Technical Aspects

Many studies have been undertaken on the technical aspects of the Bakun HEP,
particularly those relating to the safety of the dam and structures as well as the
feasibility of transmitting electricity through long submarine cables. Although both the
dam and the submarine cables are larger and longer than those associated with
projects existing today, the Bakun HEP does not represent a 'quantum leap'. The
technical studies completed to-date and the final design, which will be carried out
during project implementation, will ensure that the Bakun HEP will be safe and
efficient.
Evolution Of The Bakun HEP Dam Design
Master Plan Studies, 1981
The Bakun HEP site, proposed on the Balui River, Sarawak, as shown in Map I, was
first identified and studied as part of the 1981 "Master Plan for the Power System
Development of Sarawak", the third of a series of studies following those carried out
in 1962/63 and 1977/79. This comprehensive study identified more than 150
potential projects, of which the largest was Bakun. Further, a multistage screening of
technical, economic and other relevant merits of the identified power projects was
performed leading to the selection of the Bakun project as the best hydroelectric
project in terms of its hydrological efficiency.
Following the initial project screening, the Government directed that further
investigations be based on a maximum power demand scenario involving High
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) bulk transmission to Peninsula Malaysia. The Bakun
HEP, along with ten other projects, was subsequently selected for more detailed
investigations reaching a pre-feasibility level.
Geological and topographical assessments led to the conclusion that the Bakun site
would allow a dam of about 200 metres high, for which only a rockfill or arch dam
would be suitable. Pending further geological investigations, the study concluded
that a 206-metre-high concrete arch dam would be cheaper than the rockfill dam
alternative for the narrow, V-shaped valley at the Bakun dam site.
Bakun Hydroelectric Project Feasibility Report, 1983
The overall feasibility study initiated by SESCo and carried out by a consortium of
German consultants, commenced in October 1981. Three types of dams were
considered anew to determine the optimal height of the dam, viz a rockfill dam, a
concrete gravity dam, and a concrete arch dam. The concrete arch dam was
selected for the detailed feasibility design studies based on (1) feasibility-level
layouts and cost estimates prepared for each dam type alternative, and (2) the
length of time to complete each alternative.

BAKUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT SITE

The significant features, resulting from the detailed feasibility studies of the general
layout and major components of the project, are highlighted below:
a 204-metre high concrete arch dam with a crest length of about 1,100 metres
and a total concrete volume of 3.9 million cubic metres (mcm). Four bottom
outlets with a combined outflow capacity of 6,700 cubic metres per second
(cumecs) were incorporated in the middle section of the arch dam, controlled
by four radial gates;
an underground powerhouse with eight 300-MW Francis units, giving a total
generating capacity of 2,400 MW. The main transformers and the switchgear
were housed in a separate cavern situated downstream of the powerhouse
cavern;
an inlet bay in front of the intake structure consisting of eight steel-lined
pressure shafts and an outlet bay downstream comprising eight tailrace
tunnels;
a concrete chute spillway with six radial gates situated at the left abutment.
The spillway would have capacity of 17,040 cumecs; and
a river diversion scheme comprising upstream and downstream cofferdams
and two concrete-lined diversion tunnels located at the left abutment. The two
tunnels have a combined discharge capacity of 5,175 cumecs.
Panel Evaluation in Mid-1980s
A panel of experts, comprising Dr. John Newberry, Ivor Pinkerton, et. al., issued four
reports between 1985 and 1986 regarding the design of the hydropower component
of the Bakun project and the preparation of bid documents for the construction of
these works. The Panel assisted in the design evolution during this period.
During the design development under the Panel's review, additional geological
exploration showed the site to be less favourable for an arch dam than earlier
explorations had indicated. The Panel preferred an earth core rockfill dam (ECRD),

provided suitable core material within economic haulage distance of the dam site
could be found. Otherwise, the Panel suggested the adoption of a concrete face
rockfill dam (CFRD).
In view of the geological conditions, the revised layout incorporated both the power
facilities (including a surface powerhouse) and the spillway on the left bank.
Diversion capacity was raised to allow for a 1-in-500-year flood. The design at this
point incorporated three 12-metre-diameter concrete lined diversion tunnels with the
main cofferdam (which forms part of the upstream rockfill zone of the main dam)
some 85 metres in height.
Project Conceptualisation Using CFRD Instead Of ECRD, 1991 - 1994
Except for the undertaking of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 1989,
the project was essentially dormant until 1990, when a revised cost estimate was
prepared. This was followed in 1991 by a proposal from a private sector consortium
to build, own and operate the Bakun project. This proposal included a number of
recommendations to accelerate the implementation and lower costs, among which
the principal one was that the dam be a CFRD instead of an ECRD.
SESCo employed the same panel of experts to review this proposal in September
1991. Although the Panel concluded that the CFRD was as good as the ECRD, the
technology for the latter was "well proven" for a 210 metre-high dam. At the same
time, the Panel reiterated its stand that an ECRD had always been contingent upon
the availability of suitable core material and that the possibility of a CFRD was not
technically ruled out.

The Kenyir HEP, Terengganu

Ekran Berhad Proposal, 1994

In April 1994, Ekran Berhad submitted to the Government a conceptual proposal to
implement the Bakun HEP on a privatised basis. The Government responded with an
invitation for a detailed proposal from Ekran Berhad to develop and operate the
project and its associated facilities. The proposal was submitted to the Economic
Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister's Department in November 1994.

