3+92

The Bay Mmkirid

Fire

R. F. Nelson,* SPE-AIME,Shell 011Co.

Introduction
Platform B was launched July 16, 1969, in the
Bay Marchand Block 2 field. The 12-pile structure
was located in 55 ft of water, 7 miles offshore and
65 miles south of New Orleans. It was designed for
36 wells, which were to be drilled by two independently operated, full-sized drilling rigs.
The first well on the platform was started Sept.
15, 1969. By Dec. 1, 1970, the two rigs, Storrndrill
20 and Sformdrill 21, had drilled and completed 22
wells. Of those wells, 21 were dual completions and
one was a single completion. Daily production was
17,500 bbl of oil and 40 MMcf of gas. Two additional wells were in the process of being drilled. (Hg,
Now with Shell Development

MARCH, 1972

Co. in Houston.

1 is an aerial view of Platform B before the fire

broke out.)
Platform B was equipped with the latest safety
devices and was being opera@d in full compliance
with Government regulations.
What caused the Bay Marchand fire? Several investigations have disclosed the following facts. The
plastic coating on the tubing in Well B-21 sloughed
off and plugged the well. In the course of wireline
operations to clean out the well a serious human
error was made: during a period when the well was
unattended, the well control valves were left incompletely closed. The well blew out and the fire ignited.
V*W
WtiWi,
BTi3@5
fG~ CClll=
A SUbSUrf2W~ W@
pletion purposes, was in effect at the time.
225

The platform was immediately abandoned. Of the

60 men aboard, four employees of the Storm Drillirw Co.. owners and operators of the two drilling rigs,
W;Ek~l!ed.
That more lives were not lost is a tribute to the
unselfish attitude and response capability of the industry. Chevron 011 Co. and Petroleum Helicopters,
Inc., along with standby vessels, converged on the
platform, and within about 45 minutes the survivors
were out of the water.
Shells nearby Platform A, a production platform, was used as an assembly point. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., were joind by the Coast Guard, and the

injured were shuttled to New Orleans hospiW.

While the men were on the way to hospitals, the
division production manager, the division mechaticd
engineer and -.I were ,--=
flying ALto the
site for .,,..a first-hand
-l.. &-mnnlla
assessment. une cmxe ol wc P141UUIM w- WUV-J.
entire structure appeared to be on fire. @lg. 2
The
shows the platform shortly after the fire broke out.)
Two key decisions were made at this point. Fret,
the sheer magnitude of the fire called for the formation of a special emergency organization. The decision was to select for the job the most capable men
in Shells Offshore Div. men who would have clearcut responsibltities and who were familiar with the opK.x-

T
4

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. .

1
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I

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.

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JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY

by outside companies and generated through normal

industxy channels. All these people in the emergency
group were relieved of their regular assignments in
order to give their undivided attention to the crisis.
Certain men were assigned to serve as liaison to
government agencies to brief officials of the Environmental Protection Agency, the USGS, and the Coast
Guard on this approach to putting out the fire.
This, then, was the general plan formulated within
~ felw bnl
.-.1rc. .fif. ~hp
... nuthreak
- ----- of the fire, Staff meetings
were held daily, includlng weekends and holidays.
Communication and coordination were established
quickly and maintained throughout the fire.

:ations in Bay Marchand. These people would form

]e core of the Bay Marchand Emergency Group.
The second decision was that a relief-well operaon be undertaken. There was no subsurface safety
alve in B-21, and at that time it was thought that at
:ast four of five other wells were burning. There was
:ally no responsible alternative to the relief-well
pproach. The escaping oil and gas would be con~med by the flames while the relief wells were being
riiieci to shut ofl the fimv at the WiiiC~.

organization of the Emergency Group

hming the return flight to New Orleans, we sketched
ut the basic organization that would be required.
ig. 3 shows the Bay Marchand emergency group
rganization. W. M. Marshall, division production
lanager, was placed in charge of the over-all, day]-day operation. His deputy was H. D. Cox, division
obstruction manager. B. J. Bullard, division drilling
uperintendent, headed the relief-well drilling. N. L.
)odge, division construction superintendent, was
Jaced in charge of the fire-control team. F. T. Leder,
.ivision mechanical engineer, directed the pollutionontrol operation. Public relations was headed by
d. H. Boeger, manager of Shells New Orleans public
elations ofKce. A Novel Ideas stafl of two men
creened and passed along worthwhile ideas offered
-------/.
.._

