Goitia vs.

Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252
Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally
married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted
marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which
the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to
maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take
refuge in the home of her parents.
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause
of action.
Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant,
who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The
law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife
was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the
defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of
the conjugal home.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO
GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as man
and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain.
Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him
as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be
declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband
was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification
for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
HELD: NO.

It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of

the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined
to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of
these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved
from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
#54 ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ 42 Phil 54
GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
(Matrimonial Home)

Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years
when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that
asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial
judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued illtreatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed.

Issues:
(1)
Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was
with sufficient justification.
(2)
Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff
has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife.

(3)
Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory
injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with
him as his dutiful wife.

Held:
(1) No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband
were not proven;

(2) The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife
is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and
143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode
and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him
to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay
the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing
such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of
society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing
the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step
involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which
is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this
consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from
the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done
nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is
under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit
with him.

(3) Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case
is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint.
Held: judgment appealed from in
cross-bill, it is declared that
home without sufficient cause;
return. Plaintiff absolved from

respect both to the original complaint and the

Dolores has absented herself from the marital
and she is admonished that it is her duty to
cross-complaint.

VALDEZ v. CA and LAGON

Facts:
Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina de Leon Valdez were the owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 24,725 square meters located in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. The property was designated
as Lot No. 3 and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) issued on August 18, 1967.
When Carlos Valdez, Sr. died intestate on March 26, 1966, he was survived by Josefina and
their children, including Carlos Valdez, Jr., a practicing lawyer.
December 28, 1978- Josefina caused the subdivision survey of the property into eight (8) lots
(3-A to 3-H), all fronting the national road. To enhance the value of the property, she decided to
sell a portion thereof to Jose Lagon, a businessman in Sultan Kudarat who owned the Lagon
Enterprises and the Rural Bank of Isulan.
May 1, 1979, Josefina executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing her son, Carlos, Jr. to
sell a portion of Lot No. 3-C and Lot. No. 3-D to Lagon. The lots subject of the sale had an area
of 4,094 square meters, with a frontage of 64.3 square meters.
Part of the consideration of the transaction was that Lagon will cause the transfer of the Rural
Bank of Isulan to the property and construct a commercial building beside the bank.
On May 9, 1979, Josefina, through her son and attorney-in-fact, Carlos, Jr., executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale of a portion of Lot No. 3 with a frontage of 64.3 square meters in favor of Lagon.
However, the condition imposed by Josefina was not incorporated in the deed; although the SPA
executed by Josefina was appended thereto. It was indicated in the deed that the property was
to be sold for P80,000 cash and that Lagon had already paid the said amount to Carlos, Jr. In
reality, however, Lagon purchased the 4,094-square-meter property at P40.00 per square meter,
or for the amount of P163,760 inclusive of Carlos, Jr.s personal account to Lagon in the amount
of P73,760. Lagon had not yet remitted to Josefina the said amount of P163,760.
April 21, 1981: Lagon issued several postdated checks as payment, a balance of 61,800 was
left unpaid.
April 27, 1981:Carlos, Jr. prepared an Affidavit signed by Lagon. Where it was stated that Lagon
had agreed to undertake the transfer of the Rural Bank of Isulan to the property and construct a
commercial building thereon and such must be complied with within five years from the date of
the deed of absolute sale and failure to comply with the said conditions would make the deed of
sale null and void. Lagon also made it clear in the said affidavit that the consideration of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale was not only the P80,000.00 purchase price, but also that the subject
property be commercialized.
Lagon failed to comply with the condition to effect the transfer of the Rural Bank and to pay the
balance. Consequently, Josefina and Carlos Jr. refused to deliver the torrens title of the property
to Lagon. Lagon failed to comply even after several demands by the vendor. Later, Carlos Jr
wrote again to Lagon to propose the reduction of the area of the property subject of the sale to
correspond to the amount already paid by Lagon. Lagon did not reply.
In the meantime, the TCTs of the 8 parcels of land were cancelled. All subdivision titles were
under the name of "Josefina L. Valdez, married to Carlos Valdez, Sr.