The selection on the type of dam to be constructed at the Bakun site was subjected
to extensive study in the proposal because the dam type is of paramount importance
to the cost of the project and the completion schedule. Another consideration was
that although a CFRD at Bakun may still be the highest of its type in the world, in the
period since 1987, many such dams approaching the height of the Bakun dam have
been completed. The study focused on a comparison between a slightly modified
ECRD and a CFRD, finally supporting the choice of a CFRD. Further modifications
were made to the rest of the project design presented in the earlier bid documents
mainly to reduce construction costs and/or the construction period.
Technical Evaluation Of Ekran Berhad's Proposal
The Government, with the assistance of Harza Engineering, undertook a detailed
review of technical, financial, economic and management aspects of the proposal.
The guiding principles behind the review were the control of risk, the maximisation of
predictability, the enhancement of the bidding process and the maximisation of the
long-term benefits of the project to the Malaysian economy.
In respect of the technical aspects, the review recommended the following:
CFRD Design Details
Significant elements of the design of CFRDs include (1) the details of the
peripheral joint between the deck and the plinth, (2) the rockfill in that area,
and (3) the longitudinal joint details. The review emphasised a need to outline
these details carefully in the bid documents because of the necessity to
minimise deformation and joint openings.
In the variable foundation, there are some areas where geological conditions
require positive measures to extend the seepage path and to protect the
structure against erosion of material under high water head.
A programmed of additional drilling along the line of the proposed plinth would
be useful to provide bidders with further insight concerning the extent of
special measures that would be required to address potentially unfavourable
orientations of the plinth line.
Strict delineation of materials zoning compound the stockpiling and blending
problems associated with the construction of the dam and would make the
construction schedule more critical. Instead, the use of fewer and more liberal
zones was proposed to enhance the ability of the contractor to complete the
project on time and at lower cost.
Diversion
It was suggested that construction of the integrated cofferdam be moved from
upstream to within the "central" area of the dam, allowing its formation to
comprise less high quality rockfill in that zone.

BAKUN HYDRO COMPONENT LAYOUT

CROSS SECTION OF THE BAKUN DAM

Power Intake And Spillway

Concerns about large excavation quantities, slope stability and support
requirements were raised in connection with these components of the
project. Modifications were suggested to reduce the quantities and
height of the cuts including shifting both the power intake and the
spillway toward the left abutment of the dam, with less space between
them.
Diversion Tunnels Length And Portals
By modifying the alignment, the length of each diversion tunnel could
be reduced by about 200 metres.

Powerhouse Type And Location

Further improvement by optimising the layout is possible, including (1)
choosing a powerhouse orientation more parallel with the river,
resulting in less excavation in the steep-sided valley; and (2) using six
units of 400 MW each rather than eight units of 300 MW, resulting in a
reduction of the length of the powerhouse and also excavation.
Penstock Size
Optimisation of the penstock size could result in a smaller diameter,
thus realising additional cost savings.

Technical Feasibility And Safety Of The Hydro Component

Evolution Of Rockfill Dam Designs
The rockfill dam is defined as an embankment dam that relies on rockfill as the major
structural element. The principal types of rockfill dams are the CFRD and the ECRD.
Although the use of rock in dams dates back to ancient times, the rockfill dam, as it
is known, is generally considered to have evolved from rock crib and timber face
rockfill dams created by miners during the California gold rush in the U.S. in the
1860s and 1870s. These dams were later taken over by irrigation and power
companies and supplemented by higher dams, with dumped rockfill, and with face
membranes constructed of concrete rather than of timber.
The development of the CFRD began primarily in the U.S. in the early 1900s. By the
late 1930s, the ECRD became popular and for about 20 years very few CFRDs were
constructed. After the 1950s, when dam construction of all types increased
throughout the world, significant advances were made both in the concrete face and
earth core dam types. The following section presents the evolution of the CFRD.
Early Period (1900 - 1940)
The rockfill dams built before 1910 were primarily timber faced, dumped
rockfills up to 30 metres in height with very steep slopes (0.5H:1V to
0.75H:1V), with a thin layer of hand placed rock on each face to maintain the
steep slope during dumping. These dams demonstrated the very high sheer
strength of dumped rockfill under low confining pressures and the usefulness
of rockfill as a dam building material. By 1910, the practice of hand placing
rocks on steep slopes was abandoned for economic reasons and the dumped
rockfill slope was adopted, thus eliminating expensive manual labour.
Early rockfill dams performed satisfactorily up to a height of 75 metres. Higher
dams, however, developed face cracks and excessive leakage, because of
the high compressibility of the dumped rockfill. The dams were still safe,
nonetheless, except when overtopped, and nearly all are in service today.
However, the high cost of repairing the face cracks and leakage in the higher