.-

. ----

Industry Response to the Emergency

The call went out to the industry for jack-up drilling
rigs and support equipment. The response was immediate. Amoco Production Co., Continental Oil Co.,
Forest Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., and PennzoilUnited, Inc., sacrificed their schedules and commitments. Stormdri[l VI was put under tow on the very
first day and arrived at Bay Marchand on Dec. 4. It
was immediately assigned to drill a relief well to B-21.
Fluor Drilling Services Mr. Gus 11 arrived Dec.
5; ODECOS Margaret arrived Dec. 6; Sformdrill W
arrived Dec. 10; and Penrod 56, which was already
under contract to Shell, arrived Dec. 12.

= .-----+.
---e.

--

Fig.2Platform
MAN~CH, 1972

B on fire.
227

5=
EEE1------ ~

DIVISION PRO>. MAhAGCR

PUBLIC RELATIONS
P.R. MGR. k STF.

--..-.~
K:LILt

SERVICES

b-,tL

r-l
ON. DRILL, SUPT.

SR, CIVIL ENGR,

2 ORILL ENGRS.
. ... .
. ..-.

1 OIV. ORILL. COORD.

!::=:::.
I
. ,,.. r. . . .. .. ..

SR. PURCH.

SR. FIELD sERvIcEs suw.

Marehand

Emergeney

In addition, two jack-up workover rigs, the OtTshore Co.s Hustler, and the Walker-Huthnance
Smackover, were obtained for the kill operations.
Bullards relief-well drilling group was compact
-.-m VOU.I..Q
- -.&+.arEOf RVw
m fl+ling
nis sum
(F@. 4).ANxv.. . . .... ~ng~nee~
aIId IWOengineering assistants, a reservoir engineer,
a directionaldrilling coordinator, and 10 drilling foremen. With the exception of the foremen, all the members of the relief-well drilling team were assigned to
the same office at the Offshore Div. headquarters.
Thus, all necessary decision-making apparatus for the
relief-well drilling was at hand.

Techniques Employed by the

Emergency Group
1- th;nPk-IIm
tics
-r
- = were on their way to Bay
w~,l~
,,.- ,---Marchand, an over-all drilling plan was de&ed. The
plan contained three key points.
1. The number of drilling rigs would be limited
to five. There were several reasons for this: five was
thought to be the maximum number that could be
safely and accurately directed; at this early stage the
number of wells that could be identified as burning
was limited; and, although. time was important, we
did not want any effort to be wasted. (Fig. 5 shows
ilOW
the
area
looked at t!!e peak Of 2CtiVhy,)
2. One relief well would be drilled to kill durdzone wells. To achieve this goal, a maximum 25-ftradlus target was set for each producing horizon.
TM was thought to be a realistic objeetive in view
of the anticipated high level of drilling supetiion
and directional drilling controi. The cioser the relief
well could be drilled to the blowing zone, the smaller
the volume of fluid required, and the fewer days
needed to establish communication and kfil the well.
3. A 7%-in. intermediate casing string would be
set above the topmost producing zone, and a 5-in.

22s

LEEVILLE OFFICE

!=l

TRANS. REPRE.
lfLo. ElJUIP. SPEC.

1 ~

TRANS. SPEC.

ma-t-==
Fig. 3-Bay

SUPV

sR. ANALYST
COMM. & TRANS.

