Annual Report 2015

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

ANNUAL REPORT 2014-2015

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted on November 15, 1983 by the President of
India by exercising the powers conferred by Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962) to carry out
certain regulatory and safety functions under the Act. The regulatory authority of AERB is derived from the rules and
notifications promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Environment Protection Act, 1986.
The mission of the Board is to ensure that the use of ionizing radiation in India does not cause undue risk to
health of people and the environment. Currently, the Board consists of Chairman, Chairman, SARCOP (Ex-Officio,
AERB), four external Members and a Secretary.
AERB carries out its functions through highly qualified work force and specialist committees under the
guidance of the Board. Apex level committees include Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP), the
Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation (SARCAR), Advisory Committees for Project Safety Review
(ACPSRs), Advisory Committee on Radiological Safety (ACRS), Advisory Committee on Industrial and Fire Safety
(ACIFS), Advisory Committee on Occupational Health (ACOH), Advisory Committee on Security (ACS) and
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS). The ACPSRs recommend to AERB issuance of authorizations at
different stages of projects of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), after reviewing the submissions made by the
project authorities based on the recommendations of the associated Project Design Safety Committees.
The SARCOP carries out safety surveillance and enforces safety stipulations in the operating units of the DAE
under the purview of AERB. SARCAR recommends measures to enforce radiation safety in medical, industrial and
research institutions, which use radiation and radioactive sources. AERB receives advice on development of safety
codes and guides and on generic nuclear, radiation and industrial issues from Advisory Committees namely, ACNS,
ACRS, ACIFS and ACSD-FCF. ACOH advises AERB on occupational health safety matters.
The administrative and regulatory mechanisms in place ensure multi-tier review of all safety matters by
experts in the relevant fields available nationwide. These experts come from reputed academic institutions, R&D
organizations, industries and Governmental Agencies.
AERB has a Safety Research Institute (SRI) at Kalpakkam, which carries out research in various safety-related
topics and organizes seminars, workshops and discussion meetings periodically.
AERB has eight technical divisions. Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Directors/Heads of Divisions and
Director, SRI constitute the Executive Committee, which meets periodically and takes decisions on important matters
related to the functioning of the organization. AERB enforces the following Rules issued under the Atomic Energy Act,
1962:
Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004.
Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987.
Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996.
Atomic Energy (Working of the Mines, Minerals and Handling of Prescribed Substance) Rules, 1984.
The mission of the Board is to ensure that the use of ionizing radiation
and nuclear energy in India does not cause undue risk to health of
people and the environment.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ANNUAL REPORT
2014-2015

NIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR
MUMBAI-400 094
Website : www.aerb.gov.in
FUNCTIONS OF THE
Develop safety policies in nuclear, radiation and industrial safety areas for facilities under its purview.
l
Develop
l
Safety Codes, Guides and Standards for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation
and decommissioning of different types of nuclear and radiation facilities.
Grant
l
consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, after an

appropriate safety review and assessment, for establishment of nuclear and radiation facilities.
Ensure
l
compliance with the regulatory requirements prescribed by AERB during all stages of consenting
through a system of review and assessment, regulatory inspection and enforcement.
Prescribe
l
the acceptance limits of radiation exposure to occupational workers and members of the public
and acceptable limits of environmental releases of radioactive substances.
Review
l
the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear and radiation facilities and during transport of
large radioactive sources, irradiated fuel and fissile material.
Review
l
the training program, qualifications and licensing policies for personnel of nuclear and radiation
facilities and prescribe the syllabi for training of personnel in safety aspects at all levels.
Take
l
such steps as necessary to keep the public informed on major issues of radiological safety
significance.
Promote research and development efforts in the areas of safety.

l
Maintain liaison with statutory bodies in the country as well as abroad regarding safety matters.
l
Review the nuclear and industrial safety aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.
l
Review the safety related nuclear security aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.
l
Notifying
l
to the public, the nuclear incident, occurring in the nuclear installation in India, as mandated
by the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
CONTENTS
Page
No.
HIGHLIGHTS OF AERB ACTIVITIES AT A GLANCE
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
ORGANISATION CHART OF AERB
CHAPTER 1
SUMMARY
CHAPTER 2
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
17
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES
17
25
38
44
CHAPTER 3
REGULATION OF FACILITIES USING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN INDUSTRY,

MEDICINE, AGRICULTURE AND RESEARCH
47
3.1
3.2
3.3
INTRODUCTION
REGULATORY PROCESS
REGULATORY INSPECTIONS
47
50
54
CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
59
4.1
59
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
LICENSES ISSUED UNDER THE FACTORIES ACT, 1948 / ATOMIC ENERGY

(RADIATION PROTECTION) RULES, 2004
REGULATORY INSPECTIONS & SAFETY REVIEW
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY STATISTICS
FATAL ACCIDENTS
PROMOTION OF INDUSTRIAL & FIRE SAFETY
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
60
60
64
65
66
CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
67
5.1
5.2
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
67
72
CHAPTER 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
75
CHAPTER 7
SAFETY DOCUMENTS
79
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
NEW SAFETY DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED

SAFETY DOCUMENTS TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED IN HINDI
SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT DOCUMENTS
79
81
81
82
CHAPTER 8
SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH
83
8.1
SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
83
(i)
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND CONTAINMENT SAFETY STUDIES

THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY STUDIES
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE SAFETY ANALYSIS EXERCISES
PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS (PSA)
REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES
FIRE SAFETY STUDIES
CIVIL STRUCTURE AND SEISMIC SAFETY STUDIES
RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES
STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK END OF THE FUEL CYCLE
RELEASE OF BOOKLET ON SRI HIGHLIGHTS(2010-2014)
AERB FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAMME
85
88
90
91
93
94
96
97
98
101
102
103
CHAPTER 9
PUBLIC INFORMATION
105
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.9
INTERACTION WITH MEDIA

PRESS RELEASES
AERB NEWSLETTER
ANNUAL REPORT
AERB BULLETIN
WEBSITE MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAMS
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT-2005
105
106
106
106
106
107
107
108
108
CHAPTER 10 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
111
10.1
10.2
111
114
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
IRRS MISSION TO AERB

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR
SAFETY
AERB'S ACTIVITIES AS MDEP MEMBER
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF IAEA
BILATERAL COOPERATION
THE ANNUAL CANDU SENIOR REGULATORS GROUP MEETING
ANNUAL MEETING OF WWER REGULATORS FORUM
PARTICIPATION IN IAEA & NEA ACTIVITIES
PARTICIPATION IN ASIA-EUROPE MEETING ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
114
114
115
116
116
117
118
CHAPTER 11 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AERB
119
11.1
11.2
119
119
QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (QMS) OF AERB

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (IMS) OF AERB
CHAPTER 12 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE
121
12.1
12.2
121
121
12.3
12.4
12.5
MANPOWER AUGMENTATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 1995 AND IMPLEMENTATION /
WELFARE OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR SCHEDULED CASTES/TRIBES/OBC
TRAINING
AERB COLLOQUIA / LECTURES
COMPETENCY MAPPING EXERCISE AT AERB
(ii)
122
123
123
12.6
12.7
12.8
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION & TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE
RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION
124
124
125
CHAPTER 13 SAFETY PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES
127
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
127
127
128
128
DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS MEET

HEALTH PHYSICS PROFESSIONAL MEET
THEME MEETING ON SAFETY CULTURE
STAKEHOLDER AWARENESS PROGRAMMES
CHAPTER 14 OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION
131
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
131
131
131
132
PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI
PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR HINDI IMPLEMENTATION
HINDI TALKS/WORKSHOPS
HINDI COMPETITIONS
CHAPTER 15 ACHIEVEMENTS
133
15.1
15.2
133
133
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS
AERB AWARDS
CHAPTER 16 TECHNICAL INTERACTION WITH EXTERNAL AGENCIES
137
16.1
16.2
137
138
INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

PROJECT GUIDANCE
CHAPTER 17 AERB WELFARE ACTIVITIES
139
17.1
17.2
17.3
17.4
139
139
140
140
AERB STAFF CLUB ACTIVITIES

CLEANLINESS PLEDGE ON THE EVE OF GANDHI JAYANTI
BOOK RELEASING CEREMONY
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY CELEBRATION
CHAPTER 18 DEPUTATIONS ABROAD
141
APENDIX
ANNEXURE
147
151
(iii)
INDEX TO TABLES
Table
No.
Title
Page
No.
2.1
Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Nuclear Power Projects and

Backend Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities during the year 2014-15
17
2.2
Categorization of RI observations
23
2.3a
Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Projects in 2014-15 with Status of resolution
24
2.3b
Status of resolution of RI recommendations of Nuclear Projects for the Year - 2013-14
24
2.4
Meetings of Safety Committees
25
2.5a
Categorization of Recommendations made during scheduled Regulatory

Inspections (April 2014 to March 2015)
33
2.5b
Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category-I, II & III) of Operating NPPs

during the previous year (Year-2013-14)
35
2.6
Licensing of Operating Staff
36
2.7
INES Rating of Significant Events in NPPs during the last five years
37
2.8
Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Fuel Cycle Facilities
38
2.9a
Categorization of Deficiencies observed during scheduled Regulatory Inspections

of Fuel Cycle Facilities (April 2014 to March 2015)
42
2.9b
Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category-I, II & III) of Fuel Cycle Facilities

for the Year-2013-14
43
4.1
Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries

(Data Source- Statistics of Factories-2012 published in January 2015,
Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt. of India)
63
5.1
Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2014)
72
5.2
Radiation doses received by workers in Medical Industrial and Research Institutions

during 2014
73
5.2a
Radiation doses received by workers in Medical, Industrial and Research institutions

during 2013
74
6.1
Site and off-site emergency exercises carried out in the year 2014
75
8.1
New Research Projects Approved
103
8.2
Research Projects Renewed
103
(iv)
INDEX TO FIGURES
Figure
No.
Title
Page
No.
2.1
INES Events Scale
37
2.2
System-wise Classification of SERs in NPPs during the year 2014
37
2.3
Classification of Direct causes of SERs
37
2.4
Classification of Root causes of SERs
37
4.1
Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE units in 2014
61
4.2
Distribution of Man-days Loss in DAE Units in 2014
61
4.3
Injury Index in DAE Units in 2014
62
4.4
Frequency Rates in DAE Units in 2014
62
4.5
Year wise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units
62
4.6
Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Acts in DAE Units-2014
63
4.7
Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Conditions in DAE Units-2014
63
4.8
Distribution of Injuries with respect to Type of Accidents causing Injuries in DAE units-2014
64
5.1a
Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)
68
5.1 b
Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Gross Beta)
68
5.1 c
Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)
69
5.1 d
Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Argon-41)
69
5.1 e
Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Fission Product Noble Gas)
70
5.1 f
Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Iodine-131)
70
5.2 a
Public Dose at 1.6 Km Distance for NPPs (AERB prescribed Annual Limit is
1000 micro-sievert)
71
5.2 b
Total Effective Dose in Different Zones during the year-2014

(AERB prescribed Annual Limit is 1000 micro-sievert)
71
5.3
Collective dose for operation and maintenance of NPPs

(excluding the dose for special campaign like EMCCR and EMFR) for last 5 years
73
8.1.1
PT-CT average temperature
83
8.1.2
Comparison of maximum vertical displacement of bottom head with experimental

result for OLHF-1
84
8.1.3
Comparison of measured sag at channel mid-point with numerical sag result with
localized strain model for test CD-9
84
8.2.1
Comparison of steam mole fraction variation in different compartments of containment

for two approaches-with and without condensation at walls
85
8.2.2
AIHMS test chamber with instruments
86
8.2.3
Water droplet size distribution
87
8.2.4
Water droplet as point cloud
87
8.3.1
Variation of mass flow in PDHRS circuit
89
8.3.2
Variation in SG level
89
8.3.3a
Measured single phase mass flux and pressure drop variation
90
8.3.3b
Estimated single phase mass flux and pressure drop variation
90
8.4.1
Full energy photo peak efficiency of NaI and HPGe detector for different volumetric
source geometries
91
(v)
8.5.1
He mole fraction variation at selected monitor points (Comparison of turbulence models)
92
8.5.2
He mole fraction variation at selected monitor points (Effect of heat losses)
92
8.7.1
Normalized total core power during transients
94
8.7.2
Comparison of neutron attenuation as a function of thickness in B4C and Ferro Boron

(11.8% & 15%) for Cu (n,g
) reactions
94
8.7.3
Neutron flux spectra in KK core and radial reflector regions
96
8.9.1
FE model of sample structure and FRS for BDBE
98
8.10.1
Diurnal changes in the ground level concentration of 131I (pBq/m3)
98
99
237
Np and
135
8.10.2
Annual doses to public due to Tc,
8.10.3
Morphological changes due to combined outfall channel
100
8.10.4
Plume dispersion as shown in NEMIS
100
8.10.5
Location of identified Rallying posts to a given sector for KKNPP site
101
9.1
RTI queries replied during the last 7 years
108
12.1
Year wise Manpower Augmentation in AERB
121
(vi)
Cs at 0.5km distance from the NSDF
99
HIGHLIGHTS OF AERB ACTIVITIES AT A GLANCE

During the year, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board continued its regulatory safety oversight on Indian operating
nuclear power plants (21 units), nuclear power projects (5 units under construction and 1 unit under commissioning),
several fuel cycle facilities, research units and large numbers of radiation facilities spread across the country.
All operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities under AERBs purview operated safely during the year
and radioactive discharges as well as doses to occupational workers were well within prescribed limits.
The radioactive releases from NPPs remained well within the limits authorized by AERB and the effective dose to
public around the NPP sites was far less than the annual limit of 1 mSv (1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed by AERB. The
maximum individual radiation dose among occupational workers has also remained well below the annual limit of 30 mSv
prescribed by AERB.
AERB continued safety reviews related to commissioning of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Projects (KKNPP-1&2)
and extended the Clearance for Operation of KKNPP-1 up to 100 % FP up to April 30, 2015. Safety review towards license
for regular operation of KKNPP-1 was in progress. Safety review towards the commissioning activities at KKNPP Unit-2 is in
progress. Clearances were granted for erection of major equipment for the under-construction 700 MWe Pressurized Heavy
Water Reactor (PHWR) nuclear power projects at Kakrapar (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata (RAPP-7&8). Safety review
related to siting consent of four units each of 700 MWe PHWR type reactors proposed to be set up at Gorakhpur, Haryana,
was in advanced stage.
AERB extended the license for operation of Kakrapar Atomic Power Station - 1&2, Rajasthan Atomic Power
Station - 1&2, Madras Atomic Power Station - 1&2 and Tarapur Atomic Power Station - 1&2 based on in-depth safety
reviews. AERB continued to monitor the progress of implementation of safety enhancements at the operating NPPs
identified post Fukushima nuclear accident at Japan.
AERB continued its regulatory oversight over the operating fuel cycle facilities including the uranium mines and
mills, thorium mines and mills, fuel fabrication facilities and heavy water plants. License was granted for operation of
Mohuldih uranium deposit mine of Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) located in Seraikella - Kharsawan district
in the State of Jharkhand and the consent for commissioning of Tummalapalle mill, UCIL was extended. Licenses for
operation of the Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) facilities at Manavalakurichi, Chavara and Chatrapur were renewed.
Siting consent was issued for establishing a 500 TPA PHWR fuel fabrication and 65 TPA Zircaloy fabrication facilities at
Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Rawatbhata, Kota.
AERB continued to implement measures identified for further augmenting its regulatory oversight of radiation
facilities. As a part of its e-Governance initiatives, AERB put into operation a web-based System called e-Licensing of
Radiation Applications (e-LORA) which enables automation of the regulatory processes for various radiation facilities
located across the country and enhances its efficiency and transparency. Subsequent to its operation, notable strides have
been made in registration of diagnostic x-ray equipment. At present, e-LORA is operational for the applications of
Diagnostic Radiology, Gamma Irradiation Chamber, Industrial Radiography, Nuclear Medicine, Nucleonic Gauges,
Radiotherapy and Well logging.
AERB continued to carry out regulatory inspections covering nuclear, radiation and industrial safety aspects for
various facilities and activities under its purview, to ensure adherence to its regulatory requirements. With establishment of
the Radiation Safety Agency (RSA) in the States of Chhattisgarh and Tripura, the number of operational Directorate of
Radiation Safety (DRS)/ RSAs at the State/Union Territory level now stands at four ( Kerala, Mizoram, Chhattisgarh and
Tripura). As on March 31, 2015, AERB has signed Memorandum of Understanding with 12 States, including the above
four. These DRS/RSAs carry out regulatory inspections of medical diagnostic x-ray facilities in their respective States.
AERB continued to pursue safety studies and research activities on important areas of nuclear, radiation and
industrial safety to enable independent assessment and facilitate regulatory decisions during the consenting/licensing
process. AERB promoted various safety research activities relevant to regulatory issues across the country.
AERB hosted the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission of IAEA, the first ever international peer
review of AERB by a team of IAEA. The IRRS team visited AERB during March 16-27, 2015 for peer review of Indias legal
and regulatory framework for safety regulation of nuclear power plants and projects. The IRRS Mission, which comprised of
senior regulators and domain experts from several countries, carried out the review against the established IAEA Safety
Standards and Guidance. The IRRS Mission concluded that the Indian nuclear regulatory body is an experienced,
knowledgeable and dedicated regulatory authority for the protection of the public and environment. The team identified
several good practices followed by AERB and made recommendations and suggestions for further strengthening of safety
regulatory regime. The final report of the IRRS Mission is awaited from IAEA.
During the year, AERB has published eight regulatory safety documents including, a revised Safety Code on Site
Evaluation of Nuclear Facilities which considers current requirements & extends the scope to cover a comprehensive range
of land based nuclear facilities and a new Safety Code on Design of Light Water Reactor Based Nuclear Power Plants,
which provides mandatory design requirements for the light water reactor based Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). These safety
documents duly incorporated the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi, Japan nuclear accident. AERB also published
a policy document titled Policies Governing Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Safety which consolidates the established nuclear and radiation policies already enshrined in the Atomic Energy Act,1962, the Rules made thereunder and the
high level documents, into single document.
AERB continued its cooperation with international organizations such as International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), regulatory fora such as CANDU Regulators forum and VVER Regulators forum and
with regulatory bodies of several countries. AERB hosted the annual meeting of CANDU Senior Regulators Group for the
year 2014 in Mumbai. Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman AERB, participated in the 58th General Conference of IAEA, as a part of
Indian delegation. A delegation led by Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, AERB represented India in the Diplomatic
Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) held on February 9, 2015. The Indian delegation supported the
consensus on the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety which was adopted in the diplomatic conference. A bilateral
meeting with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of United States of America was held wherein, inter-alia, the areas
related to nuclear regulatory safety and associated R&D activities were discussed.
AERB initiated implementation of the Integrated Management System (IMS) in addition to existing Quality
Management System (QMS), which integrates various functions and responsibilities of AERB towards realizing its safety
goal and will eventually subsume & encompass the existing QMS of AERB.
Towards strengthening of Public Awareness, AERB has issued press releases, arranged a press briefing, published
AERB Bulletins and Newsletters, conducted several stakeholder awareness programmes, displayed exhibits in various
science & technology fairs/meets and periodically posted advertisements in print media stating the requirement of licensing
of radiation facilities, including registration of medical diagnostic X-ray units etc.
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

Chairman, AERB
Shri S.S. Bajaj
Members
Shri S. Duraisamy
Ex Officio AERB
Chairman, SARCOP
Prof. Harsh Gupta

President IUGG,
National Geophysical Research Institute,
Hyderabad
Dr. K. V. Raghavan
Distinguished Professor,
INAE, Indian Institute of Chemical Technology,
Hyderabad
Prof. Devang V. Khakhar

Director,
Indian Institute of Technology,
Bombay
Shri R. Bhattacharya
Secretary, AERB till March 4, 2015
Dr. G. K. Rath
Professor and Head,
Department of Oncology AIIMS,
New Delhi
Shri S. Harikumar
Secretary, AERB from March 5, 2015
ORGANISATION CHART OF AERB
ATOMIC ENERGY
REGULATORY BOARD
Safety Review Committee for

Operating Plants
(SARCOP)
Safety Review Committee for

Application of Radiation
(SARCAR)
Project Safety Review

Committees
Advisory
Committees
Safety Research Institute

(SRI), Kalpakkam
Operating Plants Safety Division

(OPSD)
Nuclear Projects Safety Division

(NPSD)
Industrial Plants Safety Division

(IPSD)
Siting & Structural Engineering

Division (SSED)
Radiological Safety Division

(RSD)
Nuclear Safety Analysis Division
(NSAD)
Resources & Documentation
Division (R&DD)
Communication and Reactor
Physics Division (C &RPD)
Administration Division
Accounts Division
CHAPTER 1
SUMMARY
During the year 2014-15,
the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) continued to carry
out its principal mandate of
ensuring safety in all facilities and
activities involving nuclear energy
and ionizing radiation. AERB
continued its wide range of
regulatory
activities
in
its
endeavor to achieve its mission
and to strengthen itself as a more
effective and efficient regulator.
AERB has been providing
regulatory safety supervision of
the nuclear power plants (21
operating, 5 under construction
and 1 under commissioning),
front and back end fuel cycle
facilities, research facilities under
its purview and radiation facilities
which are using ionizing radiation
sources in industry, medicine,
agriculture & research. There has
been no major safety related event
in any of the nuclear and radiation
facilities during the year.
AERB carried out its
functions with the support of its
secretariat and specialist committees under the guidance of the
Board. The following are the
highlights of significant achievements of AERB during the period.
India
Hosts
Integrated
Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) Mission of IAEA
One major noteworthy
activity carried out by AERB in the
direction of its commitment for
benchmarking with best international regulatory practices, was
the hosting of IAEA - Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)

Mission. An expert peer review of
the current extent of compliance
with IAEA Standards and
Guidance provides a good
indicator of the effectiveness of the
regulatory oversight for various
facilities/ activities in the country.
The IRRS Mission is a
peer
review
mission
of
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), conducted at the
request of a country (which is a
member of IAEA) with nuclear
power plants and radiation
facilities, to review the common
aspects of any States national,
legal and governmental framework and regulatory infrastructure
for nuclear and radiation safety
against IAEA Standards &
Guidance. The peer review
mission at AERB was a twelve day
long mission carried out during
March 16-27, 2015, at the request
of the Government of India. The
IRRS Mission reviewed the
regulatory framework of AERB,
for Nuclear Power Plants and
Projects.
The IRRS team comprised 16 experts from the nuclear
regulatory bodies of Bulgaria,
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland,
Hungary, Israel, Netherland,
United Kingdom, United States of
America, and the IAEA itself.
The IRRS Mission was
preceded by an extensive self assessment by AERB, which
lasted for about a year, using
SARIS
(Self-Assessment
of
The IRRS Mission concluded that the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
(AERB) is an experienced, knowledgeable and dedicated regulatory
authority for the protection of the public and the environment.
Regulatory Infrastructure for

Safety), a software-tool developed
by IAEA. AERB submitted all the
required responses along with the
explanations
and
necessary
references to IAEA as Advance
Reference Material as per the
agreed time-line.
During the twelve day
long mission, the IRRS team
members
collected
further
information, conducted review
and verification of earlier
submissions through interactions
with the senior management
officials of AERB and examination
of documents. A few team
members from IRRS team visited
the Kakrapar Atomic Power
Station (KAPS) along with the

regulatory inspection team for
observing the inspection practices
of AERB and the on-site
emergency
preparedness
arrangements.
After completing the peer
review, the IRRS Mission concluded that the Indian nuclear
regulatory body, the Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
is an experienced, knowledgeable
and dedicated regulatory authority for the protection of the public
and environment. An initial draft
report was provided by IAEA.
IAEA will be submitting the final
mission report to the Government
of India by July 31, 2015.
Chairman, AERB, having conversation with Mr. Ramzi Jammal, IRRS Mission Team Leader and Mr. David Senior, Deputy
Team Leader in the Entry Meeting at AERB Premises
Entry Meeting of IRRS Mission at AERB

(Front Row L to R: Shri S.S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Shri
R.Bhattacharya, Vice-Chairman, AERB, Shri S.Duraisamy,
Chairman, SARCOP and Dr. P.K.Vijayan, Director, RDDG,
BARC) and Senior Officials of AERB
Entry Meeting of IRRS Mission at AERB

IRRS Mission Team Members
The IRRS team acknowledged that AERB continues to

enhance its regulatory programme to face the current
and future challenges in regulating nuclear safety.
IRRS Team Members - AERB Officials at Exit Meeting
Highlights of the AERB Board

Meetings
The Board met four times
during the financial year (201415): on May 23, 2014 at AERB,
Mumbai, July 8 & 9, 2014 at
KAPP 3 & 4 Site, December 30,
2014 and March 4, 2015 at AERB,
Mumbai. The Board reviewed the
safety status of operating Nuclear
Power Plants (NPPs), Nuclear
Power Projects, Fuel - Cycle
Facilities / Projects, Radiation
Facilities and the (R & D activities
being carried out by AERB. Based
on the satisfactory review, the
important decisions taken by the
Board were as follows:
Grant of consent for Erection
of Major Equipment at KAPP 3
& 4.
Grant of consent for Erection
of Major Equipment at RAPP 7
& 8.
Grant of consent for siting for

establishing
500
TPA
Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactor
(PHWR)
Fuel
Fabrication Facility and 65
TPA of Zircaloy Fabrication
Facility at NFC, Rawatbhata,
Kota site.
Approval of the Revised Code
on Site Evaluation of Nuclear
Facilities
(AERB/NF/SC/SRev1), which supersedes the
earlier Safety Code published
in 1990.
Approval of the AERB Safety
Code on Design of Light
Water Reactor Based Nuclear
Power Plants (AERB/NPPLWR/SC/D) which provides
mandatory requirements for
the design of light water based
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to
ensure the highest level of
safety that can reasonably be
achieved and maintained.
Approval of the policy

document Policies Governing
Regulation of Nuclear and
Radiation Safety, which
consolidates the high level
safety requirements enshrined
in the Atomic Energy Act and
rules thereunder, AERBs
Safety Codes and other
Regulatory documents.
Approval of the Dose Criteria,
which spells out high level
technology neutral requirements with respect to radiation
dose limits to the member of
public during normal and
accident conditions.
committees for all the Nuclear

Power Projects (NPP) and Back
End Fuel Cycle Facilities. The
highlights of project safety reviews
conducted during financial year
2014-15 are as follows:
Presently, six NPPs are
under
various
stages
of
construction and commissioning.
Safety
review
towards
commissioning of Kudankulam
Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP1&2) was in progress. AERB had
granted Clearance for raising
reactor power up to 90% Full
Power (FP) and for limited
duration at 100% FP for
AERB Board Meeting in Progress

(L to R: Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary AERB, Shri S. Duraisamy, Chairman, SARCOP, AERB, Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB,
Dr. K. V. Raghavan, IICT, Hyderabad, Dr. G. K. Rath, AIIMS, New-Delhi, Prof. Devang V. Khakhar, Director, IIT, Bombay, Prof Harsh Gupta,
President, IUGG, NGRI, Hyderabad)
Safety Review of Nuclear

Power Projects and Back End
Facilities
All
Nuclear
Power
Projects (NPP) and Back End
Facilities undergo an elaborate indepth safety review by AERB
during their various stages namely
siting, construction, commissioning and operational stage. AERB
follows its well established multitier safety review mechanism
comprising of safety review
conducting specified tests in

KKNPP Unit-1 on May 1, 2014.
Based on the satisfactory review of
the tests results, Clearance for
Operation of KKNPP-1 up to
100% FP for a limited duration
was granted on August 30, 2014
with validity up to December 31,
2014. The reactor power was
raised in steps to carry out the
specified tests. Subsequently,
shutdown of reactor was taken on
September 26, 2014 to resolve a
problem arising due to the thrust
Erection of End-Shield in KAPP Unit 4
Lowering of End-Shield at RAPP-7
pad bearing temperature of

Turbine reaching near to the
operation (acceptable) limits.
After completing the maintenance
work of turbine, the reactor was
made critical on December 6,
2014 and the turbine generator
was synchronized to Grid on
December 7, 2014. Based on the
stabilized plant performance data
at 1000 MWe power operation,
the Clearance for Operation up to
100% FP was extended till April
30, 2015.
Application
seeking
Clearance for Hot Run of KKNPP2 submitted by NPCIL was
reviewed and based on the
satisfactory review; Clearance for
Hot Run (Commissioning SubPhase A3) was issued on February
26,
2015.
Commissioning
activities were in progress at
KKNPP-2.
Safety review towards
Clearance for Site Excavation for
KKNPP-3&4 was in progress.
Presently
infrastructure
development works are in
progress at the site.
Erection of equipment
and components was in progress
for indigenously designed 500
MWe sodium cooled Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR).
Preparatory
works
towards
Reactor Containment Building

leak test and integrity tests of
secondary sodium circuits were in
progress.
Civil construction work
for 700 MWe indigenously
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors
(PHWRs) was in progress for the
twin units at Kakrapar Atomic
Power Project (KAPP)-3&4 and
Rajasthan Atomic Power Project
(RAPP)-7&8 projects. Based on
satisfactory review of structure,
systems and components and
other civil engineering and
security aspects, Clearance for
Erection of Major Equipment ( i.e.
last sub stage before completion of
construction) was granted to
KAPP-3&4 and RAPP -7&8 units
on May 26, 2014 and March 05,
2015 respectively.
Four
units
of
indigenously designed Pressurized
Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR),
each of 700 MWe are proposed to
be set up at Gorakhpur, Haryana.
NPCIL Application with relevant
submissions for siting consent was
in advanced stage of review by
AERB. NPCIL has also submitted
application
for
Excavation
Consent
(EC)
along
with
associated
submissions.
Preliminary review of the same
was in progress.
NPCIL has proposed to

install progressively 6 units of
Evolutionary Pressurized Water
Reactor (EPR), each of 1650 MWe
capacity, at Jaitapur Site on the
western coast of Maharashtra.
NPCIL application seeking siting
consent for Jaitapur Nuclear
Power Project (JNPP) - 1 to 6 is
under review in AERB. AERB has
asked NPCIL to submit the
associated documents for review.
is closely monitoring the status of

implementation of these safety
measures / upgrades. All identified
short term measures and majority
of medium term safety measures /
upgrades have been implemented
at all stations. The implementation
of long term measures involves
carrying out certain R & D studies,
procurement of equipment and
erection etc. and is expected to be
completed by December 2016.
Safety
review
of
indigenously designed back end
fuel cycle facilities namely,
Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel
Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) and
Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility
(FRFCF) was in progress. Precommissioning activities are in
progress in DFRP. Subsequent to
construction clearance granted on
September 12, 2013, excavation
work is in progress at FRFCF site.
AERB
carried
out
detailed review of Periodic Safety
Review (PSR) report of KAPS- 1 &
2 and Application for Renewal of
License (ARL) for operation of
RAPS-1&2. Based on the review
and assessment, license for
operation of KAPS-1&2 was
extended for next 5 years while,
license for operation of RAPS1&2 was extended for limited
duration i.e. up to December 31,
2016. The details of review carried
out during these license renewals
are given in Chapter-2.
Application for Siting

Consent for 2 units of 500 MWe
each Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR1&2) at Kalpakkam Site has been
submitted by BHAVINI in
February, 2015 and is under
review by AERB.
Safety Review of Operating
NPPs and Research Reactors
All operating nuclear
power plants and research
reactors under AERB's purview
operated safely during the year.
Subsequent
to
the
nuclear accident at Fukushima
NPPs, Japan due to earthquake
followed by tsunami on March
11, 2011, a number of safety
measures / upgrades were
identified for strengthening the
safety of Indian nuclear power
plants which were categorized
into short term, medium term and
long term, with respect to time
frame for implementation. AERB
Pending implementation
of the safety measures/upgrades
identified post Fukushima, AERB
had earlier extended the license
for operation of MAPS-1&2 and
TAPS-1&2 for a limited period.
The applications for extension of
license for operation of these
plants were reviewed. Based on
the satisfactory progress towards
resolution of pending issues and
the action plan for completion of
the remaining issues, licenses for
operation of MAPS-1&2 and
TAPS-1&2 were extended up to
December 31, 2015 and March
31, 2016 respectively.
The
licenses
for
operation of IGCAR facilities such
as Compact Reprocessing of
Advanced fuels in Lead cell
(CORAL) and Interim Fuel
Storage Building (IFSB) were
extended. In addition to above,
AERB granted permission for

23rd irradiation campaign of Fast
Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR),
IGCAR, unloading of spent fuel
from Dry Storage Concrete Casks
(DSCC) in Away From Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Bay (AFRSFSB) at RAPS-1&2 and
fabrication of Cobalt Teletherapy
Sources (CTS) at RAPP Cobalt
Operating Facility (RAPPCOF).
In the year 2014, a total
of 35 significant events were
reported from operating NPPs.
Out of these, one event was rated
at level 1 (anomaly) on
International Nuclear Events Scale
(INES). Remaining 34 significant
events were rated at level 0
(deviations below scale) on INES.
During the period, a total
49 regulatory inspections were
carried out in the operating NPPs
and research facilities, out of
which 27 were scheduled inspections and 22 were special inspections. Special inspections included
unannounced inspections of NPPs
& research facilities and inspections during biennial shutdown of
NPPs.
The radioactive releases
from NPPs were within the limits
of technical specifications for
operation. Effective dose to public
around all NPP sites was far less
than the annual limit of 1 mSv
(1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed
by AERB. The individual radiation
dose among occupational workers
during the year 2014 was well
below the prescribed annual limit
i.e. 30 mSv, with maximum
individual radiation dose of 17.81
mSv/yr received by a regular
employee of RAPS 1 & 2.
In the year 2014, Site
Emergency
Exercises
were
conducted at all NPP sites and one
off-site emergency exercise was
conducted at Kudankulam Site.

AERB officials carried out special
regulatory inspections on emergency aspects and participated in
these emergency exercises as
observers.
AERB participated in
Emergency Exercises conducted
by IAEA under 'Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident' and Convention on
Assistance in a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency'.
Safety Review of Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Facilities, R&D
and Other Facilities
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
and Research & Development
(R&D) facilities namely atomic
minerals exploration units of
Atomic Minerals Directorate for
Exploration and Research (AMD)
facilities, mines & uranium ore
processing mills of Uranium
Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL),
thorium mining, mineral separation plants & mills of Indian Rare
Earths Ltd. (IREL), Nuclear Fuel
Complex (NFC) at Hyderabad,
Zirconium Complex (ZC) at
Pazhayakayal, Heavy Water
Plants (HWP), diversified projects
of Heavy Water Board, radiological safety surveillance on the
facilities handling Beach Sand
Minerals and other Naturally
Occurring Radioactive Materials
(NORM), R&D units at Variable
Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC),
Raja Ramanna Centre for
Advanced Technology (RRCAT)
and industrial units at Electronics
Corporation of India Limited
(ECIL) operated safely during the
year.
Safety review of projects
& operating plants of these units
were carried out with respect to
both radiological & industrial
safety aspects.
AERB
granted
the
License for operation of Mohuldih
uranium deposit mine of UCIL
located in Seraikella-Kharsawan
district in the State of Jharkhand
with ore production capacity of
500 TPD. Commissioning consent
of Tummalapalle mill was
extended up to April 30, 2015.
AERB continued to
monitor the activities of IREL with
special focus on long-term
management of thorium oxalate
and recovery of uranium.
Commissioning of Monazite
Processing Plant (MoPP) at IREL,
Chatrapur to produce Uranium,
Thorium and Rare Earths was in
progress. AERB renewed the
License for operation of IREL
facilities at Manavalakurichi,
Chavara and Chatrapur for a
period of five years, based on the
satisfactory review of the performance of these facilities during the
last five years with respect to
radiological safety.
Siting consent was issued
for a new project of 500 TPA
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor
(PHWR) Fuel Fabrication Facility
and 65 TPA of Zircaloy
Fabrication
Facility
at
Rawatbhata, Kota, based on the
satisfactory review by multi-tier
safety committees of AERB.
Heavy Water production
at HWP-Baroda and HWPTuticorin continued to be under
shutdown due to non-availability
of feedstock from the associated
fertilizer plants. Presently, HWPBaroda is engaged in production
of potassium metal and Tri Butyl
Phosphate
(TBP)
solvent.
Diversified
projects
namely,
Versatile Solvent Synthesis Plant
(VSSP) at HWP-Tuticorin and
Versatile Solvent Production Plant
(VSPP) at HWP-Talcher were
under normal operation. The
license for operation of HWP-Thal

was renewed for a period of five
years based on the satisfactory
review of the application in AERB.
AERB continued its
radiological safety surveillance on
facilities handling Beach Sand
Minerals and other Naturally
Occurring Radioactive Materials.
Consent for commissioning of 10 MeV, 5 kW TWINDUS
Linac-1 and Consent for first stage
of testing of 20Mev indigenously
developed Microtron at RRCAT,
Indore were issued, based on
satisfactory review of the respective applications. Application for
regular operation of INDUS-2
Accelerator at 2.5 GeV, 200 mA at
RRCAT, Indore was under review
at AERB. Proposal for testing of
2.5Mev, 10kW DC Accelerator is
under review. Consent for
construction of Effluent Treatment
Plant (ETP-2) and consent for
regular operation of the High
Range
Gamma
Calibration
Facility at ECIL, Hyderabad were
issued by AERB.
Industrial Safety
AERB is responsible for
administration of the Factories
Act, 1948 and the Atomic Energy
(Factories) Rules, 1996 in all the
units of DAE under its purview.
AERB reviews the industrial and
fire safety aspects during stagewise consenting process, inspections and document development
as a part of overall review process.
AERB also oversees the construction safety aspects of nuclear
projects by carrying out special
inspections of nuclear power
projects and quarterly inspection
of other nuclear facilities under
construction.
For nuclear fuel cycle
facilities, R&D units and other
facilities, a total of 115 regulatory

inspections
were
conducted
during the year with respect to
radiological, industrial and fire
safety aspects. Apart from the
regulatory inspections of nuclear
power projects, operating nuclear
power plants, operating nuclear
fuel cycle facilities, R & D and
other facilities on yearly & half
yearly basis, additional 15
industrial safety focused special
inspections at construction sites of
nuclear power projects and 4
quarterly inspections of nuclear
fuel cycle facilities under construction were carried out.
There were two fatalities
during the financial year 2014-15.
One occurred at RAPP 7&8 due to
fall of object and the other at
RAPS 1&2 due to fall from height.
These accidents were investigated
and reviewed by AERB and
recommendations to prevent
recurrence of such incidents were
disseminated to all DAE units
under purview of AERB.
Safety Review of Radiation
Facilities
AERB carried out safety
review of various facilities using
radiation sources in industry,
medicine,
agriculture
and
research. During the period,
AERB issued 7926 consents
(license,
authorization
and
registration) for operation, 338
type approvals, 2434 approval of
radiation safety officers for
different practices and 2636
permissions for procurement of
radioactive sources (imported &
indigenously manufactured).
AERB
carried
out
regulatory inspections of 744
different radiation facilities, which
is higher than last year. AERB
carries out inspection of radiation
facilities in accordance with
graded approach based on the

radiological hazard potential.
State Directorates of Radiation
Safety (DRS) at Kerala and the
Radiation Safety Agencies (RSAs)
at Mizoram and Chhattisgarh
have also carried out a substantial
number of inspections. Recently, a
RSA was authorized by AERB in
the State of Tripura to start the
regulatory inspections in the State.
As a part of its eGovernance initiatives, AERB has
put into operation a web-based
system called e-Licensing of
Radiation Applications (e-LORA)
which enables automation of the
regulatory processes for various
Radiation Facilities located across
the country. This is with the
objective to enhance the efficiency
and transparency in the regulatory
processes. Presently, e-LORA has
been made operational for the
applications
of
Diagnostic
Radiology, Gamma Irradiation
Chamber, Industrial Radiography,
Nuclear Medicine Nucleonic
Gauges, Radiotherapy and Well
logging.
Regulation of diagnostic
X-ray equipment has always been
a challenge owing to its large
number and their spread across
the country. Towards strengthening of the regulation of diagnostic
X-ray equipment, apart from the
e-LORA, AERB has taken up
several other initiatives such as a)
simplification
of
regulatory
requirements, b) authorization of
Quality
Assurance
service
providers c) enhanced outreach to
the diagnostic facilities through
web site, d) periodic advertisements and issuing targeted letters /
emails and e) efforts for decentralizing the inspections of diagnostic
radiology facilities by having a
Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with State Governments
and Union Territories to set up
Directorate of Radiation Safety

(DRS) / Radiation Safety Cell in
various State / Union Territories.
These efforts coupled with eLORA have resulted into a
significant increase in regulation of
diagnostic X-ray equipment.
During the period, AERB
has signed a MoU with the
Government of Tripura for
establishment of DRS. As on date,
AERB has signed agreements with
a total of 12 States (Kerala,
Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, Punjab, Chhattisgarh,
Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Odisha, Arunachal
Pradesh and Tripura) of which
DRS in Kerala, Mizoram,
Chhattisgarh and Tripura are now
functional.
AERB routinely puts out
notices in daily newspapers asking
stakeholders of X-ray facilities to
obtain the requisite license from
AERB. Further, AERB recently has
put out a warning notice in all
leading newspapers asking all
stake holders to obtain AERB
license, failing which their facility /
equipment is likely to be sealed.
Following this, AERB has initiated
10
enforcement actions in various

cities, and sealed equipment in
facilities not complying with
regulatory standards.
A
No
Objection
Certificate (NOC) was issued for
import and supply of Proteus 235
Proton
Therapy
Accelerator
Facility for Apollo Hospitals,
Chennai. This is the first of its kind
radiotherapy facility in the
country.
AERB investigated four
unusual occurrences in radiation
facilities, three in industrial
facilities and one in a research
laboratory. The unusual occurrences in the industrial facilities
occurred due to non-compliances
of AERB requirements with
respect to design in one and with
respect to operational practices in
the other two. AERB has taken
enforcement actions against these
institutions.
Safety Document Preparation
During the year, eight
new regulatory safety documents
were published, out of which two
were Safety Codes, five Safety
Guides and one Safety Manual.