dams led to the poor reputation of CFRDs. This dramatically slowed the use
of high as well as low CFRDs in the following period.
Transition Period (1940 - 1970)
Construction of CFRDs resumed in the 1950s. However, once again the
higher dams with dumped rockfill experienced leakage problems and costs
were excessive. A major breakthrough occurred when dumped rockfill was
replaced with compacted rockfill. This transition began in 1955, and since
1967, no dams of the dumped rockfill type have been constructed. The
compacted rockfill achieved the higher modulus of compressibility that was
desired to enable the concrete face to perform better. To obtain the higher
modulus, the smooth drum vibratory roller (used earlier in highway
construction) was employed, and soon became a standard piece of
equipment in CFRD construction. In addition to reviving the construction of
CFRDs, compacted rockfill enabled small rocks of low compressive strength
to be utilised.
Modern Period (1970 - Present)
The use of compacted rockfill enabled dams to be designed with limited
deformation and as a result many CFRDs were constructed throughout the
world in increasing numbers and for increasing heights. During this period, a
major new development in their design was the use of a slipformed, nearly
monolithic face slab, with no horizontal contraction joints. This feature was
first employed in the 40-metre-high Piedras Dam in Spain, completed in 1970.
Following the successful use of this monolithic face slab in three Australian
Dams (Pindari in 1970, Kangaroo Creek in 1970, and Cethana in 1971), all
subsequent dams worldwide were designed with it.
Following the construction of the 110-metre-high Cethana Dam, the
development of CFRDs progressed rapidly throughout the world. The
completed modern CFRDs, that broke previously set height precedents, in the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s were Alto Anchicaya in Colombia, Foz de Areia in
Brazil and Aguamilpa in Mexico, respectively.
The performance of the many and increasingly high CFRDs during this
modern period has demonstrated that a substantial pool of experience exists
which can be used to construct with confidence dams of more than 200
metres in height. Currently, several CFRDs, up to 220 metres in height, are
under consideration throughout the world. A list of the world's highest CFRDs
(higher than 100 metres) either completed or under construction.

World's Highest CFRDs

Name of Dam
Aguamilpa

Country

Year Of
Completion

Height
(metre)

Mexico

1993

187

Tianshengqiao

China

1997

180

Foz de Areia

Brazil

1980

160

Xingo

Brazil

1994

150

Salvajina

Colombia

1983

148

Segredo

Brazil

1991

145

Alto Anchicaya

Colombia

1974

140

Chuza

Colombia

1978

135

Messochora

Greece

1994

135

Koman

Albania

1986

133

USA

1966

130

Golillas

Colombia

1978

130

Khao Laem

Thailand

1984

130

Shiroro

Nigeria

1984

130

Cirata

Indonesia

1987

125

Reece

Australia

1986

122

Neveri

Venezuela

1981

115

Portugal

1958

110

Yugoslavia

1967

110

Cethana

Australia

1971

110

Batang Ai,
Sarawak

Malaysia

1985

110

New Exchequer

Paradela
Rama

Optimisation Of The Bakun HEP Design

The project layout included in the tender documents has been reviewed by
competent engineers with worldwide experience to develop a project that would
provide optimum benefit and ensure safety. The reviews were oriented towards the
evaluation of the design concept, constructibility, implementation schedule and cost.
As a result of these reviews, several changes in the design and project layout have
already been made and substantial cost and construction time reductions have been
realised.
Safety Of Dam Design
Dam designers have recognised for many years that the common sense approach to
dam safety is to provide redundant lines of defense against abnormal behaviour.
Designers of modern dams follow this "defensive design" approach. The "defensive
design" approach uses engineering judgment and experience to select and
incorporate in the design of the dam, measures that provide protection against
catastrophic failure, mitigate the effects of unforeseen events and provide multiple
lines of defense. In general, the redundant safety measures are incorporated in the

dam without incurring excessive additional costs or introducing construction

schedule delays.
The main function of a dam is to retain the reservoir. This is accomplished by
incorporating a watertight element in the embankment. In the case of a CFRD,
watertightness depends on the upstream concrete face and the foundation. These
two elements interface in the plinth or perimeter slab. A brief description of these
details is as follows:

the concrete face is not monolithic but composed of vertical strips or slabs.
The joints between these vertical strips are carefully designed to
accommodate movement between slabs and preserve the continuity of the
face;
the concrete face-plinth joint, also called the perimetric joint, receives careful
attention during design, and later during construction, to control leakage. The
joint detail includes a zone of cohesionless silty soil or fly ash above,
waterstops and a joint filler within the joint, a sandasphalt pad and selected
granular fill underneath the joint;
the plinth, or base slab is a watertight concrete connection of the face slab to
the foundation, and is top of the grout curtain. The plinth increases the
seepage path below the concrete face; and
the foundation for the embankment and plinth of the CFRD are treated to
prevent leakages and erosion of the foundation. Treatment includes
excavation to competent rock, cleaning of the excavated surface before
casting the plinth on site, preserving the integrity of the rock foundation and
injecting under pressure, a cement-water grout into the foundation rock mass
to extend the monolithic action of the plinth into the rock.

In addition to the main features discussed above, several lines of defense are
incorporated in the design:

an impervious blanket of compacted soil is constructed in the lower part of the

concrete face and plinth. This blanket provides extra protection against
leakage through the joints in the slab and at the slab-plinth connection;
processed rock transition zones located below the slab provide support to the
slab and act as filters to control leakage through the concrete slab joints;
the rockfill body of the dam provides stability, and, because the rockfill is free
draining and highly resistant to erosion, provides a safe outlet to any leakage;
shotcrete or concrete is used to treat the foundation rock surfaces both
upstream and downstream from the plinth to preserve the integrity of the rock;
trenches backfilled with concrete are constructed beneath the plinth when the
foundation rock is weathered or previous; and
filter layers are placed on the foundation downstream of the plinth to control
any seepage emerging from the foundation.

