5.4.

party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the
offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The failure of
the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic
Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less
than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall
be imposed upon any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall
execute any fictitious contract.

Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not
more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud
or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter.
Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) provides:

5.4.1.

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

5.4.2.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail
to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

5.4.3.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or

persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.

5.4.4.

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paidby the drawee.

5.4.5.

It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to the
holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped in plain
language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to
pay the same:Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this
Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the
drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the
reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance
of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped
or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.

5.4.6.

5.5.

Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the
notice that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment
in full of such check, if such be the fact."
BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to be
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker,
drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the
check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the

check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the
drawee bank for that purpose.
5.5.1.

The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because
"knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The
presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment
in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing,
making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five
banking daysfrom receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to
pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment in full by the drawee of such check.

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA

5.6.

In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER,

G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of
Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Information alleged that on or about May 17, 1996 in the
Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said
accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully
funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank
Checks, all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully
well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks were
presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay the
value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned
total amount of P50,000.00.
To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner
denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private complainants favor
claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope
because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same
albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks
cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not
funded. When she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted
Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her if she will
not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her

by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the
notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is,
in 1997.
In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the crime of
estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years
of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in
the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was
merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12, 2008.
Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put forth a
single assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed in
blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to secure a
loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she
issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her
money. She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and
Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her
simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not

sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of
sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. [1]
In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to
him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a
total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis would
not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the
10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by
appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to
encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already
closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was
received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had
bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action from
Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise
to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa,
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but
signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a
guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with the same incredulity as
the lower courts.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The
Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance. [2]

Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with
her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that
the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellants
assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience, the Court stated.
Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far
less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with the lower courts that appellants bare denial
cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the
trial court, appellants failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story
is fatal to her cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding
the conviction of appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the two
decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court.
LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22
5.7.

In EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, G.R. NO. 191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner
Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra)was the Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera (deceased), Jr.
was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged
in money lending activities. Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo
S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo)invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money
placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he
invested plus the interest on his investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by
LNCC to Tarcelo.
When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for
the reason account closed. Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the
payment of these checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he caused the
filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the
total amount of P925,000.00 with the MTCC in Batangas City.
After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the
charges and ordered them to respectively pay the mandated fines for each
violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency and
it furtheradjudged them civilly liable and ordered them to pay, in solidum, private
complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they signed
the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no date
of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks would be issued; the
seven checks were only among those in one or two booklets of checks they were
made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the

transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold office there. The RTC
affirmed the MTCC decision.
Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the
notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for lack of
merit.
Mitra went up to the Supreme Court on a petition for review and submitted
the issues: WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE
DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES; and
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF
DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE
LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The Court held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a
substitute for money and as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions
and obligations. The use of checks as payment allows commercial and banking
transactions to proceed without the actual handling of money, thus, doing away with
the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment is made. It permits
commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly and efficiently. But
the convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely
affect confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure
public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of
addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded
checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing checks
to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded check as an
offense not only against property but also against public order. [4] The purpose of
BP 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the offense, to
isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social
order.[5] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for at least
30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of the check or both imprisonment and
fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. Any person who makes or

draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
Mitra posited in the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate
check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must first
be proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be declared to have
committed the violation before the liability attaches to the signatories of the checks.
The Court stated that it found itself unable to agree with Mitras posture. The
third paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check
in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision recognizes the
reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its wording is
unequivocal and mandatory that the person who actually signed the corporate
check shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain
any condition, qualification or limitation.

The Court cited the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[6] where it ruled
that the accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as
treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in the
negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere
issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or in
consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this case, Mitra
signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held
liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers knowledge
that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his check.
Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates
the prima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the drawer of the
check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder of the check or makes
arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of the
notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within
those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.
Mitra alleged that there was no proper service on her of the notice of dishonor
and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This contention, the Court
said, raised a factual issue that was not proper for review. It is not the function of the
Court to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals. Our review is
limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts unless the petitioner shows
that the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances that warrant a different
disposition of the case[7] or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence,
with respect to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of
dishonor, the Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC,
the RTC and the CA.
The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon the accused,
said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the prosecution that a
demand letter was served upon the accused prevails over the denial made by the
accused. Though, having denied that there was no demand letter served on April 10,
2000, however, the prosecution positively alleged and proved that the
questioned demand letter was served upon the accused on April 10,
2000, that was at the time they were attending Court hearing before
Branch I of this Court. In fact, the prosecution had submitted a Certification
issued by the other Branch of this Court certifying the fact that the accused were
present during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With such straightforward and
categorical testimony of the witness, the Court believes that the prosecution has
achieved what was dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor
Ting and Caras evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent
to her. The Court accepts the prosecutions narrative that the accused refused to
sign the same to evidence their receipt thereof. To require the prosecution to

