1AC

Feral Revolution
The resolution constructs a system of biopower in our heads
repressing our self to what can be topical, whats non-vague and
whats fair; This cop stops the revolution and kills VTL
Faun 92 (Feral Faun (Wolfi Landstreicher), A mountain, 1992, The feral
revolution, the cop in our heads, Anarchist Library)
*we do not endorse ablest language

The cops in our heads will continue to suppress our rebelliousness until we learn
to take risks. I dont mean that we have to be stupidjail is not an anarchic or liberatory situation, but without risk, there is
no adventure, no life. Self-motivated activity activity that springs from our passions and
desires, not from attempts to conform to certain principles and ideals or to blend
in to any group (including anarchists)is what can create a situation of anarchy, what can open
up a world of possibilities limited only by our capabilities. To learn to freely express our passionsa skill earned only by doing itis

When we feel disgust, anger, joy, desire, sadness, love, hatred, we need to
express them. It isnt easy. More often than not, I find myself falling into the appropriate social role in situations where I
want to express something different. Ill go into a store feeling disgust for the whole process of
economic relationships, and yet politely thank the clerk for putting me through
just that process. Were I doing this consciously, as a cover for shoplifting; it
would be fun, using my wits to get what I want; but it is an ingrained social
response a cop in my head. I am improving; but I have a hell of a long way to go. Increasingly, I try to act on my
essential.

whims, my spontaneous urges without caring about what others think of me. This is a self-motivated activitythe activity that
springs from our passions and desires, from our suppressed imaginations, our unique creativity. Sure, following our subjectivity this

but never mistakes comparable to the

mistake of accepting the zombie existence that obedience to authority, morality,
rules or higher powers creates. Life without risks, without the possibility of
mistakes, is no life at all. Only by taking the risk of defying all authority and living
for ourselves will we ever live life to the full.
way, living our lives for ourselves, can lead us to make mistakes,

It is this magical spell that forces a banal, boring zombification

Faun 87 (Feral Faun (Wolfi Landstriecher), a mountain, 1987, Rants,
Essays and Polemics, The Spell, Anarchist Library)
I have had a spell cast on me, a spell to control my mind. Yet it is not this which makes
me mad, for this spell is cast on everyone. I am mad because I am aware of this spell. It is not
acceptable in this rationalist society to be aware of this spell. Even those whose work it is to
cast the spell are unaware of it. Advertisers, politicians, educators, ministers, entertainers and
militants all believe that they only communicate reality or other pleasure and so are doing good. They are not evil
magicians- they are, themselves, victims of the spell they weave. There cannot be any evil
I am mad.

magicians for the very concept of evil is part of the spell. And the source of the spell does not lie in any living being; it lies in things,
in commodities. Since commodities have never been and can never be consciously acting agents, even they cannot be called evil
magicians. they do not maliciously seek to control us. Rather, by their nature, they radiate control much as a star radiates warmth
and light (although a star, being alive, may consciously choose to radiate warmth and light for its own and other beings pleasure). e
spell radiates from commodities through human agents to all beings trying to make everything into commodities. But why does this
matter to me?

If there is really no such thing as evil, if this spell cannot be evil, then

why do I so adamantly oppose it? Very simply because it takes away my freedom,
it suppresses my desires. Where I can imagine an infinite, ecstatic beauty, this spell produces a banal, boring ugliness
and tries to convince me that this is what I really want. Why should I se le for the non-life, the merely undead existence, this spell

? The best this spell can offer anyone is power and I

dont want power. I want life, joy, ecstasy, for this is the true magic, the magic
that can make all the most beautiful things I imagine into reality . Yes, I am aware
of the spell and I reject it. Not because it is evil, but because it is banal, boring and ugly. It
makes me, and every other being so much less than we could be. Why accept the limits of this spell? Why continue the
Zombie existence? It may be all we know, but it isnt all we can imagine. And what we can imagine, we can come to
offers when I can imagine so much more

know; what we can imagine, we can create.

Enslavement to the self is worse than actual enslavement; the ability

to disobey ingrained social responses marks the highest stage of
freedom
Baudrillard 01 (Jean Baudrillard, ugly philosopher, 2001, impossible
exchange, pg. 80)
,
,
. the ability to
disobey oneself marks the highest stage of freedom. Obeying ones own will is an
even worse vice than being enslaved to ones passions. It is certainly worse than
enslavement to the will of others. And it is, indeed, those who submit themselves
mercilessly to their own decisions who fill the greater part of authoritarian ranks,
alleging sacrifice on their own part to impose even greater sacrifices on others.
Each stage of servitude is both more subtle and worse than the one which
precedes it. Involuntary servitude, the servitude of the slave, is overt violence. Voluntary
servitude is a violence consented to: a freedom to will, but not the will to be free. Last comes voluntary selfservitude or enslavement to ones own will: the individual possess the faculty to
will, but is no longer free in respect of it. He is the automatic agent of that faculty.
He is the serf to no master but himself.
To be able to disobey moral rules and laws to be able to disobey others is a mark of freedom But

Self-surveillance makes it impossible to break free from the

commodity exchange system of the debate space; we become enslaved
to work in exchange for the ballot
Negri and Guattari 90 (Antonio Negri and Felix Guattari, smarties, 1990,
communists like us, pg 7-8)
Bankrupt: the collectivest regimes have failed to realize socialist or communist ideals. Capitalism too has played fast and loose with

Forget capitalism and socialism: Instead we

have in place one vast machine, extending over the planet an enslavement of all
mankind. Every aspect of human life work, childhood, love, life, thought,
fantasy, art is deprived of dignity in this workhouse. Everyone feels only the
threat of social demise: unemployment, poverty, welfare. Work itself defaults on
its promise of developing the relations between humanity and the material
promises of liberty, equality, progress and enlightenment.

environment; now everyone works furiously, to evade evition, yet only hastening
their own expulsion from the mechanical process that work has become. Indeed work
itself as organized by capitalism or socialism has become the intersection of irrational social reproduction and amplified social
constraints. Fetters irrational social constraints are thus at the foundation of all subjective consciousness formed in the work

establishing this collective subjectivity of restriction and surveillance is

the first imperative of the capitalist work apparatus. Self-surveillance and doubt
prevent any intimations of escape, and preempt any questioning of the political,
legal or moral legitimacy of the system. No one can withdraw from this capitalist
legality of blindness and absurd goals.
process. And

Inability to break enslavement results in individuals holding life in

contempt, making it something to take revenge uponsubsumes their
impacts.
Deleuze 62 (Gilles Deleuze, has awful handwriting, 1962, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pg 108)
*edited for gendered language
As a result of the comrades type the comrade of ressentiment does not react: the comrades
reaction is endless, it is felt instead of being acted. This reaction therefore blames its object, whatever it
is, as an object on which revenge must be taken, which must be made to pay for this infinite delay.
Excitation can be beautiful and good and the comrade of ressentiment can experience it as such; it can
be less than the force of the comrade of ressentiment and the comrade can possess an abstract quantity of
forces great as that of anyone else. The comrade will none the less feel the corresponding object as a
personal offence and affront because the comrade makes the object responsible for the
comrades own powerlessness to invent anything but the trace a qualitative or typical
powerlessness. The comrade of ressentiment experiences every being and object as an
offence in exact proportion to its effect on the comrade . Beauty and goodness are, for the
comrade, necessarily as outrageous as any pain or misfortune that he experiences. One cannot get rid of
anything, one cannot get over anything, one cannot repel anything everything hurts. Comrades and
things obtrude too closely; experiences strike one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound (EH I
6 p. 320). The Comrade of ressentiment in Comradeself is a being full of pain: the sclerosis or hardening
of Comrade consciousness, the rapidity with which every excitation sets and freezes within the comrade,
the weight of the traces that invade the comrade are so many cruel sufferings. And, more deeply, the
memory of traces is full of hatred in itself and by itself . It is venomous and depreciative because it
blames the object in order to compensate for its own inability to escape from the
traces of the corresponding excitation . This is why ressentiments revenge, even when it is
realized, remains spiritual, imaginary and symbolic in principle.

It is a decision rule; must reject all violations of freedom

Petro 74 (Professor of Law @ Wake Forest University. University of Toledo Law Review
Spring 1974, page. 480)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest HemingwayI believe in only one thing: liberty.
And it is always well to bear in mind David Humes observation: It is seldom that liberty of any
kind is lost all at once. Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect
of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other
aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human
aspiration. Ask Solzhenistyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a
supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual

and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified
and resisted with undying spirit.

Solvency
Thus Isaac and I advocate a revolution focused not on power but on
absolute rejection of debate norms and charter a nomadic journey
into the unmapped and unmappable territories of wild freedom
Faun 92 (Feral Faun (Wolfi Landstreicher), crazy philosopher,1992, feral revolution, pg 1)
a revolution that can break down civilization and restore the vital energy of
untamed desire cannot be like any revolution of the past . All revolutions to date have centered
But

around power, its use and redistribution. They have not sought to eradicate the social institutions that domesticate; at best they have

revolutionaries of the past have

aimed their attacks at the centers of power seeking to overthrow it . Focused on power, they
only sought to eradicate the power relationships within those institutions. So

were blind to the insidious forces of domination that encompass our daily existence and so, when successful at overthrowing the

. To avoid this, we need to focus not on power, but

on our desire to go wild, to experience life to the full, to know intense pleasure
and wild adventure. As we attempt to realize this desire, we confront the real forces of domination, the forces that we
face every moment of every day. These forces have no single center that can be overthrown. They are a web that binds us. So
rather than trying to overthrow the powers that be, we want to undermine
domination as we confront it every day, helping the already collapsing civilization to break down more
quickly and as it falls, the centers of power will fall with it. Previous revolutionaries have only explored
the well-mapped territories of power. I want to explore and adventure in the
unmapped, and unmappable, territories of wild freedom. The revolution that can create the
world I want has to be a feral revolution. There can be no programs or organizations for feral
revolution, because wildness cannot spring from a program or organization . Wildness
powers that be, they ended up re-creating them

springs from the freeing of our instincts and desires, from the spontaneous expression of our passions. Each of us has experienced
the processes of domestication, and this experience can give us the knowledge we need to undermine civilization and transform our

. Our distrust of our own experience is probably what keeps us from rebelling
as freely and actively as wed like. Were afraid of fucking up, were afraid of our own ignorance. But this distrust
lives

and fear have been instilled in us by authority. It keeps us from really growing and learning. It makes us easy targets for any

To set up revolutionary programs is to play on this fear and

distrust, to reinforce the need to be told what to do . No attempt to go feral can be successful when
authority that is ready to fill us.

based on such programs. We need to learn to trust and act upon our own feelings and experiences, if we are ever to be free

[Do crazy performance stuff]

We have become a radical singularity that cant be defined and refuse
to be defined
Faun 87 (Feral Faun, actual mountain, 1987, Rants, Essays and
Polemics, I Am Not Human: Another Anti-Humanist Rant,
Anarchist Library)
Scientists try to convince me that I share enough in common with close to the billion of the living beings on this planet to be
classified with then as homo sapiens that is as human. I say, bullshit, I am NOT human. At one time I thought I was human and
because I thought so, was. But now I know better. What is human but a label, and what purpose does this label have? Every

label is an attempt to define, that is to order, and I reject all order . After all, if I am
labelled a human being, does this not mean I am not a bird, a wolf, a deer, a tree, a river

or a mountain? Yet there are times when I want to be all of these things. For what I want
is to be a great, wild, magickal being, a mad, erotic creature of chaos, ever-changing,
ever-dancing, beyond all definition. And god, the stupidities done in the name of humanity An infinity of wild
beings who would gladly have been our lovers have been subjugated, raped and murdered in that name. How can I, a being who
wants their love, accept for myself that name of horror? I refuse it. I am no human. I

have no essential commonality

with such armored beings as Ronald Reagan, David Rockefeller, General Westmoreland.
Let them have that name of rape and murder, of rationality which is death . Let them be
the humans. If you must name me, call me elf, faun, faerie, werewolf, lunatic; names of
beings who defy conformity, who refuse all order, who capriciously make light even of
their names. For these names symbolize free, wild beings, beings of chaotic grandeur, mad, impetuous lovers of all of life. It is
time for the human to end. Let the new beings rise up; the beings we are without armors, without
classifications sad definitions; heroic beings, strong and gentle, complete in themselves
and so free of the need to enslave, to murder to rape; beings beautiful and androgynous,
open to the magick of the cosmos, sharing love and pleasure with all beings . For this is our
true divine being, the being trapped in the armor of the label human, is the lie of
humanism, Let us free ourselves and paradise will be here now.

