Justice Velasco Rulings - Labor Law

LABOR LAW 1
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 166208
G.R. No. 158786
Art. 277 of the Labor Code provides the manner of

termination of employment, thus:
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts

during a strike
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security

of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause without prejudice to
the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department
of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on
the employer.
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:
Respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of

committing an infraction. A verbal appraisal of the charges
does not comply with the first notice requirement.
Second, an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense
contained merely a general description of the charges
against him and did not even state a company rule or policy
allegedly violated. Likewise, there is no mention of any of
the grounds for termination of employment under Art. 282
of the Labor Code. Third, no hearing was conducted.
G.R. No. 166208
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) x xx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike or who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful
strike.
It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater
than that of the members.
G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786

Members liability depends on participation in illegal acts
Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No.

85122 provides the exceptions in the coverage of the
payment of the 13th-month benefit. The provision states:
Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is

liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act
"during a strike." While the provision is silent on whether
the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is
irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in a
legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated.
SEC. 3. Employers covered.The Decree shall apply to all

employers except to:
However, an ordinary striking worker/union member cannot

be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
x xxx
G.R. Nos. 142732-33
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission,

boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed
amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the
time consumed in the performance thereof, except where
the workers are paid on piece-rate basis in which case the
employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar as such
workers are concerned.
We affirm that Genuino was dismissed for just cause but

without the observance of due process.
Thirteenth (13th)-Month Pay
In his Complaint, respondent admitted that he was paid on

commission only. Moreover, this fact is supported by his pay
slips which indicated the varying amount of commissions he
was receiving each trip. Thus, he was excluded from
receiving the 13th-month pay benefit.
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating

the services of employees:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees
should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employees
To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
COMPILED BY ATTY. RAL CASABAR
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to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should
schedule and conduct a hearing or conference.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is
justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written
notice of termination.
In this case, the letters dated sent by Citibank did not
identify the particular acts or omissions allegedly committed
by Genuino. While the bank gave Genuino an opportunity to
deny the truth of the allegations in writing and participate in
the administrative investigation, the fact remains that the
charges were too general to enable Genuino to intelligently
and adequately prepare her defense.
G.R. Nos. 142732-33
Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer
may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her
employer or duly authorized representative. In order to
constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence
should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the
employer. Also, the act complained of should have arisen
from the performance of the employee's duties.36 For loss
of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not
arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts
sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
employee's misconduct is not required. It is sufficient if
there is some basis for such loss of confidence or if the
employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain
the moral conviction that the employee concerned is
responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position.
As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury
Department, she held a position of trust and confidence.
There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's
policies nor her understanding of these policies as reflected
in the survey done by the bank. Genuino did not have her
employer's interest. The letter of the bank's clients which
attested that the withdrawals from Citibank were made
upon their instructions is of no import. It did not explain
why they preferred to invest in Global and Torrance, nor did
it mention that Genuino tried to dissuade them from
withdrawing their deposits. Genuino herself admitted her
relationship with some of the depositors in her affidavit.
G.R. No. 153510
Insubordination or willful disobedience
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal,
these two elements must concur:
(1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful,

