Get Homework/Assignment

Done

Homeworkping.c
om
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/

Research Paper help

https://www.homeworkping.com/

Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/

click here for freelancing tutoring sites

1. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object

** As expressed in the literal reading of the text
1. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Facts:
On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment
of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon
the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July
1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision
in the above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment of
holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it
complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to
and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending,
among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay.
Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code,
the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and
regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial
section thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the month.
Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of
working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then
Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank,
by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the
Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to
an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce
the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18
October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued
an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular
holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its
resolution en banc dismissing the banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of
the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the
Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent
prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order
directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute
the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in
accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November
1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G.
Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated

20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for
certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly
paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

premium and overtime diff erentials for worked legal holidays from
November 1, 1974.
The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees
Associations claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section
2,Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction No. 9, which respectively provide:

Held:
From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and
Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on
holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid
employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the
implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the
courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as
null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the
Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long
as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within
the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Power to construe
THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of
Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a
complaint with the Regional Offi ce No. IV, Department of Labor, now
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank,
for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for

Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are

uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or
established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not.
POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850 have
clarified the policy in the implementation
of the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was
considered
important in determining entitlement to the benefit.
Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he
was considered definitely
already paid. If he was working for less than
313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were
already
paid to him or not.
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit
principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly
salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are
entitled to the benefit. the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been
fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid
employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is
receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his
monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be
already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made
from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur,
then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new
interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in
promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy
Instruction No. 9.
Held:
Ye s . T h e S e c r e t a r y ( M i n i s t e r ) o f L a b o r h a d e x c e
e d e d h i s statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor
Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules

and regulations. While it is true that the Minister has the authority in the
performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement,
construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the
statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.
**a. Dura lex sed lex
Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240
March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don
Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual
the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch
162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio
Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate children as
described in art 992 should be construed as spurious children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

Aguila v. CFI of Batangas

G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico
Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the
disputed property as the only surviving child of the second marriage. The
private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria Alabastro,
the sole offspring of the first marriage and had sued for partition and damages
against the petitioner, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to
the first marriage as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired
anything during their marriage.
On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a writ of execution
pursuant to which the properties held by the defendants were levied upon and
sold at public auction to the plaintiffs as the highest bidders. The defendants
filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the
defendants in the earlier action for partition in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. In their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their
affirmative defenses.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner may rightfully alleged res judicata in this
case.
(2) Whether or not the Court should allow reconveyance of the properties in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
HELD:
(1) No since the petitioner does not seek to do away with the rule of res
judicata but merely proposes to undo a grave and serious wrong perpetuated
in the name of justice. As a matter of fact, he was not denied the opportunity
to submit evidence which the due process guarantees. Records show that he
did not have the ooprtunity to be heard because of the gross ineptitude of
petitioners original counsel.
(3) No. The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is wellsettled. This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud,
property is registered in the name of a person not its owner. However, it cannot
be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice
determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate
proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that case was a valid
resolution of the question of ownership over the disputed properties and
cannot be reversed now through the remedy of reconveyance.
Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. All
abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which
pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice,
while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the

mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim is

"aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.
**Inapplicability in criminal cases
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p):
4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts:
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as
Special Agent by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March
1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the
accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the
said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as
special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the
performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October
1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms
and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was
conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of
the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of
firearms
Held:
The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within
the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v.Macarandang). In the
present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority
to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of
his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was
unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government
property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bring as as he was
already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked
the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967,
years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore
obtaining at the time of appellants appointment as secret agent, he incurred
no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. The Supreme Court
reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his
provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56
and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was
discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22
with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he

owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated
that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed
evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of
People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret
agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police
which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper
defense to illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The
next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it
in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
As determined through Construction
**General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution,
to lift term limits of elective officials, by peoples initiative. Delfin wanted
COMELEC to control and supervise said peoples initiative the signaturegathering all over the country. The proposition is: Do you approve of lifting the
term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose
Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total
number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen.
Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can

only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes
of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of peoples initiative was
left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
peoples initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
d. Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for
peoples initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative on amendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article
XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to
Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or
granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c)
does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in
the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The argument that
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it
is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on
the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance

or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the

autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to
the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of
emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4]
Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfins movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex
gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only

after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of
by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
** 2. Specific Rules
a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and
Paz Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General
opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to
be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been
acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child
may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an
acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of
the father or mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the
intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338
would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are
much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is
unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these
rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the
liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged
natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An
acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of
the law, they should be allowed adoption.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece

of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix
and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation
was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property,
by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.
The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as
it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage
applies to a common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the
policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy
to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does
not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed
property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and
the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
KING vs HERNAEZ
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ,
ETC., ETAL., respondents-appellants.
FACTS
Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen Import Meat and Produce" Philippine
Cold Stores, Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of
Commerce and Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and
mandamus(Court of First Instance of Manila)
writ of preliminary
appeal __
(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180
No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no
association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in

the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x) merely to ban them from its
ownership and not from its management control or operation.
(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended
by Republic Act No.134)
which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the laws of nationalization
of certain rights, f r a n c h i s e s o r p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e R e t a i l Tr a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy Law would punish acts
intended to circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the
retail business.
Itchong Case
ISSUE
Is the employment of aliens in non-control position in a retail
establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
RULING
Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law(X )unconstiright of employer to choose The nationalization of an economic measure
when founded on grounds of public policy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s
unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
C o n s t i t u t i o n because its aim is merely to further the material progress and
welfare of the citizens of a country. Indeed, in nationalizing employment
in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but
its sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those
of other nationalities. falls within the scope of police power, thru which
and by which the State insures its existence and security and
the supreme welfare of its citizens
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This pr
e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is
hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against
appellees.
Bustamante vs. NLRC, 1996
Petitioner
Osmalik S. Bustamante, Paulino A. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Mario D.
Sumonod, and Sabu J. Lamaran
Respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
Ponente
Padilla, J.
Docket Number and Date of Decision
G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996
Significance of the Case

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due
an employee on account of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or
reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his
illegal dismissal.
This case finally abandoned the Mercury Drug rule and deduction of
earnings elsewhere rule then prevailing at that time.
Historical Backdrop
Prior to the present case, SC had applied different methods in the computation
of backwages.
Backwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay
(backwages) to an employee, it also had the implied power of reducing the
backpay where backpay was allowed. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR
can increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several
circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employees
employment in other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal, or
the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from
outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside
employment.
This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases.
Cases are usually held up in the determination of whether or not the
computation of the award of backwages is correct.
Mercury Drug Rule . In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal
dismissal cases, the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. CIR,
1974, to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications
should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee.
In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages
equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made
the base figure for such awards without deduction, subject to deduction where
there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to
increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating
circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employers part.
On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279
of the said code provides:
[...] An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed
from the time his compensation was was withheld from him up to the time of
his reinstatement.
The above provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court
after the promulgation of theMercury Drug case, and during the effectivity of
P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. In effect, this qualified the
provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to 3 years.
Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21
March 1989, the pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was
amended to read as follows:
[...] An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

In accordance with the above provision, an illegally dismissed employee is

entitled to his full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the
time of his actual reinstatement.
Despite the amendment, however, in a subsequent case, Pines City Educational
Center vs. NLRC, 1993, the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug
rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the
employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any,
should be deducted from backwages.
The rationale for such ruling was that, the earning derived elsewhere by the
dismissed employee while litigating the legality of his dismissal, should be
deducted from the full amount of backwages which the law grants him upon
reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee at the
expense of the employer.
Issue
Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the
period of his illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of
backwages.
Ruling
Conformably with the evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be
diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the
period of his illegal dismissal.
The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the
legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself
and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the
price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee.
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 is to give more
benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury
Drug rule or the deduction of earnings elsewhere rule.
Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to full
backwages as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages
the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period
of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for full backwages
to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and,
therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index
animi sermo est (literally speech is the index of intention).
US v. Toribio
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html
Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from
the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act

regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the
animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for
appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No.
1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit
of the municipal treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these
provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty
imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal
slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer.
Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers
(1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without
a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section
33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption
or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a
permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the
keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and
also of the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would
tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30
and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the
permit provided for in section 30.
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. BERNARDO T. PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 42; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR
COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:

Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than
in the sugar industry. While it is the lowly farm worker who must toil in the
field under the harshness of conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more
the fruits of production. While the planter lives in the comfort of his palatial
home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than not defies
the basic tenets of human dignity.[1]
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court seeking to review and set aside the August 8, 1993 Decision [2] and
January 21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 42,[4] Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 6894 for Declaratory Relief.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening
the Sugar Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics
for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws
providing additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic
Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross
production of 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing
scheme, in the absence of any private agreement between the planters and
farm workers, depending on the mills total production for each immediately
preceding crop year; and specifically providing that any increase in the
planters share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase
shall accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers. [6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien
of P2.00 per picul on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for
subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar workers. [8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social
amelioration program in the sugar industry:
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; and
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (In milling districts where the annual
gross production is less than 150,000 piculs)
On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00
per picul on the gross production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 19911992, with an automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the
succeeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act subject to the
discretion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and upon
recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9]
Directly addressing the effect of the new P5.00 per picul lien vis--vis the two
previously existing laws, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides:
Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the
sugar industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as
amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under this Act: Provided, That
cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies at
the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be affected thereby.
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further states:
Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof
notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit,
interest, right or participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the
enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary under this
Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.

Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) is engaged in

the business of, among others, milling raw sugar cane of various sugar
plantations in their milling district. For the crop year 19911992, the sugar
farm workers share in BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted to P30,
590,086.92.[10]
Under P.D. No.621, the workers benefit for the same crop year amounted to
P2,233,285.26, computed as follows:
Gross production of BISCOM
1,595,184.46
(In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOM Share
478,555.33
70% Planter Share
2,116,626.13
Multiplied by P2.00 lien
x
P2.00
TOTAL
P2,233,258.26[11]
But considering that the P2.00 lien under P.D. No.621 is obviously lesser than
the P5.00 lien under R.A. No.6982, the same was no longer imposed by BISCOM
pursuant to R.A. No.6982.
Hence, before R.A. No.6982 took effect, the total farm workers benefit was:
Under R.A. No. 809
P30,590,086.92
Under P.D. No. 621
2,233,258.16
P32,823,345.18
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No.6982, the total workers benefit in BISCOMs
milling district was computed as follows:
Gross Production of BISCOM
1,595,184.46
(In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOM share
478,555.34
70% Planter Share
1,116,629.12
Multiplied by P5.00 lien
x
P5.00
TOTAL FARMWORKERS BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12]
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No.
809 and P.D. No. 621, respondent Secretary of Labor issued Department Order
No.2 (1992),[13] directing, inter alia, the three milling districts in Negros
Occidental, namely: SONDECO, San Carlos and herein private respondent
BISCOM, to continue implementing R.A. No.809 per recommendation of the
Sugar Tripartite Council.
Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc.
(PASON), an organization of sugar farm plantation owners milling with private
respondent BISCOM, filed with the respondent court a Petition for Declaratory
Relief against the implementation of the said D.O. No. 2. It theorized that in
view of the substitution of benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, whatever
monetary rewards previously granted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No.
809 and P.D. No. 621 were deemed totally abrogated and/or superseded. [14]
On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailed Decision;
the dispositive portion of which held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares:
1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute
the benefits under RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already
in implementation at the time of the effectivity of RA 6982; and
2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to
enjoy the benefits under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth
be provided for by RA 6982 now being implemented by private respondent.
SO ORDERED.[15]

With the denial of its motion to reconsider the aforesaid Decision, petitioner
found its way to this Court via the present petition.
The petition is not visited by merit.
From a cursory reading of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable
conclusion would be that the benefits under R.A. No.809 and P.D. No. 621 have
been superseded by those granted under the new law. This substitution,
however, appears to be qualified by Section 14[17] which disallows substitution
if its effect would be to diminish or reduce whatever financial benefits the
sugar farm workers are receiving under existing laws at the time of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6289.
How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpreted in light of the
qualification under Section 14 of the same Act?
Petitioner insists that the word substitution in Section 12 should be taken in
its literal sense considering that the intention of Congress to effect a
substitution of benefits is clear and unequivocal. Under this interpretation of
unqualified substitution, the sugar farm workers in the subject milling district
will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against
the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 and
R.A. No. 809.
So also, invoking the Opinion[18] It is believed that the benefits conferred upon
labor by RA 809 have been superseded by those granted to it under RA
6982. This conclusion is inescapable from a reading of Section 12 of the latter
law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the production-sharing
scheme decreed in RA 809 cannot remain in force upon the effectivity of the
new production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982; otherwise, sugar
workers would be receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously.
The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982
is qualified by Section 14 of the latter. This section provides that if the effect of
such substitution will be to diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards
sugar industry laborers are receiving under RA 809, then such workers shall
continue to be entitled to the benefits provided in such law. Expressed
otherwise the production-sharing scheme in RA 6982 does not apply to sugar
industry workers in milling districts where its application would be financially
disadvantageous to them, in which case the existing production-sharing
agreement based on RA 809 shall still govern. (Opinion No. 115, S. 1992 dated
September 2, 1992, signed by Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon.)18 of the
Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends, in the alternative, that the application
of R.A. No. 809 can be maintained but in no case should the benefits
thereunder be implemented in addition to R.A. No. 6982. Applying this
interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers would amount
toP30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by the public respondent
(that the benefits conferred by R.A. No.6982 should complement those granted
by R.A. No. 809 which cannot be superseded by the former Act since Section 14
thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the total workers benefit would be as
follows:
R.A. No. 809
P30,590,086.92
R.A. No. 6982
__,583,145.61
P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should
be construed in connection with every other part so as to produce a

harmonious whole and every meaning to be given to each word or phrase is

ascertained from the context of the body of the statute. [19] Ut magis valeat
quam pereat.[20]Consequently, laws are given a reasonable construction such
that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by
reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute.[21]
Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which apparently
mandates a total substitution by R. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A.
No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 existing at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982,
can not be construed apart from Section 14 which prohibits such substitution if
the effect thereof would be to reduce any benefit, interest, right or
participation enjoyed by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The
Court finds as untenable the interpretation of the petitioner based an
unqualified substitution of the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by
the monertary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the amount
of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previously enjoyed by the
sugar farm workers under the former laws.
It bears stressing that the primordial objective behind the enactment of R.A.
No. 6982 was to augment the income of sugar workers by establishing a social
amelioration program in cases where sugar farm workers had none, and at the
same time, to improve whatever amelioration schemes already existing in the
sugar districts concerned.[22] In recognition of the avowed guarantee under
Section 3, Article 13 of the Constitution to uphold the right of workers to a just
share in the fruits of production, the policy of R.A. No. 6982 states:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights
of workers in the sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production
by augmenting their income and, among other schemes, institutionalizing the
mechanism among the partners in the sugar industry to enable the workers
and their families to enjoy a decent living. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing studiedly considered, there can be no other construction that
would best promote the welfare of the sugar farm workers, than the
interpretation of the public respondent, implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a
complement to R.A. No. 809.
Citing the floor deliberations of Congress,[23] petitioner insists that the nondiminution of benefits referred to in Section 14 pertains only to pending claims
of the workers at the time of the effectivity of the Act. Stated differently, it is
contended that the benefits to which the workers are entitled under R.A. No.
809 and P.D. No. 601 can be validly diminished by virtue of the application of
R.A. No. 6982, because the non-diminution provision in Section 14 thereof
refers to pending claims accruing under P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809, and not to
the very benefits previously enjoyed by the workers under the said laws. With
this construction, from a total benefit of P32,823,345.18 conferred by R.A. No.
809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers would only be entitled to a meager
amount of P5,583,145.61.
The contention is barren of sustainable merit. To limit the application of the
non-diminution principle only to pending claims would be repulsive not only to
the policy of the Act but also to the salutory provisions of the
Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity
of P27,240,199.57 between P32,823,345.18 andP5,583,145.61 would not
warrant such an interpretation. As aptly ratiocinated[24] by the respondent
Court, the evolution of legislation in the sugar industry had always had for its

10

foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar farm worker. Hence,
through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always
provided for an increase in wages and benefits. The reason is obvious. Amidst
the rapidly changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the
industry, the sugar worker can hardly cope with his meager income to lean on.
Equally wanting of merit is the alleged double recovery under the
interpretation subscribed by the public respondent. Note that had not R.A. No.
6982 been enacted, sugar farmworkers would be entitled to a total a share
of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; whereas under the
alternative view of the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92)
granted by R.A. No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A.
No. 6982, sugar farm workers stand to lose the difference of P2,233,258.56,
from a total of P32,823,345.18 which they were entitled before RA 6982 took
effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous construction cannot be
countenanced, being violative of the non-diminution principle under Section 14
of R.A. No. 6982.
In view of the foregoing, the addition of the monetary rewards under R.A. No.
6982 to the benefits granted by R.A. No. 809, is what is called for in the case
under consideration. While it is true that addition is different from
substitution, the circumstances involving subject milling districts (where the
sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary
advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise,
the workers would suffer a diminution of benefits. Therefore, the increase of
monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as a consequence of
such interpretation, is merely incidental to the application of the nondiminution policy of R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which should be liberally
construed to further its purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincing the interpretation proposed by private
respondent BISCOM. While maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and
P.D. No. 621 (where the total share of the workers is P32,823,345.18),
and disregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to the sugar farm
workers, to the mind of the Court, the assailed construction of the public
respondent (where the total share of the workers is P36,173,232.53), would be
more in keeping with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living
condition of workers in the sugar industry. Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
[26]

Premises studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, and

so holds, that the respondent Court ventured not in any judicial legislation but
merely gave life to the avowed policy of the State under Section 18, Article 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
guarantee the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED; and the assailed Decision in Civil Case
No. 6894, dated August 18, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 42, Bacolod City, AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Villanueva v. COMELEC Case Digest

**When literal import must yield to spirit/intent
Villanueva v. COMELEC
No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution
for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing
on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded
all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the
presumption that Petitioners candidacy was not duly approved by
Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation
but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the
grounds that Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that
assuming it was effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid
since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or
technical defects.
HELD:
No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality,
which should not be used to frustrate the peoples will in favor of Petitioner as
the
substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day tha
t he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading
of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than
its literal reading should have
guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withd
rawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.
**When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG
1991]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

11

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of
February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were

involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WENCESLAO
ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO
FRONDA, defendants-appellees.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for appellant.
Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were
charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was
alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muoz, Nueva Ecija the
accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to
her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests
of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at
P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch VI).chanrobles virtual law library
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of
particulars as to the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The
lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their
plea.chanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds
(1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged;
(2) that there is no law punishing it, and
(3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time
The fiscal opposed the motion.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order
of August 11, 1966. It held that the information is basically deficient because it
does not describe lie circumstances under which the cavans of palay were
found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date
agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the
palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share
based on the last normal harvest.The prosecution appealed from the order of
dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information in this
case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the
same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. - It shall be unlawful for either the tenant
or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop
at any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food
for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to
allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set
for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his

12

net share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the
landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either party
shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the
general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine
and forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the
discretion of the Court. ... *
We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held
in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant
case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code
of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as
implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was
already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may
be rationalized in this manner:
The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share
tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the
harvests.chanrobles virtual law library
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law
(except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the
leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions
indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced
in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or
part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.chanrobles virtual law library
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more
raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed
in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian
Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on
September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa
lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this
case.chanrobles virtual law library
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy
throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically
converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the
entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated
the tenant from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316
interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding
until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential
Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that,
as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.chanrobles
virtual law library
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace
the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are
concerned.chanrobles virtual law library

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law,
had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is
already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that
Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore
pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual
law library
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all
that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was
contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford,
Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).chanrobles virtual law
library
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute,
and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former
statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative
declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and
whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles
virtual law library
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs.
Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs.
Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil.
431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252,
254).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtual law library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Endnotes:
* Appellees' contention that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over
the offense because inferior courts have jurisdiction over offense in which the
penalty is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more
three thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment and that it is the
Muoz municipal court that has jurisdiction is wrong. The Court of First Instance
has concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior court in mm in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of-more
than two hundred pesos (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law).
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:

13

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education,
in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez
in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile
of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban,
her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

**b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole

i. Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible; reconcile apparently conflicting
provisions
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION represented herein by
Administrator AMANTE SIAPNO, EVANGELISTA A. GARCIA, RICARDO
BRIONES, CLARITA B. CASTRO, CRISTINA LOPEZ, JESUS C. BONDOC and
ROSALINA C. CARINO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court to review and set aside the decision of the Commission on Audit [1]dated
February 7, 1995 in COA Decision No. 95-108.[2]
The National Tobacco Administration (NTA, for short), under Executive Order
No. 116, as amended by Executive Order No. 245,[3] is a government-owned
and controlled corporation (GOCC, for brevity) tasked to supervise and
improve the viability of the tobacco industry in this country.
On August 9, 1989, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6758, [4] entitled An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the
Government and for Other Purposes. On October 2, 1989, pursuant to Section
23 of said law, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to serve as the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6758.
Pertinent records show that even prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6758, officials and employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social
Amelioration Benefit equivalent to one-and-a half (1 1/2) month of their basic
salary. From 1989 to 1993, however, the said benefit was reduced to
one (1) month of the basic salary due to financial/budgetary constraints. In
May, 1993, the nomenclature of subject social amelioration benefit was
changed to educational assistance in order to reflect the rationale behind the
same, which is to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue graduate studies and to
finance the schooling of their children.