Our performance act triggers such a powerful response that the

debate space commits suicide
Payne, 14 (Rodger A. Payne, Professor and Chair Department of Political
Science at the University of Louisville, Visiting research fellow at Harvard's Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Stanford's Center for International
Security and Cooperation, and the Program on International Politics, Economics
and Security at the University of Chicago, 1983 NDT Winner, The Dark Knight:
Science and the National Security
State,https://www.academia.edu/7841864/The_Dark_Knight_Science_and_th
e_National_Security_State)
Despite the attention directed at various mobsters, the

primary villain of the film is the Joker. In this film, the

Joker is identified as a violent and malevolent individual who poses a threat to the mob as well
as to ordinary citizens and the government. Like politically motivated terrorists, the Joker is not driven by
simple greed. Indeed, he steals millions of dollars from organized crime and then sets it on fire
with a very public blaze. Jokers political purpose seems to be something akin to anarchy as he
aims to destroy the fiber of organized society and instill mass fear . During the film, both District Attorney
Dent and Alfred Pennyworth, Bruce Waynes butler and Batman confidante, explicitly refer to the Joker as a terrorist. The Joker
makes violent threats and uses violence in pursuit of his own agenda, even though that agenda is not
ideological per se. His actions nonetheless represent almost a textbook definition of terrorism . As with realworld terrorists, Joker hopes to provoke a level of fear that will dominate the public mood and
provoke public officials to react so brutally that their own legitimacy and authority will be
subject to challenge. The change Joker seeks requires law and order to disintegrate. One key plot point involves Joker
arranging the kidnapping of Harvey Dent and Rachel Dawes in order to force Batman to make a choice that will lead to the murder
of one or the other. The idea seems to be to make Batman abandon the one rule he never breaks not to kill anyone. At times

the tactics and tools Joker employs mirror those of real-life terrorists. Just like transnational
terrorists, Jokers acts of violence frequently threaten innocent civilians , though mass murder does not
appear to be his central aim. He typically provides warning of his planned deeds that both magnify fear and allow time for
evacuation of various high profile public places. Joker and his men commit violent crimes that are almost flamboyant by design
and like al Qaeda, Joker even has the capacity to commit several acts of terror at the same time. At one pivotal point in the film,
Joker murders the police commissioner and a judge and personally invades the penthouse home of Bruce Wayne, who is hosting a
fundraiser for Harvey Dent. In a meeting with mob bosses, Joker protects himself by revealing that he is wearing

a jacket strapped with hand grenades a makeshift suicide vest that would kill the nearby

mobsters if used. Like real terrorists, he is apparently willing to sacrifice his own life in pursuit of his larger goals.
Joker broadcasts a threatening homemade video that concludes with the execution of a man
only tangentially related to the plot. This video suggests actual recordings made by militants and
terrorists in Iraq and other conflict zones. Joker also turns a henchman into a walking bomb and detonates the
device planted inside him remotely with a cell phone call. Later, Joker distantly triggers other conventional explosives planted in
government and institutional targets. Finally, like most contemporary terrorists, the Joker employs fairly basic technologies to
exploit power asymmetries. Much of the havoc Joker creates is triggered by his application of relatively mundane and readily
available weapons his favorite weapon seems to be the knife and he often looks awkward wielding automatic weapons. Indeed,
towards the end of the film Joker even declares that he is a man of simple and cheap tastes, favoring

dynamite, gunpowder and gasoline. This contrasts starkly with the advanced military tools employed by Batman
throughout the film. Joker may be mad, but Batman is the party with access to the scientists who
provide the more technically advanced arsenal. The Jokers malevolent nature is perhaps best
described in a monologue the character delivers well into the story in a confrontation with bedridden and badly burned Harvey Dent. He begins it by comparing himself to a dog chasing cars. I wouldnt know
what to do with one if I caught it. I just do things. Im just the wrench in the plans. He concludes his speech with a call
to introduce a little anarchy. Upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos. Im an
agent of chaos. Earlier in the film, Alfred describes a similar thief he had encountered as a young man while working in
Burma. That criminal had proven particularly difficult to catch. Alfred concludes his tale by declaring that s ome men aren't
looking for anything logical, like money... they can't be bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated
with. Some men just want to watch the world burn. While Alfred is saying these lines, Jokers grotesque physical
image dominates the screen. Alfred eventually reveals that the authorities in that instance had to take a
radically destructive measure to subdue their foe they burned the forest. This echoes the famous line
7

from the Vietnam War that It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.

Vote aff
Bataille 36 (Georges Bataille, 1936, Elementary School Librarian, The Sacred
Conspiracy, The Anarchist Library, pg 1-3, accessed 9/25/16)

ourexistenceisthecondemnationofallthat
isrecognizedtoday,aninternalrequirementwantsusalsotobeimperious.Whatweareundertakingisawar.Itis
timetoabandontheworldofthecivilizedanditslight.Itistoolateto
wanttobereasonableandlearned,whichhasledtoalifewithout
attractions.Secretlyornot,itisnecessarytobecomeother,orelsecease
tobe.Theworldtowhichwehavebelongedproposesnothingtolove
outsideofeachindividualinsufficiency:itsexistenceislimitedtoits
convenience.Aworldthatcantbelovedtodeathinthesamewaya
manlovesawomanrepresentsnothingbutpersonalinterestandthe
obligationtowork.Ifitiscomparedwithworldsthathavedisappearedit
ishideousandseemsthemostfailedofallofthem.Inthosedisappearedworldsitwas
possibletoloseoneselfinecstasy,whichisimpossibleintheworldof
educatedvulgarity.Civilizationsadvantagesarecompensatedforbythe
waymenprofitbyit:menoftodayprofitbyittobecomethemost
degradedofallbeingswhohaveeverexisted.Lifealwaysoccursinatumultwithnoapparent
WEAREFEROCIOUSLYRELIGIOUS,andinsofaras

cohesion,butitonlyfindsitsgrandeurandrealityinecstasyandecstaticlove.Hewhowantstoignoreorneglectecstasyisabeingwhose
thoughthasbeenreducedtoanalysis.Existenceisnotonlyanagitatedvoid:itisadancethatforcesustodancefanatically.Theideathatdoesnt
haveasobjectadeadfragmentexistsinternallyinthesamewayasdoesaflame.Onemustbecomefirmandunshakeableenoughthatthe

Itisuselesstorespondtothosewhoare
abletobelieveinthisworldandfindtheirauthorizationinit .Iftheyspeakitis
possibletolookatthemwithouthearingthem,andevenifwelookat
them,toonlyseethatwhichexistsfarbehindthem.Wemustrefuse
boredomandliveonlyonthatwhichfascinates.Onthisroaditwouldbevainto
moveaboutandtoseektoattractthosewhohavevagueimpulses,likethoseof
passingthetime,laughing,orbecomingindividuallybizarre.Onemustadvancewithoutlookingback
andwithouttakingintoaccountthosewhodonthavethestrengthto
forgetimmediatereality.Humanlifeisdefeatedbecauseitservesasthe
headandreasonoftheuniverse.Insofarasitbecomesthatheadandreasonit
acceptsslavery.Ifitisntfree,

existencebecomesemptyorneuter,andif
itisfree,itisagame.Theearth,aslongasitonlyengenderedcataclysms,trees,andbirdswasafreeuniverse;the
fascinationwithlibertybecamedulledwhentheearthproducedabeing
whodemandednecessityasalawovertheuniverse.Manneverthelessremainedfreetono
longerrespondtoanynecessity.Heisfreetoresembleallthatisnotheintheuniverse.
HecancastasidetheideathatitisheorGodwhopreventseverything
elsefrombeingabsurd.Manescapedfromhisheadlikethecondemned
manfromhisprison.HefoundbeyondhimnotGod,whoisthe
prohibitionofcrime,butabeingwhodoesntknowprohibition.BeyondwhatI
am,Imeetabeingwhomakesmelaughbecauseheisheadless,whofills
mewithanguishbecauseheismadeofinnocenceandcrime.Heholdsaweaponof
steelinhislehand,flameslikeasacredheartinhisrighthand.Heunitesinoneeruptionbirthand
death.Heisnotaman.Butheisntagod,either

.HeisnotI,butheis
moreIthanI:hisbellyisthelabyrinthinwhichhehimselfgoesastray,
ledmeastray,andinwhichIfindmyselfbeinghe,thatis,amonster.WhatI
existenceoftheworldofcivilizationfinallyappearsuncertain.

thinkandrepresentIdidntthinkorrepresentalone.Iamwritinginasmallcoldhouseinafishingvillage;adoghasjustbarkedinthenight.My
roomisnexttothekitchenofAndreMasson,whoismovinghappilyaboutandsinging.AttheverymomentIamwritinghehasputonthe

Morethananythingelse,theovertureof
DonGiovannitieswhatisgivenmeofexistencetoachallengethat
opensuparavishmentoutsideoftheself.AtthisveryinstantIlookuponthatheadlessbeing,madeupof
phonographarecordingoftheovertureofDonGiovanni.

twoequallystrongobsessions,becomeDonGiovannisTomb.WhenafewdaysagoIwasinthiskitchenwithMasson,sittingwithaglassof

death
hadtobecomeanaffectionateandpassionatedeath,cryingouthis
hatredforaworldthatmadeweighevenondeathitsworkershand,
alreadyIcouldnolongerquestionthatthelotandtheinfinitetumultof
humanlifeareopennottothosewhoexistlikepokedouteyes,butto
thosewhoarelikeclairvoyants,carriedawaybyanupsettingdreamthat
couldnotbelongtothem.
wineinmyhandwhilehe,suddenlyimagininghisowndeathandthatofhiskin,hiseyesfixed,suffering,almostcryingoutthat

Framework

Util
Policy decisions directed at maintaining human survival through
whatever means will encourage genocide, war, and the destruction of
moral values
Callahan 73 Co-Founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy
from Harvard University (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, p 91-93)
the name of
survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the
rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist
domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense
budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs . During World War II, native JapaneseThe value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In

Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in
Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly
unjustifiable. The survival

of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of

Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most
elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival:
the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and
unarguable value. The

main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the
controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival . For Jacques Monod, in Chance and
Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of
the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from
marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts
to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus
procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose
works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced
abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these
reasons it

is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of

survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to
inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is
not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked.
Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the
hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern
is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The

potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of

wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the
need for survival is basic to comrade, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights
make much sense without the premise of a right to lifethen how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival
without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the
price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would
be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not
properly manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.

Utilitarianism disregards respect for the individual and perpetuates

societal inequality by evaluating utility as a whole
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and
the Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)

The inclusion of all sentient beings in the calculation of interests severely

undermines the force of any claim that utilitarianism is an "egalitarian" doctrine,
based in some notion of equal concern and respect for persons . But let us assume Kymlicka
can restore his thesis by insisting that it concerns, not utilitarianism as a general moral doctrine, but as a more limited thesis about
political morality. (Here I pass over the fact that none of the utilitarians he relies on to support his egalitarian interpretation

utilitarianism is not
seen as a political doctrine, to be appealed to by legislators and citizens, but a
nonpublic criterion of right that is indirectly applied [by whom is a separate issue] to assess
the nonutilitarian public political conception of justice. ) Still, let us assume it is as a doctrine of
political morality that utilitarianism treats persons, and only persons, as equals. Even in this form it cannot be
that maximizing utility is "not a goal" but a "by-product," "entirely derived from
the prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration " (CPP, p. 31) Kymlicka says, "If
construe the doctrine as purely political. The drift of modern utilitarian theory is just the other way:

utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of maximizing welfare"
(CPP, p. 35, emphases added). But how can this be? (i) What is there about the formal principle of equal consideration (or for that
matter occupying a universal point of view) which would imply that we maximize the aggregate of individuals' welfare? Why not
assume, for example, that equal consideration requires maximizing the division of welfare (strict equality, or however equal division
is to be construed); or, at least maximize the multiple (which would result in more equitable distributions than the aggregate)? Or,
why not suppose equal consideration requires equal proportionate satisfaction of each person's interests (by for example,
determining our resources and then satisfying some set percentage of each person's desires) . Or finally we might rely on some
Paretian principle: equal consideration means adopting measures making no one worse off. For reasons I shall soon discuss, each of
these rules is a better explication of equal consideration of each person's interests than is the

utilitarian aggregative

method, which in effect collapses distinctions among persons. (2) Moreover, rather than construing
individuals' "interests" as their actual (or rational) desires, and then putting them all on a par and measuring according to intensity,
why not construe their interests lexically, in terms of a hierarchy of wants, where certain interests are, to use Scanlon's terms, more
"urgent" than others, insofar as they are more basic needs? Equal consideration would then rule out satisfying less urgent interests
of the majority of people until all means have been taken to satisfy everyone's more basic needs. (3) Finally, what is there about
equal consideration, by itself, that requires maximizing anything? Why does it not require, as in David Gauthier's view, optimizing

to say
we ought to give equal consideration to everyone's interests does not, by itself,
imply much of anything about how we ought to proceed or what we ought to do. It
is a purely formal principle, which requires certain added, independent assumptions, to yield any substantive
conclusions. That (i) utilitarian procedures maximize is not a "by-product" of equal
consideration. It stems from a particular conception of rationality that is explicitly incorporated into the procedure. That
(2) individuals' interests are construed in terms of their (rational) desires or
preferences, all of which are put on a par, stems from a conception of individual
welfare or the human good: a person's good is defined subjectively , as what he wants or
would want after due reflection. Finally (3), aggregation stems from the fact that, on the classical view, a single
individual takes up everyone's desires as if they were his own, sympathetically
identifies with them, and chooses to maximize his "individual" utility. Hare, for one,
constraints on individual utility maximization? Or why does it not require sharing a distribution? The point is just that,

explicitly makes this move. Just as Rawls says of the classical view, Hare "extend[s] to society the principle of choice for one
comrade, and then, to make this extension work, conflat[es] all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial
sympathetic spectator" (TJ, p. 27). If these are independent premises incorporated into the justification of utilitarianism and its
decision procedure, then maximizing

aggregate utility cannot be a "by-product" of a

procedure that gives equal consideration to everyone's interests. Instead, it
defines what that procedure is. If anything is a by-product here, it is the appeal to
equal consideration. Utilitarians appeal to impartiality in order to extend a method of individual practical rationality so
that it may be applied to society as a whole (cf. TJ, pp. 26-27). Impartiality, combined with sympathetic identification, allows a
hypothetical observer to experience the desires of others as if they were his own, and compare alternative courses of action according