Group organization

chart.

liner would then be run to total depth. This was to

insure against losing returns and against sticking the
drillpipe when drilling within 25 ft of a blowing well.
e:-.
~,,l~c the fi=( refief wen m B-21 was dri!!ed with no
problems, and since we had the benefit of some
knowledge gained from a reservoir simulation stuciy,i
.. .
mt cu~*e .- 1:..-., -..m..b-m
_
we declclea to drop the o-iu. UIIGI 1~qui-.e..
quent relief wells were drilled to total depth and 7% in. casing was run without loss of drilling-mud returns.
The 25-ft-radius target was found to be a reasontiictanre ~h~eved
for each
- U*.W-*
-~11=1u..
abk Objeetive. ThG
... .
well is shown in Table 1. The relief well for B-4, the
last burning well, was unsuccessful, so B-4 was killed
from the surface. The success in getting so close to
the targets was possible because accurate and reliable
surveys on the blowing wells had been obtained when
the wells were drilled. Gyro, single-shot, and miild-

MANAGER

DIVISION PROD. MANAGER

OEPUTV

~-------------l
,%

uaLc
EMTONs
P.R. MGR. & SiF.

REGIONAL STF.

t
r

RELIEF WELLS

DIV. ORILL. SUPT.

. .
~i?iLL

-.. ame
LNWES.

2 ENGRS. ASSTS.
1 OIV. DRILL. COORO.
10 DRILL FOREMEN

Fig. 4-Relief.well

organization

chart.

JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY

TABLE

1-RELIEF WELL TARG~ COMPARISON WITH

25-=

R;;;f

RADIUS OBJECTIVE
Blowout
Well

Distance

Between

Wells (ft)

KILL IMi

3
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
7

B-21
B-10
B-SD
B*3D
B-5D
B-16D
B4D
B-17
B-28
B-15
B-9

13
21
82
57
15

@*

(surf~~e kill)
28
15
18
150

SIICIL FOREMAN

Fig. -Kill

organization

chart.

shot surveys had been run on every well on Platform

B by the same team handling the drilling and directional surveys for the relief wells.
The directional surveys on the relief wells were
taken as they would be for any normal well. When
the relief well approached the blowing well, special
logging devices were run to detect the casing string
in the target well. This was to verify the distance between the wells as calculated from conventional surL- .,. -..
..--..1
- wcha
-.-.
. T.
.L..
*A l--._---_J .L-.
veys.
It sncnuu
m.
smxx+cu
LIIi-ALUK
scum
pcupc,

To minimize the chance of large errors the surveys

were computerized and special techniques were used
for calculating between station points. Apart from
this, the relief wells were drilled using off-the-shelf
hardware and by applying sound oilfield know-how.
The kill organization (Fig. 6) was even more compact than the drilling team. The drilling superintendent, of course, was in charge of this phase too.
Halliburton handled the pumping operation, IMC

same instruments, and the same techniques were used

for surveying the relief wells that had been used for
the production wells. No new factors were introduced.

and the Shell foremen were in charge of the kill trees

and rig operations.
Details of the kill procedure are shown in Fig. 7.

n.akulnlaal~

x.4,.,-r-,--rk.td
LVAUU
&w*
U.,,-.--

th~
lmrictim ..
ffim m...
kill
..a~nauo

flIA4c
.....

..

Fig. 5-Aerial

MARCH, 1972

view of fire end relief rigs.

229

SELF ELEVATING
MOBILE PLATFORM
. \-.!
.

MGL
*
-...1
MUDLINE

The idea was to pump sea water down the reiief

bores until communication was established. This was
indicated by pumping-pmssure fluctuations and flame
behavior. Communication was confirmed by sighting
water, or steam, coming from the burning well. Seventeen lb/gal mud was then pumped until the blowing
well died. The use of cement was purposely avoided
so pumping could be resumed later, if required; howrmmninu
..
------ . . . . . . . . . +....-.aame
ever, n was never ncwss=ly
So we could have the option of killing one or both
zones of a blowing well, a packer was set in the relief
well between the two producing horizons. A string
of 4%-in. tubing was then hung above the upper
zone. The upper zone, thus, could be ktied by pumping down the tubing and annulus at rates as high as
40 bbl/min with 7,000 psi surface pressure. The
lower zone could be ktied by guiding the tubing
into the packer and pumping down the tubing at rates
as high as 25 to 30 bbl/min at 7,000 psi surface
pressure. The tubing-packer arrangement allowed the
lower zone to be killed first or both zones to be killed
simultaneously.
.
-:---- .... . x~..m+-d t-in the smnll
1 ne pumping equlpnlcllL wcss AMUUA.LU=
..
. . ..
jack-up workover rigs mentioned earlier, the Smackover and the Hustler. Both rigs had the dxillkg
equipment removed. Fig. 8 shows how the small
jack-up workover rig and the larger relief-well drilling
rig were linked for the kill operation. Pumps were
mounted and staged to deliver 5,000 hhp at surface
.U

d-

WATER
nleBl
-.. . ACING
.. .. . .