Eleven
regulatory
safety
documents
were
under
development and eight were
translated into Hindi. As of now,
AERB has published 150
regulatory safety documents for
nuclear and radiation facilities
including industrial safety.
The publication of AERB
Safety Code on Design of Light
Water Reactor Based Nuclear
Power Plants which is primarily
meant for nuclear power plants
with light water based reactors
designed for electricity generation,
has set a new benchmark with
respect to safety of nuclear power
plants. Apart from providing the
design requirements for light water
based reactors, the code also
specifies
additional
safety
requirements for supporting the
accident management infrastructure that may be needed to handle
events, along with unexpected
failure of all the existing safety
features / systems.
International Cooperation
During the reporting
period, AERB took several
initiatives to enhance its contribution in harmonization of international regulatory practices and
methodologies and continued its
participation in various international forums.
A
bilateral
meeting
between
Atomic
Energy
Regulatory Board of India and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) of United States of America
was held during September 1011, 2014 at Rockville, Maryland
USA. The purpose of the meeting
was
to
continue
bilateral
cooperation between AERB and
NRC in the areas of nuclear safety
regulation, regulatory / safety
research including severe accident
prevention and lessons learned

from Fukushima nuclear accident.
In addition, the areas to be
considered for future bilateral
cooperation and exchange were
also identified in the meeting.
Shri
S.
S.
Bajaj,
Chairman AERB participated in
the 58th General Conference of
IAEA held during September 2226, 2014 at the IAEA Head
Quarters, Vienna, as part of the
Indian
Delegation
led
by
Chairman,
Atomic
Energy
Commission Shri R. K. Sinha.
AERB hosted the annual
meeting of CANDU Senior
Regulators Group (CSRG) for the
year 2014 at Mumbai during
November 10 - 14, 2014. The
areas of common interest to
CANDU operating countries were
discussed,
which
inter-alia
included, Instrumentation &
Controls (I&C) aspects of CANDU
reactors, source term assessment
methodology, radiological impact
assessment, possible measures for
avoidance of long term offsite
contamination etc.
A
five
member
Delegation from India led by Shri
R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, AERB
represented
India
in
the
Diplomatic Conference of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS), held on February 9, 2015.
The Indian delegation supported
the consensus on the Vienna
Declaration on Nuclear Safety
which seeks to achieve significant
safety enhancements in the
nuclear power plants all over the
world, both new as well as the
existing ones.
AERB attended 21st
annual meeting of the VVER
Regulators Forum held during
June 16 - 18, 2014 at Helsinki,
Finland. This Forum aims at
11
sharing the operating experience

and harmonizing the regulatory
practices followed for VVERs.
AERB
continued
participating in the meetings and
discussions at IAEA on the various
issues related to NPPs. AERB also
actively
participated
and
contributed in the different
Working groups of Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) and Multinational
Design Evaluation Programme
(MDEP).
AERB signed a bilateral
arrangement with the Regulatory
body of Finland (STUK) on
October 15, 2014 during the visit
of Honorable President of India,
Shri Pranab Mukherjee to Finland.
The
arrangement
includes
exchange of information between
the two organizations on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and radiation safety issues, safety
issues related to the construction,
operation and decommissioning
of nuclear power plants, as well as
security assessments, emergency
preparedness and radioactive
waste disposal. AERB already has
similar bilateral arrangements
with the regulatory bodies of other
countries namely, France, Russia,
Romania, Ukraine and United

States of America.
Research & Development
(R & D) and Safety Studies
AERB
carries
out
independent safety analysis and
research on important areas of
nuclear and radiation safety which
facilitate the regulatory review and
constitute one of the inputs for
regulatory decision making during
licensing process. The important
areas covered during the period
are Severe Accident (SA) studies
for 540 MWe PHWR and TAPS1&2 BWR, hydrogen distribution
& Containment safety studies,
thermal hydraulics safety studies
including
independent
verification of Station Blackout
scenario for the KAPP 700 MWe
PHWR, temperature distribution
for fuel pellets in thermal reactors
etc.,
fire
safety
studies,
probabilistic
safety
analysis,
structural and seismic studies,
radiological assessment studies,
environmental safety studies etc.
AERB
also
continued
to
participate in certain International
Collaborative Safety Analysis
exercises.
The Indian Delegation at the plenary of the Fifty-Eighth Regular Session of

IAEA General Conference
12
CSRG Annual Meeting for the Year 2014 at Mumbai
AERB continued to
promote and fund several
research projects on reactor safety,
radiation safety, front end and
back end fuel cycle safety related
problems and industrial safety at
various reputed universities and
academic institutions under the
Safety Research Programme.
During the period four new
projects were approved and
twelve on-going projects were
renewed.
Human Resource
Development
Availability of adequate
number of competent staff and
maintaining the competence for
current and future needs of AERB
is important for efficient and
effective discharge of its mandate.
AERB has augmented the
technical manpower substantially
by
inducting
postgraduates
through
AERB
Graduate
Fellowship scheme (AGFS) in IIT
Bombay and IIT Madras and
through training schools of BARC,
IGCAR and NFC and transfer of
experienced personnel from
operating plants and R&D
institutes. During the period, the
scientific & technical manpower in
AERB has increased from 251 to
264. The total strength of
manpower in AERB is 324 (264
scientific and technical & 60
supporting staff).
AERB continued to train

its staff by organizing various
training programmes, workshops,
on the job training at NPP sites etc.
Refresher training course on
Regulatory and Safety Aspects
was organized for AERB officers
involved in various regulatory
activities during February 11 - 12,
2015 at AERB Mumbai.
Six officers of AERB have
achieved higher qualifications in
the areas of engineering, science
and law.
As a proactive step for
continual
improvement
in
upgrading competency aspects of
its human resource, AERB has
initiated a competency mapping
programme in addition to the
existing Systematic Approach to
Training programme. In this
direction, AERB has prepared a
document titled Regulatory
Competence Framework for
AERB
which
addresses
competence
requirements,
analysis of available competencies
and comparison of the required
competencies and systematic
identification
of
individual
training needs. In preparation of
this document, a four quadrant
competence model based on
Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes
(KSA) was adopted from IAEA
publications.
13
AERB has also provided

training on various regulatory
aspects in nuclear and radiation
safety for the officials of BARC
Safety Council and for officials
from Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission and Bangladesh
Atomic
Energy
Regulatory
Authority (through a Fundamental
Course on Nuclear Energy
(FCNE) organized by the Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Ltd.),
on request.
AERB Awards
To promote excellence
and
recognize
outstanding
achievements of the staff engaged
in the AERB regulatory and
associated
research
&
development activities, AERB has
instituted an yearly award scheme
from the year 2012. AERB award
scheme comprises of individual
awards as well as group
achievement awards. Awards for

the year 2013-14 were distributed
during
the
Annual
Day
Celebrations of AERB held on
November 15, 2014.
Public Outreach Activities
Press Briefing
AERB organized a press briefing
on March 31, 2015 soon after the
conclusion of the Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
mission of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
AERB, the first international peer
review it hosted. The media was
appraised of the highlights of IRRS
Mission, its findings and its
relevance for AERB by Shri S. S.
Bajaj, Chairman, AERB. During
the press meet, Chairman, AERB
responded to a number of
questions
posted
by
the
journalists.
Shri S.S.Bajaj, Chairman, AERB addressing the Press Conference at AERB, Mumbai
(L to R: Shri S. Hari Kumar, Secretary, AERB, Shri S. Duraisamy, Chairman SARCOP, AERB, Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB,
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice-Chairman, AERB, Shri Fredric Lall, Director, NPSD, and Shri P. R. Krishnamurthy, Director, OPSD)
14
Press Releases
AERB
issues
press
releases with an aim to keep
members of public informed
about its important activities. The
press releases are issued in English
as well as Hindi. During the
period, six press releases were
issued.
a wide target audience with the

specific objective of enhancing
awareness on the aspects of
radiation safety etc.
AERB Bulletin
AERB continued its
initiatives to publish popular
versions of its annual report, in a
more public friendly format as
AERB BULLETIN in different
regional languages, in order to
reach out to larger public more
effectively. The bulletin presents
key information contained in the
Annual Report and was published
in English, Hindi, Marathi and
Tamil.
Public Awareness Programs
AERB
continued
strengthening its public outreach
activity with an aim to reach out to
all sections of society (public,
stakeholders, including manufacturers & suppliers, operator etc.)
and bring awareness on the
aspects of nuclear, radiation &
industrial safety. Apart from the
activities like publication of annual
report,
newsletter,
updating
website, providing response to
RTI and parliament questions,
etc., AERB periodically published
advertisements in print media on
aspects of obtaining requisite
consents for possessing or use of
radioactive sources / radiation
generating
equipment
and
requirements for medical diagnostic X-ray units, displayed exhibits
on the safety and regulatory
aspects of Nuclear & Radiation
Facilities through participation in
science and technology fairs,
conducted awareness programs to
15
Chapter 2
Safety Surveillance of
Nuclear Facilities
CHAPTER 2
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
2.1
NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS
2.1.1
Project Safety Review
AERB has established a regulatory framework,

which involves stipulating the safety requirements,
issuance of regulatory consents, verification of compliance
through safety reviews & inspections during various stages
from siting, design, construction, commissioning,
operation etc. All nuclear power projects undergo an
elaborate and in-depth safety review during their various
consenting stages.
A well established multi-tier safety review
mechanism comprising of safety review committees is
followed for safety review during various stages of projects
namely siting, construction, commissioning and preoperational stage in all the Nuclear Power Projects (NPP)
and Back End Fuel Cycle Facilities. The first tier review is
carried by Site Evaluation Committee (SEC), Project
Design Safety Committee (PDSC), Civil Engineering
Safety Committee (CESC) and associated Specialist
Groups (SGs)/ Task Forces (TFs) / Working Groups (WGs).
In the case of KKNPP-1&2, SGs carried out the first-tier
design safety review. For commissioning phase of these
Units, additional Specialists Groups have carried out indepth safety review of various commissioning procedures,
performance of various systems and commissioning
reports. Apart from the above, various In-House Review
Groups (IHRGs) conducted detailed technical reviews of
all submissions before review by respective safety
committees/SGs/WGs.
The second-tier review is performed by respective
Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review (ACPSR),
which includes members from Academic Institutes,
Experts retired from DAE units and specialist members
from Governmental agencies and members from AERB,
BARC, IGCAR and NPCIL.
The third-tier review is carried out by the Board of
AERB.
The safety review process is supplemented by
planned Regulatory Inspections (RI) as established in
regulatory safety documents of AERB and also special RIs,
as required. Compliance with the requirements recommended by the safety committees and those specified in
various codes, standards and guides of AERB along with
the stipulations specified in the consent are verified during
RI. Safety significant observations arising from RIs are
reviewed in safety committees and considered before

giving clearance for subsequent stages.
Table 2.1 lists the number of meetings held by first
and second tier safety committees of various projects
during the year 2014-15. In addition, a large number of
meetings of SGs, TFs and WGs constituted by SEC/ PDSC/
CESC/ ACPSR/ AERB were held for in-depth review of
specific topics of the projects.
Table 2.1: Meetings of Safety Review Committees
of Nuclear Power Projects and Fuel Cycle
Facilities Projects during the year 2014-15
Project Safety
Committee
Number of
Meetings
ACPSR - LWR-1
12
ACPSR (PHWR/PFBR)
PDSC (KAPP-3,4 & RAPP-7,8)
10
PDSC (KKNPP 3&4)
PDSC (PFBR)
PDSC (FRFCF & DFRP)
SEC (JNPP)
SEC (GHAVP)
CESC
The status of safety review of various projects and

some salient observations / recommendations made
during the review are given in subsequent paragraphs.
(A)
Nuclear Power Projects: Review Status
(i)
Kudankulam
(KKNPP) - 1
Nuclear
Power
Project
AERB granted Clearance for raising reactor

power up to 90% Full Power (FP) and further up to 100%
FP for limited duration for conducting specified tests on
May 1, 2014. Subsequently, KKNPP-1 completed the
various specified tests and these were reviewed by ACPSR
- LWR-1. Based on the satisfactory review of the tests
results and plant performance report, Clearance for
Operation of KKNPP-1 up to 100% FP for a limited
duration was granted on August 30, 2014 with validity up
to December 31, 2014.
During power raise, it was noted that thrust pad
bearing temperature of Turbine was reaching near to the
operation (acceptable) limits. To investigate this problem
17
in turbine, reactor was shut down on September 26, 2014.

Site investigation revealed damages to high pressure
turbine steam flow profiling plates, 1st and 2nd stage
diaphragms and rotor. After completing the maintenance
work of turbine and conduct of initial checks on the
repaired turbine, Unit-1 was started and synchronized to
grid on December 7, 2014.
Subsequently, NPCIL submitted request for
extension of validity period to carry out the specified tests
at 100% FP. Based on the stabilized plant performance
data at 1000 MWe power operation, Clearance for
Operation up to 100% FP was extended till April 30, 2015.
KKNPP-1 is currently in Sub-Phase C-3 stage of commissioning and presently operational upto around 100% FP.
AERB Observer Teams (AOTs) were deputed
regularly to KKNPP Site for physical verification of
compliances and to witness the various tests. The reports
sent by AOT were reviewed in-house as well as in
SGs/ACPSR for necessary follow up.
been finalized and included in the Technical

Specifications for Operation.
c)
As part of Phase-C commissioning activities,

Reactor physics tests were conducted successfully
at ~ 98% FP which included Reactor core energy
release distribution analysis, Reactor core powerrelease field control algorithms, Measurement of
stationary Xenon poisoning, Dynamic test of
emergency protection manual actuation etc. The
test results were reviewed and found satisfactory.
d)
In-Service Integrated Leak Rate Testing (IS-ILRT)

of Primary Containment was conducted as per
the requirement of Technical Specifications for
Operation. The observed leak rate was found to
be within the acceptable limits.
e)
Various dynamic tests during Phase-C commissioning (power operation) were conducted and
results were found satisfactory.
f)
Radiological survey data at 100% FP was

reviewed and found within the limits. Area
Radiation Monitoring System and Environmental
Radiation Monitors are operating satisfactorily.
(ii)
Kudankulam
(KKNPP) - 2
Nuclear
Power
Project
Commissioning activities were under progress.

Hydro-tests of primary coolant system, secondary system
and containment spray test have been completed and
results were found acceptable.
KKNPP-1 Control Room
Some of the salient observations / recommendations made during the safety review for KKNPP-1 are given
below:
a)
Based on post Fukushima safety assessment,

various activities related to safety enhancements
were reviewed periodically. All the 17
recommendations of AERB-SC (EE) on PostFukushima Safety Enhancements, except one
recommendation related to long term action of
Ultimate Load Bearing Capacity (ULBC)
analysis, have been implemented at KKNPP Site.
NPCIL has submitted ULBC analysis report of
primary containment and preliminary review of
the same has been completed.
b)
Based on the safety reviews carried out,

Operation and surveillance requirements for PostFukushima safety enhancement systems have
18
After completion of pre-commissioning activities,

Site submitted Application seeking Clearance for Hot-Run
of KKNPP-2 on October, 2014 along with relevant
documents and these were reviewed by the relevant
SGs/TFs and ACPSR- LWR-1 and various activities were
identified to be completed before Hot Run. Preoperational Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) of containment was completed and after normalization of systems,
primary hydro-test was completed successfully. Based on
satisfactory review, Clearance for Hot-Run was granted on
February 26, 2015. Subsequently, primary system heat-up
for steam line flushing and subsequent heat-up to rated
temperature and pressure as part of Hot-Run were carried
out. AERB observers were posted at site.
Some of the salient observations / recommendations made during the safety review for KKNPP-2 are given
below:
a)
Summary reports on Pre-Service Inspection (PSI)

carried out on pipelines of primary system,
auxiliary system and safety systems, post Hydro

test were reviewed in AERB and found
satisfactory.
b)
The Structural Integrity Test results indicated

elastic behaviour of containment as expected and
the measured deflections of the containment were
within acceptable limits.
c)
During the first pre-service Integrated Leak Rate

Testing (ILRT) of Primary Containment, the
observed leak rate results were found to be
slightly higher than the acceptable values. Site
investigated the cause of increased leak and
necessary corrective actions were taken.
Subsequently, as per recommendation of AERB,
a repeat ILRT was conducted in JanuaryFebruary, 2015. The results were found
satisfactory.
d)
During hot-run, one Passive Heat removal

System (PHRS) train was taken into service for
~30 minutes to test initial performance of the
system. It was observed that the cooling trend was
similar to KKNP-1 and found acceptable.
e)
The thermal energy of PHRS outlet air draught is

utilized in the Annulus Passive Filtration System
(APFS) system for its passive operation. During
PHRS train test, the respective train of APFS
system was also taken in to service for performance assessment and was observed to be within
acceptable limits.
An Off-Site Emergency Exercise (OSEE) was
conducted on January 31, 2015. AERB Observer
Teams (AOTs) participated in the exercise along
with various concerned agencies and the local
public. Site has submitted detailed report of the
exercise. The exercise was conducted
satisfactorily.
KKNPP - 1 & 2
(iii)
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)
The last phase of construction i.e. major

equipment erection is nearing completion. Majority of the
equipment have been erected and the reactor top is closed.
Erection of Transfer Arm and Inclined Fuel Transfer
Machine were in progress. Primary Sodium Pumps (PSPs),
Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanism, Diverse Safety
Rod Drive Mechanism and Control plug have been
erected. Sodium to Air heat exchangers of Safety Grade
Decay Heat Removal system have been erected and are
being connected to the system piping. Preparatory works
towards Reactor Containment Building leak test and
integrity tests of secondary sodium circuits were in
progress. Commissioning activities related to the auxiliary
systems were in progress.
PFBR Turbine Top View
Some of the salient observations / recommendations made during the safety review are given below:
a)
The proposal for purifying secondary sodium

stored in the secondary storage tank-1 was
reviewed. It was recommended to complete the
construction activities of the main secondary
sodium circuit and its auxiliary circuits in all
aspects and obtain Construction Completion
Certificates (CCCs) before taking up sodium
purification activities.
b)
Main Vessel (MV) Pre-heating scheme is being

reviewed as part of design safety review. AERB
had recommended for integrated pressure hold
test of MV, adequate temperature monitoring to
ensure design differential temperature across
critical components remains within allowed limit
and adhering to industrial safety requirements for
handling large volume of hot nitrogen for
preheating.
c)
Site has carried out a dry run to transfer the

finished Fuel Sub-Assemblies (FSA) from Interim
19
Fuel Storage Building (IFSB) to PFBR. This

exercise was carried out to study the technical
feasibility to transport the FSA in the casks
designed for the purpose. Site was asked to
incorporate the emergency measures taken while
transporting the FSA in the emergency handling
procedure.
(iv)
Kakrapar Atomic Power Project - 3 & 4

(KAPP-3&4) and Rajasthan Atomic Power
Project- 7 &8 (RAPP-7&8)
Transformers erection was in progress. Piping and

cabling work in safety related buildings had been
initiated.
Construction of Reactor Building internals and
containment walls was in progress in both RAPP-7&8
units. Both End shields and Calandria were lowered in
Calandria vault in RAPP-7 & their alignment was in
progress. Civil construction activities related to other safety
and non-safety buildings were in progress at RAPP-7&8.
The 220kV switchyard has been commissioned and
energized.
Detailed safety review of the indigenously

designed 700 MWe PHWRs was in progress. The design
of RAPP-7&8 is similar to KAPP-3&4, except for site
specific changes. NPCIL applications seeking clearance
for Erection of Major Equipment for KAPP-3&4 and
RAPP-7&8 were reviewed by AERB and based on
satisfactory review, Clearance for Erection of Major
Equipment were issued for KAPP-3&4 on May 26, 2014
and RAPP-7&8 on March 05, 2015 respectively.
Lowering of End-Shield at RAPP - 7
Installation of Pre-Fabricated Ring Liner at KAPP-3
Civil construction activities related to safety and

non-safety buildings was in progress at KAPP-3&4. End
shield grouting after welding with Calandria was
completed for KAPP-3. Diesel Generators and Startup
AERB Board Members during their visit to KAPP-1&2
Overview of RAPP-7&8 Site
20
a)
The size of vent line of Passive Decay Heat

removal System (PDHRS) Condenser tank is
planned to be reduced for installing a motorized
containment isolation valve on the line. It was
recommended to review the effect of reduced
vent line size on the performance of PDHRS.
b)
Experiments have been planned by NPCIL at IIT

Bombay to establish the efficacy of Containment
Spray System (CSS) for Iodine scrubbing and
containment depressurization. Based on the

review, provisions have been made for more
accurate measurements for Iodine removal/
deposition.
Accordingly,
procedures
for
conducting experiment have been revised and
trial runs of the experiments were being carried
out.
c)
d)
It was recommended to NPCIL to submit the

Basis of Acceptance (BoA) document for the
identified safety critical Structures, Systems and
Components (SSCs) before their erection.
Accordingly, BoA documents for Calandria Vault,
End Shields, Calandria, PHT headers and
shutdown cooling pump have been submitted
and found acceptable.
At KAPP-3 site, while installing PHT header (#7),
few feeder stubs were trimmed to avoid obstruction with already erected Fuelling Machine
columns in FM Vaults. Event / Change Report for
the same were submitted to AERB. Based on
safety review, the erection procedure for headers
has been revised.
e)
Based on post Fukushima safety assessment, Air

Cooled DGs (one per unit) have been provided in
700 MWe PHWR units. It was recommended to
ensure surveillance of the Air Cooled DGs & its
auxiliaries.
(v)
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KK

NPP) - 3 to 6
Siting clearance for KK NPP Unit 3 to 6 was

granted by AERB in February 2011.The design of KKNPP3&4 is envisaged to be similar to the design of KKNPP1&2. Infrastructure development related activities at
KKNPP-3&4 were in progress. Safety review by AERB of
submittals related to Excavation Clearance stage i.e. sitespecific data, layout, geotechnical data, design basis
ground motion, tsunami hazard assessment etc. were in
progress.
c)
Design Basis Flood Level (DBFL) was reassessed

based on the available data on tropical cyclone
from India Meteorological Department. The
reports for estimation of flood level due to storm
surge and due to tsunami were under review.
(vi)
Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (JNPP)
Six units of Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor

(EPR), each of 1650 MWe are proposed to be set up at
Jaitapur Site on the western coast of Maharashtra. NPCIL
Application for Siting Consent for JNPP - 1-6 was under
review by the Site Evaluation Committee.
(vii)
Four Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR)

units of 700 MWe each is proposed to be set up at
Gorakhpur, Haryana. Application and relevant
submissions for Siting Consent were in advanced stage of
review by the Site Evaluation Committee of AERB.
NPCIL has also submitted application for
excavation consent of GHAVP-1&2 and associated
documents. Review of the same is in progress.
Site Evaluation Committee for GHAVP visiting the proposed

GHAVP - 1 to 4 site at Gorakhpur, Haryana
(viii)
a)
The Site was recommended to submit experience

feedback of KKNPP-1&2, compliance to the latest
issued AERB safety documents on siting & design
and Post-Fukushima Safety enhancement
measures.
b)
Design Basis Ground Motion (DBGM) parameters for KKNPP-3&4 were reassessed based on the
methodology accepted by AERB for KAPP-3&4.
Indigenously Designed 700 MWe PHWR

NPPs - Gorakhpur, Haryana
Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (AP

1000) Project
Towards developing its preparedness for carrying

out review of regulatory documents of AP-1000 Reactors
to be set up in India, AERB undertook a review of general
technical information on overall design and operational
safety requirements of the AP-1000 reactor.
21
(B)
(i)
Back-end Fuel Cycle Projects: Review

Status
Demonstration
Fast
Reactor
Reprocessing Plant (DFRP)
Fuel
DFRP is being set up at IGCAR Kalpakkam to

reprocess the spent fuel from FBTR on regular basis and
PFBR fuel on experimental basis. It consists of two facilities
namely Head End Facility (HEF) and Process Plant Facility
(PPF).
Construction of PPF and erection of most of the
major equipment have been completed and construction
of HEF has been completed. Equipment erection and
associated piping with modification works in sampling
cells-1&2, contactor cells-1&2, centrifuge and in dissolver
cells were in progress at HEF.
Site has submitted the commissioning programme
and QA manual for commissioning stage. The road map for
various Clearances required during commissioning stage
has been finalized. Pre-operational checks and tests are
being done as a part of pre-commissioning activities.
(ii)
Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Reprocessing

Facility (FRFCF)
An integrated facility called Fast Reactor Fuel

Cycle Reprocessing Facility (FRFCF) is being constructed
at IGCAR, Kalpakkam. The facility will be used for recycling the spent fuel from PFBR, fuel fabrication & assembly,
reprocessing and waste management. After detailed review
of safety aspects, construction clearance for FRFCF was
granted. Presently, excavation work is in progress.
2.1.2
Consents / Clearances / Permissions/

Concurrence Issued
(1)
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project - 1&2

(KKNPP-1&2)
22
KKNPP-1
Clearance for Raising Reactor Power up to 90%
FP and for limited duration at 100% FP for
Conduct of Specified Tests (May 1, 2014).
Extension of validity of Clearance for Raising
Reactor Power up to 90% FP and for limited
duration at 100% FP for Conduct of Specified
Tests (June 13, 2014).
Clearance for Operation of Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Project Unit-1 upto 100% FP for Limited
Duration (August 30, 2014).
Extension of validity for Clearance for Operation
up to 100% FP for limited duration (December
30, 2014).
KKNPP-2
Clearance for Hot Run of Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Project Unit-2 (Commissioning Sub-Phase
A3) (February 26, 2015).
(2)
Kakrapar Atomic
(KAPP-3&4)
Clearance for Erection of Major Equipment at

KAPP 3&4 (May 26, 2014).
Permission for Grouting of the End-shields of
KAPP-3&4 (September 29, 2014).
Power
Power
Project-3&4
(3)
Rajasthan Atomic
(RAPP-7&8)
Project-7&8
Clearance for Erection of Major Equipment at

RAPP-7&8 (March 5, 2015).
2.1.3
Regulatory Inspection of Projects
Regulatory Inspection (RI) of the Nuclear Projects

were carried out as a safety audit measure to ensure
compliance with the AERB safety requirements and
stipulations. Emphasis was given on aspects related to
Project Management, Safety Culture, Quality Assurance,
Civil Construction, Equipment Storage & Preservation,
Fabrication and Erection of major safety related
components, Documentation, Commissioning activities,
Industrial & Fire Safety, Radiological Monitoring and
Emergency Preparedness. In addition compliance to
previous RI recommendations was checked during every
inspection.
Observations made during the Regulatory
Inspections are broadly categorized adopting the graded
approach for resolution of issues. Safety related RI
observations were discussed in respective safety
committees. Category I & II observations were
appropriately considered for enforcement measures and
while grant of regulatory consents. Category III & IV issues
are related to shortcoming noticed during construction and
commissioning and are related for quick resolution as per
project schedule. Additionally, Category IV issues which
are related mainly to procedural inadequacy are corrected
by project management on priority for implementation.
Category V issues are mostly related to housekeeping and
most of the observations are complied during RI itself.
Compliance received within one month for all such issues
are verified during subsequent RI. Categories of RI
observations are given in Table 2.2.
Compliance / response to RI observations /
recommendations are required to be submitted by utilities
within stipulated time period from the date of issuance of
RI report. Safety related RI observations /
Table 2.2: Categorization of Regulatory Inspection Observations

Particulars
Category
Category: I
Category: II
Category: III
Violation of AERB safety directives and/or ACPSR/PDSC/CESC Stipulations/Recommendations.

Non-compliance with the Requirements of AERB Codes/Standards/Rules and other consent
stipulations.
Deviations from Technical Specifications for Operation and Safety Report requirements during
commissioning stage.
Deficiencies and degradations in systems/ structures/ components and deficiencies in preservation/
construction procedures/ practices /QA of safety and safety related systems
Deficiencies in procedures and compliance with PSI requirements
Major Inadequacies and non-compliance in Emergency Preparedness during construction /
commissioning
Deficiencies in important procedures to meet Technical Specifications for operation requirements
during commissioning stage
Observation/Recommendation requiring Safety Review.
Shortcomings noticed in the design of safety, safety related and safety support systems, during
construction / commissioning phase, including generic design deficiencies.
Deficiencies in implementation of design, and/or lack of design provisions related to safety, safety
related and safety support system.
Category: IV
Procedural inadequacies and non-compliance during construction/commissioning:

Organizational
Managerial
Training & Qualification
Emergency Preparedness
QA of Non-Safety Related Systems.
Commissioning Procedures
O&M Procedures
Category: V
General Observations/Deficiencies regarding

Housekeeping and
Good Practices
recommendations were discussed in respective safety

committees along with utility responses. Before granting of
particular stage / sub stage consent, resolutions of all
relevant RI observations / recommendations for the
respective projects were considered.
1.
At KK NPP-1&2, it was observed that a total of 16

pressure transmitters measuring Main Steam
Header (MSH) pressure belonging to different
Class-III systems were located at the same
location. An event of water ingress in these MSH
pressure transmitters from nearby pipeline joint
leaks had resulted into preventive protection
actuation. In view of these observations, KKNPP1-2 was asked to relocate the pressure transmitters to avoid common cause failure. KKNPP-1&2
has carried out a detailed survey and identified
modifications. These modifications are planned
to be implemented during the next refuelling
shutdown.
2.
At RAPP-7&8, a small portion of concrete cover

over annular key of End shield support structure
in Calandria vault was chipped to facilitate
erection of End shields. Subsequently, as directed
by AERB, detailed analysis of the Calandria-End
shield assembly was carried out to assess its
Total twenty nine RIs of nuclear projects including

six special inspections were carried out during the year
2014-15. Additionally, five scheduled security inspections
were carried out. Total number of RIs and the numbers of
recommendations (category wise) and their current
resolution status are brought out in Tables 2.3a.
Current status of resolution recommendations
(category wise) of the RIs carried out for various projects
during year 2013-14 is also brought out in Table 2.3b.
Some of the salient observations made during the
above regulatory inspections of various projects are as
follows:
23
Table 2.3a: RI recommendations of Nuclear Projects in 2014-15 with Status of resolution
Project
Number of Recommendations Resolved

as on March 31, 2015
Number of
Recommendations
No. of RI
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
Total
KKNPP-1&2
39
46
23
26
KKNPP-3&4
KAPP-3&4
10
72
82
57
66
RAPP-7&8
16
53
69
15
39
54
PFBR
14
73
87
14
14
DFRP
FRFCF
29
51
243
295
28
134
162
Total
Table 2.3b: Status of resolution of RI recommendations of Nuclear Projects for the Year 2013-14
Project
Number of Recommendations Resolved

as on March 31, 2015
Number of
Recommendations
No. of RI
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
Total
KKNPP-1&2
10
45
55
10
38
48
KKNPP-3&4
KAPP-3&4
14
60
74
13
56
69
RAPP-7&8
10
42
52
10
40
50
PFBR
88
96
54
55
DFRP
11
12
FRFCF
23
43
249
292
34
192
226
Total
integrity under postulated design basis seismic

event towards qualifying its support structure.
Based on the review, further strengthening of the
End shield grout was carried out by adding steel
fibres. Similar issue was earlier pointed out at
KAPP 3 & 4 and the resolution of the issue at
RAPP 7 & 8 was in line with the methodology
followed at KAPP 3 & 4. For demonstrating the
efficacy of the fibre reinforced grout, Site specific
mock-up studies were also being carried out as
directed by AERB.
3.
During the regulatory inspection (RI) of RAPP-7 &

8, certain civil construction joints were observed
to be located in some of the beam - column
junction. As a good engineering practice, the
construction joints are to be located away from the
beam-column junctions. Based on these observa-
24
tions of the RI team, AERB had asked for reevaluation of the strength of such beam-column
junctions. Pending completion of this assessment,
AERB asked NPCIL to suspend further construction work at all such locations. Subsequently, after
detailed review, it was established that in most of
the joints, the strength of joints were in accordance with the design requirements. Further,
additional strengthening measures including
application of phosphatic epoxy mortar at these
joints was proposed by NPCIL. After review of
these measures, AERB has permitted resumption
of the construction of these joints.
4.
At PFBR Steam Generator Buildings, it was

observed that at some of the locations, the
sodium leak collection trays could not be installed
due to space constraints, At some locations, the
gap between adjacent leak collection trays were

observed to be significant. AERB asked BHAVINI
to carry out a walk-through and QA audit of the
installed sodium leak collection trays and to
verify the adequacy of coverage of these trays for
all locations having potential for sodium leakages.
5.
6.
7.
At Kakrapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP) - 3, the

straight tubes of Annular Gas Monitoring System
(AGMS) and Sniffer tubes (KAPP-3) which were
welded to the End-Shield lattice tubes were
observed to be further bent to match the layout.
AERB asked NPCIL to conduct Post-bending
integrity checks of the existing welds of tubes with
the channels by appropriate Non Destructive
Testing (NDT).
At KAPP - 3 & 4, it was observed that the junction
boxes planned to be installed in Pump Room
were having holes in side faces for cable entry
apart from the holes at bottom side. As per the
design intent, the cable entry has to be provided
from bottom of panels/junction boxes panels /
junction boxes, to protect the equipment from
dust and water droplets (from containment
spray). In view of above, AERB recommended to
ensure that cable entry to the junction boxes is
carried out as per the design intent.
At DFRP Head End Facility, it was observed that
some of the Embedded Parts (EPs) installed in the
hot cell wall were not having provisions for
ensuring that there is no potential for direct
radiation streaming. AERB has asked to augment
shields in these areas.
2.2
NUCLEAR
POWER
PLANTS
RESEARCH REACTORS
2.2.1
Operational Safety Review
AND
AERB carried out safety review and monitoring of

operating NPPs and Research Reactors following multi tier
review process. Operating plants undergo continuous
safety review through periodic reports and regulatory
inspections supplemented by exhaustive five yearly
reviews which take place during review of application for
renewal of license. Renewal of license of a Nuclear Power
Plant is done based on detailed safety reviews of the plant.
These safety reviews are of two types: a limited scope
safety review called Application for Renewal of
Authorization (ARA) and a very comprehensive safety
review called Periodic Safety Review (PSR). The ARA
involves detailed safety review of safe operation of NPP as
per its design intent, safety systems performances,
improvements in safety, etc. In PSR, a much more comprehensive safety review is carried out which includes
additional factors like advancement in technology,
feedback of operating experience from within India as well
as from other countries, comparison of current safety
standards, cumulative effects of plant ageing, probabilistic
safety assessments etc. The ARA and PSR are carried out
alternatively in every 5 years.
The licence for operation of NPPs, is given

for maximum period of five years. Renewal
of licence is considered based on extensive
safety review.
The SARCOP (Safety Review Committee for
Operating Plants), which is the apex committee for safety
review of operating plants, held eight meetings during the
year 2014-15. Unit Safety Committees (USC) / standing
committees established under SARCOP met a number of
times to review safety related issues of individual plants or
subject in detail. Number of meetings conducted by
various safety committees / standing committees during
the year 2014-15 is given in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Meetings of Safety Committees
Name of the Safety Committee
No. of
meetings
SARCOP
08
TAPS-1&2 Safety Committee
08
TAPS-3&4 Safety Committee
07
RAPS-MAPS Safety Committee (RMSC)
12
NAPS-KAPS Safety Committee (NKSC)
12
KGS-1&2 and RAPS-3&4 Safety

Committee (KRSC-I)
09
KGS-3&4 and RAPS-5&6 Safety

Committee (KRSC-II)
08
IGCAR Safety Committee
06
SARCOP Standing Committee Reactor Physics (SC-RP)
03
SARCOP Standing Committee on

Control, Instrumentation & Computer
based systems (SCCI&CS)
04
Expert Group on Coolant Channels

(EGCC)
03
CESCOP
05
2.2.2
Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued
During the year, a number of applications from

the utilities were reviewed and several authorizations /
clearances / permissions were issued. Important among
these are:
25
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l
Renewal of License for Operation of TAPS-1&2

up to March 31, 2016.
Renewal of license for operation of RAPS-1&2
up to December 31, 2016.
Renewal of license for operation of MAPS up to
December 31, 2015.
Renewal of license for operation of KAPS-1&2
up to July 31, 2019.
Renewal of License for operation of IFSB,
IGCAR up to June 31, 2018.
Renewalof License for operation of CORAL,
RpG, IGCAR up to March 2016 or completion of
reprocessing of 14 Fuel Sub-Assemblies (FSAs)
whichever is earlier.
Permission for 23rd irradiation campaign of
FBTR, IGCAR.
Permission for fabrication of Cobalt Teletherapy
Sources (CTS) at RAPPCOF.
Permission for unloading of spent fuel from Dry
Storage Concrete Casks (DSCC) in AFR-SFSB at
RAPS-1&2.
up exercise of operating personnel have been

completed. The EOPs are further updated as and
when additional strengthening measures are
implemented.
External Hook-Up Points for injecting water to important

systems
l
2.2.3
Post Fukushima safety upgrades at NPPs
Safety assessment of operating Nuclear Power

Plants (NPPs) in the wake of nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daiichi NPPs.
Subsequent to the nuclear accident at Fukushima
Diiachi NPPs, Japan in March, 2011, both AERB and
NPCIL had independently carried out safety assessment of Indian NPPs. The details of these assessments
and status of implementation of identified safety measures
were brought out in the subsequent annual reports.
Based on these reviews, a number of measures were
identified for strengthening the safety of NPPs. These
measures were categorized into short term, medium term
and long term, with respect to time frame for implementation. AERB is closely monitoring the progress of
implementation of these safety enhancements. The status
of implementation of identified upgrades is as follows:
Additional emergency lighting backed up

by solar cells:
Solar powered emergency lighting has been
installed at KAPS 1&2, RAPS 3&4, RAPS 5&6,
MAPS and KGS 3&4. For other stations i.e. TAPS
3&4, NAPS 1&2, RAPS-1&2 and KGS 1&2, this
will be implemented by June-2015. Pending the
implementation of this provision at other stations,
the battery backed up emergency lighting has
been augmented.
Short term measures

l
26
Enhancing the reliability of cooling

through external hook-up points
External hook up points have been provided at all
stations for injecting water to important systems
and equipment viz. steam generators, primary
heat transport system, emergency core cooling
system, end shield, calandria, calandria vault,
and spent fuel storage bay, during extended
accident conditions, if required. The review &
revision of Emergency Operating Procedures
(EOPs) related to external events and extended
Station Blackout (SBO) and training and mock-
Solar powered emergency lighting
Medium term measures

l
Introduction of seismic trip where it does

not exist:
The provision of automatic trip of reactor during
seismic event exists in the original design of
NAPS-1&2 and KAPS-1&2. Post Fukushima,
AERB has reviewed for implementation of this
provision in all other operating NPPs. Based on

the recommendation of AERB, the provision has
been implemented at MAPS, KGS-3&4, TAPS3&4, RAPS-5&6, TAPS-1, KGS-1&2, RAPS-3
and RAPS-2. For remaining two stations
(i.e.TAPS-2, and RAPS-4) the scheme will be
implemented in the next available Biennial
Shutdown/Partial Shutdown (BSD/PSD).
l
Strengthening of back-up power supply (air

cooled mobile / fixed DG at higher
elevation):
Air cooled DGs of 200 KVA have been installed at
MAPS, Kaiga site, KAPS-1&2, TAPS-1&2 and
NAPS to provide back-up power to essential
loads during extended SBO. Procurement actions
for DGs have been initiated at Rajasthan site and
TAPS-3&4. Pending the procurement and
commissioning of these DGs, mobile air cooled
DGs of similar / lower capacity have been
arranged on temporary basis.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
At RAPS -2, an additional emergency boiler feed

pumps has been installed at higher elevation. This
pump can be operated by power from air cooled
flood DGs located at higher elevation.
At KGS-1 to 4, RAPS-3 to 6 and MAPS,
transferring of water in deaerator storage tank to
steam generators by gravity (as emergency
makeup) has been demonstrated. At MAPS, the
emergency boiler feed pump located above the
review basis flood level can be used for
transferring water from deaerator to steam
generators.
The procurement of diesel driven fire water pump
for transferring water from deaerator to SGs was
under progress for NAPS, KAPS and TAPS-3&
and is expected to be made available by
December-2015.
Additional mobile pumps and fire tenders:

Based on the review of adequacy of existing
pumps and fire tenders, procurement of
additional fire tenders has been initiated for
Kaiga, Kalpakkam, Rajasthan and Narora site.
Additional Fire tender has been received at
MAPS, Kalpakkam site & Narora site and at Kaiga
site it is expected to be delivered by May, 2015.
For Rajasthan site, the fire tender is expected to be
made available at site by December 2016.
Presently, four nos. of diesel operated pumps
have been commissioned and are being tested on
a routine basis.
Steps for augmentation of onsite water

storage, wherever required:
Availability of water in seismically qualified tanks
had been reviewed for each NPP. Review
indicated that sufficient water is available in onsite
seismically qualified structures/tanks for meeting
the emergency need at KGS-1 to 4 & RAPS-3 to
6. Based on this review, NPCIL has decided to
Strengthening provision for monitoring of

critical parameter under prolonged loss of
power
All stations have identified the critical parameters
that are required to be monitored during
extended loss of power failure and adequate
provisions have been made for monitoring of
critical parameter under prolonged loss of power.
Additional mobile air cooled DG
Provision of diesel driven pumps for

transfer of water from deaerator storage
tank to steam generators:
The status of upgrade with respect to provision of

diesel driven pumps for makeup of steam generators from
deaerator storage tank during emergency at various
stations is as follows:
8000 m3 of onsite water storage at KKNPP
27
build seismically qualified water pools at MAPS,

NAPS, KAPS and TAPS-3&4 and strengthen the
existing storage tanks at RAPS-1&2 to meet the
seismic qualification. Towards this, construction
of seismically qualified water storage tank of
capacity 1750 m3 at MAPS and 5000 m3 at TAPS3&4 has been completed. In addition, MAPS has
installed a pipeline to transfer water from
BHAVINI reservoir (7000 m3 capacity) to hook up
points. At RAPS-1&2, foundation of existing
storage tanks had been strengthened to make
them seismically qualified. Construction of
seismically qualified water storage tanks of
capacity 3500 m3 at NAPS and 2500 m3 at KAPS1&2 were in progress and expected to be
completed by October, 2015 and June, 2015
respectively.
hydrogen management for all operating PHWRs

was reviewed by the expert committee constituted by AERB. Performance verification of
BARC developed Passive Auto-Catalytic
Hydrogen Recombiners was under progress at
Hydrogen Recombiner Test Facility (HRTF),
NPCIL R & D Centre, Tarapur. After satisfactory
performance of these systems and based on these
reviews, actions for implementation of PARs will
be initiated at Sites. The scheme is expected to be
implemented at all stations by the end of year
2016.
l
Provision for venting of containment:

Experimental verification of hydraulic behaviour
and
Decontamination
Factor
(DF)
of
Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS)
was in progress at TAPS-3&4. After successful
completion of the experiment, implementation of
CFVS at all PHWR sites will be initiated. NPCIL
has also submitted Design Basis Report (DBR) for
containment venting system for TAPS-1&2 which
is under review. The CFVS system is expected to
be implemented at all stations by the end of year
2016.
Creation of On-site Emergency Support

Centre (OESC) at NPP sites:
Long term measures

l
Enhancing Severe Accident Management

programme:
Preventive measures that are required to be taken
under severe accident condition such as hook up
provisions had been implemented at all stations
and
interim severe accident management
guidelines for usage of these provisions have
been prepared. Subsequently, a generic technical
basis document on Accident management
Guidelines for Indian PHWRs has been submitted to AERB which is under review. Further, site
specific guidelines for MAPS and KGS have been
prepared based on these generic guidelines and
were under review. For other stations, site specific
guidelines are under preparation.
Strengthening
hydrogen
management
provisions:
The analysis report on hydrogen generation
under accidental conditions and requirement of
Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners (PAR) for
General guidelines prepared by the Advisory

Committee for developing the guidelines for
creation of an on-site emergency support facility
constituted by AERB have been reviewed and
approved by AERB. Civil Design Basis Report
(DBR) and General Arrangement drawing of
OESC have been reviewed and accepted by
CESCOP, AERB. Location of OESC has also
been identified for all sites. NPCIL has been asked
to submit site specific DBRs.
2.2.4
Operating NPPs: Review Status
The safety status of individual NPPs, Research

Reactors and associated facilities are described below:
(i)
TAPS-1&2 and TAPS-3&4
TAPS-1&2 and TAPS-3&4 operated safely

during the year.
Extension of license for operation of TAPS-1&2
Hydrogen Recombiner Test Facility (HRTF) at Tarapur
28
The license for operation of TAPS-1&2 was valid

till December 2014. TAPS-1&2 submitted an application
seeking renewal of license for operation of the station
beyond December 2014. While extending the license up to
December 2014, station was asked to address the pending

issues such as containment inerting, Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) weld inspection, core shroud health assessment etc. and implementation of remaining post
Fukushima upgrades.
TAPS-1&2 has completed/implemented number
of identified post Fukushima upgrades including seismic
re-evaluation of recently modified systems, installation of
air cooled DG set, installation of sealing gates at two
locations, provision for use of water stored in raw water
storage tank and DM water storage tank, hook up provision for water addition into important reactor systems,
raising foundation of jacket cooling water pump and diesel
oil transfer pumps of EDGs and SBO DG along with all its
auxiliaries above review basis flood level (RBFL), interim
arrangement of high point venting for removal of noncondensable gases from reactor vessel, arrangement for
monitoring critical parameters under SBO condition,
strengthening of communication between site and district
authorities etc. TAPS-1 has implemented provision for
automatic reactor trip on seismic events and has planned
to implement the same at TAPS-2 during the refueling
outage of the unit, scheduled during May-June 2015.
Actions for implementation of the remaining post
Fukushima modifications / upgrades and resolution of
pending issues such as installation of additional sealing
gates to avoid flooding of important areas, implementation
of containment filtered venting & containment inerting,
establishing On-site Emergency Support Centre (OESC),
immobilization of resins stored in SPERT etc. are in
progress. NPCIL has also planned to carry out inspection
of RPV (upper shell weld joints and core belt region weld
joints) and core shroud in TAPS-1 during ongoing refueling outage. These inspections are in progress. Similar
inspections have been planned to be carried out in TAPS-2
during refueling outage of unit, scheduled during MayJune 2015.
Based on the progress made by TAPS 1 & 2
towards implementation of post Fukushima safety
upgrades, and considering the action plan given by station
for implementation of remaining safety measures &
pending issues in a time bound manner, AERB has
extended the license for operation of TAPS-1&2 up to
March 2016.
(ii)
RAPS - 1 to 6
RAPS-1 is under shutdown since 2004 with all the

fuel bundles removed from the reactor core. RAPS Units - 2
to 6 operated safely during the year.
Extension of license for operation of RAPS-2

The license for operation of RAPS-1&2 was valid
till August 31, 2014. As per the regulatory requirements,
station submitted an application for renewal of license for
the next five years. The performance of the RAPS-2 since
restart of the unit in September 2009 (after its En-Mass
Coolant Feeder Replacement (EMFR) outage) was
submitted as a part of the application. The application was
reviewed in detail. During the review, it was noted that the
safety performance of RAPS-2 has been satisfactory.
There was no case of individual exposure above 20 mSv.
The radioactive releases from the station remained well
within the technical specifications limit during the reporting period. Station had adequately addressed the operational problems experienced in the past by taking necessary corrective actions. Various tests/inspections were
carried out as per the In-service inspection programme of
RAPS-2. The results of tests indicated that condition of
safety related systems and equipment were found to be
satisfactory. In view of the recent failure of hair pins of
boilers in RAPS-2, station has planned to replace all the
hairpins with new hair pins by April 2017.
With respect to civil structure healthiness
assessment, station has planned to extract samples from
turbine building, reactor building, service building, stack
and pump house for analysis. RAPS-1&2 had instituted a
comprehensive programme for qualification of
components required to function during accident
conditions. Based on the results of Equipment
Qualification (EQ) test, some components have already
been replaced and actions are in progress for replacement
of the other identified components.
Station has implemented a number of post
Fukushima identified upgrades such as hook up provision
for water addition into important reactor systems,
provision of automatic reactor trip on seismic events,
availability of on-site water storage, Installation of new
emergency boiler feed water pump for transfer of
inventory of de-aerator to steam generator, provision for
monitoring of critical plant parameters etc. Actions are in
progress for implementation of other pending post
Fukushima safety upgrades such as provision of Passive
Autocatalytic Recombiners (PAR), containment filtered
venting, provision of solar power lighting, creation of Onsite emergency support facility, preparation of station
specific SAM guidelines etc.
Based on the satisfactory progress towards
resolution of the issues identified during PSR and the
action plan for completion of the remaining actions, the
license for operation of RAPS-1&2 was extended for
limited duration i.e. up to December 2016.
29
Permission for unloading of spent fuel from Dry

Storage Concrete Casks (DSCC) in Away From
Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Bay (AFR-SFSB) at
RAPS-1&2
pending issues and the action plan for completion of the

remaining issues, the license for operation of MAPS was
renewed up to December 2015.
(iv)
Dry Storage Facility (DSF) was constructed at

RAPS 1&2 to augment the storage capacity of spent fuel at
the station. The design and other aspects of dry storage
facility were reviewed and approved by AERB. However,
there were twenty eight casks of old design which were not
conforming to the approved design. In view of this, AERB
restricted the storage period of spent fuel in identified 28
casks to maximum of 10 years.
RAPS-1&2 submitted an application seeking
permission for unloading of spent fuel stored in old design
casks in AFR-SFSB pool. Based on the review, permission
for unloading of spent fuel from old design casks (at RAPS1&2) in AFR-SFSB pool was granted.
(iii)
MAPS-1&2
Both the units operated safely during the year.
Renewal of license for operation of MAPS

The license for operation of MAPS was valid up to
June 2014. Subsequently, MAPS had submitted an
application for renewal of license up to December 2015,
bringing out the progress made towards the resolution of
identified issues such as implementation of post
Fukushima safety upgrades, revision of various
documents, disposal of resin from an underground tank
etc. The application was reviewed in detail in AERB. It was
noted that MAPS has completed actions for some of the
pending issues, such as revision of technical specifications,
revision of Level - 1 PSA, implementation of hook-up
point for injecting water to safety systems, erection of an
overhead line from the discharge header of fire water
pumps to hook-up point, construction of a seismic
qualified 1750 m3 water storage tank, erection of a
seismically qualified bund around the diesel storage tank,
seismic assessment of additional systems in view of
Fukushima accident and implementation of provision of
automatic trip of reactor during seismic event etc. MAPS
has also made satisfactory progress towards resolution of
other pending issues such as implementation of severe
management
handling
provisions,
qualification
equipment for harsh environment condition, disposal of
resin from an underground tank, implementation of a
permanent SFSB purification system, procurement of an
additional 2000 kVA DG and procurement of an
additional fire tender etc. It was noted that the submission
of detailed report on Periodic Safety Review (PSR) of
MAPS was due for submission at the end of June 2015.
Based on the satisfactory progress towards resolution of
30
NAPS-1&2
Both the Units operated safely during the year
(v)
KAPS-1&2
Both the units operated safely during the year
Periodic Safety Review of KAPS-1&2

The license for operation of KAPS-1&2 was valid
up to July 31, 2014. The station conducted a detailed
Periodic Safety Review (PSR) in accordance with the
guidelines specified in AERB Safety Guide on Renewal of
License for Operation of NPPs (AERB/SG/O-12) and
requested renewal of license for operation of the units for
next five years. The report on PSR was reviewed in detail
within the concerned division, safety committee and
SARCOP. As a part of this review, SARCOP also visited
various areas of KAPS site and reviewed the status of upgradations being carried out based on post Fukushima
safety reviews.
The detailed review of PSR indicated that the
performance of the station remained satisfactory during
the reporting period. The required modifications in safety
systems of plants were carried out after approval of the
safety committee and SARCOP. Many of the safety
upgrades have been implemented at the station including
the recommendations made post Fukushima, introduction
of online test facilities, replacement due to obsolescence
and retrofitting to bring the station to current safety
standards. All the significant events have been reviewed by
the respective safety committee and SARCOP and
corrective actions have been undertaken / implemented.
The effluent discharges from the station were below the
prescribed technical specifications limits. The total
effective dose to the member of public at the site exclusion
boundary remained very low as compared to the limit
prescribed by AERB. The equipment qualification tests are
in the advance stage of completion. The in-service
inspections of important SSCs have indicated that their
condition is satisfactory.
KAPS has carried out assessment for revised flood
levels based on upstream dam break. As per these
assessments, 1.64 km of road and the adjoining areas are
required to be lowered to limit the flood levels to 50.25 m
R.L. Pending the completion of this activity, bunds of 20cm height have been made at the entry points of RB & TB
to prevent flood water entry into these buildings for safety
assurance. Many of the post Fukushima identified safety
measures / upgrades have been implemented and

remaining are in advance stage of implementation. Based
on the satisfactory PSR and the action plan for resolution
of the identified issues, the license for operation of KAPS1&2 was renewed up to July 31, 2019.
AERB Board Members visit to KAPS 1 & 2 Control Room
(vi)
KGS-1& 2 and KGS-3 & 4
at CORAL (Compact Reprocessing of Advanced fuels in

Lead cell) facility of IGCAR. SARCOP had accorded
permission for operation of CORAL up to December 31,
2014 for reprocessing of six number of FBTR spent fuel
sub-assemblies. Subsequently, IGCAR had submitted a
proposal for the extension of license along with the
compliance to the pending recommendation which was
reviewed by OPSD, IGCAR-Safety Committee and
SARCOP. During the reviews, it was noted that IGCAR has
implemented the action plan for resolution of most of the
pending recommendations such as installation of CapperDecapper in containment box, provision for monitoring
concentration of hydrogen in waste storage tank, provision
of air purging system for waste storage tanks during SBO
etc. Seismic qualification of waste storage tanks of CORAL
has been completed and the results were reviewed in
S&SED, AERB and IGCAR-SC and found acceptable.
The seismic analysis and seismic margin assessment for
other SSCs is still pending. Based on satisfactory review of
the application for license for operation and action plan for
addressing the identified issues, AERB granted extension
of license for operation of CORAL facility up to March
2016 or completion of reprocessing of 14 Fuel SubAssemblies (FSAs), whichever is earlier.
KGS-1, 2, 3 & 4 operated safely during the year.