that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude;
and
(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.13
In the present case, there is no question that petitioners
order for respondent to render overtime service to meet a
production deadline complies with the second requisite. Art.
89 of the Labor Code empowers the employer to legally
compel his employees to perform overtime work against
their will to prevent serious loss or damage:
Art. 89. EMERGENCY OVERTIME WORK
Any employee may be required by the employer to perform
overtime work in any of the following cases:
x xxx
(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on
machines, installations, or equipment, in order to avoid
serious loss or damage to the employer or some other cause
of similar nature;
In the present case, petitioners business is a printing press
whose production schedule is sometimes flexible and
varying. It is only reasonable that workers are sometimes
asked to render overtime work in order to meet production
deadlines.
G.R. No. 153510
Due process: twin notice and hearing requirement
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be
given two (2) notices before his employment could be
terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of
their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the
employees that their employment is being terminated. Not
to be taken lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity for
the employee to defend himself personally or by counsel of
his choice.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee
two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be
heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity
of his separation.
In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious
and imminent threat to the life or property of the employers
or of other employees like theft or physical injuries, and
there is a need for preventive suspension,17 the employers
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can immediately suspend the erring employees for a period
of not more than 30 days. Notwithstanding the suspension,
the employers are tasked to comply with the twin notice
requirement under the law. The preventive suspension
cannot replace the required notices.
G.R. No. 161196
The undated, similarly worded resignation letters tended to
show that the guards were made to copy the pro-forma
letters, in their own hand, to make them appear more
convincing that the guards had voluntarily resigned.
With the finding of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
reinstatement to their positions without loss of their
seniority rights and with full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time compensation was
withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement as provided for in Article 279 of the Labor
Code.
G.R. No. 161196
As the law now stands, illegally dismissed employees are
entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and
reinstatement.
They are entitled to reinstatement, if viable, or separation
pay, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, and backwages.
The award of one does not preclude the other as the Court
had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.
Where an employee would have been entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages, but circumstances, i.e.,
strained relationships, make reinstatement impossible, the
more equitable disposition would be to award separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher, in addition to
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and benefits or their
monetary equivalent, computed from the time the
employees compensation was withheld up to the time of
the employees actual reinstatement.
G.R. No. 161690
The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically
protected by Art. XIII, Section 314 of the Constitution and
such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution
and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once
registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate
labor organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of
registration confers a union with legitimacy with the
concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be
canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining
unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of
any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code,
such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the

adoption or ratification of the unions constitution and like
documents.
The Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a
union, it is not enough to show that the union includes
ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement,
or fraud in connection with the application for registration
and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or
by-laws, among other documents.
G.R. No. 163419
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the
negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization
and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining
unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus,
where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the
law between the parties and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law. Moreover, if the
terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of their stipulations shall
G.R. No. 163942
With respect to the Secretary's Order allowing payroll
reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the
individual respondents herein, an amendment to the
previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not
allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned
states that all workers must immediately return to work and
all employers must readmit all of them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it
clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is
consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or
slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to
the national interest.
G.R. No. 163942
In assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should
impose actual reinstatement in accordance with the intent
and spirit of Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. As with most
rules, however, this one is subject to exceptions. Payroll
reinstatement is a departure from the rule, and special
circumstances which make actual reinstatement
impracticable must be shown.
In one case, payroll reinstatement was allowed where the
employees previously occupied confidential positions,
because their actual reinstatement, the Court said, would be
impracticable and would only serve to exacerbate the
situation. In another case, this Court held that the NLRC did
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not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed
payroll reinstatement as an option in lieu of actual
reinstatement for teachers who were to be reinstated in the
middle of the first term. We held that the NLRC was merely
trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a
festering and serious problem.
G.R. No. 163942
Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."
The various categories of an illegal strike:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such
as strike by employees performing governmental functions;
or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[such as
Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid
strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as
inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice
against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its
objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers
[for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor
Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing
injunction[such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by
the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the
Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a
no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause in the CBA.
G.R. No. 163942
Regarding the Union officers and members' liabilities for
their participation in the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a),
paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status x xx."
The law makes a distinction between union officers and
mere union members. Union officers may be validly
terminated from employment for their participation in an
illegal strike, while union members have to participate in
and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment
status.
Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof of the
participation of the striking employees in the commission of
illegal acts during the strikes.
G.R. No. 167622