Fig. 7Kill

procedure

OIL
---

schematic

diagram.

,k.u-

~-..w.-w

JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY

~ln

pressures up to 10,000 psi. The use of two kill platforms allowed considerable operational flexibility
since separate kill operations could be bandied simultaneously. Being mobile, the platforms could be
positioned within stepping distance of the drilling
rigs. Especially advantageous was the all-weather
capability of the pumping piatform. Uiiiiiie imrgem,~l~~,tedml
offered
around-they-...mnc
r, the ~iatf~~.s
clock operations, regardless of rough seas. It is believed that this use of converted, jack-up rigs for
pumping was an industry first.
IMC assembled 35,000 bbl of 17 lb/gal premixed
mud in barges near Shells emergency staging base on
Bayou Lafourche, below Leeville, La. Mother
boats were secured to the pumping platforms and a
shuttle fleet of 10 mud vessels supplied the mother
boat with enough liquid mud to maintain a constant
pumping rate of 1,500 bbl/hour.
Ten relief wells were drilled to kill 11 producing
wells. One of the relief wells was used to kill two
wells that were close together and, as discussed
earlier, one relief well was unsuccessful. The completed relief wells were fitted with conventional trees
and marine marker beacons and foghorns (Fig. 9).
During the relief-well drilling and kill operations
a simultaneous effort was under way to set up firecontrol procedures. Headed by N. L. Dodge, this
organization consisted of three civil engineers, a staff
production engineer, and two construction inspectors.
Paul Red Adair was hired as a consultant. It is appropriate here to tell about the contribution of Adair
and his men. From the first day of the fire, Shell
thought it was possible to kill the burning wells using
the relief-well approach; as stated earlier, the intensity of the fire left no option. Adair confirmed this
assessment. Until the fire subsided, there was nothing
he could do; explosives and capping were out of the
question.
With the killing of B-21 on Dec. 30, 1970, the
fire was reduced an estimated 40 percent. From that
point on, Shell could have elected to use Adairs
services to kill the rest of the burning wells with
explosives. However, the prospect of oil flowing into
the Gulf from several wells at once was unacceptable,
whereas the relief-well approach appeared confirmed.
A

-I-:..*-

fiumrs

. . ----

-.-..