14

Sometime in February, 1994, Miss Dalisay E. Aracan, Resident Auditor of NTA,

issued a Notice of Disallowance of the payment of the educational assistance
for calendar year 1993, opining that the NTA has no statutory authority to
grant the incentive. In January, 1995, the same Resident Auditor caused the
disallowance of the same benefit paid in 1994, for the same reason.
On April 25, 1994, the petitioners appealed to the Commission on Audit,
praying for the lifting of the disallowance in question, pointing out
that: (1) Benefits received by employees as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to
Section 12 of R.A. 6758; (2)the benefit having been received for so many years,
even prior to the effectivity of the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, has
been a vested right, on the part of the recipients and (3) such allowance
regularly granted, forms part of the total compensation package of NTA Officers
and employees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof amounts to
unathorized diminution of pay.
On February 7, 1995, the Commission on Audit came out with its questioned
Decision the pertinent portion of which, reads:
After a thorough evaluation, this Office believes and so holds that the
disallowance of the Auditor on the payment of the mid-year social amelioration
benefits or the educational assistance benefits is in order. It bears stress that
Sec. 5.6 of CCC No. 10 (Implementing R.A. 6758) is so explicit when it provides
that:
Payment of other allowances/fringe benefit and all other forms of
compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not
mentioned in Sub-Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above shall be discontinued effective
November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe benefits after
said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public Funds.
Since the educational assistance or the mid- year social amelioration is not
among those allowances mentioned in Sub-pars. 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, the
same shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989 and considering that
NTA paid its officials/employees this type of allowance, such payment shall be
considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
The provision of Sec. 12 second sentence thereof as invoked by the
Administrator should be read in conjunction with the first sentence thus Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subistence [sic] allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign
service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation
not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBMshall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such
other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized. xxx
xxx xxx
xxx
Premises considered and for lack of legal basis, the herein request of the
Administrator, NTA for the lifting of the disallowance in question, may not be
given due course.[5] [Underscoring; supplied]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari, filed on April 24, 1995, seeking the annulment of the said
COA Decision; theorizing that the respondent Commission on Audit erred:

I.
IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION
/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEING
RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING
WAY BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARY STANDARDIZATION LAW (R.A.
6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAME LAW (R.A.
6758) OR IS OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS;
II.
IN FAILING TO REALIZE AND CONSIDER THAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE
PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
BENEFIT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF COMPENSATION PROSCRIBED
UNDER EXISTING LAWS AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III.
IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED NTA EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER
SAID SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT AND COAs
DISALLOWANCE THEREOF IS AN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH RIGHT.
Petitioners raise the pivotal issues: (1) whether or not the social amelioration
or educational assistance benefit given to the individual petitioners prior to
enactment of R.A. 6758 is authorized under the law, (2) whether or not the
disallowance of the said benefit is tantamount to diminution of pay,
and (3) whether or not the individual petitioners have acquired a vested right
thereover.
First Issue:

Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Subparagraphs 4.1, 5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the
Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 6758.
A. Sections 12 and 17 of R. A. 6758, read:
Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances,
except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign
service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation
not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such
other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or
employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed
into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the
National Government.
while
Section 17. Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently
receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those
absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of
which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount
of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall received [sic] in the future.

15

B. Section 4.1 of CCC No. 10:

4.0
DEFINITION OF TERMS
4.1
The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall
refer to the sum total of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated
hereunder, being received as of June 30, 1989 and certified and authorized by
the DBM.
4.1.1
Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA)/Bank Equity Pay (BEP) equivalent to
forty percent (40%) of basic salary or P300.00 per month, whichever is higher;
4.1.2
Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic
salary or P150.00 per month, which ever is higher;
4.1.3
COLA granted to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and
Position Classification Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National
Government and to GOCCs/GFIs following the Compensation and Position
Classification Plan under LOImp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOImp. No. 97/CCC No.
2, in the amount of P550.00 per month for those whose monthly basic salary is
P1,500.00 and below, and P500.00 for those whose monthly basic salary is
P1,501.00 and above, granted on top of the COLA/BEP mentioned in Item 4.1.1
above;
4.1.4
Stabilization Allowance; and
4.1.5
Allowance/fringe benefits converted into Transition Allowance
pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 177, as implemented by Corporate Budget
Circular No. 15, both series of 1988.
4.2
Allowances enumerated above are deemed integrated into the basic
salary for the position effective July 1, 1989.
4.3
Transition allowance, for purposes of this circular shall mean the
excess of the present salary of the incumbent defined in Item 4.1 hereinabove,
over the eighth step of the Salary Grade to which his position is allocated.
C. Sub-Paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC. No. 10:
5.0 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
xxx xxx
xxx
5.4
The rates of the following allowances/fringe benefits which are not
integrated into the basic salary and which are allowed to be continued after
June 30, 1989 shall be subject to the condition that the grant of such benefit is
covered by statutory authority.
5.4.1
Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of incumbent
of the position authorized to receive the same at the highest amount legally
authorized as of June 30, 1989 of the level of his position within the particular
GOCC/GFI;
5.4.2
Uniform and Clothing Allowance at a rate as previously authorized;
5.4.3
Hazard Pay as authorized by law;
5.4.4
Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with
special projects of inter-agency undertakings;
5.4.5
Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and
specialists who are of acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
5.4.6
Honoraria for lecturers and resource persons/speakers;
5.4.7
Overtime Pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
5.4.8
Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence of marine officers and
crew on board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of
hospital personnel who attend directly to patients and who by nature of their
duties are required to wear uniforms;

5.4.9
Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently
entitled to the same;
5.4.10
Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized
for personnel stationed abroad;
5.4.11
Night Differential of personnel on night duty;
5.4.12
Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the
rate as prescribed in their respective Charters;
5.4.13
Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
5.4.14
Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial
bodies and Committees; and
5.4.15
Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign
and local travel outside of their official station;
5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise Integrated into the basic
salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989
subject to the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate
authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative
issuances are as follows:
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy;
5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy;
5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
5.5.5 Childrens Allowance;
5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
5.5.7 Meal Subsidy;
5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9 Tellers Allowance.
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of
compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not
mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above shall be
discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such
allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners maintain that since they have been receiving the social
amelioration or educational assistance benefit before July 1, 1989, when R.A.
No. 6758 took effect, and the benefit was not integrated into their standardized
salary rate, they are entitled to receive it even after the effectivity of the said
Act.[6] They base their claim on the second sentence of Section 12 and on
Section 17 of the Salary Standardization Law which, for the sake of
thoroughness and clarity of discussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to
wit:
Second Sentence of Section 12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only
as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized;
xxx
Section 17: Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently
receiving salaries and additional compensation /fringe benefits including those
absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of
which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as

16

transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount

of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall received in the future.
It is the submission of the Commission on Audit that payment of the
educational assistance in question is not authorized under Republic Act No.
6758, arguing that the provision of Sec. 12, second sentence thereof as
invoked by the Administrator [representing the petitioner herein] should be
read in conjunction with the first sentence...;[7] and if the entire Section 12 is
further considered in relation to sub-paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC No. 10,
respondent concluded that the grant of subject educational assistance would
have no legal basis at all.
Confusion as to the proper interpretation of Section 12 springs from two
seemingly contradictory provisions. The last clause of the first sentence of
Section 12, reads:
[A]nd such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as
may be determined by the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates herein prescribed;
while the second sentence of Section 12 is to the following effect:
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Before proceeding to rule on the proper interpretation of the two provisos
aforecited, the salient features of the provision as a whole should first be
pondered upon and tackled.
Under the first sentence of Section 12, all allowances are integrated into the
prescribed salary rates, except:
(1) representation and transportation allowances (RATA);
(2) clothing and laundry allowances;
(3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels;
(4) subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
(5) hazard pay;
(6) allowance of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section
12 as may be determined by the DBM.
Analyzing No. 7, which is the last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, in
relation to the other benefits therein enumerated, it can be gleaned unerringly
that it is a catch-all proviso. Further reflection on the nature of subject fringe
benefits indicates that all of them have one thing in common - they belong to
one category of privilege called allowances which are usually granted to
officials and employees of the government to defray or reimburse the expenses
incurred in the performance of their official functions. In Philippine Ports
Authority vs. Commission on Audit,[8] this Court rationalized that if these
allowances are consolidated with the standardized rate, then the government
official or employee will be compelled to spend his personal funds in attending
to his duties.
The conclusion - that the enumerated fringe benefits are in the nature
of allowance - finds support in sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
Sub-paragraph 5.4 enumerates the allowance/fringe benefits which
are not integrated into the basic salary and which may be continued after June
30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of such benefit is covered by
statutory authority, to wit:

(1) RATA;
(2) Uniform and Clothing allowances;
(3) Hazard pay;
(4) Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special
projects or inter-agency undertakings;
(5) Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who
are of acknowledged authorities in their fields of specialization;
(6) Honoraria for lectures and resource persons or speakers;
(7) Overtime pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
(8) Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence allowance of marine officers
and crew on board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations,
and of hospital personnel who attend directly to patients and who by nature of
their duties are required to wear uniforms;
(9) Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently entitled to
the same;
(10) Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized for
personnel stationed abroad;
(11) Night differential of personnel on night duty;
(12) Per Diems of members of the governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate
as prescribed in their respective Charters;
(13) Flying pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
(14) Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members or Staff of collegial
bodies and Committees; and
(15) Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and
local travel outside of their official station.
In addition, sub-paragraph 5.5 of the same Implementing Rules provides for the
other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated into the basic salary
and allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to
the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate authorization either
from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative issuances, as follows:
(1) Rice Subsidy;
(2) Sugar Subsidy;
(3) Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
(4) Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
(5) Childrens Allowances;
(6) Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
(7) Meal Subsidy;
(8) Longevity Pay; and
(9) Tellers Allowance.
On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is awarded by the
government in order to encourage the beneficiaries to pursue further studies
and to help them underwrite the expenses for the education of their children
and dependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the nature of financial
assistance and not of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not
necessary while for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not only that, the
former is basically an incentive wage which is defined as a bonus or
other payment made to employees in addition to guaranteed hourly
wages[9] while the latter cannot be reckoned with as abonus or additional
income, strictly speaking.
It is indeed decisively clear that the benefits mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 12 and sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 are entirely different

17

from the benefit in dispute, denominated as Educational Assistance. The

distinction elucidated upon is material in arriving at the correct interpretation
of the two seemingly contradictory provisions of Section 12.
Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that the particular words, clauses
and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but
thewhole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A
statute must so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.[10] And the rule - that statute must be construed as a
whole - requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized, if at all possible.[11] It is likewise a basic precept in statutory
construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of the subject statute.[12] With these rules and the foregoing
distinction elaborated upon, it is evident that the two seemingly irreconcilable
propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that under the aforesaid catch-all proviso, the legislative intent is
just to include the fringe benefits which are in the nature of allowances and
since the benefit under controversy is not in the same category, it is safe to
hold that subject educational assistance is not one of the fringe benefits within
the contemplation of the first sentence of Section 12 but rather, of the second
sentence of Section 12, in relation to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758, considering
that (1) the recipients were incumbents when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on July
1, 1989, (2) were, in fact, receiving the same, at the time, and (3) such
additional compensation is distinct and separate from the specific allowances
above-listed, as the former is not integrated into the standardized salary
rate. Simply stated, the challenged benefit is covered by the second sentence
of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, the application of sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of
CCC No. 10 being only confined to the first sentence of Section 12, particularly
the last clause thereof which amplifies the catch-all proviso.
Furthermore, the non-inclusion by the Department of Budget and Management
of the controverted educational assistance in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of
CCC No. 10 is expected since the term allowance does not include the
questioned benefit which belongs to a different genus. The argument that the
said fringe benefit should be disallowed on the ground that it is not mentioned
in the Implementing Rules of the Statute is consequently fallacious. It is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that the implementing rules and
regulations (CCC No. 10, in this case) cannot amend the act of Congress (R.A.
6758). The second sentence of R.A. No. 6758 expressly provides that such
additional compensation ... being received by incumbents ... not integrated into
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. To be sure, the
said Circular cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the statute as to
prohibit something permitted and allowed by law.[13] The Circular cannot extend
the law or expand its coverage as the power to amend or repeal a statute is
vested in the legislature.[14]
Conformably, as mandated by the second sentence of Section 12, in relation to
Section 17 of the Republic Act under interpretation, the mid-year educational
assistance should continue to be authorized.
THE SECOND AND THE THIRD ISSUES:

That the Disallowance of the Payment of Subject Educational Assistance

Constitutes Diminution of Compensation; That the NTA Employees Have
Already Acquired a Vested Right Over the Same.

Gleanable from the wordings of the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No.
6758 is the intention of Congress to prevent any diminution of the pay and
benefits being received by incumbents at the time of the enactment of the
Salary Standardization Law. Verily, disallowing any such benefit is against the
spirit of the Statute and is inconsistent with the principle of equity which
regards the spirit and not the letter...[15] of the law. Hence, while it cannot be
said that the NTA employees have acquired a vested right over the educational
assistance in dispute as it is always subject to availability of funds,
[16]
nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds are available as in the case
under consideration, would be violative of the principle of equity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; the assailed COA Decision No.
95 - 108 is SET ASIDE, and the disallowance in question LIFTED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL
CORPORATION,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of Land Linoan,
Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondents
certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to
farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per
hectare for the riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total
of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural
Landholdings (LISTASAKA) which private respondent had earlier filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower Fair Value Acceptable to
Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the
Philippines valued private respondents lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per
hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be
paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the governments offer, pointing out that nearby
lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40
per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuation
made by the LBP.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just
Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as
a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to
pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the
ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of

18

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latters Revised

Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the
RTC found that, in violation of the DARABs rules of procedure the petition had
been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied
on October 13, 1994. Private respondent therefore filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 56-57 falls under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of
Appeals which, in its decision[1] of October 4, 1995, set aside the order of
dismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings.
In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform,
filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases
involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a
landowner can resort to the RTC under 57. Petitioners sustain the affirmative
proposition. They cite 50 of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides:
50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the Dar. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under
R.A. No. 6657 is a [matter] involving the implementation of agrarian reform
within the contemplation of this provision. They invoke 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657,
which provides that any party who disagrees to the decision [of the DAR] may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of
just compensation, as confirming their construction of 50.
The contention has no merit.
It is true that 50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however,
that 57 provides:
57. Special jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
this Act. the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]. [2] The
provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by
considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and

criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of
power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The
DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay[3] and Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we held
that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scotys
Department Store v. Micaller[5] we struck down a law granting the then Court of
Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the
Industrial Peace Act.
Petitioners also cite Rule II, 5 and Rule XIII, 1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
in support of their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators
may only be appealed to the DARAB. These rules provide:
Rule II 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders,
decisions, and other dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform
adjudicators].
Rule XIII, 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order
or decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of
the parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period
of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if
the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed
by the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or
adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal.
Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the
New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994,
now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an
agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the
Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the
new rules provides:
11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power
vested in the courts.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and
the compensation to be paid for their taking.[6] Through notice sent to the
landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In
case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is
held[7] and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the
central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the
land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to

19

the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian
Court.[8]This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation
cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents
case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court
to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as
a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. [9] It would
subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest
original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make
the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision
of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary
to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is
only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be
paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this
question.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON.
ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO 184861, JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. Afterwards, private respondent, together with her husband, filed a
complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private
respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as
for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f prejudicial question in Civil
Case No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree
with private respondents argument that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during
the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a
civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded the filing of the civil case.

it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by

amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had.In the instant case, the
phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil
action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly
before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions,
that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be
construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system.This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every effort must be made to
harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations.
The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed
in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation,
or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the
principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil
Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of
law.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No.
4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and
sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check
the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna
de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing

20

privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:

Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in
the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens &
fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages &
other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993
are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by
the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners
of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A
of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.

of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order
and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA,
RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.

Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor
was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 337593Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and
Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges
on municipal waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal
the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible,
effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law
cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue
purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and
for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding
of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION,

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced
therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Gaerlan vs Catubig

21

Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the
eight -seatCity Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig.
The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one
of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the
Court to challenge Catubigs eligibility for officeon the averment of non-age.
Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented
his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months
and
22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and
24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1,
1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned
as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or
the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same.
Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The
judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig
appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed
not by R.A.170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter
alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years
later.
R .A . 170, as amended
Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than
twenty- three
years of age. xxx"
R .A .2 2 5 9
Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at
least
twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election
and is a qualified voter.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended,
has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259
Decision:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of whether or not
a special law has been repealed or amended by one
or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the
Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Co ngress show
beyond doubt that its members intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of

special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except
those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof.
In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in consistent
with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.
Section 1of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the
Philippines,
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila,
Cavite, Trece
Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the
City of Baguio, thusshowing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from
the provisions of said Act are
subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in
Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly
precluded to vote for provincial officials. Since Dagupan City is removed from
the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision
on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are
not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what
the legislative body has expressly ordained.It is accordingly held that
respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he
took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.
City of Manila vs Genaro Teotico
22 SCRA 267 Civil Law - Torts and Damages Liability of municipal
corporations in certain cases
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in
P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries
upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code
the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city
treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on
appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of
Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila
states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the
city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall
prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident
happened in national highway.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law;
that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general
law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the

22

negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city
from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but
merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities,
and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or supervision.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a
national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the
road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the Citys
control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the
defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have
control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged
that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the citys roads, P.
Burgos included.
City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to
the contrary, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate,
distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and power shall be 25 of their
gross receipts.
Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law
or other special law, the province may impose a tax on business enjoying a
franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annul receipts.
RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the legislature intended
to withdraw all tax exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is
made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code, when it provides that unless
otherwise provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn
upon the effectivity of the Code.
Lagman v City of Manila (QUICO)
Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version)
Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service
Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed
routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight.
Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the
name and style of Marco Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger
buses along his authorized line.
On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in
pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no.
4986, entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the
City of Manila, and for other purposes, which the city mayor approved. The
pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;
Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of
Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the
best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx

Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no.
4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that
regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested,
under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also
contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact
Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted
by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.
Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails
over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as
amended)?
Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later
enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as
amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former
and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of
C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after
notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute
vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or
control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or
prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred
upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission
under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the
said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon
the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to
the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section
18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an
exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not
favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception
to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against
petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF

23

AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras

ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due
process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is
further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC
had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes
of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.
Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)
Vda De Urbano v Gsis
2001
Facts
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure
a housing loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the
mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the property and emerged as the highest
bidder.
In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS
Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16,
GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired
Assets Department subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an
extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure to do so forfeited the
reclamation of the property and sold in a public bidding.
The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of
the property. The Gsis AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000
with the GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property.
Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal
arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were unable to pay. GSIS
then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the
property for 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the
petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the 124k balance to be

paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. The Board
informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to
repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the
property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a
certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover,
the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member
of the GSIS. It wasnt given due consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested
the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they
filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public
bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to
acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or
elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to
compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in
determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to its
members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive to the
needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board could exercise
discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase the
subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the
whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs
of its members.
With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court
also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period
imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell
the property since the property belongs to him (the board as well)
The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the subject property was
not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the
petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject
property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were repeatedly unable
to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager, the
observation was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right.
The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their
requests and the GSIS cant be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted

24

under the petitioners application under Operation Pabahay. The sale to

respondent cant be annulled on such invoked right.
2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the
GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure,
through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered
unserviceable govt property and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable
govt property or those no longer needed. The house was obviously not
unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the General guidelines on the
divestment or disposal of assets of government owned corporations the law
stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement of
disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to
sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of
business. The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided
for Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of
Government Agencies, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal
requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the regular course of
business nor to the disposal by govt financial institutions of foreclosed assets
or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to
the Govt under proclamation no 50.
The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question
whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls
under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the
same thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one
of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari
material are to be taken together as if they were one law.
Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these
were used to generate more revenue for GOCCS through the disposition of its
non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the
case) According to the court, the policy intent on the disposition of acquired
assets then governed the case at bar.
Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The
court said yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular
course of business, and thus did not offend the requirements of the said coa
circulars.
3. No.
GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for repurchase of subject property
was based on a factual determination of the petitioners financial capacity and
the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after
giving them one year to repurchase.
The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, cant also impute bad
faith on GSIS when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte
case, the court held that the constitutional right to information was limited to
matters of public concern to transactions involving public interest.The sale of
the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a purely private
transaction. Pets. Cant demand to be informed of such public negotiation

since they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply
with the GSIS terms of repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS
terms.
DECLARADOR VS. GUBATON G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006
Facts:
A 17 years old minor was proven to have committed a crime of murder with
evident premeditation and abuse of strength of stabbing 15 times a teacher,
wife of the petitioner, in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas,
Capiz but the sentenced is suspended by the Judge automatically. A petition
that the suspension of sentenced was not proper because the minor is
disqualified as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in suspending the sentence of a minor of a
crime committed punishable by death.
Held: Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, will be automatically suspended without a need for
application except when the youthful offender was disqualified on any one of
the following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions, (2) to one who is convicted for an
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted
for an offense by the Military Tribunals. In the case at bar, the youthful
offenders crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, by death or
life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not
applicable.
Liability
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank) and his teacher-in-charge at
the Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly
subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have
been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School
and during school hours.
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government & Chairman, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner,
NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional
Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; and MARIO
VALDEZ,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court[1] to set aside the decision (in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995[2] of
public respondent National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due
course for lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review filed by

25

petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman,

respectively. Challenged in the said appeal and petition for review were the
decision of 15 August 1994[3] and resolution of 25 October 1994[4] of the
Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB 8), which
affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings and annexes filed by the parties disclose the following factual
and procedural backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct,
Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the
Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario
Valdez.[5] The complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police Eighth
Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own
investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the
petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a
decision[6] finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their
dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No.
174, dated 23 April 1994,[7] was issued ordering, among other things, the
dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of
the decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof thru their own
effort and initiative only on 13 June 1994.[8] However, they received a copy of
Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special
Order No. 174,[9] petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal [10] filed with
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional
Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said
motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to
the RAB.
In its decision of 15 August 1994, [11] the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the
Regional Director. In its resolution of 25 October 1994, [12] it denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received
a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of
the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their Appeal[13]dated 5 February
1995 and Petition for Review[14] dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners appeal and petition for
review for lack of jurisdiction it appearing x x x that both the Decision and the
Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and
executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide
respondents appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60) days. [15] In
support
thereof,
the NAPOLCOM cited
Section
23,
Rule
IV
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:
Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. Failure of the Regional
Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the reglementary period shall
render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing
of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government.

xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the Regional
Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become final and executory after
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for
Reconsideration is filed within said period.
A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision
rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that
the same is filed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in
question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground
of prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon
the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel
where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office. The said
provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or removal
or dismissal from office. x x x
(2) The Secretaries x x x shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. x x x In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
Department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case, the same
shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision
covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners; consequently, they should have
appealed to the CSC. It also advances the view that the instant petition should
have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course,
for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners appeal from and petition for review of
the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies.
I
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 [16] provides for the finality of disciplinary
actions against members of the PNP as follows:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon
a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary
action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided,
further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving
demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or

26

National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That
failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period
shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the
filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (Italics supplied)
The
last
proviso
of
this
section
is
restated
in
Section
23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB
Decisions. The NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide the
appealed cases within sixty (60) days from receipt of the entire records of the
case from the PNP summary dismissal authority. However, failure of the
NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said
period renders the decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of
an appeal by the respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government. The decision rendered by the NAPOLCOM
National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an appealed case shall be final and
executory unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is filed within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, in which case, it shall become final and executory
upon receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the aforesaid
board denying, modifying or affirming the decision.
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to
decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed
decision becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to the right
of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said
provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a
decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions
of the RAB rendered within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of
the section is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein
that explicitly bars any further appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of
government officials and employees must then be inquired into considering
that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be
national in scope and civilian in character, [17] it is now a part, as a bureau, of
the reorganizedDILG.[18] As such, it falls within the definition of the civil
service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. [19] For this reason,
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where
the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission,
the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987
promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules
provide as follows:

SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the

Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation
and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262,[20] the Secretary of the DILG has the power of
supervision and control of his Department. His powers and functions
thereunder are recognized and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990.
[21]

In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990,
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations
implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[22]
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the
appealed decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of theDILG. Likewise, if
the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may
still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabadas appeal was addressed to the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government x x x as
Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission, [23] while De
Guzmans petition for review was addressed to the Honorable Secretary,
Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chairman, National
Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.[24]
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary
of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the
other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition
for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as
Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the
jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction
because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. x x x
xxx xxx
xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed

27

upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits. x x x
This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction
only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary
actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief
of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over
decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue,
through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995decision denying
due course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada
and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5,
Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOMMemorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these
rules suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of the RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is flawed because it
would allow a ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an
appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of
1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for
the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of theDILG Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to annual and set aside the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 March
1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration
before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with. [25]
II
The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is
premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus
untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the
one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada
and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal
would have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim
in their Reply to the Comment of theOSG that their case falls within the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the
petitioners relating to the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
instant
petition
is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a letter) of the National Police
Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government isDIRECTED to RESOLVE with
reasonable
dispatch
the
appeal
and
petition
for
review
of

petitioners SPO3 NOEL

CABADA and SPO3RODOLFO
G.
DE
GUZMAN,
respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and resolution of 25 October
1994 of the Regional Appellate Board, Eighth Regional Command, if the same
were filed on time.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE,
as Treasurer of the City of Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.
Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.
Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084,
entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of
the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its approval and
requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts sought for in
their complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present
controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the
City Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and
amending the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed
in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross
sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to said ordinance, private
respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for
the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the
City of Naga a claim for refund of the following amounts, together with
interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to
Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the
difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of
the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They alleged
that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3,
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it was
approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in
1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for
the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be
refunded to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So
private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga
(Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective
only in the year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have
Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and

28

arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the
sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained
of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of
P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be enjoined
from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private
respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of their
taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published in
accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of
the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its
passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the
City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and
accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective manner. As
special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the private
respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that the
collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the
refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable; that petitioners
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the
City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality
of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious
filing of the claim against them, in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and at the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits of
the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on June
15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360
entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of
Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto
on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated places
by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents voluntarily
paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on February
15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that
Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the
year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the
petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their taxes
to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna,
P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from
the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the
sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga,
took effect in the quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July 1970,
invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as
the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that "Each
approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after the 10th
day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They
contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City

of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his
approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City
Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following
its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance
itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary
to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the
same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the
ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance
is deemed approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the
City Mayor with his veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June
25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from
June 25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that
Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under
Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly
provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360
could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its
passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as
earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the
ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it
shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners
to support their stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of
its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that
is more relevant because it is the provision that specifically refers to effectivity
of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed to have
superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in
so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360
became effective and enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its
approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.A municipal license
tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year,
but an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the
quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is
one which changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts
of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance
No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in
the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the next succeeding
year after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect
and became enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict
between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really such a conflict in
the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal
ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal
license tax already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely

29

new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall
be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December of any year after the next succeeding year. This means that the
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a
municipal license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next
succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by
the new ordinance. This is different from the second type of a municipal
ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted
during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any subsequent
quarter. We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which
changes a municipal license tax already in existence and an ordinance creating
an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9
which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or
parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the
same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently
intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise
itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new
statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and
stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation ...
. 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same
subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect
they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are
in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments
and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed
to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old
and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes

relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new
provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when
the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is
not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by
applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
when the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or
repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the problem
refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the
graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and
sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of
Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls
within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be
refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for
the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City
RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and
furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on
granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners
MR, hence the instant petition.
Ramirez vs. CA
Issue:

30

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to
impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to

include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between

petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any
doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
GARVIDA VS. SALES
n 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her
candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she
is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing).
Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and
the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida
won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed
as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of
age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not
specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said
provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less
than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because
she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that
candidates for SK must be:
Filipino citizen;
an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official
barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase
is not equivalent to less than 22 years old. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of
Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he
should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though
obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been
elected by reason of the winners eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He
cannot be declared as successor simply because he did not get the majority or
the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would have been
different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida
despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes stray.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK
member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member
obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**

31

(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK

chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only
applies when the SK Chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is
convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3)
consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what Section 435 contemplates.
Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being
eligible means being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.

compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein.

The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has
been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore,
Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the
social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not
require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16704

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

Mataguina Integrated Wood vs. CA

Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22
requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias
Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission
in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in
the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly
premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular
for lack of autho
rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular
No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as
to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative
rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative
agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and

FACT:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging
businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was
established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the
majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be
transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises
Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)
alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs
timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged
and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE
appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency,
Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda
found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co
requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay
the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a
writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the
Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the
Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the
original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the
issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only
without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently
without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs
constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of
Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an

32

opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI
was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the
Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable
upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient
conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis
merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or
impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister
disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The
liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative
proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of
fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA
(Davide, Jr., 1996)
A search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served at any time
within 10 days. If its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the
same may be continued the following day or days until completed, provided it
is within the 10 day period.
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID),acting on
information that a huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang
lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber
coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990,RTC
Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same day, the team seized from the
lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber, and various
species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumber yard
and placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession of
seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because
Mustang Lumber failed to produce required documents upon demand. Upon
recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran suspended Mustang
Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor of the govt the seized articles.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles,and questioned
the validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure
on April 1 is valid as it comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure
is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April 4seizure was also valid
pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang lumber
filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid.

(1) April 1 search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant. (2*) The search on April 4 was a
continuation of the search on April 3 done under and by virtue of the search
warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126Sec
9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of 10 days. Hence, it could be served

at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day or days
until completed, provided it is still within the 10-day period.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. CA did not commit any reversible error in
affirming RTC judgment. Search and seizure done was valid
.CASE DIGEST BY Agee Romero***There were other issues in the case: the
owner of Mustang Lumber was charged with violation of the Forestry Reform
Code. Mustang lumber movedto quash the information on the ground that the
facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense (subject
matter of the information islumber, which is neither timber nor other forest
product under Forestry Reform Code and hence, possession thereof w/o the
required legal documents is not prohibited) and to suspend the proceedings
pending the outcome of the formal challenge of Mustang Lumber regarding the
legality of the seizure. Lengthy discussion on the meaning of lumber. But SC
held that the information validly charged an offense because lumber is
included in the term timber.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally
Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the
Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR
707 which states that donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners
or companies or corporations owned and
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by Section 56 of the
Revised Election
Code.
The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46
of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and
other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other
contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly
situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special
election. Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint with the COMELEC assailing the
validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of
the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or
to influence in any manner any elections.The prohibited active intervention of
foreigners there under may consist of:(1) aiding any candidate, directly or

33

indirectly, in any election;(2) taking part in any election; and (3) influencing in
any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that
contributions by foreigners to the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the
purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not made in aid or
support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the
allocation of space for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any
way influence the result of the election, ... .He then filed an appeal with the
Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary
to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on
Elections or in grave abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of
preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was issued as
COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, and any candidate; as
well as the terms aid, take part, andinfluence, as contemplated In
Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other meanings
Held:
The term any elections definitely comprehends or applies to election of
delegates Constitutional Convention. Foreigner, on
the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or
organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election
Code, broadening the application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to
natural
persons only. Any candidate likewise comprehends some candidates or all
candidates. The terms aid, to take part, andinfluence, were also
construed in their general sense with aid referring to to support, to help, to
assist or to strengthen or
to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in;
and "influence" means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be
able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behaviour
of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to
affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act
upon physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert
or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by
modifications, feelings or conduct. There is nothing in the Revised Election
Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different meaning to the
aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general
sense. There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning
of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general
meaning, unless it is expressed that they have acquired a special and
restricted meaning. Hence, in
this case, generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but
the effect that all candidates benefit from the contribution amounts to an
assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one candidate. Allowing
such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the

laws protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the
COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the
Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be
given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections.
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731
promulgated respectively on August 13, 1970 and September17, 1970 are
therefore declared illegal and null and void.
G.R. No. L-28360 January 27, 1983
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO C. MENOR, as Acting General Manager of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, and MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PRE-QUALIFICATION, NAWASA, defendants-appellants.
Nicolas T. Benedicto, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gov't. Corporate Counsel for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the requirement of a tax clearance certificate as a
prerequisite for taking part in public biddings or contracts to sell supplies to
any government agency.
Judge Cloribel of the Court of First Instance of Manila in his decision dated
March 1, 1967 in Civil Case No. 66750, a mandamus case, ordered the Acting
General Manager of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and the
members of the Committee on Pre-Qualification to allow C & C Commercial
Corporation to participate as a qualified bidder in the public bidding for the
supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes to the Nawasa in spite of the fact
that it had a pending tax case and had no tax clearance certificate.
By virtue of that judgment, which became final because the Nawasa did not
appeal, C & C Commercial Corporation took part in the bidding. When the bids
were opened on May 18, 1967, it was found to be the lowest bidder.
In a letter dated July 25, 1967, Antonio C. Menor, the acting general manager
of the Nawasa, required C & C Commercial Corporation to submit the tax
clearance certificate required in Presidential Administrative Order No, 66 dated
June 26, 1967, 63 0. G. 6391, which reads as follows:

34

Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order the disqualification of any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending casebefore the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs or criminal or civil case in
court pending or finally decided against him or it involving nonpayment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the Government,
to participate in public biddings or in any contract with the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities. including government-owned or controlled
corporations, until after such case or cases are terminated in
his or its favor, or unless the Secretary of Finance shall certify
that such cases are pending and not decided without fault on
the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bond for
payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices entities and instrumentalities and local
governments shall impose this condition and shall require, in
addition, the latest certified copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation
Form No. 19.65-E-I and BIR tax clearance Form No. 1761 as
prerequisites to participation in any public bidding orexecution
of any contract with them. Violation of this order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (pp. 8-9, Brief for defendantsappellants).
Menor said that the requirement as to the tax clearance certificate was
mandatory as held by the Government Corporate Counsel in his Opinion No.
159, Series of 1967.
On that same date, July 25, 1967, or long after Judge Cloribel's judgment had
been executed and when he had no more jurisdiction to amend it, C & C
Commercial Corporation filed a motion in Civil Case No. 66750 wherein it
prayed that the Nawasa officials be ordered to award to the said corporation
the contract for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes, that they be
restrained from awarding the contract to another bidder and that they be
required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. In
effect, that motion was another petition for mandamus.
Judge Cloribel in his order of August 23, 1967 granted the motion and ordered
Menor and the other Nawasa officials to award within ten days from notice the
contract to C & C Commercial Corporation as the lowest bidder. From that
order, the Nawasa appealed to this Court. Judge Cloribel approved its record on
appeal in his order of November 9, 1967.

Realizing that the appeal would delay the award and that another bidder might
be given the contract, C & C Commercial Corporation filed in the lower court
another petition for mandamus dated November 21, 1967 wherein it prayed
that the Nawasa Board of Directors, its Committee of Awards and Menor, its
acting general manager, be restrained from awarding the contract to another
bidder and that they be ordered to award the contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation (pp. 29-30, Rollo).
That case, Civil Case No. 71346, was assigned to Judge Francisco Geronimo. In
his order dated January 8, 1968, he denied the motion of C & C Commercial
Corporation for a preliminary injunction. He said that the injunction would be
inimical to the public interest (p. 37, Rollo).
The Government Corporate Counsel in a manifestation dated January 15, 1968
apprised the lower court that the Nawasa board of directors in its resolution
dated January 11, 1968 awarded the contract to Regal Trading Corporation as
the "lowest complying bidder" (p. 38, Rollo).
Menor in his letter of January 16, 1968 forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for examination and review the contract entered into between the
Nawasa and Regal Trading Corporation, acting in behalf of the Sumitomo Shoji
Kaisha, Ltd., for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes worth
$387,814.72 (p. 41, Rollo). The Presidential Economic Staff and the Office of
the President approved the contract (p. 64, Rollo).
Unable to get an injunction from Judge Geronimo, C & C Commercial
Corporation sought recourse in this Court. In its ex parte motion of January 28,
1968, it asked this Court to enjoin the implementation of the said contract (p.
16, Rollo).
The Nawasa opposed the motion on the ground that there was nothing more to
be enjoined. Its counsel revealed in its opposition what C & C Commercial
Corporation had suppressed: the fact that after Judge Geronimo had denied its
petition for injunction C & C Commercial Corporation instituted another action
(the third case) in the Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal (presided over by
Judge Pedro Navarro), docketed as Civil Case No. 10572, wherein it sought a
declaration of the nullity of the award to Regal Trading Corporation.
Judge Navarro in his order dated February 7, 1968 restrained Menor, the
Nawasa, the Committee of Awards and Regal Trading Corporation "from going
through" with the said contract and from opening the corresponding letter of
credit until the injunction incident is resolved (pp. 58-59 and 80-81, Rollo).

35

In contrast, this Court in its resolution of March 18, 1968 denied C & C
Commercial Corporation's aforementioned motion for the issuance of an
injunction. As the parties herein had already submitted their briefs, the appeal
was submitted for decision. The issue is the propriety of Judge Cloribel's order
compelling the Nawasa officials to award the said contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation.
It may be argued that the issue had become moot because the contract had
already been awarded to Regal Trading Corporation in 1968 and at this late
hour it can be presumed that the contract had been fully performed and
implemented. Nevertheless, a ruling on the contentions of C & C Commercial
Corporation is necessary, according to the Government Corporate Counsel, "if
only to make the appellee-corporation stop playing around with our courts" (p.
70, Rollo). For the guidance of the bench and bar, we have to resolve the legal
issues raised by the Nawasa.

The trial court erred in holding that Administrative Order No. 66 could not be
given a retroactive effect to the bid of C & C Commercial Corporation which
allegedly had been allowed to bid in prior transactions with the Nawasa in spite
of its pending tax case,
It erred because Administrative Order No. 66 (promulgated after Judge Cloribel
had rendered his decision of March 1, 1967) covers not only the bidding but
also the "execution of any contract with" the lowest bidder. In this case, at the
time the said order was issued, no award had as yet been made and when the
award was to be made, the said order was already in force.
3. Moreover, it was not the ministerial duty of the Nawasa officials to award the
contract to C & C Commercial Corporation even if it was the lowest bidder, The
Nawasa in its addendum No.1 to the invitation to bid dated July 6, 1966
reserved the right "to reject the bid of any bidder" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).