(vii)
INDIRA GANDHI CENTER FOR ATOMIC

RESEARCH (IGCAR)
Extension of License for operation of IFSB,
IGCAR
The Interim Fuel Storage Building (IFSB) is a

facility constructed inside FBTR complex for; a) storing of
fresh fuel pins received from Advanced Fuel Fabrication
Facility (AFFF) Tarapur, b) making Sub-Assemblies (SAs)
for PFBR and c) storage of finished SAs till transportation
to PFBR. Initial license for regular operation of the facility
was issued by AERB in October 2012 which was valid up
to October 2014.
Permission for 23rd irradiation campaign of FBTR,

IGCAR
During the year 2013-14, SARCOP had given
permission for 22nd irradiation campaign for FBTR, IGCAR
for irradiation of three sodium bonded Pu-natural U-Zr
metal fuel pins in a special steel carrier SA in the core, in
addition to continued irradiation of earlier loaded metallic
fuel pins. The campaign was completed on April 1, 2014.
Subsequently, IGCAR submitted a proposal seeking
permission for 23rd irradiation campaign of FBTR for
continuation of irradiation of the sodium bonded metallic
fuel pins at two locations, low dose irradiation specimen up
to 5 dpa, long term irradiation of structural materials and
irradiation of natural uranium 6% Zr sodium - bonded
metallic fuel pins. The proposal was discussed in the
IGCAR safety committee and SARCOP. After detailed
review, SARCOP permitted commencement of 23rd
irradiation campaign of IGCAR, subject to the replacement
of three control rods (which would be exceeding the
fluence limit) before start-up of the campaign.
Subsequently, IGCAR has replaced the remaining three
control rod before start of the 23rd irradiation campaign
and the Irradiation campaign is in progress.
Since October 2012, various activities such

assembling of Control Safety Rod (CSR) and Diverse
Safety Rod (DSR), making of blanket/ core SAs, storing of
SAs blanket storage vault / fuel storage vault were
completed successfully. Operational performance of the
facility has been reviewed by IGCAR Safety Committee
and SARCOP. Performance of the various systems of IFSB
were found to be satisfactory. Based on the satisfactory
review, AERB extended the license for operation of IFSB
up to June 2018.
(viii)
Extension of License for operation of CORAL

Facility, IGCAR
Permission for fabrication of Cobalt Teletherapy

Sources (CTS) at RAPPCOF
The reprocessing of FBTR spent fuel is carried out
In the year 2011, AERB had given permission for
RAPPCOF, BRIT
31
fabrication of one batch of Cobalt Teletherapy Sources

(CTS) at RAPPCOF, based on the detailed review of the
facility, addressing the issues related to spread of
contamination. The campaign was conducted successfully
in December 2011.
Subsequently, RAPPCOF had submitted
application seeking permission for fabrication for six nos.
of CTS. The application was reviewed in detail in RAPSMAPS Safety Committee and SARCOP. During the review,
it was noted that the recommendations made by AERB
have been implemented by the facility. Based on the
satisfactory reviews of the application, permission was
granted by AERB for fabrication of six nos. of CTS at
RAPPCOF.
2.2.4
facilities and category wise distribution of observations

falling under Cat-I, II and III during the period April 2014 to
March 2015 are given in Table 2.5 a.
Some of the salient observations made during the
above regulatory inspections of operating NPPs are as
follows:
1.
Regulatory Inspections
During the period from April 2014 to March

2015, a total of forty nine regulatory inspections of
operating NPPs and research facilities were carried out,
which included twenty seven scheduled inspections for
nuclear & radiological safety aspects, seven scheduled
inspections for nuclear security aspects, ten special
inspections and five special unannounced inspections.
Eight out of ten special regulatory inspections (one each at
NAPS-1, TAPS-1, MAPS-1, KAPS-2, RAPS-2, RAPS-3,
RAPS-5, and KGS-3) were conducted during the biennial
shutdown of NPP units to monitor the radiological safety
aspects and remaining two special inspections, one at
RAPS-5 was conducted to check surveillance
requirements in view of continuous run of unit and one at
RAPS-2 was conducted to check radiological safety
aspects and startup / PSD jobs. The five special
unannounced inspections (one each at RAPS-1&2, RAPS3&4, RAPS-3 & 4, NAPS-1&2 and RAPPCOF) were
conducted to assess the aspects related to operation and
radiological safety at operating nuclear facilities.
AERB follows-up the implementation of all the
recommendations made during these inspections. The
number of regulatory inspections of operating nuclear
At TAPS-3&4, considering the large size of its core

(as compared to 220 MWe standard PHWRs),
effective control of overall reactor power also
takes into account the power fluctuations in local
zones of the core. For the measurement of these
local neutron powers, Self-Powered Neutron
Detectors (SPNDs) are installed throughout the
core to detect and respond to the local power
disturbances. Further, the entire core has been
theoretically divided into a number of zones with
one light water filled compartment installed per
zone. Effective control of these zonal powers is
thus achieved by varying the light water (acting as
neutron absorbers) in these Zone Control
Compartments (ZCCs) according to the SPND
signals for that Zone. During inspection, it was
observed that in one of the units TAPS-4 signals
from some of the SPNDs were showing incorrect
values, thus affecting zonal power control (for
some zones) and causing the corresponding ZCC
water levels to remain outside their respective
nominal range. It was thus recommended to
rectify the SPNDs signals and in turn, bring the
ZCC levels within the nominal range so that zonal
power can be controlled effectively. Based on the
recommendation made during regulatory
inspection, the station has promptly replaced all
the defective SPNDs from the core with fresh &
calibrated SPNDs during Biennial Shutdown of
the unit in December, 2014, and ensured that the
SPND signals are now showing the correct values
and that the ZCC levels are all within their
respective nominal ranges.
The observations during the scheduled regulatory inspections are broadly categorized as follows:
Category: I
Deviations from Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements/ stipulations.
Category: II
Deficiencies and degradations in Systems/ Structures/Components of Safety and Safety Related

systems and deficiencies in important procedures to meet the technical specifications & reporting
criteria
Category: III
Shortcomings identified in the design of Safety, Safety related and Safety support systems, based on
operating experience including generic deficiencies.
Category: IV
Procedural inadequacies & non-compliances.
Category: V
General observations/deficiencies regarding

Housekeeping and
Good Operating/maintenance Practices.
32
Table 2.5a: Categorization of recommendations made during scheduled regulatory inspections

(April 2014 to March 2015)
Unit
Number of Inspections
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
Total
RAPS-1&2
RAPS-3&4
RAPS-5&6
MAPS-1&2
NAPS-1&2
KAPS-1&2
3#
KGS-1&2
KGS-3&4
RAPPCOF
NA
NA
NA
NA
FBTR & KAMINI, IGCAR
Radio Chemistry Lab
NA
NA
NA
NA
Radio Metallurgy
NA
NA
NA
NA
CORAL
FRTG
NA
NA
NA
NA
Total*
27
10
11
27
41
Planned
Special
TAPS-1&2
TAPS-3&4
*
#
2.
In addition, seven site-wise scheduled inspections to cover aspects related to nuclear security and one unannounced RI were undertaken for each
NAPS-1&2, RAPS-1&2, RAPS-3&4, TAPS-3&4 and RAPPCOF nuclear facilities during 2014-15.
One RI of the KAPS-1&2 schedule in April 2015 for 2015-16 was preponed and conducted in March 2015, along with IRRS team visit.
In PHWRs, power is produced by nuclear fission

inside fuel bundles that are loaded inside
horizontal tubes / channels inside the reactor.
Transfer of this power, which is manifested in the
form of heat, to the steam generators (SGs) are
done by heavy water flowing through the tubes
and taking the heat along. This constitutes the
Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system. The heavy
water, after transferring the nuclear heat to the
SGs, gets cooled and once again enters the fuel
tubes and this flow continues as long as there is
production of heat in the fuels. A measure of
power produced (in the reactor core), is the
temperature difference of the PHT water before
and after its transfer of heat to the SGs. This is
called SG T, measured across the SGs, and
used by the Regulating System for control of
reactor power at the desired level. During
inspection at RAPS-3, it was observed that the the
SG T signal of one of its SGs was indicating
beyond the prescribed range. Considering the
importance of the signal in power regulation,
station was using the signal from a different SG as
back-up. The inspection team recommended

rectifying the deficiency at the earliest and
bringing the system back to its normal
configuration.
Accordingly,
station
has
investigated the problem, and replaced the faulty
temperature sensor, calibrated the corresponding
T transmitter. Now, the SG T value is within the
desired range.
3.
In the wake of the Fukushima accident on March

11, 2011, a number of detailed safety reviews and
enhancements have been carried out at all the
Indian NPPs as per the recommendations of
various committees in AERB, NPCIL & at
stations. One of the significant recommendations
for a NPP located at a coastal site like TAPS-1&2
was elevation of base height of the SBO Diesel
Generator (DG). This special DG is supposed to
supply emergency power to carry out necessary
safety functions when an extreme external event
similar to that at Fukushima renders both off-site
and on-site power unavailable (situation being
called Station Black-out, or SBO). At TAPS 1 & 2,
33
based on various reviews and discussions, the

maximum rise in water level during a flood-like
situation at TAPS-1&2 was estimated and it is
known as Review Basis Flood Level (RBFL). The
SBO DG was elevated above this RBFL by
constructing a new foundation. During the
inspection at TAPS-1&2, some cracks were
observed on the foundation of the SBO DG. It
was noted that the station has initiated the
assessment with regard to the nature of crack
through external experts. The SBO DG being an
important equipment during an extreme external
event, it was recommended to ensure the
structural integrity of the foundation of SBO DG
and implement the suggestions / recommendations of the expert team on priority and carry out
vibration trending of the DG even during routine
surveillances. Based on the recommendation of
RI team, various tests were conducted by the
experts and the test results revealed that the
nature of cracks appeared to be surface cracks
and are not related to factors that could affect the
overall foundation strength. In addition, vibrations trending of the SBO DG have also been
initiated to ensure continued integrity of the
foundation.
4.
Relief Valves (RVs) are used in various systems,

both safety & safety-related, at a NPP. The main
purpose of a RV is to pop open when the
pressure of the process fluid exceeds a set value.
This opening or relieving of the process fluid
prevents the containing structure (to which the RV
is connected) from being adversely affected due
to excessive pressure. In this regard, periodic
testing of RVs is carried out to ensure their
operation when desired. For the RVs located in
safety systems, the testing requirements are also
spelt out in Technical Specifications. During
inspection at NAPS-1&2, certain deficiencies
were observed with respect to the testing of the
RVs including aspects on drift checking of RV set
points, Suitability of Pressure Gauge used for
testing and Calibration procedures & acceptance
criteria. Based on the recommendations of RI
team, NAPS has revised the relevant checklists to
incorporate drift checking and has specified
calibration procedures and necessary acceptance
criteria as per relevant standards in the checklists.
5.
Meteorological instruments are installed at all

NPP sites for continuous assessment of
atmospheric dispersion factor, wind speed and
stability categories. Requirement for continuous
availability of meteorological data is specified in
the technical specifications for operation of NPPs.
34
The meteorological data is required for the

assessment of environmental impact during
normal
operation
and
for
initiating
countermeasures during emergency conditions.
During inspection at KAPS-1&2, it was observed
that readings of these instruments, as available in
control room recorders, are also connected to
office Local Area Network (LAN). Considering
that the control room recorders are of higher
safety classification (designed for enhanced
safety requirements) as compared to the office
local network (designed for lesser safety
requirements), failure of the later might affect the
functioning of the former. In this regard, it was
recommended that direct connection of above
two systems of different safety class should be
avoided, or justified with respect to impact on
failures. Based on the recommendations, station
has separated the control room recorders (for
monitoring meteorological data) from office
LAN, and made it a standalone system.
6.
During the inspection at CORAL facility IGCAR,

Kalpakkam, the healthiness of the fire water
system at the facility was verified vis--vis those
specified in the technical specifications for
operation of the facility. It was observed that on a
few occasions, the fire water header pressure was
not meeting the minimum pressure specified in
the technical specifications for operation of the
facility, mainly in view of maintenance of the fire
header lines and fire water pumps. CORAL was
asked to submit detailed explanatory note on the
reasons of violations and the corrective actions
taken in this regard and the same was reviewed by
the AERB safety committee. Based on the review,
it was recommended that during any planned
outage of fire water system, prior permission shall
be taken from AERB, along with alternate
measures to meet the requirements specified in
the technical specifications document. Further, a
number of corrective actions have also been
taken by CORAL to enhance the availability of
fire water system.
7.
In order to ensure preparedness during a

radiological emergency, all NPPs carry out
periodic exercises including Plant, Site & Off-site
Emergencies. The response is observed during
the exercises and deficiencies, if any, are
corrected promptly. For smooth and efficient
management during an emergency, specific
locations in and around a NPP is designated as
emergency control centers, which act as nodal
points for initiation of various countermeasures.
The required equipment essential for mitigation
in an emergency are also segregated and secured

at designated places as emergency equipment
centers. During the inspection at KGS-3&4,
Plant Emergency Equipment Centre (PEEC), it
was noted that while all the necessary documents
were available at the Site Emergency Control
Centre (SECC), the radiation monitoring
instruments were not available as per requirement
at PEEC ( shortfall in numbers), as well as in the
contamination casualty kit used for the
ambulance. In this regard, it was recommended
by the regulatory inspection team of AERB to
ensure availability of all the required instruments
in PEEC at the earliest. Based on the
recommendations made, station has promptly
carried out a survey of the instruments already
available at PEEC, and made arrangements to
meet the necessary requirements.
8.
During normal operating conditions of a NPP or a

test reactor like FBTR, electrical power supply for
functioning of its various equipment is obtained
from off-site sources. However, when this source
becomes unavailable, safety functions like
shutting down the reactor, ensuring adequate
cooling, etc. is done by using on-site power
supplies. This includes the Diesel Generators
(Dgs), which supply emergency power for
keeping the reactor and other systems in a safe
state. In view of above, ensuring regular
monitoring of its parameters, periodic testing and

systematic preventive maintenance is required.
During inspection at FBTR, the maintenance and
monitoring records of the DGs were verified in
detail. As a part of condition monitoring of the
DGs, station carried out chemical and
ferrography analysis of DG lube oil. The
inspection team verified the relevant records, and
observed some discrepancies in the test results
with respect to the analysis done so far by an
external agency, and that carried out in-house by
FBTR. Based on the recommendation, station
has carried out a number of repeat analyses of oil
samples at FBTR in-house lab, and found the
results to be in order.
The recommendations of regulatory inspections
are being followed up by Operating Plants Safety Division
and the respective unit safety committee for their
resolution. All seventy four recommendations made
during regulatory inspections of operating NPPs during the
year 2011-12 and thirty four Category I, II & III made
during 2012-13 and, have been resolved. Out of forty
Category I, II & III recommendations made during
regulatory inspections of operating NPPs during the year
2013-14, thirty eight have been resolved and resolution of
only two RI recommendations are in progress. The status
of resolution of Category-I, II & III recommendations made
during regulatory inspection of operating NPPs during the
Year-2013-14 is given in Table-2.5b.
Table-2.5 b: Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category-I, II & III) of

operating NPPs during the previous year (Year-2013-14)
Total number of
Recommendations
Unit
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
TAPS-1&2
TAPS-3&4
RAPS-1&2
RAPS-3&4
Number of
recommendations resolved
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
RAPS-5&6
MAPS-1&2
NAPS-1&2
KAPS-1&2
KGS-1&2
KGS-3&4
Total
10
27
40
10
25
38
35
2.2.5
Licensing of Operating Staff
The number of operating personnel, who were licensed / re-licensed for various nuclear power plants during the
year 2014-2015, is tabulated in Table 2.6.
Table-2.6: Licensing of Operating Staff
SCE
ASCE
ASCE (F)
CE
CE (F)
Licensing
committee
meetings
TAPS 1 & 2
TAPS 3 & 4
14
RAPS- 1 & 2
RAPS- 3 & 4
16
RAPS-5 & 6
18
MAPS-1 & 2
NAPS
10
KAPS
18
KGS- 1 & 2
KGS- 3 & 4
KKNPP
10
40
39
17
104
30
25
No. of Persons Licensed

Plants
Total
In addition to the above, one control room

assistance/field supervisors (Level-IV) and one senior fuel
handling engineer (Level-II) were licensed / re-licensed for
the operation of FBTR, IGCAR.
2.2.6
Significant Events
It is obligatory for operating nuclear power plants

to report promptly to regulatory body, certain events that
occur in the plant which have or may have impact on
operational safety. Under the reporting system established
by AERB, the events reportable to the regulatory body are
divided into two categories, termed as,
(a)
(b)
Events and
Significant Events.
This categorization of events is done based on

their safety significance and importance to operational
safety experience feedback.
The SERs received from the operating NPPs are
also rated on the International Nuclear and Radiological
36
Event Scale (INES). The INES system of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rates events at seven levels
(1 to 7) depending on their safety significance as provided
in Fig.2.1. Events rated at level 4 and above are termed as
'Accidents'. The accidents at Chernobyl NPP in former
USSR (now in Ukraine) in April 1986 and at Fukushima
NPPs in Japan in March 2011 were rated at level 7 on
INES. These accidents involved large scale radioactivity
release to environment. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and 3
are called 'incidents'. Events with no safety significance are
rated at level 0 or below scale. The IAEA-INES scale is
depicted at the end of the report.
In year 2014, a total of 35 significant events were
reported from operating NPPs. Out of these, one event was
rated at level 1 on INES. Remaining 34 significant events
were rated at level 0 on INES. The INES rating of
significant events at NPPs during the last five years is given
in Table: 2.7. The classification of systems affected / failed
in the significant events is given in Figure 2.2. The
classification of direct causes and root causes of the
significant events are given in Figures 2.3 & 2.4.
Major Accident
Accident
Accident With Wide Consequences
Accident With Local Consequences
Serious Incident
Incident
Anomaly
Incident
Table 2.7: INES Rating of Significant Events at

NPPs during the last five years
Serious Accident
Below Scale / Level 0

No Safety Significance
INES
Levels
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
33
36
30
32
34
>3
Total
34
38
32
33
35
Fig.2.1: INES Events Scale

Feedwater, Steam
and Power
Coversion
Systems
6%
No system
involved
3%
Human
factors
11%
Instrumentation
and control
failure
16%
Electrical
Systems
20%
Primary
Systems
49%
Instrumentation
& Control
Systems
11%
Essential
auxiliary
Systems
11%
RCA under
progress
10%
Human
Performance
related-Personnel
work
practices
5%
Human
Performance
related-Procedure
unavailability/
incompleteness/
non-compliance
24%
Mechanical
Failure
39%
Hydraulic/
pneumatic
failure
5%
Electrical
Failure
29%
Fig.2.2: System-wise classification of the SERs

in NPPs during the year 2014
Others
13%
0%
Equipment
related -Design
configuration and
analysis
24%
Equipment
relatedMaintenance,
testing or
surveillance
24%
Fig.2.4: Classification of Root causes of SERs

One significant event of year 2014 which was
rated at level 1 on INES is briefly described below:
On May 17, 2014, a canister containing
irradiated neutron detectors was picked from the spent
fuel storage bay by energising an electromagnet (attached
to a hoist) for shifting inside a transportation flask at TAPS4. While lowering the electromagnet inside the
transportation flask, the canister body got disengaged
Fig.2.3: Classification of Direct causes

of SERs
from its top cover plate due to failure of screws and fell into
the transportation flask. The top cover of the canister
remained attached to the electromagnet. The operator
had noticed dropping of the canister through a camera
monitor, but misinterpreted it as a result of de-energization
of the electromagnet. The operator had actually missed to
carry out the step of de-energization of electromagnet.
Subsequently, when the electromagnet was retracted, the
canister top cover plate (with cobalt contamination) got
unshielded and resulted in high radiation field in the
working area. This event was detected by local radiation
monitors and the area was immediately evacuated. A
temporary worker present in the working area got exposed
and received radiation dose of 15.7 mSv. After the event,
his total radiation dose for year 2014 was 17.36 mSv. The
limit for temporary worker is 15 mSv. The event revealed
shortfalls in the procedure for transfer of irradiated
neutron detectors and the effective implementation of
human error prevention tools like self-check, peer check,
supervision. The event was reviewed in detail in AERB.
Further transfer of irradiated neutron detectors was
permitted only after satisfactory implementation of the
necessary corrective actions by the plant to prevent
occurrence of such event in future.
37
2.3
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER

RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
The nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other related

industrial facilities under the regulatory control of AERB
are mines and mills of Uranium Corporation of India Ltd.
(UCIL), plants of Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL),
Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Zirconium Complex (ZC),
Heavy Water Plants (HWP), Atomic Minerals Directorate
for Exploration and Research (AMD) and Fast Reactor Fuel
Cycle Facility (FRFCF addressed in section 2.1). In
addition to the above, Beach Sand Minerals (BSM)
facilities and other Naturally Occurring Radioactive
Materials (NORM) facilities with respect to radiological &
industrial safety, are also regulated by AERB.
For a large nuclear fuel cycle facility, three-tier
review process is followed by AERB, for grant of consent
during various stages. The first level of review is by Design
Safety Review Committee (DSRC) or respective Unit
Safety Committee (USC), the second level of review is by
Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review- Fuel Cycle
Facilities (ACPSR-FCF) and the third and final review is by
the Board of AERB. For other facilities, a two-tier review
process is being followed with first level of review by DSRC
or respective USC and second level of review by ACPSRFCF or SARCOP. Safety review of the operating plants is
carried out by USC and SARCOP. 34 meetings were
conducted by AERB for carrying out safety review of fuel
cycle facilities as per the details given below in Table 2.8.
The highlights on safety status, reviews,
regulatory inspections and licensing of personnel carried
out in the above facilities are given below.
2.3.1
Operating Plants / Project Safety Review
Applications for issue / renewal of licenses and

consents to the operating units received in AERB were
reviewed in detail. Based on the satisfactory performance
of the units, licenses for operation were issued / renewed
and consents for new projects were issued.
Safety review of fuel cycle facilities, important
observations and recommendations made during the
review are given as under:
(i)
Uranium Corporation of India Limited

(UCIL)
The mines at Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narwapahar,

Turamdih, Banduhurang, Bagjata, Tummalapalle and the
mills at Jaduguda & Turamdih were in operation during
the year. License for operation of Mohuldih mine has been
granted for 500 TPD of ore production capacity.
Commissioning consent of Tummalapalle mill has been
extended up to April 30, 2015. The proposal for raising
dam height from 198m RL to 208m RL at Turamdih
tailings pond has been granted. Authorisation for
radioactive waste disposal / transfer authorization from
Tummalapalle mine has been granted. The revised
technical specifications for operation of Jaduguda mill
have been approved.
The following proposals of UCIL were reviewed:
l
Capacity augmentation of uranium ore

processing plant at Turamdih mill
The application for capacity augmentation of
Table 2.8: Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Name of the Safety Committee
No. of Meetings
Design Safety Review Committee for Diversified Projects (DSRC-DP)
Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects (DSRC-UEP)
Design Safety Review Committee for Nuclear Fuel Complex (DSRC-NFC)
UCIL-AMD Safety Committee
BSM-NORM Safety Committee
NFC Safety Committee
HWP Safety Committee
ECIL Safety Committee
DAE-Accelerator and Laser Safety Committee (DAE-ALSC)
Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review- Fuel Cycle Facilities (ACPSR-FCF)
Advisory Committee on Safety Documents related to Fuel Cycle Facilities (ACSD-FCF)
Total
38
34
uranium ore processing plant at Turamdih mill from 3000

TPD to 4500 TPD was reviewed by UCIL & AMD Safety
Committee (UASC). Based on the recommendation of
UASC, UCIL had submitted the revised design basis
report, safety report and revised technical specifications for
operation addressing the issues identified by UASC
regarding adequacy of effluent treatment plant due to
enhanced capacity & service life of the existing tailings
dam and future plan for disposal of tailings for enhanced
capacity. These issues were reviewed by UASC and based
on the satisfactory review and resolution of identified
issues, clearance was granted by AERB for capacity
augmentation of uranium ore processing plant at
Turamdih mill from 3000 TPD to 4500 TPD.
l
Reuse of Stage-I tailings pond of Jaduguda

mill by raising its dam height
The application for reuse of stage-I tailings pond

of Jaduguda mill by raising its dam height from 133m RL
to 143 m RL was reviewed by the Siting & Structural
Engineering Division (SSED) of AERB & UASC
respectively. UCIL had submitted documents pertaining to
the issues raised by the UASC including dam breach
analysis covering a study on flow pattern of slurry in case of
dam breach and related emergency preparedness and
these are under review by AERB.
l
Consent for raising dam height from 198m

RL to 208m RL at Turamdih tailings pond
The proposal for setting up of Magnetite recovery

plant at Turamdih mill is under review.
(ii)
Change over to peroxide product at

Turamdih mill
The proposal for change over to peroxide product

at Turamdih mill was reviewed by UASC. The safety
committee recommended UCIL to submit the compliance
on the implementation of pending recommendations of
the issues related to peroxide product at Jaduguda mill and
the revised procedure for transporting peroxide product
from Turamdih mill, for further review.
l
Setting up of second circuit ETP at

Turamdih mill of UCIL
Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL)
The Rare Earth Division at IREL Udyogamandal

and Mineral Separation Plants (MSP) of IREL at Chavara,
Manavalakurichi and Chatrapur operated safely during
the year. Commissioning activities of Monazite Processing
Plant (MoPP) at IREL, Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM),
Chatrapur is under progress. The following proposals of
IREL were reviewed.
l
Renewal of license for operation of IREL

plants at Manavalakurichi, Chavara and
Chatrapur
Applications for renewal of license for operation

of IREL, Manavalakurichi, Chavara and Chatrapur under
the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004
were reviewed by the Beach Sand Minerals & Naturally
Occurring Radioactive Materials Safety Committee (BSMNORM-SC). Based on satisfactory performance of the
facility for the last five years with respect to radiological
safety, the licenses for operation of these facilities were
renewed for a period of five years.
l
Considering the Turamdih Mill expansion plan

and present holding capacity of the Tailings ponds, UCIL
had submitted the application for the raising dam height
from 198m RL to 208m RL at Turamdih tailings pond. The
application was reviewed by UASC and SARCOP, AERB.
Based on the satisfactory review, the consent for raising
dam height from 198m RL to 208m RL at Turamdih
tailings pond was issued by AERB on January 05, 2015.
Setting up of Magnetite (by-product)

recovery plant at Turamdih mill of UCIL
Retrieval of monazite from the trenches at

IREL
In view of the upcoming 10,000 TPA of monazite

processing plant at IREL, Chatrapur, a proposal to retrieve
& upgrade (96%) the crude monazite available in the
trenches at IREL Chatrapur, Chavara and Manavalakurichi
was submitted by IREL and reviewed by the BSM-NORM
Safety Committee with respect to radiological safety
aspects. Based on the satisfactory review, permission was
granted by AERB for retrieval and upgradation of crude
monazite available in the trenches at IREL Chatrapur and
IREL, Chavara. The proposal for retrieval and upgradation
of crude monazite available from the trenches at IREL
Manavalakurichi was under review.
(iii)
Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) & Zirconium

Complex (ZC)
All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad and ZC,

Pazhayakayal operated safely during the year. The
following proposals of NFC were reviewed.
The proposal for setting up of second circuit ETP

at Turamdih mill is under review.
39
Siting consent for 500 TPA PHWR Fuel

Fabrication Facility and 65 TPA Zircaloy
Fabrication Facility at Rawatbhata, Kota:
The revised Technical Specifications for operation

of Heavy Water Plant - Manuguru was approved by AERB.
l
Application for siting of 500 TPA PHWR Fuel

Fabrication Facility and 65 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication
Facility at Rawatbhata, Kota was reviewed by a Task Force
constituted by AERB and subsequently, the task force
report along with site evaluation report was reviewed by
Nuclear Fuel Complex Safety Committee (NFC-SC) and
Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review- Fuel Cycle
Facilities (ACPSR-FCF). The application was finally
reviewed by the Board of AERB. Based on the satisfactory
review, the consent for siting of 500 TPA PHWR Fuel
Fabrication Facility and 65 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication
Facility at Rawatbhata, Kota was issued by AERB for a
period of three years, with certain stipulations.
(iv)
Approval
of
revised
Technical
Specifications for operation of Heavy
Water Plant - Thal
The revised Technical Specifications for operation of Heavy Water Plant - Thal was approved by AERB.
l
Approval of Site Emergency preparedness

plant of HWP, Thal
The Site Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) of

HWP-Thal was approved by AERB.
(v)
Atomic
Minerals
Directorate
Exploration and Research (AMD)
for
Heavy Water Plants (HWPs)
The Heavy Water Plants at Kota, Manuguru,

Hazira & Thal were under normal operations. Heavy
Water production at HWP-Baroda and HWP-Tuticorin
remained suspended due to non-availability of feedstock
from the associated fertilizer plants. Presently, HWPBaroda is engaged in production of potassium metal and
Tri Butyl Phosphate (TBP) solvent. Diversified projects
namely, Versatile Solvent Synthesis Plant (VSSP) at HWPTuticorin and Versatile Solvent Production Plant (VSPP) at
HWP-Talcher were under normal operation.
Exploration and drilling activities were under

progress in various regions of AMD. Regulatory
Inspections of these sites were carried out by AERB.
Annual Safety, Health & Environment Report of AMD was
reviewed in UASC. AERB recommended for
implementing pre-employment & periodic audiometric
examination of employees working in high noise areas,
submitting the audiograms & medical test reports of
suspected noise induced hearing loss cases to AERB for
review, appointing of qualified Safety Officer and
Radiological Safety Officer (RSO) in all its regions and
timely reporting of occupational injuries.
The following proposals / safety issues were reviewed:

(vi)
l
Renewal of license for operation of Heavy

Water Plant - Thal
Application for renewal of license for operation of

Heavy Water Plant - Thal was reviewed by the Heavy
Water Plants Safety Committee (HWP-SC). The safety
committee recommended HWP-Thal to prepare ageing
management program for critical equipment (including the
implementation of Residual Life Assessment), submit
safety assessment report w.r.t. external events (seismic,
wind & flood) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
to AERB for review. Further, the application for renewal of
license along with the compliance status of
recommendations given by AERB was reviewed by
SARCOP. Based on the satisfactory review and the action
plan for resolution of the identified issues, AERB renewed
the license for operation of HWP-Thal for a period of five
years i.e. up to December 31, 2019.
l
40
Approval
of
revised
Technical
Specifications for operation of Heavy
Water Plant - Manuguru
Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) & Naturally

Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM)
Facilities
Applications from M/s Beach Minerals Company

India Ltd, Arasoor, Tuticorin,M/s Miracle Sands &
Chemicals, Mappillayurani, Tuticorin, M/s Miracle Sands
& Metals, Mela Arasadi, Tuticorin, M/s The Kerala Minerals
and Metals Ltd., Kovilthottam, Chavara, M/s Trimex Sands
Pvt. Ltd., Vatsavalasa, Srikakulam, M/s Cochin Minerals
and Rutile Ltd, Aluva, M/s DCW Ltd, Sahupuram, M/s
Transworld Garnet India Pvt. Ltd, Garamandal, M/s Beach
Minerals Company Pvt. Ltd., Tirucendur BSM facilities for
renewal/issue of license under the Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 were reviewed by the
BSM-NORM Safety Committee. These included seven
applications for renewal and two fresh applications. Based
on the satisfactory radiological safety status of the plant,
safe disposal of monazite enriched tailings, availability of
AERB approved Radiological Safety Officer at site and
considering performance of site during last five years (for
renewal cases), licenses / registrations were issued to the
BSM facilities, as applicable for a period of five years.
2.3.2
Consents/Clearances/permissions Issued
The applications related to new projects of fuel

cycle facilities for stage wise consent (i.e. siting,
construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning) were reviewed by DSRC / USC, ACPSRFCF and finally by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The
detailed safety review covered industrial & fire safety,
radiological safety, waste management and environmental
protection aspects. Based on the safety review, stage wise
consents were issued for the following:
l
l
l
2.3.3
TWINDUS Linac-1 was issued on January 22,

2015 and is valid up to January 31, 2017.
Consent for construction of Agricultural Radiation
Processing Facility (ARPF) at Choithram Mandi,
Indore was extended on March 12, 2015 and is
valid up to December 31, 2016.
Regulatory Inspections
Regulatory Inspections on industrial and fire

safety aspects under the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules 1996, radiological safety aspects under the Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 and waste
management aspects under the Atomic Energy (Safe
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 were carried
out for fuel cycle facilities and DAE Accelerator units.
During the period from April 2014 to March 2015, a total
of sixty-four regulatory inspections of operating nuclear
facilities, industrial plants, research facilities and projects
under construction were carried out, which included fiftyfive scheduled inspections for industrial & radiological
safety aspects, two scheduled inspections for security
aspects in H2S based Heavy Water Plants, four inspections
of the Medical Cyclotron Project under construction at
VECC, Kolkata and three special inspections as per
recommendations of the Unit Safety Committee (one each
at Particle Irradiator Facility at IGCAR, Uranium Recovery
Plant at UCIL, Jaduguda and TAPS 1&2).
The consent for raising dam height from 198m RL

to 208m RL at Turamdih tailings pond was issued
on January 05, 2015.
Consent for siting of 500 TPA PHWR Fuel
Fabrication Facility and 65 TPA Zircaloy
Fabrication Facility at Rawatbhata, Kota was
issued on May 28, 2014 for a period of three
years.
Extension of validity of Consent for Siting &
Construction of 3TPA Niobium Thermit
Production Facility at Nuclear Fuel Complex
(NFC), Hyderabad up to March 31,2017.
Consent for Siting and Construction of Boric Acid
Conversion and BF3 Gas Generation Facility at
Heavy Water Plant - Talcher was granted and is
valid up to February 29, 2020.
Consent for first stage of testing of 20 MeV
Microtron was issued on February 26, 2015.
Consent for commissioning of 10 MeV, 5 kW
The observations made during regulatory

inspections are broadly categorized as follows:
Particulars
Category Type
CATEGORY- I
(CAT.I)
Violation of Acts, Rules, AERB Codes & Standards, Tech. Specs. Requirements (Safety Limit,
CATEGORY- II
(CAT.II)
Deficiencies in Operating Systems and Safety Related systems
Deficiencies in Surveillance procedures/practices
Short comings identified in the design of Safety related equipment and working conditions
Limiting Safety System Settings and Limiting Conditions of Operation), SARCOP/AERB

Safety Directives, Licensing conditions
based on plants operating experience including Generic deficiencies.
Safety Review related observations
CATEGORY-III
(CAT.III)
Procedural inadequacies in :
CATEGORY-IV
(CAT.IV)
General observations/deficiencies regarding
Organization
ISI
O&M procedures
Training & Qualification
Radiation Protection Procedures
Radiological Waste management
Effluent management
Emergency Preparedness
Housekeeping and
Good Operating/maintenance Practices
41
AERB follows-up the implementation of all the

recommendations made during these inspections. The
number of regulatory inspections in different fuel cycle
facilities and DAE Accelerator units and category wise
distribution of important observations falling under Cat-I,
II and III during the period April 2014 to March 2015 are
given below in Table 2.9a. The observations under Cat-IV
are of minor nature and mostly related to housekeeping
and good operating/maintenance practices, which are
duly complied within a short time.
Beach Sand Minerals Facilities
Regulatory Inspections of Non-DAE Facilities
(Beach Sand Minerals) on radiological safety aspects were
also carried out. The major recommendations arising out
of regulatory inspections were related to proper
confinement of monazite rich tailings, spillage

management, management of tailings, keeping records on
monitoring instruments calibration etc.
2.3.4
Compliance status of RI recommendations

of fuel cycle and DAE Accelerator units and
their resolution (2013-14)
For the year 2013-14, 38 Cat-I recommendations

out of 49 and 170 Cat-II recommendations out of 192
have been resolved (Table 2.9b). The pending
recommendations pertaining to Cat-I & Cat-II that are yet
to be resolved are long term issues. The target date for
implementing these has been identified and is being
followed up in the respective unit safety committees and
regulatory inspections.
Table 2.9a: Categorization of Deficiencies Observed During Scheduled Regulatory Inspections of

Fuel Cycle Facilities and DAE Accelerator Units (April 2014 to March 2015)
Category
Number of
Inspections
II
III
UCIL
13
22
153
188
NFC
11
119
134
ZC
47
55
IREL OSCOM
74
84
Unit
Total
IREL Udyogamandal
10
34
45
IREL Manavalakurichi
11
11
IREL Chavara
HWP Manuguru
11
78
89
HWP- Kota
12
40
52
HWP- Talcher
12
16
HWP- Tuticorin
22
27
HWP-Thal
29
35
HWP- Baroda
15
HWP- Hazira
37
49
TDP, RCF, Chembur
26
32
ECIL
11
31
50
RRCAT
12
37
58
VECC
42
59
AMD
13
61
79
Total
39
59
160
865
1084
Note: The heavy water production at HWP-Tuticorin, Baroda & Talcher remained suspended.
42
Table 2.9 b: Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category- I, II & III) of

Fuel Cycle Facilities and DAE Accelerator Units for the Year-2013-14
Total number of
Recommendations
Unit
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
UCIL
18
113
NFC
13
ZC
IREL OSCOM
Number of
recommendations resolved
Total
Cat. I
Cat. II
Cat. III
137
14
84
103
126
146
12
118
137
11
68
81
56
65
19
43
69
17
41
62
IREL Udyogamandal
22
36
21
31
IREL Manavalakurichi
11
IREL Chavara
HWP Manuguru
12
94
108
12
87
101
HWP- Kota
11
71
82
10
64
74
HWP- Talcher
22
26
18
21
HWP- Tuticorin
19
24
13
18
HWP-Thal
13
38
51
32
40
HWP- Baroda
11
15
11
14
HWP- Hazira
25
34
23
31
TDP, RCF, Chembur
27
35
27
34
ECIL
10
16
33
15
30
RRCAT
17
17
VECC
37
33
74
37
32
72
AMD
Total
49
192
753
994
38
170
665
873
2.3.5
streams during start up. AERB recommended for

revising the start up procedure & including check
points to prevent uneven heating during startup &
shutdown, use of torque wrench for ensuring
proper tightening of joints and periodically
ensuring the adequacy of tightness of joints prone
to leakages.
Licensing of Plant Personnel
The licensing committee for authorization/reauthorization of operation personnel of Heavy Water

Plants met on five occasions and 35 operation personnel
were authorized/ reauthorized during the year.
2.3.6
Significant Events
l
The following significant events reported were

reviewed in detail by AERB and measures to prevent
recurrence of such incidents were recommended.
l
H2S leakage from waste stripper liquid outlet line

upstream flange joint and heat exchanger tube
side interconnecting flange joint at HWP-Kota on
April 30, 2014. The root cause of the leakage was
identified as temporary loosening of the joint due
to the differential expansion caused by sudden
and un-coordinated release of cold and hot
Partial collapse of cooling tower at HWP-Kota on

June 11, 2014. The root cause of the incident was
identified as failure of degraded load bearing
members of the cooling tower structure. HWPKota has installed a new induced draft counter
flow type cooling tower made up of pultruded
Fibre Reinforced Plastic (FRP) after detailed
review by AERB. AERB also made
recommendations to prevent recurrence of such
incidents at all HWPs which included revision of
surveillance and maintenance procedures
focusing on load bearing components of cooling
43
tower, maintaining records on factors having

bearing on life of the wooden components
including algae growth, chlorine dosing etc.
l
2.4
Leakage at the flange joint of the pipeline carrying

uranium tailings from Tummalapalle mill to the
tailings pond of UCIL on September 02, 2014.
The cause of the event was a case of sabotage as
per the investigation report of UCIL. The spilled
solids were immediately collected in bags and
disposed into tailings pond and the area was
decontaminated. AERB recommended for
increasing surveillance in the area around the
pipeline carrying tailings from Tummalapalle mill
to the tailings pond.
Leakage of the pipeline carrying treated uranium
tailings at Jaduguda mill of UCIL on March 30,
2015. The cause of the event was leakage from
pin-hole developed in the pipeline. The spilled
solids were immediately collected in bags and
disposed into tailings pond and the area was
decontaminated and the affected portion of
pipeline was replaced. AERB also made
recommendations to prevent recurrence of such
incidents which included periodic replacement of
tailings transfer pipeline inside the covered
trench/inaccessible locations and improving the
existing interlock provided for stoppage of tailings
transfer pumps on pressure drop in tailings
transfer pipeline.
R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES
Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron

Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced
Technology (RRCAT) and Electronics Corporation of India
Ltd. (ECIL) were also carried out by AERB, apart from the
Fuel Cycle Facilities. A two-tier review process is adopted
for these facilities. The first level of review is by the
respective unit safety committee of the facility and second
level is by SARCOP.
2.4.1
Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC)
The room temperature cyclotron (K-130) was

under operation delivering alpha and proton beams of
various energies and intensities. Commissioning of
Super-conducting cyclotron & radioactive ion beam
facility are in progress. The construction of medical
cyclotron, which will be used, for commercial production
of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Single
Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT)
isotopes as well as high end technological research is
under progress.
44
The following proposal related to VECC was

reviewed in the DAE Accelerators & Lasers Safety
Committee (formerly known as VECC RRCAT Safety
Committee).
l
Status of activities at Medical Cyclotron

Project
Proposal for erection of equipment was reviewed

along with Safety Report of Medical Cyclotron Project.
Design basis of fire protection system, ventilation, liquid
effluent management system, electrical system etc. Based
on the review, the Committee asked VECC to finalize the
fire protection system and submit a note on total Waste
Disposal System from Medical Cyclotron Project,
including the basis for stack height.
2.4.2
Raja Ramanna Centre

Technology (RRCAT)
for
Advanced
INDUS-1 was operating and producing

synchrotron of 450MeV beam energy at 100 mA beam
current. INDUS-2 was operating at 2.5 GeV beam energy
and 150mA beam current and commissioning is under
progress for achievement of higher current.
Authorisation for seven beam lines of INDUS-2 has
already been issued by AERB for carrying out
experiments. The 10MeV Linear Accelerator (LINAC)
was under operation. Status of ongoing accelerator
projects such as Free Electron Laser (FEL) - LINAC, Infra
red FEL-LINAC, 10 MeV TW-INDUS LINAC, 10 MeV
Microtron, 2.5 MeV DC Accelerator at RRCAT, Indore
and Agricultural Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF) at
Choithram Mandi, Indore as well as laser projects are
being periodically reviewed.
The following proposals / safety issues related to
RRCAT were reviewed in the DAE-DAE- Accelerator and
Laser Safety Committee (DAE-ALSC).
l
License for Regular Operation of Indus-2

Accelerator
Proposal for licence for regular operation of

Indus-2 Accelerator of RRCAT was reviewed. Committee
reviewed the commissioning experience results, along with
the radiation surveillance data and asked RRCAT to study
the induced activity in the LCW water used for cooling
various equipment of the Synchrotron Radiation Source.
RRCAT was also recommended to carry out a fault tree
analysis and to revise the safety reports based on
discussions in the committee. The commissioning consent
was further extended on March 26, 2015 with validity up to
April 2016.
Approval for testing of 2.5 MeV, 10 kW DC

Accelerator
Application for the grant of clearance for stage-1

(i.e. testing at low power - 2.5 MeV energy and 1 kW
power) testing of the DC Accelerator was reviewed. It was
noted that the machine will be housed in an existing
shielded vault of IMA building. Detailed review on aspects
related to testing of pressure vessel containing SF6 gas and
deterioration of electrical cable in high radiation field was
carried out by the safety committee. RRCAT was asked to
submit details of tests conducted for the pressure vessel
and was recommended to use radiation hardened cable
for material handling system and provide Oxygen level
monitor in the accelerator vault.
l
Approval for testing of 20 MeV Microtron
Application for grant of clearance for testing of

indigenously developed 20 MeV Microtron was reviewed.
Based on the satisfactory review and resolution of
identified safety issues, the consent for first stage of testing
(i.e. operation at less than 10 minutes duration with the
stipulation to provide hardware control on pulse repetition
rate at 2 Hz) was issued by AERB on February 26, 2015.
l
Extension of commissioning consent for

revised Stage-5 of FEL LINAC
The consent for construction of ARPF facility at

Choithram Mandi, Indore was extended on March 12,
2015 with validity up to December 31, 2016
2.4.3
Electronics Corporation of India Limited

(ECIL)
All the manufacturing Units of ECIL were in

operation. The following proposals were reviewed in the
ECIL safety committee:
l
Approval for Construction of NPR server

room and transformer room
Application for the consent for construction of

NPR server room and transformer room in the existing
Nalanda Complex was reviewed. Safety issues viz.
capacity of proposed transformer, layout of transformer
room & power distribution from the transformer were
reviewed and based on the satisfactory review and
resolution of the identified issues, Consent was granted by
AERB for construction of NPR server & transformer room.
l
The Application for extension of commissioning

consent with respect to Stage-5 of FEL-LINAC (7.5 MeV
with average beam current of 2 W) was reviewed along
with the report on commission experience. Based on the
satisfactory review, and considering the development of an
indigenous 10 kW RF source with provision of phase and
amplitude locking the safety committee recommended for
the extension of the commissioning consent.
Extension of Consent for the construction

of Agricultural Radiation Processing
Facility (ARPF) at Choithram Mandi,
Indore
Approval for construction of Effluent

Treatment Plant -2
Application for construction of another Effluent

treatment plant on East side of ECIL factory was reviewed.
Based on the satisfactory review, consent was granted by
AERB for construction of Effluent Treatment Plant-2.
Application for regular operation of High

Range Gamma Calibration Facility
Testing of Stage-3 of TWINDUS Linac-1
Application for grant of clearance for testing of

Stage-3 of TW-INDUS LINAC-1 (10 MeV, 5 kW) was
reviewed. Committee reviewed the test results of the
previous stage with respect to adequacy of shielding,
ventilation and safety interlocks. Based on the satisfactory
review, the Consent for commissioning of 10 MeV, 5 kW
TWINDUS Linac-1 was issued by AERB on January 22,
2015 with validity up to January 31, 2017.
Application for Consent for regular operation

of high range Gamma Calibration Facility was reviewed
by the safety committee. Based on the satisfactory
review and the commissioning test results of safety
interlocks for the facility, Consent was granted by AERB
for regular operation of High Range Gamma
Calibration Facility.
45
Chapter 3
Safety Surveillance of
Radiation Facilities
CHAPTER 3
REGULATION OF FACILITIES USING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN
INDUSTRY, MEDICINE, AGRICULTURE AND RESEARCH
3.1
INTRODUCTION
In keeping with its mission, AERB regulates various

facilities using radiation sources in Industry, medicine,
agriculture and research. The radiation source implies
radioisotopes (such as Ir-192, Co-60, Cs-137, Tc-99m, Se75 etc.) and radiation generators like X-rays and
accelerators. These sources, which are of immense benefit
to society, have the radiation hazard potential ranging
from high to very low. Regulation of these sources is in
accordance with the radiation hazard potential involved
and the extent of use in the public domain.
There has been an accelerated growth in the

application of ionising radiation technologies in the
country, posinga challenge towards the regulation of such
radiation facilities. Towards meeting this challenge, AERB
has implemented a state-of-art e-Governance system,
eLORA (e-Licensing of Radiation Applications) which is
automation of regulatory processes. The details on eLORA and the success achieved through its
implementation are given in the highlights.
A glimpse on the various applications of these
sources is given.
INDUSTRIAL USE OF RADIATION SOURCES

RPF
Radiation Processing Facilities (RPF) including Gamma Irradiators, electron
beam accelerators are used mainly for sterilisation of healthcare products,
crosslinking of polymers in cable industries. Some of the facilities are also used
for radiation processing of food items for various purposes such as inhibit
sprouting, delay in ripening, microbial decontamination, Insect disinfestation,
shelf line extension etc. The activity range is about few PBq (~106Ci). They are
of high radiation hazard potential.
IRED used for

Industrial Radiography
Industrial Radiography using Industrial Radiography Exposure Device (IRED),
is one of the important non-destructive methods used for study of weld joints,
castings etc. Radioisotopes like Ir-192, Co-60, Tm-170, Se-75 and different
energies of X-rays are being are used in the field of industrial radiography. The
activity range is from few TBq (few tens of Ci) to few tens of TBq (few hundreds
of Ci). The X-ray energy range is from few hundreds of keV to few MeV. They
are of high to moderate radiation hazard potential.
GIC
Gamma Irradiation Chambers (GIC) are basically used for irradiation of blood
and in research activities. Usually Co-60 radioisotope is used in this application.
The activity ranges from few tens of TBqto few hundreds of TBq. They are of
high to moderate radiation hazard potential.
47
IRGD also called

Nucleonic gauges
The Industrial Radiation Gauging Device (IRGD) are used for online
monitoring of quality control parameters such as thickness, level, density,
coating thickness, elemental analysis etc; Sources used for nucleonic gauges
consist of gamma sources such as Co-60, Cs-137, Am-241 etc., beta sources
such as Sr-90, Kr-85, Pm-147, Tl-204, etc, neutron sources such as Am-241-Be.
The activity range is from MBq (mCi) to GBq (Ci). They are of low radiation
hazard potential.
Well logging facilities

Radioactive sources are used in well logging application for exploration of oil,
coal, geophysical logging etc. The sources used are mainly Cs-137, Am-241Be, and some calibration sources such as Co-60, Ra-226, Th-232 etc. and
neutron generator eg. Deuterium-Tritium Generators etc. The activity range is
from kBq (micro Ci) to GBq (Ci). They are of medium radiation hazard
potential.
MEDICAL USES OF RADIATION SOURCES
Teletherapy
In teletherapy (branch of Radiotherapy), radiation is used to treat malignancy.