Stability Of The Embankment

Rockfill dams, with an impervious upstream face, have been constructed for over
100 years. Their inherent stability has been established by their long service record
without failures.

The Khao Laem Concrete Face Rockfill Dam, Thailand

Compaction of the rockfill in layers of specified thickness, proper selection of

materials, careful treatment of the foundation and appropriate embankment slopes
can only improve their stability. At Bakun, detailed stability analysis of the dam has
been performed. During the final design phase and construction of the dam,
additional analyses will be performed to verify and confirm the stability.
Seismic Stability Of Bakun CFRD
The dam is located in an area of low to very low natural seismic activity. This is
confirmed by the fact that only twelve tremors have been felt in the area in the last
100 years. The project area is located in a stable block far from the seismically active
plate boundaries. The seismic hazard assessment indicates that the maximum
credible event (an event of Modified Mercalli Intensity 1o=VII) for the site would
generate a peak ground acceleration (for design purposes) corresponding to 0.1g
(gravitational pull). Modern CFRDs can safely withstand the ground shaking
associated with accelerations higher than this. In conclusion, seismicity at the site
does not constitute a safety issue nor a major design issue.
Although the dam and reservoir are both very large, the probability that the project
might trigger an earthquake is small because of the low natural seismicity of the
area, and the watertightness of the reservoir. Even if an earthquake were triggered
by the reservoir, that event will occur within the framework of the pre-existing low
seismic activity. Any reservoir-triggered earthquake will be smaller than the
maximum naturally occurring earthquake discussed above.
Occurrence of an earthquake would tend to cause small settlements of the dam.
Although no modern CFRD has been subjected to strong earthquake shaking,
Cogoti Dam, in Chile, an earlier dumped rockfill CFRD experienced shaking
generated by a large (magnitute 8.3) earthquake centred 16 kilometres away from
the site. The dam settled 38 centimetres at the crest. No damage of significance was
experienced. The earthquake shaking experience at Cogoti greatly exceeds the
ground movements that might be expected to occur at Bakun during an earthquake.

A modern well-compacted CFRD, such as Bakun, undergoing an earthquake would

experience smaller settlements that would not endanger the stability of the dam.
Several high CFRDs have been constructed in areas of moderate to high seismicity.
Of the above, only Foz do Areia, Brazil, is in an area low seismicity similar to Bakun.
All others are located in moderate to high seismicity areas. These CFRDs have been
designed and constructed using many of the defensive measures discussed above.

List of CFRDs in Seismic Areas

Height
(metre)

Seismicity of
Site

Bakun, Malaysia (u/d)

205

low

Sogamoso, Colombia
(u/d)

195

moderate to
high

Aguamilpa, Mexico

187

high

Tiangshengqiao, China
(u/c)

180

moderate

Foz do Areia, Brazil

160

low

Messochora, Greece
(u/c)

150

moderate

Salvajina, Colombia

145

moderate

Alto Anchicaya,
Colombia

140

moderate

Golillas, Colombia

130

moderate

Cirata, Indonesia

125

high

Dam

Note: u/d = under design; u/c = under construction

Reservoir Induced Seismicity

It is generally accepted that changes in water pressure within the rock mass
supporting the reservoir are the primary causes of observed reservoir induced
seismicity (RIS). It is also accepted, based on the available data on RIS, that
reservoir induced earthquakes require the existence of an active fault along which
the tectonic stresses can be relieved. The water pressure reduces the strength of
pre-existing fractures bringing their strength closer to the stress field existing within
the rock mass, facilitating the release of tectonic stresses through an earthquake.
Existing data also indicated that the RIS events are smaller than the maximum
naturally occurring earthquake. Conditions favouring RIS are not present at the
Bakun site except for the size and depth of the reservoir. The conditions at the
project site are as follows:

regional faults have not been detected in the reservoir area and the local
faults do not show significant displacements;
local historic seismicity is very low to non-existing, as discussed above;

the rock mass, formed by greywacke and shale/mudstone sequences,

presents low permeability; and
the groundwater elevations are high at the project site and within the
projected reservoir.

Ancillary Components
The project works are designed taking into consideration state-of-the-practice
procedures for each of the project elements. Safety concerns during operation and
construction are the primary influence on the selection of the technical solutions
adopted. This design process will continue during the construction phase, when the
detailed design will be prepared. To assure that the construction takes place
according to the design philosophy, detailed quality control procedures will be
established. These quality control procedures will encompass all construction
activities including environmental protection, river diversion, excavation, fill
placement, concrete construction, road construction, equipment fabrication,
equipment erection, initial filling of the reservoir and equipment start-up. The
procedures will include inspection and audit of construction procedures and
activities, including surveillance before work, in some cases, during work, after work,
and testing. To aid the process, instrumentation will be installed within the dam, its
foundation and at other major structures. Data provided by the instrumentation will
be evaluated during construction, first filling and initial operation, and during the
continued operation of the project. Specific technical and safety aspects for the most
important of the civil structures are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Segredo Concrete Face Rockfill Dam, Brazil