We hold that Judge Cloribel acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing his erroneous order, directing that the Nawasa officials
should award the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation. The order is
erroneous and void for the following reasons:

Therefore, a bidder whose bid is rejected has no cause for complaint nor a right
to dispute the award to another bidder (Esguerra & Sons vs. Aytona, 114 Phil.
1189; Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, L-27072, July 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 491).

1. The said order was an amendment of a judgment that had already been
satisfied. The case was closed and terminated. Judge Cloribel had no right and
authority to issue such an order after he had lost jurisdiction over the case. The
award of the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation was not the lis mota in
the mandamus case before Judge Cloribel. It was an extraneous matter that
could not have been injected into that case nor resolved therein. What was in
issue was whether C & C Commercial Corporation should be allowed to take
part in the bidding even if it had no tax clearance certificate.

It should be noted that "advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to

make proposals, and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or
lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears" (Art. 1326, Civil Code). No such
contrary intention appears in this case.

2. The Nawasa was justified in not awarding the contract- to C & C Commercial
Corporation because it had no tax clearance certificate. It had a pending tax
case in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The award to C & C Commercial
Corporation would be in gross contravention of Administrative Order No. 66.
That was the ruling in Nawasa vs. Reyes, L-28597, February 29, 1968, 22 SCRA
905, where the bidder was also the appellee herein, C & C Commercial
Corporation. It was held therein that C & C Commercial Corporation was
disqualified under the said order to take part in the bidding to supply the
Nawasa with steel pipes because it had "tremendous tax liabilities".
Under Administrative Order No. 66, the Nawasa officials would be subject to
administrative disciplinary action if they awarded the contract to C & C
Commercial Corporation in spite of its unsettled tax liabilities.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order is reversed and set aside with costs against
C & C Commercial Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro
Manila was considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and
they were aided by judges who should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

36

In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
66750 filed by the C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the
NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court ordered the NAWASA to allow the
plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in the bidding for
the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for
the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes
due with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as
illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory,
and in compliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff
corporation which thereupon submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could
make any award of the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided
against him or involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the
government, to participate in public bidding or in any contract with the
government or any of its subdivision, branches or instrumentalities including
government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which NAWASA
refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to
file a motion praying that defendants award the contract called for to said
plaintiff being the lowest responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court
ordered the defendants to award the contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court
observing in its Order dated August 23, 1967, that the plaintiff is "the lowest
bidder and practically the only one who can furnish a Filipino or local product
under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants
contended that the matter of award of the contract was not included in the
Decision dated March 1, 1967; that Administrative Order No. 66 of the
President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 applies to the contract called
for; and that the matter of the award of the contract in question rests on the
absolute discretion of the defendants, taking into consideration all the
circumstances attendant thereto. 5 This motion having been denied,
defendants took the present recourse to have the Order dated August 23, 1967
of th lower court set aside.
The only issues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for short) are:
(1) whether or not the award of the contract in question may be deemed to
have been included in the judgment of the Court of First Instance dated March
1, 1967, or inferred therefrom; and (2) whether or not Administrative Order No.

66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines applies in the instant
case.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated March 1, 1967
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the relief prayed for by ordering the
defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among
the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of
locally manufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of
different sizes from 12" to 24" diameter, without costs or
damages.
In accordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short)
submitted its bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have
been the lowest responsible bidder, appellee was not forthwith given the final
award of the corresponding contract because, as stated earlier, the President of
the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Administrative Order No. 66
pertinent provisions of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order the disqualification of any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in
court pending or finally decided against him or it involving nonpayment of any tax, duty, or undertaking with the Government,
to participate in public biddings or in any contract with the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, until after such case or cases are terminated in
his or its favor, or unless the Secretary of Finance shall certify,
that such cases are pending and not decided 'without fault on
the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bond for
payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities and local
governments, shall impose this condition and shall require in
addition, the latest certified copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation
Form -No. 19.65 E-I and BIR Tax Clearance Form No. 17.61 as
prerequisite to participation in any public biddings orexecution
of any contract with them. Violation of this Order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis supplied)

37

What appellant Antonio C. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did was
to address a letter to appellee on July 25, 1967, requesting it to comply within
ten (10) days from receipt of the letter with the requirements of the
presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proof of said
compliance. 6
On the same date, July 25, 1967, plaintiff filed a "Motion" with the court below
for the issuance of an order to compel appellants to "award the contract called
for in the aforementioned bidding" in its favor. To the motion, appellants filed
an opposition, despite which, the lower court issued the questioned Order of
August 23, 1967.
The main contention of appellants in seeking the setting aside of the
aforementioned questioned order is that the subject thereof is not included in,
or inferred from, the judgment of March 1, 1967 which merely "ordered
appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified bidders."
Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already satisfied when appellants prequalified the appellee and allowed it to tender its bid, and that nothing more is
to be done under the judgment.
It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of
judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or
final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of action or special proceeding, litigation
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necesarry thereto.

Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question
was not "so adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its
dispositive portion to adjudging only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee
contends otherwise and maintains that the awarding of the contract to it is
necessarily implied from and included in the order in the judgment declaring it
qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel
appellants to allow it to take part in the bidding in question, appellee
necessarily meant to be also awarded the corresponding contract if its bid is
found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest bidder" under
the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee
to enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that
appellee is found to be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not
made in its favor, without any valid reason to reject any or all bids as is
generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated by
appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No.
66, after the judgment has become final and even already executed, at least
insofar as it ordered appellants to allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident
from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10) days within which to
comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is complied
with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned
requirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to
court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposed on it (appellee)
the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order No.
66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When
the lower court decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so
take part in the public bidding in question, the judgment must take precedence
over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become
final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person,
natural or juridical, who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from
participating in public biddings or any contract with the Government or any of
its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily
includes the award to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the
lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the bidding would be a meaningless
exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for appellee.1wph1.t The
judgment has become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the judgment

38

has become "property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of
law. This is exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the
Philippines would do if it is made to apply to the instant case, for while the
Court, by final judgment, qualified appellee to participate in the bidding, the
Administrative Order would disqualify said party. This would be an illegal
interference on the power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed,
if only on reliance of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New
Constitution for reasons I have set forth at length in Malacora vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submitted
more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro
Manila was considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and
they were aided by judges who should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
66750 filed by the C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the
NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court ordered the NAWASA to allow the
plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in the bidding for
the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for
the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes
due with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as
illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory,
and in compliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff
corporation which thereupon submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could
make any award of the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided
against him or involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the
government, to participate in public bidding or in any contract with the
government or any of its subdivision, branches or instrumentalities including

government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which NAWASA

refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to
file a motion praying that defendants award the contract called for to said
plaintiff being the lowest responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court
ordered the defendants to award the contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court
observing in its Order dated August 23, 1967, that the plaintiff is "the lowest
bidder and practically the only one who can furnish a Filipino or local product
under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants
contended that the matter of award of the contract was not included in the
Decision dated March 1, 1967; that Administrative Order No. 66 of the
President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 applies to the contract called
for; and that the matter of the award of the contract in question rests on the
absolute discretion of the defendants, taking into consideration all the
circumstances attendant thereto. 5 This motion having been denied,
defendants took the present recourse to have the Order dated August 23, 1967
of th lower court set aside.
The only issues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for short) are:
(1) whether or not the award of the contract in question may be deemed to
have been included in the judgment of the Court of First Instance dated March
1, 1967, or inferred therefrom; and (2) whether or not Administrative Order No.
66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines applies in the instant
case.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated March 1, 1967
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the relief prayed for by ordering the
defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among
the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of
locally manufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of
different sizes from 12" to 24" diameter, without costs or
damages.
In accordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short)
submitted its bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have
been the lowest responsible bidder, appellee was not forthwith given the final
award of the corresponding contract because, as stated earlier, the President of
the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Administrative Order No. 66
pertinent provisions of which reads:

39

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order the disqualification of any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in
court pending or finally decided against him or it involving nonpayment of any tax, duty, or undertaking with the Government,
to participate in public biddings or in any contract with the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, until after such case or cases are terminated in
his or its favor, or unless the Secretary of Finance shall certify,
that such cases are pending and not decided 'without fault on
the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bond for
payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities and local
governments, shall impose this condition and shall require in
addition, the latest certified copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation
Form -No. 19.65 E-I and BIR Tax Clearance Form No. 17.61 as
prerequisite to participation in any public biddings orexecution
of any contract with them. Violation of this Order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis supplied)
What appellant Antonio C. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did was
to address a letter to appellee on July 25, 1967, requesting it to comply within
ten (10) days from receipt of the letter with the requirements of the
presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proof of said
compliance. 6
On the same date, July 25, 1967, plaintiff filed a "Motion" with the court below
for the issuance of an order to compel appellants to "award the contract called
for in the aforementioned bidding" in its favor. To the motion, appellants filed
an opposition, despite which, the lower court issued the questioned Order of
August 23, 1967.
The main contention of appellants in seeking the setting aside of the
aforementioned questioned order is that the subject thereof is not included in,
or inferred from, the judgment of March 1, 1967 which merely "ordered
appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified bidders."
Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already satisfied when appellants prequalified the appellee and allowed it to tender its bid, and that nothing more is
to be done under the judgment.

It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of
judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or
final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of action or special proceeding, litigation
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necesarry thereto.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question
was not "so adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its
dispositive portion to adjudging only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee
contends otherwise and maintains that the awarding of the contract to it is
necessarily implied from and included in the order in the judgment declaring it
qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel
appellants to allow it to take part in the bidding in question, appellee
necessarily meant to be also awarded the corresponding contract if its bid is
found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest bidder" under
the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee
to enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that
appellee is found to be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not
made in its favor, without any valid reason to reject any or all bids as is
generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated by
appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No.
66, after the judgment has become final and even already executed, at least
insofar as it ordered appellants to allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident
from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10) days within which to

40

comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is complied
with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned
requirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to
court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposed on it (appellee)
the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order No.
66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When
the lower court decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so
take part in the public bidding in question, the judgment must take precedence
over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become
final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person,
natural or juridical, who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from
participating in public biddings or any contract with the Government or any of
its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily
includes the award to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the
lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the bidding would be a meaningless
exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for appellee. The judgment has
become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the judgment has become
"property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of law. This is
exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines
would do if it is made to apply to the instant case, for while the Court, by final
judgment, qualified appellee to participate in the bidding, the Administrative
Order would disqualify said party. This would be an illegal interference on the
power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed,
if only on reliance of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New
Constitution for reasons I have set forth at length in Malacora vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submitted
more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1985)Ponente: Makasiar,
C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169)
Facts:
April 28, 1965 - Island Savings Bank (ISB) approvedthe loan application for
P80,000 of Sulpicio Tolentino, who, asa security for the loan, also executed a
real estate mortgageover his 100-ha land. The approved loan application called
for P80,000 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments for a period of 3 years,

with 12% interest.May 22, 1965 a mere P17,000 partial release of theloan
was made by ISB, and Tolentino and his wife Editasigned a promissory note for
P17,000 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of
execution of thecontract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.An advance
interest for the P80,000 loan covering a6-mo period amounting to P4,800was
deducted from the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded to
Tolentinoon July 23, 1965, after being informed by ISB that there wasno fund
yet available for the release of the P63,000 balance.Aug. 13, 1965 the
Monetary Board of the CentralBank issued Resolution No. 1049, which
prohibited ISB frommaking new loans and investments, after finding that it
wassuffering liquidity problems.June 14, 1968 the Monetary Board
issuedResolution No. 967, which prohibited ISB from doing business in the
Philippines, after finding that it failed to put upthe required capital to restore its
solvency.Aug. 1, 1968 ISB, in view of non-payment of theP17,000 covered by
the promissory note, filed an applicationfor the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgagecovering the 100-ha land; and the sheriff scheduled
auction.Tolentino filed a petition with the CFI for injunction,specific
performance or rescission and damages with preliminary injunction, alleging
that since ISB failed to deliver the P63,000 remaining balance of the loan, he is
entitled tospecific performance by ordering ISB to deliver it with interestof 12%
per annum from April 28, 1965, and if said balancecannot be delivered, to
rescind the real estate mortgage.CFI issued a TRO enjoining ISB from
continuingwith the foreclosure of the mortgage, however, after
findingTolentinos petition unmeritorious, ordered the latter to payISB P17,000
plus legal interest and legal charges and liftingthe TRO so the sheriff may
proceed with the foreclosure.CA, on appeal by Tolentino, modified CFIs
decision byaffirming dismissal of Tolentinos petition for specific performance,
but ruled that ISB can neither foreclose themortgage nor collect the
P17,000loan.
SC: The parties, in the P80,000 loan agreement,undertook reciprocal
obligations, wherein theobligation/promise of each party is the consideration
for thatof the other; and when one party has performed or is ready andwilling
to perform his part of the contract, the other party whohas not performed or is
not ready and willing to performincurs in delay (Art. 1169, CC).When Tolentino
executed a real estate mortgage, hesignified his willingness to pay the P80,000
loan, and fromsuch date, the obligation of ISB to furnish the loan accrued.Thus,
ISBs delay started on April 28, 1965 and lasted 3 yearsor when Resolution No.
967 was issued prohibiting ISB fromdoing further
business
, which madit legally impossiblefrom ISB to furnish the P63,000 of the
loan.Resolution No. 1049 cannot interrupt the default of ISBin complying with
its obligation to release the P63,000 balance because it merely prohibited ISB
from making new loans andinvestments, not from releasing the balance of
loanagreements previously contracted.The mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an
engagementdoes not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does
itconstitute any defense to a decree of specific performance; andthe mere fact
of insolvency of a debtor is never an excuse for the nonfulfillment of an
obligation, but instead, is taken as a breach of contract.The fact that Tolentino
demanded and accepted the refundof the pre-deducted interest cannot be
taken as a waiver of hisright to collect the P63,000 balance. The act of ISB in
askingfor the advance interest was improper considering that onlyP17,000 out

41

of the P80,000 loan was released.The alleged discovery by ISB of the

overvaluation of theloan collateral cannot exempt it from complying with
itsobligation to furnish the entire P80,000 loan because bank
officials/employees have the obligation to investigate theexistence and
valuation of the properties being offered as aloan security before approving the
loan application.
Issues/Held/Ratio
1)
WON the action of Tolenitno for specific performance can prosper.

the P63,000 balance, the realestate mortgage of Tolentino became

unenforceable to suchextent. P63,000 is 78.75% of P80,000, hence the
mortgagecovering 100 ha is unenforceable to the extent of 78.75 ha.The
mortgage covering the remainder of 21.25 ha subsists as asecurity for the
P17,000 debt.Judgment:1)Tolentino is ordered to pay ISB P17,000 plus P41,210
(12% interest per annum)2)In case Tolentino fails to pay, his real estate
mortgagecovering 21.25 ha shall be foreclosed to satisfy histotal
indebtedness3)The real estate mortgage covering 78.75 ha isunenforceable
and ordered released in favor of Tolentino
Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals

NO.Since ISB was in default under the agreement, Tolentinomay choose

between specific performance or rescission, butsince ISB is now prohibited
from doing further business, theonly remedy left is Rescission only for the
P63,000 balance of the loan.
2)
WON Tolentino is liable to pay the P17,000 debtcovered by the promissory
note.

YES.The bank was deemed to have complied with itsreciprocal obligation to

furnish a P17,000 loan. The promissory note gave rise to Tolentinos reciprocal
obligationto pay such loan when it falls due and his failure to pay theoverdue
amortizations under the promissory note made him a party in default, hence
not entitled to rescission (Art. 1191,CC). ISB has the right to rescind the
promissory note, beingthe aggrieved party.Since both parties were in default in
the performance of their reciprocal obligations, both are liable for damages.
Incase both parties have committed a breach of their reciprocalobligations, the
liability of the first infractor shall be equirablytempered by the courts (Art.
1192, CC). The liability of ISBfor damages in not furnishing the entire loan is
offset by theliability of Tolentino for damages (penalties and surcharges)for not
paying his overdue P17,000 debt. Since Tolentinoderived some benefit for his
use of the P17,000, he shouldaccount for the interest thereon (interest was not
included inthe offsetting).
3)
WON Tolentinos real estate mortgage can beforeclosed to satisfy the P17,000
if his liability to paytherefor subsists.

NO.

Director of Lands vs. CA

276 SCRA 276
G. R. No. 102858
July 28 1997
Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of
his title under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence his heirs represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who
was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessorsin-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of
the subject land since 1938. The trial court dismissed the petition for the
reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

The fact that when Tolentino executed his real estatemortgage, no

consideration was then in existence, as there wasno debt yet because ISB had
not made any release on the loan,does not make the real estate mortgage void
for lack of consideration.It is not necessary that any consideration should pass
atthe time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage.When the
consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, thelatter can take effect only
when the debt secured by it iscreated as a binding contract to pay. And when
there is partialfailure of consideration, the mortgage becomes unenforceableto
the extent of such failure. Where the indebtedness actuallyowing to the holder
of the mortgage is less than the sumnamed in the mortgage, the mortgage
cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due.Since ISB failed to furnish

Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to
the Supreme Court.

42

mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term shall in prescribing

At the back of the contract which reads:

14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted
in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June 20,
1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for
recovery of consequential damages.
Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that venue of action was improperly laid. Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition
to the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of
First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting parties.
CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue.

the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters

Issue:

receipt of the court order setting the time for Initial Hearing. While concededly

WON the venue of action was improper (CFI of Pampanga)? NO, it made use of
the word may, hence only directory.

Issue:
W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory.
Held:
It is mandatory. The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates the

such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its

import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that
in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory
meaning.
Stat Con Principle: When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation.
It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or erroneous.
Legal Maxims: Verba Legis and Dura Lex Sed Lex
CAPATI vs. OCAMPO
G.R. No. L-28742 April 30, 1982
Directory statute.
It is permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be
done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its
purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and
substantially the same result can be obtained.

Held:
It is well settled that the word may is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term may
be connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. May is an auxillary
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
The stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By
the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and
exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga. They merely agreed to
submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek
recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance
with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION

Facts:

G.R. No. 126496 April 30, 1997

Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor of

the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He
entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Jesus Ocampo, a resident of
Naga City where he undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and
columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications
indicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to complete said
construction on or before June 5, 1967. To emphasize this time frame Ocampo
affixed his signature below the following stipulation in bold letters: TIME IS
ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE 67.

GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR

43

in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National

Telecommunications, respondents.
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals 2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines,
Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain
Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates
Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. This
application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time of the filing of
this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative
franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised
applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for
local exchange carrier service 4. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International
Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal
awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private
respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent
BellTel the right, privilege and authority to
carry on the business of providing telecommunications services
in and between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the

Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage,

lease, maintain and purchase telecommunications systems,
including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless
telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit
and receive systems, and other telecommunications systems
and their value-added services such as, but not limited to,
transmission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio
and video, information service bureau, and all other
telecommunications systems technologies as are at present
available or be made available through technical advances or
innovations in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and
operate or manage transmitting and receiving stations and
switching stations, both for local and international services,
lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to
efficiently carry out the purposes of this franchise. 5
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second
Application 6 praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined
nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone
exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and
fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was
docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposed
to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most modern
and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100%
digital local exchange telephone network
Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed
as NTC Case No. 93-481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier
application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice.
The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as
NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private
respondent BellTel's evidence. Written opposition and other pertinent pleadings
were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla
Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as
oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel's application were
Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty
Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone,
PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications,
Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and
Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.

44

On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation

of its evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of
BellTel were cross-examined by the aforementioned oppositors. On December
21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the
technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application. Pursuant
to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization
Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to
Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6,
1995 7 manifesting his findings and recommending that "based on technical
documents submitted, BellTel's proposal is technically feasible." 8
Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory
Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding
that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least
for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and
expressly signified their approval thereto by making the following notation on
the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, 1995:
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility,
the application merits due/favorable consideration. 9
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and
Consuelo Perez affixed their signatures and the date, "4/6/95."
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two
members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working
draft 10 of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent
BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners
Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members
composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim
that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure and
practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate
any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the
Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only

Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole

authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only
his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly no
voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes the
majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the
issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on May 5,
1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of
a Provisional Authority 11. Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the
CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez that
were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the
aforementioned working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to
BellTel, which draft was made by the Legal Department of the NTC and initialed
by the said deputy commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May 12,
1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion 12 reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition
private respondent BellTel.