The radioisotopes like, Co-60, and radiation generators like Linear Accelerators
are used. They are of high radiation hazard potential.
Brachytherapy
In brachytherapy (branch of radiotherapy in which the source is kept very near

to the lesion) the isotopes used are Ir-192, Cs-137, Sr -90, Ru-106, I-125 with
activity range is MBq (mCi) to GBq (Ci). They are of medium hazard potential.
48
Cath Lab
X-rays are used in Medicine as an important diagnostic tool. Diagnostic

Radiology using x-rays are
Interventional Radiology equipment (Cath Lab):
l
Computed Tomography
These equipment are used in operation theatres for various interventional

procedures and are of high to moderate radiation hazard potential to
medical professionals operating the equipment. The C-Arm equipment is of
low to moderate hazard potential.
l
Computed Tomography:
These equipment are of low to moderate hazard radiation potential.

l
The general purpose radiography and dental equipment:
Radiography and Fluroscopy
These constitute around 70-80% of all x-ray equipment that are used and
are of low to very low radiation hazard potential.
l
Mammography, Bone Mineral Densitometer:
These equipments are of very low radiation hazard potential.
MEDICAL USES OF RADIATION SOURCES

Medical cyclotron
In Nuclear Medicine, Radio-pharmaceuticals, such as Tc-99m, I-131, Thalium201 and F-18 are used for diagnosis and treatment.
Nuclear Medicine Facilities
Usually the radioisotopes are produced in research reactors, but some

radioisotopes that are used in Nuclear Medicine are also produced from
Medical Cyclotron facilities.
The medical cyclotron facilities are of high radiation hazard potential. The
Nuclear medicine centres are of low to moderate radiation hazard potential
49
OTHER USES OF RADIATION SOURCES
3.2
Consumer Goods
manufacturing facilities
Small radioactive sources in Smoke detectors Thorium gas mantle and starters.
They are of very low hazard potential. Hence, approval is accorded to
manufacturing facilities of this equipment.
Facilities using
sealed sources
Though, sealed radioactive sources are used in various industrial and medical
applications, but under this heading, sealed source means the sealed sources
that are used in education, research and calibration purposes. The activity
range is from kBq (Ci) to GBq (Ci). They are of low to moderate radiation
hazard potential.
Facilities using
unsealed sources
Unsealed sources are used in various research and academic institutions, such
as agriculture, veterinary science etc; They are of low radiation hazard potential.
REGULATORY PROCESS
The regulatory process of the radiation facilities is

based on the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules,
promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The
regulation of radiation facilities are carried out broadly by
a) Issuances of Consents b) Approval of Radiation safety
personnel and c) carrying out regulatory inspections and
investigation of unusual occurrences. Apart from the
above, AERB is also involved in d) Conducting Awareness
programmes and e) Accrediting / Recognizing institutes for
environmental monitoring, low level counting and
calibration of radiation survey meters & dosimeters.
3.2.1
Issuance of Consents
Consenting process involves the issuance, in the

order of decreasing hazard potential, of License,
Authorization or Registration to operate the equipment/
facility. The statutory requirements are graded based on
the radiation hazard potential and may require multiple
50
stages of approval to address the hazard before final

issuance of consents to operate the facility / equipment.
Type Approvals are issued to manufacturer / supplier for
equipment conforming to the regulatory standards.
Approvals are also issued as an interim consent towards
the respective Licenses. No Objection Certificates (NOC's)
are issued to the stake holder to import either equipment or
radioactive source, after which the stakeholder needs to
obtain either a Type Approval or the respective consent for
use. AERB has a multi-tier consenting process (i.e. review
by AERB and its Safety committees) depending on the
hazard potential involved. The process of issuance of
various consents is as per AERB Safety Guide on 'Consenting Process for Radiation Facilities' (AERB/SG/G-3).
The transportation of radioactive material
(including that of nuclear material from nuclear facilities) is
governed by regulations specified by AERB in Safety Code
for the transport of radioactive materials and is line with
the international requirements specified by IAEA for safe
transport of radioactive material.
The number of consents issued this year (April 2014-Mar 2015) is as follows:
CONSENT
PRACTICE
EQUIPMENT/ FACILITY
Radio therapy facilities
Nuclear medicine facilities
Diagnostic X-ray facilities

LICENSE /
RENEWAL
Linear Accelerator
33
Telecobalt facility
04
Medical Cyclotron facility
03
PET-CT
23
SPECT-CT
10
Interventional Radiology
250
Computed Tomography
563
Manufacturing facilities of
diagnostic X-ray equipment
19
Radiation Processing facilities
14
facilities
65
Research accelerators
Radio therapy facilities
HDR Brachytherapy
Gamma Irradiation Chamber

(GIC)
AUTHORISATION
Diagnostic X-ray facilities
Diagnostic x-ray facilities
14
01
Supply of diagnostic X-ray equipment
34
Authorization of agencies for QA of

diagnostic X-ray equipment
36
Well logging
REGISTRATION
NUMBER ISSUED
04
Radiography/Fluoroscopy,
Mammography, Dental etc;
6785
Facilities using unsealed

radio-isotopes for research
18
Self shielded x-ray unit and

PCB analyser
05
IRGD (Nucleonic gauges)
45
APPROVALS
TYPE
APPROVAL/
RENEWAL
NOC's ISSUED
FOR
IMPORT OF
EQUIPMENT
Radiotherapy
15
21
CT
54
Diagnostic radiology equipment
116
IRED
10
Sealed sources
IRGD (Nucleonic gauges)
93
X-ray Inspection system (baggage, food and cargo screening)
29
Radiotherapy and Brachytherapy
123
Radiation Processing Facility
01
Self shielded x-ray unit and PCB Analyzer
05
IRED
141
Diagnostic Radiology
96
Computed Tomography
23
09
51
Type of practice
Indigenous
Imported
1087
131
Well logging Sources
25
22
IRED
60
157
GIC
03
02
Industrial radiography
PERMISISION
FOR
PROCUREMENT
OF
RADIOACTIVE
SOURCE
PACKAGE
DESIGN
PERMISSIONS
GRANTED IN
TRANSPORT OF
RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL
FOR DISPOSAL
Thorium Nitrate
02
00
Thorium Oxide
02
00
Consumer products (Ionization Chamber Smoke

Detector (ICSD), Electron Capture Detector (ECD),
Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS), [Explosive
Detectors], Static Charge Eliminator Device, Others
(like watches/research associated products etc)
09
207
Sealed sources
14
16
Telecobalt source
10
10
HDR Brachytherapy sources
00
214
Brachytherapy sources (I-125 seeds)
04
04
Nuclear Medicine
165
251
Research Centres
69
128
Radio Immuno Assay Centres
36
Type B(U)/(M) Approved packages
36
Type A Registered Packages
26
Exported to the original supplier
415
Disposal facilities within the country
226+ 44241 (ICSD)
Radioactively contaminated metal
8750 kg
INTERMEDIATE APPROVALS LEADING TO ISSUANCE OF LICENCE

CONSENT
EQUIPMENT/ FACILITY
Site approval
Layout plan
OTHER
APPROVALS
Design and construction
Commissioning
52
NUMBER
ISSUED
Medical cyclotron
02
Radiotherapy
258
Nuclear medicine centres
39
Medical Cyclotron
01
Industrial Radiography source storage facility
66
Research centres
09
Sources storage pit (well logging)
01
Research accelerator
00
04
Medical cyclotron
00
00
00
Radio-therapy Simulator
06
Medical Cyclotron
00
Medical Linear Accelerator(Radiotherapy)
33
Telecobalt (new and after source replacement)
10
RAL Brachytherapy Facilities (HDR)
07
Design and construction
Commissioning
00
00
00
Radio-therapy Simulator
06
Medical Cyclotron
00
Medical Linear Accelerator(Radiotherapy)
33
Telecobalt (new and after source replacement)
10
RAL Brachytherapy Facilities (HDR)
07
Industrial Radiography enclosure
21
Telecobalt units
10
Remote after loading(RAL) brachytherapy unit
03
Medical Linear Accelerator
16
MAL Brachytherapy
01
00
Well logging
263
IRED
622
IRGD
15
Source replacement /
09
replenishment
Radiotherapy
118
Decommissioning
OTHER
APPROVALS
Source movement
3.2.2
Medical cyclotron
Safety Committees for Radiation Facilities:
The safety committees review the radiation safety

aspects of medical, industrial and research institutions
which use radioactive sources / radiation generating
equipment.
The committees also recommend issuance of

license for operation or issuance of Type Approval, based
on their review. The committees consist of experts in the
field from the industry, medicine and academic institutions
apart from the experts from Bhabha Atomic Research
Center (BARC) and AERB.
Name of committee
Advisory Committee on Radiological Safety
Abbreviation No. of meetings

ACRS
04
Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation
SARCAR
05
Safety Review Committee of Medical and Research Accelerators
SRCMRA
02
Safety Review Committee for Radiation Processing Plants
SRC-RPP
02
Committee on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
COSTRAM
06
Committee on Safe Management of Disused Sources originating from

Radiation Facilities.
COSMDS
01
SCURF
02
SACNUM
04
SCBF
02
CRSA-RF&T
03
CRCL
01
SCRRRSD
05
Committee to Review functioning and accreditation of Environmental survey

Laboratories (ESLs) at NPPs and other Radio Analytical Laboratories (RALs)
CORFAL
02
Committee for Accreditation of Personnel Monitoring Laboratories
CAPML
01
OEIC
02
Standing Committee for Investigation of Unusual Occurrences in Radiation

Facilities
Safety Committee on Nuclear Medicine Facilities
Safety Committee on BRIT Facilities
Committee to Review Security Aspects of Radiation Facilities and Transport
of Radioactive Material
Committee for Recognition of Calibration Laboratories for Radiation Monitoring
Instruments
Standing Committee for Review and Revision of AERBs Radiation Safety
Documents
Excessive exposure investigation committee
53
3.2.3
Approval of Radiological Safety Officers
While the built-in safety of the equipment and

institutions operational preparedness towards safety are
ensured by adhering to requirements specified by AERB,
the implementation of radiation safety is carried out by the
AERB designated Radiological Safety Officers (RSOs).

The RSOs are thus not only acting as extended arms of the
regulatory body at every hospital and industrial radiation
facility, but are also the pivotal interface between the
medical/ industrial community and the regulatory body.
This year the number of fresh RSOs approved for different practices are as follows:
Type of Practice
No.
Type of Practice
No.
237
Radiotherapy facilities
611
IRGD operations
197
94
Sealed sources handling
03
Research centers
22
Well logging operations
20
Diagnostic radiology facilities
Radiation processing facilities
05
NORM industries
3.3
REGULATORY INSPECTIONS
One of the important means to ensure effective

regulatory control in the use of radiation sources is
through a structured regulatory inspection program.
AERB has prepared a Manual on Inspection of Radiation
Facilities, the AERB/SM/G-3. This documents covers all
aspects of regulatory inspections such as frequency,
inspection process, enforcement areas, check list of
various important parameters to be verified, the
assessment on deviations etc;
The Southern Regional Regulatory Centre
(SRRC) and the Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre
Type of facility
1243
02
(ERRC) and the recently instituted Northern Regional

Regulatory Centre (NRRC) are mandated to carry out
extensive regulatory inspections, covering the respective
region. In addition, regulatory inspections were carried
out by the Directorate of Radiation Safety (DRS), Kerala,
Radiation Safety Agencies (RSAs), Mizoram and
Chhattisgarh in respect of diagnostic radiology
equipment. Recently, a RSA was authorized by AERB in
the State of Tripura to start the regulatory inspections in
the State.
The inspections of radiation facilities /
equipment carried out in this year by AERB / RRC and by
DRS/RSA is as follows:
Type of inspection
No. of facilities/
institutes
inspected
No. of equipment
inspected
Radiotherapy equipment
Periodic
101
278
Medical cyclotron
Includes Site, Pre-commissioning

and Periodic
07
NA
Includes Site, Pre-commissioning

and Periodic
117
NA
Diagnostic radiology
AERB/RRC on sample basis
116
884
Directorate of Radiation Safety,

Kerala on sample basis
532
667
Radiation Safety Agency,

Chhattisgarh on sample basis
12
35
Radiation Safety Agency,

Mizoram on sample basis
Periodic and special
107
210
Radiation Processing Facilities
Includes Site, Pre-commissioning,

Periodic and special
12
NA
On sample basis
09
164
GIC
On sample basis
20
24
IRGD
On sample basis
103
692
Research and RIA
On sample basis
13
Manufacturer of gas mantles
Periodic
12
NA
Accreditation of Institutes
Pre-assessment
03
NA
Southern Regional Regulatory
69
286
54
On sample basis
09
164
GIC
On sample basis
20
24
IRGD
On sample basis
103
692
Research and RIA
On sample basis
13
Manufacturer of gas mantles
Periodic
12
Accreditation of Institutes
Pre-assessment
Southern Regional Regulatory

Centre
Eastern Regional Regulatory
Centre
3.4
NA
03
NA
69
286
55
408
All Radiation Facilities

(Industrial and Medical Applications
of Radiation)
UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY AERB
Unusual occurrences in the use of radiation

sources occur due to design or operational lacunae. AERB
extensively investigates these incidents and takes suitable
regulatory/ remedial/ enforcement actions.
There were four unusual occurrences, involving
three from Industry and one from a Research laboratory.
In one Radiation Processing Facility, while
irradiating a product box, the source frame with Co-60
source got stuck along with the product box. A water pool
acting as a shield is normally used to store this highly
radioactive source. It is taken out only for irradiation of
product boxes. As per the design intent, the source should
have got detached from product box and moved into water
pool after irradiation. As this did not happen, the supplier,
AERB and BRIT was immediately notified. The source was
subsequently brought into the water pool with coordinated efforts of all agencies. The root cause of this
incident was analyzed and was noted that the facility had
carried out certain modifications in the design of product
carriers without taking prior approval from AERB.
Warning letter to the concerned facility were issued with
instructions that prior permission should be taken from
AERB before implementing any design changes.
Two radiography sources (Roli-1) containing Ir192 were stolen from radiography agencies based at
Nagpur and Rahuri. In both these cases, the root cause of
the incident was inadequacy in security measures.
Subsequently, these sources were recovered. AERB
viewed these incidents seriously and issued warning letters
and has asked these facilities to strengthen the security
measures on priority.
In one of the Research Laboratories handling
tritium (H-3) filled light sources (TFS); unusually high
airborne H-3 activity levels were observed which resulted
into excessive dose of 55 mSv to one worker. The unusual
high airborne H-3 activity was attributed to the rotary
pump oil which contained H-3 in the range of 24 to 28 Ci. It
was noted that the above mentioned pump was not in
service for nearly two months during which the tritiated
water vapours had resulted into increase of pressure inside

the pump. The vapours then got released probably
through diffusion from the mechanical seal. The air
concentration levels were soon normalized and steps were
taken to avoid recurrence. These included a) Provision for
enclosure of pump b) Rerouting of exhaust was through
fume hood and c) Periodic monitoring of oil for tritium. As
a long term measure, the laboratory is exploring the option
of installing of an oil-free pump.
Information was received from a labour union of an
engineering industry in Pune, Maharashtra, regarding a
suspected radiation exposure of a welder about two years
ago. The welder was suspected to have received radiation
dose while working adjacent to the location of a
radiography operation with a Techops-680 source
containing 30Ci of Co-60. Based on the information,
AERB immediately carried out a detailed investigation of
the premises. The investigation revealed serious procedural
lapse on the part of the radiography team, of warning light
indicators. AERB issued show cause notice to the
institution and withdrew the Certificate of Site-in-charge
and Radiographer for a period of three months. The dose
received by the worker was estimated to be about 160mGy.
HIGHLIGHTS
1)
e-Licensing of Radiation
(e-LORA system)
Applications
AERB has taken a major initiative for

implementation of e-Governance system named e-LORA
(e-licensing
of
Radiation
Applications),
for
computerization of regulatory licensing processes for the
use of radiation sources and radiation generating
equipment in India. The e-LORA system is web based
system and provides accessibility and ease of filing of
applications to the stakeholders through internet. The
objective is to ensure that procedures for application
submission by the utility and application processing by
AERB are simplified and fast as well as facilitates higher
efficiency and enhanced transparency in its exchanges
with the stakeholders. This is user-friendly and any
stakeholder can view the status of their application for
license on a 24X7 basis.
55
The e-Licensing of Radiation Applications,

AERBs e-governance portal has commissioned the
following applications of radiation Radiotherapy, Gamma
Irradiation Chamber, Industrial Radiography, Nuclear
Medicine and Nucleonic Gauge. e-LORA has facilitated to
the utility faster submission of application forms towards

licensing and on fulfillment of requirements, faster receipt
of requisite licenses from AERB. A glimpse of
achievements through e-LORA is presented below.
Success achieved with e-LORA so far.

1) Quantifiable response from the utility:
a)
b)
c)
d)
More than 11,000 institutes active in e-LORA.

More than 11,000 radiation professionals are registered in e-LORA.
The number of RSO approvals has significantly increased.
The major achievement of e-LORA is in the regulatory activities of diagnostic X-rays where in just a period two
years, more than 23,000 x-ray equipments are declared in system and more than 14,000 equipment are
already licensed. Before e-LORA, only about 5,000 licenses were given for X-ray equipment.
e) e-LORA has a database of over 28,000 employees working in radiation facilities and it is utilized for spreading
safety awareness.
2) Improved efficiency and better work management of AERB officers.
a) Roles, responsibilities and authorities are well defined in e-LORA work flow hence allotment of work is done
instantaneously.
b) Well defined business validation rules in the system have significantly contributed in reduction of review time.
c) The inventory of equipment and radioactive sources is managed effectively in e-LORA.
d) The employees at AERB Regional Regulatory Centres are working in tandem with headquarters as e-LORA is
operable through VPN (Virtual Private Network), which was a difficult proposition before e-LORA.
e) Automated document management in e-LORA has eliminated paper management activities and division is
heading towards paper-less office.
2) No Objection Certificate (NOC) for import and
supply of Proteus 235 Proton Therapy
Accelerator
An application for issue of No Objection
Certificate (NOC) for import and supply of Proteus 235
Proton Therapy Accelerator Facility was submitted by the
Apollo Hospitals, Chennai. This is the first of its kind facility
in the country. Though both standard radiotherapy and
proton beams work on the principle of selective cell
destruction, the major advantage of proton treatment over
conventional radiation is its superior dose-distribution
characteristics. The energy distribution of protons can be
directed and deposited in tissue volumes designated by the
physicians-in a three-dimensional pattern from each beam
used. This capability provides greater control and
precision and, therefore, superior management of
treatment. As a result of protons, the radiation oncologist
can increase the dose to the tumor while reducing the dose
to surrounding normal tissues. The overall affects lead to
the potential for fewer harmful side effects, more direct
impact on the tumor, and increased tumor control.
Aspects concerned with radiation safety, shielding
and decommissioning were reviewed by a committee of
56
experts constituted by AERB. Based on the satisfactory

review including site visit, AERB issued No Objection
Certificate for procurement of Proteus 235 Proton Therapy
Accelerator.
No Objection Certificate (NOC) was issued for

import and supply of Proteus 235 Proton
Therapy Accelerator Facility of the Apollo
Hospitals, Chennai, a first of its kind facility in
the country.
3)
Radiation Safety Agency at Tripura
Diagnostic radiology facilities utilizing X-ray units

are widely used in the country and a large number of
persons undergo diagnostic X-ray procedures every year.
These X-ray units if not designed or operated properly may
lead to unwanted radiation exposure to the patients as well
as the operators. AERB has stipulated various regulatory
requirements for such X-ray facilities such as Design
Certification (Type Approval), Registration of X-ray
Equipment and Certification of Radiological Safety
Officers (RSOs).
In view of the tremendous increase in the medical

diagnostic installations using medical X-ray units in the
country, AERB has taken proactive steps to exercise
regulatory control over all such installations by
decentralizing the regulatory inspection of these units by
having an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with
State Government and Union Territories to set up
Directorate of Radiation Safety (DRS)/Radiation Safety
Agency (RSA) in various States / Union Territories.
Towards this, Principal Secretary, Department of
Health & Family Welfare, Government of Tripura and
Secretary, AERB signed the MoU for establishment of RSA
for effective regulatory control on medical diagnostic X-ray

facilities on September 25, 2014. Subsequently, Radiation
Safety Agency was established and training was imparted
by AERB to the staff. AERB issued authorization for
Radiation Safety Agency for the State of Tripura in March,
2015.
- AERB has MOU with 12 States for

establishing Directorates for Radiation
Safety (DRS) / Radiation Safety Agency
(RSA)
- State level DRS / RSA are functional in
Kerala, Mizoram, Tripura and Chattisgarh
4)
Establishment of Northern
Regulatory Centre (NRRC)
Regional
As a further step towards de-centralization and

effective regulation of large number of radiation facilities in
the country, AERB has set up NRRC, to oversee the
regulatory functions in northern region.
5)
Shri M. Nagaraju, Principal Secretary, Department of

Health & Family Welfare, Government of Tripura and
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, AERB during signing of
MoU for establishment of RSC, Tripura
Dissemination of information on e-LORA

licensing process and Radiation safety:
During the period, following were the activities

carried out/ initiated towards dissemination of information
to all stakeholders and the medical community.
End User Coverage

1
Well-logging sources
Radiation Safety and Regulatory Aspects in handling of Well Logging Sources

and AERB e LORA system for Engineers, Geo Physicist of ONGC, Mumbai
held on 24/02/2014
Nuclear medicine
End users were sent information through email.

Demonstration of the eLORA software with respect to consenting activities for
nuclear medicine given during the TMH Radiation Safety Update in Nuclear
Medicine (TRASNUM 2015) conducted by the Department of Nuclear Medicine
and Molecular Imaging, Tata Memorial Hospital, Parel, Mumbai during 28-29,
March, 2015.
About 250 participants from various Industrial radiography institutions have

attended the programme. Officers from AERB demonstrated the e-LORA
system through VPN network (online). AERB arranged online demonstration of
e-LORA for end user module of industrial radiography practice to various
industrial radiography institutions at four regions of the country viz. Mumbai on
March 10, 2015; Bangalore on March 20, 2015; Delhi on March 25, 2015 and
Kolkata on March 30, 2015.
57
Live demonstration of e-LORA at Association of Medical Physicists of India (AMPICON 2014) Conference, Loni, Maharashtra
58
Chapter 4
Industrial Safety
CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
AERB is responsible for administration of the
Factories Act, 1948 and Atomic Energy Factories Rules,
1996 in all the units of DAE under its purview. AERB
reviews the industrial and fire safety aspects during stagewise consenting process, inspections and document
development. AERB also focuses on the construction
safety aspects of nuclear projects by carrying out special
inspections of nuclear power projects in addition to the
quarterly inspections and quarterly inspections of other
nuclear facilities under construction. The fire safety aspects
of the nuclear facilities are verified by checking the
compliance with the requirements of AERB Safety
Standard on Fire Protection Systems for Nuclear
Facilities and periodic review of Fire Hazard Analysis of
the facilities.
Licenses were issued/renewed under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended in 1987) and
the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996.
The nuclear power projects employ large number
of contractor workforce, which is dynamic in nature and
also there is a large spread of activities. In order to have an
effective monitoring and to ensure highest level of industrial safety at these construction sites, special regulatory
inspections on industrial safety were carried out once in six
months.
Competent persons are designated for various
DAE units are appointed under the provisions of the
Factories Act, 1948 (as amended in 1987) and Rule 31 of
the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 for the purpose
of carrying out tests, examinations and inspections under
various Section (s) of the Factories Act, 1948, namely for
civil construction & structural work, operation of dangerous machines, lifts and hoists, lifting machinery and lifting
tackles, pressure plant, dangerous fumes, supervision of
handling of hazardous substances and ventilation system.
During the financial year, Ninety Six (96) persons were
designated as competent persons in different DAE units.
and Board of AERB. The lessons learnt are disseminated

to all DAE units.
4.1
LICENSES
ISSUED
UNDER
THE
FACTORIES ACT, 1948 / ATOMIC
ENERGY (RADIATION PROTECTION)
RULES, 2004
The following licenses for operation under the

Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 / Rule 3 of Atomic
Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004, as applicable,
were renewed / issued / extended to various DAE units.
l
Certifying Surgeons are appointed by AERB,

under Section 10 of the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended
in 1987) and under Rule 5 of Atomic Energy (Factories)
Rules, 1996 for carrying out the duties prescribed in Rule 7
of Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996.
A Fatal Accident Assessment Committee (FAAC)

constituted by AERB reviews the fatal accidents at DAE
units. The recommendations made by FAAC are further
deliberated in respective Advisory Committees / SARCOP
License for operation of Heavy Water Plant-Thal

under Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 was
renewed on December 19, 2014 for a period of
five years.
Licence for Operation of Rajasthan Atomic Power
Station 5&6 under Section- 6 of the Factories Act
1948 was renewed on March 31, 2015 for a
period of five years.
License for operation of Mohuldih Mine of UCIL
under Rule 3 of Atomic Energy (Radiation
Protection) Rules, 2004 was issued on October
29, 2014 for a period of five years.
License for operation of M/s Beach Minerals
Company India Ltd., Arasoor, Tuticorin,
Tamilnadu under Rule 3 of Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 was issued on
August 19, 2014 for a period of five years.
License for operation of M/s Miracle Sands &
Chemicals, Mappillayurani, Tuticorin, Tamilnadu
Protection) Rules, 2004 was issued on August 19,
2014 for a period of five years.
License for operation of M/s Indian Rare Earths
Ltd., Manavalakurichi, Kanyakumari, Tamilnadu
Protection) Rules, 2004 was renewed on August
Ltd., Orissa Sands Complex, Odisha under Rule 3
of Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules,
2004 was renewed on August 19, 2014 for a
Ltd., Chavara, Kollam, Kerala under Rule 3 of
Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules,
License for operation of M/s Miracle Sands and
59
4.2
Metals, Mela Arasadi, Tuticorin, Tamilnadu under

Rule 3 of Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection)
Rules, 2004 was renewed on August 19, 2014 for
a period of five years.
License for operation of M/s The Kerala Minerals
and Metals Ltd., Kovilthottam, Chavara, Kerala
License for operation of M/s Trimex Sands Pvt.
Ltd., Vatsavalasa, Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh
Registration certificate for operation of M/s
Cochin Minerals and Rutile Ltd., Aluva, Kerala
Registration certificate for operation of M/s DCW
Ltd., Sahupuram, Thoothukudi, Tamilnadu
Registration certificate for operation of M/s
Transworld Garnet India Pvt. Ltd., Garamandal,
Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh under Rule 3 of
Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules,
Registration certificate for operation of M/s Beach
Minerals Company Pvt. Ltd., Tirucendur, Kuttam,
Tamilnadu under Rule 3 of Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 was renewed
on August 18, 2014 for a period of five years.
facilities. Special inspections were carried out at the

construction sites of KKNPP 1&2, RAPP 7&8, KAPP 3&4
and PFBR, DFRP & FRFCF at Kalpakkam. Quarterly
inspections were carried out at the construction sites of
VECC - Medical Cyclotron at Kolkata. These inspections
were focused on implementation of various safety
management systems related to the construction activities
and compliance to the AERB Directives on construction
safety. Some of the significant improvements observed at
the operating plants and construction project sites are
given below.
l
REGULATORY INSPECTIONS & SAFETY

REVIEW
l
Regulatory inspections on industrial & fire safety

aspects under the Factories Act, 1948 and the Atomic
Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 along with radiological
safety and waste management aspects were carried out at
various DAE units. Special inspections at construction sites
of nuclear power projects and quarterly inspections at
construction sites of other fuel cycle facilities and R&D
units were carried out to ensure compliance to the safety
requirements stipulated by AERB. Quarterly industrial
safety status reports from all major construction sites were
reviewed by AERB.
During the year, 115 regulatory inspections were
carried out, which includes 15 special inspections at
construction sites of nuclear power projects in addition to
the quarterly inspections of nuclear power project sites and
4 quarterly inspections of construction sites of fuel cycle
60
4.3
The special inspections carried out at construction sites of nuclear power projects and quarterly
inspections of construction sites of various fuel
cycle facilities led to implementation of periodic
internal safety audits of contractors safety
management systems by licensees and these
audits has enhanced the regulatory compliance to
the statutory requirements by the contractors at
NPP sites.
The effluent in settling tanks at NFC, Hyderabad
is being treated by a new electro-coagulation
system on trial basis. The results have shown
decrease in the uranium levels in the settling
tanks.
Safety Inspection Committees has been constituted at RRCAT, Indore with the objective of
strengthening safety supervision through periodic
inspections in respective identified areas. This has
led to better follow-up and implementation of
actions for resolution of the recommendations
made on various safety issues.
In view of ageing related issues observed with old
fire hydrant lines at VECC, Kolkata, the lines have
been replaced by new fire hydrant pipelines. Also
VECC has carried out fire hazard analysis for
critical areas of the Medical Cyclotron Project.
An above-ground pressurised fire water system
with a ring-main header & fire hydrants at
different locations of the facility covering all the
areas along with pumping equipment has been
commissioned and made operation at ECIL,
Hyderabad.
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY STATISTICS
The compilation of Occupational Injury Statistics2014 of DAE units (other than BARC facilities and mines)
provides the data on accidents and analysis of number of
injuries and man-days loss.
During the calendar year 2014, there were 29
reportable injuries including two fatalities with a loss of
22,120 man-days compared to 39 reportable injuries
including 5 fatalities with a loss of 31, 349 man-days in
2013. The two fatalities during the calendar year 2014

occurred at construction site RAPP 7&8 and operating unit
RAPP 1&2.
The Frequency Rate (FR) was 0.21 in 2014 as
compared to 0.27 in the year 2013 and a Severity Rate
(SR) of 160 in 2014 as compared to 219 in 2013.
Incidence rates (IR) of DAE units are compared
with that of similar industries across the country. The Nonfatal Incidence Rate in NPPs was 0.16 in 2014 as
compared to 1.55 (2012) in other Electricity generation
companies in India. Non-fatal Incidence Rate in HWPs was
0.61 in 2014 as compared to 1.14 (2012) in other chemical
manufacturing units in India. These figures, highlight
better safety performance of some of the DAE units among
other similar industries in the country. Table 4.1 gives the
comparison of incidence rates in some DAE units with
other similar industries in the country.
In 2014, 374 Near Miss Accidents (NMAs) were

reported from different units of DAE out of which about
22.46% were related to Fall / slip of the person on the
same level. Analysis also revealed that most of the
incidents reported from Nuclear Power Projects & Nuclear
Power Plants were related to Fall of objects, Fall of
persons from height & Fall of persons on the same level.
Unit wise comparison of reportable injuries and
man-days lost in 2014 is presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2
respectively. Unit-wise comparison of Injury Index and
Frequency Rate (F.R) are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4
respectively and year wise comparison of Injury Index in
DAE Units is presented in Figure 4.5.
Distribution of injuries caused due to unsafe acts,
injuries due to unsafe conditions and injuries with respect
to the type of accidents in DAE units are presented in
Figures 4.6 to 4.8.
Fig. 4.1: Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE units in 2014
Fig.4.2: Distribution of Man-days Loss in DAE Units in 2014
61
0.5
0.4
0.129
0.3
0.002
0.025
0.020
NP Projects
0.040
0.039
0.1
NP Plants
0.2
VECC
RRCAT
AMD
BRIT
ECIL
IGCAR
NFC & ZC
UCIL Mills
IREL
HWPs
0.0
DAE Units
Fig. 4.3: Injury Index in DAE Units in 2014
Fig. 4.4: Frequency Rates in DAE Units in 2014
Fig. 4.5: Year wise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units
62
Table 4.1: Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries
(Data Source - Statistics of Factories - 2012 published in January 2015,
Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt. of India)
Incidence Rate
Industry Type
Fatal
Non -Fatal
Heavy Water Plants (2014)
0.61
Manufacture of Chemicals &

Chemical products (2012)
0.23
1.14
Nuclear Fuel Complex (2014)
2.18
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products

except Machinery and Equipment (2012)
0.1
0.47
Nuclear Power Plants (2014)
0.08
0.16
Electricity, Gas, Steam and

Air Conditioning Supply (2012)
0.33
1.55
Fig. 4.6: Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Acts in DAE Units-2014
Fig 4.7: Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Conditions in DAE Units- 2014
63
Fig 4.8: Distribution of Injuries with respect to Type of Accidents in DAE units-2014
4.4
employed in the project and submit reports to

AERB for further review.
FATAL ACCIDENTS
There were two fatalities reported during the year

2014-15. These were at RAPP 7&8 and RAPS 1&2. These
accidents were investigated by AERB and reviewed by
Fatal Accident Assessment Committee (FAAC) and
remedial measures suggested to prevent such recurrences.
The analysis and recommendations of these accidents
were forwarded to all units of DAE for information and
lessons to be learnt.
A summary of the accidents along with review
and recommendations/directives of AERB is as follows.
A fatal accident took place at the construction site
of RAPP 7&8 on November 06, 2014. While shifting of a
bundle of reinforcement bars using a tower crane within
storage yard of M/s HCC Ltd. at RAPP 7 & 8, the crane Jib
collapsed. A contract worker (Rigger) of M/s. HCL Ltd got
trapped under the collapsed jib, sustaining severe injuries.
The jib also got entangled with the nearby reinforcement
bars in the yard, trapping the injured worker. The
entrapped worker was subsequently brought out after
arranging a mobile crane for lifting the collapsed jib and
the reinforcement bars. The injured was given first aid and
transferred to site hospital. The victim succumbed to his
injuries. Following enforcement actions were taken by
AERB.
-
64
AERB suspended the operation of all material

handling operations involving tower cranes at
RAPP 7&8 and asked NPCIL to establish the root
cause of failure of the crane jib and re-test &
calibrate the safety devices of other tower cranes
The accident investigation report of AERB and

the submissions made by NPCIL were reviewed
in AERB. NPCIL was asked to take immediate
corrective actions to prevent such reoccurrences.
Based on the satisfactory review of the
submissions made by NPCIL, AERB granted
clearance for operations of tower cranes on
December 17, 2014.
A fatal accident took place at the RAPS-1&2

during modification of vent-line of downgraded heavy
water storage tanks. On November 21, 2014, a
departmental employee while performing gas cutting by
sitting on the dyke wall of downgraded heavy water
storage tank, lost his balance and fell backward into the
dyke area and received laceration injury on his head. The
injured was given first aid in the Ambulance and taken to
RR site hospital and then shifted to a Hospital at Kota for
further treatment. He was operated to remove a blood clot
in his brain. The victim succumbed to injuries on
November 25, 2014. Based on the investigation by AERB,
the root cause of the accident was identified as adequate
hazard analysis and implementation of safety measures
not being carried out by responsible persons prior to
execution of the job. The accident was reviewed in AERB
and recommendations were made to prevent recurrence of
such incidents which included strict enforcement of work
permit system with the responsibility of safe working
conditions ensured by Engineer-in-Charge of the Site,
provision of scaffolding for all such jobs that cannot be
done safely from ground, strengthening the compliance to
safety requirements, effective use of Job Hazard Analysis

& Checklists and work supervision by contractor as well as
by department.
4.5
PROMOTION OF INDUSTRIAL & FIRE

SAFETY
4.5.1
Industrial & Fire Safety Awards
The displayed models/articles were well appreciated by the

visitors.
Industrial & Fire Safety Award is presented every

year by AERB to DAE units. The Award presentation
function for Industrial Safety Awards and Fire Safety
Awards for DAE units for the year 2014 was held on April
17, 2015 at AERB.
Industrial safety award in production units group
comprising of Nuclear Power Plants and Heavy Water
Plants was jointly awarded to Narora Atomic Power
Station (Narora in Uttar Pradesh) and Madras Atomic
Power Station (Kalpakkam in Tamilnadu). Zirconium
Complex (Pazhayakayal in Tamilnadu) and Indian Rare
Earths Limited (Udyogamandal in Kerala) jointly received
the Industrial Safety Award in production units group
comprising of other than Nuclear Power Plants & Heavy
Water Plants. There were no winners in the groups of
construction units and research& other low risk units.
Inauguration of Galleria AERB
Fire Safety Award in the Category of operating &

high fire risk units was awarded to Kaiga Generating
Station 1&2 (Kaiga in Karnataka).
Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB presented the
awards to winner units and released a compilation of
Occupational Injury & Fire Statistics for the year 2014
for DAE units.
Inauguration of Galleria AERB
4.5.2
Release of Compilation of Occupational Injury & Fire

Statistics for the year 2014
(L to R: Shri K. Ramprasad, Head, IPSD, AERB, Shri S.S. Bajaj,
Chairman, AERB, Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice-Chairman, AERB
and Shri H. Ansari, IPSD, AERB)
Environment Protection Awards
Environment Protection Award is also awarded by

AERB to the DAE units exhibiting commendable
performance towards protection, sustainability and
preservation of the environment. The criteria considered for
Environment Protection Award includes aspects, such as
compliance to legal requirements, greenery development,
conservation of electricity, fuel, water, chemicals etc. &
reduction of waste and environmental protection
promotional aspects. There are three groups for this award
namely: Group-I (Operating units and mines), Group-II
(R&D and other units) and Group-III (Projects & Mines
(under construction / development). For the year 2013,
NAPS & IRE-OSCOM were adjudged as winner under
Group-I and RAPP 7&8 under Group-III during the 31st
DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professional Meet,
held at BHAVINI, Kalpakkam during October 15-17, 2014.
To commensurate with the occasion, an AERB

Galleria depicting the Mission of the Board was displayed.
65
4.6
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
4.6.1
Advisory
Health
Committee
on
Occupational
The AERB Advisory Committee on Occupational

Health (ACOH) reviews the occupational health records of
employees of DAE units, recommends measures to ensure
their health, informs AERB of any observed case of
occupational diseases and suggests ways to improve the
occupational health activities. During the period, ACOH
conducted three meetings. No occupational diseases were
reported during 2014-15 from any of the DAE units.
A
workshop
on
"Emergency
Medicine"
including
"Emergency Medical Management & Poisoning for

Certifying Surgeons & Para - Medical staff of all DAE units
was jointly organized by Advisory Committee on
Occupational Health (ACOH), AERB and KKNPP, NPCIL
in collaboration with The Trauma Life Support Society of
th
India, Ernakulam Medical centre, Kochi during 17th- 18
July, 2014 for the benefit of the paramedical staff and
certifying surgeons working in the Occupational Health
Centres / First Aid Centres of Department of Atomic
Energy, (DAE) Units. Total 78 delegates from various DAE
Units attended the Workshop.
No occupational diseases were reported

during 2014-15 from any of the DAE units
Workshop on "Emergency Medicine including Emergency

Medical Management & Poisoning in progress at KKNPP
(L to R: Shri R. S Sundar, Site Director, KKNPP, Shri R.
Bhattacharya, Vice-Chairman, AERB, Dr. PTV Nair, Chairman
(ACOH), Dr. Ajay Dubey Medical Officer In Charge KKNPP, Dr. R.T.
Sachdeo, Chief Medical Superintendent, NPCIL and Dr. Raghu
Director, Ernakulam Medical Centre
66
Chapter 5
Environmental Safety and

Occupational Exposures
CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
5.1
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY
The waste management aspects are reviewed

throughout the life cycle of the plants, right from the siting
stage, to construction, commissioning, operation and
decommissioning stage. Based on the satisfactory review
of the arrangements made by the plant for safe
management of radioactive wastes, AERB issues
Authorization under the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of
Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 with respect to the
quantity and activity content of the waste.
AERB has specified the requirements for safe
management of radioactive wastes in form of Safety Code
Management of Radioactive Waste (AERB/SC/RW) and
has issued several guides thereunder providing guidance
on various aspects to meet the requirements of the Code.
The Safety Code deals with the requirements for radiation
protection aspects in design, construction and operation of
waste management facilities and the responsibilities of
different agencies involved. The Code is also applicable to
the management of radioactive waste containing
chemically and biologically hazardous substances, even
though other specific requirements may additionally be
applicable as per relevant standards.
Periodic reports are submitted to AERB in
prescribed forms. AERB also conducts regular inspection
of these plant sites to verify compliance with the laid down
requirements. Every five years, prior to renewal of license
for operation of these facilities, the adequacy of waste
management arrangements and their impact on the
environment are thoroughly reviewed.
The independent Environmental Survey Laboratories