produce the signature of the accused on said demand letter would be imposing an
undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt acknowledgment is not and has never
been required of the prosecution either by law or jurisprudence. [emphasis supplied]
With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the
presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to cover
the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the account was already
closed.
To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the abovequoted provision, the Court said, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full
payment of the check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [8]
The Court added that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and
that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of
dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make
arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With all the above
elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP
22 imposes for its breach.[9]

6. PRAYER.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after notice
and hearing the respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG.
22 to protect/preserve the right/interest of the complainant to recover his claim
of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus exemplary damages of
P100,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00, attorneys fees of
P125,000.00 plus 5% of the recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
X x x City, October 18, 2011.

Xxx
Complainant
LTO Drivers License No.
__________________
Expiring on _________
Assisted By:
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Complainant
Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___ day of
October 2011, affiant/complainant showing his official identification document as
stated above.
Administering Assistant City Prosecutor

Annexes: A to L, supra.

[1]
[2]
[3]

Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659

(2002).
Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400,
citing People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
[4] Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986).
[5] Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253.
[6] 337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).

American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we
held an accused corporate officer free from civil liability for the corporate debt after
the lower court acquitted the accused of criminal liability under BP 22. Note that this
is a totally different case from the present case as the issue here is both criminal
and civil liability.
[7]
[8]
[9]

DEFENSES AGAINST BP 22

The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a complete defense.
Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572 [1997]), we emphasized that the full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The
absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulate of fairness require
that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under BP 22.
Justice Melo, Third Division, VICTOR TING SENG DEE and EMILY CHANAZAJAR, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 140665. November 13, 2000]

The elements of the offense under Section 1, BP Blg. 22, are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of
any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full
upon presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 23. People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305, 310 [1989].
It will be noted that BP Blg. 22 requires that the drawer of the check must have knowledge at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Under Section 2
thereof, the making, drawing and issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such

insufficiency when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check. However, the
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency does not lie when the maker or drawer pays
the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.
Justice Hermosisima, Jr., FIRST DIVISION, ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 9579697. May 2, 1997.]

Insufficiency of the Knowledge of Fund upon Issuance of the Check

Crux of the Petition
Petitioner raised as defense before the Court of Appeals her lack of actual knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks, and lack of personal notice of dishonor
to her. The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed the RTC decision, reasoning that "the
maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for
insufficiency of funds. (People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305; Nieras vs. Hon. Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, 181
SCRA 1)" 12 The Court of Appeals also stated that "her alleged lack of knowledge or intent to issue a
bum check would not exculpate her from any responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22, since the act of making
and issuing a worthless check is a malum prohibitum." 13 In the words of the Solicitor General, "(s)uch
alleged lack of knowledge is not material for petitioner's liability under B.P. Blg. 22." 14
Lack of Actual Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check upon its
presentment is an essential element of the offense. 15 There is a prima facie presumption of the
existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which
was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. It is important to stress, however, that this is not a
conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that were subsequently
dishonored merely engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds,
but it does not render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The prosecution has a duty to prove all the
elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption; petitioner, on the
other hand, has a right to rebut the prima facie presumption. 16 Therefore, if such knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held
liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22. Although the offense
charged is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not thereby excused from its responsibility or
proving beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense, one of which is knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds.
After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court finds that Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she affixed her
signature to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were issued, and even at the time