13

to the aforestated two motions of

In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon

Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of private
respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on May 29, 1995. On May
29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on June
13, 1995.
On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a
Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve) 14. In said motion,
private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the
order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the
ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority
out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer,
private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that
as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of
the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition
aforecited motion.

15

to the

45

On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the
aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant
to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment 16in which the Solicitor General took a legal
position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close
examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious
analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent
to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this
Honorable Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications
Commission as a collegial body;
(b) restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from
arrogating unto himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner
Bell Telecom's application under NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as
void; [and]
(e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.

17

On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein

assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:

1. Petitioner's petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is

hereby granted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular No. 11-93, Annex "J" of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-193, Annex "K" of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex
"L" of the Petition, are hereby SET ASIDE for being contrary to
law. The Respondents and all those acting for and in their
behalf are hereby enjoined and prohibited from implementing
or enforcing the same; [and]
2. Petitioner's petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in
that the Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and deputy
commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby directed to
meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft
Order, Annex "B" of the Petition, within fifteen (15) days from
the finality of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

18

The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner

Simeon Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the
application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional
authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for
review.
Commissioner Kintanar's petition, docketed as G.R No. 126526,
ascribes to the respondent appellate court the following
assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC
3-1-93 and the Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995,
made a collateral attack on a law which was nowhere called for
in the pleadings of the parties nor is authorized by the Rules of
Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that
the Commission is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact
that other bodies which were a spin off from the defunct Public
Service Commission were created as a collegial body. The law
that created EO 546 erased the collegial character of the
proceeding before the NTC.

46

3. The Court of Appeals' decision contains serious

contradiction; worse, it considered evidence not formally
offered or incorporated into the records of the case; yet failed
to consider evidence submitted by petitioner- appellant nor on
the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties.
3.1 CA erred in assuming that the NTC is
collegial by the fact that Charters of other
regulatory agencies expressly made them
collegial while this express provision was
absent in NTC's charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC
MC 92-614 prevails and [requires] collegiality.
3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco
signed by her and her 2 deputies are in no way
indicative of collegiality and should not be
considered as having any persuasive effect . . .
3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in applying the
Board of Communications Rules of Practice and
Procedures.
4. The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus,
directing and in effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and
deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meet en banc to
consider and act on a "draft Order" only which the Court itself
recognized no longer had the approval of two (2)
Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals
had set aside a duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995
allegedly because it did not carry the approval of 2
commissioners. 19
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R No.
126496, assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the following
grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant
Petition outright for its failure to implead indispensable parties,
in violation of Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court;

2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of

and passing upon BellTel's Petition, which on its face is
premature since the Order of July 4, 1996 assailed was not a
find decision of the Commission;
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take
cognizance of the Petition, the disposition in Decision therein
which nullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93
itself constitutes a collateral attack on the said laws, the
validity of which were never put in issue by any of the parties,
contrary to the clear legal requirement that the validity of laws
can be attacked only in direct proceedings instituted for that
purpose;
4. It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on
the validity of NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum
Circular No 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely unnecessary
for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined
the prime issues as being that of collegiality, nonetheless the
Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in declaring
the NTC as a collegial body despite the clear intent of E.O. No.
546 and the provisions of DOTC MC 95-640, and the obvious
implications of pending bills in Congress on the reorganization
of the NTC;
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and only the
draft-in rendering its Decision in BellTel's application
constitutes an unwarranted, unauthorized and unlawful
interference in and canalization of the discretionary functions
of the Commission as a quasi-judicial entity; and
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel
of surreptitiously securing a draft decision, and encourages and
places premium on future similar illegal acts-all in violation of
the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re
Jurado: Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12, 1990). 20
On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus
Motion 21 praying for, among others, the consolidation of G.R Nos. 126496 and
126526.

47

On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. 22 On the same
day, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion 23 echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R Nos.
126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion 24 reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse
to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in
behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse
the Solicitor General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the
NTC to file its own comment in G.R No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R Nos.
126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion 25 praying that the latter's petition in G.R No. 126526 be
adopted as their comment in the consolidated cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the
fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial
agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC
acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission
each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any
incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider
the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is
now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man
commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the
collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only

one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body
even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the
respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the
NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936,
the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146
which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While
providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service
Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it
clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the
Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to
him by the Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA
2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and
emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service
Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The
amendment provided that contested cases and all cases
involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
signed, into law, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and
approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn,
created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the
PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of
three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
. . . The Board of Communications shall be
composed of a full time Chairman who shall be
of unquestioned integrity and recognized
prominence in previous public and/or private
employment; two full-time members who shall
be competent on all aspects of
communications, preferably one of whom shall
be a lawyer and the other an economist . . .
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its "Rules of
Procedure and Practice" in connection with applications and
proceedings before it.
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No.
546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of

48

Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board

of Communications and the Telecommunications Control
Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O.
546 provides that
. . . The Commission shall be composed of a
Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners,
preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and
another an economist. . . .
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September
24, 1979 . . . However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of
Procedure and Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules
of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied
to proceedings in the NTC. In the meantime, the Decisions of
the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the NTC which
rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners "non-participative"
in the task of decision-making. This prompted the then Minister
of Transportation and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek
the legal opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
as to whether the NTC was a collegial body or not. On January
11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion . . . to the effect
that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and
thus the then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC signing
the Decisions of the NTC was authorized by law. . . .
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to
great weight . . . . However, the same is not controlling or
conclusive on the courts . . . . We find and declare, in the
present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct.
Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was
a collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should
meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of
such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of
the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under
the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its
proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the
NTC) sits En Banc.
. . . In every case heard by the Board en banc,
the orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions

disposing of the merits of the matter within its

jurisdiction shall be reached with the
concurrence of at least two regular members
after deliberation and consultation and
thereafter assigned to a member for the writing
of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the
order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state
in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall
issue all orders, rulings, decisions and
resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to
him. Copy of the decision on the merit of the
case so assigned shall be furnished the
Chairman of the Board.
xxx xxx xxx
Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and
heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and
promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full
membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at
least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a
valid Decision . . . . While it may be true that the aforesaid
Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of
BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the
NTC when it was established under Executive Order No. 546.
This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of
"Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National
Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200" when it
declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure
promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board
of Communications, the immediate predecessor
of respondent NTC . . . govern the rules of
practice and procedure before the BOC then,
now respondent NTC. . . .
In the case of "Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
versus National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717", the
Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of
Procedure and Practice of BOC . . . .

49

Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the

Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently
been and remains a collegial body.
Respondents Kintanar's and NTC's pose that Respondent
Kintanar, alone, is vested with authority to sign and promulgate
a Decision of the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a
commission as envisaged in Executive Order No. 546. It must
be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:
[a] body composed of several persons acting
under lawful authority to perform some public
senica (City of Louisville Municipal Housing
Commission versus Public Housing
Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter,
2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of
officials appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or
exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service . . .
(Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authority
that a "commission" is synonymous with "board" (State Ex. Rel.
Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash
County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as
can be easily discerned from the context of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a
Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners . . . not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The
conjunctive word "and" is not without any legal significance. It
is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means "in
addition to" (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus
Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word
"and", whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full
sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as
relating to one another . . . .
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given
effect on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated law
and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. As the
aphorism goes, "that the thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed" . . . If it was the intention of President Marcos to
constitute merely a single entity, a "one-man" governmental
body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegial body,
he would not have constituted a commission and would not

have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of,

not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the
two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a
commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and
Dumlao as well, acting together in the performance of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with the
Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC and
applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that . . . of Executive Order 546 used the
word "deputy" to designate the two (2) other members of the
Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the
NTC. . . . The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by
the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof.
Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are
without functional implications and are designed merely for the
purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the
personnel of the NTC. . . .
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the
collegiality of the NTC when he promulgated and issued
Department Order No. 92-614 . . . Even then Commissioner
Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement opposition
to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek
refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno . . . . It
was only when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and
Respondent Kintanar was designated to replace Commissioner
Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-flapped [sic], and suddenly
found it expedient to recall his Department Order No. 92-614
and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases
pending with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of
Procedure and Practice before the NTC, more specifically Rule
15 thereof . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to
buttress their argument . . . because under the House Bill, the
NTC is transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We find
Respondents' pose tenuous. For, it can likewise be argued, with
justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the
existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming
the same.

50

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-193 . . . Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 . . . and the Order of
Kintanar . . . declaring the NTC as a single entity or noncollegial entity, are contrary to law and thus null and void and
should be, as they are hereby, set aside. 26
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that
respondent appellate court's act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 11-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner Benedicto
on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars and
an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the court's power to nullify
administrative regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative
regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first
place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on
their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They
were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely
illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a
ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are
an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null
and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that
constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of
striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals, private
respondent BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar
for the former's adherence and defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the
latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as
indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom private respondent BellTel seek
to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of
their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the
final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC because
the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General.
Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors' cause could not be significantly
affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not
into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the
issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the
same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the
commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of
private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises
to be the most technologically advanced telephone service in the country. This
court is not in any way concerned with whether or not private respondent
BellTel's project proposal is technically feasible or financially viable, and this
court should not, in fact, delve into these matters which are patently outside of
its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was
the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed
grave abuse of discretion, and so we must review and ascertain the correctness
of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this score, and this score
alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of
indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent
appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en
banc and forthwith grant private respondent BellTel's application for a
provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the
second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered
by respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety
of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a
case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As
to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office
of the special civil action ofmandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after
all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar,
Dumlao and Perez to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working

51

draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply
ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body, and the subject of
the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working draft
which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent
BellTel's application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of
Appeals, however, did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application.
This is understandable since every commissioner of the three-man NTC has a
vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTel's application and
the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the
members of the commission of their individual discretion in private respondent
BellTel's case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed
with the consideration of private respondent BellTel's application for provisional
authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since December, 1994. With
the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay action on the said
application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate any and all
NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals' order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel's application for a
provisional authority, attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order granting
provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the latter
through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single piece of
evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working
draft. In private respondent BellTel's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged that said
working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of
the NTC. 27 Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. Edgardo
Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. 28 The working draft
is attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by
any person for any stated purpose. 29

apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant

proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF
PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI
C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the
Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses
of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
I
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral,
the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay, to wit:

Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the

working draft or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have
utterly failed to offer proof of any illegality in the preparation or procurement of
said working draft.

(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or

oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the
petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.

The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be
diverted from the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the
NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of

authority for installing a water pipeline which is being
operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to
service respondent's private residence and medical clinic.

52

On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two

Administrative cases in the following manner:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi,
Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the
sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTYNINE PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No.
352, plus legal interest due thereon from the time it was
approved in audit up to final payment, it being legally due the
Complainant representing the money value of his leave credits
accruing for services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to
1992 as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION,
respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered
SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a
period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her
blatant abuse of authority coupled with oppression as a public
example to deter others similarly inclined from using public
office as a tool for personal vengeance, vindictiveness and
oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI
C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof
for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service
of the first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative
Case No. 02-92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse the
Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter have paid
for electric and water bills from July to December 1992,
inclusive (Rollo, p. 16).
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President
questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution
thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Administrative Appeals. Decision in administrative cases
may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed
to the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of
decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panglungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component
cities.
Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the
Office of the President issued an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions
of which read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No.
7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12
February 1987, quoted below:
Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The
respondent shall be considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the
events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in
an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No.
7160).
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is
stayed upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed
herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency
of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable
(Adm. Order No. 18).
xxx xxx xxx
After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for
Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of execution
pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue
prejudice to public interest.

53

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders

the suspension/stay of execution of:
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case
No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993 suspending Mayor
Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two
(2) months, and
b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case.
No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993 suspending Mayor
Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three
(3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid
Order of the Office of the President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160,
which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative
Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and
Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the
President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the
pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on
January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which
provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts
thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this
Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of

Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws
or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 467 [1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is
through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine
American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management
Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption
against implied repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs,
46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that
they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631
[1940]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant
and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room
to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay
the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that
the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language
expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of
a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to
order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and
regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon
a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found, its object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other (cf. De

54

Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis
to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of
the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might
be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition
of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997]

GMCR,

INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS
CORP.;
ISLA
COMMUNICATIONS
CO.,
INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES,
INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as
Commissioner
of
the
National
Telecommunications, respondents.

[G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997]

COMMISSIONER
SIMEON
L.
KINTANAR,
NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.BELL
TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under

Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and
Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge
Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional
Authority. This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time
of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted
a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications
service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised
applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for
local exchange carrier service [4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International
Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal
awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private
respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent
BellTel the right, privilege and authority to
carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and
between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this
purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless
telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive
systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added
services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile,
control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and all other
telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be
made available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or
construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and receiving
stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines,
cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out
the purposes of this franchise.[5]
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second
Application[6] praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined
nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone
exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and
fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was
docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposed
to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most modern

55

and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100%

digital local exchange telephone network.
Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application
docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier
application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice.
The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed
as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of
private respondent BellTels evidence. Written opposition and other pertinent
pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc.,
Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as
oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTels application were
Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty
Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone,
PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications,
Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and
Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.
On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the
presentation of its evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the
witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the aforementioned
oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its
application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common
Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to
Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6,
1995[7] manifesting his findings and recommending that based on technical
documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible. [8]

BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q.
Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon
Kintanar.
While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three
members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation,
petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding
procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and
promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in
the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since
only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as
the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the
NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have
allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually
constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying
for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on
May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the
Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference was explicitly made to the
findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was
also made of the aforementioned working draft of the order granting a
provisional authority to BellTel, which draft was made by the Legal Department
of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May
12, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition[13] to the aforestated two motions
of private respondent BellTel.

Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory
Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding
that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least
for the initial two (2) years.

In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon

Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of private
respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on May 29, 1995. On
May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on
June 13, 1995.

Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC

Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same
and expressly signified their approval thereto by making the following notation
on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, 1995:

On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a
Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve) [14] In said motion,
private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the
order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the
ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority
out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer,
private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that
as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of
the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.

With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application
merits due/favorable consideration.[9]
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez
affixed their signatures and the date, 4/6/95.
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two
members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working
draft[10] of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent

On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition [15] to

the aforecited motion.

56

On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed
by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the
aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant
to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.

2. Petitioners petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the

Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners
Perez and Dumlao, are hereby directed to meet en banc and to
consider and act on the draft Order, Annex B of the Petition, within
fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]

In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate
court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment [16] in which the Solicitor General took
a legal position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close
examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious
analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent
to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:

The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon

Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla
Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as
oppositors in the application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional
authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review.

WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this Honorable

Court:

1. The Court of Appeals, in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93 and
the Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral attack on a
law which was nowhere called for in the pleadings of the parties nor is
authorized by the Rules of Court.

(a)
declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a
collegial body;
(b)
restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating unto
himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c)
order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms
application under NTC-94-229;
(d)

declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]

(e)

uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614. [17]

On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the

herein assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Petitioners petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby
granted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex J
of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex K of the
Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex L of the Petition, are
hereby SET ASIDE for being contrary to law. The Respondents and all
those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and prohibited
from implementing or enforcing the same; [and]

Commissioner Kintanars petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes

to the respondent appellate court the following assignment of errors:

2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the Commission
is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were a
spin off from the defunct Public Service Commission were created as a collegial
body. The law that created EO 546 erased the collegial character of the
proceedings before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it
considered evidence not formally offered or incorporated into the records of the
case; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner-appellant nor on
the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties3.1
CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the fact that
Charters of other regulatory agencies expressly made them collegial while this
express provision was absent in NTCs charter.
3.2
CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 prevails and
[requires] collegiality.
3.3
The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed by her and her 2
deputies are in no way indicative of collegiality and should not be considered
as having any persuasive effect xxx.
3.4
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications
Rules of Practice and Procedures.

57

4. The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus, directing and in

effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez, to meet en banc to consider and act on a draft Order only which
the Court itself recognized no longer had the approval of two (2)
Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside a
duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 allegedly because it did not carry the
approval of 2 commissioners.[19]

On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus

Motion[21] praying for, among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and
126526.

On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as

G.R. No. 126496, assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the
following grounds:

On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a

Manifestation/Motion[24] reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse
to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in
behalf of the NTC.

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant Petition

outright for its failure to implead indispensable parties, in violation of
Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of and
passing upon BellTels Petition, which on its face is premature since the
Order of July 4, 1996 assailed was not a final decision of the
Commission;
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take
cognizance of the Petition, the disposition in Decision therein which
nullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 itself
constitutes a collateral attack on the said laws, the validity of which
were never put in issue by any of the parties, contrary to the clear legal
requirement that the validity of laws can be attacked only in direct
proceedings instituted for that purpose;
4. It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity
of NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 since
the same was absolutely unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime
issues as being that of collegiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeals
committed a serious error of law in declaring the NTC as a collegial
body despite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions of
DOTC MC 95-640, and the obvious implications of pending bills in
Congress on the reorganization of the NTC;
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering
its Decision in BellTels application constitutes an unwarranted,
unauthorized and unlawful interference in and canalization of the
discretionary functions of the Commission as a quasi-judicial entity;
and
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel of
surreptitiously securing a draft decision, and encourages and places
premium on future similar illegal acts-all in violation of the ruling and
the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm. Matter No.
90-5-383 (July 12, 1990).[20]

On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. [22] On the
same
day,
the
NTC
and
Commissioner
Kintanar
filed
a
Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R.
Nos. 126496 and 126526.

In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to

excuse the Solicitor General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC,
require the NTC to file its own comment in G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion[25] praying that the latters petition in G.R. No. 126526 be
adopted as their comment in the consolidated cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the
fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial
agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a
majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly
decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the
chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not
sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply
put,
Commissioner
Kintanar
is
not
the
National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of
the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of
the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When
we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasijudicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the
NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum
circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No.
146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body
and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man
regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the
respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the
NTC:

58

In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service
Commission (PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public
Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that
the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner
could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service
Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public
Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment
provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law,
Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated
Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications (BOC)
in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of
three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
x x x The Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman
who shall be of unquestioned integrity and recognized prominence in previous
public and/or private employment; two full-time members who shall be
competent on all aspects of communications, preferably one of whom shall be
a lawyer and the other an economist x x x
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and Practice
in connection with applications and proceedings before it.

then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of the NTC
was authorized by law. x x x
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x
x. However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We
find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not
correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a
collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in
deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But
the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of
the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of
Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15]
of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc:
x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions
and resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall
be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision
or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings,
decisions and resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the
decision on the merit of the case so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman
of the Board.
x x x

On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating
the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications,
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that -x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an
economist. x x x
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x x
x. However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and
Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. In the
meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the
NTC which rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-participative in
the task of decision-making. This prompted the then Minister of Transportation
and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinion of the then
Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC was a collegial body
or not. On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion x x x to the
effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the

Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a
member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon,
or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which case the
concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a
valid Decision x x x. While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure
was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however,
the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure
before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No. 546. This
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA
200 when it declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the
Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x
govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now
respondent NTC. x x x
In the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National
Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717, the Supreme Court applied and
cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC x x x.

59

Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its
predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.
Respondents Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is
vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is
antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order No.
546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:
[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform
some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus
Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed
and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a
public nature or service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is
persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with board (State Ex.
Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109
Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily discerned
from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is
composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners x x x not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word and is
not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the
law. It means in addition to (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus
Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and, whether
it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as
binding together and as relating to one another x x x.
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed x x x. If it was the intention of President Marcos to
constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of a
commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a
commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is
composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the
two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission
composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together
in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions,
conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC
and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word deputy to
designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate
against the collegiality of the NTC. x x x The collegiality of the NTC cannot be
disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership
thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without
functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x

In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the
NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x
x. Even then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement
opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek
refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno x x x. It was only
when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar was
designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flipflapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his Department Order
No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases pending
with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before
the NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof x x x.
xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their
argument x x x because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a
collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents pose tenuous. For, it can likewise
be argued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the
existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming the same.
xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x
declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law
and thus null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside. [26]
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that
respondent appellate courts act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 11-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner Benedicto
on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars and
an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the courts power to nullify
administrative regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative
regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first
place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are
on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to
law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are
absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a
ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are
an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.