The basic issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction
over the case resolves itself into the question of whether an
employer-employee relationship existed between Manulife
and Tongko. If no employer-employee relationship existed
between the two parties, then jurisdiction over the case
properly lies with the Regional Trial Court.
G.R. No. 167622
In the determination of whether an employer-employee
relationship exists between two parties, this Court applies
the four-fold test to determine the existence of the
elements of such relationship. The Court set out the
elements of an employer-employee relationship, thus:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
(d) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct.
It is the so-called "control test" which constitutes the most
important index of the existence of the employer-employee
relationship that is, whether the employer controls or has
reserved the right to control the employee not only as to
the result of the work to be done but also as to the means
and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
Stated otherwise, an employer-employee relationship exists
where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved
but also the means to be used in reaching such end.
In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control over
Tongko that would make him its employee. Several factors
contribute to this conclusion.
In the Agreement dated July 1, 1977 executed between
Tongko and Manulife, it is provided that:
The Agent hereby agrees to comply with all regulations and
requirements of the Company as herein provided as well as
maintain a standard of knowledge and competency in the
sale of the Company's products which satisfies those set by
the Company and sufficiently meets the volume of new
business required of Production Club membership.
Thus, with the company regulations and requirements
alone, the fact that Tongko was an employee of Manulife
may already be established. Certainly, these requirements
controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was to
achieve the company's goals.
G.R. No. 167622
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause
for the termination of employment, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause. This burden of proof appropriately lies on
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the shoulders of the employer and not on the employee
because a worker's job has some of the characteristics of
property rights and is therefore within the constitutional
mantle of protection. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code
mandates in explicit terms that the burden of proving the
validity of the termination of employment rests on the
employer. Failure to discharge this evidential burden would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and,
therefore, illegal.
G.R. No. 167622
Article 279 of the Labor Code on security of tenure
pertinently provides that:
In cases of regular employment the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
We thus stated that an illegally dismissed employee shall be
entitled to backwages and separation pay, if reinstatement
is no longer viable:
As the law now stands, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and
reinstatement. These are separate and distinct from each
other. However, separation pay is granted where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer. In
effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement
is no longer viable and backwages.
G.R. No. 180926
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code reads:
"Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
The claim of accused-appellant that she received no
payment and that the payments were handed directly over
to her co-accused fails in the face of the testimony of the
complainants that accused-appellant was the one who
received the money. And even if it were true that no money
changed hands, money is not material to a prosecution for
illegal recruitment, as the definition of "recruitment and

placement" in the Labor Code includes the phrase, "whether
for profit or not."
G.R. No. 180926
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is
burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit:
(1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article
34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and
(3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group. x xx
G.R. No. 170287
Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly
terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under
Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under Art. 283; (3)
termination due to disease under Art. 284; and (4)
termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from
employment due to the enforcement of the union security
clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on Union security
contains the provisions on the Union shop and maintenance
of membership shop.
There is union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period as a
condition for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees who are
union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or
who thereafter become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued employment until
they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit
or the agreement is terminated.
Termination of employment by virtue of a union security
clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our
jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and
prevents disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration
of the CBA. By preventing member disaffiliation with the
threat of expulsion from the union and the consequent
termination of employment, the authorized bargaining
representative gains more numbers and strengthens its
position as against other unions which may want to claim
majority representation.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing
the union security clause, the employer needs only to
determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement
of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is
sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel
the employee from the union. These requisites constitute
just cause for terminating an employee based on the CBA's
union security provision.
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The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union members
must maintain their membership in good standing as a
condition sine qua non for their continued employment with
the Club is unequivocal. It is also clear that upon demand by
the Union and after due process, the Club shall terminate
the employment of a regular rank-and-file employee who
may be found liable for a number of offenses, one of which
is malversation of Union funds.
G.R. No. 180892
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under
the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support
the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
G.R. No. 186289
The nature of res judicata, as now embodied in Sec. 47, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, in its two concepts of "bar by
former judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment." These
concepts of the doctrine of res judicata are applicable to
second actions involving substantially the same parties, the
same subject matter, and cause or causes of action. In the
instant case, there is no second action to speak of, involving
as it is the very same action albeit the NLRC remanded it to
the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 187730

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still
be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042
("R.A. 8042"), otherwise known as the Migrants and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, viz:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers and includes referring, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise,
include the following act, whether committed by any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount
greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;
G.R. No. 187730
x xxx
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements

must be established:
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as

determined by the Department of Labor and Employment;
and
(1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the

meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under
Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers;8 and
(3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another.9 When illegal recruitment is committed by a
syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
G.R. No. 187730
Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and
placement" refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not".
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the
prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM
Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers
for overseas employment.
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in

connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not
actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
G.R. No. 187730
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
G.R. No. 187730
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter
of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal
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injury.
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the

accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large,
deceived the complainants into believing that the agency
had the power and capability to send them abroad for
employment; that there were available jobs for them in
Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength
of such assurance, the complainants parted with their
money in payment of the placement fees; that after
receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused
went into hiding by changing their office locations without
informing complainants; and that complainants were never
deployed abroad.
Here, the striking workers committed acts of (1)

interference by obstructing the free ingress to or egress
from petitioners compound and (2) coercion and
intimidation.
G.R. No. 191138-39