the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The scope of petitioner's duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporation's
checks; her duties were limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch. 17 Under the
organizational structure of Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was the sole
responsibility of the Treasury Department. Veronilyn Ocampo, former Treasurer of Premier, testified
thus:
xxx
Since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds,
knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the
corporation, she may not be held liable under B.P. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes such as
B.P. 22 "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant . . ." 22.
Alfredo L. Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines and Jose C.
Batausa, G.R. No. 116033, p. 19, February 26, 1997. The element of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds having been proven to be absent, petitioner is therefore entitled to an acquittal.
This position finds support in Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 23. 148 SCRA 595, March 16,
1987. where we stressed that knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the
check was an essential requisite for the offense penalized under B.P. 22. In that case, the spouses Paz
and Nestor Dingle owned a family business known as "PMD Enterprises." Nestor transacted the sale of
400 tons of silica sand to the buyer Ernesto Ang who paid for the same. Nestor failed to deliver. Thus,
he issued to Ernesto two checks, signed by him and his wife as authorized signatories for PMD
Enterprises, to represent the value of the undelivered silica sand. These checks were dishonored for
having been 'drawn against insufficient funds.' Nestor thereafter issued to Ernesto another check,
signed by him and his wife Paz, which was likewise subsequently dishonored. No payment was ever
made; hence, the spouses were charged with a violation of B.P. 22 before the trial court which found
them both guilty. Paz appealed the judgment to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which modified
the same by reducing the penalty of imprisonment to thirty days. Not satisfied, Paz filed an appeal to
this Court "insisting on her innocence" and "contending that she did not incur any criminal liability under
B.P. 22 because she had no knowledge of the dishonor of the checks issued by her husband and, for
that matter, even the transaction of her husband with Ang." The Court ruled in Dingle as follows:
"The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that petitioner be acquitted of the instant
charge because from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness Ernesto Ang, it was established that
he dealt exclusively with Nestor Dingle. Nowhere in his testimony is the name of Paz Dingle ever
mentioned in connection with the transaction and with the issuance of the check. In fact, Ang
categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle who received his two (2) letters of demand. This lends
credence to the testimony of Paz Dingle that she signed the questioned checks in blank together with
her husband without any knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor.
In the case of Florentino Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, promulgated December 8, 1986, it was held that an
essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the assailed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
the Court of Appeals) is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby rendered ACQUITTING petitioner
on reasonable doubt." 24
In rejecting the defense of herein petitioner and ruling that knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds, Respondent Court of

Appeals cited People vs. Laggui 25 and Nierras vs. Dacuycuy. 26.
181 SCRA 1, January 11,
1990.These, however, are inapplicable here. The accused in both cases issued personal not
corporate checks and did not aver lack of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or absence of personal
notice of the check's dishonor. Furthermore, in People vs. Laggui 27 the Court ruled mainly on the
adequacy of an information which alleged lack of knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued and not at the time of its presentment. On the other hand, the Court in Nierras vs.
Dacuycuy 28 held mainly that an accused may be charged under B.P. 22 and Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code for the same act of issuing a bouncing check.
The statement in the two cases that mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without funds does not
support the CA Decision. As observed earlier, there is here only a prima facie presumption which does
not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence. On the contrary, People vs. Laggui clearly spells
out as an element of the offense the fact that the drawer must have knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds in, or of credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the same in full on presentment; hence, it
even supports the petitioner's position.
Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, June 20, 1997, Per Panganiban, J.

Added to these is the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. A makers knowledge is

presumed from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds.37 [Vaca v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656.] Once proved that the maker or drawer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit, which is also an important element for the offense
to exist, he is rendered ipso facto liable.
Justice Bellosello, SECOND DIVISION, Cueme v. People, G.R. No. 133325. June 30, 2000

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a
check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified
that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within the five banking days from receipt of
the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.
Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Betty King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.

Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. Prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued.
But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving the notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an oppurtunity to satisfy
the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the court held in Lozano v. Martinez,
the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its application." [146 SCRA 324,
December 18, 1986, per Yap, CJ]. This oppurtunity, however, can be used only upon receipt of the by
the accused of a notice of dishonor. [Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, June 20, 1997,
Per Panganiban, J.]
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it

must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter,
failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment.
Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Betty King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.

Insisting on her innocence, Paz Dingle filed the instant petition contending that she did not incur any
criminal liability under BP 22 because she had no knowledge of the dishonor of the checks issued by
her husband and for that matter even the transaction of her husband with Ang.
The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that petitioner be acquitted of the instant
charge because from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness Ernesto Ang, it was established that
he dealt exclusively with Nestor Ang. Nowhere in his testimony is the name of Paz Dingle ever
mentioned in connection with the transaction and with the issuance of the check. In fact, Ang
categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle who received his two (2) letters of demand. This lends
credence to the testimony of Paz Dingle that she signed the questioned checks in blank together with
her husband without any knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor.
In the case of Florentino Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, promulgated December 18, 1986, it was held that
an essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds.
Justice Paras, SECOND DIVISION, PAZ M. DINGLE, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, G.R. No. 75243. March 16,
1987.