River Diversion Works

The river diversion works provide protection to the construction site, the
contractor's equipment and personnel, the project's civil works and
mechanical and electrical equipment during construction. The diversion
will consist of upstream and downstream cofferdams, three river
diversion tunnels and other ancillary structures. The river diversion
works are designed to provide protection from floods of up to 500-year
recurrence interval.
Three 12-metre internal diameter diversion tunnels, approximately
1400 metres long, will be used to evacuate the flood waters during

construction. The tunnels will be stabilised using rock bolts and

drainholes as well as through a process of consolidation grouting and
concrete lining. The concrete lining will also contribute to the safety of
the tunnels, protecting the rock excavation against erosion due to the
high flow velocities. One of the tunnels will be converted to a bottom
outlet after construction of the project. The intake structures are
designed to convey the flood waters in the tunnels with minimum
losses. The outlet structures are designed to protect the tunnels from
retrogressing erosion.

Kenyir HEP's spillway

Spillway
The spillway is composed of a gated ogee, an open concrete chute, a
flip bucket and a plunge pool. The ogee, with crest elevation of 209
metres, is divided into four 15 metre wide bays separated by 6.5 metrewide piers. The spillway will be founded on competent rock in a large
excavation. The slopes of this excavation will be designed for long-term
stability. The stabilisation measures will include regularly spaced rock
benches, a surface drainage system, drainholes and rock anchors.
The spillway is the safety valve of the reservoir dam system. When
inflows to the reservoir are larger than the outflows required for
generation, and the reservoir is full, these inflows need to be
discharged through the spillway by opening the gates. The amount of
opening depends on the volume of inflow, and is determined following
an operation rule designed to maximise the flows available for
generation but always considering the general safety of the dam. The
dimensions of the spillway are selected based on the Probable
Maximum Flood (PMF). The probability of occurrence of the PMF in
any single year approaches zero. Its recurrence interval is
indeterminate but is at least many thousands of years.
The flip bucket and plunge pool are designed to safely discharge the
flood waters away from the toe of the dam and the powerhouse. The
flip bucket is designed to be stable under the hydrodynamic forces
applied to it by the discharge flows, and the plunge pool is designed to

control the erosive forces of the discharged waters. Its sides will be
protected with a concrete slab anchored in the rock.
Water Conductors
The water conductors include the power intakes and the pressure
shafts and tunnels. The eight power intakes are joined together and
located in an excavation next to the spillway, in the left abutment of the
dam. The eight pressure shafts and tunnels convey the water from the
intake to the turbines in the powerhouse.
Power Intake The power intake structures are designed to safely
withstand the forces applied to them by the reservoir and inflow.
The external dimensions of the structures are selected to be
stable under static and earthquake conditions. The internal
dimensions of the intake structure are chosen based on the
requirements for the hydraulic passages and the dimensions of
the mechanical equipment housed in them.
Power Shafts And Tunnels The power shafts and tunnels are
designed to convey the water from the reservoir to the turbines
without large head losses. The geotechnical parameters of the
rock mass surrounding the tunnels, the relative position of each
tunnel, the groundwater regime in the tunnel area, both present
and future, after the project is in operation were considered
during the design process and will be continuously monitored
during the construction phase to obtain a safe and economical
power corridor. Additional tests within the rock mass will be
undertaken to provide appropriate parameters for detailed
design.
Powerhouse
The powerhouse will be of the surface type, located on the left bank of
the river, near the toe of the dam but separate from it. The powerhouse
will provide enough space to install and later operate all the equipment
necessary to generate energy using an installed capacity of 2,400 MW.
The powerhouse will be equipped with cranes of sufficient capacity to
handle the erection and later the maintenance of the equipment. In
general, although providing the spacing requirements for the electromechanical equipment, and a safe and comfortable working
environment, the powerhouse will be a very compact building to
decrease construction costs.
The substructure of the powerhouse will be founded on sound rock.
The dimensions of the substructure besides being controlled by the
space requirements of the equipment, will be selected to provide
sufficient weight for static and seismic stability, and to resist the
stresses imposed by gravitational, hydraulic and mechanical forces,
and the vibration of the equipment. The slopes of the excavation will be
designed for long-term stability. For this purpose, the excavation walls
will incorporate regularly spaced rock benches and a surface drainage
system, and drainholes and rock anchors will be placed where required
for stability. The substructure will also provide safety against flooding
due to a rising tailwater level.

The Powerhouse at the Jor Power Station, Perak

Energy And Power Generation

In order to assess the energy generation of the Bakun reservoir and power plant, a
simulation / optimisation type mathematical model was used. The model applies the
storage-continuity equation, driven by a series of reservoir inflows, taking into
account net evaporation from the lake, seepage looses and the reservoir storage
defined between the permissible maximum and minimum operating levels. In its
optimisation option, the applied algorithm maximises the continuous power output of
the reservoir. The optimisation procedure is based on a well-tested dichotomous
search technique which uses continuos power as its objective value.
The basic operating rule for each monthly interval was assumed as follows:

water release will be made so as to just meet the target continuous power;
should the continuous power release cause the reservoir to fall below the
minimum operating level, the water release is reduced such that this minimum
operating level is just reached at the end of the month; and
should the continuous power release cause the reservoir to rise above the
maximum operating level, the water release is increased to just reach the
maximum operating level at the end of the month; extra releases are turbined
as much as possible and the amount in excess of the total turbine capacity is
spilled.