-.-1

Wise WUIMI

. ...3
wa~

.X,hila

-at,.:,d
IGL=llGU

-.,,Ab

+h

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MARCH, 1972

w~iis

~~~

fhe

assi=~.~ent

UIG

GI.LOA

LtJ

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us-

---

--------------

--

the burning platform, a constant cause for concern

was that ~he well conductors and tubing would
succumb to falling debris and the terrific heat before
the relief wells could be completed. The rate of deterioration was countered by the use of the two spray
barges, the lirafla and the Tidelands W. From Dec.
4 until the final capping of Well B-4, the two barges
pumped an almost constant flow of 13,000 gal/rein
on the upwind side of the fire. Since the fire nozzles
could project a worthwhile stream for only about 100
ft, the two barges were often winched within 50 ft
of the blazing platform. Controlled quantities of dispersant were diluted into water spray as a safety
barrier between the burning platform and the anchored barges. Corexit and Cold Clean were
authorized by the Federal authorities to be used at
a rate of 3 gal per 10,000 gal of water.
Despite the spray barge effort, falling debris and
the heat caused several tubing strings to bend and
even loop into the water. The bent and looped wells
added a pollution threat because the combustion
efhciency was lowered. The problem was compounded as lateral and downward plumes of flame
deteriorattx3 adjacent wells and obscured the view of
blowing wells, which hindered visual confirmation
that communication with the relief well had been
established. (See photograph, Page 225.)
The first attempt to overcome this problem was
made on Jan. 10, 1971, when a Shell employee and
sharpshooter shot a hole in the looped tubing of Well
B-10. A small but visible stream of oil spewed out
and ignited. This confirmed that the well was still
flowing, so relief well operations were continued until
communication was established and the blowing well
was killed.

wall
w..

effort continued. When we were trying to solve the

looped-well problem discussed later, he steered the
group away from ideas he knew from experience to
be impractical.
The fire-control organization had three principal
objectives: (1) to identify the burning wells and assign
priorities for drilling relief wells; (2) to slow the rate
of deterioration of the burning platform; and (3) to
salvage and restore the Bay Marchand facility.
In cooperation with one drilling engineer, the idenf;fifi~tinn of
orities for drilling relief wells was coordinated through
the fire-control team. The identification group took
more than 1,000 color photographs and spent hundreds of houn observing the fire from various positions to pinpoint the burning wells one by one. The
identification task was complicated by the fact that
wellheads were often damaged by fire and falling
.,.1

debris as the platform deteriorated. However, their

patience paid off in that every burning well was cor.--1 - .-----J
--1:-C ..,-11
rectiy identified and not a Sinys
ul~lcmeuA Icllcl
W=U
was drilled. Knowledge of the platform layout, patience, and a keen eye were the keys to this accomplishment.
r.h. -a ~ A IAW tb mtm nf rbt-rinratinn
of
Ill

--

~fi-

.-.
-,. .

-.

Fig. 9-Relief

well with tree

and

marine

markers.

231

3?!?%IT
Fig. 10-Sand

cutting head.

B after all wells were secured.

Fig. 1 lPlatform

Pollution-Control

m. UIm- m.

P-J

m.m91R

m
m. m

swI
m.c41mttNc

u. vat m

I
I
mum.
Mam
M. -M
-,,
b*1
-w
am
am
II
Fig.

232

I
WM.
mwmul

II

-.
--

am

[
mullaI

This modest success, gained with Coast Guard permission and due regard for safety, led to an innovation that proved to be a real asset. An abrasive
cutting technique involving a Shell-designed boom
and delivery system and a Dowelldesigned cutting
head (Fig. 10) was used successfully to cut bent and
looped tubing, which improved visibility and diverted
the hydrocarbon flow away from the water and away
from other nearby wells. Water, nitrogen, and sand
were pumped at a high pressure through the boom
and cutting head, which was forked around the
tubing: The first model was modified to include a
hydraulic ram for fore and aft adjustment and a
swivel-mounted cutting head that allowed a fine degree of lateral adjustment through an arc.
Although the planning for salvaging and restoring
the Bay Marchand facility began much earlier, this
phase of the operation went into action when the final
well, B-4, was extinguished. The tension built up
near mid-April. Ten wells had been killed; but the
eleventh, B-4, despite many attempts, proved recalcitrant. We decided to sidetrack the relief well in an
attempt to get closer to the blowing zone. In the
meantime, the emergency group grew increasingly
concerned about the wells that had already been
killed and wanted to get those wells secured. When
the forecast predicted good weather for several days,
promising ideai oii-recovery coriditkm, the W! fire
was extinguished with a high-pressure stream of
water. With oil skimmers positioned downwind, the
fire-control team set a prefabricated deck onto the
remains of Platform B. Using this work deck, Adair
and his men, assisted by Shells field team, capped
B-4 on April 16, 1971. It was the 136th day of the
emergency.
The fire-control team started on the salvage and