60

Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently

null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546
that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of
striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals,
private respondent BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar for the formers adherence and defense of its one-man rule as
enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar may be
considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom private
respondent BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having
acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for
the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of
NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the
Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies
against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause could not be
significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of
discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are
interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the
merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at
least two members of the commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the
application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate
what promises to be the most technologically advanced telephone service in
the country. This court is not in any way concerned with whether or not
private respondent BellTels project proposal is technically feasible or
financially viable, and this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters
which are patently outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court
of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so we must
review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent
appellate court on this score, and this score alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of
indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent
appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en
banc and forthwith grant private respondent BellTels application for a
provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the
second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered
by respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety
of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a
case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As
to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office

of the special civil action of mandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after

all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar,
Dumlao and Perez to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working
draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply
ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body, and the subject of
the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working draft
which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent
BellTels application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of
Appeals, however, did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said
application. This is understandable since every commissioner of the three-man
NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTels
application and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the
exercise by the members of the commission of their individual discretion in
private respondent BellTels case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly
proceed with the consideration of private respondent BellTels application for
provisional authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since December,
1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay action
on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate
any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals order for the NTC to sit
and meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTels application for a
provisional authority, attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order
granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by
the latter through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single
piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said
working draft. In private respondent BellTels Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Resolve Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged that
said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal
Department of the NTC.[27] Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head,
Engr. Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez.
[28]
The working draft is attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which
may be borrowed by any person for any stated purpose.[29]
Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced
the working draft or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners
have utterly failed to offer proof of any illegality in the preparation or
procurement of said working draft.
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be
diverted from the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the
NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is
more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant
proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

61

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al.,
G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I.

THE FACTS

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified
FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?
III. THE RULING

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0)

to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing
the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5,
the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and
which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of
their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting,
their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of

respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner
HLI, which
option
the
Court
thereby RECALLED and SET
ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate
land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies
to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have
the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is
on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they
were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of

the Court decision.
II.

THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held
by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at
the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis
mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling
in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless

62

that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify
the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3.

subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme
only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of
the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2,
2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive,
the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply
to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the
DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with
the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.]

NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of

Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the
revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land
and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the
DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco
that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011
Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation
canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by
farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size
that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and
resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per
FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure
the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per
qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are
within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area
with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the
500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to
industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as
well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government,
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of
the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the
SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4.

5.

NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands

under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified
FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be

transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of
the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified
FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the
placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the
FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the
subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory,
since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not
entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6.

YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC

approved HLIs SDP.

YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of

taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since
this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these
qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of

63

the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders
of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of
shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220
total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so
as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing

that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general
elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion
for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and
appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing
or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by

Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of
RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both
Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to

increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at
least one (1) member.

HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is
nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special,
different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the
amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks
the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A
political question is not subject to review by the Court.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the

Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November 1971.

Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable

Question (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

64

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA

ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S.
ALFON, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978,
which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a change of name. Only a
question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which are
well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: t.hqw
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel,
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14,
1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times
Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato
Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General,
Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on
the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit
the same for resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it
appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital
(Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's
Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila
(Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella

Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and

Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have
been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When
petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high
school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school
she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from
elementary to college show that she was registered by the
name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not
committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G3 and G-4).
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the
petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college
using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since
her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by
this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same
name.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not

65

proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact

that petitioner has been using a different surname and has
become known with such surname does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her
surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the
father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise
admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to
change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the
Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of
Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has
the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for
change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted
but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized
to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change
her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon
she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the
Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is
equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: t.hqw
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner
for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change

of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol.
1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up
to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner
is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be
known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA
ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S.
ALFON, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978,
which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a change of name. Only a
question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which are
well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: t.hqw

66

This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner

Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel,
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the

petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
childhood;

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14,

1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times
Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college

using the same name;

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty.

Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato
Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General,
Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on
the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit
the same for resolution of the Court.

4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same

name.

From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it

appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital
(Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's
Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila
(Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and
Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have
been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When
petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high
school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school
she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from
elementary to college show that she was registered by the
name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not
committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G3 and G-4).

3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since

her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by
this name;

Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not
proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact
that petitioner has been using a different surname and has
become known with such surname does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her
surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the
father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise
admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to
change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the
Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of
Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has

67

the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for

change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted
but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized
to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner
is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be
known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
Floresca vs. Phillex Mining

The lower court should have fully granted the petition.

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change
her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon
she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the
Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is
equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: t.hqw
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner
for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change
of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol.
1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up
to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining

Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper
mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a
result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically,
the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions
for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al
moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act
before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before
the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that
they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil
case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts
then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The
SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not

68

availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win in the lower court
whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA
should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the
book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the
law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of
the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers
are already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The
exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature
NOT the SC.

Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority

G.R. No. 164527
15 August 2007
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant
petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing
Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No.
(MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of
many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite
into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-OperateTransfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private
sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed
MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the
plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the

bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint

Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of
Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area.
The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain
will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or
terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses
incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that
stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such
revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by
both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the
on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the
JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design
changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation
No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare
land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at
Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended,
to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing
structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by
RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to
acquire lands of public domain

69

Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to

the SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be
responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are
approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to
the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or
by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose
authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD
727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR
is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises
of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President
via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It
must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first
in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President
Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be
no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these
are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have
already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under
the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property
rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may
deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right
to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was
noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper
was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be
paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands
were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the
state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information
on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III,
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by
virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question
after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the projects
implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the
Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to

question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has
passed.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution #
13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all
the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116,
1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which
stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up
to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the
provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of
office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The
petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of
petitioner without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of
the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject
to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is
undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention
of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where
there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term
rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of
his term to hold such office.

G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985

NATIONAL
HOUSING
vs.
BENJAMIN
JUCO
AND
THE
COMMISSION, respondents.

CORPORATION, petitioner,
NATIONAL

LABOR

RELATIONS

70

Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.

Amante A. Pimentel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor
Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
The background facts of this case are stated in the respondent-appellee's brief
as follows:
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin
C. Juco) was a project engineer of the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14,
1975. For having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation
which was allegedly committed on March 5, 1975.
Juco's services were terminated by (NHC) effective as
of the close of working hours on May 14, 1975. On
March 25, 1977 he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office No. 4,
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and
Employment) docketed as R04-3-3309-77 (Annex A,
Petition). The said complaint was certified by Regional
Branch No. IV of the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
where it was docketed as Case No. RB-IV-12038-77 and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa. The latter
conducted the hearing. By agreement of the parties,
the case was submitted for resolution upon submission
of their respective position papers. Private respondent
(Juco) submitted his position paper on July 15, 1977. He
professed innocence of the criminal acts imputed
against him contending "that he was dismissed based
on purely fabricated charges purposely to harass him
because he stood as a witness in the theft case filed
against certain high officials of the respondent's
establishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his immediate
reinstatement to his former position in the (NHC)
without loss of seniority rights and the consequent
payment of his will back wages plus all the benefits
appertaining thereto. On July 28, 1977, the NHC also
filed its position paper alleging that the Regional Office
Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, "is without authority to
entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering
that the NHC is a government owned and controlled

corporation; that even assuming that this case falls

within the jurisdiction of this Office, respondent firm
(now petitioner) maintains that respondent (Juco), now
private respondent, was separated from the service for
valid and justified reasons, i.e., for having sold
company properties consisting of 214 pieces of scrap
G.I. pipes at a junk shop in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, and thereafter appropriating the proceeds
thereof to his own benefit."
The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reads:
The fact that in the early case of Fernandez v.
Cedro (NLRC Case No. 201165-74, May 19, 1975) the
Commission, (Second Division) ruled that the
respondent National Housing Corporation is a
government-owned or controlled corporation does not
preclude us from later taking a contrary stand if by
doing so the ends of justice could better be served.
For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is
a sum formula for achieving uniformity of action and
conducive to the smooth operation of an office,
Idolatrous reverence for precedents which have
outlived their validity and usefulness retards progress
and should therefore be avoided. In fact, even courts
do reverse themselves for reasons of justice and equity.
This Commission as an Administrative body performing
quasi judicial function is no exception.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby, set aside. In view, however, of
the fact that the Labor Arbiter did not resolve the issue
of illegal dismissal we have opted to remand this case
to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution of the
aforementioned issue.
The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation
organized in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporations, dated January 5, 1951. Its shares of stock are owned
by the Government Service Insurance System the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and
Development Corporation, and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.
Pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 118, the capital stock of NHC was
increased from P100 million to P250 million with the five government
institutions above mentioned subscribing in equal proportion to the increased
capital stock. The NHC has never had any private stockholders. The
government has been the only stockholder from its creation to the present.

71

There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of

government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service
law and civil service rules and regulations.

The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC
wants to apply in its entirety to the private respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. The terms and
conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned
and controlled corporations shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries
shall be standardized by the National Assembly as
provided for in the New Constitution. However, there
shall be reduction of existing wages, benefits and other
terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by
them at the time of the adoption of the Code.

Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which
stated:
A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions
of the Government shall be provided by law.
The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the
embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an
earlier loophole which allowed government-owned or controlled corporations to
avoid the full consequences of the an encompassing coverage of the civil
service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the addition of "agency"
and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of the Government. All
offices and firms of the government are covered.
The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle exercises or a meaningless
gestures. They carry the strong message that t civil service coverage is broad
and an- embracing insofar as employment in the government in any of its
governmental or corporate arms is concerned.
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential
Decree No. 807 is unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or
controlled corporations belong to the civil service and are subject to civil
service requirements.
It provides:
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations
Personnel. All permanent personnel of governmentowned or controlled corporations whose positions are
now embraced in the civil service shall continue in the
service until they have been given a chance to qualify
in an appropriate examination, but in the meantime,
those who do not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility shag not be promoted until they qualify in an
appropriate civil service examination. Services of
temporary personnel may be terminated any time.

Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of

Labor and Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gives the background of the
amendment which includes government-owned or controlled corporations in
the embrace of the civil service.
We stated:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show
that in the deliberation held relative to what is now
Section 1(1), Article XII-B, supra, the issue of the
inclusion
of
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations figured prominently.
The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor
leader, vehemently objected to the inclusion of
government-owned or controlled corporations in the
Civil Service. He argued that such inclusion would put
asunder the right of workers in government
corporations, recognized in jurisprudence under the
1935 Constitution, to form and join labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining with their employers
in the same manner as in the private section (see:
records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).
In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention enlightened the
members of the Committee on Labor on the divergent
situation of government workers under the 1935
Constitution, and called for its rectification. Thus, in a
Position Paper dated November 22, 197 1, submitted to
the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional
Convention, then Acting Commissioner of Civil Service
Epi Rey Pangramuyen declared:

72

It is the stand, therefore, of this

Commission that by reason of the
nature of the public employer and the
peculiar character of the public service,
it must necessary regard the right to
strike given to unions in private
industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees.
It
has
been
stated
that
the
Government, in contrast to the private
employer, protects the interests of all
people in the public service, and that
accordingly, such conflicting interests
as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they
employ.
Moreover,
determination
of
employment conditions as well as
supervision of the management of the
public service is in the hands of
legislative
bodies.
It
is
further
emphasized that government agencies
in the performance of their duties have
a right to demand undivided allegiance
from their workers and must always
maintain a pronounced esprit de corps
or firm discipline among their staff
members.
It
would
be
highly
incompatible with these requirements
of the public service, if personnel took
orders from union leaders or put
solidarity with members of the working
class
above
solidarity
with
the
Government. This would be inimical to
the public interest.
Moreover, it is asserted that public
employees by joining labor unions may
be compelled to support objectives
which are political in nature and thus
jeopardize the fundamental principle
that the governmental machinery must
be impartial and non-political in the
sense of party politics. (See: Records of
1971 Constitutional Convention).

Similar, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing for the

inclusion
of
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations in the Civil Service, argued:
It is meretricious to contend that
because
Government-owned
or
controlled corporations yield profits,
their employees are entitled to better
wages and fringe benefits than
employees of Government other than
Government-owned
and
controlled
corporations which are not making
profits. There is no gainsaying the fact
that the capital they use is the people's
money. (see: Records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention).
Summarizing
the
deliberations
of
the
1971
Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of
Government-owned or controlled corporation Dean
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila
University Professional School of Law, stated that
government-owned corporations came under attack as
g cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher
than their counterparts in the various branches of
government, while the capital of these corporations
belongs to the Government and government money is
pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster,
and they should therefore come under the strict
surveillance of the Civil Service System. (Bernas, The
1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974
ed., p. 524).
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as
amended, and the Civil Service Decree as amended and the precedent in
the Alliance of Government Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner
National Housing Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs
governmental functions and not proprietary ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its amended
articles of incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is
organized is to assist and carry out the coordinated
massive housing program of the government,
principally but not limited to low-cost housing with the

73

integration cooperation and assistance of

governmental agencies concerned, through
carrying on of any or all the following activities:

all
the

l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands

for the purpose of construction and building therein
preferably low-cost housing so as to provide decent
and durable dwelling for the greatest number of
inhabitants in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social
and economic community growth through the
establishment of general physical plans for urban,
suburban and metropolitan areas to be characterized
by efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects
of the government for the establishment of nationwide
and massive low cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and
technical studies of the development and promotion of
construction of houses and buildings of sound
standards of design liability, durability, safety, comfort
and size for improvement of the architectural and
engineering designs and utility of houses and buildings
with the utilization of new and/or native materials
economics in material and construction, distribution,
assembly and construction and of applying advanced
housing and building technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of lowcost housing privately or cooperatively owned water
and sewerage system or waste disposal facilities, and
the formulations of a unified or officially coordinated
urban transportation system as a part of a
comprehensive development plan in these areas.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the
government to accomplish governmental policies and objectives and extend
essential services to the people. It would be incongruous if employees
discharging essentially governmental functions are not covered by the same
law and rules which govern those performing other governmental functions. If
government corporations discharging proprietary functions now belong to the
civil service with more reason should those performing governmental functions
be governed by civil service law.
The respondent NLRC cites a 1976 opinion of the Secretary of Justice which
holds that the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" in

Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution contemplates only those

government-owned or controlled corporations created by special law. The
opinion states that since the Constitution provides for the organization or
regulation of private corporations only by "general law", expressly excluding
government-owned or controlled corporations, it follows that whenever the
Constitution mentions government-owned or controlled corporations, it must
refer to those created by special law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals all charters,
laws, decrees, rules, and provisions exempting any branch, agency,
subdivision, or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations from the civil service law and rules is also
cited to show that corporations not governed by special charters or laws are
not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions in the
Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears that at the time the
Convention discussed government-owned or controlled corporations, all such
corporations were organized only under special laws or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government
may be created by special charter does not mean that such corporations not
created by special law are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the decree
repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption from the civil
service law imply that government corporations not created by special law are
exempt from civil service coverage. These charters and statutes are the only
laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they are the only ones which
could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the general law
which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional Convention
discussed only corporations created by special law or charter cannot be an
argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil service coverage. As stated in
the cited speech delivered during the convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all
government corporations then in existence were organized under special laws
or charters. The convention delegates could not possibly discuss governmentowned or controlled corporations which were still non-existent or about whose
existence they were unaware.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the
phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible
and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a
corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not
cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases
when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention
or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution It would be
possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary
corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A
government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations.
These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their
officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict

74

accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the
Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service
employment. Conceivably,all government-owned or controlled corporations
could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporation
under the general law. The constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.

It may be asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civil
Service should it not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My answer is, not
necessarily. For it may well be that the National Housing Corporation is in
limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be
"government-owned or controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar
proceedings:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the

respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of
the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is
REINSTATED.

Human Settlements Development Corporation

SO ORDERED.

Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera,

Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Philippine
Associated
Corporation

Separate Opinions

Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.

It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for
the Commissioner of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the
constitutional provisions on the Civil Service in respect of government-owned
or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons stated therein,
that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.

Republic Planters Bank

In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special
law; it was organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law Act No. 1459 entitled,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER
WHICH SUCH CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has
been replaced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 known as The New Corporation
Code.] In the fight of my opinion, the National Housing Corporation is not
covered by the Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the Labor Code? I am not
prepared to answer this question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that
whether or not a corporation is "government-owned or controlled" depends
upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be "government-owned or
controlled" for one purpose but not for another. In other words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or
controlled."

Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.

Smelting

and

Refining

QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the above-named
corporation is government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for
the Commissioner of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the
constitutional provisions on the Civil Service in respect of government-owned
or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons stated therein,
that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special
law; it was organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law Act No. 1459 entitled,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF

75

SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER

WHICH SUCH CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has
been replaced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 known as The New Corporation
Code.] In the fight of my opinion, the National Housing Corporation is not
covered by the Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the Labor Code? I am not
prepared to answer this question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that
whether or not a corporation is "government-owned or controlled" depends
upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be "government-owned or
controlled" for one purpose but not for another. In other words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or
controlled."
It may be asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civil
Service should it not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My answer is, not
necessarily. For it may well be that the National Housing Corporation is in
limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be
"government-owned or controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar
proceedings:
Human Settlements Development Corporation

WILLARD, J.:
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary An Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms,
and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the
provisions of this Act.
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person
any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles
virtualawlibrary Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to
firearms in possession of persons who have secured a license therefor
or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act.
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No.
1780, committed as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully,
and criminally, had in his possession and concealed about his person a
deadly weapon, to wit: chanrobles virtualawlibrary One (1) iron bar,
about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end and a
string on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed
and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the
Philippine Commission.

Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.

Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation

A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government
has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that

Philippine
Associated
Corporation

Smelting

and

Refining

Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation

Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.
Republic Planters Bank
QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the above-named
corporation is government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintif-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO
NIO, Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION

The words or other deadly weapon only signify a kind of weapon

included within the preceding classification. In other words, the rule of
ejusdem generis must be applied in the interpretation of this law,
which rule is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
The most frequent application of this rule is found where
specific and generic terms of the same nature are employed in
the same act, the latter following the former. While in the
abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full
signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like
nature they take their meaning from the latter, and are
presumed to embrace only things or persons of the kind
designated by them.
In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about
the person would not be a violation of this Act. The rule of construction above
referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of
the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other
parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the
result which would reached by application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the

76

latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in
the view of the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a
violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners
argue that they are regular employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are
necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondents main business,
steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to
private respondent NSC.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC

[G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are considered permanent employees as

opposed to being only project employees of NSC.

FACTS: Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel

Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice,

HELD: NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions
affirmed.

regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration

Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the
Labor Arbiter declared petitioners regular project employees who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists,
but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary

RATIO: Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered permanent

employees. However, contrary to petitioners apprehensions, the designation
of named employees as project employees and their assignment to a specific
project are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means
of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.

differentials.
On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of more than six (6) years should
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It
affirmed the Labor Arbiters holding that petitioners were project employees
since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five
Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the
time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to
petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal

qualify them as regular employees, the Supreme Court believed this claim is
without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as
project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or
legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second paragraph of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who
has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee,
relates to casual employees, not to project employees.

and factual basis.