The reservoir operation and power generation studies were carried out for the
reconstituted monthly-based hydrological period 1949 - 1993. At the maximum
operating level of 228 metres above sea level (m asl), the Bakun reservoir has a
surface area of 695 square kilometres and a storage capacity of 43.8 billion cubic
metres. At the minimum operating level of 195 m asl, the storage capacity is 24.6
billion cubic metres. The active storage volume of 19.2 billion cubic metres is
equivalent to about 178 days of mean reservoir inflow. The revised long-term mean
stream flow at the Bakun Discharge Measurement Station was determined to be
1,314 cumics.
The capacity and energy generation data for the Bakun hydroelectric power plant are
summarised.

The average monthly power and energy output, as well as the monthly energy
production during a wet year and dry year.

Capacity and Energy Generation of the

Bakun HEP
Maximum Generating Capacity (at 228
2,400 MW
metres asl)
Average Generating Capacity

2,359 MW

Minimum Generating Capacity (at 195

1,820 MW
metres asl)
Firm Capacity (delivered)

1,653 MW

Average Annual Energy Generation

16,785
GWh

Firm Annual Energy Generation

15,560
GWh

Average Plant Factor

80.0%

Firm/Average Energy Ratio

92.5%

MAP OF THE BAKUN HEP RESERVOIR AREA

CONTINUOUS POWER AND MAXIMUM GENERATING CAPACITY FOR 2,400 MW INSTALLED CAPACITY

Average Monthly Power and Energy Output (Installed Capacity 2,400

MW)
Energy Production
(GWh)

Generating
Capacity (MW)

Plant
Factor

Average
Production (GWh)

January

2,364

84

1,484

1,734

1,321

February

2,367

84

1,332

1,613

1,193

March

2,366

81

1,418

1,641

1,321

April

2,366

85

1,448

1,726

1,279

May

3,371

85

1,498

1,786

1,321

June

2,376

81

1,380

1,528

1,279

July

2,369

75

1,328

1,323

1,319

August

2,356

76

1,339

1,323

1,321

September

2,342

79

1,327

1,280

1,279

October

2,335

79

1,381

1,323

1,321

November

2,339

82

1,383

1,629

1,279

December

2,353

84

1,467

1,755

1,322

Year

2,359

80

16,785

18,661

15,555

Month

Wet Year Dry Year

Technical And Safety Aspects Of HVDC Submarine Cable

Evolution Of Cable Design Since The 1980s
For high power HVDC submarine cables, the principal area of development has
been in developing conductor insulating material to operate at higher voltages. This
in turn enables higher power levels to be achieved. Research is continuing into the
behaviour of cable insulation under changing temperature / pressure / stress
conditions, and both testing and operating experiences are being accumulated. The
operation of the Bakun cable will enable the project to take advantage of the latest
developments in this area. The control flexibility possible with modern HVDC
converter stations can therefore be used to increase the operating voltage on the
HVDC submarine cables when the conditions in the cables permit this.
Modern converter control technology utilises computer techniques. Consequently,
data can be continuously fed into the control system representing the conditions in
the cables in such a way that the HVDC converters will control the HVDC system to
avoid undesirable electrical conditions arising in the submarine cables. At least three,
and possibly four, HVDC schemes have control features specifically to cover aspects
of cable loading.
Although the Bakun project will have the longest and highest rated HVDC submarine
cables, this may be overtaken early next century by even longer installations. An
Iceland to Scotland (UK) submarine cable link is under serious study, which involves
a route length of over 900 kilometres. An Iceland-Norway alternative, which has also
been suggested, would involve a route length of over 1,200 kilometres, that is about
twice the Bakun cable route length. The power capacity being considered for the
Iceland project would require cables of similar rating (if not higher) to the Bakun
cables.
Originally, submarine cables were laid from conventional ships, in which the cable
was coiled in one or more holds, and paid out either over the bow or via the stern, as
the ship moved along the cable route. The Norwegians developed powered
turntables on a large barge for a project in 1976, which enabled easier laying of large
cables with satellite navigational positioning systems and a device to follow the
touch-down point of the cable on the sea floor. Such very accurate and highly
controlled cable laying has become the current practice. Turntable capacity is now
adequate for over 130 kilometres of the Bakun cable, or over 200 kilometres of a
slightly smaller cable.
Cables have been laid in a very wide range of conditions and depths. The Mersina
Straits cables were laid through an area of rocky outcrops and tidal currents up to six
knots. The Cook Strait New Zealand cables were laid at depths up to 260 metres,
through a zone in which weather and tidal changes were the predominant difficulties.
By comparison, the Bakun cable route is shallow, without difficult rock zones, and
without strong tidal currents or rough weather conditions.
An unusual feature of the Sarawak-Peninsular Malaysia cable route, is the high sea
floor temperature of around 29oC. Most cables to date have been installed in seas
where the temperatures are below 15oC, with many below 10oC. The maximum