The significant fact

is that, in this procedure, appeals to equal consideration have nothing to do with
impartiality between persons. What is really being given equal consideration are
desires or experiences of the same magnitude. That these are the desires or
experiences of separate persons (or, for that matter, of some other sentient being) is simply an
to their conduciveness to a single maximand, made possible by equal consideration and sympathy.

incidental fact that has no substantive effect on utilitarian calculations. This becomes
apparent from the fact that we can more accurately describe the utilitarian principle in terms of giving, not equal consideration to
each person's interests, but instead equal consideration to equally intense interests, no matter where they occur. Nothing is lost in
this redescription, and a great deal of clarity is gained. It is in this sense that persons

enter into utilitarian

calculations only incidentally. Any mention of them can be dropped without loss of
the crucial information one needs to learn how to apply utilitarian procedures.
This indicates what is wrong with the common claim that utilitarians emphasize
procedural equality and fairness among persons, not substantive equality and
fairness in results. On the contrary, utilitarianism, rightly construed, emphasizes neither procedural nor substantive
equality among persons. Desires and experiences, not persons, are the proper objects of equal concern in utilitarian procedures.

it is
little wonder that utilitarianism can result in such substantive inequalities . What
follows is that utilitarian appeals to democracy and the democratic value of equality are
misleading. In no sense do utilitarians seek to give persons equal concern and respect.
Having in effect read persons out of the picture at the procedural end, before decisions on distributions even get underway,

Although utilitarianism claims to result in equality, its nature to only

regard people as one entity rather than a group of individuals
inherently contradicts the principle of equality
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and
the Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
To sum up, though utilitarianism incorporates equality as a property of the
justification of the principle of utility, and of the decision process through which that principle gets applied,
it does not leave any place for equality in the content of that principle. On its face, this
standard of right conduct directs that we maximize an aggregate. As a result neither equality or any other
distributive value is assigned independent significance in resulting distributions of goods. Kymlicka
claims that, because Rawls sees utilitarianism as teleological, he misdescribes the debate over distribution by ignoring that
utilitarians allow for equality of distribution too. But the

distribution debate Rawls is concerned with

is a (level 2) debate over how what is deemed good (welfare, rights, resources, etc.)
within a moral theory is to be divided among individuals . It is not a (level 3) debate over the
distribution of consideration in a procedure which decides the distribution of these goods. Nor is it a (level 1) debate over the
principles of practical reasoning that are invoked to justify the fundamental standard of distribution.

Owning oneself is a moral imperative utilitarianism imposes

interpersonal obligations to society, which destroys morality
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and
the Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
Kymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism: teleological and egalitarian. According

to Rawls's
teleological interpretation, the "fundamental goal" (LCC, p. 33) of utilitarianism is not
persons, but the goodness of states of affairs. Duty is defined by what best brings about these states of
affairs. " [M] aximizing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our
primary duty isn't to treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of
affairs" (LCC, p. 27). It is difficult to see, Kymlicka says, how this reading of utilitarianism

can be viewed as a moral theory. Morality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter
of interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each other. But to whom do
we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not to the impersonal ideal
spectator . . . for he doesn't exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs don't have
moral claims." (LCC, p. 28-29) Kymlicka says, "This form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a political
morality" (LCC, p. 29). Suppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose "fundamental principle" is "to treat people as
equals" (LCC, p. 29). On this egalitarian reading, utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual interests and desires, a
procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It's a moral theory which purports to treat people as
equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one. (LCC, p. 25)

Risks taken by the government to increase overall utility will severely

compromise the individual which will result in fatality
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
Equity has provided a limited answer to the question of acceptable risk . The traditional
doctrine of injunctions against tortious behavior holds that courts may enjoin behavior that is virtually
certain to harm an identifiable individual in the near future .'2 This body of law, however,
focuses more on avoidance of harm to specific persons than on regulation of risk.'3 It is thus inapposite to the questions of modern
technological risk, risk that is

quite unlikely to injure any identifiable individual in the

short-term, but that carries severe consequences that are certain to occur to
someone in the medium to distant future. Consider the paradigm of the Acme Chemical Company: Acme
Chemical Company is discovered to be storing chemical wastes on its land in such a way that seepage containing traces of those
wastes are entering an underground water system that serves as the sole drinking water supply for a town several miles away. One of
the chemicals has been classified as a carcinogen in laboratory experiments on mice. Although extrapolating from these results to
predictions of human carcinogencity is somewhat controversial, federal agencies routinely do so. Under one of a number of plausible
sets of assumptions, a concentration of ten parts per billion (ppb) in drinking water is estimated to increase a human's chance of
contracting cancer by one in one hundred thousand if the human is assumed to consume a normal intake over the course of twenty
years. Analyses show that the current concentration in the underground aquifer near Acme's plant is ten ppb. This case exhibits the
typical features of risky actions associated with modern technology. The

probability of risk to any individual

is relatively small while its severity is substantial, perhaps fatal. Risk is being
imposed on individuals who have not consented to it in any meaningful sense. Finally,
risk is unintentional in the sense that imposing risk on others is not an objective of Acme's plan.'4 We may assume its executives in
fact would be tremendously relieved if they could avoid the risk.

Utilitarianism promotes inequity and inherently discriminates

against minority like slavery
Odell, 04 University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., On
Consequentialist Ethics, Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)
A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity , and is
related to the kind of objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose
further that they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same
amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are going to do with
this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a decision to always follow the rule
(RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further that each of his children receive five degrees of
pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give
all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow
the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting
siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although
Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable. Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally equal. Neither

father is more or less exemplary or culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and
state it as: ' (H) Both

act and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution.

What Rawls does is to elaborate objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls,
fails to appreciate the importance of distributive justice, and that by doing so it
makes a mockery of the concept of "justice." As I pointed out when I discussed Russell's views regarding

partial goods, satisfying

the interests of a majority of a given population while at the

same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population
(as occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do
so even though the minority group may have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the
utilitarian commitment to maximize the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons."

One person can be forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the
good, or the total aggregate satisfaction, as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be
sacrificed to the Gods for the welfare of the group.

Utilitarianism destroys value to life by forcing the individual to take

risks on a cost-benefit basis in an effort to increase overall utility of
an entity, while demoralizing the individuals own system of values
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
From the individual's point of view, the balancing of costs and benefits that
utilitarianism endorses renders the status of any individual risk bearer
profoundly insecure. A risk bearer cannot determine from the kind of risk
being imposed on him whether it is impermissible or not. The identical risk may be
justified if necessary to avoid a calamity and unjustified if the product of an act of profitless carelessness, but the nature
and extent of the underlying benefits of the risky action are fre quently
unknown to the risk bearer so that he cannot know whether or not he is
being wronged. Furthermore, even when the gain that lies behind the risk is well-known, the status
of a risk bearer is insecure because individuals can justifiably be inflicted
with ever greater levels of risk in conjunction with increasing gains . Certainly,
individual risk bearers may be entitled to more protection if the risky action exposes many others to the same risk, since
the likelihood that technological risks will cause greater harm increases as more and more people experience that risk. This

that insight seems scant comfort

to an individual, for it reinforces the realization that, standing alone, he does
not count for much. A strategy of weighing gains against risks thus renders the status of any specific risk
makes the risky action less likely to be justifiable. Once again, however,

victim substantially contingent upon the claims of others, both those who may share his victim status and those who stand
to gain from the risky activity. The anxiety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun
by larger social considerations underlies what H.L.A. Hart has aptly termed the "distinctively modern criticism of

despite its famous slogan, "everyone [is] to count for

one,"59 utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary place in its
system of values. Various versions of utilitarian ism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to
utilitarianism,"58 the criticism that,

maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.60 Whatever the specific formulation, the

goal of maximizing some mea sure of utility obscures and diminishes the
status of each individual. It reduces the individual to a conduit, a reference point that registers the
appropriate "utiles," but does not count for anything independent of his monitoring function.61 It also produces
moral requirements that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximize
utility, since once the net effects of a proposal on the maximand have been
taken into account, the individual is expendable . Counting pleasure and pain equally across
individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only plea sure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals
and the trampling of the few in furtherance of the utility of the many.

status of any individual radically contingent .

In sum, utilitarianism makes the

The individual's status will be preserved only so long

as that status con tributes to increasing total utility. Otherwise, the individual can be discarded.

The only way to preserve individualism is to allow all persons to have

the right to own themselves regardless of any negative
consequentialist impacts
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
2. Liberal Theories in the "Rights" Tradition. A

second group of theories avoids the modern

criticism of utilitarianism by making the individual central . Contemporary theorists as diverse as
John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Richard Epstein, Charles Fried, and Ronald Dworkin continue a tradition variously described as the
Kantian, natural rights, or "rights"

tradition.62 They all define the requirements of justice in

terms of recognizing and preserving the essential characteristics of individuals as
free and autonomous moral agents.63 In this approach, the individual is defined
prior to articulating the terms under which that individual can be acted upon or
interacted with, and those terms are consequently specified so as to protect and
preserve what is essential to the individual. In this context, rights have been called "trumps" since they
constrain what society can do to the individual.64 These theories all aspire to
make the individual more secure than he is under utilitarianism . In the rights tradition, the
crucial criteria for assessing risks derive from the impact of those risks on risk victims, and the criteria are defined independently of
the benefits flowing from risk creation. To be plausible, such a program cannot totally prohibit risk creation, but the ostensible
advantage of this program over utilitarianism is that risk creation is circumscribed by criteria exclusively derived from
considerations of the integrity of the individual, not from any balancing or weighing process.65 The root idea is that nonconsensual
risks are violations of "individual entitlements to personal security and autonomy."66 This idea seems highly congruent with the
ideology of environmentalism expressed in our national legislation regulating technological risk. Indeed, two scholars have recently
suggested a modern rendering of Kant's categorical imperative: "All

rational persons have a right not to be

used without their consent even for the benefit of others ."67 If imposing risk amounts to using
another, this tradition seems to be the place to look to secure the status of the individual.

Predictions
Reject the negatives form of prediction; The randomness of everyday
life means you cannot predict events and the attempt at prediction
deprives VTL
Baudrillard '01 (Jean baudrillard, ugly philosopher, 2001 impossible exchange,
pg 83)
it is impossible to predict an event with mathematical certainty before it has
actually happened. God himself could not predict it, and the more He was God,
the less it would be possible' (Schnitzler). 'He who truly knows how to live
will appreciate the little surprises which always await him in the least
significant event.' In the end, Rhinehart recognizes that everyone else lives
multiple lives which are the product of chance too, even if they do not know it and
spend their lives trying to deny it. So, the establishment of a purely random
universe (if such a thing were possible) would not in the least change the world as
it currently exists. This was already the hypothesis where the virtual economy- of
free-floating capital and pure speculation- is concerned

Sequencing
Deontological principles of rights should be considered first other
interpretations are assigned no moral value if conflicting with the
principles of rights because viewing the debate from a deontological
perspective is the only way to guarantee freedom
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and
the Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
The priority of right asserts then that the reasons supplied by moral motivesprinciples of right and their institutional requirements-have absolute precedence
over all other considerations. As such, moral motives must occupy a separate dimension in practical reasoning.
Suppose then a supplementary stage of practical reasoning, where the interests and pursuits that
figure into ordinary deliberation and which define our conception of the good are
checked against principles of right and justice. At this stage of reasoning, any ends
that directly conflict with these moral principles (e.g., racist ends or the wish to
dominate others), or whose pursuit would undermine the efficacy of principles of right (e.g., desires for unlimited
accumulation of wealth whatever the consequences for others), are assigned no moral value, no matter
how intensely felt or important they may otherwise be. Being without moral value, they count for
nothing in deliberation. Consequently, their pursuit is prohibited or curtailed by the
priority given to principles of right. The priority of right then describes the hierarchical subordination in
practical deliberation of the desires, interests, and plans that define a person's rational good, to the substantive demands of
principles of right.32 Purposes and pursuits that are incompatible with these principles must be abandoned or revised. The same
idea carries through to social and political deliberations on the general good. In political deliberative procedures, the priority of right
means that desires and interests of individuals or groups that conflict with the institutional requirements of principles of right and
justice have no legitimate claim to satisfaction, no matter how intense peoples' feelings or how large the majority sharing these aims.
Constitutional restrictions on majority rule exhibit the priority of right. In democratic procedures, majorities cannot violate
constitutional rights and procedures to promote, say, the Christian religion, or any other aspect of their good that undermines
others' basic rights and opportunities. Similarly, the institutional requirements of Rawls's difference principle limit, for example,
property owners' desires for tax exemptions for capital gains, and the just savings principle limits current majorities' wishes to
deplete natural resources. These desires are curtailed in political contexts, no matter how intense or widely held, because of the
priority of principles of right over individual and general good.33 The priority of right enables Rawls to define a notion of admissible
conceptions of the good: of those desires, interests and plans of life that may legitimately be pursued for political purposes.