For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike
is a valid ground for termination of their employment. But
for union members who participated in a strike, their
employment may be terminated only if they committed
prohibited and illegal acts during the strike and there is
substantial evidence or proof of their participation, i.e., that
they are clearly identified to have committed such
prohibited and illegal acts.
G.R. No. 191138-39
The proscribed acts during a strike are provided under Art.
264 of the Labor Code, thus:
ART. 264. Prohibited Activities. (a) No Labor organization
or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of
this Book or without first having filed the notice required in
the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of case
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
x xxx
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
G.R. No. 191138-39

There is no question that the May 6, 2002 strike was illegal,
first, because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike on
March 5 or 14, 2002, it had not yet acquired legal
personality and, thus, could not legally represent the
eventual union and its members. And second, similarly
when KMLMS conducted the strike-vote on April 8, 2002,
there was still no union to speak of, since KMLMS only
acquired legal personality as an independent LLO only on
April 9, 2002 or the day after it conducted the strike-vote.
These factual findings are undisputed and borne out by the
records.
Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the
conduct of the strike-vote report were ineffective for having
been filed and conducted before KMLMS acquired legal
personality as an LLO, violating Art. 263(c), (d) and (f) of the
Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 161796
The power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an
executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru
zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions, very
well effect reclassification of land use within their respective
territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the
executive department, through its appropriate agencies,
carry the same force and effect as any statute.
G.R. No. 161796
"Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to NonAgricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land; thus
x xx Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural

activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral
or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not
classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and
its preceding competent authorities prior to June 15, 1988
for residential, commercial or industrial use..
G.R. No. 197353
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled
to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work
LABOR LAW 8

under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation x xx." Verily, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to other established employment
privileges, and to his full backwages.
The boarding house privilege being an established perk
accorded to petitioner ought to have been granted him if a
real and authentic reinstatement to his former position as
general manager is to be posited.
G.R. No. 197353
Generally, employees have a demandable right over existing
benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employers.
And if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or
has, for a considerable period of time, been given regularly
and deliberately, then the grant ripens into a vested right
which the employer cannot unilaterally diminish,
discontinue or eliminate without offending the declared
constitutional policy on full protection to labor.
So it must be here with respect, at the minimum, to the
lodging accommodation which TAWTRASCO, as found by
the NLRC, appears to have regularly extended for free for
some time to petitioner.
G.R. No. 197353
Reinstatement is no longer viable where, among other
things, the relations between the employer and employee
have been so severely strained, that it is not in the best
interest of the parties, nor is it advisable or practical to
order reinstatement.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, payment of
separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable
or viable.
G.R. No. 197353
Indeed, separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of
reinstatement in certain circumstances, such as:
(1) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of
the passage of a long period of time or because of the
realities of the situation;
(2) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest;
(3) reinstatement is no longer feasible;
(4) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the
parties involved;
(5) the employer is prejudiced by the workers continued
employment;
(6) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have
supervened; or
(7) strained relations between the employer and the
employee.
G.R. No. 192531
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless
the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children,
the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
G.R. No. 208321
Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to
terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. Certain guidelines must be observed for the
employer to terminate an employee for loss of trust and
confidence.
[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal, or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be
arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to
the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to
justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
G.R. No. 208321
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one
holding a position of trust and confidence.
The second requisite of terminating an employee for loss of
trust and confidence is that there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid cause
for dismissal, the loss of confidence must be based on a
willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts.
G.R. No. 208321
Employees holding a position of trust and confidence, one
who is either: (1) a managerial employee; or (2) a fiduciary
rank-and-file employee, who, in the normal exercise of his
or her functions, regularly handles significant amounts of
money or property of the employer.
G.R. No. 208321
Managerial employees are defined as those vested with the
powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies
and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge,assign or discipline employees or effectively
recommend such managerial actions.
Fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the
normal exercise of their functions, regularlyhandle
significant amounts of money or property and are thus
classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
LABOR LAW 9