G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978

77

ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS
CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO,
BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS,
FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEA,
LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official
capacities as City Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City
Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH
X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissing the petition for
mandamus in Civil Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan),
instituted against the City of San Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San
Carlos City and the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer of
San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City
Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos,
from the time of its creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a
third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became effective on June 21,
1969 provides that the basic salaries of city judges of second and third class
cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then actually
receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the
national government and P650.00 is the share of the city government, which
salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City Judge of a third
class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary
actually being received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said
act shall be paid by the city government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the
filing of the petition on January 21, 1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary

differential of P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos (Pangasinan);

that the petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the
necessary budget and to pay him the said differential but the respondents,
without any justification, whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the same;
that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the necessary budget
providing for the payment of the salary of the petitioner as provided for in
Republic Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy
remedy except the present action for mandamus; and that because of the
refusal of the respondent to comply with their obligation as provided in
Republic Act No. 5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services of a
lawyer to file this action for which he was to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's
fees. 2
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted and denied
the allegations in the petition and alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further
provides, among other things, that the salary of the city judge shall at least be
one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city mayor; that the city judge
receives an annual salary of P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than
the salary being received by the city mayor which is P13,200.00 yearly; that
assuming the existence of a salary difference, in view of the provision of
Republic Act No. 5967, that the payment of the salary difference shall be
subject to the implementation of the respective city government, which is
discretionary on the part of the city government as to whether it would or
would not implement the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the
financial difficulties of the city which has a big overdraft, the payment of the
salary difference of the city judge cannot be made; and that the petitioner
should pay his lawyer and should not charge the attorney's fees to the
respondents who have not violated any rights of the petitioner. 3
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered
its decision dated May 31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides
higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall receive a
basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as provided
thereinbelow:
xxx xxx xxx

78

(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos
per annum;

SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would

like to congratulate Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the concern

of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in this
particular amendment prepared by the distinguished lady from
La Union, this will not require the council to pay it at P100.00
exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is just the limit
the maximum but they may fix it at much less than that.
That is why the words "at least" were suggested by the
Committee. It need not be exactly just P100.00 less. It may be
P500.00 less.

For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge, and for second and third class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand five hundred
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for other
cities, the city judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the
salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per
month less than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 5967 would be interpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the
salary of the city judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the
salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City Mayor
(particularly in the case of second and third class cities) would be rendered
totally useless." The petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of
the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the
salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of said Section 7 should give way
to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21,
1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a third class city; that the petitioner as
city judge received an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of
San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00 which was exactly
P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became
Republic Act No. 5967, the following discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I recall
that there will be some cities where the city judges will receive
salaries higher than those of the mayors. And in all charters,
Your Honor, the city judge is considered a department head
theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It would not be fair for
the purposes of public administration that a city department
head should receive a salary higher than that of the chief
executive of the city.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the cities

of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter. The Mayors
are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now, under the
amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija and
Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor
does it mean that if the salary of the city mayor is P1,500, the
city judges will receive P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention to lines
13 to 20. We presented this amendment because it says here:
"For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge". So it will happen, and my
attention was called by the gentlemen from Iloilo that the
city judge win be receiving more salary than the city mayor.
Hence the amendment, Mr. President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and
this was their objection. We have proposed this amendment to
at least solve this problem, so that no city judge will be
receiving more than the city mayor. So they will be receiving
less than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate
Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787. (Emphasis
supplied .) 4

79

It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in
enacting Republic Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not
be higher than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause "Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least P100.00 per month
less than that of the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the
salary of city judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute.
When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of
the statute the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it
is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an
annual salary of P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide
for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of the said
city.

Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD:
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision
appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.

always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of

SO ORDERED.

were to adopt his over what has been done.

Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No.
106719. September 21, 1993

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
Ponente: QUIASON, J.
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same
did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its
own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and copetitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE:

FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing
the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint
filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

80

The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to

aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that

preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative

(a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he

charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive

has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the

suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as

power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are

an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case
People vs. MagallanesG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed
against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend
the suspension of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
suspension, as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction
and cooperation of P/Col.
Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the
PNP, with Police Inspector Abetos
cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan,
Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez,Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to
abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with theuse of
a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident
premeditation, treachery and nocturnity.The other accused secretly buried the
victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a feeof
P500.00 each.The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty
and filed motions for bail. Theprosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the
alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After theprosecution
rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the
reception of evidence wassuspended because of the motions for inhibition of
judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarilyinhibited himself
and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the
transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial
court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the
informations do notstate that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motionfor the Transfer of
Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same
was denied.The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later
inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the
refusal of the judge totransfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private
respondents were required to comment on the petition andissued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with
the trial of thecase.
ISSUE:

81

Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers
HELD:
The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of
the commencement of theaction. When the informations in the cases were
filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan wasP.D. 1861 ,
which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving: 1)violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to theiroffice,
where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00.If the penalty for the
offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court or theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court.Jurisdiction is also
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan
has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of taking advantage of
his position is not sufficient to bringthe offenses within the definition of
offenses committed in relation to public office. It is considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its
jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A.
1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a)
when the public officers rank i
s classified as Grade 27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers
involved occupy a position classified as Grade 27 or higher. Accused Torres,
who is highest in rank among the accused, only has a rank classified as Grade
18.

Republic vs Migrino
Vera vs Cuevas
People vs Echaves

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

-express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others
San Pablo Manufacturing Co. vs Commission of Internal Revenue

Noscitor

Sociis

-where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct

construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated

Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January
28 1961

Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already

acquired before the subsequent

FACTS:

enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to

officers whose rank is Grade 27 or

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various

materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate

higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation.
Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the
enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet
begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED

precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers

and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made
of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the
17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the
cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic

82

Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The

general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the

petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%

statutes object and purpose. The rule, however, is applicable only to cases

special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass

where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to

in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax

or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true

Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not

that the term stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a number of articles that

exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of
the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term stabilizer and

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and

flavors mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those

limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not

used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied,

require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in

the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition

ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection

for review.

with other rules of construction.

ISSUE:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v Social Security Commision
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 263
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)

HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.
RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term
stabilizer and flavors as used in the law refers only to those materials
actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is
based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that general
terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the

Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charities,
and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are
directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of
Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known
as the Social Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term employer as defined in the law should
following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on
undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which
are pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase activity of any kind in the
definition is preceded by the words any trade, business, industry, undertaking.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.

83

HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is
not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term employer is
sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or
entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it
contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.

G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983

PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the

respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring
that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite
the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office.
We find for the petitioner.
At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was
required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out,
petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation law
(Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of probation. Under
Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following:
(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment
of more than six years;
(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the
State;

Abundio J. Macaraas for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing
check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven
years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four
months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as
minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum. 2
Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having
appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent judge,
who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the
petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:
(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final

judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos;
(d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of the decree; and
(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of the decree became applicable,
pursuant to Section 33.
Under the abovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from
being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to be
sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation which,
from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than
undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In expressly
enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the
clear intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration.
If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order
that its objective could be realized and achieved, We cannot but find
respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation

84

insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law
should be applied.

ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to society as to be wrested

away therefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals should be.

The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed." According to him, the State has shown
serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as shown by
various measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing
checks.

The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for
probation, is that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by
his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial court and the
affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals.

For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the
offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the
offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established,
such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in
society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as
to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed
with hardened criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as
within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him
that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his
fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him.
If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with,
not the prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission of the
offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong
obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through
bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He would thereby add
to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to
probation. Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature
thereof are those against national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other
crimes being those punished by more than six years imprisonment.
Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for
disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the
nature of the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid
down by the law in determining who may be granted probation. That crime
would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of estafa,
which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for which is generally
separated by a thin line from mere civil liability.
For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit
an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must be served
that will act as deterrent to protect society. In protecting society, the family of
the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser
extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost sight of, it
being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as
measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so

We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has
not shown repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found
guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision
of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for
insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or at
least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of
probation.1wph1.t The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well
worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within
the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took by which to
achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach, petitioner cannot
be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation benefits.
Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of
appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied for probation,
made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
The penalty imposed by respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of
the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the
law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have
them applied for probation even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the
penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals
petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith?
Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification
for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We
find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied
in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving
the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in the case of Balleta Jr. vs.
Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by the
Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant
petition for probation.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside,
and petitioner is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms
and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by the
probation officer.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

85

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.

Samson v. CA [Nov. 25, 1986]

24SEP

Samson v. Court of Appeals

Fact:
AO No. 3, issued by Mayor Samson of Caloocan City, summarily terminated the
services of respondent Talens who held position of Asst. Sec. to the Mayor on
the ground of lack and loss of confidence and appointing Liwag to the
position.

RA No. 2260 declares the position of secretaries to city mayors non-competitive

Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 th District of Manila where

respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned
for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement,
were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on
the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to
handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was
then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to
them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed
a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for
one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

and this was interpreted by Mayor Samson as to include the position of Asst.
Sec. to the Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of

respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the
respondent were proper.

Issue:
Legality of Administrative Order No. 3

Held:
Secretary to the Mayor and Asst. Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and
distinct positions. One is of higher category and rank than the other. The
functions strictly attributable to a secretary, is not automatically vested or
transferred to an assistant secretary, because the latter simply assists or aids
the former in the accomplishment of his duties.

CATU VS RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was
owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who
are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar,
respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall
within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While
RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being
a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA
7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to
practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.

86

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a

prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required
by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oathand/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
G.R. No. L-32441

March 29, 1930

DOMINADOR
GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
the
BOARD
OF
MEDICAL
EXAMINERS
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.

Jose
Varela
Calderon
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.

for

appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation
proceedings, and particularly the decision of the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated March 30,
1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license to practice
medicine and surgery.
2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status
before the investigation and the decision of March 30, 1926,
that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an
adverse decision.
3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a
license for the practice of medicine and surgery in the
Philippine Islands, such as he had prior to the investigation and
adverse decision.
4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and
6, bill of exemptions.)
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint
be dismissed.
After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with
costs against the plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of
Manila was authorized to appear and institute administrative
proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City
of Manila, had personality nor power to institute administrative
proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381,
known as the Opium Law, is valid.

87

4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the

Opium Law, is unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.

Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more than one
subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill.

5. In holding that section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium

Law, is in force.

Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not
foreign to the end pursued in said Act, and that in view in the provision of said
section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one
subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physician or dentist who
prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the
use of said drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the
purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it is
one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view. Such punishment is not
the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means
employed to regulate the use of opium.

6. In not holding that section 9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed,
even on the supposition that it was valid.
7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
8. In denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed
by appellant.
The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against
the plaintiff, preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila,
who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the
Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the
matter.
According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111,
the procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the
following:
Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall
be begun by filing a written charge or charges against the
accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or
persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners
itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges.
Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the
Board of Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with
written notice of the time and place when they will be heared
and determined, shall be served upon the accused or his
counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for
said hearing. (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)
The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by
any specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to
require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of the law
we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges
referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges
were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not
deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and
to take the proper action according to law.
The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section
9 of Act No. 2381 is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since
said section is foreign to the subject of said Act, in violation of section 3 of the

In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power
expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection
of the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine
Islands.
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE
UPON THE SUBJECT. The Philippine Legislature is expressly
authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, to adopt
legislation upon the importation and sale of opium in the
Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to
protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people
of the Philippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the
police power of the State. (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35
Phil., 56.)
And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381
relative to the physicians and dentist are simply detailes and means conducive
to the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be
stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that properly speaking, they
are not foreign matter.
The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when
a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its
title. To require every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided
for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be
unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not
to the details of the act. The subject must be single; the
provisions, to accomplished the object involved in that subject,
may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a statute will
be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or
indirectly, to the same subject, have natural connection, and

88

are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. As very

frequently expressed by the courts, any provisions that are
germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be
included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.)
In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground
alleged by the plaintiff, the violation of the constitutional provision must be
substantial and manifest. It is not so in the case at bar.
2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their
subjects are not expressed in the titles, the violation of the rule
must be substantial and plain. (Posadas vs. Menzi, Decision of
the United States Supreme Court, page 388, No. 11, May 15,
1929, United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions.)
At all events the validity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has already been
upheld by this court, not only in the above cited case, United States vs. Wayne
Shoup, supra, but also in the subsequent case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing
(37 Phil., 211).
Passing to the fifth and sixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for
appellant contends that even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it
was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by section 780 of the Administrative
Code, we note, first, that there is no express repeal of section 9 of Act No.
2381. Secondly, it cannot be held that it has been impliedly repealed, for the
reason that the provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are neither contrary to,
nor incompatible with, the provisions of section 780 of the Administrative Code,
as amended. Upon this point, we approve and adopt the following statements
made by the trial judge:
Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493
being complete, and "covering the field" by implication
repealed all laws relating to the practice of medicine, powers of
the Board of Medical Examiners and allied matters; hence, the
said law, expressly providing the causes for revocation of
medical licenses, necessarily excluded all others, even though
embodied in prior enactments.
Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners
could revoke licenses for "unprofessional conduct," without
defining the term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law) provided that
illegaly prescribing opium should be cause for revocation of
medical licenses. Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No.
310. Act No. 2381 also an Opium Law in its section 9,
repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists. The
repetition did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2493, section 11
(Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of physicians
are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining
the phrase. In other words, so far as revocation of licenses is

concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere reenactment of Act No. 310.

The reenactment of the said portion of Act No. 310 did not
repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said section 9 has been
repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No.
2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words
"unprofessional conduct" of the following:
"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or
dishonorable conduct" as used in this chapter shall be
construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring,
aiding or abeting a criminal abortion; (2) advertising,
either in his own name or in the name of any other
person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written
or printed paper, or document, of medical business in
which untruthful or improbable promises are made, or
being employed by, or in the service of any person,
firm, association or corporation so advertising, or
advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good
morals; (3) habitual intemperance or addition to the
use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having
a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or
misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5)
willfully betraying a professional secret."
It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five
examples specified there can be no other conduct of a
physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct theretofore
deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio
unius est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means
of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to
defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does
not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to
remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists,
"unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more
reason does the criminal use of opium remain a specific cause
for revocation of license. (Pages 11, 12 and 13, bill of
exceptions.)
As to the seventh and eighth assignments of error, we find the judgment and
appealed from correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial
properly denied.
As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of
Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration
and the authority granted the Secretary of the Interior of confirming or
reversing the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial
character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise
thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on
its merits.

89

As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of

general application that mandamus will not lie to review or
control the acts of executive officers and boards of state and
federal governments in respect of matters as to which they are
vested with discretion. In other words, they cannot be
compelled to act or render a decision in any particular way, and
this is so, even though the exercise of this discretion requires
the construction and interpretation of statutes. Where public
officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their
conclusions,
although
disputable,
are
impregnable
to mandamus. (38 C. J., 659-660.)
That this action is really a mandamus proceeding, appears clearly from the
terms of the complaint filed herein.

Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960

which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly
approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session
of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were
absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present
and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer
and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a
temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to

Finding no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is

affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2

Malcolm,
Ostrand,
Johns
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.

Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said

and

Villa-Real,

JJ.,

concur.

Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the

minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by

the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void

Javellana vs Tayo

G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962

and not in accordance with.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid

ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL

GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as
Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of
Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista,
Iloilo, respondent-appellant.

RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case
has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the
absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The
attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as
there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the
proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant
public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or

FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal
Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the
time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the dulyelected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of

consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to

one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is
controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering

90

that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered
the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty,
not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial
Board upholding the validity of the session in question.

DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.

[Digest] Lopez vs. CA (1970)
Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor)
v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.

91

Facts:
January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce
planes which forwarded such message to Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of
the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the
radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in
terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of
1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the
babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered
that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz
merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax the same word to be used
by the newspapers who covered the same
January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by
Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of
Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and
food and clothing being scarce
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the "January News Quiz" made
reference to Cruz as a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. Called it Hoax of
the year
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a
different person of the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business
man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 published statements correcting their misprint and
explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan
13th issues deadline
Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded
P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)
CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue:
WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the
wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in relation to the hoax of the year?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to
P1,000.00
Ratio:
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its
face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is "malicious defamation, expressed
either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or

reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a
libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person."
o In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture being published beside the
article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
2.

Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim
any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
State interest in press freedom citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official
actsof course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to
have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
Last word on the subject Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy
Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)

Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out
the responsibility arising from the publication of the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!
4.

o
o
o

Dissent: Dizon, J.
Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
No evidence of actual malice
The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz
The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be
considered excusable negligence
G.R. No. L-10690

June 28, 1957

APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FELISA ALVENDIA, respondent.

1.

Emili P. Cortes and Pacifico L. Santiago for petitioners.

Isidro T. Calma for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

92

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in Case No. 215 Pampanga (later transferred to the Court of Agrarian
Relations which denied reconsideration of the Industrial Court's decision)
authorizing the ejectment of petitioners from their respective landholdings, and
their replacement by other tenants of their landlord's choice.
It appears that petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel
Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in
barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida Blanca, Pampanga, under tenancy
contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July 27, 1954,
respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the
ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54
and 1954-55, they did not personally perform the principal work of plowing and
harrowing on their respective landholdings, but entrusted said work to other
persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the
farm work themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied respondent's claims,
and alleged that they were the ones working the land although at times, they
were helped by their children and sons-in-law; and that respondent filed the
ejectment action against them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts
with her on the 45-55 sharing basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.
After trial, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped either
by their sons, sons-in-law, or grandsons, on their landholdings; held that a
contract of tenancy is personal in nature and can not be entrusted to a son,
son-in-law or grandson, especially where there is a specific prohibition in the
tenancy contracts against allowing third persons to do the principal phases of
farming for the tenants; and authorized petitioners' ejectment and replacement
by other tenants. The case was later transferred to the Court of Agrarian
Relations upon its creation where petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Industrial Court's judgement, which was denied. Hence, their present
appeal.
The lower court found that the "third persons" referred to by respondent
Alvendia to whom petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of plowing and
harrowing on their respective landholdings were either their sons-in-law or
grandsons who were not, however, dependent upon them for support and were
living separately from them. The issue, therefore, is whether petitioners
violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to
such relatives.
Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant" as:
. . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system;

While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act,

includes:
. . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other
person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who
are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
operate the farm enterprise.
Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, petitioners
were within their legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their
sons-in-law or grandsons. Such relatives fall within the phrase "the members of
the family of the tenant"; and the law does not require that these members of
the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being
applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant
or not", whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and usually help
him operate the frame enterprise", the law considers also part of the tenant's
immediate household.
But respondent Alvendia claims that as her contracts with petitioners were
entered into when Act 4054, the old Tenancy Act, was still in force, the
definition of the word "tenant" given in said Act should be applied in this case,
to wit:
. . . a farmer or farm laborer who undertakes to work and
cultivate land for another or a person who furnishes the labor
with the consent of the landlord.
Granting that Act 4054 applies to this case, there is, however, nothing in its
above definition of "tenant" to prohibit the farmer who undertakes to work and
cultivate the land of another, from doing such work with the assistance of his
family, who are under his control and authority. The above definition is, in fact,
so broad that it even includes the labor of third persons hired by the farmer to
work on his farm, under the clause "or a person who furnishes the labor with
the consent of the landlord". It is the hiring of third persons to do the farm work
for the tenant that the new tenancy Republic Act No. 1199, eliminated from the
old concept of "tenant" under Act 4054, thus restricting the meaning of
"tenant" to one "who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another, with the latter's consent . . ." Whether under the new or the old
tenancy law, therefore, the work done by the members of a tenant's family is,
in legal contemplation, included in the work that the tenant undertakes to
perform on the land given to him in tenancy. In the absence of clear and
categorical imperatives, we will not construe statutes in a sense inconsistent
with the traditional unity of the Filipino family.
Respondent Alvendia also contends that her tenancy contract with petitioners,
Exhibits A, B, C, and D, expressly prohibit the latter from asking for and
accepting help in the cultivation of their landholdings from their sons-in-law
and grandsons, under the provision in said contracts that:

93

(a) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow and prepare the land
to be planted, and likewise, he is the one to plant and fence the
seedbed. With respect to this work, the LANDLORD shall not
spend for anything, but she has the power to tell or order the
TENANT when to plow, harrow, or what to do pertaining, the
tenant's work.
The above provision contains no prohibition for the tenant to accept assistance
from the members of his family in the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting,
or fencing of his landholding. It simply enumerates the exact duties expected
of the tenant by his landlord; and the tenant is referred to as "the one" to
perform these duties, only, to distinguish his obligations from those of his
landlord. We see nothing in farming tasks that requires individual specialized
skill. Besides, it is a fact that petitioners Galang and Santos were already 74
and 64, respectively, when respondent signed the tenancy contracts with them
in 1953. Respondent's having accepted petitioners Galang and Santos as her
tenants in spite of their advanced age not only disproves her claim that they
are already too old to perform their duties as tenants, but proves that she had
impliedly agreed that these petitioners would be helped by their families in
their farm work, since respondent must have realized that at their advanced
age, these petitioners could not by themselves alone perform all the farm work
without family assistance.
The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the ejectment action
filed by respondent against petitioners dismissed, with costs against
respondent Felisa Alvendia. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953,
which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of
P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953.
Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused
to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No.
879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the same for
settlement refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section
2 of Republic Act No. 879.