design operating temperature for the paper insulation in the cable is usually 50oC,
such a high sea floor temperature means that there is a smaller temperature range
available for cable load current heating. The smaller temperature range does help
the insulation design and consequently the combined diameter of the central copper
conductor and the paper insulation for the Bakun cables will be no greater than for
the 250 kilometres Baltic cable which was laid between Germany and Sweden in
1994.
Reliability And Safety Of Submarine Cables
International experience shows that HVDC submarine cables are inherently reliable,
and that breakdown (or failure) is primarily the result of external causes. By far the
greatest cause of failure is related to shipping activities, either from anchors or
fishing / trawling equipment. Probably, the next highest cause of failure is related to
repair joints which are sometimes made under difficult conditions and in haste.
Modern and specially-built repair ships and newer joint making techniques are
overcoming repair joint problems.
The early English Channel cables of the 1950s achieved about 50 per cent
availability because of frequent anchor damage. Some of the earlier Scandinavian
cables also suffered high numbers of cable failures caused by shipping
The introduction of double wire armoured cables provided protection against impact
damage from light to medium trawling equipment, but were unable to completely
protect against impact damage from very large heavy anchors, or the very heavy
trawling equipment.
Burial of cables in areas exposed to large anchors and trawls commenced in the
early 1980s. The newer English Channel cables laid in 1986 for the England-France
2,000 MW link were buried over their full length in trenches (1.5 metres deep) cut
into the hard sea floor, and deliberately backfilled. This has been entirely successful
as no damage has been reported.
Cable repair is performed by locating the damage area, cutting the cable close to the
damaged location, lifting each end of the cut cable and inserting a new piece to
replace the damaged portion by joining it to the cut ends, then dropping the cable
back to the sea bed. This procedure leaves loops of cable each time it is done and is
one reason why multiple cables are laid with a relatively large spacing. Repair times
are dependent on:

time to mobilise repair personnel and equipment to the fault location;

time to locate the fault (usually achieved before mobilisation is complete);
weather conditions at the fault locations; and
difficulty of recovering cable from its buried (or partially buried) state on the
sea floor, that is depth of water and depth of burial.

Under good conditions, where mobilisation of repair vessels and personnel is

immediate and where the faulted cable can be easily and quickly lifted from the sea
floor, a short length of cable may be spliced in and the cable returned to service in
the order of 10 days. This is the typical situation in Norway where repair vessels and

personnel are immediately on hand. However, the owners of the Fennoskan cable
between Sweden and Finland expect the repair / return-to-service time for their cable
to be about 25 days. For Bakun cables, their protection and frequency of repair are
the subject of ongoing investigations. Repair of the cable for Bakun will be relatively
easy because of the shallow water, and the relatively mild weather. On the other
hand, the length of the cable may increase the time to find the fault location. Positive
measures to protect the integrity of the cable include the provision for adequate
burial, the proposal to maintain a ship on site to repair and store spare cables on
site, and the provision of false cables to prevent anchors hitting the real cable.
System Stability
Modern networks of electrical power generation, distribution and consumption are "in
balance", that is, at any given moment, the power being generated is being
consumed in its entirety. Because consumers are constantly connecting and
disconnecting electrical equipment, the operator of a power system must be
constantly adjusting the generation to suit the required load demand.
Apart from adding and subtracting consumption (load), there are from time to time,
equipment failures which disturb the balance and the ability of the interconnected
network to maintain a stable balance known as the "stability" of the system. A
disturbance (such as the failure of a particular power line) causes the remaining lines
to be overloaded and blackouts to occur, and thus leads to a temporary problem of
instability. However, the resulting effect on the systems may only be a slight change
in the frequency of the supply or voltage (normally 240 volt, 50 cycle in Malaysia).
This could only be of mild concern (such as causing an electrical clock to lose time),
but in a modern economy there are many connected facilities that are susceptible to
frequency and voltage variation or industries which suffer badly from power failures.
The objective of system planners and controllers is, therefore, to achieve a "stable"
system which will not fail under the conditions of normally expected disturbances.
Connecting the power system of Sarawak and Peninsula Malaysia (indirectly) by the
cable will be a major change in the configuration of the Malaysian system and the
effects of this linkage are being carefully studied as part of the Bakun HEP.
The following scenarios are being studies as part of the system stability evaluations:

damage to one of the cables causing a sudden loss in the power being
supplied by Bakun;
the effect of equipment failure in Peninsula Malaysia on the generators at
Bakun and on the supply of power to Sarawak; and
the control requirements of the link to enable the system to be adequately
protected.

The result of these studies will be incorporated into the power system.
Long Distance Submarine Cables Worldwide

Since the 1980s, at least ten HVDC long distance cable links have been installed
with cables similar sizes to the planned Sarawak-Peninsula Malaysia link.
Except for the length, the pertinent characteristic for the proposed Bakun HVDC
cables are well within the experience of the cable manufacturers to ensure
successful installation.
According to records, only Fennoskan, Sweden-Finland has had any cable faults
since installation. The single Fennoskan fault, which is believed to have been caused
by a ship's anchor in an unburied part of the cable, occurred in 1991. Fennoskan is
exposed to pack ice along the coast and consequently, the cables were buried in a
trench cut in the sea floor and covered with protective concrete slabs to the depth
where pack ice ceased to be a concern. The very low frequently of anchoring and
fishing did not justify further burial.
The Cook Strait cables in New Zealand are laid across a deep canyon system and
legislation has been enacted to curtail activities within the cable corridor. So far, no
faults have occurred along the cables laid in 1991.