G.R. No. 208321
Jurisprudence has pronounced that the crossing of a check
means that the check may not be encashed but only
deposited in the bank. As Treasurer, respondent knew or is
at least expected to be aware of and abide by this basic
banking practice and commercial custom.
G.R. No. 197763
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules), as amended
by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, which read as
follows:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place
the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if
his continued employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or of his coworkers.
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension
shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall
thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a
substantially equivalent position or the employer may
extend the period of suspension provided that during the
period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits
due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be
bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the
extension if the employer decides, after completion of the
hearing, to dismiss the worker, (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 205300
A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting
or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
1.The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and
independent business and undertakes to perform the job,
work or service on its own account and under its own
responsibility according to its own manner and method, and
free from the control and direction of the principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except
as to the results thereof;
2.The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or
investment; and
3.The agreement between the principal and contractor or
subcontractor assures the contractual employees
entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization,
security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.
G.R. No. 205300
Contracting is prohibited when the contractor or
subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to
perform a job, work or service for a principal and if any of
the following elements are present, thus:
capital or investment which relates to the job, work or

service to be performed and the employees recruited,
supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal; or
2.The contractor does not exercise the right to control over
the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
G.R. No. 129486
Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements
concur:
First, the offender does not have the required license or
authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers.
Second, the offender undertook (1) recruitment and
placement activity defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code or (2) any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the
same code. Illegal recruitment is qualified into large scale,
when three or more persons, individually or as group, are
victimized.
G.R. No. 129486
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement, as follows:
x x x [A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
G.R. No. 200580
A fundamental principle in Philippine labor law is the
application of the four-fold test in determining the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, thus:
(1) selection and engagement;
(2) payment of wages;
(3) power to dismiss; and
(4) power of control over the means and methods by which
the work is to be accomplished.
There are, however, instances when these elements are not
exercised by a single person or entity. There are cases
where one or more of the said factors are assumed by
another entity, for which reason, the Court made it clear
that of the four tests mentioned, it is the power of control
that is determinative. One such instance is whenever an
employer supplies workers to another pursuant to a
contracting agreement, i.e., job contracting.
1.The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial
LABOR LAW 10

G.R. No. 200580
Not all forms of contracting arrangements are, however,
permitted. In contrast, there is the so-called labor-only
contracting.
Labor-only contracting exists when:
(1) the person supplying workers to the purported principal
does not have substantial capital or investments in the form
of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among
others; and
(2) the workers recruited and placed by such person/entity
perform activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the alleged principal. Finding that a contractor is
engaged in labor-only contracting is then equivalent to
declaring that there exists an employer-employee
relationship between the supposed principal and the
employee of the purported contractor.
G.R. No. 200580
Labor-only contracting results in the following:
(1) the subcontractor will be treated as the agent of the
principal whose acts and representations bind the latter;
(2) the principal, being the employer, will be responsible to
the employees for all their entitlements and benefits under
labor laws; and
(3) the principal and the subcontractor will be solidarity
treated as the employer.
With the mentioned effects of labor-only contracting on
employment status, a determination of the legitimacy or
illegality of the contracting arrangement between the
principal and the contractor is necessary not only to
determine who between the two entities is the real
employer of the employee but also to determine upon
whom liability should be imposed in the event that the
employee is illegally dismissed, as here, among others.
G.R. No. 145587
Article 277 of the Labor Code states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security
of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of
this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken
by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of
the workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal
by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized

cause shall rest on the employer. x x x
G.R. No. 145587
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the
following twin elements must concur:
(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude;
and
(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
G.R. No. 145587
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee
two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be
heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity
of his separation.
G.R. No. 154628
For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee
so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
G.R. No. 157680
The principal test for determining whether an employee is
properly characterized as "project employee," as
distinguished from "regular employee," is whether or not
"the project employee" was assigned to carry out "a specific
project or undertaking," the duration and scope of which
were specified at the time the employees were engaged for
that project. And as Article 280 of the Labor Code, defining a
LABOR LAW 11