Lack of Adequate Notice of Dishonor

There is another equally cogent reason for the acquittal of the accused. There can be no prima facie
evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case because no notice of dishonor was
actually sent to or received by the petitioner.
The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The trial court itself
found absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina Lim Lao by the drawee bank based on the
unrebutted testimony of Ocampo "(t)hat the checks bounced when presented with the drawee bank but
she did not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim Lao as there was no need to inform them
as the corporation was in distress." 29 The Court of Appeals affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, this finding is binding on this Court. 30. Maximino Fuentes vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 109849, p. 9, February 26, 1997; citing Juan Castillo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 106472, p. 9, August 7, 1996.
Indeed, this factual matter is borne by the records. The records show that the notice of dishonor was
addressed to Premiere Financing Corporation and sent to its main office in Cubao, Quezon City.
Furthermore, the same had not been transmitted to Premier's Binondo Office where petitioner had

been holding office.

Likewise no notice of dishonor from the offended party was actually sent to or received by Petitioner
Lao.
xxx
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the prima facie
presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum
check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to
make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to
perform it the action is abated." This was also compared "to certain laws 32 See, e.g., E.O. 107, 83
O.G. No. 7, p. 576 (February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349 (November 1,
1993).allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally
possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability." 33. Nitafan, supra, pp.
121-122. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days
from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense." 34. Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, supra. The absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require
that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. 22.
In this light, the postulate of Respondent Court of Appeals that "(d)emand on the Corporation
constitutes demand on appellant (herein petitioner), 35 is erroneous. Premiere has no obligation to
forward the notice addressed to it to the employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself
incurs no criminal liability under B.P. 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under B.P.
22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor is necessary.
Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it
is petitioner, as an officer of the corporation, who is the latter's agent for purposes of receiving notices
and other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to the corporation,
which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute notice to the latter.
Epilogue
In granting this appeal, the Court is not unaware of B.P. 22's intent to inculcate public respect for and
trust in checks which, although not legal tender, are deemed convenient substitutes for currency. B.P.
22 was intended by the legislature to enhance commercial and financial transactions in the Philippines
by penalizing makers and issuers of worthless checks. The public interest behind B.P. 22 is thus clearly
palpable from its intended purpose. 36 See Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323, 339-341, December
18, 1996.
At the same time, this Court deeply cherishes and is in fact bound by duty to protect our people's
constitutional rights to due process and to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.
3737. Sections 1 and 14, Article III, Constitution. These rights must be read into any interpretation and
application of B.P. 22. Verily, the public policy to uphold civil liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights
necessarily outweighs the public policy to build confidence in the issuance of checks. The first is a
basic human right while the second is only proprietary in nature. 38. See also Philippine Blooming Mills

Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189, June 5, 1973.
Important to remember also is B.P. 22's requirements that the check issuer must know "at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank" and that he must receive
"notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Hence, B.P. 22 must not be applied in a
manner which contravenes an accused's constitutional and statutory rights.
There is also a social justice dimension in this case. Lina Lim Lao is only a minor employee who had
nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks. Why she was required by her employer
to countersign checks escapes us. Her signature is completely unnecessary for it serves no fathomable
purpose at all in protecting the employer from unauthorized disbursements. Because of the pendency
of this case Lina Lim Lao stood in jeopardy for over a decade of losing her liberty and suffering
the wrenching pain and loneliness of imprisonment, not to mention the stigma of prosecution on her
career and family life as a young mother, as well as the expenses, effort and aches in defending her
innocence. Upon the other hand, the senior official Teodulo Asprec who appears responsible for
the issuance, funding and delivery of the worthless checks has escaped criminal prosecution simply
because he could not be located by the authorities. The case against him has been archived while the
awesome prosecutory might of the government and the knuckled ire of the private complainant were all
focused on poor petitioner. Thus, this Court exhorts the prosecutors and the police authorities
concerned to exert their best to arrest and prosecute Asprec so that justice in its pristine essence can
be achieved in all fairness to the complainant, Fr. Artelijo Palijo, and the People of the Philippines. By
this Decision, the Court enjoins the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government to see that essential justice is done and the real culprit(s) duly-prosecuted and punished.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Lina Lim Lao is ACQUITTED. The Clerk of
Court is hereby ORDERED to furnish the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government with copies of this Decision. No costs.
Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, June 20, 1997, Per Panganiban, J.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a
check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified
that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within the five banking days from receipt of
the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.
Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Betty King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.

