et.al
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO S. MACAYA
In 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated a 34hectare lot (w/ certificate of title) to his eight (8)
children and two (2) grandchildren. Severino Manotok
who was appointed judicial guardian of his minor
children 'accepted on their behalf the aforesaid
donation. At that time, there were no tenants or other
persons occupying the said property.
In that same year, Teodoro Macaya accompanied by
Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to
Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to
live on the Balara property so that he could at the
same time guard the property and prevent the entry of
squatters and the theft of the fruits and produce of the
fruit trees planted by the owner. Manotok allowed
Macaya to stay in the property as a guard (bantay)
but imposed the conditions that at any time that the
owners of the property needed or wanted to take over
the property, Macaya and his family should vacate the
property immediately; that while he could raise
animals and plant on the property, he could do so
only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant
and raise animals on the property; and that the
owners would have no responsibility or liability for
said activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use
only three (3) hectares. These conditions, however,
were not put in writing.
On December 5, 1950, the property-owners organized
themselves into a corporation engaged primarily in
the real estate business known as the Manotok
Realty, Inc. The owners transferred the 34-hectare lot
to the corporation as part of their capital contribution
or subscription to the capital stock of the corporation.
From 1946 to 1956, Macaya did not pay, as he was
not required to pay anything to the owners or
corporation whether in cash or in kind for his
occupancy or use of the property. However, the
corporation noted that the realty taxes on the property
had increased considerably and found it very
burdensome to pay the said taxes while on the other
hand, Macaya had contributed nothing nor even
helped in the payment of the taxes. Thus, Macaya
upon the request of the owners agreed to help by
remitting ten (10) cavans of palay every year as his
contribution for the payment of the realty taxes
beginning 1957.
On June 5, 1964, the corporation requested Macaya
to increase his contribution from ten (10) cavans to
twenty (20) cavans of palay effective 1963 because
SO ORDERED.
restraining
order. DOLE
alleged
that
entered
into
[4]
Agreement
Banana
(BPPA). The
Production
BPPA
and
Purchase
provided
that
SEARBEMCO.
within
the
exclusive
dispute
DOLE
argued that:
Board
(DARAB)
has
Administrative
Order
dispute
between
DOLE
and
Subsequently,
DOLE
[12]
amended complaint,
filed
on February 2,
2001 an
THE CA RULING
On July 26, 2001, SEARBEMCO filed a special civil
action for certiorari[16] with the CA alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC for denying its motion
to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
DARAB;
[18]
likewise
disregarded
SEARBEMCOs
emphatic
juridical recourse.
bodies.
[20]
concerning
or
fixing,
agrarian dispute.
representations
of
farm-workers
persons
in
associations
negotiating,
[26]
II
parties.[29]
on agricultural
relationship
over
this
SEARBEMCO has not shown that the abovementioned indispensable elements of tenancy relations are
present between it and DOLE. It also cannot be gleaned
did not violate any of the provisions of the BPPA, since the
bananas rejected by DOLE were sold to the spouses Abujos
who are third-party buyers and are not exporters of bananas
transactions that the BPPA allows. Since the sole basis of
DOLEs complaint was SEARBEMCOs alleged violation of
the BPPA, which SEARBEMCO insists did not take place,
the complaint therefore did not state a cause of action.
Due consideration of the basic rules on lack of cause of
action as a ground for a motion to dismiss weighs against
SEARBEMCOs argument.
In applying this authoritative test, we must hypothetically
assume the truth of DOLEs allegations, and determine
whether the RTC can render a valid judgment in
accordance with its prayer.
We find the allegations in DOLEs complaint to be
sufficient basis for the judgment prayed for. Hypothetically
admitting
the
allegations
in
DOLEs
complaint
abandoned:
Appeals
Motor
Philippines
Corp.
v.
Court
of
The
Agreement
between
petitioner DMC-USA and private
respondent MMI is a contract. The
provision to submit to arbitration any
dispute arising therefrom and the
relationship of the parties is part of
that contract and is itself a contract.
As a rule, contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting
parties and produce effect as between
them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly,
only parties to the Agreement, i.e.,
petitioners DMC-USA and its
Managing Director for Export
Sales Paul E. Derby, and private
respondents
MMI
and
its
Managing Director Lily Sy are
bound by the Agreement and its
arbitration clause as they are the
only signatories thereto. Petitioners
Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and
private respondent SFI, not parties to
the Agreement and cannot even be
considered assigns or heirs of the
parties, are not bound by the
Agreement and the arbitration clause
therein. Consequently, referral to
arbitration in the State of California
pursuant to the arbitration clause and
the suspension of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the
return of the arbitral award could be
called for but only as to petitioners
DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr.,
and private respondents MMI and
Lily Sy, and not as to other parties in
this case, in accordance with the
recent case of Heirs of Augusto L.
Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty
Corporation, which superseded that
of [sic] Toyota Motor Philippines
Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
xxxx
JOSE MENDOZA
versus NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO,
respondent
[43]
Since the
Benigno
Germino,
was
the
plaintiffs
household.[8]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
plaintiffs bona
fide agricultural
lessee.
The
PARAD
appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case should have
plaintiffs
and
appropriated
the
lands
produce
for
THE CA RULING
It found that the MTC erred in transferring the case
proceedings.
[12]
THE PETITION
THE PARAD RULING
jurisdiction
Although
Narciso
averred
tenancy
as
an
OUR RULING
We deny the petition.
complaint
tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.[39]