regular employee vis--vis a project employee, would have
it:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee
G.R. No. 157680
In termination disputes, the burden of proving that an
employee had been dismissed for a lawful cause or that the
exacting procedural requirements under the Labor Code had
been complied with lies with the employer. Where there is
no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for termination
of employment, the law considers the case a matter of
illegal dismissal.
G.R. No. 157680
Petitioners assertion that there can be no illegal dismissal
of project employees inasmuch as they are not entitled to
security of tenure is inaccurate. The constitutionallyprotected right of labor to security of tenure covers both
regular and project workers. Their termination must be for
lawful cause and must be done in a way which affords them
proper notice and hearing.
G.R. No. 163607
Separation pay is the amount that an employee receives at
the time of his severance and is designed to provide the
employee with the wherewithal during the period he is
looking for another employment. The award of separation
pay is authorized in the situations dealt with in Article 283
and Art. 284 of the Labor Code, but not in terminations of
employment based on instances enumerated in Art. 282.
G.R. No. 163607
The only cases when separation pay shall be paid, although
the employee was lawfully dismissed, are when the cause of
termination was not attributable to the employees fault but
due to:
(1) the installation of labor saving devices,
(2) redundancy,
(3) retrenchment,
(4) cessation of employers business, or
(5) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial
to his health and to the health of his co-employees (Articles
283 and 284, Labor Code.) Other than these cases, an
employee who is dismissed for a just and lawful cause is not
entitled to separation pay even if the award were to be
called by another name.
Separation pay is likewise awarded in lieu of reinstatement

if reinstatement is no longer feasible, as when the
relationship between the employer and employee has
become strained.
G.R. No. 163607
But where the cause of the separation is more serious than
mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more
discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give
separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his
inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such
generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts
of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear
dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is
doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed
separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not
depraved. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but
sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the
company premises, the situation is changed completely. This
is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of
separation pay would be entirely unjustified.
G.R. No. 163607
Still, in some cases, separation pay or financial assistance
may be extended as a measure of social justice or
compassionate justice.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as
a measure of social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example,
habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow
worker, the employer may not be required to give the
dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance,
or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice.
G.R. No. 163607
The Court declined to grant termination pay because the
causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor
Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful
or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral
character of the employees. We, therefore, find that in
addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other
grounds under Art. 282, like willful disobedience, gross and
habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and
commission of a crime against the employer or his family,
separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed
employee.
In analogous causes for termination, like inefficiency, drug
use, and others, the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant
separation pay anchored on social justice in consideration of
length of service of the employee, the amount involved,
whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the
employee and the like, using guideposts enunciated in PLDT
on the propriety of the award of separation pay.
LABOR LAW 12

G.R. No. 164824
G.R. No. 169780
Loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on

the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, the
employee must be invested with confidence on delicate
matters, such as the custody, handling, or care of the
employers money and other assets.
Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by

the employer through no fault of the employees x x x
resorted to by management during periods of business
recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations or
during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of
materials, conversion of the plant for a new production
program or the introduction of new methods or more
efficient machinery, or of automation. Retrenchment is a
valid management prerogative. It is, however, subject to
faithful compliance with the substantive and procedural
requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence.
G.R. No. 164824

But while employers are given a wide latitude of discretion
in the termination of services of managerial employees for
loss of confidence, there must be substantial proof thereof.
This means that the employer must clearly and convincingly
establish the charges, or, in fine, the facts and incidents
upon which the loss of confidence may fairly be made to
rest, that is, it must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established or proven facts.
Moreover, loss of confidence, as a ground for termination,
should not be
(1) simulated;
(2) used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal, or unjustified;
(3) arbitrarily asserted; and
(4) a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad
faith.
G.R. No. 164824
The Court declined to grant termination pay because the
causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor
Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful
or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral
character of the employees. We therefore find that in
addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other
grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and
habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and
commission of a crime against the employer or his family,
separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed
employee.
G.R. No. 169780
The right of management to retrench or to lay-off workers
to meet clear and continuing economic threats or during
periods of economic recession to prevent losses is
recognized8 by Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended,
partly providing:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel.The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to x x x retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of
the establishment x x x by serving a written notice on the
worker and the [DOLE] at least one month before the
intended date thereof. x x x In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year
of service whichever is higher. x x x
G.R. No. 169780