On December 31, 1982, Josefina and her children executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Carlos Valdez, Sr. in which the heirs waived all their rights over the estate in favor
of their mother, Josefina.
On December 1, 1983, Geodetic Engineer Santiago C. Alhambra conducted a subdivision
survey of Lot No. 3-C, covered by TCT No. 16438 into three (3) subdivision lots 3-C-1, 3-C-2,
and 3-C3. Engr. Alhambra prepared a subdivision plan on his survey which he submitted to the
Bureau of Lands on December 12, 1983. Lagon paid for his professional services.
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIB) in Isulan talked to Carlos, Jr. and offered to buy
Lot No. 3-C-2 for P100.00 per square meter. Carlos, Jr. agreed. Josefina executed a deed of
absolute sale on May 8, 1984, over Lot No. 3-C-2 for P35,000.00 in favor of PCIB. PCIB was
given a new title and this was registered in the RD
On June 11, 1987, the deed of extrajudicial settlement earlier executed by the heirs of Carlos
Valdez, Sr. was filed and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. On June 16, 1987,
Josefina executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 3-D in favor of Engr. Rolendo Delfin, who was issued
a new TCT over the property.
To remind Lagon of the conditions of the sale, Carlos, Jr. furnished Lagon with a machine copy
of the said affidavit on August 12, 1987. Lagons counsel, Atty. Ernesto I. Catedral pointed
outout that he had earlier sought Lagons consent for the construction of the PCIB Branch in Lot
No. 3. Catedral posited that by consenting to the sale of the property to PCIB and the
construction thereon of its branch office, Lagon thereby substantially complied with his
undertaking under the deed of absolute sale.
On August 4, 1988, Josefina executed a real estate mortgage over Lot No. 3-C-3 in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for a loan of P150,000.00. Josefina
executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot No. 3-C-1 in favor of her son, Carlos, Jr. on February
21, 1989. A new TCT was issued in favor of Carlos Jr. As of that time, a nipa hut, PCIB branch,
a pharmacy, the K house, and the headquarters of the Nacionalista Party were already
constructed on the lot.
September 24, 1990, Lagon filed a Complaint against Josefina, and Carlos, Jr., in his capacity
as attorney-in-fact of Josefina, for specific performance and damages with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
Lagon testified that Josefina failed to deliver the title to the property he purchased from
her, as well as the possession thereof; hence, he was not certain of the metes and
bounds of the property and could not secure a building permit for the transfer and
construction of the Rural Bank of Isulan, as well as the commercial building. Besides,
Carlos, Jr. secured his permission for the construction of the PCIB commercial building on Lot
No. 3-C-2 which was sold to him by Josefina, and even agreed to the deduction of the purchase
price thereof; hence, the balance was only P26,880. Lagon demanded that the title to the
property be turned over to him and the occupants thereof be evicted therefrom so that he could
comply with the conditions of the sale for the construction of the commercial building and the
transfer of the Isulan Rural Bank.
On the other hand, Josefina and her son alleged that Lagon had no cause of action against
them because he failed to comply with the terms of the deed of absolute sale, his undertaking
under his affidavit, and to pay the purchase price of the property in full. Carlos, Jr. denied
securing Lagons consent to the construction of the PCIB branch on Lot 3-C-2, and agreeing to

deduct P35,000 from the balance of Lagons account for the purchase price of the property.
Josefina and Carlos, Jr. interposed counterclaims for damages and attorneys fees.
On January 20, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lagon.
Josefina and Carlos, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE HAS NO VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THEM CONSIDERING
THAT HE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF HIS WRITTEN
CONTRACTS WITH THE DEFENDANTS and erred IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE ACT OF
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS IN RESCINDING THEIR CONTRACT WITH THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS PERFECTLY LEGAL, VALID, EFFECTIVE AND BINDING ON
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
Initially, CA ruled in favor of Josefina. Later, CA reversed itself and rendered an Amended
Decision, setting aside its decision and affirming that of the RTC
Hence the petition in SC
Issues:
a) W/N THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES BEING SUBJECT TO THE SUSPENSIVE
CONDITIONS AGREED UPON WAS A CONTRACT TO SELL OR A CONTRACT OF SALE?
(k of Sale)
b) w/n THE PETITIONERS HAD THE RIGHT TO RESCIND THEIR CONTRACT WITH
PRIVATE RESPONDENT? (yes)
c) w/n PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HIS CLAIM FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES CONSIDERING HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
SUSPENSIVE CONDITIONS AGREED UPON? (no)
Held:
The Subject Property is the Exclusive Property of Josefina de Leon Valdez
We note that the title covering the property was issued on August 18, 1967, during the marriage
of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and petitioner Josefina, under the name "Josefina L. Valdez
married to Carlos Valdez, Sr." The issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not
determinative of the conjugal nature of the property, since there is no showing that it was
acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina L. Valdez The
presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during marriage is
conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is
registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said
spouse.
Petitioner Josefina Valdez and the Respondent entered into a Contract of Sale over the Subject
Property
Petitioner Josefina executed a SPA in favor of her son, Carlos, Jr., authorizing the latter to sell
the subject property, and Josefina, through her son, executed the deed of absolute sale over the