(ESL) of the Health, Safety and Environment Group,
BARC carry out environmental surveillance at all the
operating nuclear power plants at sites. The liquid and
gaseous radioactive wastes discharged to the environment
during the year 2014 from the operating Units were only a
small fraction of the prescribed technical specification
limits. The technical specification limits on release of
radioactive effluents for all the nuclear power plants were
revised with effect from January 1, 2010. This has resulted
in change of discharges of some of the effluents, in terms of
percentage of technical specifications, from the year 2010
onwards as compared to the previous year. However,
absolute discharges from all NPPs were, in general, similar
to those in the previous years. The liquid and gaseous
discharges from the plant for the year 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013 and 2014 as percentage of limits prescribed in
technical specifications for operations of respective
stations are presented in the Figures 5.1 (a) to 5.1(f).
Radiation dose to members of the public near the
operating plants is estimated based on measurements of
radionuclide concentration in items of diet, i.e.,
vegetables, cereals, milk, meat, fish, etc and through intake
of air and water. It is seen that the effective dose to public
around all NPP sites is far less than the annual limit of 1
mSv (1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed by AERB. The
effective doses to the members of the public due to the
release of radioactive effluents from the plants are
presented in the Figures 5.2 (a) and 5.2 (b).
The liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents discharged to the

environment from the operating NPPs were a small fraction of the
prescribed limits.
The effective dose to public around all NPP sites is only a small
percentage of the annual limit of 1 mSv prescribed by AERB.
67
Fig 5.1 (a) : Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)

% of Tech spec. limit
25
20
15
10
5
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
2010
0.00
0.42
7.50
15.73
9.91
4.5
0.24
12.22
1.53
0.40
2011
0.00
0.25
13.80
4.36
9.85
5.52
0.44
8.10
2.38
0.46
2012
0.00
2.19
9.86
6.86
11.51
4.94
0.35
8.39
2.97
0.57
2013
0.00
1.90
22.21
12.87
10.36
6.72
0.45
15.88
3.27
0.17
1.03
2014
0.00
0.99
18.78
8.54
8.07
6.42
0.35
19.34
4.22
0.079
21.62
Note: 1) TAPS 1&2 are Boiling Water Reactors. Hence, there is no generation / discharge of Tritium.
2) The data of MAPS pertain to transfer of liquid waste to Centralised Waste Management Facility
(CWMF) at Kalpakkam for processing & discharge to the environment.
3) At KKNPP Unit-1, during operation of the reactor, a small amount of tritium gets generated. The
station is authorized to discharge a miniscule amount of tritium through its effluent, after
treatment. The authorized limits being very small, the discharges are reflected as significant
percentage of authorized limit, even though the actual discharge amount is negligible from
radiological safety considerations.
4) KKNPP-1 was commissioned in 2013, due to which data reported for KKNPP-1 is from 2013 only.
Fig 5.1 (b) : Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Gross beta)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
2010
0.55
0.77
18.00
6.78
1.77
0.032
0.10
6.78
0.57
0.06
2011
0.29
0.81
20.41
7.80
1.24
0.253
0.02
3.92
0.22
0.04
2012
0.26
0.94
22.92
6.03
1.31
0.00
0.01
5.45
0.53
0.53
2013
0.19
0.36
39.92
7.36
0.86
2.43
0.03
4.71
1.04
0.45
0.17
2014
0.18
0.24
8.39
9.48
0.50
0.29
0.02
7.01
0.11
0.11
0.31
Note: Gross beta activity value reported by MAPS-1&2 is the activity transferred to CWMF of BARC. The
Gross beta activity in liquid effluent release was high in the year 2013 as Unit-2 was shut down for 209
days.
68
Fig 5.1 (c): Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
2010
0.00
3.89
9.96
3.86
5.13
3.03
6.69
1.01
0.35
1.62
2011
0.00
4.20
8.19
2.89
7.02
2.86
6.60
1.63
0.62
2.84
2012
0.00
6.42
6.71
3.28
7.56
3.94
4.87
1.62
1.35
4.73
2013
0.00
5.85
5.48
3.85
3.99
4.63
4.06
2.18
0.92
2.43
0.00
2014
0.00
8.14
7.40
2.24
4.70
8.75
4.07
1.84
1.03
2.43
0.00
Note: TAPS 1&2 are Boiling Water Reactors. Hence, there is no generation / discharge of Tritium.
Fig 5.1 (d) : Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Argon-41)

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
2010
0.00
39.04
19.87
6.96
3.16
0.13
4.84
1.22
0.03
3.47
2011
0.00
43.72
20.16
6.06
6.26
0.06
2.12
0.74
0.12
4.46
2012
0.00
36.86
20.33
2.91
2.88
0.00
1.35
0.54
0.08
2.48
2013
0.00
25.29
13.98
2.61
5.18
0.00
1.37
1.14
0.34
0.50
0.00
2014
0.00
27.97
18.41
2.65
2.92
0.25
1.03
0.69
0.40
1.49
0.00
Note: Argon-41 releases from RAPS-1&2 and MAPS are high as compared to other units due to air filled
calandria vault and use of air for annulus gas system.
69
Fig 5.1 (e): Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Fission Product Noble Gas)
25
20
15
10
5
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
2010
11.94
3.26
6.00
2.38
7.77
9.43
21.30
9.81
0.05
6.36
2011
8.79
17.60
3.09
1.58
14.09
13.82
4.87
21.33
0.03
19.45
2012
6.29
14.55
1.36
4.40
8.84
8.32
2.03
20.00
0.20
6.91
2013
6.72
1.66
0.99
4.73
10.38
3.50
2.03
6.62
0.59
1.09
0.002
2014
10.85
0.11
4.18
1.01
5.39
5.67
7.25
12.13
0.75
1.09
0.140
Fig 5.1 (f) : Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Iodine-131)
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
TAPS
1&2
RAPS
1&2
MAPS
1&2
NAPS
1&2
KAPS
1&2
2010
5.21
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.91
2011
3.02
3.24
0.16
0.22
3.71
2012
2.30
0.16
0.22
0.23
2013
4.41
0.00
0.04
2014
4.70
0.00
0.40
KGS
1&2
RAPS
3&4
TAPS
3&4
KGS
3&4
RAPS KKNPP
5&6
1
0.91
0.51
0.04
0.05
0.53
1.21
0.01
0.03
1.06
0.12
2.06
0.05
0.52
0.08
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.29
0.02
0.00
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.62
Note: In the technical specifications of TAPS 1 & 2, the limit for Iodine - 131 releases includes the discharge of
particulate activity also.
70
Fig 5.2 (a): Public Dose at 1.6 Km Distance from NPPs

(AERB Prescribed Annual Limit is 1000 micro-sievert)
Effective dose (Sv)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Tarapur
Site
Rawatbhata
Site
Kalpakkam
site
Narora
Site
Kakrapara
Site
Kaiga
Site
Kudankulam
Site
10.15
39.60
22.93
0.42
0.75
1.47
2011
7.42
36.30
19.50
0.48
0.88
1.90
2012
5.52
39.88
29.88
0.56
0.78
1.24
2013
6.94
27.4
15.52
0.56
0.92
0.8
0.001
2014
8.71
41.01
23.14
0.44
0.76
1.10
0.081
2010
Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites is relatively higher as compared to other reactors sites,
due to release of Ar-41 from RAPS-2 and MAPS. At Tarapur site, it is high due to release of FPNG from
TAPS 1 & 2.
Fig 5.2 (b): Total Effective Dose in Different Zones during the Year 2014
(AERB Prescribed Annual Limit is 1000 micro-sievert)
45
Effective dose (Sv)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Tarapur
Site
Rawatbhata
Site
Kalpakkam
site
Narora
Site
Kakrapara
Site
Kaiga
Site
Kudankulam
Site
1.6km
8.71
41.01
23.14
0.44
0.76
1.10
0.08
1.6-5km
3.65
18.34
13.94
0.35
0.52
0.90
0.02
5-10km
1.50
6.46
5.38
0.29
0.34
0.60
0.01
10-15km
0.89
2.47
2.79
0.28
0.30
0.40
0.006
15-30km
0.47
1.41
1.03
0.27
0.29
0.20
0.004
Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites is relatively higher as compared to other sites, due to
release of Ar-41 from RAPS-2 and MAPS. At Tarapur site, it is high due to release of FPNG from TAPS 1 & 2.
71
5.2
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
In each NPP, a Radiological Safety Officer (RSO)

and Alternate RSO are designated by the competent
authority to implement the radiation protection
programme. The RSOs are entrusted with the
responsibility for providing radiological surveillance and
safety support functions. These include radiological
monitoring of workplace, plant systems, personnel,
effluents, carrying out exposure control, exposure
investigations, analysis and trending of radioactivity in
plant systems.
All NPPs have radiation safety programme and
work procedures intended to control the occupational
exposures. AERB Safety Manual on Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Facilities (AERB/NF/SM/O-2 Rev.4, 2005)
specifies Dose Limits and Investigation Levels (IL) for
occupational workers to control the individual doses. As
per AERB directives for an occupational worker, annual
dose limit is 30 mSv, with the condition that it should not

exceed 100 mSv in a span of 5 years. The specified annual
dose constraint for radiation exposure of temporary
worker is 15-mSv. For better exposure control, the
individual cases are investigated and controlled at an early
stage so as to avoid reaching the AERB specified dose
limits. Following ILs are applicable to the nuclear facilities.
Monthly dose
10 mSv
Quarterly dose
15 mSv
Annual dose
20 mSv
The information on number of workers in NPPs

who received dose between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30
mSv during the year 2014 is given in Table: 5.1. There was
no case of individual radiation exposure above the
prescribed annual dose limit of 30 mSv.
Table 5.1: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2014)

NPP
Number of
monitored
persons
Average dose
for monitored
person
(mSv)
Number of
persons
received
dose
Average dose
among dose
receivers
(mSv)
Number of workers
received dose in the range
< 20
(mSv)
20-30
(mSv)
>30
(mSv)
TAPS-1&2
1163
2.45
943
3.03
943
RAPS-1&2
1154
2.68
938
3.30
938
MAPS-1&2
1249
2.18
1134
2.41
1134
NAPS-1&2
1422
1.50
1109
1.93
1109
KAPS-1&2
1363
1.02
1060
1.31
1060
KGS-1&2
1466
1.12
1114
1.48
1114
RAPS-3&4
1447
1.36
1102
1.97
1102
TAPS-3&4
1592
0.57
943
0.96
943
KGS -3&4
1292
0.66
807
1.06
807
RAPS 5&6
1289
0.97
978
1.27
978
KKNPP-1
1643
0.05
212
0.41
212
72
Figure 5.3 gives collective dose for operation and maintenance of NPPs (excluding the dose for special campaign
like EMCCR and EMFR) for last 5 years.
Fig. 5.3: Collective Dose (Person-Sv) at NPPs

6
5
4
2010
2011
2012
2
2013
2014
1
0
Note: Collective dose of KKNPP-1 is very less as there was no refueling outage in the year 2013 and 2014.
The information on the number of workers in medical, industrial and research institutions who received exposures
during the year 2014 is given in Table 5.2
Table 5.2: Radiation doses received by workers in Medical Industrial and Research Institutions
during 2014*
Category of
radiation
worker
No. of
Averaged
No. of Averaged
monitored dose for persons
dose
persons monitored receiving
for
persons
dose
exposed
(mSv)
greater persons
than zero (mSv)
No.of workers receiving annual

individual dose excluding zero dose
D(mSv)
0<D
<20
20<D
<30
30<D
<40
40<D
<50
D>50
Diagnostic x-rays
64815
0.3
24834
0.8
24816
16
Radiation Therapy
10488
0.21
3916
0.55
3916
Nuclear Medicine
2377
0.52
1365
0.9
1365
Industrial
Radiography &
Radiation
processing
7588
0.43
2324
1.41
2313
Research
4372
0.11
1315
0.37
1315
89640
0.3
33754
0.8
33725
23
Total
*The data does not include excessive exposure cases under investigation.
73
The information on number of workers in

Medical, Industrial and Research institutions, who
exceeded radiation exposures in different ranges during
the year 2013, was given in Table 5.3 of AERB annual
report for the year 2013-14. The information for the year
2013 is now updated incorporating the outcome of
investigation of excessive exposure cases that have been
concluded and is given in Table 5.2 (a) below.
Table 5.2 (a) Radiation doses received by workers in Medical Industrial and Research Institutions
during 2013
Category of
radiation
worker
No. of
Averaged
No. of Averaged
monitored dose for persons
dose
persons monitored receiving
for
persons
dose
exposed
(mSv)
greater persons
than zero (mSv)
No.of workers receiving annual

individual dose excluding zero dose
D(mSv)
0<D
<20
20<D
<30
30<D
<40
40<D
<50
D>50
Diagnostic x-rays
59900
0.34
22615
0.89
22586
16
10
Radiation Therapy
10395
0.22
3952
0.56
3952
Nuclear Medicine
2273
0.46
1223
0.86
1221
Industrial
Radiography &
Radiation
processing
7582
0.43
2746
1.2
2737
Research
4379
0.1
1062
0.41
1062
84529
0.32
31598
0.86
31558
23
10
Total
The information on number of workers in various Fuel Cycle Facilities who received radiation doses less than 20 mSv,
between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30 mSv during the year 2014 is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities
Type of Facilities
Uranium mines
(UCIL)
Number
of
Exposed
Persons
Average
Dose for
Exposed
Persons
(mSv)
Maximum
Dose of
Exposed
Persons
(mSv)
Jaduguda
925
2.51
Bhatin
60
Narwapahar
Number of workers
received dose in the range
< 20
(mSv)
20-30
(mSv)
>30
(mSv)
9.97
925
0.83
2.03
60
853
3.76
7.02
853
Turamdih
688
3.27
8.36
688
Bagjata
554
3.21
5.03
554
Banduhurang
369
1.70
2.85
369
Mohuldih
193
3.68
6.63
193
Tummalapalle
1407
4.41
13.35
1407
Jaduguda
476
1.89
8.13
476
Chavara
Thorium mines and
mineral separation (IREL) Chatrapur
80
0.64
4.77
80
36
0.87
5.61
36
Manavalakurichi
171
1.5
11.22
171
Udyogamandal
317
0.75
8.29
317
Chatrapur
166
1.03
4.35
166
1167
Uranium mill (UCIL)
Thorium mill (IREL)

Fuel fabrication
(NFC)
#
Location
these figures are for external dose
74
Hyderabad
1167
0.41
5.4
Chapter 6
Emergency
Preparedness
CHAPTER 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in India are
designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in
conformity with relevant nuclear safety requirements.
These requirements ensure an adequate margin of safety
so that NPPs can be operated without undue radiological
risks to the plant personnel and members of the public.
State of the art safety measures are provided based on
principles of defense-in-depth, redundancy (more
numbers than required) and diversity (back-up systems
operating on different principles). These include fail safe
shutdown system to safely shutdown the reactor,
combination of active and passive (systems working on
natural phenomena and not needing motive power or
operator action) cooling systems to remove the heat from
the core at all times and a robust containment systems for
confining any release of radioactivity. Not withstanding
these, it is mandatory to develop Emergency Preparedness
and Response (EPR) Plans as a measure of abundant
caution. These plans are prepared in accordance with the
national laws and regulations and deals with the effective
management of any eventuality with a potential to pose an
undue radiological risk to the plant personnel and public.
Similarly, EPR plans are ensured for nuclear
facilities under the purview of AERB handling hazardous
chemicals namely ammonia and hydrogen sulphide based
Heavy Water Plants (HWPs) and some of the heavy water
plants catering to the production of solvents. These plans
are prepared as per AERB safety guidelines on On-Site
and Off-Site Emergency Preparedness for Non-nuclear
installations and deals with the effective management of
any eventuality with a potential to pose an undue chemical
risk to the plant personnel and public.
AERB reviews and approves the emergency
preparedness and response plans for both plant and onsite emergency situation whereas off-site emergency plans
are reviewed by AERB and approved by the District
authority / Local Government.
AERB ensures that necessary EPR plans are

in place and emergency exercises are
conducted before issuing regulatory consent
for operation of nuclear power plants.
Site-specific emergency preparedness plans of
the respective stations are tested by carrying out periodic
emergency exercises involving the station authorities,
district administration, and the members of public on
sample basis. These exercises are used for twin purposes:
(a) familiarization of personnel concerned with the

management and implementation of emergency response
measures and (b) assess the adequacy of these plans and
improve them based on feedback from exercises. Plant
Emergency Exercises (PEE) are carried out once in a
quarter by each NPP. Site Emergency Exercise (SEE) and
Off-Site Emergency Exercise (OSEE) are carried out by
each site once in a year and once in two years respectively.
During the periodic regulatory inspections of NPPs, AERB
reviews the preparedness of plants to handle emergencies
to verify that this is in accordance with the approved plans.
Periodic Site Emergency Exercises (SEE) and OffSite Emergency Exercises (OSEE) were carried out at
hydrogen sulphide based HWPs at Manuguru and Kota.
SEEs are carried out once in 6 months and OSEEs once in
a year. SEEs, Periodic Emergency Exercises (PEEs) & Fire
mock exercises are carried out at ammonia based HWPs at
Baroda, Thal, Hazira and Talcher. PEEs are carried out
once in a quarter and fire mock exercises are carried out
once in 2 months.
OSEE mock exercises were conducted at HWP,
Kota on December 24, 2014 and at HWP, Manuguru on
December 17, 2014. AERB officials witnessed the actual
OSEE mock exercises at some of the HWPs sites. The
response of the plant personnel, officials & public involved
in the exercise and general level of the awareness amongst
the public were good. The mock exercise reports were
reviewed in AERB. The number of site and offsite
emergency exercises carried out at the NPP sites in 2014 is
given in Table 6.1. AERB officials witnessed site
emergency exercises at four stations. During the year
2014, OSEE was conducted at KKNPP. AERB officials
witnessed this OSEE.
Table 6.1: Site and off-site emergency exercises
carried out in the year 2014
NPP Sites
SEE
OSEE
*Tarapur Site
*Rawatbhata Site
*Kalpakkam Site
*Narora Site
*Kakrapar Site
*Kaiga Site
1
1
KKNPP
*The OSEE was conducted at these sites in the year 2013 and
thereby the exercise is not due during the year 2014.
75
Review of Preparedness for Off-Site Emergency at

NPP Sites
AERB has prepared detailed checklist for AERB
observers during site & off-site emergency exercises and
for regulatory inspections to check the emergency
preparedness of NPPs. During the year 2014, AERB
officials carried out special regulatory inspections on
emergency preparedness aspects and participated in site
emergency exercises as an observer at NPP sites, viz.
Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Kakrapar and in off-site
emergency exercise conducted at KK-NPP site. The
observations made during these exercises / inspections
were sent to stations for implementation of the corrective
actions. SARCOP carried out a detailed review of the
observations made by AERB officials during these
exercises and inspections.
The OSEE at KK-NPP was in general satisfactory
and in line with the approved emergency preparedness
and response plans. The coordination among plant
personnel, district officials, various emergency response
agencies and public involved in the exercise was good and
their response / action were timely. During the review,
some of the areas for improvement identified includes, the
participation of all the identified district official in the
exercises, harmonization of procedures among all NPP
sites to the extent possible, exercising the coordination
among all the agencies involved in managing emergencies
at plant, site and off-site level during off-site emergency
exercises, etc. All NPP sites have been asked to
appropriately address areas of improvement in emergency
preparedness manual and the procedures for conducting
emergency exercises.
Review of AERB Guidelines
Preparedness Plans for NPPs
on
Emergency
AERB has published safety documents bringing

out guidelines for preparation of emergency preparedness
plan for nuclear facilities as well as non-nuclear facilities.
Subsequent to the Fukushima accident at Fukushima
NPPs, Japan, assessment of these guidelines was done
within AERB and by NDMA. IAEA also published a
general Safety Guide on Criteria for Use in Preparedness
and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency
(IAEA Safety Standard Series No. GS G-2) during the year
2011. In the light of these developments, AERB has
revised the safety guide Intervention Levels and Derived
Intervention levels for Off-Site Radiation Emergency and
published it as AERB/SG/EP-5 Criteria for Planning,
Preparedness and Response for Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency. This safety guidelines provides criteria for
establishing an emergency preparedness and response
plan for nuclear and radiation facilities to deal with nuclear
and radiological emergency. The implementation of this
76
new guideline at NPPs is in progress. AERB has also

undertaken revision of safety guide Preparation of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Plan (AERB/SG/EP-2).
Creation of On-Site Emergency Support Centre at
NPPs
Based on the reviews undertaken on safety
assessments of Indian NPPs, in light of the accident at
Fukushima NPPs, AERB had mandated the requirement
for establishing the On-Site Emergency Support Centre
(OESC) at all NPP sites. AERB had constituted an
Advisory Committee to develop the guidelines for
establishing OESC at all NPP sites. AERB after a detailed
review accepted the generic guidelines for establishing
OESC and had asked NPCIL to submit design basis report
for the site specific OESC for all NPP sites in accordance
with the accepted generic guidelines. In this regard, the
design basis report of civil structure for OESC for a typical
site has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. NPCIL has
been asked to submit roadmap for the establishment of
OESC with all required features.
AERB mandated the requirement for

establishing the On-Site Emergency Support
Centre (OESC) at all NPP sites.
Establishment of Nuclear and Radiological
Emergency Monitoring Cell at AERB
The implementation of off-site emergency
preparedness and response plan during actual emergency
situation in public domain is the responsibility of District,
State and National Authority and Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE). As per the existing requirements, the
information of any nuclear and radiological emergency
situation in India is to be reported to these authorities,
including AERB. In order to strengthen the monitoring of
progress of emergencies and the review of actions taken by
the involved agencies, a Nuclear and Radiological
Emergency Monitoring Cell (NREMC) is being established
at AERB. The cell consists of experts who will activate the
cell on short notice to assess the emergency situation and
the actions performed by various agencies to handle the
emergency. The infrastructure required for this cell,
including communication facilities, documents and
protocols to obtain the information during emergency
condition from the concerned agencies during
emergencies have been established. The Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) of NREMC has been prepared
and issued which details on the roles & responsibilities,
communication mechanism and mechanism for
responding to emergency. The NREMC was activated
during the off-site emergency exercise at KK-NPP site to
review the effectiveness of SOP.
Highlights of IRRS peer review on Regulatory

Aspects of Emergency Preparedness and Response
(EPR)
As a part of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory
Review Service (IRRS) Mission of AERB, which was
carried out during March 17-27, 2015, the role of AERB
with respect to EPR aspects were also reviewed.
A few members from the IRRS Mission team
accompanied the regulatory inspection team of AERB to
KAPS site to see the Emergency Preparedness and
Response arrangements at the site.
that occurs in another state that has ratified the treaty. The
Crisis Management Group of Department of Atomic
Energy (CMG-DAE) is the national contact point for India
for these conventions. Periodic exercises are conducted by
IAEA for training and preparedness of the involved
agencies. These exercises are of three types, viz. ConvEx-1
covers communication & notification aspects, ConvEx-2
covers aspects related to requesting and / or providing
assistance during emergencies, and ConvEx-3 cover all
aspects of early notification & assistance convention.
During the year 2014, representative from AERB
participated in the following two exercises.
l
Emergency
Participation in Emergency Exercises Conducted

by IAEA
India is signatory under the IAEA Conventions on
Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and Assistance in
case of Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency.
Under these conventions, India has agreed to provide
notification of any nuclear accident that occur within its
jurisdiction that could affect other countries and any
assistance can be provided in the case of a nuclear accident
Exercise ConvEx-2a on April 29,

2014 to test the ability of national competent
authorities to complete the appropriate reporting
forms.
l
Emergency
Exercise
ConvEx-2b
during
September 2-4, 2014 to test the ability of national
competent authorities to complete the
appropriate reporting forms and provide the
assistance to the requesting state.
77
Chapter 7
Safety Documents
CHAPTER 7
SAFETY DOCUMENTS
AERB has established, within the legal and
regulatory framework, mechanism for development,
review and revisions of regulatory documents for use in
regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities and related
activities covered by the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and as
envisaged under AERB Safety Code on 'Regulation of
Nuclear and Radiation Facilities' AERB/SC/G. AERB
follows graded approach in document development
process which is specified in AERB/NRF/SG/G-6 (Rev. 1).
Regulatory safety documents issued by AERB are
classified in the following decreasing order of hierarchy:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Safety codes
Safety standards
Safety guides
Safety manuals
Technical documents
The requirements covered in safety codes and

safety standards are mandatory in nature. The safety guide
is a safety document containing detailed guidance and
methodologies that are acceptable to AERB to implement
the specific parts of a safety code / safety standard. Safety
guides are recommendatory nature.
AERB involves experts, utility and interested
parties in the development of the regulations and guides
through whom the comments and feedback are received
throughout the development stage. Technological
advances, international guidelines, research and
development work, relevant operational lessons learned
and institutional knowledge are considered as appropriate
in development / revision of the regulations and guides.
Feedback from nuclear and radiation facilities is also taken
for preparation of new document or for revision of an
existing document.
AERB has issued regulations and guides which
provide adequate coverage commensurate with the
radiation risks associated with the facilities and activities, in
accordance with a graded approach. The progress on
regulatory safety documents during the year is given below:
7.1
1.
NEW SAFETY DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED
AERB Revised Safety Code 'Site Evaluation

of Nuclear Facilities' [AERB/NF/SC/S (Rev.
1)]
AERB Safety Code titled 'Code of Practice on
'Siting of Nuclear Power Plants', AERB/SC/S was
published in 1990, to provide the requirements to be met
during siting of Nuclear Power Plants in India for assuring

safety. The present safety code is revised to reflect
developments, which have taken place since then. The
revised AERB Safety Code 'Site Evaluation of Nuclear
Facilities' supersedes the earlier version.
Previous version of the Safety Code was related to
land based stationary nuclear power plants (NPP), while
the scope of the revised Safety Code has been extended to
cover a comprehensive range of land based nuclear
facilities: nuclear power plants and research reactors, as
well as nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
The revised Safety Code prescribes requirements
for site evaluation for limiting the radiological impact and
categorizes the nuclear facilities into Category-1 (highest
radiological hazard) to Category-4 (conventional)
facilities. It also covers assessment of site characteristics,
natural events and human - induced events specific to the
site, which will have a bearing on the safety of the nuclear
facility and radiological impact on the environment and
population due to the nuclear facility at the site during
normal operation and accident conditions. In addition,
adequacies of new provisions in the light of lessons learnt
from Fukushima accident have also been examined.
Considerations for additional safety margins beyond
those considered for design basis events and assessment
of impact of cliff edge effects on safety of nuclear facility
have been brought out in the revised code. Dose criteria
for normal operation and accident conditions for nuclear
power plants in the code are revised and are also
specified for nuclear facilities other than nuclear power
plants.
2.
AERB Safety Code 'Design of Light Water

Reactor Based Nuclear Power Plants'
(AERB/NPP-LWR/SC/D)
AERB Safety Code on ' Design of Light Water

Reactor Based Nuclear Power Plants' provides mandatory
requirements for the design of light water based Nuclear
Power Plants (NPP) and is intended to ensure the highest
level of safety that can reasonably be achieved and
maintained. The 'safety code' establishes the design
requirements for the structures, systems and components
(SSC) of a light water based nuclear power plant for safe
operation and for preventing events that could
compromise safety, or for mitigating the consequences of
such events, if they do occur and organizational processes
important to safety, that are required to be met.
79
The safety code expands the well-established

concept of plant states and defense in depth by introducing
Design extension conditions including severe accidents.
The code also specifies additional safety requirements for
supporting the accident management infrastructure that
may be needed to handle events, along with unexpected
failure of all existing safety features / systems. The
requirements in the code also take into account the lessons
learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi, Japan nuclear
accident.
3.
Revised AERB Safety Guidelines Criteria

for Planning, Preparedness and Response
for Nuclear or Radiological Emergency
[AERB/SG/EP-5 (Rev.1)]
AERB Safety Guidelines on Criteria for Planning,

Preparedness and Response for Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency provides criteria for establishing an
emergency preparedness and response plan for nuclear
and radiation facilities to deal with nuclear and
radiological emergency. The criteria provided in this
guidelines is to undertake protective actions and other
response actions in precautionary action one (PAZ), urgent
protective action zone (UPZ), extended planning distance
(EPD) and ingestion and commodities planning distance
(ICPD) which replace existing Space - Time Domains
specified in the present safety guide AERB/SG/HS-1
'Intervention Levels and Derived Intervention Levels for
Off-Site Radiological Emergency' published in the year
1992.
This Safety Guidelines provides reference levels,
generic criteria, emergency action levels, operational
intervention levels including numerical values for these
criteria for protective actions and other response actions in
the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. This
Safety Guidelines also provides guidance dose value for
protection of emergency workers and the public in the
event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
releases were considered as the level of concern for

determination of screening distance value (SDV) for the
location of control room air inlet paths, while the Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) were considered for
determination of SDV for the site boundary.
5.
AERB safety guide on Commissioning of

Pressurized Water Reactor based Nuclear Power Plants
elaborates the general steps to meet the requirement
mentioned in the AERB safety code on Nuclear Power
Plant Operation [AERB/NPP/SC/O (Rev.1)], with respect
to commissioning of pressurized water reactor based
nuclear power plants in India. Experience gained during
commissioning review of KKNPP-1 was utilized in
finalizing this guide.
The safety guide provides details on the
organization and responsibilities of various groups
involved in commissioning, commissioning programme,
commissioning tests to be performed, commissioning of
engineering safety features designed to mitigate any
accidents in the unlikely event of their occurrence and
documents to be submitted to regulatory body during precommissioning and post-commissioning activities.
The safety guide also elaborates on specific
aspects of pressurized water reactor such as fuel loading,
documents to be verified during commissioning of nuclear
power plant, baseline data to be collected for maintenance
and life management, list of hazards and malfunctions
during commissioning, pre-operational checks, initial
criticality, low power and power tests etc. are included in
the guide. The typical contents of commissioning
procedures and format for commissioning reports are also
included in the guide.
6.
4.
AERB Safety Guide Evaluation of Design

Basis
for
External
Human-induced
Events for Nuclear Power Plants
(AERB/NPP/SG/S-7)
The safety guide provides guidance for

identifying various human activities in the region of the
proposed nuclear power plant that may have potential to
challenge safety, determining possible impact resulting
from such events and analyzing consequences to arrive at
a suitable design basis. This safety guide covers guidance
on important events such as hazardous gas releases,
explosion, fire, aircraft crash, blasting, mining etc., which
have potential for adverse impact on the nuclear power
plant. The Short Term Exposure Limits (STEL) for toxic
80
AERB Safety Guide Commissioning of

Pressurized Water Reactor Based Nuclear
Power Plants (AERB/NPP-PWR/SG/O-4 C)
AERB Safety Guidelines Safety Aspects in

Design and Operation of Heavy Water
Plants (AERB/HWP/SG-1)
The safety guidelines provides requirements

and guidance on siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation and decommissioning for
Heavy Water Plants, based on isotopic exchange between
hydrogen sulphide - water and ammonia - hydrogen
processes. The guidelines addresses various aspects of
operational hazards, the design & operational safety
features of critical equipment, guidance on maintenance &
modification and appropriate monitoring and control
techniques to protect workers, public and environment
from industrial hazards associated with these operations.
Emergency preparedness aspects and the need for training
and authorization of operating personnel have also been

outlined in the document.
the participating agencies in fulfilling relevant stipulated

requirements and related guidance.
7.
7.3
SAFETY
DOCUMENTS
DEVELOPMENT
1.
AERB Safety Code titled Transport

Radioactive Materials [SC/TR-1/(Rev.1)]
2.
AERB Safety Code titled Industrial Radiography

[AERB/RF-IR/SC-1 (Rev. 1)]
3.
AERB Safety Code titled Radiation Processing

Facilities (AERB/RF-RPF/SC-1)
4.
AERB Safety Guidelines titled Development and

Application of Lasers (AERB/SG/IS-7)
5.
AERB Safety Guide titled Preparation,

Transport, Handling, Storage of Radioactive
Consignments and Emergency Response
Planning, Preparedness for Transport Accidents
involving Radioactive Material [AERB/RFTR/SG-1 (Rev.1)]
6.
AERB Safety Guide titled Ionising Radiation

Gauging Devices(Nucleonic Gauges) and Well
Logging Applications(AERB/RF-IGD/SG-1)
AERB Safety Guidelines Life Management

of Heavy Water Plants (AERB/HWP/SG-2)
The safety guidelines provides requirements

and guidance for planning and implementing an effective
life management programme for the new and presently
operating Heavy Water Plants. The guidelines addresses
on the issues related to such causative factors, timely
detection of incipient failures and preventive / mitigation
measures during various stages of a heavy water plant such
as siting, design, construction, pre-operation and
operation phases. The guidelines elaborates on the
essential factors to be considered for a comprehensive
assessment on the ability of the structures, systems and
components important to safety for performing their
intended functions reliably as per intended safety margins,.
8.
AERB
Safety
Manual
'Regulatory
Inspection
for
Radiation
Facilities'
(AERB/RF/SM/G-3)
The safety manual elaborates on the

organisation requirements, inspection programme,
methodology of inspection and suggested types of
enforcement actions for various radiation facilities. It
includes typical checklists for carrying out regulatory
inspection of such facilities. It is also intended to assist all
7.2
UNDER
of
SAFETY DOCUMENTS TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED IN HINDI
S. No. Title
Reference No. with publication year
1.
Control of Works
AERB/NRF/SG/IS-1 (Rev. 1), 2011
2.
Fire Protection Systems for Nuclear Facilities
AERB/NF/SS/FPS (Rev. 1), 2010
3.
Computer Based Systems of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors
AERB/NPP-PHWR/SG/D-25, 2010
4.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors
AERB/NPP&RR/SG/RW-8, 2009
5.
Uranium Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facilities
AERB/FE-FCF/SG-3, 2009
6.
Seismic Qualification of Structures, Systems and Components of

Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors
AERB/NPP-PHWR/SG/D-23, 2009
7.
Quality Assurance in Nuclear Power Plants
AERB/NPP/SC/QA (Rev. 1), 2009
8.
Extreme Values of Meteorological Parameters
AERB/NF/SG/S-3, 2008
Consenting Process for Radiation Facilities

Volume-1
AERB/RF/SG/G-3 (Vol. 1 of 4) 2011
10

Volume-2
11

Volume-3
AERB/RF/SG/G-3 (Vol. 3of 4) 2011
12

Volume-4
81
7.
AERB Safety Guide titled Gamma Irradiation

Chambers(AERB/RF-RPF/SG-1)
7.
Safety Guide DS 381: Safety of Nuclear Fuel

Cycle Research and Development Facilities
8.
AERB Safety Guide titled Dosimetry in Food

Processing by Gamma Radiation (AERB/RFRPF/SG-2)
7.4.2
IAEA Draft Document Profile (DPPs)
1.
DPP DS489: Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel
9.
AERB Safety Guide titled Medical Cyclotron

Facilities(AERB/RF-MED/SG-2)
2.
DPP DS490: Seismic Design and Qualification

for Nuclear power Plants
10.
AERB Safety Guide titled Isotope Production

Laboratories(AERB/RF-RS/SG-2)
3.
DPP DS491: Deterministic Safety Analysis for

Nuclear power Plants
11.
AERB Safety Manual titled Annual Collective

Dose Budget for Nuclear Power Plants
(AERB/NF/SM/O-3)
4.
DPP DS492: Human Factors Engineering in

Nuclear power Plants
5.
7.4
REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT DOCUMENTS
DPP NST051: Security during the Lifetime of a

Nuclear Facility
The following draft IAEA safety standards and

document profiles were reviewed in AERB during 201415.
6.
DPP DS484: Revision of the Safety Requirements

NS-R-3 on Site Evaluation for Nuclear
Installations
7.4.1
IAEA Draft Documents
7.
1.
Safety Guide DS419: Radiation Protection and

Safety in Well Logging
7 DPP DS485: Revision of the Safety Guide NSG-2.12 on Ageing Management and Programme
for Long Term Operation for Nuclear Power
Plants
2.
Safety Guide DS420: Radiation Protection and

Safety in Nuclear Gauges
8.
DPP DS486: Revision of SSG-16 on Establishing

the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power
Programme
3.
Safety Guide DS454: Predisposal Management

of Radioactive Waste from the Use of Radioactive
Materials in Medicine, Industry, Agriculture,
Research and Education
9.
DPP DS487: Revision of NS-G-1.4 Design of Fuel

Handling and Storage Systems for Nuclear Power
Plants
4.
Safety Guide DS455: Establishing

Infrastructure for Radiation Safety
the
10.
DPP DS488: Revision of NS-G-1.12 - Design of

the Reactor Core for Nuclear Power Plants
5.
Safety Guide DS460: Communication and

Consultation with Interested Parties by the
Regulatory Body
11.
DPP NST045: Computer Security for Nuclear

Security
12.
6.
IAEA Tec Doc: Consideration of the application of

IAEA Safety Requirements for Design of Nuclear
Power Plants
DPP NST049: Detection of Nuclear and other

Radioactive Material at Undesignated Points of
Entry and Exit
82
Chapter 8
Safety Analysis
and Research
CHAPTER 8
SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH
8.1
8.1.1
SEVERE
ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
concluded that the thermal hydraulics code

SCDAP/RELAP5 can be used in predecting the channel
failure and collapse under a SA scenario for 540 MWe
PHWR. The code was also used for simulationg SA
conditons in BWRs.
2000
PT-CT average Temperature (K)
AERB recognizes the importance of safety

analysis and research in support of its regulatory work as it
helps in obtaining deeper insights into the issues
concerning nuclear and radiation safety. Safety analysis
activities to support the regulatory decisions are being
carried out by AERB divisions namely, Nuclear Safety
Analysis Division (NSAD), Siting & Structural Engineering
Division (SSED), Industrial Plants Safety Division (IPSD)
and at Safety Research Institute (SRI), Kalpakkam. The
significant safety analysis work carried out in nuclear and
radiation safety areas are; reactor safety analysis including
deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis, reactor
physics, severe accident analysis, hydrogen distribution
and mitigation, international collaborative safety analysis
exercises, structural analysis, thermal hydraulic and
radiological impact assessment. The highlights of safety
analysis and R & D activities are presented below.
Channel Collapse
1000
Loop 1 Channel 1
Loop 1 Channel 4
Loop 1 Channel 6
&
10000
20000
30000
40000
Time (s)
Fig. 8.1.1: PT-CT average temperature
Severe Accident Analysis for 540 MWe

PHWRs
8.1.2
The objective of the analysis was to perform an

independent assessment and to study the capability of the
thermal hydraulic system code RELAP5/MOD3.4 to
simulate various severe accident (SA) conditions in 540
MWe PHWRs. Scenarios like Extended Station Black Out
(ESBO) and Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) along with
Loss of Emergency Core Cooling System (LOECCS) and
Loss of Moderator Heat Sink (LOMHS) were studied. In
the ESBO analysis, credit of any mitigatory action was not
considered and was carried out for more than 7 days. For
the analysis, the channels were clubbed based on their
elevation and the flow to power ratio. Due to assumption
of unavailability of any heat sink, the accident proceeds to
severe accident domain causing multiple fuel channel
failures leading to core degradation. Pressure TubeCalandria Tube (PT-CT) average temperature is shown in
Figure 8.1.1. As can be seen from the figure, the average
PT-CT temperature decreases after 360 sec owing to
manual crash cool down. Due to the absence of heat sink,
the average PT-CT temperature increases and then
decrease sharply at 8000 sec due to PT-CT contact. The
temperature further increases and upon reaching the
average temperature of 1473 K, the channels collapses to
the bottom and re-quenches in the moderator resulting in
decrease in its temperature. As the moderator boils off at
28500 sec, the channel temperature again rises and
reaches around 3000 K. Based on the analysis, it was
PT-CT contact
SAMG Independent Verification Analysis
As a part of review and independent verification

of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG)
for 220 MWe Kaiga Generating Station, KGS-1&2,
selected scenarios were analysed using SCDAP/RELAP5.
Two scenarios were considered for the analysis namely,
Scenario-1: Simultaneous occurrence of loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) along with failure of emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) and loss moderator cooling system
(LMODC) and Scenario-2: Simultaneous occurrence of
Station Blackout (SBO), Loss of Fire Water (LFW)
injection to steam generator (SG) and LMODC. In this
study, injection of water into the calandria vessel through
hook-up arrangement as per SAMG was considered.
During the accident scenario, as a consequence of
various events, primary inventory is lost depriving the fuel
of any cooling, leading to increase in fuel temperature,
which in turn increases the Pressure tubes (PTs)
temperature. Subsequently, under Scenario-1, PT sags
and touches the calandria tube (CT) and under Scenario2, PT balloons and touches the calandria tube (CT)
establishing the contact. As per SAMG, the injection
through hook-up is initiated as soon as the moderator level
drops to very low level and the PT-CT contact helps in
improving the heat transfer from fuel to the moderator. It
was inferred that the injection flow rate decided by the
83
8.1.3
Analysis of LWR Reactor Pressure Vessel

during Severe Accident
During severe core melt scenario, molten corium

collects in the lower head of reactor pressure vessel. The
corium starts heating the vessel wall resulting to lower head
deformation and rupture. The objective of this exercise
was to develop reactor pressure vessel lower head failure
model for light water reactor (LWR) and validate with the
already available experimental data. Based on the
analysis, it was found that there is a delay in vessel lower
head failure due to phase transition of vessel material from
ferritic to austenitic phase. The developed numerical
model was validated with the experimental results reported
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Lower Head Failure Project report
published by Sandia National Laboratories. The
comparison of maximum vertical displacement of vessel
lower head with the experimental data of OLHF-1 is
presented in the Figure 8.1.2. As can be seen from the
figure, the vessel fails 6.3 min later if phase transition effect
is considered. The evaluated gross lower head failure
equivalent plastic strain is around 30% which is consistent
with all three OLHF-1, OLHF-2 and OLHF-3 experiments.
The simulation for perforated vessel lower head was also
carried out which shows that lower head fails due to failure
at interface between Inconel weld material and base
material.
VD_Exp
VD_FEM
VD_FEM with phase transition delay
160
Vertical Displacement (mm)
140
Mid Point Sag/FEM

Mid Piont sag/Exp.
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
0
120
4000
6000
8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000
Time (s)
100
80
60
8.1.5
40
20
50
100
150
200
Time (min)
Fig. 8.1.2: Comparison of maximum vertical

displacement of bottom head with experimental
result for OLHF-1
8.1.4
2000
Fig. 8.1.3: Comparison of measured sag at

channel mid-point with numerical sag result
with localized strain model for test CD-9
Single Channel Sag Behavior with

Localized Creep Deformation during
Severe Accident
Sagging of fuel channels take place in PHWR
84
during severe accident scenario. The estimation of core

disassembly progression is necessary to develop severe
accident safety procedures. During severe accident, the
channel temperature rises and it starts sagging due to
bundle wait or the weight of above channels. The objective
of this work was to evaluate the sagging behavior of single
channel due to bundle weight using in-house developed
creep subroutine in ABAQUS. The simulation of 1/5th
scaled single channel sag behavior was carried out
considering uniform heating of channel. A beam model
was used to predict the sag of channel. The simulations
uses visco-elastic material model using ABAQUS. The
developed numerical model has been validated with the
single channel sag experiment reported in Mathew et al,
2003. The overall characteristics of the sag curve agree
reasonably well with the experimental results as shown in
Figure 8.1.3. The validation of developed numerical
model was carried out for different channel heating rates
which envelop the heating rates expected during severe
accident scenario in PHWR.
Mid Point Sag/FEM (mm)
utility was sufficient to remove the heat produced during

the accident scenario.
Behavior of Cold Rolled Joint between CT

& CSTS during Severe Accident
The objective of this exercise was to investigate

the structural behaviour of cold rolled joint between
calandria tube and calandria side tube sheet (CSTS) at
high temperature during severe accident conditions. A
numerical model is developed for typical cold rolled joint
between CT and CSTS using elastic-plastic material
behaviour. The cold rolled joint strength at room
temperatures is well tested and known for CT and CSTS
rolled joint. During severe accident scenario the joint
temperature increases as the moderator heat sink is lost
along with LOCA with ECCS failure, loss of end shield
cooling and loss of moderator cooling. The work was
carried out to evaluate the pullout strength of cold rolled

joint at high temperature considering axial loading. The
exercise involved analysis of typical cold rolled joint at
different temperatures which can be assumed during
severe accident scenario. The analysis revealed that the
pullout strength at 300C, 400C and 500C were 11.3
tonne, 10.4 tonne ton and 8.7 tonne respectively.
8.1.6
Structural
Integrity
Assessment
of
Calandria Vessel during Severe Accident
The objective of the study was to evaluate the

integrity of calandria vessel under molten core debris
during a severe accident scenario. Calandria vessel could
act like a core catcher and confine the spread of
radioactivity. A Finite Element Analysis (FEM) using
ABAQUS Multi-physic was carried out considering the
availability and non-availability of calandria vault water.
The analysis was carried out to study the coupled thermal
and structural behavior of the calandria vessel. A failure
criterion based on deformation and inelastic strain
(plasticity and creep) was used to predict the behavior. Two
cases viz. Case 1: the calandria vessel is cooled by outside
calandria vault water and Case 2: where only steam is
present outside the calandria vessel leading to reduced
convective heat transfer were analyzed. The analysis
showed that the plastic and creep strain is not sufficient for
the failure. The plastic strain contribution is 0.8 % and
creep strain contribution is negligible, which is less than the
critical strain value (14.73%) for failure. The maximum
deformation predicted is 20.23 mm. It was concluded that
the calandria vessel may not undergo inelastic strain
(plastic and creep strain) failure as long as the calandria
vault water is available.
Also, a 3-D analysis in multi-physics environment
was carried out using another FEM tool to evaluate the
thermal and structural behavior of the calandria vessel
subjected to high thermal and sustained weight loads from
molten corium. In this study, it was found out that the
plastic strain due to sustained weight load on the calandria
vessel was 1.04%. It was concluded that calandria vessel
will maintain its structural integrity till water is present in
calandria vault and is in close agreement with the FEM
analysis. The failure of calandria vessel may occur due to
the localized melting when the vault water is not available.
8.2
HYDROGEN
DISTRIBUTION
CONTAINMENT SAFETY STUDIES
AND
8.2.1
Effect of Condensation on Distribution of

Hydrogen
&
Steam
in
Reactor
Containment
The objective of this exercise was to carry out air,

steam and hydrogen distribution analysis in the
containment during accident conditions as a part of

independent regulatory assessment. During the LOCA
type of accident scenarios, high amount of steam is
released whereas, the release of hydrogen starts only after
certain time. The steam released in the initial period starts
condensing on the cooler surfaces of containment
structures. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
simulations are necessary for obtaining accurate
predictions of the local concentrations. Commercially
available CFD codes do not have all necessary models for
carrying out steam condensation and hydrogen
distribution analysis. In view of above, a condensation
model has been developed and validated against the
experimental results for use in full containment simulation.
Full containment 3D simulations were carried out
considering two approaches, with and without
condensation. The comparison of two approaches is
presented in Figure 8.2.1. As can be seen from the figure,
for the case without condensation, steam concentration is
significantly high compared to the case considering
condensation. In the case considering condensation, it is
observed that the steam condensation has strong influence
on the steam concentration in various compartments
leading to strong change in species distribution. Hence, for
realistic simulation, considering condensation is must for
correct prediction of hydrogen distribution. The model
including steam condensation will be used for future study
to identify the location for installation of hydrogen
mitigation devices.
Fig.8.2.1: Comparison of steam mole fraction

variation in different compartments of
containment for two approaches with and without condensation at walls
8.2.2
Numerical Studies on Hydrogen Mitigation
The in-house CFD code (HDS-PMRK) has been

updated and validated against the REKO-3 experiments.
The current version includes a multi-step model for
hydrogen reaction chemistry, models for radiation heat
transfer, axial conduction on catalyst plates and heat
transfer across the catalyst plates. The code has been used
to study hydrogen recombination in PAR in presence of
85
steam. The capability to simulate hydrogen recombination

in steam environment has been demonstrated. An
experimental program to investigate the performance and
safety aspects of hydrogen removal by catalytic
recombination is underway at SRI. This facility will come
up within the SRI engineering hall at Kalpakkam.
Numerical studies have been conducted for arriving at the
design details.
8.2.3
Commissioning of AIHMS facility at IIT

Madras
The AERB IITM Hydrogen Mixing studies Facility

(AIHMS) has been erected in the IIT Madras premises
under the AERB-CSRP scheme and is presented in the
Figure 8.2.2. This facility consists of a 2m3 cylindrical vessel
with thermally controlled walls and hydrogen injection at
the central plane. This facility has been commissioned and
preliminary experimental trials have been carried out. The
test chamber can be converted into a multi-chamber
enclosure. This facility is expected to provide data for
hydrogen distribution in enclosures.
8.2.4
Construction of SRI Engineering Hall
To facilitate experiments pertaining to safety

research, an engineering hall is being set up in SRI under
the XII plan. This hall will house a high bay (160 sq. m,
height 8.5 m), a low bay (160 sq. m, height 4.25 m), an
office space (160 sq. m). Additional space for future
expansion of the engineering hall has also been allocated
Fig. 8.2.2: AIHMS test chamber with

instruments
in the IGCAR master plan. In the first phase, three
experimental facilities, namely Hydrogen Mitigation
Facility (HYMIF), Water and Steam Interaction Facility
(WASIF) and Calandria Vessel under Core Collapse
(CVCC) facility are envisaged to come up within the high
bay of the hall and radiation shielding experiments will be
planned within the low bay. The first stone for this hall was
laid by the Chairman, AERB on 28th August, 2014 in
presence of SRI and CEG staff. The hall is likely to be
available for experimental activities by December, 2015.
Shri S.S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, being briefed by Shri V. Balasubramaniyan, Director, SRI, on the details of the
SRI Engineering hall and subsequent laying of foundation stone
8.2.5
Containment Filtered Venting

Modelling using RELAP5
System
In the event of a nuclear power plant accident, the

pressure within the nuclear reactors containment building
may increase. A Containment Filtered Venting System
(CFVS) allows for the release of the over-pressure through
a scrubber normally containing water and chemicals,
86
where most of the fission products are contained. The

objective was to predict functional parameters of the CFVS
including mass flow rate, water flow rate through the
venture throat, effect of pressure on the mass flow rates etc.
As a part of independent assessment, the proposed CFVS
for TAPS-1&2 was modeled using RELAP5/Mod3.4. The
piping system from the Common Chamber (CC) top to the
scrubber tank, scrubber tank, venturi-nozzles and exhaust
piping were modeled. However, the filters and separators

in the scrubber tank were not included in the modeling.
Prediction of water flow through the venturi throat
demonstrates the designed functioning of the scrubber to
remove the particulate from the air flow into the scrubber
tank. The mass flow rate at various location of the venting
system for two different CC pressures (140 kPa and 130
kPa) was estimated. It was inferred that the CC exit and
vent exit flow rate decreases as the CC pressure decreases.
The vent exit flow rate is higher than the CC exit flow rate
indicating that some water droplets are being carried along
to the exit.
8.2.6
CFD Simulation of Venturi Scrubber for

Containment Filtered Venting System
venturi scrubber which is widely used as wet scrubbers.