HELD:
Florentino v. PNB

No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent;
that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation

G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956

organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a
comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase

FACTS:

from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction,
to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,

The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine
National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner
Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured

association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or

controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897
unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of

94

contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note

payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the
current or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record
that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay
certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the
government. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that
many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served
during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay
certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the
Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic
Act No. 304.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the
obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved.
Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2
of the Amendatory Act No. 897.
People v. Tamani
G.R. Nos: L-22160 & L-22161
Facts: On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of
consummated and attempted murder. On
February 25, 1963, Tamanis counsel received a copy of the decision and
consequently filed for a motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the
lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered
mail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed
the lower courts decision.
Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending
that the appeal should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day
period of appeal from the date of notice and not from the date of promulgation.
Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47 days late.
2
Issue: Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of
promulgation or from the date of notice of the decision. Held: Appeal was

dismissed. The 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation.
Ratio: Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6.
When appeal to be taken
.

an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of
the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or
his attorney.
3
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February
25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's
counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in
section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while the word
"notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is
sanctioned by the rule of
reddendo singula singulis
: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's
counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and not 11
days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58
days late.
Mapa v. Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case Digest
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
FACTS:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable
in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do
so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that
the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the
four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of
the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends
that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision plans.
ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957
through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the
contracts of sale incorrect.
HELD:

95

No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause
7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of
default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted
long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those
provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the
developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or
condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to
facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.
Chua v. CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case Digest
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers
those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive
officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive
years
of government
service
as
of
the
date
of
separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with
Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by
the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee
the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

is

excluded

from

HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the
equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to
sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be
denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those
covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary
implication in deciding this case.
G.R. No. L-5127

May 27, 1953

PEDRO
BATUNGBAKAL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as
Auditor General of the Philippines,defendants-appellants.

Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz, Assistant Attorney Leovigildo

Monasterial
and
Juan
T.
Alano
for
appellant.
Jose M. Casal for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal by the National Development Company (NDC) and Manuel
Agregado as Auditor General of the Philippines from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila ordering the appellants to reinstate the plaintiffappellee Pedro Batungbakal in his former position as property examiner in the
Comptroller's office in the NDC, with a salary of P2,040 per annum, the
compensation he was receiving when he was suspended on December 31,
1946, and further ordering that he be paid his back salary at the rate of P2,040
per annum from the date of his suspension up to the date of his reinstatement,
deducting therefrom whatever amount he still owed the NDC. The appeal
having been taken direct to this court, only questions of law may be raised and
the finding of facts made by the trial court are binding on the parties and on
this tribunal. The facts as found by the lower court may be briefly stated as
follows.
On February 14, 1939, plaintiff Pedro Batungbakal was appointed by the
Auditor General as cash and property examiner in the office of the Comptroller
of the NDC. Shortly before the Pacific was the position of cash and property
examiner was divided into two, namely, cash examiner and property examiner,
Batungbakal retaining the position of property examiner. Around October of
1944 he went on leave.
When the NDC was reopened in March, 1945, Batungbakal and some other
employees in the Comptroller's office were recalled to duty. The Comptoller was
under the supervision of the Auditor General but his salary and those of his
personnel were paid by the NDC. Since the reorganization of the NDC it
became the practice that only the Comptroller was appointed by the Auditor
General with the approval of the Board of Directors of the Company while the
personnel in his office were appointed by the company itself.
On August 24, 1945, Batungbakal was appointed by the Chairman of the Board
of Directors and Acting General Manager of the NDC as property examiner in
said company with a salary of P100 a month; he was promoted in salary to
P2,040 a year effective April 1, 1946, in the same position of property examiner
by appointment dated March 30, 1946, signed by the Acting General Manager
of the NDC.
On December 31, 1946, Batungbakal was suspended from office as property
examiner by the Investigating Committee created by Administrative Order No.
39 of the President of the Philippines, and on April 17, 1947, he received from
the officer in charge of the NDC notice of his dismissal. Said notice reads as
follows:

96

Pursuant to the instruction of the Chief of the Executive Office, I

have the honor to inform you that according to the report of
the Investigation Committee which was created under
Administrative Order No. 39 of His Excellency, the President of
the Philippines to investigate the business affairs and
operations of the National Development Company, you have
been found to have committed gross negligence in the
performance of your duties to the detriment of this Company.
The said Committee likewise found that irregularities
committed by you constitute acts and ommission which made
possible the ommission of irregularities in the disposal of yarns
either in the names of fictitious buyers or through dummies,
contrary to the policy of this Company.
On May 28, 1947, Batumbakal filed a petition for reconsideration with the
Office of the President; the matter was referred to Hon. Sixto de la Costa as
Chairman of the Investigating Committee.
On December 4, 1948, the Investigating Committee of the NDC under the
Chairmanship of Honorable e la Costa submittee to the President of the
Philippines through the Secretary of Justice its report of the investigation which
ends thus:
In view of the foregoing, the committee reconsiders its previous
findings, declaring that Batungbakal and de la Cruz have not
committed negligence in the discharge of their duties, and
therefore recommends their reinstatement to the service of the
National Development Company.
On August 17, 1949, the Secretary of Justice forwarded the said report together
with other pertinent papers to the Office of the President with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that: (1)
Mr. Pedro Batungbakal be reinstated with the warning that, as
representative of the Comptroller, which included the auditing
department, he was bound by the rules, regulations and
instructions issued by the Management of the National
Development Company and his failure hereafter to comply with
these rules, regulations and instructions will be more severely
dealt with; . . . "t" (Exhibit A).
On September 5, 1949, the Office of the President of the Philippines referred
the matter to the General Manager of the NDC through the Chairman of the
Control Committee, Government Enterprise Council (GEC) for appropriate
action.

On October 14, 1949, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Control Committee of

the GEC forwarded the papers to the General Manager of the NDC with the
following statements:
The Control Committee, GEC, hereby concurs in the view of the
Secretary of Justice stated in the preceding second
endorsement exonerating Messrs. Pedro Batungbakal and
Sisenando de la Cruz of the charge of gross negligence in the
performance of their duties since the evidence gathered by the
Investigating Committee headed by Judge de la Costa shows
that they did not know of the existence of the instructions
contained in the memorandum order of the Management dated
June 13, 1946 and the goods sold by the National Development
Company were delivered to an authorize representative of the
party to whom the goods were sold. (See Exhibit 2-A of the
respondent Auditor General.)
On October 27, 1949, the Technical Assistant (Legal Credit and Collection) of
the NDC wrote a letter to the Auditor General through the Auditor of the NDC,
wherein after giving a brief statement of the case of Batungbakal including the
findings and recommendation of the Investigation Committee and the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice for the reinstatement of
Batungbakal, he requested the opinion of the Auditor General as to whether or
not Batungbakal was entitled to his backpay from the date of his suspension to
the date of his reisntatement.
The Auditor of the NDC in his first indorsement to the Auditor General among
other things said:
Obviously, the reinstatement of Mr. Batungbakal in the Office of
the Auditor of the National Development Company is no longer
feasible, because there is no vacancy for the position of
"property examiner" formerly held by him. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

However, in view of the recommendation of the Secretary of

Justice in this case, this Office believes that no objection may
interposed to the reinstatement of Mr. Batungbakal in the
National Development provided that the same is not made to
any position under the jurisdiction of the General Auditing
Office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Accordingly, it is believed that Mr. Batungbakal is not entitled

to any salary from the time of his suspension or dismissal to
the date of his resinstatement or appointment to a position

97

different from that held by him when he was suspended and

later dismissed from office.

formerly occupied by him and requested that his back salary be paid to him as
soon as possible.

On February 15, 1960, the Auditor General returned the papers of Batungbakal
of the NDC with the following statement:

In its meeting of November 8, 1950, the Board of Directors of the NDC

approved Batungbakal's request for the payment of his salary amounting to P
7,820 as of October 31, 1950, and appropriated the necessary sum therefore,
subject to the final approval of the GEC and the Auditor General provided
Batungbakal relinquished his right to reinstatement in the service of the NDC.

In view of the foregoing circumstances surroundings the case

of Mr. Pedro Batungbakal and the fact that his reinstatement to
the position formerly held by him in that office is no longer
feasible, this Office recommends that anew position be created
in the National Development Company to which he may be
reinstated, provided it will not be in the Auditing Department.
With reference to his claim for salary, this Office will offer no
objection to the payment thereof from the ate of his suspension
on December 31, 1946, to the date of his dismissal on April 17,
1957 (Exhibit 1-AG).
On April 15, 1950, the Secretary of the Board of Directors of the NDC wrote to
Batungbakal informing him that the Board of Directors of the NDC in its
meeting of April 12, 1950, has authorized the payment of his salary during the
period of his suspension from December 31, 1946 to the date of his dismissal
on April 17, 1947, as recommended by the Auditor General, and that the Board
likewise authorized his reappointment to any suitable position in the NDC. His
backpay from December 31, 1946 up to April 17, 1947 amounting to P689 was
applied to the sum of P1,392.42 (should be P1,394.42), leaving an unpaid
balance of P705.42.
On August 15, 1950, the Acting Secretary of Economic Coordination replying to
a letter of counsel for Batungbakal said that he approved the action taken by
the Board of Directors of the NDC reiterating its previous resolution that it had
no objection to the re-employment of Batungbakal to any suitable position in
the NDC but stating however that it was not possible to re-employ him at that
time because his former item was already occupied by someone else, and that
there were no vacant item to which he could be appointed.
On October 2, 1950, Batungbakal wrote to the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the NDC, requesting his resinstatement in the service of the
company and the payment to him of all his salary up to the date of his
resinstatement. Acting upon this request the Board of Directors of the NDC in
its meeting held October 8, 1950 authorized his reinstatement as previously
approved by said Board on April 12, 1950 provided that "he renounce his right
to claim for the payment of his back salary, and authorized the Acting General
Manager to look for a suitable position for him in the National Shipyard &
Graving Dock Department."
On November 4, 1950, Batungbakal through counsel informed the General
Manager of the NDC that he declined to accept any position other than the one

On November 17, 1950, the Acting General Manager of the NDC wrote to the
Secretary of Economic Coordination transmitting excerpts from the minutes of
the meeting of the NDC held on November 8, 1950, for his final approval at the
same time informing Batugbakal's counsel of his action.
In a memorandum to the Auditor General dated December 29, 1950, the Chief
Law Officer, after discussing the fact of the case of Batungbakal stated his
opinion that the action of the Board of Directors of the NDC authorizing the
payment of back salaries to Batungbakal was legally justified for the reason
that Batungbakal had not been suspended and dismissed for cause, and that
as an employee of the NDc which is an agency of the Government he could not
be removed except for cause. The Senior Attorney of the same office in another
memorandum to the Auditor General on the same matter said that he had an
interview with counsel of Batungbakal regarding the latter's claim for back
salary, and made reference to efforts of the Auditor's office towards a
compromise and stated his belief that the full back salary of Batungbakal could
legally be paid by the Government because it covered a period of only three
years, and that there was a precedent to support it, namely, that of Severo Yap,
former Superintendent of the of about of Prisons who was paid his back salary
for a period of about five years during his suspension, and he expressed his
belief that the office may not insist on further compromise.
On February 7, 1951, the Auditor General by his 2nd indorsement returned to
the Administrator of Economic Coordination the resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors of the NDC on November 8, 1950, authorizing the payment
to Batungbakal of the sum of P7,820 as back salary from December 31, 1946 to
October 31, 1950 with the following comment and recommendation:
This office finds no specific provision of law under which
payment to Mr. Batungbakal of the aforesaid amount of P7,820
may be authorized. The provisions of section 260 of the
Revised Administrative Code which authorizes payment to a
suspended employee of his full salary corresponding to the
whole period of his suspension upon his exoneration or
reinstatement may not be applied in the instant case because,
as will be noted from the facts stated in the within letter of Mr.
Batungbakal, dated October 2, 1950, he was not merely
suspended from office but also dismissed from the service.

98

In the case, however, of employees who were dismissed from

the service by the Commissioner of Civil Service but
subsequently exonerated upon appeal to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, it was ruled by the President as a matter of
policy that payment of their salary for the period they were out
of the service shall be discretionary on the part of the
Department Head concerned. This ruling, it is believed, may be
followed in the instant case.
In view of the precarious financial condition of the National
Development Company, the undersigned, pursuant to the
aforesaid ruling, hereby authorizes the payment to Mr.
Batungbakal of his salary corresponding only to the period from
the date of his suspension on December 31, 1946 to December
31, 1947.
On April 12, 1950, the Administrator of Economic Coordination in his 3rd
indorsement, returned said resolution to the General Manager of the NDC
informing him that in view of the reasons stated in the preceding indorsement,
his office had no objection to the payment of the salary of Batungbakal from
December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1947.
On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if
not disgusted with the treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the NDC and Manuel Agregado as Auditor
General with the following prayer:
Wherefore plaintiff prays this Honorable court:
(a) In the first cause of action, to order the officer-in-charge of
the defendant NDC to reinstate the plaintiff into the service
without any condition or qualification whatsoever;
(b) In the second cause of action, to order the Auditor General
to approve the claim of the plaintiff for his back salary from the
time he was suspended on December 31, 1946 up to the time
that he would be reinstated, and also to order the officer-incharge of the NDC to pay the back salaries of plaintiff for the
above-stated period at the rate of P2,040 per annum;
(c) To order the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of five
thousand pesos (P5,000) representing damages and attorney's
fees and also to order the defendants to pay the costs of this
suit; and
(d) To grant the plaintiff all other just and equitable relief.

The defendants each filed an answer. Hearing was had on the preliminary issue
raised by the Auditor General in his answer to the effect that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's cause of action against the Auditor General
whose decisions are appealable only to the President of the Philippines or to
Supreme Court defending on whether the aggrieved party is a government
officer or a private person, citing Article XI, section 3, of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act 327, and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Auditor General
further claimed that his right and duty to appoint personnel and to approve
accounts was discretionary on his part and could not be limited or compelled
by mandamus.
Ruling, that the court had jurisdiction, it ordered the case to be tried on its
merits. After trial the lower court presided by Judge Fidel Ibaez rendered the
decision now appealed from as related at the beginning of this opinion.
To determine the right of plaintiff Batungbakal to reinstatement and to back
salaries, it is necessary to ascertain his status as an employee. Altho his salary
was paid by the NDC, nevertheless, he was appointed by the Auditor General
who under section 548 of the Administrative Code, is ex officio auditor of
corporations like the NDC wherein the Government of the Philippines owns the
majority stock. As such ex officio auditor, the Auditor General is authorized to
appoint his representative in the said corporation as well as to appoint and fix
the salary and the number of personnel to assist said representative in said
work. Batungbakal was such employee in the office of the comptroller or
auditor of the NDC, under the control of the Auditor General. Although after the
reorganization of the NDC it became the practice for the NDC itself to appoint
personnel in the office of the comptroller or company auditor, nevertheless, the
practice cannot override or supplant the legal provisions of the law, much lees
affect the status of such personnel.
In an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice in his second indorsement of
July 27, 1949, requested by the Auditor General, the said Secretary said that
the auditor General controlled corporations referring to the Cebu Portland
Cement Co. (which has the same status as the NDC as well as their
subordinates are not corporate employees but agents of the Government and
therefore they are embraced in the civil service. According to the Secretary of
Justice this view was shared by the Commissioner of Civil Service himself.
Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law." Section 694 of the Administrative Code has a similar provision.
Interpreting these two laws, basis and statutory, we have held in the case
of Lacson vs. Romero,1 G.R. No. L-3081, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778 and De los Santos
vs. Mallari2 G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1952, that a civil service official may
not be removed from office except for cause. We have here a case of a civil
service employee, suspended and later dismissed without case as shown by
the fact that after a reinvestigation he was exonerated and found guiltless of
the charges of gross negligence filed against him, and was even recommended
for reinstatement by the Government Committee that investigated him. In
other words, his suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only

99

of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself. To remedy the evil and
wrong committed, the least that could be done is to restore to him the office
and post of which he had been illegally deprived, and to include in that remedy
or redress payment of the salary which he should have received during this
period of illegal suspension and dismissal is far from unreasonable and unjust.

asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. And the
payment of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement,
this, aside from the parallel and analogy which may be found in section 260,
paragraph 1, Revised Administrative Code which provides for the payment of
back salary upon reinstatement.

But the Auditor General contends that under the law which gives him right to
appoint the personnel in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC, he has full
discretion to appoint or not to appoint any person in that office; that as Auditor
General vested by the Constitution and section 584 of the Administrative Code
with jurisdiction over the accounts of the Government including claims against
it, he also has full discretion to grant or withhold back salaries corresponding to
the period of suspension or dismissal of an employee appointed by him. It is
also claimed that to reinstate Batungbakal to his former position would mean
the removal without cause of the present incumbent. We cannot agree with
Auditor General. His theory and contention if accepted and followed would lead
to an unfortunate and intolerable situation, incongruous with basic principles of
justice and the constitutional protection of civil service employees against
Government abuse and unjustified suspension or removal. Without reference to
the present Auditor General, let us imagine in the future an arbitrary and
wrong-minded Auditor General dismissing an employee from his office or in an
office under his control, without cause, and later appointing another person to
the same position. Such dismissed employee may establish to the satisfaction
of the Government and the courts that he was innocent and was dismissed
without reason or cause, and yet under the theory afore-mentioned, such
dismissed employee is utterly helpless and without redress because his
reinstatement and the payment of his back salary are wholly within the Auditor
General's discretion which may not be controlled by mandamus to say nothing
of the fact that having already filed the position, there is no vacancy to which
the dismissed employee may be re-appointed. The unreasonables and fallacy
of the theory and contention above-mentioned is patently revealed and
brought home by the case just imagined.

It is further argued that Batungbakal not having appealed from the decision of
the Auditor General denying his claim to reisntatement and payment of back
salary, as provided by Article XI, section 3, of the Constitution, the Jones Law,
section 255, Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 327, section
2 thereof, and Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, said decision has become final
and conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, and he may
not resort to the courts. This same question was raised and decided in the case
of Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil., 866, where it was held that the failure to
appeal from the Auditor's decision does not affect claimant's right of redress in
the Courts, and that although the Organic Act provides that the "decision of the
Auditor shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branches of the
Government," said Organic ACt does not provide that said decision shall be
final and conclusive upon either the Legislature or the Judiciary.

When a citizen after due hearing establishes his right in court, said right is
paramount and must be given force and effect. The way must be cleared for its
enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as well as administrative,
must give away.
Having proven that he (the plaintiff) had been suspended and dismissed
without cause, contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, his
reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty
whose performance may be controlled and enjoined by mandamus.3 There is
no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not being directed to perform an
act which he may or may not execute according to his discretion. He is being

As for the contention that for the Auditor General to reinstate the plaintiff
would be tantamount to compelling him to dismiss without cause the present
incumbent who was appointed after plaintiff's dismissal, suffice it to say that in
so doing, neither injustice nor violation of law would be committed. Inasmuch
as Batungbakal was illegally suspended and dismissed, legally speaking, his
position never became vacant, hence there was no vacancy to which the
present incumbent could be permanently appointed. In other words, the
present incumbent's occupancy of or tenure in said post is temporary and
precarios and does not come within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. But, assuming for the moment that the incumbent's tenure were
permanent and that said tenure fell under the protection of the Constitution,
still, his being made to leave the post to give way to the plaintiff's superior
right, may yet be considered as removal for cause, not unlike a case of quo
warranto where a respondent incumbent is ousted by court order to give way
to the successful party or petitioner.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

100