Technical And Safety Aspects Of Overhead Transmission

Evolution Of The Design Of Transmission Cables Since The 1980s
The need to transmit economically large bulk power over long distances has
contributed to the development of direct current (DC) transmission system consist of
overhead conductors and shield wires.
Overhead Conductors
The evolution of conductor selection since 1980 has been based on research
projects directed to the investigation of the voltage dependent phenomena,
characteristics, and requirements of overhead DC and alternating current
(AC) lines. Extensive research on the high voltage DC has been carried out at
the HVDC Development Programme of the Bonneville Power Authority,
Portland, Oregon, USA and the HVDC Test Centres of Electric Power
Research Institute, USA at Dallas and Oregon, where many of the analytical
methods were developed and validated through testing.
The parameters that influence the selection of the overhead DC conductors
are associated with three main factors, namely, electrical, economical and
physical. Some of the electrical parameters at the edge of the right-of-way,
such as ground gradients, radio and TV interferences and audible noise, have
changed since the 1980s and now there are requirements that transmission
lines must meet. The conductors are selected on the basis of a break-even
economic analysis that considers the cost of corona losses and material along
with the electrical limit parameters of radio noise, electric fields, ion current
density, and charge density.

Long Distance Submarine HVDC Cables Worldwide1

Project Cable

Year Voltage(kV) Lenght(kilometre) Depth(metre) Operating and Peak

Manufacturer

Conductor
Cross
Impluse
Section Area
Strees(kV/millimetre)
(Square
millimetre)

Power(MW)

Baltic Cable,
Gremany-Sweden
1994
ABB High Voltage
Cables

450
600

250

45
1600

29
84

Skagerrak,NorwayDermark
1993
Alcatel Cable

350
500

128

560
1400

27
84

Cheju Island,Korea
Alcatel Cable,
1993
Pirelli

180

2 X 100

140
400

Not Available

Kontiskan 91,
Sweden-Demmark
1991
ABB High Voltage
Cables

285
300

64

80
1200

23
75

Cook Straits, New

Zealand
ABB High Voltage 1991
Cables, and Alcatel
STK

350
1500

3 X 41

260
1400

24
84

Fennoskan,
Sweden-Finland
ABB High Voltage
1989
Cables Standard
Telofon of
Kabelfabr

400
500

200

120
1200

28
90

Kontiskan 2,
Sweden-Denmark
1988
ABB High Voltage
Cables

285
300

64

80
1200

23
75

Gotland 3, Sweden
ABB High Voltage 1987
Cables

150
160

97

170
800

22
68

Cross-Channel,
England
1986
France Les Cables
1985
de Lyon, BICC and
Pirelli General

270
8 X 250

8 X 70

60
900

Not Available

Gotland 2, Sweden
ABB High Voltage 1983
Cables

150
160

92

170
800

22
68

Note:
Mass impregnated (solid) insulation similar to the cable designed for the Bakun HEP

Shield Wires
The major evolution in the selection of shield wires has been the
development of fibre optics. Shield wires are used to protect the
overhead current carrying conductors from direct lightning strikes. The
development of overhead shield wires with fibre optics provides
significant benefits as the shield wire is used for the dual purpose of
lighting protection and communications.
Reliability Stability And Safety Of Transmission Cables
In general, the words "reliability and stability" are terms associated with a system or
a network. However, in terms of a conductor in a transmission system, they are
associated with the physical preservation of the conductor within the system. In
general, damage to conductors can occur at the attachment points where the
conductors are held in place with clamps, at the locations close to the tower where
proper distance from the the tower must be maintained to satisfy the minimum gap
clearances for a particular voltage level, and at any point where current carrying
conductors are not properly protected by shield wires. Flashes from conductor to
ground have the potential of damaging the strands of conductors and will require
repair.
The reliability and stability of the line are improved by designing the line with a high
degree of probability for the insulation and gap clearances to withstand the
anticipated over voltages resulting from the system operations. In addition, line
reliability and stability are enhanced by protecting the conductors and the line from
the effects of lightning.
The parameters that affect the lightning performance of the line include the keraunic
level of the area, tower geometry, insulation at each tower (gap clearances and
number of insulators), and grounding at each tower location.
The DC lines for the Bakun HEP have been designed for a keraunic level of 180
days / year which is indicative activity that takes place in the vicinity of the line route.
The lines will be designed to limit the tripout rate of the DC overhead lines to less
than 0.25 outages per pole per 100 kilometres of line per year.
Safety of transmission cables are associated with ground clearances. For the Bakun
HEP, provisions will be made in the design of the line to incorporate increases in the
temperature of the conductor produced as a result of circulating currents and the
design will consider the worst ambient conditions for the case. Appendix II show
shows the technical characteristics of the Bakun HEP.

Transmission towers and lines in Peninsula Malaysia

Conclusion
The design of the Bakun HEP has evolved since the initial studies carried out in the
early 1980s, taking into account developments worldwide in design and construction
technology of high dams and high voltage direct current submarine cables. The
design of the hydro dam has incorporated features that will ensure the highest
degree of safety and economics. The project will also capitalise on the vast
improvements in technology in cable design and manufacture that has occurred over
the last 10 years. These factors will together produce an excellent hydroelectric
project to serve both the peninsula and Sarawak.