subject property. She also acknowledged receipt of partial payments of the purchase price of
the property on April 21, 1981 through her attorney-in-fact; the balance of the purchase price
thus stood at P61,880.00 There is, likewise, no dispute that the respondent signed the affidavit
on April 27, 1981. The parties, however, differ on the real nature of their transaction and on
whether the said affidavit formed an integral part of the deed of absolute sale executed by
petitioner Josefina in favor of the respondent.
The real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written
agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties thereto. In the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to
be pursued
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the constructive
or actual delivery thereof, as provided for in Article 1477 of the New Civil Code. The vendor
loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved
or rescinded by a notarial deed or by judicial action as provided for in Article 1540 of the
New Civil Code. A contract is one of sale, absent any stipulation therein reserving title
over the property to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price nor giving the
vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract in case of non-payment. In a contract
of sale, the non-payment of the price is a resolutory condition which extinguishes the
transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligations created thereunder. In
a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive
condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from becoming effective.
The deed is one of sale, not a contract to sell. The deed specifically states that the
property is sold and delivered to the respondent as vendee. Josefina even warranted the
peaceful possession and ownership of the respondent over the property subject of the
transaction. She did not reserve the ownership over the property, as well as any right to
unilaterally rescind the contract. There has been, by the execution of the said deed, a
constructive delivery of the property to the respondent; hence, the latter acquired ownership
over the same. Upon payment of the purchase price, petitioner Josefina was obliged to deliver
the torrens title over the property to and under the name of the respondent as the new owner
and place him, as vendee, in actual possession thereof; otherwise, the failure or inability to do
so constitutes a breach of the contract sufficient to justify its rescission.
However, we rule that the deed of absolute sale was unenforceable as of the date of its
execution, May 9, 1979. This is so, because under the Special Power of Attorney petitioner
Josefina executed in favor of her son, petitioner Carlos, Jr., the latter was authorized to sell the
property on cash basis only; petitioner Josefina likewise required the construction of a
commercial building and the transfer of the Rural Bank of Isulan, as part of the consideration of
the sale to be incorporated in the said deed as part of the respondents obligation as vendee
In sum, then, the respondent had no cause for specific performance against the
petitioners. However, the petitioners are obliged to refund to the respondent the latters partial
payments for the subject property
Facts:

Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months
after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned
for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. Ahouse
and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and
Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint.
Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with
Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issues:
1. Who owns the riceland?
2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial courts decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the
nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between Miguel and
Carlina and the termination of their conjugal partnership?
4. Can Kristophers status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated
in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession?
5. Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-defendant in the case?
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for
cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on
July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
theiractual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or

income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22 years of age and Miguel was
already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought 2 months
before she and Miguel actually cohabited to exclude their case from the operation of
Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the
riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even
assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of coownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of Miguel
and Carlina.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00
on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of
this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. The
transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of the Civil Code because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should
not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceedinginstituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery
of
ownership
and
possession.

5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the
case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).

Agapay vs. Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left
to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia
was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957,
Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in
the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child
Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979,
they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get
back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by
Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded
in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with
Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual
contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of
buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court

that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the
land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who
was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering
his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as
her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without
judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the
deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim
that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The
lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

Mrs. Henry Harding vs Commercial Union Assurance Company

38 Phil. 464 Mercantile Law Insurance Law Representation Warranty
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as
a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in
the Philippines. The cars value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic
(Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The
mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This
estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also
disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an
agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as
to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union
also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her
husband] is void under the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

HELD: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made
by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the
cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00
and then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to
P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was
effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this
valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated
value.

MRS. HENRY E. HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-12707, August 10, 1918
Procedural History
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest,
alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs
judgment for the amount demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant
appeals.
Statement of Facts
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift
from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The cars value was
estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car
was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done,
estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs.
Harding to Smith, Bell and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta
Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the
cost of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated
that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under
the Civil Code.