Only

admissible conceptions of the good establish a basis for legitimate claims in

political procedures (cf. TJ, p. 449). That certain desires and pursuits are permissible,
and political claims based on them are legitimate, while others are not,
presupposes antecedently established principles of right and justice . Racist conceptions of
the good are not politically admissible; actions done in their pursuit are either prohibited or discouraged by a just social scheme, and
they provide no basis for legitimate claims in political procedures. Excellences such as knowledge, creativity, and aesthetic
contemplation are permissible ends for individuals so long as they are pursued in accordance with the constraints of principles of
right. Suppose these perfectionist principles state intrinsic values that it is the duty of everyone to pursue. (Rawls leaves this
question open. cf. TJ, p. 328.) Still,

they cannot supply a basis for legitimate political claims

and expectations; they cannot be appealed to in political contexts to justify limiting
others' freedom, or even the coercive redistribution of income and wealth (cf. TJ, pp.
331-32). This is because of the priority of right over the good. Now return to Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka says both Rawls and
utilitarians agree on the premise of giving equal consideration to everyone's interests, and that because utilitarians afford equal
consideration, "they must recognize, rather than deny, that individuals are distinct persons with their own rightful claims. That is, in
Rawls's classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the good" (LCC, p. 26). Since "Rawls treats the right as a
spelling-out of the requirement that each person's good be given equal consideration," there is no debate between Rawls and
utilitarians over the priority of the right or the good (LCC, p. 40).

Either pay for my food or give me the ballot.

Socrates and Plato 399 BCE (Written by Plato, Source material
Socrates, they did important stuff ig, The apology pg 12)
*edited for gendered language
He assesses the penalty at death. So be it. What counter-assessment should I propose to you, b gentlemen of the
jury? Clearly it should be a penalty I deserve, and what do I deserve to suffer orto pay because I have deliberately not led a quiet life
but have neglected what occupies most people: wealth, household affairs, the position of general or public orator or the other offices,

I
did not follow that path that would have made me of no use either to you or to myself, but I went
to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I sayis the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade
the political clubs and factions that exist in the city? I thought myself too honest to survive if I occupied myself with those things.

him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that the comrade should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the
city's possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way. What do I deserve for being such a
comrade? Some good, comrades of the jury, if I must truly make an assessment accordingto my deserts, and something suitable.
What is suitable for a poor benefactor who needs leisureto exhort you? Nothing is more suitable, comrades, than
such a comrade to be fed in the Prytaneum,5 much more suitable for him than for anyone of you who has won a

for

victory at Olympiawith a pair or a team of horses. The

Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I

make yoube happy. Besides, the comrade does not need food, but I do. So if I must make a just assessment
of whatI deserve, I assess it at this: free meals in the Prytaneum. When I say this you may think, as when I spoke of appeals to pity
and entreaties, that I speak arrogantly, but that is not the case, comrades of the jury; rather it is like this: I am convinced that I never
willingly wrong anyone, but I am not convincing you of this, for we have talked together 37 but a short time. If it were the law with
us, as it is elsewhere, that a trial for life should not last onebut many days, you would be convinced, but now it is not easy to dispel
great slanders in a short time. Since I am convinced that I wrong no one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to say that I deserve some
evil and to make some such assessment against myself. What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty Meletus has assessed
against me, of which I say I do not know whetherit is good or bad? Am I then to choose in preference to this something that I know
very well to bean evil and assess the penalty at that? Imprisonment? Why should I live in prison, always subjectedto the ruling
magistrates the Eleven? A fine, and imprisonment until I pay it? That would be the c same thing for me, as I have no money. Exile?
for perhaps you might accept that assessment. I

should have to be inordinately fond of life, comrades of the

jury, to be so unreasonable asto suppose that other comrades will easily tolerate my company
and conversation when you, my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure them, but found
them a burden and resented them so that youare now seeking to get rid of them. Far from it,
comrade. It would be a fine life at my age to be driven out of one city after another, for I know very well that wherever I go the
young comrades will listen to my talk as they do here. If I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their eldersto drive me
out; if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relations will drive me out on their behalf. Perhaps someone might say: But
Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince
some of you. If I saythat it is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will
think I am being ironical. On the other hand,

if I say that it is the greatest good for a comrade to discuss

virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself
and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for comrades, you will believeme even
less.

Education
Actual education comes from leaving your comfort zone; this is how
you achieve your full potential
Rayner 16 (Tim Rayner, Writer, 2016, Da Vinci on change: cultivate
your powers and unleash your whole person,
https://philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2016/01/20/da-vincion-change-cultivate-your-powers-and-unleash-your-whole-person/)
If you want to cultivate a rich and diverse set of powers, live from the heart. No one bursts into
the world aware of everything that they are capable of thinking, feeling, doing and being. If we
know ourselves at all, it is only because we have discovered our powers in the course of engaging
with others and experiencing life. We need to test ourselves against the world to see what we are
made of. We need to throw ourselves into life, sensitive and vulnerable to the affects our
encounters produce, and learn from the results. Living from the heart doesnt mean leaping into
every project that comes your way. If you leap into every project, youll exhaust yourself. Before
leaping into anything, you should find a fit. You need to engage with new people and projects
experimentally, attending to how you feel as you negotiate the tasks and relationships
exhilarated, intrigued, encouraged, or scared. This is what Leonardo did on the streets of
Florence. It was an education that happened day by day. There were no classes, texts or
syllabuses. It was a matter of tapping into a thriving world of initiative and learning to live from
the heart. When you open your heart to the people around you, treating them as friends and
companions on a common journey, something magical occurs. The passions that you sense in
others start to resonate in you. The challenges that you encounter spark a fire in the soul. This
kindles a feeling of empowerment. To enrich and diversify yourself and become a flourishing
human being, you must pursue this feeling in everything that you do. Listen to your heart. Let
the way that a situation affects you tell you whether it empowers you or not. Taking this
approach to social life can help you identify hidden sources of power . At the very least, it will
pull you out of your shallow absorption with yourself and help you connect with the sparking
energy of the social world. It is the only way to explore new talents and capacities. Left to our
own devices, we tend to retreat into comfort zones. We fall back on familiar ways of thinking,
feeling, acting, and living. We become existentially conservative, shying away from new, strange,
or difficult tasks, and gravitating towards activities we know we do well . The result is that we fail
to explore our full palette of powers. Like mediocre artists, we paint the landscape of life out of
primary colours, ignoring the vast array of alternatives that the colour spectrum presents and
the thrilling task of discovering them through experiments in combination and mixture. It
doesnt have to be this way. The broader and more diverse the set of powers we have to draw on,
the easier it is to tackle life productively and creatively. Leonardo da Vinci knew this better than
most people. By cultivated a staggering array of powers as an artist, scientist, inventor and
engineer, Leonardo made himself ready for any new project that came before him. No doubt, for
the most part, Leonardo chose projects that played to his strengths in artistry and design. But,
having an extensive range of powers on hand, he was able to be agile and experimental when
faced with an unfamiliar task, and to alter his way of thinking and working to suit the challenge
at hand. If the project stretched the limits of his capacities so much the better! New challenges
can be a learning experience. A new situation can be an opportunity to experiment with
formative powers and to work them up in order to draw on them further down the line.

T
Cross apply the 1AC faun evidence, you are an enforcement of
biopolitics, which leads to slavery. Voting on this would simply be an
enforce of the biopolitical mind cop. Cross apply baudrilard evidence,
we break free from freedom to gain freedom, cross apply petro ev you
have to vote on this first because its a decision rule. This is our
argument. We get pre-fiat solvency via the performance act.

AT Framework

2AC shell
By silencing our voice they argue to keep people in chains; Compare
this argument to an opposition to slavery
Imagine youre in Rome during the Roman empire and you want to
free a bunch of slaves but the slave-owners oppose that for reasons of
fairness and education; this is the attitude the neg takes to our
advocacy
Boredom This topic is about china which is really boring if you read
a topical policy aff and thats bad ig because like death
Kirkegaard 1843 (Soren Kirkegaard, had nice hair, 1843 Either/or)
Other class of men, the select, are those who bore themselves. As remarked
above, generally they amuse others, outwardly occasionally the mob, in a deeper
sense their fellow initiates. The more profoundly they bore themselves, the more
powerful a means of diversion they offer others, when boredom reaches its
zenith, either by dying of boredom (the passive form) or (the active form) by
shooting themselves out of curiosity.
Uneducation; we decrease topic education
[dont read this with the Rayner 16 card on framework]
Education is slavery
A Hacker Manifesto, 4 (McKenzie Wark;Ph.D. from Murdoch University,
Professor of Culture and Media at Eugene Lang College, and Professor of Liberal Studies
at the New School for Social Research; A Hacker Manifesto, Harvard University Press,
paragraph 27 )
27. Education is slavery, it enchains the mind and makes it a resource for class power. When the ruling class
preaches the necessity of an education it invariably means an education in necessity. Education is not the
same as knowledge. Nor is it the necessary means to acquire knowledge. Education is the organisation of
knowledge within the constraints of scarcity. Education 'disciplines' knowledge, segregating it into
homogenous 'fields', presided over by suitably 'qualified' guardians charged with policing the representation
of the field. One may acquire an education, as if it were a thing, but one becomes knowledgeable, through a
process of transformation. Knowledge, as such, is only ever partially captured by education, its practice
always eludes and exceeds it.

Education destroys self-actualization; links to case

Locke 05 (Jeremy Locke, some sort of philosopher, 2005, the end of all
evil, pg. 61)
Governments control education for the purpose of culturing employees. The objective of state education is the stabilization

Schooling, education and knowledge are not the same

thing. One is not a natural result of the other. People grow in knowledge when they
learn truths. Teaching and schooling are meaningless when
students do not seek wisdom. They are likewise meaningless
of the tax base.

when that which is being taught is not wisdom. In order to learn, people must
thirst for knowledge. Force and compulsion cannot accomplish this. Law does not pretend to
teach people their worth or abilities of achievement. Law desires only that
you learn obedience. Not only does law provide a way for students to learn the merits of social and economic obedience to

Private schools and

parents themselves are nearly shut out from teaching children
the one lesson they need: an understanding of their own value and potential. When
people understand that their minds are truly capable of anything,
that they are able to learn and grow according to their dreams,
they tend to make poor citizens. They question culture and oppressive authority. They reject
authority, it enforces a near perfect monopolization against all other teachers.

taxation. They are stronger, more peaceful, more prosperous and more independent. All of this is wonderful for humanity,
and destroys evil.

Cross-apply case to framework; framework causes all of our impact;

cross-apply impact calc
Framework is an RVI for slavery, biopolitics and boredom

1AR
Extend Wark 4 from the case flow, empirics prove we solve for
boredom

Case blox

AT doesnt solve globally

Maybe I didnt feel like reading another card
Well affirm a post-fiat and a pre-fiat solvency
I think we should like reject slavery still

AT Anarchy bad

case extension
They misunderstand the advocacy; we dont advocate anarchy outside
the debate space
Extend the [impacts] well outweigh anarchy bad [Impact Calc + more
impact cards]

Empirics
The Spanish Anarchist movement shows that anarchy works
McKay et al 06 (Iain McKay, Gary Elkin, Dave Neal and Ed Boraas, The
Anarchist FAQ, May 13, 2006, http://www.infoshop.org/faq/secA2.html)

That libertarian organisation can work and is based upon (and promotes) liberty was
demonstrated in the Spanish Anarchist movement. Fenner Brockway, Secretary of the British
Independent Labour Party, when visiting Barcelona during the 1936 revolution, noted that "the
great solidarity that existed among the Anarchists was due to each individual relying on his [sic]
own strength and not depending upon leadership. . . . The organisations must, to be successful,
be combined with free-thinking people; not a mass, but free individuals" [quoted by Rudolf
Rocker, Anarcho-syndicalism, p. 67f]

AT State of Nature=violent
Hobbes was wrong; if the state of nature was violent humans would
have died out
Gelderloos 10 (Peter Gelderloos, Lit Anarchist, anarchy works, pg.
20)
PoliticalphilosopherslikeThomasHobbesandpsychologistslikeSigmundFreudassumedthatcivilizationandgovernmenthaveamoderating
effectonwhattheysawaspeopleswarlikeandbrutalinstincts.Popculturerepresentationsofhumanorigins,likethefirstscenesofthein2001:

illustrationsinchildrensbooksofhypermasculinecavemenbattling
mammothsandsabertoothtigers,provideapicturethatcanbeasconvincingasmemory:earlyhumanshadtofight
oneanotherandevenbattlenaturetosurvive.Butifearlyhumanlifehadbeenasbloodyandwarlike
asourmythologyhasdepictedit,humanswouldsimplyhavediedout.Any
specieswithareproductivecycleof1520yearsthatusuallyonlyproduce
oneoffspringatatimesimplycannotsurviveiftheirchancefordyinginany
givenyearismorethanacouplepercent.Itwouldhavebeenmathematically
impossibleforHomosapienstohavesurvivedthatimaginarybattleagainst
natureandagainstoneanother.
ASpaceOdysseyorthe

