preference ordering, the preferences are weighed accordingly. If some preferences happen to conflict, this is no problem as the one that is the strongest, in terms of its hypothetical rationality, is the one we should satisfy. Even though we
have a now-for-then desire and a present desire that identify
inconsistent states of affairs as contributing to welfare, we
can simply disregard the desire that is lower in the preference ordering. In this case, it again appears that the present
desire would be weaker since it is not as informed as the
now-for-then desire.
As I have demonstrated, current preferences are not always stronger than past preferences, and it is possible to
deal with conflicting preferences. Because of this, the authors conclusion does not necessarily follow from the main
reason given. They have provided no strong theoretical reason for denying such people the option of euthanasia if their
now-for-then desire to have their lives terminated was fully
informed and in accordance with their precedent autonomy.
Furthermore, if welfare is understood as preference satisfaction, then thwarting their now-for-then preferences may
cause their lives to worsen, and it is certainly possible to use
this theory of welfare to derive an account of best interests. If
this is done, then both the best interest standard and precedent autonomy standard may point in the same direction.
And take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of
justice and law.
Holy Koran, Al-Anam, Verse 151
Address correspondence to Kiarash Aramesh, Assistant Professor, Medical Ethics and History of Medicine Research Center, Tehran
University of Medical Sciences, No. 21, 4th floor, 16 Azar Avenue, Enghelab Square, Tehran, Iran. E-mail: kiarasharamesh@tums.ac.ir
ajob 65
If a patient is presumed dead according to medically established neurological criteria (brain death), switching off
life support also may be permissible with due consultation
and care, particularly when it is clear that continued life support is of no use for the already dead patient (Al-Qaradawi
2005) or, in the case of organ and tissue donation, for saving another persons life. This practice is routine in Iran and
some other Muslim countries.
End-stage dementia patients, however, are not dead by
either neurological or cardiac criteria. It is impermissible to
kill a patient because the disease may be incurable, even if
the patient is terminally ill. On the contrary, such a patient
must be protected and human dignity respected through
the provision of food and medicine until such time when
the patients life comes to its natural end. As the Prophet,
peace and blessings be upon him, is reported to have said,
Allah created no disease but created something to cure it
(as reported by Al-Bukhari and Muslim). In another hadith
narrated by al-Tirmidhi, we read, O Allahs Servants! Seek
treatment, for Allah does not create a disease but creates a
treatment for it (European Council for Fatwa and Research
2005). Finally, in the hadith narrated by Ahmad, we read:
Allah created no disease but created something to cure it.
Some may know it and some may not (European Council
for Fatwa and Research 2005). So these Prophetic hadiths give
66 ajob
and J. A. Eefsting. 2007. Would we rather lose our life than lose our self? Lessons
from the Dutch debate on euthanasia for patients with dementia.
American Journal of Bioethics 7(4): 4856.
Khamenei, A. 2007. Islamic medical laws (Istiftaat). Available at:
http://www.basijmed.com/esteftaat/ahkam kh/detail.asp?iNews
=116&iType=24 (accessed January 22, 2007).
Sachedina, A. 2005. End-of-life: The Islamic view. Lancet 366: 774
779.