Venturi scrubber is used to effectively encapsulate the
particulates from contaminated gas in tiny droplets formed
by disintegration of a liquid due to shearing by high kinetic
energy of gas flowing into it. As a part of independent
assessment of the proposed CFVS, a CFD simulation of
venturi scrubber was carried out. In this analysis, two types
of particulates with densities equivalent to Tri-uranium
octoxide (U3O8) and Cesium (Cs) have been considered
with particulate sizes 1 m, 2 m and 3 m. The
distribution of the water droplet diameter obtained after
atomization is shown in Figure 8.2.3 and as point cloud in
Figure 8.2.4. It was observed that for larger particles, the
efficiency is very high, even if they are of low density. For
smaller particles, the efficiency of the scrubber may be low.
The most important part of a venting system is
Fig.8.2.3. Water droplet size distribution

8.2.7
Assessment of
Venting System
Containment
Filtered
The design basis of the proposed Containment

Filtered Venting System (CFVS) for TAPS-1&2 was
reviewed. Two separate studies were undertaken. In the
first, the adequacy of CFVS scrubber tank water inventory
to absorb the energy content of steam and decaying
radioactive isotopes discharged into it (following a severe
accident) was assessed. A mathematical model for heat
transport was developed and the response of scrubber
tank to heat load under single and two units SBO
conditions in TAPS-1&2 has been investigated. The
adequacy of CFVS water inventory has been
demonstrated for SBO conditions. In the second study, the
adequacy of CFVS vent line to depressurize the common
chamber volume of the containment building was
investigated. Parametric studies were conducted to bring
Fig.8.2.4 Water droplet as point cloud

out the influence of key system variables such as upstream
pressure, vent line size, length and system losses.
8.2.8
Containment Peak Pressure Assessment

during LOCA
Containment peak pressure and temperature of

Kaiga 220 MWe PHWR during the LOCA blow down
period was assessed as a part of independent verification.
Analysis was carried out with different blow down data.
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) was not
considered in the analysis carried out by both utility and
AERB. Two Case studies were analysed namely, Case-1:
with utility supplied blow down data and Case-2: with the
discharge rates obtained from independent LOCA analysis
carried out by AERB using RELAP5.The blow-down
discharge was assumed to occur in Zone 1(FM Vault-N).
The containment peak pressure for Case-1 and Case-2
87
was compared. It is inferred that, for Case-1, the

containment peak pressure predicted by the ASTEC is in
agreement with the Utility analysis. However, in Case-2,
slightly higher containment peak pressure was observed.
Analyses were also carried out using THYCON
with and without crediting severe accident management
guidelines (SAMG) stipulation of injecting water into the
calandria vessel at a specified rate. It was found that the
peak containment pressure at the end of 7 days is higher
for the case with SAMG action, as the water added to
calandria vault also ultimately evaporates to increase the
containment pressure. However, the peak pressures in
both the scenarios are found to be well within the primary
containment design pressure.
8.2.9
CFD Simulations to Study Steam

Ingression during Severe Accident (SA)
The objective of the exercise was to simulate fuel

channel failure scenario during severe accident to study
the steam ingression inside the Pressure Tube (PT) after
blow down in the typical 220 MWe PHWR fuel channel.
During severe accidents, after the moderator boils
off, allowing uncovered fuel channels to heat up and fail.
The steam-fuel clad interaction leads to hydrogen
generation. CFD code was used to study the velocity
contours and local spatial properties of steam during
interaction with PT under various geometric
configurations. The results indicated that in the case of
symmetrically inclined PT with fish mouth opening at
center, the steam enters the PT via fish mouth and exits
from both the ends. The velocity predicted in this case was
highest compared to all other cases. It was observed that
steam ingresses inside the PT from fish mouth opening
with a continuous and symmetric flow field across the fish
mouth opening. On both ends, firm change in flow field,
especially rotation of flow was observed. The continuous
flow field occurs throughout the PT. On both side of the
upper half of flow field inside the PT, high velocity of steam
is present. The maximum velocity inside the PT reaches
around 0.4 m/s, significantly higher than inlet velocity. It
was also observed that the mass flow rate of steam entering
inside PT depends on surface temperature of PT.
8.2.10 Mathematical
Spray
Model
for
Containment
and non-condensable gas mass fraction on the heat

removal capacity. The droplet diameter was found to have
a prominent role in the heat removal capacity of the spray
system. Further, the heat removal capacity is found to be
proportional to ambient temperature and inversely
proportional to the pressure, diameter and noncondensable gas fraction. A correlation was developed as
a function of above parameters to estimate the heat
removal rate. This was then integrated with an in-house
code. The efficacy of the water droplet sprays in
condensing the steam was shown by comparing the
PHWR containment transients with and without the
operation of spray system.
8.3
THERMAL
STUDIES
8.3.1
Internally Coupled Multi-Point Kinetics for

Asymmetric Power Transient in Natural
Circulation BWR using RELAP5
88
SAFETY
To address the inadequacy of point kinetics

model of RELAP5 for analyzing neutronics asymmetric
transients in loosely coupled reactor, multi-point kinetics
model has been developed and is used for predicting
zonal powers during asymmetric power excursion in one
zone of a Natural Circulation Boiling Water Reactor
(NCBWR) arising from ejection of a control rod. Thermalhydraulic analysis was also carried to investigate the
occurrence of boiling crisis due to power excursion in a
particular zone of the reactor core for a given reactor over
power trip setting. Hench-Levy correlation was used to
estimate the Critical Heat Flux (CHF) in the peak powered
channel. Four Cases based on rate of reactivity addition,
total reactivity added and reactor trips (zonal & global
power) were analyzed. For cases (Case-1 and Case-2)
reactivity of 2mk was added in 900s with trip based on
110 % global and 120% zonal power, respectively. While
in the remaining two Cases (Case-3 and Case-4) reactivity
addition of 1mk in 1s with trip based on 110% global
power and 120% zonal power was considered
respectively. Critical heat flux ratio was estimated for each
Case and it was observed that the available safety margin
is very narrow for all the cases analysed with global power
trip, and the least CHFR of 1.16 was observed in Case-1.
It was also concluded that zonal power trip is important in
developing reactor trip set point to avoid CHF.
8.3.2
A mathematical model for calculating the energy

absorption capacity of the containment spray system
under LOCA conditions has been developed. Heat and
mass transfer to model single water droplet was first
developed and later extended to droplet size distribution.
Parametric studies were conducted to bring out the effect
of droplet size distribution, ambient pressure, temperature
HYDRAULICS
Identification of Critical Break in RIH of

540 MWe PHWR using Uncertainty
Analysis
As a part of independent regulatory assessment,

a methodology was developed using RELAPS5/MOD3.4
to identify the critical break size in reactor inlet header
(RIH) of PHWR (540 MWe) considering uncertainty
analysis. Decay heat, discharge coefficient and thermal

non-equilibrium constant were considered as uncertain
parameters. Based on first order Wilks assumption, for
95% fractile and 95% confidence, 59 numbers of configurations for the above three parameters were selected using
Latin Hypercube Sampling. A range of break sizes ranging
from 20% to 50% with an increment of 5 was considered
and seven break sizes were selected for analysis. For each
break size, 59 cases were analyzed using RELAP5. A set of
computer program based on FORTRAN was developed to
post process the data. Using these programs, the peak clad
surface temperature for each case of each break size was
estimated. The exercise has led to an understanding on
the relation between PCT and critical break size for
Reactor Inlet Header (RIH) in a 540 MWe PHWR. For
each break size, the highest peak clad temperature (PCT)
among the 59 cases is the value with 95% fractile and 95%
confidence. The critical break with 95% fractile and 95%
confidence is that break size for which the 95% fractile and
95% confidence PCT is highest. The critical break was
identified based on peak clad surface temperature and
was found to be 55% break in RIH of PHWR (540 MWe)
with class-IV power unavailable. Without uncertainty
analysis, for base case only, the critical break size
estimated earlier was found to be 35%.
Fig. 8.3.1: Variation of mass flow in

PDHRS circuit
8.3.4
Analytical Studies on Natural Circulation

Phenomena in PDHRS of 700MWe PHWR
An analytical study has been carried out to

investigate the thermal hydraulic characteristics of the
700 MWe PHWR PDHRS under SBO conditions. A
mathematical model based on homogeneous equilibrium
model was developed to derive an analytical expression
for loop mass flow rate. The effect of several operating
and geometrical parameters such as pressure, Collapsed
8.3.3
Independent Verification of SBO Analysis

for 700MWe PHWR
Passive Decay Heat Removal Systems (PDHRS)

are being provided in all the upcoming 700 MWe
PHWRs in India as a First of a Kind (FOAK) system to
handle prolonged Station Black-Out (SBO) conditions.
As a part of safety review of preliminary safety analysis
report of accident analysis for KAPP 700 MWe PHWR,
transient analysis for SBO scenario has been carried out
using RELAP5/Mod3.4. It was observed that natural
circulation establishes in the primary, secondary and
PDHRS circuit of the plant, with PDHRS tank as a heat
sink. The variation of mass flow rate in the PDHRS tube
side within time span of 8 hrs is presented in the Figure
8.3.1 and the variation in the Steam Generator (SG)
level is presented in Figure 8.3.2. Analysis shows that the
PDHRS is capable of conserving the SG inventory and
maintaining the primary and secondary pressure and
temperature well below their operating limits, and the
existing inventory of water in the PDHRS tank is
adequate for a period of 8 hours without makeup
requirement.
Fig. 8.3.2: Variation in

SG level
Water Level in SG, condenser elevation, condenser tube

angle and condenser flow cross-sectional area etc. were
investigated. The results were compared with that of
utility DBR and a good agreement was observed. The
study has demonstrated that an analytical solution based
on reasonable assumptions can provide significant insight
into the flow characteristics of two-phase, natural
circulation closed loop such as the PDHRS of 700 MWe
PHWR.
89
The heat flux estimated during the initiation of the

rise in wall temperature is the critical heat flux (CHF). An
experimental study for the measurement of transient CHF
in horizontal tube has been setup. Further to the
measurement of CHF by experiment, analyses of the effect
of oscillatory flow on CHF were done using the thermal
hydraulic system code RELAP5/Mod3.4. As the void
fraction at the test section exit increases beyond 0.85, the
wall temperature starts increasing due to the decrease in
heat transfer coefficient. The high void fraction during the

CHF occurrence suggests liquid film dryout. The
numerical analysis also predicts annulus flow regime
during the occurrence of CHF. It was observed that the
numerical analysis predictions are in good agreement with
the experimental observations. The oscillatory variation in
mass flux and the test section pressure drop during a typical
experiment and the numerical estimation for single phase
region is shown in Figs.8.3.3a and 8.3.3b respectively. For
the two phase region, the estimated pressure drop shows
an increasing trend as the void fraction increases due to the
assumption of linear increase in the applied heat flux.
Fig. 8.3.3a: Measured single phase mass flux

and pressure drop variation
Fig. 8.3.3b: Estimated single phase mass flux

and pressure drop variation
8.3.5
8.3.6
Numerical Analysis of Transient CHF

Experiment
Temperature Distribution of Thoria pellet

in Thermal Reactor Flux Profile in
Comparison with other Fuels
Temperature distribution studies for fuel pellets of

various materials such as Thorium Oxide (ThO2), Uranium
di-oxide (UO2), Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX), Metallic Fuel,
Carbide and Nitride fuels were studied. The objective of
the exercise was to carry out a comparative study of radial
temperature profile for various fuels by assuming space
dependent volumetric heat generation profile across the
fuel pellet using multi-physics software COMSOL. The
exercise would aid in the thermal analysis of fuel based on
parameters like peak temperature, radial temperature
distribution, centerline temperature for a fuel etc. Due to
self-shielding effect, the thermal neutron flux shows a
depression in the central region of the fuel pellet in a
thermal reactor. Hence, more heat is generated in the
peripheral region as compared to the central region. For
the fixed heat generation profile, the highest centerline
temperature is found for MOX fuel. The peak temperature
for thoria fuel was found to be significantly lower than that
of MOX and UO2 fuel. The low peak temperature will
provide more safety margin as it will operate far away from
its melting point.
90
8.4
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
8.4.1
Calibration of Gamma Spectrometers for

Complex Geometrical Sources
The water samples from the nearby water bodies

and soil samples in and around the pipelines carrying
waste materials from Reprocessing Group, IGCAR to
Centralized Water Management Facility (CWMF) are
counted at Radiation Physics Laboratory of AERB-Safety
Research Institute using a 2 x 2NaI (Tl) scintillation
detector and a P-type co-axial HPGe (GCD 180-50)
gamma spectrometer for the identification of radionuclide
contamination and their activity levels. The accuracy of
activity analysis using these gamma spectrometers mainly
depends on calibration for energy and efficiency, which
relates the activity of the source being counted and the
number of counts observed. The absolute photo peak
efficiency of the gamma detector is a function of gamma
energy, the source-sample geometry and source-detector
distance. A study has been carried out to observe the effect
of source geometry on the efficiency of the both the
detector types and to fit the efficiency as a continuous
function of energy for complex geometrical sources i.e. for
source geometries in which samples are usually contained
for their activity measurements. The study shows that the

efficiency of both types of detectors decreases with the
increase in sample source volume as presented in Figure
8.4.1. In essence, the study brings out the importance of
carrying out efficiency calibration of gamma detectors for
different source geometries.
Fig. 8.4.1: Full energy photo peak efficiency of

NaI and HPGe detector for different
volumetric source geometries
8.4.2
Gamma Counting of IAEA Samples for

IAEA-TEL-2014-03 World Wide Open
Proficiency Test
Water and sediment samples of IAEA were

counted using HPGe gamma radiation detector for
radionuclide identification and activity determination in
collaboration with Radiological Safety Division of IGCAR.
Three regular water samples containing gamma, beta and
alpha emitting radio-nuclides, the seaweed sample
representing the biota spiked with anthropogenic gamma
emitting radio-nuclides and the lake sediment sample with
low radioactive content were counted for gamma activity.
The Cs134, Cs137 and Eu152 activity (which were
estimated using HPGe gamma radiation detector) were
compared with IAEA declared proficiency test results. It
was found that they are within the acceptable limit for all
water and sediment samples.
8.4.3
Isotopic Analysis of Low-level Radioactive

Liquid Waste Samples
Low-level radioactive waste samples, which had

undergone various treatments at Centralized Waste
Management Facility of BARC for their activity reduction
before disposals, were analyzed using HPGe gamma
spectrometer to see the effect of their treatment. Activities
of the liquid waste samples containing Cs-137 and Tc-99
and the samples subjected to the subsequent removal of
Cs-137 and Tc-99 were measured to find the effects of
dilution on activity reduction and to confirm their removal.

The results indicated the effective removal of Cs-137 and
Tc-99.
8.5
INTERNATIONAL
COLLABORATIVE
SAFETY ANALYSIS EXERCISES
8.5.1
IAEA
ICSP
sub-cooling
on
HWR
moderator
AERB is participating in an IAEA International

Collaborative Standard Problem (ICSP) on HWR
moderator sub-cooling requirements to demonstrate
backup heat sink capabilities of moderator during
accidents. The objective was to assess the safety analysis
computer codes against the contact boiling experimental
data. The test facility consists of graphite heater
surrounded by pressure tube (PT) and calandria tube (CT).
The gap between PT and heater was filled with Argon and
the PT-CT gap was filled with Co2. The test section was
immersed in a water tank. Open calculation was
completed using system thermal hydraulics code
RELAP5/Mod3.4. The Pressure Tube-Calandria Tube
(PT-CT) gap filled with the Co2 gap was modeled as two
heat structures representing the top and bottom halves.
Moderator tank was modeled in three dimensions to
simulate the natural convection and stratification
phenomena more accurately. The PT-CT gap conductance
and the power input to the graphite heater were modified
as per the data released by IAEA after the completion of the
blind calculations by the participating organizations. With
the improved modeling, open calculations predict the
parameters associated with the phenomena observed in
the test more accurately. PT-CT contact increases the CT
surface temperature leading to dryout and rewetting of the
CT surface. The experiment demonstrated that the
moderator acts as an effective heat sink during the severe
accident progression in PHWR channels and the analysis
shows the capability of the system code RELAP5 in
predicting the associated phenomena with reasonable
accuracy.
8.5.2
Analysis
of
OECD/NEA
HYMERES
PROJECT
(HYdrogen
Mitigation
Experiments for REactor Safety)
AERB is participating in OECD/HYMERES

project. The objective of HYMERES (HYdrogen Mitigation
Experiments for REactor Safety) project is to investigate
complex safety relevant issues for mitigation of a severe
accident leading to release of hydrogen into nuclear
reactor containment. The project involves a series of
experiments being conducted in the PANDA (PSI,
Switzerland) and the Mitigation and Stratification
(MISTRA) (CEA, France) facilities.
91
The PANDA facility is a large scale, multicompartmental thermal hydraulic facility suited for
investigations related to the safety of current and advanced
LWRs. The simulation of HYMERS project is divided into
series of steps. The objective of Series HP1 is to study the
interaction of break flow (steam jet) with an obstruction in
stratified helium environment in PANDA facility. Post-test,
CFD simulations of these tests have been performed and
results were compared with the experiments. As an
illustrative example, details of simulation of test HP1-2 are

discussed here. As an initial condition, 2 m thick layer of
Helium is present at the top of vessel. Interaction of
injected steam jet with this layer leads to erosion of this
layer with time. This erosion process is recorded by the
Helium monitor points where the experimental and
simulation results are compared. Effect of turbulence
model and heat losses from the walls on gas distribution
evolution was studied and the comparison of results is
presented in Figures 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 respectively. The
comparison shows good agreement between the
experimental and simulation results.
Fig. 8.5.1: He mole fraction variation

at selected monitor points
(Comparison of turbulence models)
Fig. 8.5.2: He mole fraction variation

at selected monitor points
(Effect of heat losses)
8.5.2.1 CFD Simulation of HP series tests of

HYMERES project (PANDA Facility)
8.5.2.2 CFD Simulation of HM2-0 test

HYMERES project (MISTRA facility):
of
HM2 and HM3 tests of MISTRA facility are

dedicated for studying the thermal effect of Passive
Autocatalytic Re-combiners (PARs) in containment. HM20 is a reference test for HM2 and HM3. The objective of
HM2-0 is to create a rich helium layer in the bottom part of
the inner compartment and to study the natural evolution
of this helium layer. The test sequence of HM2-0 is divided
into three phases: Phase-1: heat up of the upper part of the
facility, Phase-2: injection of cold helium / air mixture and
Phase-3: evolution of the stratified atmosphere.
Temperature predictions at lower elevations are in good
agreement with the experimental results, but at higher
elevations it is over-predicted. The CFD code has captured
the formation of stratified helium layer inside the inner
compartment. Helium disperses to the outer compartment
slowly due to convective currents and well mixed
conditions are established in the outer compartment
during the third phase. In general, CFD simulations
captured the phenomena in all three phases of the
experiment and the predictions are in reasonable
agreement with the experimental data.
92
8.5.3
Dispersion of Sulfur Di-Oxide (SO2)

released from a thermal power plant over
the complex terrain of Velenje Basin,
Slovenia as a part of IAEA-MODARIA
Exercise
As part of the activities of Working Group 2

(Exposures in contaminated urban environments and
effects of remedial measures) of the IAEA MODARIA
(Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessment)
program, modeling of dispersion of SO2 released from
Sostanj thermal power plant, Slovenia with complex
terrain and meteorology was carried out. Meteorological
modeling was carried out for a period of 48 hours (00 UTC
29th March 1991 to 00 UTC 31st March 1991) by using the
numerical weather prediction (NWP) model, advanced
research, weather research and forecasting (ARW-WRF)
ver. 3.5. European centre for medium weather forecast
(ECMWF) interim data of resolution 0.750 x 0.750 was
used as initial and boundary conditions. Generated wind
velocity profiles, temperature, relative humidity etc., were
used by Lagrangian particle model FLEXPART-WRF to
simulate the dispersion pattern of SO2. Simulated wind
fields were predominantly northerly or northeasterly and
no appreciable change in the wind direction is observed

diurnally. FLEXPART simulation showed that the
northerly or northeasterly wind carried the SO2 plume
towards the Southwest direction.
8.6
PROBABILISTIC
(PSA)
SAFETY
8.6.1
External Flood PSA for PFBR
ANALYSIS
Based on the findings and recommendations

that evolved from the Fukushima accident, AERB has
undertaken external flooding PSA (EFPSA) of PFBR as a
joint R&D exercise with participation of IGCAR,
BHAVINI and BARC. The objective of the exercise was to
evaluate plant response to external flooding events of
different severity and estimate core damage and spent
fuel damage probabilities due to these events.
Assessment of flood levels based on probabilistic external
flood hazard assessment and identification of critical
structures, systems and components from external
flooding perspective based on detailed system analysis
using event tree and fault tree approach were completed.
Plant walk down was carried out to assess the as-is status
of the components and identifying the possible
interactions and failure modes. The rainfall data over
large period were analysed for estimation of its return
frequency. The data set was assumed to be independent,
identically distributed and stationary. The tests for
independence, homogeneity, stationarity and outliers
were carried out. In this analysis, the data of site for the
maximum annual rainfall was used to predict 10000-year
return period rainfall magnitude. A large number of
plotting positions were tested and estimation was carried
out. These plotting positions were used for two
parameters Gumbel distribution fitting. In addition,
method of moments was also used to predict the 10000year return period rainfall magnitude. It was observed
that there is moderate difference between the results of
these two methods.
core damage frequency (SCDF) was introduced which is

described as the frequency of at least single core damage
per site per year.
As a first step, all possible site specific external
hazards that can affect the multiple units of nuclear plant
site were identified. These hazards were then categorized
as either definite or conditional. Initiating events that can
occur due to a particular definite and conditional external
hazard were identified and the corresponding event trees
and fault trees are developed. SCDF for each hazard was
evaluated from the Boolean expression obtained from all
the event tree accident sequences of the corresponding
hazard. Extended mission time as appropriate may be
used for accident sequences in case of external hazards
and same mission times used in internal PSA may be
adopted for internal events. The total core damage
frequency of multi-unit site was obtained as the sum of all
SCDF from all external hazards.
8.6.3
The safety grade decay heat removal system

(SGDHR) of prototype fast breeder reactor is required to
operate with different success criteria during the specified
mission time on account of steady decline in decay heat
produced by the reactor core. Markov analysis was carried
out to evaluate the availability of the system under two
monitoring schemes: continuous and periodic monitoring.
The study estimates the upper bound and lower bound for
mean unavailability of SGDHR system for the specified
mission time. Sensitivity analysis of the system attributable
to important parameters, such as test interval repair time,
etc. was also carried out. The study provides a
comprehensive approach to model scenarios with time
dependent success criteria and provides an insight on the
factors affecting availability of such systems.
8.6.4
8.6.2
Markov Analysis for Time Dependent

Success Criteria of Passive Decay Heat
Removal System
Software Reliability Estimation
PSA for Multi-unit Sites
The objective of the exercise was to identify risk

for multi-unit NPP sites arising from shared system,
common cause failures, failure correlations, cliff edge
effects, proximity dependencies etc. from different external
hazards and develop a methodology to carry out
probabilistic risk assessment to estimate site core damage
in a multi-unit NPP site.
An integrated approach was developed to
address the unique features in a multi-unit site. The
approach is realistic as it addresses all possible accident
scenarios that can result from different hazards and is
demonstrated with typical initiating events. The term site
A Markov Chain approach to estimate reliability

of a software system using genetic algorithm was studied.
In this approach, the code is initially converted into control
flow graph and then reduced to a decision to decision
graph (dd-graph). The edges of the dd-graph are assigned
weights based on the Markov transition probability matrix
using the number of visits made by test cases and the value
of the fitness function is calculated as the sum of weights of
all edges of the dd-graph covered by the test suite. The
fitness function of the genetic algorithm is calculated based
on the path coverage. In this task, integer, floating and
Boolean (int-float-bool) variables are populated from a
random number generator and one point / two point
crossovers are applied to integer, floating point and
93
boolean type of population. Genetic algorithm was used to

generate test cases to achieve path coverage with less
computation cost and time. The proposed approach
results in identifying the most critical path of the system.
8.7
REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES
8.7.1
Validation of 3D Kinetics Code TRIKIN

against AECL-7236 Benchmark
The objective of this exercise was to validate the

application of space-time kinetics code, TRIKIN developed
for VVER reactors for analysis of pressurized heavy water
reactors (PHWRs). The PHWR model of TRIKIN has been
validated against a 3D kinetics PHWR benchmark problem
(AECL-7236). The benchmark problem describe super
delayed critical transient by simulating a hypothetical loss
of coolant accident for large reactivity insertion rates.
TRIKIN results of benchmark problem have been found to
being excellent agreement with benchmarks results,
demonstrating space-time kinetics capability of the code
for PHWR type reactors. These results have been produced
based on the same time and space grid as recommended in
the benchmark problem. Sample results for normalized
total core power are presented in Figure 8.7.1.
and ferro-boron which are preferred for use in Fast

Breeder Reactors (FBRs). The shield material B4C was
considered with 78% of boron content whereas ferroboron, which is relatively cheap, was considered with two
different percentages of boron 11.8% and 15%. Reaction
rates of Mn55 (n, g
) Mn56, Cu63 (n, g
) Cu64, Au197(n, g
)
Au198 representing the attenuation of thermal and
epithermal neutron fluxes and the reaction rate of In115
(n, n') In115m representing attenuation of fast neutron
fluxes were calculated at different depth up to 19.5 cm
thickness in B4C and up to 26.5cm in ferro boron and
compared with the experimental measurements wherever
feasible. The calculated values are compared with the
experimental measurements and presented in Figure 8.7.2
for Cu63 (n, g
) Cu64 reaction. In general, the comparisons
showed good agreement for most of the reaction rates. As
observed in experimental measurements, the attenuation
property of B4C is found to be more compared to ferro
boron. However, considering the lesser boron content
11.8% and 15% in ferro-boron, ferro-boron was found to
be more effective compared to B4C.
Fig. 8.7.2: Comparison of neutron attenuation

as a function of thickness in B4C and
Ferro Boron (11.8% & 15%) for Cu (n,) reactions
Fig. 8.7.1: Normalized total core power
during transients
8.7.2
Prediction of KAMINI Neutron Beam

Attenuation Measurements in B4C and
Ferro Boron Shield Materials by Monte
Carlo Modelling
Theoretical Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were

carried out to validate the MC methodology and related
nuclear data for simulating the neutron attenuation
measurements carried out at KAMINI. After observing
satisfactory agreement with respect to experimental
measurements in the previous analysis on attenuation
properties of other shield materials like mild steel, the
study was extended to investigate the neutron attenuation
properties of the shield materials; boron carbide (B4C)
94
8.7.3
Loss of Regulation Accident

Analysis of SEU Fuelled PHWR
(LORA)
Slightly Enriched Uranium (SEU) fuel bundles are

being planned for use in the existing standard 220 MWe
PHWRs, without making any engineering modifications in
the reactor core. It is necessary to demonstrate the
significant core safety parameters like delayed neutron
fraction, neutron lifetime, reactivity feedbacks etc. for
ensuring reactor safety as per designed intent. This
exercise was carried out to analyze loss of regulation
accident for 220 PHWRs with different phases of
changeover from Natural Uranium (NU) core to full SEU
core. Considering the tightly coupled nature of 220 MWe
PHWR, point kinetics formulation was used. In-house
developed core dynamic models were used to solve
coupled point kinetics equations in tandem with core
thermal hydraulics equations for incorporating reactivity

feedbacks. Xenon dynamics model has also been included
to accommodate transient xenon feedback effect. The
analysis brought out the evolution of reactor power and
fuel temperatures w.r.t. time for different LORA cases. It
was found from the simulation results that for all the cases,
the reactor protection systems are independently able to
shut down the reactor with adequate negative reactivity
margins and the fuel centerline temperatures are below the
specified safety limits.
8.7.4
Development of Improved ODE Solvers for

Reactor Kinetics
The objective of this exercise was to enhance

efficiency and accuracy of Ordinary Differential Equation
(ODE) solvers for reactor point kinetics equations. In this
direction, a framework was developed for solution of a
system of ordinary differential equations using explicit and
implicit numerical methods. As a special case, reactor point
kinetics equations were solved for different reactivity
inputs. A methodology was developed for identification of
stability region (i.e. region for permissible values of time
step for a stable solution) for a given numerical method.
Models have been extended for linear stability analysis of
Indian PHWRs with respect to alternate fuel cycles. Based
on this developed model, a frequency domain analysis
using Bode plot technique has been carried out. Burn up
sensitivity studies in the context of core stability is being
carried out.
8.7.5
Reactor Physics Analysis of the Beginningof-Life Core of PFBR
Independent review analysis of PFBR core

physics parameters has been carried out by utilizing state
of the art computer codes and neutron cross-section data
available at SRI. The objective of the exercise was to verify
the required shutdown margins in various core states of
PFBR for ensuring the safety of the reactor. The study
encompasses a detailed analysis of the first approach to
criticality of PFBR. The neutron multiplication factor (keff)
has been estimated during each stage of initial fuel loading.
The estimated number of fuel subassemblies required for
criticality matches well with the design values. Control and
safety system of PFBR has also been analyzed by
computing the worth of absorber rods. Both insertion and
withdrawal worths of individual Control & Safety Rod
(CSR) and Diverse Safety Rod (DSR) were also estimated
for different core configuration.
8.7.6
Studies on the Effect of Nuclear Data on

the Core Parameters of PFBR
For accurate prediction of reactor physics

parameters, three important nuclear data libraries namely;
the Evaluated Nuclear Data File Version-B (ENDF/B), the

Joint Evaluated Fission Fusion File (JEFF) and the
Japanese Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (JENDL) have
been used in the neutronics analysis of the nominal core of
PFBR. As a first step, the core modeling was carried out by
Monte Carlo based computer code and the neutronics
calculations were performed by using ENDF/B-VI,
ENDF/B-VII, JEFF-3.2 and JENDL-4.0 cross-section data.
An inter-comparison of the effective multiplication factor
(keff) and absorber rod worth was made taking the
ENDF/B-VI as a reference since the same library is used in
some of the design calculations. The study indicated that
core parameters are usually predicted higher by use of
ENDF/B-VII data and lower by use of JEFF data as
compared to the reference results using ENDF/B-VI data. It
was also found that the results predicted by JENDL match
well with the reference results. The study has given an
insight to select a proper neutron cross-section data set for
fast reactor core computations in future.
8.7.7
Criticality and Shielding Review of FRFCF
Criticality safety studies have been carried out for

different locations and processing stages in the upcoming
Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) to assist the
regulatory licensing process. During the review process,
modeling of the fuel and blanket storage bay in the core
subassembly plant (CSP) was carried out by Monte Carlo
method and the effective neutron multiplication factors
were evaluated in normal and water flooding conditions.
Further, criticality safety studies for handling of fresh fuel
and blanket pin, pin magazine and fuel subassembly in the
CSP were performed for normal and water flooded
condition to ensure that the multiplication factor never
crosses the safety limit. Parametrical study on horizontal
and vertical pitch of pin storage room has also been
performed in both air and water medium to ensure
criticality safety. In addition, shielding analyses were
performed to estimate the radiation fields outside the CSP
vault and during fuel handling operations in order to
evaluate the adequacy of shield design.
8.7.8
Criticality Studies of Spent Fuel Storage

Facility
Criticality calculations were carried out by using

Monte Carlo (MC) code for the spent fuel storage facility of
KKNPP units 1 and 2 to ensure its nuclear safety i.e., a subcriticality of at least 5% (keff<0.95) during normal
operation and accident conditions. Nearly six different sets
of calculations were carried out considering; (i) different
configurations of racks (ii) rack materials with and without
neutron absorbing materials, (iii) different pitch between
and (iv) different enrichments of FAs. In order to build
conservatism in criticality calculations, the fuel assemblies
of enrichments 4.4% and 5%, which are higher than the
95
enrichments used in the present design, have been

considered without taking credit for burnup. The density of
water present inside/outside the fuel assembly cell was
decreased from 1.0 g/cc to 0.0 g/cc to simulate the accident
conditions of insufficient decay heat removal when the
water surrounding the fuel boils. Results of calculations for
all cases with borated SS rack material showed that the
required sub-criticality for all configurations is available. In
non-borated rack cases, non-fulfillment of nuclear safety
assurance has been observed for both the configurations
of 4.4% enrichment with the change in water density for
the pitch distance of 400mm. It was inferred that the values
of k
calculated for infinite array of cells are always found
to be greater than for infinite array of racks with higher
enrichment.
8.7.9
Evaluation of
Spectrum at
Locations
Neutron Fluence and

the Ex-core Detector
In Hot Full Power (HFP) operation, there are

several ex-core detectors in VVER-1000 reactors to
provide signals for reactor power monitoring, controlling
and protecting systems. In addition, neutron flux at the excore location and its spectrum are acting as radiation
loading parameters on the support constructions of a
reactor. Accurate determination of neutron fluence at the
ex-core detector locations using validated computational
tool is essential for the fresh (BOC) and burned fuel (EOC)
core configurations to ensure safe operation of the
reactors. Towards this, theoretical MC calculations were
carried out to estimate the neutron flux and its spectra at
the core and ex-core detector locations in KK VVER-1000
reactor for the BOC and EOC (average discharge burnup
of 12.0 MWd/kgHM) of initial fuel loading. Neutron flux
spectra corresponding to top and bottom axial reflectors
and radial reflector regions consisting of several
heterogeneities were also estimated. Three-dimensional
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were carried out for the flux
calculations. The neutron flux spectra corresponding to
core and radial reflector regions as shown in Figure 8.7.3.
are found to reflect the expected behavior. Based on this
study the structural integrity of the RPV may be assessed in
future.
8.7.10 KRITZ Benchmark Analysis: Pin Power
Distribution
and
Reaction
Rate
Calculations
The computational methodologies used for the
safety evaluations of the upcoming new light water
reactors need continuous validation. In view of this, two of
the parameters namely pin power distribution and reaction
rates of the KRITZ benchmark are calculated. KRITZ is an
experimental light water reactor facility located in Sweden.
The computations are performed for two of the
96
Fig. 8.7.3: Neutron flux spectra in KK core

and radial reflector regions
configurations, KRITZ-2:1 and KRITZ-2:13, which were
both made critical at room as well as at elevated
temperature. A Monte Carlo neutron transport code is
used for the calculations by using two neutron crosssection libraries, namely ENDF/B-VII.1 and JEFF 3.1.2.
The calculated pin power distribution was compared with
the measured pin power distribution. The reaction rates
namely, fission and absorption rates were calculated for
three nuclides, 235U, 238U and 234U. These were
compared with the average of similar calculations
previously done and compiled in an OECD/NEA/NSC
document. The deviation of calculated values from the
experimental measurements and benchmark values were
found to be less for all the configurations.
8.7.11 Study on Thorium Utilization in Fast
Reactors
A research work has been carried out to explore
the possibility of thorium utilization in fast breeder reactors.
In this work, the reactor physics design aspects of a U-PuZr6% metal alloy fuelled 1000 MWe fast reactor (MFBR)
with high breeding ratio has been considered and the
possibilities of thorium utilization in the blankets of the
reactor has been worked out. Interestingly, it was found
that by introducing thorium in the blankets of the MFBR in
place of depleted uranium, the breeding ratio does not
change drastically. In addition, there is a substantial
amount of fissile U-233 breeding in the reactor. The reactor
safety parameters also improve with thorium introduction.
Further, the study indicated that the U-232 buildup in the
MFBR is much less as compared to that in thermal reactors
and MOX fuelled FBRs.
8.8
FIRE SAFETY STUDIES
8.8.1
Independent Verification & Uncertainty

Estimation in Fire Hazard Analysis
Fire hazard analysis (FHA) is essential to assess
the fire potential, fire prevention strategy, detection

mechanism and suppression means at various locations.
However, there is considerable uncertainty associated with
respect to the inputs including heat release rate, material
properties, ventilation conditions, flame height, pool
diameter, etc. used for fire modeling. In view of uncertainty
in the inputs provided for FHA, an independent
verification of FHA with uncertainty assessment of Safety
Related Pump House (SRPH) of KAPP-700MWe was
carried out using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
based Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) 5.0 code.
The SRPH room, 12 pumps, cable trays, smoke
detectors and ventilation ducts etc. were modeled as per
layout details. The pool fire scenario was postulated near
Pump-1 to assess, its effect on nearby equipment. Grid
independent study was also carried out. It was noted that,
the temperature near the cable trays was around 165C
during 900 s which is below the auto-ignition temperature
of PVC cables. For assessing uncertainty, two parameters,
namely heat release rate and pool diameter were
considered. Latin Hypercube sampling techniques was
utilized for generating 25 set of input parameters. It was
observed that there is variation in response time of smoke
detectors and heat detectors. The response time for smoke
detector was observed to be ranging from 8.41 s to 20 s
and that for heat detector is in the range of 211 s to 278 s.
The maximum temperature observed was around 165C
in total 25 cases. The 5th and 95th percentile of response
time of detectors, surface temperature and heat flux (net,
radiative) were calculated. The 95th percentile of
temperature was noted as 165C and 95th percentile of
response time of smoke detector was 8.41 s. This analysis
has provided insights into the realistic results expected
during possible fire accident sequence.
8.8.2
Fire Hazard Analysis in FBR
Fire hazard analysis was carried out for a

postulated lube oil spill in a typical steam generator
building (SGB) of a fast reactor. Numerical simulations
were carried out using a 3-D model for several postulated
credible fire scenarios involving spillage and subsequent
ignition of lube oil. Parametric studies were carried out to
elucidate the effect of CO2 suppression system on the fire
development. The overall objective was to assess target
temperatures at critical locations with and without taking
credit for the CO2 suppression systems. Key parameters
such as transient variation of temperature, mass burning
rate (MBR), fire duration, pressure, smoke layer height,
heat flux on the bounding surfaces and species mass
fraction etc. were obtained. The computational time for
this problem was significantly reduced by using the Multimesh and Open MP capabilities of FDS and by employing
high performance computing facility.
8.9
CIVIL STRUCTURE
SAFETY STUDIES
AND
SEISMIC
8.9.1
Evaluation of Ultimate Load Capacity

(ULC) of Inner Containment Structure
As a part of safety assessment, AERB undertook

and completed the exercise of evaluating the ultimate load
capacity of the KKNPP-1&2 containment structures. In the
first phase of work, ULC capacity was estimated without
including the effect of internal pressure on containment
base slab, which forms the bottom boundary of the
containment. In the second phase, ULC analysis was
carried out using an integrated model of the reactor
building, which included the hermetic containment, nonhermetic supporting structures, outer containment and
annex structures of reactor building resting on the base raft
supported on soil/rock strata represented as soil springs in
the model. The predicted behavior of the containment was
as per the expected behavior deduced from International
experience of model tests of pre-stressed concrete
containments. In addition to ULC, behavior of
containment was evaluated with respect to various
parameters termed as performance indicators, such as
occurrence of first crack, reinforcement yield, tendon yield
etc. Assessment of appurtenances connected to
containment and estimation of leakage as a function of
pressure were also undertaken. The results of the study
brought out that the KKNPP containment has an ultimate
load capacity of the containment of times the design
pressure for structural collapse and the capacity with
respect to initiation of large leakage has been
conservatively predicted as 2.33 times design pressure.
The study was peer reviewed by experts from BARC and
NPCIL as part of specialist groups (SG/S-3 and SG/S-6) of
ACPSR-LWR for KKNPP review. The work was finally
presented to ACPSR-LWR.
8.9.2
Seismic Safety of NPP Structures under

Beyond Design Basis Earthquakes
Seismic design philosophy for Indian NPPs

considers two levels of seismic events i.e. Safe Shutdown
Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake
(OBE). However, recent events of exceedance of SSE
(e.g. Niigataken-chuetsu-oki earthquake 2007, Great East
Japan Earthquake, 2011 etc.) has highlighted the need for
assessment of NPP components to cater to beyond design
basis earthquake (BDBE). This requires assessment of
seismic margin of floor mounted equipment and
components under seismic event beyond the design basis.
AERB has developed a methodology for this purpose,
considering state of the art in performance assessment of
structures and requirements for qualification of systems
and components of NPPs. The method uses inputs from
nonlinear static pushover analysis (NLSPA) of the
97
structure, to obtain a globally degraded model of the

structure and subsequently uses it to generate the floor
response spectra (FRS) under BDBE conditions using a
linear time history analysis. The FRS generated for SSE
and BDBE ground motions is presented in the Figure
8.9.1.Once FRS for BDBE is established, exercise of
seismic margin assessment of floor mounted equipment
and components can be performed using methodology
similar to that adopted for seismic re-evaluation. It should
be noted that the methods for assessment of nonlinear
behavior of SSC under seismic conditions is under
development in many countries towards preparation /
refinement of guidance under BDBE conditions.
Fig. 8.9.1: FE model of sample structure

and FRS for BDBE
8.10
RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL

SAFETY STUDIES
8.10.1 Dispersion of Radionuclides over Complex

Terrain under Postulated Accident
For the formulation of technical basis for
development of strategies, procedure and guidance, it is
02:30 UTC 02DEC2013
98
essential to analyse beyond design basis accident or

design extension conditions. In view of this a dispersion
study was carried out for Kaiga site. The objective of the
study was to model the meteorological parameters with
emphasis on local topographic circulations and to study
the dispersion of important radionuclides over a complex
terrain.
Though Gaussian Plume Model (GPM) is one of
the established models for atmospheric releases, it has
limitations and cannot deal with non-homogeneous and
non-stationary meteorological conditions prevailing over
complex topography. As a case study, detailed
meteorological modeling of Kaiga site was carried out for a
period of 72 hours by using Numerical Weather Prediction
(NWP) model Advanced Research Weather Research and
Forecasting (WRF-ARW) ver. 3.5. The National Centers for
Environmental Prediction (NCEP) final analysis data of
resolution 1.0o x 1.0o, available at 6 hours interval was
used as initial and boundary conditions. Time varying
meteorological parameters generated at 10 minutes
interval were used for running the dispersion model.
Lagrangian particle model FLEXPART coupled to WRF
was used to simulate the dispersion of radionuclides
released from the postulated accident. Two important
radionuclides considered for the present study are 131I
and 134Cs. Meteorological model simulations showed
significant diurnal land-sea temperature gradients leading
to development of nocturnal land-breeze (off-shore flow)
and daytime sea-breeze circulation (on-shore flow) at the
site. Dispersion simulation of 131I using FLEXPART
model is presented in the Figure 8.10.1. As can be seen
from the figure, diurnal variation in the plume trajectory is
observed and the plume is transported to the sea during
land breeze conditions and towards the land during sea
breeze circulations. The study would be useful for carrying
out environmental impact assessment of PHWR for severe
accident conditions.
07:00 UTC 02DEC2013
02:30 UTC 02DEC2013
07:00 UTC 02DEC2013
Fig. 8.10.1: Diurnal changes in the ground level concentration of

8.10.2. Radiological Impact Assessment of a
Proposed Radioactive Waste Disposal
facility
As part of safety review work, the Radiological
Impact Assessment (RIA) of the proposed Near Surface
Disposal Facility (NSDF) of FRFCF was completed. The
overall objective of this work was to estimate the
radiological impact of various radionuclides present at the
disposal site. The computational domain consisted of an
unconfined aquifer of dimensions 2500m2000m5m,
having disposal modules of SLT and RCCT. The specified
disposal inventory included 137Cs, 239Pu, 135Cs,
237Np, 99Tc etc. A credible accident scenario that could
131
I (pBq/m3)
lead to radioactivity release from the disposal site into the

ground water was assumed. Multipurpose CFD tool
PORFLOW was used for estimating the concentrations of
various radionuclides in groundwater at a distance of
approximately 500m from the edge of the disposal site.
Domain dimensions, groundwater aquifer parameters,
radioactive source term details and contaminant transport
related parameters were all provided as input to the code.
A sensitivity analysis was also carried out with respect to
key parameters such as groundwater velocity, porosity and
distribution coefficient and activity release mode. This
study identifies the dominant variables from the point of
view of radiological impact on the public. Annual dose due
to a few radionuclides is presented in Figure 8.10.2.
Fig.8.10.2: Annual doses to public due to

99
Tc, 237Np and 135Cs at 0.5km distance
from the NSDF
99
8.10.3 Environmental Assessment of Combined

outfall Channel for PFBR-MAPS
The objective of the exercise was to assess the
environmental impact of the combined outflow channel
constructed to discharge the thermal effluent of PFBR
and MAPS using Remote Sensing - Geographical
Information System (RS-GIS) tool. High resolution data
was employed for the pre and post construction period.