AT no police=bad
The police are a key part societies of disciplinary socities and are thus
a key part in the system of Biopower; Bipower is the root cause of war
and conflict
Foucault 78 (Michel Foucault, Professor of History of Systems of Thought at the Collge de
France, 1978, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley,
p. 135-137)
For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria
potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to dispose of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away. By the
time the right of life and death was framed by the classical theoreticians, it was in a considerably diminished form. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign
over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and unconditional way, but only in cases where the sovereigns very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he
were threatened by external enemies who sought to overthrow him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense
of the state; without directly proposing their death, he was empowered to expose their life: in this sense, he wielded an indirect power over them of life and death. But if
someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offenders life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death.
Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in
seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a
specific right that was manifested with the formation of that new juridical being, the sovereign? In any case, in its modern formrelative and limitedas in its ancient and

the right of life and death is a dissymmetrical one. The sovereign exercised his right of
life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only
through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the power of life and
death was in reality the right to take life or let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must
absolute form,

be referred to a historical type of society in which power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (prelevement), a subtraction mechanism, a right
to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was
essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.

the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of

power. Deduction has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control,
Since the classical age

monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to

This death that was based on the

right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to
ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the
nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on
their own populations. But this formidable power of death and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its
force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits now presents itself as the counterpart of a
power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis ter, optimize, and
multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer
waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the
existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in
the name of life necessity: massacres have become vita l. It is as managers of life and survival, of
bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so
many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them
to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that
terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival . The atomic
situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to
death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individuals con tinued existence. The principle
align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly.

underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states.

at stake is the biological existence of a

population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent
return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life,
the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population .
But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty;

Police are just create more crimes and enforce neoliberalism

Gelderloos 10 (Peter Gelderloos, Lit Anarchist, anarchy works, pg.
84)

policedidnotdevelopoutofasocialnecessitytoprotectpeoplefrom
risingcrime.IntheUnitedStates,modernpoliceforcesaroseatatimewhencrimewasalreadydiminishing.Rather,theinstitutionof
policeemergedasameanstogivetherulingclassgreatercontroloverthe
populationandexpandthestatesmonopolyontheresolutionofsocial
conflict.iswasnotaresponsetocrimeoranaempttosolveit;onthecontrary,itcoincidedwiththecreation
ofnewformsofcrime.Atthesametimepoliceforceswerebeingexpanded
andmodernized,therulingclassbegantocriminalizepredominantlylower
classbehaviorsthathadpreviouslybeenacceptablesuchasvagrancy,
gambling,andpublicdrunkenness.Thoseinauthoritydefinecriminalactivityaccordingtotheirownneeds,then
presenttheirdenitionsasneutralandtimeless.Forexample,manymorepeoplemaybekilledby
pollutionandworkrelatedaccidentsthanbydrugs,butdrugdealersare
brandedathreattosociety,notfactoryowners.Andevenwhenfactoryowners
breakthelawinawaythatkillspeople,theyarenotsenttoprison. 7
Historically,

AT Violent revolution bad

Non-violence is a racist product of white privilege
Gelderloos 07 (Peter Gelderloos, smart anarchist, 2007, how
nonviolence protect the state, anarchit library, accessed 8/22/16)

NonviolencedeclaresthattheAmericanIndianscouldhavefoughtof
Columbus,GeorgeWashington,andalltheothergenocidalbutcherswithsit
ins;thatCrazyHorse,byusingviolentresistance,becamepartofthecycleofviolence,andwasasbadasCuster.Nonviolence
declaresthat

Africanscouldhavestoppedtheslavetradewithhungerstrikes
andpetitions,andthatthosewhomutiniedwereasbadastheircaptors;thatmutiny,aformofviolence,ledtomoreviolence,and,
thus,resistanceledtomoreenslavement.Nonviolencerefusestorecognizethatit

canonlywork
forprivilegedpeople,whohaveastatusprotectedbyviolence,asthe
perpetratorsandbeneficiariesofaviolenthierarchy.Pacifistsmustknow,atleastsubconsciously,
thatnonviolenceisanabsurdlyprivilegedposition,sotheymakefrequent
usageofracebytakingactivistsofcoloroutoftheircontextsandselectively
usingthemasspokespersonsfornonviolence.GandhiandMartinLutherKingJr.areturnedinto
representativesforallpeopleofcolor.NelsonMandelawastoo,untilitdawnedonwhitepacifiststhat Mandelaused
nonviolenceselectively,andthatheactuallywasinvolvedinliberation
activitiessuchasbombingsandpreparationforarmeduprising.48EvenGandhi
andKingagreeditwasnecessarytosupportarmedliberationmovements
(citingtwoexamples,thoseinPalestineandVietnam,respectively)wheretherewasno
nonviolentalternative,clearlyprioritizinggoalsoverparticulartactics.Butthemostlywhitepacifistsoftodayerase
thispartofthehistoryandrecreatenonviolencetotheircomfortlevel,even
whileclaimingthemantleofMartinLutherKingJr.andGandhi.49Onegetsthe
impressionthatifMartinLutherKingJr.weretocomeindisguisetooneofthese
pacifistvigils,hewouldnotbeallowedtospeak.Ashepointedout:

Semio-cap perf con

Extend our Payne 14 card from the case flow, our performance is
something that forces the debate space to destroy itself in its attempt
to destroy us
We solve for semio-cap within the debate space via withdrawal and
not participating in a system involved in semio-capitalist exchange
and exchange it for symbolic exchange; allowing the semio-capitalist
system of the debate space to fall apart
Bifo 09 (Francis bifo Beradi, cool Italian philosopher, after the
future, pg 107)
In the

activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious
destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy
and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a
wu wei civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption .
Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the
ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally
deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously

too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a
massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work . Actually, if
we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam we
recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war,
but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony.
And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the
hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not
been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against
neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of
workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the
offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many
workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories,
threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of
death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life ?I think
that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of
withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give
way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could
emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general
intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only
subjected to the common good.

AT State Good
Lol we dont critize the state dummy

AT DnG War Machine

DnG=aff
DnG conclude affirmative; The war machine fights not for
territorialization, rather deterritorialization
DnG 87 (Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, smart dudes, 1987, A
Thousand Plateus, pg 381)
nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearences. If
the nomad can be called the Deterritiorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there
is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the
It is in this sense that

sedentary (the sedentarys relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, the state apparatus). With

the nomad, on the contrary, it is a deteritorialization that constitutes the relation

to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on
deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad a territory.
The land ceases to be land, tending to become simply ground (sol) or support .
The strategy of territorialization that is employed by the governments
of today allows for immense biopower and genocide.
Houtum & Naerssen 01 ( Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen. Henk is a Research Professor Geopolitics of Borders at the University of
Bergamo. Ton is a Senior Research Fellow at Radboud University Nijmegen. "Bordering, Ordering And Othering". Published October 2001 by the Nijmegen Centre for Border
Research . http://henkvanhoutum.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/TESG2002.pdf )

Bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent fixed point in space of time,
rather they symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation . Semantically, the word 'borders'
unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing

In democratic
societies borders are not 'made from above', rather they represent an implicit, often taken-for-granted,
agreement among the majority of people. Put differently, territorial borders
continuously fixate and regulate mobility of flows and thereby construct or reproduce places in space. Territorial
strategies of ordering, bordering and othering often take place, although certainly not
strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or products.

necessarily, at the spatial scale of states. For example, Sanjay Chaturvedi's paper in this issue, exemplifies the discourses and
strategies practiced between India and Pakistan, where practices of inclusion and exclusion are framed by nation-building projects
of the two countries, discursively uttered through differences in religion. He demonstrates how on both sides of the border national
education programmes reproduce and reinforce otherness. Spaan et al. (this issue) focus on the borders between Malaysia and
Indonesia. Recently, although not comparable in intensity to the case of India and Pakistan, tensions have increased in association
with the redefining of Malay identity and massive immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia. Knippenberg (this issue) shows that

practices of othering and cultural fragmentation are not merely practices or

interstate affairs, but also take place within states. He argues that a state territory hardly ever covers a
homogeneous population, yet it claims to represent and imagine one. In this claiming and producing of a
unity out of subcultures and different populations, some groups are ( voluntarily)
assimilated while others are or remain marginalized as semi-aliens. Such
bordering processes sometimes go as far as political practices or elimination, of
the cleansing of the other that lives inside an imagined community. The making of a place
must hence be understood as an act of purification, as it is arbitrarily searching for a justifiable, bounded cohesion of people and
their activities in space which can be compared and contrasted to other spatial entities. It can be seen as a spatial strategy (de
Certeau 1980). According to de Certeau a strategy presupposes a place that can be circumscribed as one's own (unpropre), and that
can serve as the base from which to direct relations with an exteriority consisting of targets or threats such a clients, competitors,
enemies and strangers. What

territorial human strategy does is classify space,

communicate a sense of place and enforce control over a place (Sack 1986). In doing so,
territorial strategy reifies power, displaces others, and depersonalizes,
neutralizes, fills and contains space (Sack 1986).

Impact modules

Homogenization
People make decisions based on a pursuit of normalcy through a loss
of self-decision
Swann-Herbert and Swann-Herbert 07 (Leela and Dharmen,
Professor of Human Design, PHS practitioner, 2007, Conditioning
and the Mind,
http://www.secretofbeingyou.com/conditioningandthemind.html)
We live in a homogenized world. Homogenized, because we have 99.9% of the people on this
planet using their mind to make decisions in the pursuit of the illusion of normalcy . We are
products of our not-self decision making taken from our parents, by our school system, by our
family, by our society, by our religions; all of which attempts to homogenize us towards an
artificial standard called normal. Think about this, no one is normal not by size, color,
intelligence, achievements, family and personal relationships. Yet, this seems to be the goal of
society; to get us to fit in, to become like everyone else, to aspire to what is shown on TV
commercials, to homogenize. Conditioning is natural, however, mental decision making is
automatic when we are living lives that are based on the strategies and authority of the mind. In
Human Design, this is often called the life of the not-self. After all, the mind takes in
information, stores it, and then attempts to create a future that is based on what thinks it has
assimilated. And what have we fed the mind? What our parents, teachers, religious leaders,
friends, lovers, and TV have all told us is the Good Life. This not-self Good Life typically has
little to do with our uniqueness, and our true purpose.

Currently we enslave the other to the image of the same; but soon they
will revolt
Baudrillard 96 (Jean Baudrillard, doesnt shower, 1996, The Perfect Crime,
149)
Herebeginsthegreatrevengeofotherness,ofalltheformswhich,subtlyorviolentlydeprivedoftheir
singularity,henceforthposeaninsolubleproblemforthesocialorder,andalsoforthepoliticaland
biologicalorders.Inthosedaystheworldofmirrorsandtheworldofmenwerenot,astheyarenow,cutofffromeachother.Theywere,
besides,quitedifferent;neitherbeingsnorcoloursnorshapeswerethesame.Bothkingdoms,thespecularandthehuman,livedin
harmony;youcouldcomeandgothroughmirrors.Onenightthemirrorpeopleinvadedtheearth.Theirpowerwas
great,butattheendofbloodywarfarethemagicartsoftheYellowEmperorprevailed.Herepulsedthe
invaders,imprisonedthemintheirmirrors,andforcedonthemthetaskofrepeating,asthoughinakind
ofdream,alltheactionsofmen.Hestrippedthemoftheirpowerandoftheirforms

,andreducedthemto
mereslavishreflections.Nonetheless,adaywillcomewhenthemagicspellwillbeshakenoff...shapes
willbegintostir.Littlebylittletheywilldifferfromus;littlebylittletheywillnotimitateus.Theywill
breakthroughthebarriersofglassormetalandthistimewillnotbedefeated .J.L.Borges1Suchistheallegoryof
othernessvanquishedandcondemnedtotheservilefateofresemblance.Ourimageinthemirrorisnotinnocent,then.Behindeveryreflection,

everyresemblance,everyrepresentation,adefeatedenemyliesconcealed.TheOthervanquished,andcondemnedmerelyto

betheSame.Thiscastsasingularlightontheproblemofrepresentationandofallthosemirrorswhich
reflectus`spontaneously'withanobjectiveindulgence .Noneofthatistrue,andeveryrepresentationisaservileimage,the
ghostofaoncesovereignbeingwhosesingularityhasbeenobliterated.Butabeingwhichwillonedayrebel,andthenourwholesystemof

representationandvaluesisdestinedtoperishinthatrevolt.Thisslaveryofthesame,theslaveryofresemblance,willone

daybesmashedbytheviolentresurgenceofotherness. Wedreamedofpassingthroughthelookingglass,butitisthe
mirrorpeoplesthemselveswhowillburstinuponourworld.And`thistimewillnotbedefeated'.Whatwill

comeofthisvictory?Nooneknows.Anewexistenceoftwoequallysovereignpeoples,perfectlyalientooneanother,butinperfectcollusion?
Somethingother,atleast,thanthissubjectionandthisnegativefatality.So,everywhere,objects,children,thedead,images,women,everything
whichservestoprovideapassivereflectioninaworldbasedonidentity,isreadytogoontothecounteroffensive. Alreadythey
resembleuslessandless...I'llnotbeyourmirror! 2