Decisional law teaches that the requirements for a valid
retrenchment are:
(1) that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely
to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not
merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, and real, or only
if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) that the
employer serves written notice both to the employees
concerned and the DOLE at least a month before the
intended date of retrenchment;
(3) that the employer pays the retrenched employee
separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code;
(4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in
good faith; and
(5) that it uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining
who would be retrenched or retained.
G.R. No. 172913
The Court is not a trier of facts and is not to reassess the
credibility and probative weight of the evidence of the
parties and the findings and conclusions of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover,
the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are
accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial
evidence, which means such evidence as that which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The Court does not substitute its own judgment
for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of
evidence lies or what evidence is credible.
G.R. No. 173231
Under the Labor Code, retrenchment and redundancy are
authorized causes for separation from service. However, to
protect labor, dismissals due to retrenchment or
redundancy are subject to strict requirements under Article
283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION
OF PERSONNEL. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title by
LABOR LAW 13

serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or at least one
(1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
Retrenchment is an exercise of managements prerogative
to terminate the employment of its employees en masse,
to either minimize or prevent losses, or when the company
is about to close or cease operations for causes not due to
business losses.
G.R. No. 173231
In the present case, Legend glaringly failed to show its
financial condition prior to and at the time it enforced its
retrenchment program. It failed to submit audited financial
statements regarding its alleged financial losses. Though
Legend complied with the notice requirements and the
payment of separation benefits to the retrenched
employees, its failure to establish the basis for the
retrenchment of its employees constrains us to declare the
retrenchment illegal.
G.R. No. 173231
Retrenchment and redundancy are two different concepts;
they are not synonymous and therefore should not be used
interchangeably. This Court explained in detail the
difference between the two concepts in Sebuguero v. NLRC:
Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant
where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or
positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such
as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or
dropping of a particular product line or service activity
previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
Retrenchment, on the other hand, is used interchangeably
with the term "lay-off." It is the termination of employment
initiated by the employer through no fault of the
employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to
by management during periods of business recession,
industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during
lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials,
conversion of the plant for a new production program or the
introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery,
or of automation. Simply put, it is an act of the employer of
dismissing employees because of losses in the operation of a
business, lack of work, and considerable reduction on the
volume of his business, a right consistently recognized and
affirmed by this Court.

G.R. No. 179652
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing
employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the
matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have
no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship
has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review,
that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first
place.
G.R. No. 181688
Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC 2005 Rules of Procedure
pertinently provides:
SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION.Motions for
reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the
Commission shall not be entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is x x x
filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision,
resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the
same has been furnished, within the reglementary period,
the adverse party; and provided further, that only one such
motion from the same party shall be entertained.
G.R. No. 185251
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the formers work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code,
the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same
manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by
appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contractingout of labor to protect the rights of workers established
under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may
make appropriate distinctions between labor-only
contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations
within these types of contracting and determine who among
the parties involved shall be considered the employer for
purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or
circumvention of any provision of this Code.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person
supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business
of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who
LABOR LAW 14

shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and
extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
G.R. No. 185251
Such power of control has been explained as the "right to
control not only the end to be achieved but also the means
to be used in reaching such end." With the conclusion that
respondent directed petitioners to remain at their posts and
continue with their duties, it is clear that respondent
exercised the power of control over them; thus, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
To reiterate, while PLDT and Security and Safety Corporation
of the Philippines (SSCP) no longer had any legal relationship
with the termination of the Agreement, petitioners guards
remained at their post securing the premises of PLDT while
receiving their salaries, allegedly from SSCP. Clearly, such a
situation makes no sense, and the denials proffered by PLDT
do not shed any light to the situation. It is but reasonable to
conclude that, with the behest and, presumably, directive of
PLDT, petitioners guards continued with their services.
Evidently, such are indicia of control that PLDT exercised
over petitioners guards.
G.R. No. 185829
ART. 281. Probationary employment. - Probationary
employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date
the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or
when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee. (Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. 185829
Article 282 of the Labor Code considers any of the following
acts or omission on the part of the employee as just cause
or ground for terminating employment:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Lim v. NLRC, the Court considered inefficiency as an

analogous just cause for termination of employment under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 185829
Employees must be reminded that while probationary
employees do not enjoy permanent status, they enjoy the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. They can
only be terminated for cause or when they otherwise fail to
meet the reasonable standards made known to them by the
employer at the time of their engagement. Respondent
WWWEC miserably failed to prove the termination of
petitioner was for a just cause nor was there substantial
evidence to demonstrate the standards were made known
to the latter at the time of his engagement. Hence,
petitioners right to security of tenure was breached.
G.R. No. 185829
In labor cases, the Court has held corporate directors and
officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the
termination of employment of employees done with malice
or in bad faith.
A review of the facts of the case does not reveal ample and
satisfactory proof that respondent officers of WWEC acted
in bad faith or with malice in effecting the termination of
petitioner Aliling. Even assuming arguendo that the actions
of WWEC are ill-conceived and erroneous, respondent
officers cannot be held jointly and solidarily with it. Hence,
the ruling on the joint and solidary liability of individual
respondents must be recalled.
G.R. No. 192531
John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise
known as the "Social Security Law."
While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for workrelated deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation
of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the
member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death
during Johns minority, the restoration of petitioners
parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner
as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
G.R. No. 192531
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic)
that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand
LABOR LAW 15

subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children,
the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
G.R. No. 192531
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase
"dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents"
as what the ECC did.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include
all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
G.R. No. 203355
Art. 224. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code,the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non agricultural:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
xxxx
Except claims for employees compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising
from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
G.R. No. 209418
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person
supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business
of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who
shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and
extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
G.R. No. 209418

The just causes for termination of employment are
enumerated under Art. 282 of P.D. 442, as follows:
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representatives; and
Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (emphasis added)
To constitute just cause for an employee's dismissal, the
neglect of duties must not only be gross but also habitual.
Gross neglect means an absence of that diligence that an
ordinarily prudent man would use in his own affairs.
Meanwhile, to be considered habitual, the negligence must
not be a single or isolated act.
G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786
It is entirely the Unions fault that its position paper was not
considered by the NLRC.
Records readily reveal that the NLRC was even too generous
in affording due process to the Union. It issued no less than
three (3) orders for the parties to submit its position papers,
which the Union ignored until the last minute. No sufficient
justification was offered why the Union belatedly filed its
position paper.
In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that a party
cannot complain of deprivation of due process if he was
afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings
but failed to do so. If he does not avail himself of the chance
to be heard, then it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee. Thus, there was no
violation of the Unions right to due process on the part of
the NLRC.
G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786
We sustain the CAs affirmance of the NLRCs finding that
the protest rallies staged on February 21 to 23, 2001 were
actually illegal strikes. The illegality of the Unions mass
actions was succinctly elaborated by the labor tribunal, thus:
We have stated in our questioned decision that such mass
actions staged before the Bureau of Labor Relations on
February 21-23, 2001 by the union officers and members fall
squarely within the definition of a strike (Article 212 (o),
Labor Code). These concerted actions resulted in the
temporary stoppage of work causing the latter substantial
losses. Thus, without the requirements for a valid strike
LABOR LAW 16

having been complied with, we were constrained to
consider the strike staged on such dates as illegal and all
employees who participated in the concerted actions to
have consequently lost their employment status.
G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786
The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the
services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code
exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The
apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to
termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from
their illegal acts.
As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where
separation pay is given even though an employee is validly
dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying
the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987
Constitution.
G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786
In a slew of cases, this Court refrained from awarding
separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and
members who were separated from service due to their
participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.
This Court upheld the dismissal of union officers who
participated and openly defied the return-to-work order
issued by the DOLE Secretary. No separation pay or financial
assistance was granted.
This Court also upheld the dismissal of union officers who
participated in an illegal strike sans any award of separation
pay.

Justice Velasco Rulings - Labor Law

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Justice Velasco Rulings - Labor Law

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LABOR LAW 1

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 158786

Art. 277 of the Labor Code provides the manner of

Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:

Respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 158786

Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No.

Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is

SEC. 3. Employers covered.The Decree shall apply to all

However, an ordinary striking worker/union member cannot

G.R. Nos. 142732-33

e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission,

We affirm that Genuino was dismissed for just cause but

Thirteenth (13th)-Month Pay

In his Complaint, respondent admitted that he was paid on

To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

(1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful,

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 167622

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

illegal recruitment, as the definition of "recruitment and

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 187730

G.R. No. 187730

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as

(1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

All these elements are present in the instant case: the

Here, the striking workers committed acts of (1)

G.R. No. 191138-39

G.R. No. 191138-39

x xx Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

capital or investment which relates to the job, work or

1.The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

Separation pay is likewise awarded in lieu of reinstatement

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 169780

Loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on

Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by

G.R. No. 164824

G.R. No. 169780

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

affirmed by this Court.

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

In Lim v. NLRC, the Court considered inefficiency as an

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 209418

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

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