The morphological changes due to combined outfall
channel are presented in the Figure 8.10.3. It was
observed that during southerly current, deposition is
along the northern end of the canal and erosion along
southern end of the canal, and vice versa during
northerly current which demonstrate that influence of the
prevailing sea currents.
Fig. 8.10.3: Morphological changes due to combined outfall channel

8.10.4 Nuclear
Emergency
Management
Information System (NEMIS)
A user friendly information system, NEMIS
(Nuclear Emergency Management Information System)
for off-site emergency management during nuclear
accidents is being developed as part of AERBs Nuclear

and Radiation Emergency Monitoring Cell activity. To
include the atmospheric dispersion modeling during
accidental release and to study its effect in the surrounding
villages, additional software modules have been
developed and incorporated. These modules analyse the
Fig. 8.10.4: Plume dispersion as shown in NEMIS
100
input data of the accidental conditions and atmospheric

parameters using Gaussian plume model to predict the
dispersion of radioactive release. The module also has the
provision to include the results of a validated atmospheric
dispersion code and overlay the radioactive plume on the
village map to provide a visual display on the areas
affected for quick assessment of the accident situation as
presented in the Figure 8.10.4.
8.10.5 Generation of Environmental Baseline
Data for Nuclear Plant
A geo-spatial database has been generated for
KKNPP emergency planning zone on villages with latest
population data, emergency zones, sectors, rallying posts,
hospitals and primary health centers. All the villages within
16 km radial zone are filtered and a village map has been
generated. With this map, the corresponding census data
of the year 2011 is added. A list of hospitals/ primary health
centers is identified in the EPZ for each sector to provide
medical facility in the impacted area. The responsibility of
the identified hospitals is to implement protective and relief
measures during emergency. The identified rallying posts
with their corresponding sectors are shown in Figure
8.10.5.
Fig. 8.10.5: Location of identified Rallying

posts to a given sector for KKNPP site
8.11
STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK

END OF THE FUEL CYCLE
hence important to find out their influence of these diluents

on the thermal decomposition of 30% Tri-n-butyl
phosphate (TBP). Parameters such as time-temperature
profile, pressure rise, self-heat rate etc. were evaluated
using accelerating rate calorimeter under perfect adiabatic
conditions. TBP in the presence of odourless kerosene and
iso-dodecane did not show exothermic activity until
450C. The comparative thermal profiles of TBP diluted
with n-dodecane and HNP showed that the exothermic
activities preceded when HNP was used as the diluents.
Excepting n-dodecane, reactions in the presence of other
diluents did not show an appreciable pressure rise, perhaps
indicating the absence of reactions leading to breakdown
of the structure of TBP. The investigations on the effect of
irradiation of TBP reveal that the structure of TBP gets
broken in to dibutyl phosphate (DBP) and lower
hydrocarbons and TBP loses its bound water molecules.
8.11.2 Comparison
of
different
Advanced
Oxidation
Processes
towards
the
Degradation of Dibutyl Phosphate
Although Tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) is a robust
extractant for the extraction of Uranium and Plutonium, it
decomposes in the presence of nitric acid and water by
hydrolysis to lower organo-phosphate acids. Even small
amounts of such degradation products in the organic
phase can reduce the effectiveness of the extraction of
actinides and reduce the decontamination factors. Hence,
it is important to deduce methodologies for the
degradation of the degradation products of TBP.
Advanced
oxidation
processes
(AOPs)
are
environmentally friendly technologies that permit the total
or partial degradation of organic and inorganic pollutants
resistant to conventional treatments. Degradation of
dibutyl phosphate (DBP) was investigated using three
advanced oxidation processes, photo-catalytic, Fenton
and Photo-Fenton. Batch type photo-reactor was
employed for the studies and the degradation of DBP was
followed by an ion chromatographic procedure. Photocatalytic degradation of DBP using the three AOPs shows
that more than 99% of DBP could be achieved using
photo-catalytic process compared to 96% using PhotoFenton process in 180 minutes of UV irradiation.
Formation of butyl acid phosphate (MBP) was confirmed
as one of the degradation products (RT=26 min) in IC
experiments. The comparison of effectiveness of the three
AOPs towards DBP degradation followed the order Photocatalytic> Photo-Fenton > Fenton process.
8.11.1 Role of different diluents and Irradiation

on the Thermal Behavior of Tri-n-butyl
Phosphate (TBP)
8.11.3 Efficient Decomposition of

Oxalate Supernatant Waste
Many diluents n-dodecane, heavy normal

paraffin (HNP), odourless kerosene and Iso-dodecane are
being employed in the back end of the fuel cycle and it is
Treatment of oxalic acid remaining after

plutonium precipitation in a nuclear reprocessing plant is a
challenging task due to the associated fission products and
Simulated
101
radioactivity. Hydrogen peroxide and potassium

permanganate are added currently for the oxidation of
oxalic acid. Photo-catalytic degradation of oxalic acid
using nano particles of titania and Gallia was successfully
demonstrated in 240 minutes of UV irradiation. 50mg of
photo-catalysts and 0.5 ml of 30% H2O2 were employed
for the degradation of one litre of 1000 mg/L oxalic acid.
The efficiency of the catalysts employed for the
degradation of oxalic acid follow the order TiO2-S > P-25
TiO2>g
-Ga2O3> -Ga2O3. The influence of pH on the
degradation of oxalic acid follow the order acidic > neutral
> alkaline. Degradation of oxalic acid was confirmed
through decrease of total organic carbon (TOC) values and
also using titrimetric procedure using potassium
permanganate. Cerium was spiked in oxalic acid solution
to simulate plutonium and it was observed that the
presence of cerium did not affect the efficiency of the
photo-catalytic process and hence the methodology can
be applied for the degradation of oxalate supernatant
pertaining to the fuel cycle facilities.
8.11.4 Comparative study on removal of
Technetium-99 using Anion Exchange
Resin and Inorganic Sorbents
Technetium-99, a fission product of uranium-235
is significant due to its long half-life (t1/2 = 2.13 x 105 y with
beta energy of 0.297 MeV), abundance in nuclear wastes
(fission yield6%) and its environmental mobility under
oxidizing conditions. The removal of 99Tc from low level
alkaline radioactive waste was investigated and compared
using two inorganic sorbents, (dunite and titania
microspheres) and with a commercial anion exchanger

Purolite A530E. Effective removal was observed with
Purolite A530E in batch studies while fewer uptakes were
observed by the sorbents dunite and titania microspheres.
There was about 79%, 85% and 92% uptake of 99Tc by
PuroliteA530E at pH viz. 3, 7 & 11 respectively. The
column performance of the material is being evaluated
using a glass column with 4ml resin. Presence of 99Tc was
below detection limit even after the passage of 80 bed
volumes of waste. The removal of 99Tc using liquid waste
with different pH ranges follow the order neutral > acidic
> alkaline. The present investigation clearly reveals that
the employed anionic exchange resin is effective for the
removal of 99Tc in the liquid waste in the presence of high
dissolved solids. The study demonstrates the applicability
of the resin for column operations at all pH ranges and in
the presence of high salt content.
8.12
RELEASE OF BOOKLET
HIGHLIGHTS (2010-2014)
ON
SRI
A booklet SRI Highlights highlighting the research

activities carried out in SRI during the past five years
(2010-2014) was released by Chairman, AERB on March
02, 2015 at Sarabhai Auditorium, IGCAR, Kalpakkam.
The significant contributions in wider range of safety
related topics that include reactor and radiological safety,
probabilistic safety assessment, remote sensing & GIS
applications, structural and seismic safety, fire safety,
hydrogen
safety,
thermal
hydraulic
analyses,
environmental & fuel chemistry, etc. are highlighted in the
booklet.
From left, Shri V. Balasubramanian, Director, SRI, Shri S.S.Bajaj, Chairman, AERB and Dr. Vasudev Rao, Director, IGCAR
during release of SRI Highlights (2010-2014) booklet
102
8.13
AERB FUNDED
PROGRAMME
SAFETY
RESEARCH
To promote safety research and related activities,

a Committee for Safety Research Programmes (CSRP)
evaluates and recommends grants for the research projects
and to monitor their progress periodically. The Committee
also recommends financial assistance to universities,
research organizations and professional associations for
holding symposia and conferences of interest to AERB.
The CSRP met three times during the year and deliberated
on 17 new project proposals and recommended Grant-inAid for 4 new projects as given in Table 8.1. It also
approved the renewal of 12 ongoing projects as given in
Table 8.2.
In addition, financial support was provided to 41
seminars, symposia and conferences. The sub-committee
of CSRP met 11 times to clear the applications seeking
financial support from AERB for conducting the seminars /
conferences.
Table 8.1: New Research Projects Approved

S.No.
Project Title
Principal Investigator
Organisation
1.
Estimation and analysis of radiation doses

associated with interventional cardiology and
other fluoroscopy guided procedures
Dr. Satish C. Uniyal
HIHT University, Dehradun,

Uttarakhand
2.
Study of Radiation Safety Measures of X-ray

Installations in Mizoram
Dr. Kham Suan Pau
Mizoram State Cancer

Institute Campus, Mizoram
3.
Biological effects of low dose alpha particle

radiation exposure to blood lymphocytes for
bio-dosimetry
Prof. P. Venkatachalam
Sri Ramachandra
University, Chennai
4.
Study of Dosimetric Evaluation of Optically

Stimulated Luminescence in the Advanced
Radiation Therapy
Dr. M. Ravi Kumar
Kidwai Memorial Institute

of Oncology, Bangalore
Table 8.2: Research Projects Renewed

S.No.
Project Title
Principal Investigator
Organisation
1.
Leukocyte DNA damage as a biomarker for

radiation exposure to the patients undergoing
MDCT examinations
Dr. Anupama Tandon
GTB Hospital
New Delhi
2.
Evaluation & Inter-comparison of QA

measurements in radiation Oncology
Dr. P. Krishna Reddy
MNJIO & RCC,

Hyderabad
3.
A study on Radioactivity in Phosphogypsum based

Building and Construction Materials and Indoor
Radon Inhalation Dose Estimate in Tamilnadu
Dr. P. Shahul Hameed
J.J College of Engineering

& Technology,
Tiruchirapalli
4.
Effect of Radiolytic Products and Metal Nitrates on

Red oil Forming Substances
Dr. M. Surianarayanan
CLRI, Chennai
5.
Markov approach for Reliability Assessment

of Safety
Dr. R. Sujatha
SSN College of Engineering

Kalavakkam
6.
Seismic Fragility of the primary containment

considering structural integrity and leakage through
the damaged containment
Dr. Siddhartha Ghosh
IIT, Bombay
7.
Fabrication of Nano Oxide based Sensor on

stabilized Nano Zirconia for Detection of Hydrogen
Sulfide
Dr. T. M. Sridhar
Rajlakshmi Engineering
College, Chennai
8.
Thermo luminescence Characterization of

phosphors used in display devices for possible use
in accident dosimetry
Dr. A.S. Sai Prasad
Vasavi college of Engg.,

Hyderabad
9.
Image Quality /Patient - Staff dose Studies &

development of Dose audit procedures in
interventional cardiology
Dr. K. N. Govindrajan
PSG College of Technology,

Coimbatore
Numerical Simulation of the Response of Nuclear

containment subjected to Aircraft Crash
Dr. Mohd Ashraf Iqbal
10.
103
IIT, Roorkee
8.
Thermo luminescence Characterization of

phosphors used in display devices for possible use
in accident dosimetry
Dr. A.S. Sai Prasad
Vasavi college of Engg.,

Hyderabad
9.
Image Quality /Patient - Staff dose Studies &

development of Dose audit procedures in
interventional cardiology
Dr. K. N. Govindrajan
PSG College of Technology,

Coimbatore
10.
Numerical Simulation of the Response of Nuclear

containment subjected to Aircraft Crash
Dr. Mohd Ashraf Iqbal
IIT, Roorkee
11.
Reliability Assessment of the Passive system and its

integration into PSA
Dr. Suneet Singh
IIT, Bombay
12.
Development of Novel Polymeric Detectors for

Selective Dosimetric Analysis
Dr. V. S. Nadkarni
Goa University
104
Chapter 9
Public Information
CHAPTER 9
PUBLIC INFORMATION
AERB has the mandate to keep the public
informed on radiation and nuclear safety related matters.
Towards this, AERB has been maintaining a website with
all relevant and updated information; issuing press releases
on contemporary issues; publishing Annual Reports,
Annual Bulletin and Newsletters. AERB has stepped up its
efforts in addressing public concerns and provides the
information to public through print and electronic media
on various topics of public concern.
A press briefing was arranged on March 31, 2015

in AERB following the conclusion of the Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission of the IAEA
during March 16-27, 2015. The briefing was attended by
about a dozen of major media houses.
The Annual Report and Bulletin contain

information of various activities carried out by AERB
during the year in pursuance of its mission, roles and
responsibilities. In addition, Newsletter is published every
six months, informing public on current developments in
areas of nuclear and radiation safety regulation.
Chairman, AERB briefed the summary of the IRRS

Mission including observations and recommendations
made for further improvements and answered related
questions. The media was also briefed about good practice
followed by AERB which were appreciated by the IRRS
team.
9.1
INTERACTION WITH MEDIA
9.1.1
AERB Press Conference on March 31, 2015
Press conferences and / or media briefings on the

different topical issues are conducted.
Towards strengthening of Public Awareness, AERB has issued press releases, arranged a press
briefing, published AERB Bulletins and Newsletters, conducted several stakeholder awareness
programmes and displayed exhibits in various science & technology fairs / meets.
Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB addressing the Press Conference at AERB, Mumbai
following the IRRS Mission
9.1.2
Articles and Interview

Different Magazines
Published
in
Articles, e-interviews and talks of Chairman

AERB were published in different magazines. These
articles and interviews elaborated the aspects on
regulatory practices for NPPs, independence of AERB,

implementation status of long-term additional safety
measures in nuclear installations etc. Through these
interviews, it was conveyed to the public that AERB has
functional independence as a regulator and a robust
regulatory system is in place.
105
9.2
PRESS RELEASES
AERB issues press releases with an aim to keep

members of public informed about its important activities.
The press releases are issued in English as well as Hindi.
During last year, six press releases were issued:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
India participated in the 6th Review Meeting of

IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) held
during March-24 to April 4, 2014 held at IAEA,
Vienna issued on April 8,2014.
AERB Industrial and Fire Safety Awards issued on
April 22, 2014.
AERB reviewed hot water spillage incident at
KKNPP- Unit 1 issued on May 20, 2014.
AERB releases the Annual Report for the year
2013-2014 issued on September 2, 2014.
AERB Organized 31st DAE Safety and
Occupational Health Professionals Meet at
Bhartiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd
(BHAVINI), Kalpakkam during October 15-17,
2014 issued on October 15,2014.
IAEA reviews the nuclear regulatory infrastructure
of India issued on March 27, 2015.
Detailed press releases are available on AERB
website.
9.3
AERB NEWSLETTER
AERB publishes Newsletter once in every six

months. It provides a glimpse of the important regulatory
activities conducted during the period along with

important technical and awareness articles. During the
year AERB published its newsletter Vol. 27 (1), January June, 2014 and Vol. 27 (2), July - December 2014 in
English and Hindi. The Newsletters are available on AERB
website.
9.4
ANNUAL REPORT
Annual Report of AERB brings out the details of

work carried out in various divisions of AERB during every
financial year. The report is widely circulated to all the units
and Public Sector Undertakings under the DAE, Nuclear
Regulatory Agencies of other countries, IAEA, premier
educational and research institutes in India, Radiological
Safety Officers of various hospitals and nuclear
installations, news agencies in India, ex-members and
Chairman of AERB, Ex-Directors and Ex-Heads of the
divisions of AERB. The report is published in English as
well as in Hindi. The reports are available on AERB
website.
9.5
AERB BULLETIN
The AERB Bulletin, which is the popular version

of Annual Report, maintains the essence of the annual
report, yet explains the most important activities in an
understandable and public friendly format. AERB
continued its initiatives to publish the bulletin to enhance
its reach out to larger public more effectively. The bulletin is
published in English and Hindi.
Release of AERB Bulletin 2013-14 in the AERB Board Meeting
106
9.6
WEBSITE MANAGEMENT
9.6.1
AERB Website
The website of AERB serves as a single platform

providing the information on the gamut of regulatory
activities and major issues of radiological significance. The
website is associated with useful information for public like
access to AERB codes & guides, safety directives,
regulatory forms, RTI, eLORA, Annual Reports, AERB
bulletins, newsletters, press releases, public grievances,
availability of feedback form for suggestions, links to
external agencies and details of various functions carried
out by AERB.
9.7
DAE Safety and Occupational Health

Professionals Meet
AERB displayed its exhibits during the DAE

Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet held at
held at BHAVINI, Kalpakkam during October 15-17,
2014. Along with exhibits, AERB held radiation quiz
competition, radiation dose charts and other activities in
order to increase awareness on many topics. The
exhibition was very well received among the school
children.
PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAMS
AERB pursues its public outreach activity with an

aim to reach out to all sections of society (public,
stakeholders, including manufacturers & suppliers,
operator etc.) and bring awareness on the aspects of
nuclear, radiation & industrial safety. It also helps in
making AERBs safety oversight and review process more
visible. Apart from the activities like publication of annual
report, newsletter, updating website, providing response to
RTI and parliament questions, etc., the following public
outreach activities were carried out by AERB
Dr. R. Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Adviser to the GOI,

visiting AERB stall during the 6th India Nuclear Energy Expo
9.7.1
Advertisements:
AERB publishes advertisements in print media

once every six months in order to sensitize the users on
requirements of obtaining regulatory consent from AERB
for users of radioactive sources or radiation generating
equipment including medical x-ray equipment.
9.7.2
Participation in science and technology

fairs
AERB, in year 2012 took initiative to participate

in science and technology fairs where it displayed exhibits
on the safety and regulatory aspects of Nuclear &
Radiation Facilities including its safety documents. The
exhibits were aimed at giving a correct perspective on
radiation doses received and provide public, a glimpse of
the technical aspects of regulation.
AERB participated in 6th India Nuclear Energy

Expo held on 6 - 8 November 2014 at Nehru Center in
Mumbai. The event was conducted which to provide
desired impetus towards growth of nuclear sector. AERB
exhibited its display on safety regulation in this sector
which are essential as well desirable for sustainable growth.
l
Indian Science Congress
AERB displayed its exhibits during the prestigious

Indian Science Congress held on 3-7th January, BandraKurla Complex, Mumbai. The response AERBs stall was
very encouraging. People of all age ranging from school /
college students to university professors and housewives
visited AERB stall.
l
The response to the AERB's exhibits at these

science fairs was extremely encouraging with visitors of
various age groups and students visiting the stall and
getting informed about AERB and its role. In view of such
response AERB continued to participate in such science
and technology fairs. During the last one year AERB
displayed exhibits and interacted with public at following
events:
6th India Nuclear Energy Expo
Indo-Japan IJAA Conference
International Conference on Advancements in

Materials, Health and Safety towards Sustainable Energy
& Environment (MHS-2014) was organized during
August 7-8, 2014 at Kohinoor Asiana Hotel; Chennai.
AERB displayed its exhibits on its safety regulation in
nuclear industry during the event.
107
9.8
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS
Fifty one parliament questions with sub questions

were received and replied during the period.
9.9
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT-2005
Required measures were taken on the

implementation of 'Right to Information Act (RTI)' in AERB
and the required information has been put on AERB
website. The total number of RTIs handled during this
period was one hundred and four of which thirty two RTIs
were related to the radiotherapy practice. Year wise RTI
queries replied by AERB is given in Figure 9.1.
Fig. 9.1: RTI queries replied during the last 7 years
108
AERB Advertisement in leading Newspapers for the user dealing with Radioactive Sources & Radiation
generating equipment
109
Chapter 10
International
Co-Operation
CHAPTER 10
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
AERB recognizes international cooperation as a
measure for enhancing effectiveness of regulatory control
and harmonizing international regulatory practices and
accords due importance to the same. India is a contracting
party in the framework of several international instruments
promulgated for establishing a global regime for
cooperation in promoting safety in various nuclear /
radiation facilities / activities. During the reporting period,
AERB took several initiatives as to enhance its contribution
in harmonization of international regulatory practices and
methodologies and continued its participation in various
international forums. AERB has also entered into bilateral
arrangements / agreements with the regulatory authorities
of several other countries.
An expert peer review of the current extent of
compliance with IAEA Standards and Guidance provides
a good indicator of the effectiveness of the regulatory
oversight for various facilities / activities in the country. In
this direction, AERB successfully hosted the IAEAIntegrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission, a
peer review mission of IAEA, to review the regulatory
framework of AERB for Nuclear Power Plants and Projects.
10.1
INTEGRATED REGULATORY REVIEW

SERVICE (IRRS) MISSION TO AERB
10.1.1 Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
conducts an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
in countries with nuclear power plants and radiation
facilities to review the common aspects of any States
national, legal and governmental framework and
regulatory infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety
against IAEA Standards and Guidance. It is a peer review
and is conducted at the request of a country, which is a
member of IAEA.
Pursuant to the invitation by the Government of
India, IAEA undertook an IRRS peer review mission to the
review the activities of AERB in respect of the regulatory
system and activities related to safety of Nuclear Power
Plants in India. The IRRS peer review mission took place
during March 16-27, 2015.
The peer review mission involves verification

by an international team having domain
experts from all over the world, of the
regulatory
regime
against
the
very
comprehensive safety requirements of IAEA.
10.1.2 Preparations for the IRRS Mission

Preparatory meeting with IAEA officials
A preparatory meeting for the IRRS Mission was
held on October 7-8, 2014 at AERB, Mumbai. Meeting
was attended by designated IRRS team officials,
Counselor (AE) of India at Vienna and AERB officials. The
team discussed all the aspects related with the IRRS
Mission including the identification of the policy issues and
expressed the missions expectations.
Self Assessment using SARIS software-tool
After formally extending the invitation to IAEA for
the IRRS mission, the first and most significant prerequisite
of the mission was to carry out a self-assessment of the
countrys legal and regulatory framework using SARIS
(Self-Assessment of Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety),
a software-tool developed by IAEA. SARIS use a modular
structure covering different aspects under the modules
having detailed questionnaire on each aspect to compare
the individual State's regulatory infrastructure against the
IAEA standards. AERB had organized a National SelfAssessment Seminar during March 4-6, 2014 wherein,
IAEA officials elaborated the process and procedures of the
IRRS Mission, requirements and stipulations made in IAEA
standards, the missions expectations and explained the
use of SARIS. AERB carried out the self-assessment using
the software-tool and prepared responses to the questionnaires of these modules which went through a very
elaborate quality check by way of review and harmonization, analysis of the responses under the supervision of an
Apex committee of AERB. The final answers along with the
summary report and other reference material were
submitted to IAEA as Advance Referral Materials (ARMs)
as per the agreed schedule. Final submission made to IAEA
comprised of some 1000 pages of responses prepared by
AERB and other legal and regulatory documents identified
for corroborating the stated position. AERB also developed the action plan on the basis of outcome of this selfassessment and started implementing the measures to
further strengthen its processes.
AERBs participation in IRRS Missions for other
countries
Two officers from AERB, one as member and
other as observer were invited for IRRS Mission to the
Netherlands conducted during November 02-14, 2014.
Another officer from AERB participated in the IRRS
111
Mission to France conducted during November 16-28,

2014 as an observer.
One officer from AERB participated in workshop
held in Moscow on lessons learnt from IRRS and follow-up
missions since 2011.
The experience gained during these interactions
proved to be very useful as these presented opportunities
for AERB to understand modalities of conduct of IRRS
mission.
10.1.3 Conduct of IRRS Mission to India
The IAEA - IRRS Mission visited India during
March 16-27, 2015. The IRRS team comprised 16 experts
from the nuclear regulatory bodies of Bulgaria, Canada,
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Netherland,
United Kingdom, United States of America, and the IAEA
itself.
The team conducted Initial Team Meeting at its
local residence in Mumbai on March 15, 2015 in which the
members exchanged among themselves their first
impressions of the existing legislative, governmental and
regulatory regime for safety based on the submitted ARMs
to IAEA. The Entry Meeting was held on March 16 at
AERB office.
During the first week (March 16-21, 2015) the
team held discussions with the identified AERB
counterparts of respective module for seeking further
clarifications and evidences for substantiating the stated
position in the ARMs. During this week the team leader,
deputy team leader, team coordinator and the deputy
team coordinator held meetings with Chairman AEC;
Chairman AERB; Director, Bhabha Atomic Research

Centre (BARC); Chairman & Managing Director, Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) to better
understand the nature of relationship of AERB with these
agencies and independent decision making of AERB.
A group of four members of the IRRS Mission
accompanied the AERB regulatory inspection team to
Kakrapar Atomic Power Station-1&2 (KAPS-1&2) and
Kakrapar Atomic Power Project-3&4 (KAPP-3&4) for
observing the approach and procedures for carrying out
regulatory inspection by the AERB inspectors. The
members also observed the on-site emergency
preparedness arrangements in place for the management
of radiological emergencies. The IAEA experts visiting the
Kakrapar site held discussions with the senior
management officials of the operating plant as well as the
project for understanding relations between the authorized
party and applicant with AERB. Additionally, the mission
members also interviewed the Inspectors of AERB
Regulatory Team for confirming the regulatory approach
and extent of AERB.
In the second week the team discussed the
already agreed policy issues with AERB management for
bringing about greater clarity and coherence in approach
towards addressing the implementing mechanisms related
to these policy issues. Mr. Denis Flory, Deputy Director
General (DDG) and Head, Department of Nuclear Safety
and Security, IAEA, submitted the draft of the IRRS
Mission report to the Government on March 27, 2015
during the exit meeting, which marked the formal
conclusion of the Mission. India has to submit its
comments, if any, on the draft report by April 30, 2015 to
IAEA. IAEA will submit the final IRRS Mission report to
India on or before July 31, 2015.
AERB - IRRS Mission Team Members
112
The
l
AERB's research and development

infrastructure provides strong regulatory review
and assessment activities, and
The
l
scope and depth of the AERB recruitment

and training program is effective in maintaining a
knowledgeable technical staff.
The
l
use of systematic database for tracking the

recommendations from emergency exercises.
IRRS Team Members holding discussions during

daily team meeting
10.1.4 Outcome of the IRRS Mission to INDIA

The Team Leader Ramzi Jammal observed after
the mission ..there is a strong commitment to safety in
India. India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is an
experienced, knowledgeable and dedicated regulatory
body for the protection of the public and the environment.
It continues to enhance its regulatory programme to face
the current and future challenges in regulating nuclear
safety, such as reinforcing the safety of existing nuclear
facilities, monitoring ageing and decommissioning, as well
as providing oversight of the construction, commissioning
and operation of new nuclear power plants.
The draft mission report articulates the

regulatory control exercised by AERB as, The
IRRS team is satisfied with the practice of
founding regulatory decisions on wellestablished and communicated regulatory
documents coupled with the multi-tier safety
review. This ensures that AERBs regulatory
control maintains the necessary reliability and
consistency
in
its
approach
and
implementation...
The good practices identified by IRRS team in its
draft report include the following.
India
l
has a comprehensive and well-established

national educational and training system that
supports competence-building for its nuclear
program;
The IRRS mission also provided a few

recommendations
and
suggestions
for
further
improvement on the regulatory framework and the
activities, which inter-alia, is as follows.
The
l
Government should promulgate a national

policy and strategy for safety, and a radioactive
waste management strategy as a statement of the
Governments intent;
The
l
Government should embed the AERBs

regulatory independence in law, separated from
other entities having responsibilities or interests
that could unduly influence its decision making;
The
l
AERB should review the implementation of

its policy and existing arrangements to ensure it
maintains independence in the performance of its
regulatory functions;
The
l
AERB should consider increasing the

frequency of routine on-site inspections at NPPs
to allow for additional independent verification
and more effective regulatory oversight, and
The
l
AERB should develop and implement its

own internal emergency arrangements including
detailed procedures to fulfill its emergency
response role.
Chairman AERB, Shri S.S. Bajaj, after receiving

the draft report of IRRS mission on behalf of the
Government at the conclusion of the mission, said "The
acknowledgement of the effectiveness of India's safety
regulation in the outcome of this IRRS mission has
renewed AERB's resolve and commitment for ensuring a
high level of safety in the facilities and activities. AERB is
committed to pursuing the improvements suggested by the
mission towards further strengthening the regulatory
framework."
The
l
AERB takes full benefit from operational

experience with the aim of continuously
enhancing its regulatory framework and
processes;
113
Team Leader Mr Ramzi Jammal hands over the draft report

of IRRS mission to Chairman, AERB Shri S. S. Bajaj in the
presence of Mr. Denis Flory, Deputy Director General, IAEA
10.2
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF THE

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
A five member Delegation from India led by Shri

R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) represented India in the Diplomatic
Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS),
held at International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
Vienna on February 9, 2015. The diplomatic conference
was convened as decided by the 6th review meeting of CNS
held during March-April, 2014, for considering the
proposal for amendment to article 18 of the CNS. The
diplomatic conference proposed to come out with the
consensus formulation involving Vienna Declaration on
Nuclear Safety. The Indian delegation supported the
consensus on the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.
The Declaration seeks to achieve significant safety
enhancements in the nuclear power plants all over the
world, both new as well as the existing ones. The
diplomatic conference was attended by 71 member states.
In its statement to the Diplomatic Conference, the Indian
Delegation extended its full support to the Declaration by
consensus and highlighted the efforts it has taken to
enhance safety of the nuclear power plants in India.
The Vienna Declaration calls for enhancements
in the design, siting and construction of nuclear power
plants, with the objectives of preventing accidents as well
as mitigating possible radioactivity releases, should an
accident occur and avoiding early and large radioactivity
releases. It also calls for systematic and periodic safety
assessments of existing plants, throughout its lifetime, for
implementing
reasonably
practicable
safety
enhancements. These principles are being integrated in
the review process of the CNS with immediate effect, with
the requirement of reporting on the measures by the
individual Contracting Parties and its peer review, from the
next CNS Review Meeting in 2017.
114
This declaration came on the back of extensive

discussions extending over many weeks and months,
among the Contracting Parties of the CNS, on the issue of
voting on a proposal for change in the text of CNS vis--vis
a consensus. Right from the time the proposal for
amending the text of the CNS was mooted, India has been
expressing the view that the CNS processes have enough
in-built mechanisms to keep the Convention up to date
and contemporary without necessarily going in for any
amendment to the text of the Convention. In fact soon after
the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of CNS in 2012, AERB has
started the work of reviewing the regulatory requirements
for the nuclear power plants, in the light of the lessons from
the Fukushima accident. The new Codes issued recently by
AERB, on 'Siting of Nuclear Facilities' and 'Design of LWR
based NPPs' incorporate the requirements arising out of
the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. The
regulatory practices of AERB, with the enhanced safety
requirements would help enormously in addressing the
objectives of the present Vienna Declaration on Nuclear
Safety.
10.3
AERB'S ACTIVITIES AS MDEP MEMBER
The Multinational Design Evaluation Program

(MDEP) is a multinational initiative to develop innovative
approaches to leverage the resources and knowledge of
the national regulatory authorities who are currently or will
be tasked with the review of new reactor power plant
designs. AERB became a full member of the MDEP in April
2012. Among other things the focus of MDEP is to
implement the MDEP products in order to facilitate the
licensing of new reactors, including those being developed
by the Generation IV International Forum. MDEP
comprises 14 countries' nuclear regulatory authorities and
is structured under 5 design-specific working groups and 3
issue-specific working groups which meet several times a
year. The technical guidance for MDEP is provided by
Steering Technical Committee (STC), in which all the work
products generated by various working groups are
reviewed and approved.
During the period, AERB actively participated
and contributed in MDEP Policy Group meeting, Steering
Technical Committee (STC), Digital and Instrumentation
Working Group of MDEP and in the 3rd MDEP conference
on New Reactor Design Activities. India is also the member
of MDEP issue specific working groups on 'Vendor
Inspection and Coordination', 'Codes and Standards' and
design specific EPR working group and VVER working
group.
10.4
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF IAEA
The General Conference is the high level

policymaking body of the IAEA comprising of
representatives of all Member States of the Agency. The

General Conference is held annually to consider and
approve the Agency's programme and budget and to
decide on other matters brought before it.
Chairman, AERB attended the 58th General
Conference of IAEA held at Vienna during September 2226, 2014 as part of Indian delegation. Several resolutions
pertaining to nuclear safety, radiation safety, nuclear
security and international cooperation were adopted in the
General Conference. This Conference provides
opportunity to Chairman, AERB to have bilateral meetings
and interaction with his counterparts from other countries.
has bilateral arrangements with the regulatory bodies of

other countries namely, France, Russia, Romania, Ukraine
and the United States of America. During the period,
AERB has participated in a bilateral meeting with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of United States of
America and has entered into a bilateral arrangement with
the Regulatory body of Finland (STUK) during the period.
The details of the same are mentioned below.
10.5.1. Bilateral meeting between AERB and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of
the United States of America
A bilateral meeting between the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board of India and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) of the United States of America was
held during September 10-11, 2014 at Rockville,
Maryland USA. Officials from Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre (BARC), Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.
(NPCIL) and Embassy of India also participated in the
meeting as a part of the Indian delegation. The purpose of
the meeting was to continue bilateral cooperation between
AERB and NRC in the areas of nuclear regulatory safety,
regulatory safety research including severe accident
prevention and lessons learned from Fukushima nuclear
accident.
The Indian Delegation at the plenary of the Fifty-Eighth

General Conference of IAEA
10.5
BILATERAL COOPERATION
AERB has programme for bilateral cooperation

with the regulatory bodies of other countries for sharing of
experience in the field of regulation of nuclear activities for
peaceful purposes and cooperation in nuclear and
radiation safety matters. In this connection, AERB already
In addition, the areas to be considered for future

bilateral cooperation and exchange were identified. The
Indian Delegation accompanied by NRC staff also visited
North Anna Nuclear Power Plant in Virginia, USA on
September 12, 2014. The group visited the following areas
during the tour: independent spent fuel storage
installation, FLEX beyond design basis equipment storage
building, Unit 1 turbine-generator, Unit 1 control room,
emergency diesel generator room, station black out diesel
room, and training center for control room simulator.
U.S. NRC and Indian Delegation Visit to North Anna Power Station, USA
115
10.5.2 Arrangement with Regulatory Body of

Finland (STUK)
A site visit to 540 MWe PHWR (TAPS-3&4) was

also arranged for CSRG participants.
AERB signed a bilateral arrangement with the

Regulatory body of Finland (STUK) on October 15, 2014
during the visit of Honorable President of India, Shri
Pranab Mukherjee to Finland. The arrangement includes
exchange of information between the two organizations on
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation safety
issues, safety issues related to the construction, operation
and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as
security assessments, emergency preparedness and
radioactive waste disposal. The cooperation agreement
also promotes exchange visits by STUK and AERB experts.
10.7
10.6
THE
ANNUAL
CANDU
SENIOR
REGULATORS GROUP MEETING
The regulatory authorities of the seven countries

which own and operate CANDU (Canada Deuterium
Uranium) type Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR)
nuclear power plants, are member of CANDU Senior
Regulators Group (CSRG) of IAEA. These countries
namely, Argentina, Canada, China, India, Republic of
Korea, Pakistan and Romania, meet annually in CSRG
Meetings to discuss regulatory and operational issues for
improving operational safety and enhancing regulatory
effectiveness in CANDU countries.
The Annual Meeting of the CSRG for the year
2014 was hosted by AERB at Mumbai during 10 to 14
November, 2014. The areas of common interest to
CANDU operating countries were discussed such as (i)
Instrumentation & Controls (I&C) aspects of CANDU
reactors, (ii) source term assessment methodology, (iii)
radiological impact assessment, (iv) possible measures for
avoidance of long term offsite contamination etc. Further,
it was agreed to develop a document consolidating the
practices and experience relating to aspects of life
management of CANDU pressure tubes.
CANDU SENIOR REGULATORS MEETING at Mumbai
116
ANNUAL
MEETING
REGULATORS FORUM
OF
WWER
The Forum of the State Nuclear Safety Authorities

of the Countries Operating WWER (Water-Water Energy
Reactors) type reactors was established in 1993. The
objective of the Forum is to foster enhancement of the
nuclear safety and radiation protection in the interested
countries through utilization of the collective experience,
information exchange and consolidation of efforts of the
national nuclear safety authorities to study safety problems
and improve regulatory policies and practices. At the
Forum meetings, the heads of the delegation report on
issues of nuclear and radiation safety regulation in their
countries and discuss safety significant events that might
have occurred at the WWER NPPs. The current members
of the Forum are heads of the regulatory authorities of
Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, China, Finland,
Hungary, India, Iran, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.
Representatives of Germany and the IAEA take part in the
Forum as observers. The Forum acts under the
Memorandum signed by the Member Countries in 1998 in
Armenia. The Forum holds annual meetings hosted by the
Member Countries by turns.
Nine member countries (Armenia, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Russian
Federation, Slovak Republic and Ukraine) and 2 observers
(GRS and IAEA) participated in the 21st Annual Meeting of
WWER Forum. Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB and Shri
K. J. Vakharwala, Director, NPSD, AERB represented
India in the 21stAnnual Meeting of the WWER forum held
during June 16 - 18, 2014 at Helsinki, Finland.
MEMBERS of WWER REGULATORS FORUM
Participation in the Working Group on Reactor

Physics Analysis (RPWG) of VVER Regulators
Forum
One officer from AERB participated in the 'The
Kick-off Meeting of Working Group on Reactor Physics
Analysis (RPWG) of VVER Regulators Forum' during
September 25-26, 2014. The primary mandate of the
group is to verify the reactor physics codes used in VVER
safety analysis with the commissioning data.
10.8
PARTCIPATION
ACTIVITIES
IN
IAEA
&
NEA
The staff of AERB participates in various

Technical and Consultants meetings organized by IAEA on
a range of topics for NPPs, fuel cycle facilities, radiation
facilities, transportation of radioactive materials etc. and
illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. AERB has been
participating in IAEA Coordinated Research Programme
(IAEA-CRP). AERB is the national coordinator for IAEA International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) based reporting
of events and IAEA/NEA - Incident Reporting System (IRS)
and Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System
(FINAS).
and response to Nuclear and other radioactive material out

of regulatory control etc.
AERB is a participant in the activities of
International Seismic Safety Centre of IAEA in the various
working areas including Seismic safety evaluation,
Tsunami hazard, Engineering aspects of protection of
nuclear installations against sabotage and Site Evaluation
and External Events Safety AssessmentUnder the working
area with respect to tsunami hazard, AERB officers are
involved in drafting certain sections of IAEA's draft Safety
report on Tsunami and Seiche Hazard Assessment and
TECDOC on Benchmarking for Tsunami Modelling. In
this regard, AERB hosted an IAEA/ISSC meeting at AERB,
Mumbai during December 8-10, 2014 to finalize the
TECDOC.
IAEA
In addition to the above, IAEA provides

opportunity for the staff of nuclear regulatory authorities to
work with its Operating Experience (OE) team at IAEA
Headquarter, Vienna for a short duration. Such
opportunities pave the way for the staff of nuclear
regulatory authorities of member-countries to enhance
their competence in various processes related to
management of operating experience feedback programs
of IAEA. One officer from AERB was deputed to IAEA for
duration of six months.
During the period, AERB officers were deputed

for participating in the Technical and Consultants meetings
organized by IAEA and contributed towards development
of safety reports related to external event safety assessment
for multi-unit site, Nuclear Security Series Implementing
Guide on 'Regaining Control Over Nuclear and Other
Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control',
development of guidance statements for computer security
in the form of 'Potential Computer Security
Recommendations Guidance', technical guidance for
'Exercising Nuclear Security and Measures for detection of
One officer from AERB participated in the

Workshop on Nuclear Reaction data for Nuclear Power
Applications held during September 22-26, 2014 at
Trieste, Italy. The workshop was jointly organized by the
Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics
(ICTP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Vienna. The workshop was designed to provide a unique
forum to scientists and engineers to get up-to-date
information on the whole 'know-how' of nuclear data,
from the physics of nuclear reactions to production and
validation of evaluated nuclear data files. It also provided
a platform to share information on latest development in
10.8.1 Participation
Activities
of
AERB
in
the
ISSC Meeting for development of IAEA TECDOC

Benchmarking For Tsunami Modelling at AERB
117
the field of nuclear data generation as well as in the use of

nuclear data libraries in the application of nuclear
reactors.
Management of Accident (WGAMA) and projects

including in HYMERES Project with the experimental
facility at Switzerland and France coordinated by OECD.
10.8.2 Participation
Activities
One officer from AERB attended the working

group meeting of CNRA Working Group on Public
Communication of Nuclear Regulatory Organizations
(WGPC) of NEA/OECD during April 8-10, 2014 at Paris,
France along with an international workshop with
stakeholders in collaboration with French Safety Authority
(ASN) on April 9, 2014.
of
AERB
in
the
NEA
AERB continued to coordinate the activities

related to India's participation in the Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) of OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) activities. During the
period, experts from AERB were invited to contribute in
the programs of NEA, including in the Committee on
Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and their technical
working groups. AERB experts participated in the working
groups on Inspection Practices (WGIP), the Regulation of
New Reactors (WGRNR), Operating Experience (WGOE)
and Public Communication (WGPC). AERB also
contributed in NEA senior Technical Group on Defence-in
Depth. Further, in the areas of research activities of NEA
under the CSNI, AERB experts participated in the
meetings of Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations
(CSNI) as well as its working groups on Analysis and
118
10.9
PARTICIPATION
IN
ASIA-EUROPE
MEETING ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
One senior officer of AERB participated in the

3rdAsia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Seminar on Nuclear
Safety held during November 4-6, 2014 in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia and made a presentation on 'Human Resource
Development for Safety Review of Expandable Nuclear
Power Programme in India' as requested by the Nuclear
Energy Regulatory Agency (Indonesia Nuclear Regulatory
Authority).
Chapter 11
Management
System of AERB
CHAPTER 11
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AERB
AERB has implemented Quality Management
System (QMS) for its core regulatory processes viz,
consenting process, regulatory inspection and document
development. This Quality Management System is
developed based on experience over the years, its policy
and regulatory documents, IAEA and other international
standards. AERB has identified all the requirements
applicable for its organization (as derived from national
legislation, international conventions, international safety
standards, expectations of stakeholders, etc.) in
management system and are based on the experience on
regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities in the country.
AERB has established Quality Management System under
ISO 9001:2008. This system integrates various functions
and responsibilities towards realizing the safety goal of
AERB.
Recently, AERB has started the activity of
establishing an Integrated Management System (IMS) with
an objective for continually improving its management
system and aid further integration of safety, health,
environment, security, quality and resource requirements
to accomplish its objectives. This IMS will eventually
subsume & encompass the existing Quality Management
System.
11.1
QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (QMS)

OF AERB
In order to meet the required standard and

continual improvement of quality in carrying out its
functions, AERB has been certified under ISO 9001
standard by Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for its
consenting activities, regulatory inspections and
preparation of regulatory documents since November 15,
2006.
All the documents of LevelI & LevelII have
been revised and the Quality Management System (QMS)
of AERB was re-certified by BIS as per new ISO 9001:
2008.
quality manual of AERB. There were 41 observations and

no Non-Conformances (NC) were reported during the
audit carried out in May 2014 while 33 nos. of
observations and no NC were reported in the audit carried
out in November 2014. All the observations have been
complied.
BIS Team carried out surveillance audit of Quality
Management System of AERB in December, 2014 in
which no NC was observed.
In order to enhance awareness level on QMS
requirements and to improve competence of AERB
personnel in performing their QMS functions, a workshop
on Promotion of Awareness on ISO 9001:2008 Quality
Management System was organized at AERB on April 8,
2014.
Quality Management System monitoring
committee of AERB met on four occasions during the year
2014 to review the observations arising from internal
audits. The audit reports were also reviewed by the
executive committee of AERB.
11.2
INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