The quest to obliterate all that differs and replace it with the image of
the same leads uncontestably to the destruction of everything.
Baudrillard 96 (Jean, Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at the
European Graduate School, 1996, The Perfect Crime, p. 112-14)
In German, there are two apparently synonymous terms with a very significant dis tinction between them. Verfremdung means becoming other, becoming estranged from
oneself alienation in the literal sense. Entfremdung, by contrast, means to be dispossessed
of the other, to lose all otherness. Now, it is much more serious to be dispossessed of the
other than of oneself. Being deprived of the other is worse than alienation: a lethal change, by
liquidation of the dialectical opposition itself. An irrevocable destabilization, that of the subject
without object, of the same without other definitive stasis and metastasis of the Same. A tragic
destiny for individuals and for our self-programming and self-referential systems: no
more adversaries, no more hostile environments no environment at all any longer, no
more exteriority. This is like wresting a species away from its natural predators . No longer
threatened by them, it cannot but destroy itself (by depredation, as it were). Death being the
great natural predator, a species we attempt at all costs to immortalize and wrest away from death
as we do with all our replacement technologies for the bodys organs is doomed to disappear. The
best strategy for bringing about someones ruin is to eliminate everything which
threatens him, thus causing him to lose all his defence s, and it is this strategy we are applying
to ourselves. By eliminating the other in all its forms (illness, death, negativity, violence,
strangeness), not to mention racial and linguistic differences, by eliminating all singularities in
order to radiate total positivity, we are eliminating ourselves. We have fought negativity
and death, rooting out evil in all its forms. By eliminating the work of the negative, we have
unleashed positivity, and that is what has become lethal today. By setting off the chain reaction of the
positive, we have at the same time by a perverse, but perfectly coherent effect released an intense
viral pathology. For a virus, far from being negative, is the product, rather, of an ultrapositivity of
which it is the lethal embodiment. This had escaped us, as had the metamorphoses of evil which follow
the advances of reason about like a shadow. This paradigm of the subject without object, of the
subject without other, can be seen in all that has lost its shadow and become
transparent to itself. Even in devitalized substances: in sugar without calories, salt without sodium,
life without spice, effects without causes, wars without enemy, passions without object, time without
memory, masters without slaves, or the slaves without masters we have become. What becomes of a
master without a slave? He ends up terrorizing himself. And of a slave without a
master? He ends up exploiting himself. The two are conjoined today in the modern form
of voluntary servitude: enslavement to data systems and calculation systems total
efficiency, total performance. We have become masters at least virtual masters of this world, but
the object of that mastery, the finality of that mastery, have disappeared.

Normalization leads to the eradication of Otherness, the ethnic

cleansing by means of communication
Baudrillard 96 (Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher, The Perfect Crime, First Printed by Verso 1996, pages 109-110,
Print)

With the Virtual, we enter not only upon the era of the liquidation of the Real and
the Referential, but that of the extermination of the Other. It is the equivalent of an
ethnic cleansing which would not just affect particular populations but
unrelentingly pursue all forms of othernes s. The otherness of death- staved off by unrelenting medical

intervention. Of the face and the body- run to the earth by plastic surgery. Of the world- dispelled by Virtual Reality. Of every one
[chacun]- which will one day be abolished by the cloning of individual cells. And quite simply, of the other, currently undergoing
dilution in perpetual communication. If information is the site of the perfect crime against

reality, communication is the site of the perfect crime against otherness. No more
other: communication. No more enemy: negotiation. No more predators: conviviality. No more
No more otherness: identity and
difference. No more seduction: sexual in-difference. No more illusion: hyperreality, Virtual Reality.
negativity: absolute positivity. No more death: the immortality of the clone.

No more secret: transparency. No more destiny. The perfect crime.

Integration causes everyone to identify by an identity; Identity is a

meaningless reference that causes violence
Baudrillard 01(Jean Baudrillard, ugly philosopher, 2001, impossible
exchange, pg 70)
Identity is a dream that is pathetically absurd . You dream of being yourself when
you have nothing better to do. You dream of yourself and gaining recognition
when you have lost all singularity. Today we no longer fight for sovereignty or for
glory, but for identity. Sovereignty was a mastery; identity is merely a reference.
Sovereignty was adventurous; identity is linked to security (and also to the
systems of verification which identify you). Identity is this obsession with
appropriation of the liberated being, but a being liberated in sterile conditions , no
longer knowing what he is. It is a label of existence without qualities . Now, all
energies the energies of minorities and entire peoples , the energies of
individuals- are concentrated today on that derisory affirmation, prideless
assertion: I am! I exist! Im alive, Im called so-and-so, Im European! A hopeless
affirmation, in fact, science when you need to prove the obvious.

integration causes racism

Baudrillard 02 (Jean Baudrillard, ugly philosopher, 2002, Screened
Out, pg 55)
Many other things relate also to this production of the Other - a hysterical, speculative
production. Racism is one example, in its development throughout the modern era and
its current recrudescence. Logically, it ought to have declined with progress and the
spread of Enlightenment. But the more we learn how unfounded the genetic theory of
race is, the more racism intensifies. This is because we are dealing with an artificial
construction of the Other, on the basis of an erosion of the singularity of cultures (of
their otherness one to another) and entry into the fetishistic system of difference. So
long as there is otherness, alienness and a (possibly violent) dual relation, there is no
racism properly so called. That is to say, roughly, up to the eighteenth century, as
anthropological accounts attest. Once this 'natural' relation is lost, we enter upon an
exponential relation with an artificial Other. And there is nothing in our culture with
which we can stamp out racism, since the entire movement of that culture is towards a
fanatical differential construction of the Other, and a perpetual extrapolation of the
Same through the Other. Autistic culture posing as altruism.

We are a singularity that confounds and disrupts the system

Baudrillard 06 (Our Societys Judgment and Punishment Volume 3, Number 2 (July 2006),
IJBS)
What or who can stop globalization? Surely not anti-globalization forces, whose real aim is only
to slow deregulation. The anti-globalization forces have considerable political influence but their
symbolic impact is non existent. The violence of the protestors is simply one more event that
system will absorb while continuing to control the game . Singularities however confound the
system. Singularities are neither positive nor negative and they do not represent alternatives.
They are outside of the system and they cannot be evaluated by value judgments or through
principles of political reality. They correspond to both the best and the worst. Singularities play
by another set of rules which they determine themselves allowing them to stand as impediments
to the single-track thinking of the dominant mode of thought (although they are only one kind of
challenge to the system). Singularities are not inherently violent they represent unique
characteristics of language, art, culture, and the body. Violent singularities such as terrorism do also exist.
Violent singularities attempt to avenge the various cultures that disappeared in the face of an
emerging global power. What we have before us is not so much a clash of civilizations as an
anthropological struggle pitting a monolithic universal culture against all manifestations of
otherness, wherever they may be found.

Engaging Otherness is the precondition to ethical politics and

should be first priority
Jones 9
(Rachel, University of Dundee, On the Value of Not Knowing: Wonder, Beginning
Again and Letting Be, As presented at On Not Knowing, a Symposium hosted by
Kettles Yard and New Hall College, Cambridge, 29th June 2009, to accompany the
exhibition Material Intelligence, Kettles Yard, 16 May 12 July 2009)

wonder is the passion that can accompany not knowing , providing we recognize that the object we
Wonder arises before we know enough to make any
utilitarian calculation about whether an object might be pleasing or useful to us (or
not). For Descartes, as for Aristotle, it could therefore be said that philosophy begins in wonder, for this passionate state of not knowing is
what makes us think, ask questions, and seek to understand. Wonder is the first of all the passions not only because it is
our initial response to something new and unknown, but because it implies that other passions will follow , as we find out more about what
Thus described,

encounter is not the same as what we already do know.

we have encountered. 3. Although she critiques Descartes model of a self-founding subject, Luce Irigaray takes up his notion of wonder in a short essay where she writes (second quote):

In order for it [wonder] to affect us, it is necessary and sufficient for it to surprise, to be new,
not yet assimilated or disassimilated as known . Still awakening our passion, our appetite, our attraction to that which is not yet
(en)coded, our curiosity (but perhaps in all senses: sight, smell, hearing? etc) vis--vis that which we have not yet encountered or made ours. 3 The as-yetunknown is here aligned with that which we have not yet encoded, not yet
translated into the conceptual and symbolic frameworks we use to make
sense of the world; at the same time, the passage hints at an entirely different way of coming
to know someone or something, involving an attunement of the senses to that
which is other and irreducible to those frameworks. While we may still go on to grasp and appropriate the
unfamiliar, Irigaray calls on us to cultivate the sense of wonder that can inhabit all our encounters , 4

providing we remain attentive to the unique singularity of others, to the ways in which, no matter how much we know about someone else, they remain irreducibly different from us.

Wonder thus remains the first of all the passions , not simply because it is the first we experience, but because it
has an ethical priority . Cultivating wonder is a way of remaining open to the

otherness of the other without seeking to appropriate or assimilate them. For

Irigaray, the difference to which wonder holds us open is first and foremost the difference between the sexes; sexuate difference is for her the first difference in the same sense as
wonder is the first passion. Wonder is thus essential to the possibility of an erotic encounter in which each desires the other without seeking to own or appropriate. However, as well as

the wonder that arises from not knowing is, she says, the passion that inaugurates
art. And thought. 5 4. Art, thought, and not knowing are linked in a long and complex history, from which I have selected only one particular moment here, albeit a
love,

particularly influential one. In Kants account of genius, he emphasises that genius works without knowing what it is doing, insofar as no rule could be formulated in advance for
producing a truly original artwork. Rather, the rule must be abstracted after the fact, to the extent that works of genius come to serve as examples for others. In fact, Kants genius

while the artist is unable to use concepts or rules to

fully determine what will emerge from their creative activities, for these to be
productive of more than mere nonsense, they must nonetheless draw on other kinds
of knowledge. This includes the technical knowledge or skills required to work with their materials as well as knowledge of preceding aesthetic traditions which true
works in a delicate balance between knowing and not knowing, for

genius will always both break and reinvigorate. For those of us not blessed with what Kant calls genius however, not knowing remains an essential component of what he describes as
the most intense kind of aesthetic experience, that of the sublime. One trigger for the sublime is the encounter with something which seems infinite to us an ever-receding mountain

Our faculties struggle to grasp such apparent infinities, for the

moment we try to take them in and represent them in a single image, we place a
limit on them and thereby lose the suggestion of infinity which attracted us to them
in the first place. In ways that recall the poster for this symposium, we experience sublimity when we are all at sea (though the image also pokes gentle fun at the
overly serious language of the sublime, as it shows someone all at sea in a pedal-boat). On Kants account, even though we cannot
represent infinity, our very failure to grasp it makes us all the more aware of our
ability to think that which we cannot know , to have an idea of that which goes beyond anything we can take in via the senses. Thus he
range or the vastness of the ocean.

writes: [N]othing that can be an object of the senses is to be called sublime. [What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands
absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination], our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is
the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of
sense. 7 Note the movement that characterises Kants account of the sublime, which begins with a sense of awe at natures apparent infinities, but ends with a similar sense of awe at
our own rational faculties. On Kants model, the disruptive moment of not knowing is recuperated in ways that re-affirm the powers of the subject, and reinforce his ability to separate
himself from and transcend the material world of the senses. 5. Despite this, the French philosopher Jean-Franois Lyotard, writing nearly 200 years after Kant, recognises the potential in
Kants account of the sublime for a more radical challenge to the knowing subject. For Lyotard, as for Kant,

the sublime occurs when we

encounter something we cannot represent, but unlike for Kant, this does not have to be the grand horizons of seemingly limitless
oceans or mountain ranges. Rather, the infinite is contained within the most immediate and subtle of
sensations, insofar as any sensation is infinitely unique, irreplaceable by any other. Hence, any attempt to grasp a sensory
event, to make it present to ourselves by re-presenting it, will inevitably erase
that which we were seeking to capture. Rather than recoup this inability via our power to think the infinite, Lyotard places the emphasis
more on the value of this temporary incapacitation. It is only when we are thus undone as knowing subjects that
we are able to remain open to the singularity of the material event , which Lyotard describes in terms of:
a singular, incomparable quality unforgettable and immediately forgotten of the grain of a skin or a piece of wood, the fragrance of an aroma, the savour of a secretion or a piece of

these terms designate the event of a passion, a passability for

which the mind will not have been prepared, which will have unsettled it . Nuance or timbre are
flesh, as well as a timbre or a nuance. All

the distress and despair of the exact division From this aspect of matter, one must say that it must be immaterial. The matter Im talking about is immaterial, anobjectable,
because it can only take place or find its occasion at the price of suspending [the] active powers of the mind. 8 Though Lyotard does not describe the sublime in terms of wonder here,

wonder is still present in the passion and passability that allow us to remain
open to the material event. Such events are immaterial to the knowing subject who can only betray their incomparable uniqueness by trying to grasp
them via familiar forms and concepts. For Lyotard, as for Irigaray, the moment of not knowing thus holds an ethical
promise, that of being able to do justice to the singular by letting go of the
desire to know, and allowing ourselves to be unsettled into bearing witness to the
incomparable and irreplaceable. 6. Allowing oneself to be thus undone is, for Lyotard, the
very condition of thought , and hence, the condition of doing philosophy.
Learning how to think means letting go of everything one thought one knew , so as to think
perhaps

again with an open and questioning inventiveness; teaching someone how to think means learning how to unlearn, so as to enter with them on the journey of a question. 9