Issue
Whether or not Commercial is liable.
Answer
Yes. Commercial is liable.
Where it appears that the proposal form, while signed by the insured was made out by the person
authorized to solicit the insurance (Luneta and Smith Bell) the facts stated in the proposal, even
if incorrect, will not be regarded as warranted by the insured, in the absence of willful
misstatement. Under such circumstances, the proposal is to be regarded as the act of the insurer.
Reason
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that the effect of a valuation in a
policy of fire insurance is the same as in a policy of marine insurance.
By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of marine insurance is
conclusive if the insured had an insurable interest and was not guilty of fraud.
Holding
The court, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in
question and had an insurable interest therein; that there was no fraud on her part in procuring
the insurance; that the valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding
upon the defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the court below is, therefore, correct
and must be affirmed, with interest, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellant.
Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez
No. L-23002 July 31, 1967
Reyes J.B.L.;
Facts: Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she had
one living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929
with Domingo Rodriguez, a widower with four children by a previous marriage, named
Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez.
Prior to marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the registered owner of
2 fishponds located in Bulacan. Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a deed of
sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid properties to her daughter, Concepcion
calderon for the sum of P2,500 which the latter in turn appeared to have transferred to
her mother and stepfather.

Domingo Rodriguez died intestate survived by the widow, 3 children and 3

grandchildren who then entered into an extra judicial settlement consisting of one-half of
the properties allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. The fishpond was divided
as such: belongs to the widow, owned by the remaining children and goes to the
grandchildren. The children and grandchildren authorized Felix to manage their shares
in the fishpond. The children executed another document granting Felix a lifetime
usufruct over 1/3 of the fishpond. The widow then appeared to have leased from the
children and grandchildren the fishpond for a period of 5 years.
At about this time their relationship has turned worse. Felix filed an action to
declare the deeds of transfer, null and void on the grounds of vitiated consent by force
and pressure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of properties from plaintiffs daughter to the
conjugal partnership.
HELD: What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an
action based upon it must be brought within four years after it has ceased; and the
present action was instituted only in 1962, 28 years after the intimidation is claimed to
have occurred and no less than 9 years after the supposed culprit died. On top of it,
appellant entered into a series of subsequent transaction with appellees that confirmed
the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore the cause of action is clearly
barred.
That the prices were not paid does not make the sales inexistent for want of
causa. The consideration need not pass from one to the other at the time the contract is
entered into. The consideration need not be paid at the time of the promise. The one
promise is a consideration for another.
Appellants inaction to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by
the lame excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of the effect
of that transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of diligence. Ignorance
which is the effect of inexcusable negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches.s
RODRIGUEZ vs.RODRIGUEZ.
G.R. No. L-23002 July 31, 1967
Procedural History:
This case is an appeal from the CFI for the declaration of contracts celebrated on
January 24, 1934.
Facts:
In 1929 Conception Felix, widow of Don Felipe Calderon whom she had one living
child with, married a Domingo Rodriguez, a widower who had four children named
Geronimo, Jose, Mauricio and Esmeralda.

Before the marriage to Domingo, Conception Felix owned two fishponds which she
then sold to her daughter Conception Calderon for 2,500 pesos on January 24, 1934.
but Conception Calderon soon after transferred the said properties to her mother
and stepfather which was registered and notarized in the names of Domingo and
Conception Felix Rodriguez.
Domingo Rodriguez then died intestate, soon after relationships between Appelant
and step children worsened.
Issue:
Whether or not Concepcion Felix Vda. De Rodriguez can claim delacration of nullity
for the said property and recover the property she gave thereon.
Held:
No, because the property was conjugal. The property becomes conjugal when it was
transferred to the plaintiff by her daughter and registered under the spouses name
with the consent of the parties thereto was voluntary.
Reasoning:
The court held that the property became conjugal the moment it was transferred by
the appellants daughter; and her knowledge of the said transfer cannot be denied
because she was even a party of it.
Holding: The Court affirmed the decision appealed from the lower court.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima,
Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of the property.
Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to
take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the
latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his
house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship
between Cirila and Francisco.
Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same
room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his
mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that
Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument

denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of
the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the
same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint
against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages.
Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of
Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two
persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other
is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that
Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of
Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and
his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights,
where the latter waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of
Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as
well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed
that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself
that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco
asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34
year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The
latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided
with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden.

Tabancura testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his
lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq
m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of
268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year
of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market
value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas
favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship
wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such as
application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that
she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to
the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael Case Digest

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots
in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him
after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner
Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said
she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the

donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years. Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed
of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null
and void.