Responsibility under B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor is necessary.

In this light, the postulate of Respondent Court of Appeals that "(d)emand on the Corporation
constitutes demand on appellant (herein petitioner),"[35] is erroneous. Premiere has no obligation to
forward the notice addressed to it to the employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself
incurs no criminal liability under B.P. 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under B.P.
22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor is necessary.
Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it
is petitioner, as an officer of the corporation, who is the latter's agent for purposes of receiving notices
and other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to the corporation,
which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute notice to the latter.
Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, June 20, 1997, Per Panganiban, J.

Exercise of a statutory right to suspend payments is a valid defense against purported violations of
BP 22
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the
check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its
presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists
when the first and third elements of the offense are present.11 [Magno v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA
471, 480 (1992).] But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to
sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. 12 [People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8442, 8445.] As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." 13 [Rollo, p. 272.]But such
presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party
has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove
every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date
indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as
issued only then.14 [People v. Tongko, 290 SCRA 595 (1998).] The checks in this case were issued at
the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing
that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank
would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment.15 [TSN, December 1, 1993, pp. 914.] On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he
had P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank
was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment
of hefty bank charges each time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of
postdated checks in private respondent's possession.16 [Supra.] Said evidence contradicts the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at
the time said checks were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his
funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment. He could not
have foreseen that he would be advised by his own bank in the future, to close his account to avoid
paying the hefty banks charges that came with each "stop payment" order issued to prevent private
respondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its possession. What the prosecution has

established is the closure of petitioner's checking account. But this does not suffice to prove the second
element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of
insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to
misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every
element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal
statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the
Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the
statute.17 [Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 202-203 (1998).]
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 [Magno v. Court of
Appeals, supra.] it is difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity
of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers
under P.D. No. 957.19 ["SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists
from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for completing the same.
Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding delinquency interests with interest thereon at the legal rate."] A statute must be construed in
relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the
legislature.20 [King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730, 740 (1962); Mejia v. Balolong, 81 Phil. 497, 501
(1948).] Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of
legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.21 [Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
supra, Taada v. Cuneco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145 (1931);
People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, 130 (1922); US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90 (1910).] More so, when it
will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due
effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such
time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer.22 [Antipolo Realty Corp. v.
National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, 409, 411 (1987).] This exercise of a statutory right to
suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other
units of the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner
had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequent
dishonor of the check... without valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As
already stated, the prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22.
Here that presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating
the third element of the crime.
Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Sycip, Jr. v. CA and People [G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]

Exercise of a right of the buyer under article 23 of P.D. NO. 957 is a valid defense to the charges
against him.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised
Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law.23 ["ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary."] We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would
prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 "ART. 11. Justifying
circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
xxx
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office."] of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a
valid defense to the charges against him.
Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Sycip, Jr. v. CA and People [G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]

Exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against
the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 [Magno v. Court of
Appeals, supra.] it is difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity
of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers
under P.D. No. 957.19 ["SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists
from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for completing the same.
Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding delinquency interests with interest thereon at the legal rate."] A statute must be construed in
relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the
legislature.20 [King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730, 740 (1962); Mejia v. Balolong, 81 Phil. 497, 501
(1948).] Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of
legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21 [Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
supra, Taada v. Cuneco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145 (1931);
People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, 130 (1922); US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90 (1910).] More so, when it
will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due
effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such
time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer.22 [Antipolo Realty Corp. v.
National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, 409, 411 (1987).] This exercise of a statutory right to
suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other
units of the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner
had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequent
dishonor of the check... without valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As
already stated, the prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22.
Here that presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating
the third element of the crime.
Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Sycip, Jr. v. CA and People [G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]

Exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges
against him.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised
Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law.23 ["ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary."] We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would
prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 "ART. 11. Justifying
circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
xxx
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office."] of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a
valid defense to the charges against him.
Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Sycip, Jr. v. CA and People [G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]