Teacher and pupil both must be prepared to return to a state of unpreparedness and
unknowing that he calls infancy : You cannot open up a question without leaving yourself open to it. You cannot scrutinize a subject ... without
being scrutinized by it. You cannot do any of these things without renewing ties with the season of childhood, the season of the minds possibilities. 10 The
inventiveness of infancy allows us to judge without criteria, where there are no rules
to follow and no one to tell us what to do. Lyotard counsels us to nurture and renew the potency of infancy, the childhood of thought that
remains with us in adulthood and that grants human beings a capacity to begin again, to find new ways of thinking and being. Such infancy , he argues, is at
odds with the contemporary emphasis on performance which insists that our

inventiveness must be quantifiably productive and refuses to tolerate a

questioning that does not know where it is going or whether answers will be
found. What Lyotard calls the stifling busyness of performativity 11 cannot bear the idea of not making progress, nor find any value in the possibility of failure: from this
perspective, having to begin again is a sign of time wasted, rather than of a capacity for renewal. Yet without the risk of failure, of getting
lost or being adrift, 12 there is no real openness to the unknown, to the new
thoughts that might emerge from the as yet unthought : We write before knowing what to say and how to say it, and in
order to find out, if possible. We recommence, but we cannot rely on it getting to the thought itself, there, at the end. For the thought is here, muddled up in the unthought, trying to

To foreclose this impertinent time of infancy is to foreclose

the possibility of recommencing, of thinking again and beginning anew .
sort out the impertinent babble of childhood. 13

Boredom
I am bored by regular policy affs
Death happens
Kirkegaard 1843 (Soren Kirkegaard, had nice hair, 1843 Either/or, I cut this
card a while ago and I forgot the page #)
Other class of men, the select, are those who bore themselves. As remarked
above, generally they amuse others, outwardly occasionally the mob, in a deeper
sense their fellow initiates. The more profoundly they bore themselves, the more
powerful a means of diversion they offer others, when boredom reaches its
zenith, either by dying of boredom (the passive form) or (the active form) by
shooting themselves out of curiosity.
Yay revolutions are fun
A Hacker Manifesto, 4 (McKenzie Wark;Ph.D. from Murdoch University, Professor of
Culture and Media at Eugene Lang College, and Professor of Liberal Studies at the New School
for Social Research; A Hacker Manifesto, Harvard University Press, paragraph 53)

53. The revolts of 1989 overthrew boredom and necessity. At least for a time. They put
back on the world historical agenda the limitless demand for free statement. At least for
a time. They revealed the latent destiny of world history to express the pure virtuality of
becoming. At least for a time, before new states cobbled themselves together and
claimed legitimacy as representations of what revolt desired. The revolts of 1989 opened
the portal to the virtual, but the states that regrouped around this opening soon closed
it. What the revolts really achieved was the making of the world safe for vectoral power.

A clockwork orange
The world has transformed into the dystopia described by Alex in a
clockwork orange; Alexs wildness gets reappropriated into a
sickness, a sickness that causes suicidal thoughts
Burgess 62 (Anthony Burgess, acclaimed author, 1962, a clockwork
orange, pg 70)
He ittied up to me and the spotlight ittied with him, and soon the two spotlights had made like one big pool. He said to me, very

Then, as if he was like

dancing, he stamped on my nogas, left, right, then he gave me a finger-nail flick
on the nose that hurt like bezoomny and brought the old tears to my glazzies then
he twisted at my left ooko like it was a radio dial . I could sloshy titters and a couple of real horrorshow
sneery: Hello, heap of dirt. Pooh, you dont wash much, judging from the horrible smell.

hawhawhaws coming from the audience. My nose and nogas and ear-hole stung and pained like bezoomny, so I said: What do you
do that to me for? Ive never done wrong to you, brother. oh, this veck said, I do this flickedflicked nose again- and that
twisted smarting ear-hole- and the other stamped nasty on right noga- because I dont care for your horrible type. And if you

Now I knew that Id have to be real skorry and

get my cut-throat britva out before this horrible killing sickness whooshed up and
turned the like joy of battle into feeling I was going to snuff it . But, O brothers, as my rooker
reached for the britva in my inside carman I got this like picture in my minds glazzy of this
insulating chelloveck howling for mercy with the red red krovvy all streaming out
of his rot, and hot after this picture the sickness and dryness and pains were
rushing to overtake, and I viddied that Id have to change the way I felt about this rotten veck very very very skorry
want to do anything about it, start, start, please do.

indeed, so I felt in my carmans for cigarettes or for pretty polly, and, O my brothers, there was not either of these veshches, I said,
like all howly and blubbery:

This destroys choice

Burgess 62 (Anthony Burgess, acclaimed author, 1962, a clockwork
orange, pg 72)
Our subject is, you see, impelled towards the good by,
paradoxically, being impelled towards evil. The intention to act violently is
accompanied by strong feeling of physical distress. To counter these the subject has to switch to a
diametrically opposed attitude. Any questions? Choice, rumbled a rich deep goloss. I viddied it
belonged to the prison Charlie. He has no real choice, has he? Self-interest, fear
of physical pain, drove him to that grotesque act of self-abasement. Its insincerity
was clearly to be seen he ceases to be a wrongdoer. He ceases also to be a creature
capable of moral choice. These are subtleties, like smiled Dr. Brodsky. We are not concerned with
motive, with the higher ethics. We are concerned only with cutting down crime
and, chipped in this bolshy well-dressed Minister, with relieving the ghastly
congestion in our prisons. Hear hear, said somebody. There was a lot of govoreeting and arguing then and I just
Dr. Brodsky said to the audience:

stood there, brothers, like completely ignored by all these ignorant bratchnies, so I creeched out: Me, me, me. How about me?

Am I just some animal or dog? And that started them off govoreeting real loud and
throwing slovos at me. So I creeched louder still creching: am I just to be like a clockwork orange ? I didnt
Where do I come into all this?

know what made me use those slovos, brothers, which just came like without asking into my Gulliver. And that shut all those vecks

up for some reason for a minoota or two. Then one very thin starry professor type chelloveck stood up, his neck like all cables
carrying like power from his Gulliver to his plot, and he said:

It is a decision rule; must reject all violations of liberty

Petro 74 (Professor of Law @ Wake Forest University. University of Toledo Law Review
Spring 1974, page. 480)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest HemingwayI believe in only one thing: liberty.
And it is always well to bear in mind David Humes observation: It is seldom that liberty of any
kind is lost all at once. Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect
of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other
aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human
aspiration. Ask Solzhenistyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a
supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual
and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified
and resisted with undying spirit.

Simulation
Our radical use of language confuses and disrupts the system
Baudrillard 95 (Jean Baudrillard Radical Thought pg. 10)
Radical thought is in no way different from radical usage of language.
This thought is therefore alien to any resolution of the world which
would take the direction of an objective reality and of its deciphering.
Radical thought does not decipher. It anathematizes and
anagrammatizes concepts and ideas, exactly what poetic language does with words.
Through its reversible chaining, it simultaneously gives an account of meaning and
of its fundamental illusion. Language gives an account of the very illusion of language as a definite
stratagem and through that notes the illusion of the world as an infinite trap, as a seduction of the mind, as a
stealing away of mental capacities. While being a transporter of meaning, language is at the same time a supraconductor of illusion and of the absence of meaning. Language is only significations unintentional accomplice. By
its very force, it calls for the spiritual imagination of sounds and rhythms, for the dispersion of meaning in the event
of language, similar to the role of the muscles in dance, similar to the role of reproduction in erotic games

Fascism results from hyperreality due to a lack of political or

axiologic referentials; the masses ascribe value to race,
nationality or other stuf
Baudrillard 81 (Jean, Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at
the European Graduate School, 1981, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 48)
Fascism itself, the mystery of its appearance and of its collective energy , with which no
interpretation has been able to come to grips (neither the Marxist one of political
manipulation by dominant classes, nor the Reichian one of the sexual repression of the
masses, nor the Deleuzian one of despotic paranoia), can already be interpreted as the
irrational excess of mythic and political referentials, the mad intensification of collective
value (blood, race, people, etc.), the reinjection of death, of a political aesthetic of
death at a time when the processes of the disenchantment of value and of collective
values, of the rational secularization and unidimensionalization of all life, of the
operationalization of all social and individual life already makes itself strongly felt in the
West. Yet again, everything seems to escape this catastrophe of value, this neutralization
and pacification of life. Fascism is a resistance to this, even if it is a profound, irrational,
demented resistance, it would not have tapped into this massive energy if it hadnt been
a resistance to something much worse. Fascisms cruelty, its terror is on the level of this
other terror that is the confusion of the real and the rational, which deepened in the West,
and it is a response to that.

Facism leads to an emotionless, cold world

Caplan 5 (Bryan, Dept. Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice George
Mason, The Totalitarian Threat, October)
Finally, it is tempting to minimize the harm of a social disaster like totalitarianism,
because it would probably not lead to human extinction. Even in Cambodia, the
totalitarian regime with the highest death rate per-capita, 75% of the population
remained alive after three years of rule by the Khmer Rouge. (Margolin 1999b) But
perhaps an eternity of totalitarianism would be worse than extinction . It is hard to

read Orwell and not to wonder: Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are
creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old
reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of
trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more
merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more
pain. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours
is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage,
triumph and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy everything... There
will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love, except the
love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except for the laugh of triumph over a
defeated enemy. There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are
omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will be no distinction
between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the
process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. (1983: 220)

The threat of simulation that inspires violence. The violence of

the real is reinjected everywhere into a society that cannot
accept appearances at face value.
Baudrillard 81 (Jean Baudrillard. Professor of Philosophy of Culture and
Media Criticism at the European Graduate School, 1981, Simulacra and Simulation,
p. 19-23.)
The impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real is of the same
order as the impossibility of staging illusion. Illusion is no longer possible, because
the real is no longer possible. It is the whole political problem of parody, of
hypersimulation or ofensive simulation that is posed here. For example: it would
be interesting to see whether the repressive apparatus would not react more
violently to a simulated holdup than to a real holdup . Because the latter does
nothing but disturb the order of things, the right to property, whereas the former
attacks the reality principle itself. Transgression and violence are less serious
because they only contest the distribution of the real. Simulation is infinitely
more dangerous because it always leaves open to supposition that, above and beyond
its object, law and order themselves might be nothing but simulation. But the difficulty
is proportional to the danger. How to feign a violation and put it to the test?
Simulate a robbery in a large store: how to persuade security that it is a simulated
robbery? There is no objective diference: the gestures, the signs are the same as
for a real robbery, the signs do not lean to one side or another. To the established
order they are always of the order of the real. Organize a fake holdup. Verify
that your weapons are harmless, and take the most trustworthy hostage, so
that no human life will be in danger (or one lapses into the criminal). Demand a
ransom, and make it so that the operation creates as much commotion as possible- in
short, remain close to the truth, in order to test the reaction of the
apparatus to a perfect simulacrum. You wont be able to do it: the network of
artificial signs will become inextricably mixed up with real elements (a policeman will
really fire on sight; a client of the bank will faint and die of a heart attack; one will
actually pay you the phony ransom), in short, you will immediately find yourself
once again, without wishing it, in the real, one of whose functions is precisely
to devour any attempt at simulation, to reduce very thing to the realthat is,
to the established order itself, will before institutions and justice come into