restoration phase while Adairs CEW installed trees
on each of the other wells. Ail welis were then sectired
by pumping heavy mud into each tubing string. By
the ~irne ~1 the wells had been secured, about 95
percent of the junk and debris had been removed
from the platform area. (I%g. 11 shows Platform B
after all the wells had been secured.)
A new platform was fabricated and on Nov. 18,
1971, was set over the remains of the old structure.
It appears that all but two of the wells originally completed on B can be restored to production.
The 14 additional wells that would have been
drilled from Platform B had there not been a fire
are being drilled from a new platform that was set
in Sept., 1971.

*UM

12Pollution-control

*m

2UU

I
r

II
1-

organization.

~s
11

1 mn

Emergency Group

The decision to cap Well EM was based to a large

degree on the known capability of our oil recovery
fleet. Organized early in the fire like the other groups,
the pollution-control team was headed by F. T.
Leder. Lessons learned at the Santa Barbara spill,
the Chevron fire, and also the API and Shell Pipe
Line Co.s Research and Development Laboratow,
were heavily drawn upon.
Lcders pollution-control organization is shown in
Fig. 12. It reflects a philosophy that engineers should
& invo!ved in field work as much as possible. With
JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY

the threat of a huge spill there is little time for trial

and error. The basic need for pollution control was
met by the use of proven equipment, supemised in
the field by able personnel who had substantial monetary authority and the ingenuity to solve problems as
they arose. Shells pollution-control efforts at Bay
Marchand are discussed in detail in another paper.

Press Coverage of the Emergency

In the public relations aspects of the Bay Marchand
emergency there was no attempt to smother, hide,
or distort the facts. Everyone knew Shell was on the
spot. The Bay Marchand fire was an emergency of
the first order, so the communications media had a
legitimate interest in it. For understandable reasons,
.,.
-11 . .--...*.A
+ha
fi..a
t,m ha mlq ~Iu~ ~~(j
me
press :-:.!
mu.wl~
CApCL.LGU
UIG ,11- .- w ~cause massive pollution. To counter this attitude, a
frank, open, aboveboard approach to the press was
taken. A good plan had been developed to fight the
f.mmino
pollution; the next Step
fir.
,1, u W;t$n,,t
. . . . . ...
- . ...-.-= rnfwsive
------was to be open about the plans and to give the press
all the information they wanted. Six press conferences
were held, The Company also gave 50 interviews,
conducted 10 press tours of the fire site, and sent out
a total of 157 news releases. This took place over the
full period of fhe dkaster.
The results of these efforts from the beginning was
an accurate press, hence a fair press. In turn, the
accuracy and fairness of the press allowed the emergency group the freedom to persevere with the reliefwell effort. An inaccurate and distorted interpretation
of the facts might have affected the morale of the
organization and imposed an intolerable pressure to
start taking short cuts that could have been detrimental to the entire operation.

Conclusion
The Bay Marchand emergency was a technical challenge as well as a human tragedy. The challenge could
not have been met without the cooperation and the
immediate response of the offshore industry. The fact
that the challenge was met does not mitigate the
heartbreak of its happening in the first place. Nor
does it mean that any offshore fire that might occur
in the future will necessarily lend itself to the same
approach.
This overview, we feel, demonstrates that good
planning and etlicient organization, in hand with
modem technology, can go a long way toward overcoming a disaster.

Postscript
Of the 22 wells completed prior to the fire, 20 have
been restored to their original surface mechanical
condition. One has been abandoned, and another is
ready for abandonment. Restoration work consisted
of replacing the top few hundred feet of 7-in. and
10% -in. casing, extending the 30-in. conductors, replacing the top & 1,000 ft of tubing, and installing
new wellhead equipment. At least two of these wells
fir% , n~w
.-:11
-------- ~UW,l=
~-.x~ h-le
i. w=..
Icqu,le
,U,W -n
.wYa..
----- ip
. - rt~~press
r -=---Will
on one of them. Subsequent work will consist of
cleaning out mud from the tubing strings of all the
wells and flowing them for production.

Acknowledgment
I wish to express my appreciation to the management
of Shell Oil Co. for permission to publish this paper.
References
. . . ...,
1. M1lkr,

KOOCrt

Enzineerin~
Original
manuscript
received
in Society of Petroleum Engineers
received Jan. 26, 1972.
..-. .
Office Nix+. II, ~~~ 1, Revis~d mmmscri@
Paper (SPE 3492) was prasented
at SPE 46th Annual Fall Meeting. held in New Orleans, Oct. 3-6, 1971. @) Copyright 1972
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical,
and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

MARCH,

1972

Ikhg

~.

and ~kni~fik,

~Oidd ~.: p.~w~WLr

Techniques Used To Predict Blowout Control

th~ Bay F&rcnand Firev J. Pet. TedL

(%~iCh,

1972) 234-240.
2. Berry, W. L.: Pollution Control Aspects of the Bay
Marchand Fire; 1. Pet. Tech. (March, 1972) 241-249.

SPT

233