play. It is necessary to see in this impossibility of isolating the process of

simulation the weight of an order that cannot see and conceive of anything but
the real, because it cannot function anywhere else. The simulation of an offense, if it is
established as such, will either be punished less severely (because it has no
consequences) or punished as an offense against the judicial system (for example if
one sets in motion a police operation for nothing)but never as simulation since it is
precisely as such that no equivalence with the real is possible, and hence no repression
either. The challenge of simulation is never admitted by power. How can the
simulation of virtue be punished? However, as such it is as serious as the simulation of
crime. Parody renders submission and transgression equivalent, and that is the most
serious crime, because it cancels out the difference upon which the law is based. The
established order can do nothing against it, because the law is a simulacrum of the
second order, whereas simulation is of the third order, beyond true and false, beyond
equivalences, beyond rational distinctions upon which the whole of the social and power
depend. Thus, lacking the real, it is there that we must aim at order. This is certainly
why order always opts for the real. When in doubt, it always prefers this
hypothesis (as in the army one prefers to take the simulator for a real
madman). But this becomes more and more difficult, because if it is practically
impossible to isolate the process of simulation, through the force of inertia of
the real that surrounds us, the opposite is also true (and this reversibility itself
is part of the apparatus of simulation and the impotence of power): namely, it
is now impossible to isolate the process of the real, or to prove the real. This is
how all the holdups, airplane hijackings, etc. are now in some sense simulation
holdups in that they are already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration
rituals of the media, anticipated in their presentation and their possible
consequences. In short, where they function as a group of signs dedicated exclusively
to their recurrence as signs, and no longer at all to their real end. But this does not
make them harmless. On the contrary, it is as hyperreal events, no longer with
a specific content or end, but indefinitely refracted by each other (just like socalled historical events: strikes, demonstrations, crises, etc.), it is in this sense that they
cannot be controlled by an order that can only exert itself on the real and the
rational, on causes and ends, a referential order that can only reign over the referential, a
determined power that can only reign over a determined world, but that cannot do
anything against this indefinite recurrence of simulation, against this nebula whose
weight no longer obeys the laws of gravitation of the real, power itself ends by being
dismantled in this space and becoming a simulation of power (disconnected
from its ends and its objectives, and dedicated to the efects of power and
mass simulation). The only weapon of power, its only strategy against this
defection is to reinject the real and the referential everywhere, to persuade us
to the reality of the social, of the gravity of the economy and the finalities of
production. To this end it prefers the discourse of crisis, but also, why not? That of
desire. Take your desires for reality! can be understood as the ultimate slogan of power
since in a nonreferential world, even the confusion of the reality principle and the
principle of desire is less dangerous than contagious hyperreality. One remains among
principles, and among those power is always in the right. Hyperreality and simulation are
deterrents of every principle and every objective, they turn against power the deterrent
that it used so well for such a long time. Because in the end, throughout its history it was
capital that first fed on the destructuration of every referential, of every human objective,
that shattered every ideal distinction between true and false, good and evil, in order to
establish a radical law of equivalence and exchange, the iron law of its power. Capital
was the first to play at deterrence, abstraction, disconnection, deterritorialization, etc.,

and if it is the one that fostered reality, the reality principle, it was also the first to
liquidate it by exterminating all use value, all real equivalence of the states and the
omnipotence of manipulation. Well, today it is this same logic that is even more set
against capital. And as soon as it wishes to combat this disastrous spiral by secreting as
last glimmer of reality, on which to establish a last glimmer of power, it does nothing but
multiply the signs and accelerate the play of simulation. As long as the historical threat
came at it from the real, power played at deterrence and simulation, disintegrating all the
contradictions by dint of producing equivalent signs. Today when the danger comes at it
from simulation (that of being dissolved in the play of signs), power plays at the real,
plays at crisis, plays at remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, and political stakes.
For power, it is a question of life and death. But it is too late. Whence the characteristic
hysteria of our times: that of the production and reproduction of the real. The other
production, that of values and commodities, that of the belle poque of political economy,
has for a long time had no specific meaning. What every society looks for in
continuing to produce, and to overproduce, is to restore the real that escapes
it. That is why today this material production is that of the hyperreal itself.
It retains all the features, the whole discourse of traditional production, but it
is not longer anything but its scaled-down refraction (thus hyperrealists fix a real
from which all meaning and charm, all depth and energy of representation have vanished
in a hallucinatory resemblance). Thus everywhere the hyperrealism of simulation
is translated by the hallucinatory resemblance of the real to itself. Power itself
has for a long time produced nothing but the signs of its resemblance. And at
the same time, another figure of power comes into play: that of a collective
demand for signs of power- a whole world adheres to it more or less in terror of
the collapse of the political. And in the end the game of power becomes
nothing but the critical obsession with powerobsession with its death,
obsession with its survival, which increases as it disappears. When it has
totally disappeared, we will logically be under the total hallucination of power
a haunting memory that is already rid of it (no one wants it anymore, everyone unloads it
on everyone else) and the panicked nostalgia over its loss. The melancholy of
societies without power this has already stirred up fascism, that overdose of a
strong referential in a society that cannot terminate its mourning.

DnG
The nomad deterritorializes territory
DnG 87 (Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, smart dudes, 1987, A
Thousand Plateaus, pg 381)
nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearences. If
the nomad can be called the Deterritiorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there
is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the
It is in this sense that

sedentary (the sedentarys relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, the state apparatus). With

the nomad, on the contrary, it is a deteritorialization that constitutes the relation

to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on
deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad a territory.
The land ceases to be land, tending to become simply ground (sol) or support .
The strategy of territorialization that is employed by the governments
of today allows for immense biopower, otherization and genocide.
Houtum & Naerssen 01 ( Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen. Henk is a Research Professor Geopolitics of Borders at the University of
Bergamo. Ton is a Senior Research Fellow at Radboud University Nijmegen. "Bordering, Ordering And Othering". Published October 2001 by the Nijmegen Centre for Border
Research . http://henkvanhoutum.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/TESG2002.pdf )

Bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent fixed point in space of time,
rather they symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation . Semantically, the word 'borders'
unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing

In democratic
societies borders are not 'made from above', rather they represent an implicit, often taken-for-granted,
agreement among the majority of people. Put differently, territorial borders
continuously fixate and regulate mobility of flows and thereby construct or reproduce places in space. Territorial
strategies of ordering, bordering and othering often take place, although certainly not
strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or products.

necessarily, at the spatial scale of states. For example, Sanjay Chaturvedi's paper in this issue, exemplifies the discourses and
strategies practiced between India and Pakistan, where practices of inclusion and exclusion are framed by nation-building projects
of the two countries, discursively uttered through differences in religion. He demonstrates how on both sides of the border national
education programmes reproduce and reinforce otherness. Spaan et al. (this issue) focus on the borders between Malaysia and
Indonesia. Recently, although not comparable in intensity to the case of India and Pakistan, tensions have increased in association
with the redefining of Malay identity and massive immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia. Knippenberg (this issue) shows that

practices of othering and cultural fragmentation are not merely practices or

interstate affairs, but also take place within states. He argues that a state territory hardly ever covers a
homogeneous population, yet it claims to represent and imagine one. In this claiming and producing of a
unity out of subcultures and different populations, some groups are ( voluntarily)
assimilated while others are or remain marginalized as semi-aliens. Such
bordering processes sometimes go as far as political practices or elimination, of
the cleansing of the other that lives inside an imagined community. The making of a place
must hence be understood as an act of purification, as it is arbitrarily searching for a justifiable, bounded cohesion of people and
their activities in space which can be compared and contrasted to other spatial entities. It can be seen as a spatial strategy (de
Certeau 1980). According to de Certeau a strategy presupposes a place that can be circumscribed as one's own (unpropre), and that
can serve as the base from which to direct relations with an exteriority consisting of targets or threats such a clients, competitors,
enemies and strangers. What

territorial human strategy does is classify space,

communicate a sense of place and enforce control over a place (Sack 1986). In doing so,
territorial strategy reifies power, displaces others, and depersonalizes,
neutralizes, fills and contains space (Sack 1986).

Territorialization justifies elimination of the other; Fear becomes the

standard
England 06 ( Marcia Rae England, grad candidate in the University of Kentucky for Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences.
"CITIZENS ON PATROL: COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE TERRITORIALIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON". Published
in 2006. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1363&context=gradschool_diss )

This dissertation shows how organizations, including local government and police, and
residents within Seattle, Washingtons East Precinct define and police the contours of
community, neighborhoods and public space. Under the rubric of public safety,
these players create territorial geographies that seek to include only those who fit
the narrowly conceived idea of a neighbor. Territoriality is exercised against the
social Other in an attempt to build a cohesive community while at the same time
excluding those who are seen as different or as non-conformant to acceptable
behaviors in the neighborhood. This research provides a framework through which to examine
how community policing produces an urban citizen subject and an idea of who belongs in
public space. This work also combines discourses of abjection and public space showing how the
two are linked together to form a contingent citizenship. Contingent citizenship describes a
particular relationship between geography and citizenship. As I frame it, contingent
citizenship is a public citizenship where one must conform to a social norm and act in a
prescribed, appropriate way in the public sphere or fear repercussions such as incarceration,
public humiliation or barring from public parks.
*Read Baudrillard homogenization cards with this

Cap and ableism

Anarchy key to the elimination of ableism and capitalism
Moche et al 09 (Liat Ben Moche, Ph.D. student in sociology, disability studies, and womens studies at Syracuse University); Dave Hill
,Professor of Education Policy, University of Northampton, England; Anthony J. Nocella II ,professor at Le Moyne College; and Bill Templar, Faculty of
Education at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur and is a staff member in the Simon Dubnow Institute for Jewish History and Culture at the
University of Leipzig. "Dis-abling capitalism and an anarchism of 'radical equality' in resistance to ideologies of normalcy". Published in the journal of
Contemporary Anarchist Studies in 2009. https://libcom.org/files/Contemporary_Anarchist_Studies.pdf )

Disability Studies is a relatively new academic field. It springs in part from the disability rights
movement and social change activism spurred largely by people labeled and marginalized as
disabled in numerous societies (Barnes et al. 2002; Kafka 2003; Malhotra 2001). Like
Feminist and Queer Studies, Disability Studies provides a conceptual framework for a critique of
law, culture, and society. Disability Studies deconstructs and reconstructs the meaning of
disability through investigating the social construction of disability, the power structures that
support and enhance ableism, and the idea of normalcy. The basic approach that all disability
studies scholars share is that disability is not an inherent trait located in the disabled persons
body and mind, but a result of socio-cultural dynamics that occur in interactions between
society and people defined as disabled. An important point to address at the outset is that all
people are different and have unique needs. Therefore, normal, average, or able are all
socially constructed terms. Disability, from this premise, is seen as a spectrum, not a binary
(dis/ability). The construction of dis/ability as a binary and the placement of
particular individuals on either side is a result of power relations and hegemonic
beliefs about ideal productive bodies and about notions of usefulness,
independence, and social and economic contributions. Writing on the notion of
anarchy as the antipode of fascism and the fascist conception that in unity there is
strength in uniformity there is strength, Alan Moore (2007) stresses that anarchy is
almost starting from the principle that in diversity, there is strength. Everybody
is recognized as having their own abilities, agendas, and their own need to work
cooperatively with other people in mutual and collaborative approaches. This is in
direct contrast to the current neoliberal, capitalist, and modernist narrative that
individuals are independent, without the need of community or group support.
Anarchist theory foregrounds diversity as the great social reservoir of human
particularity, with people, all different, working together in common toward mutual goals.
Capitalism contributes to the marginalization of those constructed as dis/abled by positioning
the individual as consumer and producer. Capitalism, especially in its post-war hyperconsumerist form, works to reduce our humanity and citizenship to these two roles, both
of which support capitalism. For example, consumption supports the engines of production
because people have to sell their labor-power in order to purchase, and capitalism (through
the ideological and repressive apparatuses of the state (Althusser 1971; Hill 2004),
engages in permanent culture wars to capture and/or inflame peoples
consumerist materialistic desires and ideological support (Gramsci 1989; Marcuse
1969). But until everyone is respected as being different and not measured
according to an imaginary notion of a normal person, there will be those that are
marginalized, disabled, and challenged in a culture that constructs bodies along a
binary typology as either normal or

Nietzsche
We have become superman, in our radical freedom from the norms
and morals of debate

Zombies
We speak not of the zombies we see in TV shows such as the walking
dead or psychological zombies but of phenomenological zombies,
zombies deprived of consciousness and any value to life
Chalmers 95 (David Chalmers, Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose,
1995, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Theory for Conscious
Existence, pg 85, accessed 9/10/16)
This sort of zombie is quite unlike the zombies found in Hollywood movies, which
tend to have significant functional impairments. The sort of consciousness that
Hollywood zombies most obviously lack is a psychological version: typically, they
have little capacity for introspection, and lack a refined ability to voluntarily
control behavior. They may or may not lack phenomenal consciousness; as Block
(1995) points out, it is reasonable to suppose that there is something it tastes like
when they eat their victims. We can call these psychological zombies; I am
concerned with phenomenal zombies, which are physically and functionally
identical, but which lack experience. (Perhaps it is not surprising that
phenomenal zombies have not been popular in Hollywood, as there would be
obvious problems with their depiction.)
Zombies as I have described them are a strange idea, and it is unlikely that they
are empirically possible. In practice, it is likely that any replica of me would be
conscious. But the question is not whether it is plausible that zombies could exist
in our world; the question is whether the notion of a zombie is coherent. On the
face of it, the notion seems entirely intelligible. If this is correct, the conclusion is
established.
Arguing for a logical possibility is not entirely straightforward. How, for example,
would one argue that a mile-high unicycle is logically possible? It just seems
obvious. Al- though no such thing exists in the real world, the description
certainly appears to be coher- ent. If someone objects that it is not logically
possibleit merely seems that way there is little we can say, except to repeat
the description and assert its obvious coherence. It seems quite clear that there is
no hidden contradiction lurking in the description.
I confess that the logical possibility of zombies seems equally obvious to me. A
zombie is just something physically identical to me, but which has no conscious
experienceall is dark inside. While this is probably empirically impossible, it
certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no
contradiction in the description. In some ways an assertion of this logical
possibility comes down to a brute intuition, but no more so than with the
unicycle. Almost everybody, it seems to me, is capable of conceiving of this

possibility. Some may be led to deny the possibility in order to make some theory
come out right, but the justification of such theories should ride on the question
of possibility, rather than the other way around