(IMS) OF AERB
AERB has recently documented an integrated

management system in line with IAEA Safety Standard
GSR-3 encompassing existing management system for
core regulatory processes and other activities undertaken
by AERB. This system integrates various functions and
responsibilities towards realizing the safety goal of AERB.
This integrated management system is being implemented
in a phased manner.
Management system of AERB is described in its
Management System Manual and it elaborates on
characteristics of the AERB, its activities, complexities of
regulatory processes and their interactions. A number of
procedures have been developed and are being
implemented in a phased manner.
The Executive Committee (EC) of AERB

conducts the management review to ensure suitability,
adequacy and effectiveness of QMS at AERB. This review
includes assessing opportunities for improvement and the
need for changes to the QMS, including the quality policy
and quality objectives.
A Management System Monitoring Committee

(MS-MC) has been constituted to oversee the
implementation of IMS. Familiarisation / Awareness
program for the employees of AERB was organised in
February 2015.
Internal audit of AERB was carried out in May

2014 and November 2014 as per the ISO procedures and
The Integrated Management System of AERB

was reviewed by IAEA during the IRRS mission in March
119
2015. The suggestions made by the IRRS Mission team are

being incorporated for further enhancing the management
system of AERB.
Management system manual and Quality manual
describes the system for bringing together the
requirements in a coherent manner and their
implementation. Any changes in the present requirements
including new requirements are taken care during revision
of the safety documents.
120
AERB initiated implementation of the

Integrated Management System (IMS) in
addition to existing Quality Management
System (QMS), which integrates various
functions and responsibilities of AERB
towards realizing its safety goal and will
eventually subsume & encompass the
existing QMS of AERB.
Chapter 12
Human Resource
Development
& Infrastructure
CHAPTER 12
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE
12.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION
AERB manpower is being augmented at various
levels and through various channels in view of the
expanding nuclear power programme and increasing
number of radiation facilities in the country. This is being
done through fresh recruitments, transfer of experienced
personnel from operating plants and R&D institutes like
BARC and IGCAR and induction of postgraduates
through AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme (AGFS) in IIT
Bombay and IIT Madras.
Out of the total 130 new posts (103 Scientific &
Technical and 27 Administrative / Accounts posts)
sanctioned for the expansion of AERB under the XI Plan

102 posts in Scientific & Technical and 27 posts in
Administrative / Accounts / Aux. categories respectively
have been filled.
Total sanctioned strength in AERB as on March
31, 2015 is 350 comprising of 280 scientific and technical
and 70 supporting staff. Presently, in position strength is
324 comprising 264 scientific and technical & 60
supporting staff of Administrative/Accounts/Aux and in
addition, there is a commitment for recruitment against
existing vacancies with IIT Bombay, IIT Madras and
reserved category from among the candidates successfully
completing the Diploma in Radiological Physics (DRP).
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015 (March)
Fig. 12.1: Year wise Manpower Augmentation in AERB

12.2
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES
ACT,
1995
AND
IMPLEMENTATION / WELFARE OF
RESERVATION
POLICY
FOR
SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC
During the year 2014, AERB has recruited five

officials through direct recruitment in various grades. One
candidate belonging to OBC was recruited as
Stenographer-Gr. III and one candidate belonging to SC
category was recruited as Scientific Assistant. Efforts have

been made to fill up the two backlog vacancies in SC
category in Group A post and recruitment action is in
progress to fill up the two posts shortly. Action has also
been initiated to fill the reserved vacancies (SC, ST, OBC)
in the various Scientific, technical and administrative
grades. There are no backlog vacancies in Person with
Disabilities Quota. Rosters are maintained as per orders on
the subject.
121
12.3
assistants (having diploma in engineering) to

Nuclear Training Center, at Kaiga. The training
included classroom training as well as hands on
experience on plant simulator for a PHWR type
NPP. All the candidates were successful in their
final assessment interview.
TRAINING
As a part of competence development, AERB

continued to train its staff by organizing various training
programmes, workshops, on-job training at nuclear
facilities, refresher courses, technical talks, colloquia etc.
Induction training is conducted through Orientation
Course for Regulatory Process (OCRP) of AERB for the
newly joined scientific / technical staff. The OCRP
introduces the staff to organizational structure and
functions of AERB, legal powers, policies, internal
guidance and procedures of AERB.
AERB also imparts training on regulatory and
safety aspects with respect to nuclear and radiation
facilities to other organizations, on request.
12.3.1 Training Imparted for AERB Staff
12.3.1.1 AERB Orientation Course for Regulatory
Processes (OCRP- 2014)
AERB Orientation Course for Regulatory
Processes (OCRP-2014) was conducted at AERB, Mumbai
during March 10 2014 to May 6, 2014. The program
comprised of class room lectures, site visits and written
examinations. Thirty four participants from various
technical divisions of AERB participated in the course. As
a part of the course, site visits were arranged to TAPP-3&4,
Dhruva reactor, BARC and ACTREC, Kharghar. A
Valedictory Function for OCRP was conducted on August
11, 2014 at AERB, Mumbai for distribution of certificates.
12.3.1.2 Refresher Course
Refresher training course on Regulatory and
Safety Aspects was organized for AERB officers involved
in various regulatory activities during February 11 and 12,
2015 at AERB Mumbai. The course lectures were designed
to cover a wide range of regulatory activities including the
current developments at AERB in the areas of Severe
Accident, Post Fukushima Siting aspects, new
requirements specified in the AERB LWR Code, legal
aspects (Nuclear Law), Quality Assurance in NPPs, Basic
concepts on Radiological Impact Assessment (RIA) and
discussion on issues identified during review process w.r.t.
RIA, Industrial & Fire design considerations for NPP,
Personnel and Inter-personnel aspects (Code of Ethics) etc.
The lectures were delivered by in-house experts and
experts in the relevant fields from other institutions.
12.3.1.3 On-Job Training of AERB Staff
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AERB, as a part of its staff training programme,

deputed five engineers (having experience in
PWR and Fast Reactor), and with three scientific
Chairman, SARCOP Shri S. Duraisamy at Nuclear Training

Centre, Kaiga
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Five officers from AERB were deputed to TAPS3&4 and PFBR to acquire their control engineer
qualification.
12.3.2 Training imparted for Others

12.3.2.1 Training
Officers
for
BARC
Safety
Council
AERB organized a two week familiarization

training for twenty two officers belonging to BARC Safety
Council, on request, during October 13-30, 2014 at AERB,
Mumbai. The training program included class room
lectures delivered by AERB officers and interaction with
AERB officers. The training program was very interactive
and well received.
12.3.2.2 Fundamental Course on Nuclear Energy
(FCNE) for participants from Bangladesh
A Fundamental Course on Nuclear Energy
(FCNE) was organized by the Nuclear Power Corporation
of India Ltd. for officers from Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission and Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory
Authority. The FCNE course was designed in a modular
structure covering the aspects of nuclear power plant
operation, maintenance, safety aspect and regulatory
aspects etc. with an aim to aid the participating country in
understanding the basic concepts in nuclear power plant
operation. AERB officers delivered 16 lectures under the
module on regulatory framework for Nuclear Power
Plants of the course, during 18 to 21 February, 2015. The
topics focused on the significant areas of regulatory
activities including the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, the

Factories Act, 1948, Roles and responsibilities of AERB,
Consenting Process, Safety Review aspects in NPPs during
various stages, fire safety, safety assessment, siting criteria,
safety against external events, electrical safety,
environment safety life cycle management, Codes and
Guides etc. The lectures were well appreciated by the
participants.
12.3.2.3 Training
Agency
for
Radiation
Safety
Environmental Sustainability by PadmaShree S.

P. Kale, Head, Nuclear Agriculture and BioTechnology Division, BARC.
PT & CT ballooning during heat up with

moderator heat sink by Smt. Ritu Singh, S/Shri
P.K. Baburajan and Avinash J. Gaikwad, NSAD,
AERB.
Current Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear

Power Plants, Japan with emphasis on Strategy
for Fuel Removal & De-Commissioning,
Radioactive Waste Handling and Emergency
Measures by Officers from OPSD.
The Power of Subconscious Mind by Dr. Pankaj

Mehta, SHT, BRIT, Navi-Mumbai.
12.5
COMPETENCY MAPPING EXERCISE AT

AERB
Cell/
Two AERB officers conducted training

programme for the staff of Radiation Safety Cell
(RSC), Tripura in January, 2015. Consequently,
the Authorization was issued on March 3, 2015.
Two AERB officers conducted training

programme for the staff of Radiation Safety
Agency (RSA), Punjab in March, 2015.
12.3.2.4 Training for IGCAR Staff

Officers from SRI, AERB conducted a three day
introductory training on PSA & Reliability was conducted
for 15 engineers / staff of FBTR Technical Services
Division, IGCAR.
12.4
period following Colloquia/lectures were conducted at

AERB,
AERB COLLOQUIA/LECTURES
Towards the aim of continual knowledge

upgradation of its staff, AERB conducts technical talks /
colloquia on regular intervals. The topics are meticulously
chosen in line with the mandate and functioning of AERB,
covering latest scientific & technical developments
worldwide in the field of nuclear and radiation industries,
legal aspects, regulatory practices and aspects enhancing
personal & interpersonal effectiveness etc. During the
Availability of adequate number of competent

staff and maintaining the competence for current and
future needs of AERB is important for efficient and
effective discharge of its mandate. AERB follows a
Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) that provides a
logical progression from the identification of the
competencies required to perform a job to the design,
development and implementation of training to achieve
the required competencies, and subsequent evaluation of
this training. As a continual improvement process, AERB
initiated development of a document for establishing a
competence framework and infrastructural needs. In this
regard, AERB has prepared a document titled Regulatory
Competence Framework for AERB which addresses
Four Quadrant Model for Competency Mapping at AERB

IV. Personal and interpersonal effectiveness competences
I. Legal and Regulatory basis competences
IV.1 Personal effectiveness
I.1 Legal basis
IV.2 Analytical thinking and problem solving
I.2 Regulatory pol
IV.3 Soft skills
I.3 Regulations and Regulatory documents
IV.4 Strategic thinking, leadership and management

IV.5 Safety culture
III. Regulatory practice competences
II. Technical disciplines competences
III.1 Consent and consenting process
II.1 Basic technologies
III.2 Inspection process
II.2 Applied technologies
III.3 Enforcement process
II.3 Specialized technologies
III.4 Safety documents development process
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competence requirements, analysis of available

competencies and comparison the required competencies
and systematic identification of individual training needs.
The analysis also serves as inputs in forecasting of
manpower requirements. In preparing the Competence
framework for AERB, a four quadrant competence model
based on Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes (KSA) was
adopted from IAEA publications like Managing
Regulatory Body Competence and SARCON Guidelines
for regulatory functions etc. and modified to meet the
requirements of AERB functions in relation to human
resource management and training. Each quadrant
represents a group of coherent and consistent
competences.
In this connection, a pilot study was carried out
after preparing formats for all the technical divisions of
AERB for collecting, compiling and analyzing the
competence data. Three familiarization lectures on the
subject were conducted for all the officers of AERB. At
present, this exercise, in addition with other ongoing
human resource activities at AERB, is being carried out on
full fledged scale covering all the officers of the technical
divisions of AERB.
The mapping analysis will result in
recommendations for short term and long term
recruitment and/or outsourcing plans as well as specialized
training plans and/or modification of basic and refresher
training modules.
12.6
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
12.6.1 Knowledge Portal

A Knowledge Portal has been functional at the
internal website of AERB, as part of knowledge
preservation and easy retrieval. Training/teaching material,
proceedings of Conferences and Seminars, Papers
presented/published by AERB personnel and management
information system were included in the portal at regular
intervals. National and international codes/guides/manuals
are also being included on the portal.
12.6.2 Development of OPSD - System for
Tracking, Assessment & Report generation
(OPSD-STAR).
A database for tracking, assessment and report
generation was developed by in-house effort within
OPSD, AERB covering all the core regulatory processes,
such as regulatory inspections, review & assessments,
license or consent renewals, enforcements including
emergency preparedness & response and operating
experiences for all the 20 operating NPPs. This e-data
bank also known as OPSD-STAR outlines the processes,
124
related guidelines, assessments, results and improvement

actions in a very comprehensive and sophisticated
manner. It has enhanced the divisional capability to handle
documentations with ease of retrievability and traceability.
12.6.3 AERB Library
A well-equipped library is maintained in AERB. A
total of 54 new publications have been added during the
period and with this, the total collection of publications has
gone up to 10,374. In addition, 20 Journals were
subscribed during the period. Reference and Information
Services have been provided to the users and visitors of the
Library. List of New Additions, World Nuclear News,
NucNet News, NEI Newsletter, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientist Newsletter etc. are circulated in digital form
regularly by sending e-mails to AERB Staff. Table of
Contents of new issues of important journals of AERB's
subject interest are also circulated regularly by email alerts.
12.7
DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION &

TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE
12.7.1 Development of Office Automation System

As a part of eGovernance activities, AERB is in
the process of implementing a State-of-Art ERP Package
(SAP) based Office Automation System (OAS), a webbased Information and Communication Technology
(I&CT) application to computerize various functions in
Administrative & Accounts Divisions along with some
miscellaneous management functions like Committees
Management, Meeting Management, Document Lifecycle
Management, Movement & Status Tracking of Files, Tours
& Air Ticket Booking, Utility Provisioning & Complaint
Management, Purchase, Stores & Contract Management,
RTI & Parliamentary Questions Database, Transport
Management, Security Management, Time Attendance &
Absentee Management etc. which are common to all
divisions of AERB.
The system is having features like non redundant
data entry, authenticated access to data, reliable
information that can available instantly, role based workflow implementation, automated planning / scheduling
with alerts and effective tracking of status for tasks / cases.
This totally integrated system has enabled faster
processing & communication of data along with efficient
analysis and dynamic query features. All the transactions
are proposed to be on-line. In case, the signed papers /
hard copies are essential, users have been provided with a
facility to upload the scanned copies of the same. This
system is an attempt towards implementing paper-less
office at AERB. In year 2014-15, the following modules of
OAS have become operational:
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Employee Self Service Portal (ESS)

Leave Management
Filling and assessment of the Annual
Performance Assessment Report (APAR) for
Scientific & Technical personnel
Document Management System
Payroll
streamlined access to AERBs internal resources.

Access to the resources would be permitted only
to those clients having a registered account in the
system. The system boosts several robust security
features, apart from compliance to the AERBs IT
Security policy.
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Over the subsequent months, some more

modules like APAR for Administrative personnel, Finance
& Accounts, Time-attendance Management System, Tour
Management System, and Purchase & Material
Management etc. are planned to be made operational.
A Secured Socket Layer Virtual Private Network

(SSL-VPN) based Secured Remote Access
Control System has been installed at AERB. The
system basically aims to provide remote access to
AERB officers on outstation duties for accessing
the internal resources like their email account,
eLORA, Office Automation System (OAS) etc.
and also for providing connectivity between
various facilities of AERB located outside the its
headquarters at Mumbai.
12.7.2 Infrastructure Activities

To support the e-Governance project, AERB is
also planning to upgrade its Information and
Communication Technology (I&CT) infrastructure. The I
& CT infrastructure is also planned for providing remote
connectivity to AERB users accessing the internal
resources as well as anticipating the connectivity between
various facilities of AERB located outside its headquarters
at Mumbai, including Safety Research Institute (SRI),
Kalpakkam and Regional Regulatory Centers. In this
direction, for ensuring the performance and security of the
existing IT Infrastructure, the following new IT
infrastructure facilities are acquired:-
The system boosts latest security features

including
multi-factor
authentication
end-to-end
encryption for the data, access only to pre-registered
remote systems etc. Presently, the system has been
implemented for 50 users, who can access their emails,
OAS and eLORA from a remote location and subsequently
will be made available for other users.
12.8
Secured Remote Access Control System:
RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION
Secured Network Access Control System:

This system is intended to ensure trusted and
Sr. No.
Name
Design.
The following officials retired on superannuation

during the period.
Date of retirement
Remarks
Shri K.J. Vakharwala
OS
28/02/2015
Superannuation
Shri A.P. Bapat
Sr. Tech. H
30/11/2014
Superannuation
Shri S. Duraisamy
OS
31/10/2014
Superannuation
Dr. A. Ramakrishna
SO(H)+
31/10/2014
Superannuation
125
Chapter 13
Safety Promotional
Activities
CHAPTER 13
SAFETY PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES
AERB organizes and/or participates in discussion
meetings and other professional meets to deliberate on
nuclear and radiation safety aspects and the system of
regulatory regime followed by AERB and the basis of
regulatory decision making process. AERB also organises
safety promotional activities, the details of such events are
given below.
13.1
DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS MEET
AERB and BHAVINI jointly organized the 31st

DAE Safety & Occupational Health Professionals Meet
(SOHPM) at BHAVINI, Kalpakkam during October 15-17,
2014. The theme for the Meet was Safety & Emergency
Management at Coastal Site for Industrial Safety and
Diabetes Mellitus & Metabolic Syndrome for
Occupational Health Safety. Dr. Baldev Raj, Director,
National Institute of Advanced Science, Bengaluru &
Former Director, IGCAR, Kalpakkam delivered the Dr. S.S.
Ramaswamy Memorial Endowment Lecture on Tsunami
Management at Kalpakkam Nuclear Site. A monograph
on Safety & Emergency Management at Coastal Site
and Diabetes Mellitus & Metabolic Syndrome was
released during the Meet. A technical exhibition on
Nuclear Technology, Safety Appliances, Emergency
planning & preparedness, Public Awareness & Safety and
Regulatory aspects was organized during the Meet.
31st DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet

(From left Dr. Baldev Raj, Director, National Institute of Advanced
Science, Bengaluru & Former Director, IGCAR, Kalpakkam,
Shri S.S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Dr. Prabhat Kumar, Chairman and
Managing Director, BHAVINI, Kalpakkam, Shri K. A. David,
Executive Director (Operations), BHAVINI, Kalpakkam and Shri R.
Bhattacharya, Vice- Chairman, AERB)
13.2
HEALTH
MEET
PHYSICS
PROFESSIONAL
The mission of the Atomic Energy Regulatory

Board (AERB) is to ensure that the use of ionising radiation
and nuclear energy in India does not cause any undue risk
to the health and environment. Towards fulfilling its
principal mandate, the health physics professionals play
an important role of protecting workers, public and the
environment from potential radiation hazards, while
making it possible to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful use
of nuclear energy. Taking into account the crucial role of
health physicist and to familiarize the persons involved in
this field with the ongoing development in radiation
protection, AERB had organized a one day 'Health Physics
Professional Meet' on November 20, 2014 in the Niyamak
Bhavan-A, Mumbai.
The objective of the meet was to achieve high
standards in radiological safety by constantly perusing
techniques, update & enrich the knowledge and create
opportunities for continual improvement. Around 130
numbers of Health Physics professionals participated in
the meet from various DAE units. During the event, a series
of lectures were delivered by the experts from health
physics profession in various domain such as radiation
protection standards, low level effects of radiation,
radiological safety aspects in NPPs during design,
construction, commissioning & operation, radiation
protection aspects in front end & back end nuclear fuel
cycle facilities, recent development in radiation protection
area, dose assessment, regulatory requirements for
radiation protection etc.
Health Physics Professionals Meet

(From left P.R. Krishnamurthy, Director, OPSD, AERB, Shri S.S.
Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Shri S.G.Ghadge, Director (T), NPCIL,
and Shri D.N.Sharma, Director, HS & E Group, BARC)
127
13.3
THEME MEETING ON SAFETY CULTURE
Safety Culture or the way safety is perceived,

valued and prioritized in an organization has wide ranging
effects on reliability, competiveness and even employees
morale. Poor safety culture has contributed towards major
incidents and personal losses in the past. Safety culture is
not merely limited to avoiding or reducing number of
accidents, but it is to do the right thing at the right time in
response to each and every situation confronted by
people. For a nuclear regulatory body, safety culture is the
organizations values and behaviours - modelled by its
leaders and internalized by its members-that serve to make
nuclear safety the overriding priority. Experience across
the international nuclear industry and in other technical
fields has demonstrated the importance of an effective
safety culture in maintaining the safety of workers, the
public and the environment. Both regulators and the
nuclear industry recognize the need to develop a strong
safety culture in order to support successful and
sustainable nuclear safety performance.
Keeping in view the importance of safety culture
and to have insight on various aspects including the role of
regulators in assessing safety culture of both utility and
regulatory organization and to identify the scope for
Area of Interest
Topic
further improvement in its effectiveness and efficiency, a

'Theme meeting on Safety Culture' was organized in AERB
on January 23, 20014.The meeting was also aimed to
promote safety culture in organization and to embroil
individuals with the processes/assessment methodologies
related to safety culture assessment. During this meet,
lectures on the topics encompassing history and
experience with safety culture & its impact in
organizational performance, regulators role in assessing
safety culture of utilities and case study on the
methodology developed in-house for assessing safety
culture were delivered.
13.4
AWARENESS
PROGRAMS
STAKEHOLDERS
FOR
AERB has given utmost priority towards the

awareness of the radiation safety & security requirements
amongst its stakeholders; dissemination of information's to
prevent radioactive contamination in metal recycle
industries, security of radioactive material at radiation
facilities and during transport etc. Towards this, AERB
conducts awareness programs to a wide target audience
with the specific objective of spreading the importance of
radiation safety. Following awareness programs
conducted were by AERB during the year:
Target audience
Purpose
Industrial
Radiography
Refresher programme for

radiography personnel who
were not in the field for more
than 5 years has been
conducted on Thursday, 19th
June, 2014.
Radiographers / Site InCharge
To Update the basic radiation

safety and security and the
applicable regulatory
requirements to radiography
personnel / Site In-Charge,
before rejoining the industrial
radiography field.
Category-1&2
Security of Radioactive
Material (RAM) at Radiation
Facilities (RFs) and during
Transport of RAM was held
on 26th May, 2014 at Institute
of Mathematical Sciences,
Chennai.
Law and Enforcement

authorities, Mumbai Police,
Employer / Licensee of
Category-1&2 RFs of Tamil
Nadu state
The programme has been

conducted with an objective
to:
(i) bring the Law and
Enforcement authorities
and radiation facility
owners in a common
platform to inform on
security of radioactive
material at RFs and
during transport of
radioactive material
(ii) familiarization with the
requirements for security
of radioactive material in
radiation facilities (RFs)
and their enforcement as
per the AERB Guide on
Security of radioactive
source
(iii) Reiterate responsibilities
of Law and Enforcement
authorities and RFs for
ensuring the security of
RAM all the time.
128
31 Police officials in the rank

of Dy. SPs, Addl. SP, ACPs
and Sr. Police Officers from
different districts of Tamil
Nadu state and about 80
representatives from
Category-1&2 Radiation
Facilities participated in the
programme.
and their enforcement as

per the AERB Guide on
Security of radioactive
source
(iii) Reiterate responsibilities
of Law and Enforcement
authorities and RFs for
ensuring the security of
RAM all the time.
Radioactive
contamination in
metal recycling
industry
Prevention of radioactive
contamination in metal
recycling industries.
Stake holders using

Induction furnace in
manufacturing.
Dissemination of information
to prevent radioactive
contamination in metal
recycling industries
About 30 participants
attended this programme
which was held on 20th
September, 2014 at Jaipur,
in association with National
Institute for Secondary Steel
Technology.
Diagnostic
Radiology
Manufacturers and Suppliers

of diagnostic X-ray
equipment.
41 participants attended the
programme which was held
on April 8th, 2014
To make stakeholders aware

of the regulatory
requirements and how to use
e-LORA, so that it can be
communicated to the endusers.
Exhibited posters on
radiation safety issues in
diagnostic radiology
including e-LORA module.
Lectures on radiation
safety and regulatory
requirements
Radiologists participating in
the 6th ULTRAFEST, 2014
organised by Indian
Radiological and Imaging
Association (IRIA), Mumbai
during April 19-20, 2014.
To enhance radiation safety

awareness among this
medical community
Radiological and Operational

Safety Aspects for Research
Accelerator Facilities in
association with TIFR,
Mumbai on March 31, 2015.
Participation from different

universities and research
facilities.
To enhance radiation safety

awareness
Demonstration of e-LORA
module for manufacturers
and end-users.
Regulatory and safety issues
related to DR practice were
discussed in the programme.
Research
Accelerators
Awareness programme on 'Security of Radioactive Material

(RAM) at Radiation Facilities (RFs) and during Transport of
RAM' for the security officials of DCSEM; INS-Tanaji, Navy;
CISF, BARC; IB and Police officials, Trombay.
Awareness programme on 'Security of Radioactive Material

(RAM) at Radiation Facilities (RFs) and during Transport of
RAM' for Law & Enforcement Authorities and owner of
Radiation Facilities (RFs) of Eastern & North-Eastern States.
129
Chapter 14
fgUnh - Official Language

Implementation
CHAPTER 14
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION
AERB has an established programme for the
implementation of official language, Hindi. AERB is
committed to the cause of Rajbhasha and have been
continually improving in its endeavor of implementing
Hindi in the regular official works, in accordance with
official language provisions in the Constitution. In addition
to the regular official works and various translations in to
Hindi, AERB proactively initiates a series of activities
throughout the year which include: publications,
conducting training programmes, workshops, talks,
annual competitions and divisional inspections for
enhancement of Hindi use in the divisional activities.
14.1
PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI
12 AERB safety documents have been published

to Hindi. Work on Hindi translation of 4 safety
documents is in progress.
Annual Report, AERB Newsletter and AERB
Annual Bulletin have been published in Hindi
and English, which are circulated to DAE units
and various organizations of Govt. of India.
Press releases were issued in Hindi and published
in daily newspapers.
Licenses, authorizations, and inspections reports
were issued in Hindi.
During the period, a total of 6091 letters were sent
in bilingual and 98 letters were sent exclusively in
Hindi.
The requirements under Section 3/3 of OL, Act
has been complied with.
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14.2
PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR HINDI

IMPLEMENTATION
Rajbhasha Inspection was conducted by the

members of Official Language Implementation
Committee (OLIC) covering NSAD, AERB,
Mumbai for identifying the areas of Hindi
implementation and enhancing the use of Hindi
in divisional activities.
DAE Incentive Scheme for working in Hindi has
been introduced and employees are actively
participating in the scheme. Five employees were
given award under this scheme.
14.3
HINDI TALKS/WORKSHOPS
Four workshops were conducted (3 in

Administrative Training Institute and 1 in BRIT,
Vashi) on behalf of the Joint OLIC. The objective
of workshops was to motivate the employees to

take up Hindi in their day to day work and help
them with the bottlenecks if any, in this regard.
Ten officers of AERB attended these workshops.
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As part of the Hindi Talk Series in AERB, two

Hindi talks were organized during the period.
-
A talk by Mrs Deepshikha Singh, Managing

Director, Literati Training Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai
on Vyaktitva Mien Netratva (Bring out the
leader in you) on June 30, 2014.
A talk by Shri S.K. Malhotra, Head, Public

Awareness Division, DAE on Swachh
Bharat Abhiyaan Se Sambadhh Parmanu
Oorja Vibhag Ki Proudyogikiyaan (DAE
technologies relevant to Swachh Bharat
Abhiyaan).In addition to the above talk, a
very unique flower arrangement with
brooms titled Bloomspeak and a Swachh
Bharat anthem composed by AERB staff
were arranged providing the perfect
panache to the main theme of the talk.
Hindi Day and the World Hindi Day were

celebrated on September 16, 2014 and January
16, 2015 respectively on behalf of the Joint
Official Language Co-ordination Committee of
the 5 DAE units, namely, AERB, DPS, HWB,
DCSEM and BRIT.
-
On the Occasion of Hindi Day, Padmashri

Dr. S.P Kale delivered a Hindi talk on
Dainik Jeevan Mein Vigyaan (Science in
everyday life). Shri S. Duraisamy, former
Padmashri Dr. S. P. Kale delivering a Hindi talk
131
spectacularly designed with a gala of events.
Vice-Chairman, AERB was invited as the

Chief Guest.
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On World Hindi Day, a drama titled ''The

Bomb Factory, was staged by the staff of all
the five units of Joint OLIC. The objective of
the play was to enhance public awareness on
the activities of DAE.
14.4
HINDI COMPETITIONS
Marking the Hindi Day Celebrations, a series of

ten Hindi competitions were held between 18th27th of August, 2014 on behalf of Joint Official
Language Coordination Committee at V.S.
Bhavan, Mumbai. The closing ceremony was
Miss Aditi Bhagwat, Kathak Danseuse
132
The prize distribution ceremony for the Hindi

competitions conducted in AERB was held on
January 9, 2015. The highlight of the day was a
presentation on journey of Kathak (a form of
dance) titled The Kathak Katha - a journey of
Kathak through the ages by Miss Aditi Bhagwat,
one of the glitterati names from the cultural circles
of Mumbai, Film and Television personality and
an Empanelled Member, Indian Council of
Cultural Relations. The presentation, involving an
amalgam of conversation, rendition, jugalbandi
and a tiny rhythm workshop enlightened the
audience on the rich heritage of the Kathak form
of dance.
Hindi Prize Distributions
CHAPTER 15
ACHIEVEMENTS
AERB recognizes its human resource as a
valuable asset in fulfilling its mandate. AERB gives
paramount importance in maintaining a competent pool
of human resources towards discharging its responsibilities
and fulfilling its functions effectively and efficiently.
Keeping this in view and as a long term strategy for
ensuring high caliber human resources, AERB provides
support and encourage its staff to pursue knowledge
upgradation in topics relevant to regulatory functions and
safety studies.
than SO/G), Leadership Award-2 (lower than SO/G),

Meritorious Service Award and Group Achievement
Award. In all these categories, awards for the year 2013-14
were distributed during the annual function of AERB on
November15, 2014.
15.1
HIGHER QUALIFICATION
Shri Suvadip Roy, SO(C), NPSD, AERB acquired

M.Tech. degree in Electronics & Instrumentation
Engineering from Homi Bhabha National
Institute, Mumbai.
Cat.2: Outstanding Performance / Special

Contribution Award
1.
Shri J. Koley, SO/G, OPSD
2.
Shri V. Mohan, Head , SRRC
Kum. Ananya Mohanty, SO (C), NPSD, AERB

acquired M.Tech. degree in Mechanical
Institute, Mumbai.
Cat. 1: Young Scientific Officer Award

1.
Dr. Obaidurrahman Khalilurrahman, SO/E,
NSAD
2.
Shri Anand R. Pinjarkar, SO/D, RSD
Cat 3: Leadership Award-1

1.
Shri Lala Ram Bishnoi, Director, SSED
Cat.4: Meritorious Service Award

1.
Shri Madhav Shridhar Sathe, APRO, Admn.
Kum. Pampa Modak, SO(C), RSD, AERB

acquired M.Tech. degree in Radiological Safety
Institute, Mumbai.
Cat 5: Group Achievement Award:
Shri Rajoo Kumar, SO/E, RSD, AERB acquired

degree in LL.B. from University of Mumbai.
Group 1: (Seismic Margin Assessment of Nuclear

Structures Group)
l
l
Shri B.K.Singh, SO (E), RSD, AERB acquired

l
l
l
Shri Neeraj Dixit, SO (D), RSD, AERB acquired

Shri Rahul Dhoke, SA/D, OPSD acquired degree

in MSc. Chemistry Madhya Pradesh Bhoj (Open)
University.
15.2
AERB AWARDS
AERB started its award scheme from the year

2012 to promote excellence among its staff and recognize
outstanding achievements of those engaged in regulatory
and associated research and development activities. AERB
award scheme comprises of individual awards as well as
group achievement awards. The categories of awards are:
Young Scientific Officer Award, Outstanding Performance
/Special Contribution Award, Leadership Award-1 (higher
Shri A. D. Roshan, SO/F, SSED

Shri Ajai S. Pisharady, SO/F, SSED
Smt. P. Shylamoni, SO/F, SSED
Shri Sourav Acharya, SO/E, SSED
Shri Moloy K. Chakraborty, TO/E, SSED
Shri Somnath Jha, SO/D, SSED
Group 3 :( Legal Matters)

l Shri Utkarsh S. C. SO/F, NPSD
l Shri Soumen Sinha, SO/E, IPSD
l Shri Parikshat Bansal, SO/E, ITSD
l Shri Rahul Porwal, SO/E, NPSD
l Shri Srinivasan Venkatachalam, Assistant,
Administration
l Smt. Deepika Kushwaha, Steno-II, ITSD
Group 2: (Radiation Protection & Emergency
Preparedness)
l Shri S.K.Pawar, SO/F, OPSD
l Shri Shyam Vyas, SO/E, OPSD
l Shri Narendra Khandelwal, SO/E, OPSD
l Shri Vipin Chander, SO/D, OPSD
133
Group 4 : (Diagnostic Radiology)

l Dr. P. K. Dash Sharma, SO/G, RSD
l Dr. Pankaj Tandon,SO/F, RSD
l Shri R. K. Singh, SO/F, RSD
l Kum. Arti Kulkarni, SO/D, RSD
l
l
l
l
l
Smt. Anuradha V. SO/D, RSD

Shri R. K. Chaturvedi, SO/D, RSD
Smt. Rajeshri Pai, SO/D, RSD
Shri Mahesh M, SO/D, RSD
Shri Rajendra Shete, SO/C, RSD
Shri Anand R. Pinjarkar, RSD received the

Young Scientific Officer Award
Dr. Obaidurrahman Khalilurrahman, NSAD received the

Young Scientific Officer Award
Shri V. Mohan, Head SRRC, received the

Outstanding Performance/Special Contribution Award
Shri J. Koley, OPSD received the

Outstanding Performance/Special Contribution Award
Shri L.R. Bishnoi, Director, SSED, received the

Leadership Award -1
Shri M.S. Sathe, APRO, Admn. Received

Meritorious Service Award
134
Radiation Protection & Emergency Preparedness Group
Seismic Margin Assessment of Nuclear Structures Group
Diagnostic Radiology Group
Legal Matters Group
135
CHAPTER 16
TECHNICAL INTERACTION WITH EXTERNAL AGENCIES
AERB believes in sharing its technical expertise
with various Government Bodies, Universities etc. AERB
officers are actively participating in preparation and
revision of documents of Bureau of Indian Standards
(BIS), Expert Appraisal Committee of Ministry of
Environment & Forest (MoEF), Working Groups for review
of nuclear & radiological emergency plans constituted
under National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
etc. AERB encourages its technical divisions in providing
project guidance to undergraduates and post graduate
students from various Universities / Colleges.
Towards resolving generic issues related to
radiation safety due to handling of radiation sources for
various applications, AERB interacts with various
Ministries.
16.1
INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES
16.1.1 Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)

Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) the National
Standards Body is involved in Standards Formulation
apart from its other activities. During the period, AERB
Officers were involved in review and revision of BIS
documents and participated in the meetings conducted by
BIS as Chairman & Member of Committees/Sectional
Committees of BIS as detailed below.
l
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice Chairman, AERB is

Chairman of Chemical Hazards Sectional
Committee, CHD 7 and Member of BIS
Occupational Safety & Health and Chemical
Hazards Sectional Committee. Shri K.
Ramprasad, Head, IPSD is a member of
Chemical Hazards Sectional Committee, CHD 7.
They are involved in review and revision of BIS
documents.
Two Officers from AERB participated as member/
alternate member of Occupational Health &
Safety Sectional Committee CHD 8 and were
actively involved in review and revision of BIS
documents. The documents on Material Safety
Data Sheet (MSDS) and Safety Work Permit have
been developed by a panel of experts having
members from AERB and submitted to BIS for
finalization. The document ISO 10298, on
determination of toxicity of a gas or gas mixture
has been finalized by CHD 7 for publication. The
document on Occupation Health & Safety Audit -
Code of Practice (IS 14489) has been prepared

and is in the stage of finalization by the panel.
l
The safety codes of 13 chemicals have been

revised as per the new format. The Standard IS
14983:2002 (Phosphorous -Yellow/White) has
been updated and submitted to BIS.
As members of BIS committees, Officers from

AERB participated in the meetings conducted by
BIS and contributed in the review and discussions
on development of BIS codes related to
reinforced concrete, earthquake engineering and
wind design.
Another Officer from AERB participated as a

member of BIS Nuclear Energy for Peaceful
Applications Sectional Committee and its
subcommittees and is actively involved in review
and revision of BIS Standards and ISO standards.
Three meetings of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful
Applications Sectional Committee CHD-30, SC1 and Panel-1 were held during the year. The
Officer also participated in ISO/TC 85/SC-2
Radiological Protection Plenary and associated
meetings in Moscow, Russia during June 2-6,
2014. The Officer contributed in finalization of
ISO
standards
on
Dose
monitoring,
Radioactivity monitoring, calibration of monitors
and
measurement
of
gamma-emitting
radionuclides.
16.1.2 National Disaster Management Authority

(NDMA)
One Officer from AERB participated as a member
of Working Group constituted by NDMA for the
preparation of revised guidelines for offsite nuclear
emergency plan by implementing Incident Response
System (IRS) and revised criteria for planning,
preparedness and response for nuclear or radiological
emergency. The draft document has been prepared and
submitted to NDMA.
16.1.3 Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF)
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice Chairman, AERB is a
member of Expert Appraisal Committee of MoEF for
Nuclear Facilities & Strategic Facilities.
137
16.1.4 Interactions with Concerned Ministries for

resolution of generic issues related to
radiation safety
l
AERB is associated with various agencies in the

process of ensuring radiation safety in radiation facilities
and industries handling radiation sources. AERB is
routinely interacting with various ministries for resolution
of generic issues related to radiation safety due to handling
of radiation sources for various applications. Towards this,
AERB has interacted with various concerned ministries
including,
l
Ministry of Health and Family welfare in

connection with disposal of disused high level
radioactive sources in the Tele-therapy
equipment.
Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Shipping
in connection with installation of portal monitors
to curb illicit trafficking of radioactive material.
Ministry of Steel in connection with instances of
steel and metal (low-level radioactivity)
contamination.
Directorate General for Foreign Trade in
connection with establishment of requirement of
AERB authorization for import of x-ray
equipment into the country.
16.2.2 Guidance provided by SRI

SRI-AERB has been providing project work and
guidance to students and research scholars in science and
engineering in the area of reactor physics, structural
analysis, PSA and reliability, computational fluid
dynamics, fire modeling, ground water flow and
radionuclide migration etc. During the year, Officers of SRI
have guided research scholars and students on the
following projects:
l
AERB is also associated with Federation of Indian

Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Indian
Radiology and Imaging Association (IRIA) towards
dissemination of radiation safety amongst stakeholders.
AERB officers participated in technical meetings
of National Accreditation Board of Hospitals (NABH).
16.2
PROJECT GUIDANCE
Senior officers from various technical divisions of

AERB provided project guidance to undergraduate
engineering students as well as M Tech students. In
addition, PhD students registered from AERB are being
guided by the respective divisions.
16.2.1 Guidance provided by IPSD
IPSD has been providing guidance to young
engineering students to share its expertise in the field of
Quantitative Risk Assessment, Hazard & Operability
(HAZOP) studies, Fire Hazard Analysis / Modeling etc.
During this year, IPSD officers provided guidance on the
following projects to the internship students from various
Universities.
l
138
A project on Estimation of the frequency of

failure of process equipment using the Bayesian
Update method was carried out by internship

project student of BITS Pilani, Chemical
Engineering branch.
A project on Study on the effects of postulated
pool fire on the Nuclear Fuel Sub-assembly in
alcohol-cleaning system was carried out by a
M.Tech Chemical Engineering Student from
Maulana Azad National Institute of Technology,
Bhopal
A project on CFD modeling and prediction of
toxic gas dispersion from probabilistic release in a
H2S based chemical plant was carried out by
M.Tech Chemical Engineering Students from
Jawaharlal
Nehru
Engineering
College,
Aurangabad
l
l
Numerical study of water hammer transients in

Parallel pump feed water systems.
Numerical and experimental investigations on
hydrogen mitigation.
Development and application of PSA
methodology for estimation of risk from NPPs.
16.2.3 Guidance provided by SSED, AERB

As part of training programme of Orientation
Course for Engineering & Sciences (OCES), officer from
SSED guided the mini project of a trainee scientific officer
of IGCAR / HBNI on Capacity assessment of reinforced
concrete structure.
16.2.4 Guidance provided by NSAD, AERB
NSAD has been providing guidance to students,
research scholars and officers from various DAE
institutions in the area of probabilistic safety assessment,
thermal
hydraulics,
severe
accident
analysis,
computational fluid dynamics, uncertainty analysis,
reactor physics, structural analysis etc. During the year,
NSAD officers have provided guidance on the project
'Effect of Core Axial Power Profile on Critical Heat Flux
Ratio' carried out by a B. Tech student from IIT Kharagpur.
CHAPTER 17
AERB WELFARE ACTIVITIES
17.1
AERB STAFF CLUB ACTIVITIES
AERB staff club conducts sports and cultural

activities for the welfare of the staff and family members. A
well-equipped physical fitness centre (gym) is being
maintained by the AERB Staff Club efficiently for health
benefit of its officials. During the year 2014, sports
tournaments were conducted for Cricket, Swimming, Brisk
walk, Table Tennis, Badminton, Chess and Caroms
successfully.
The AERB Annual Day was celebrated on

November 15, 2014 in AERB Lawns. The family members
of AERB staff also participated in this annual cultural
programme. The participants of the cultural programme
were presented with mementos in appreciation of their
talent. The prizes were distributed to the winners of sports
tournaments - 2014 and also to meritorious children of
AERB employees who have secured above 90% in the
academics.
Cultural Performance in Progress on AERB Annual Day
AERB Cricket Tournament Winners
17.2
CLEANLINESS PLEDGE ON THE EVE OF

GANDHI JAYANTI
As a part of the Swacch Bharat Mission, the

officials of AERB gathered on 2nd October, 2014 at AERB
Auditorium, Niyamak Bhavan-A for taking a Swacchata
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice Chairman, AERB

presenting mementos to Badminton Tournament Winners
Shapath (Cleanliness Pledge). The Swacch Bharat

Mission was launched by the Government of India on
October 2, 2014 as a mass movement towards creating a
Clean India of Gandhijis dream by the Mahatmas 150th
birth anniversary in 2019 as a tribute.
139
Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, Shri R. Bhattacharya, Vice-Chairman, Shri S. Duraisamy, OSD, and other AERB Officials
taking Swacchata Shapath (Cleanliness Pledge).
17.3
BOOK RELEASING CEREMONY
AERB Staff Club has organised a Book Releasing

Ceremony at AERB, Auditorium, Niyamak Bhavan-A on
April 9, 2015. Three books on Shri Homi J. Bhabha and
Shri Vikram Sarabhai the countrys great nuclear and
space scientists and past Chairmen, Atomic Energy
Commission; authored by Mr. R. P. Kulkarni, Ex-BARC, Mr
B. U. Kulkarni, and Late Smt. Vimla Sarma were released
by Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Shri S. K. Chande,
Former Vice-Chairman, AERB and Dr S. R. Gowarikar (Sr.
Atomic Scientist).
17.4
INTERNATIONAL
CELEBRATION
WOMENS
DAY
A cultural programme was organized by women

employees of AERB on International Womens Day on
March 05, 2015. The programme was attended by the
women employees of AERB and spouses of senior AERB
officials. There was a Panel Discussion consisting of Smt.
Suzie Bajaj, Smt. H. K. Parvathy, CAO, AERB and Smt.
Padma Ranji, Social Worker, BARC as members who
spoke on topics of Equality, Why are we obsessed with
colour and size and general issues faced by women in
society respectively. All the talks and discussions were well
received by the women of AERB. Indoor games were
organized as part of the celebration and all ladies actively
participated in the competitions. Prizes were distributed to
the winners. AERB ladies worked as a team for the grand
success of the programme.
140
International Women's Day Celebrations - 2015
CHAPTER 18
DEPUTATIONS ABROAD
Sr.
No
Name of the Officer
Period
1.
S. S. Bajaj
24/3/2014
4/4/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in the Convention on

Nuclear Safety as Leader of Indian
Delegation.
2.
G. K. Panda
01/04/2014
03/04/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA Technical

Meeting on Issues of Harmonization,
Communication And Denials of
Shipment Taking into Account the
Results of the 2011 International
Conference on the Safe and Secure
Transport of Radioactive Materials.
3.
A. P. Garg
07/04/2014
10/04/2014
Chattanooga
USA
To participate in 12th International

Nuclear
Regulatory
Inspection
Workshop & 47th meeting of WGIP.
4.
Rajoo Kumar
07/04/2014
10/07/2014
Vienna, Austria
To
participate
in
International
Conference on Advances in Nuclear
Forensics: Countering the Evolving
Threat of Nuclear and other
Radioactive material out of Regulatory
Control.
5.
Soumen Sinha
08/04/2014
10/04/2014
Paris, France
To
participate
in
International
Workshop on Nuclear Regulatory
Organization Communication.
6.
K. Srivasista
08/04/2014
10/04/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in the 35th Meeting of the

Commission on Safety Standards.
7.
S. S. Bajaj
12/05/2014
16/05/2014
Maryland, USA
To participate in MDEP Policy Group

meeting and 3rd MDEP Conference on
New Reactor Design Activities.
8.
Vivek Piplani
12/05/2014
13/11/2014
Vienna, Austria
To work with IAEA Operating

Experience (OE) team for experience in
different forum like activities and
programs of IAEA.
9.
S. K. Pradhan
26/05/2014
28/05/2014
Malaysia
To participate in 1st Workshop on KINSKAIST MS Programme Review

Meeting.
10.
S. Duraisamy
02/06/2014
05/06/2014
Paris, France
To participate in 31st meeting of

Committee on Nuclear Regulatory
Activities (CNRA) & 55th meeting of
Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installation (CSNI) of OECD/NEA).
11.
S. K. Pawar
02/06/2014
05/06/2014
Moscow, Russia
To participate in ISO/TC/85/SC2 with

BIS team.
From
Venue
Purpose of deputation
To
141
12.
M. M. Kulkarni
10/06/2014
13/06/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA consultancy

meeting
to
develop
on
the
development of Computer Security
Recommendation Guidance.
13.
Ajai Pishardy
10/06/2014
12/06/2014
Yerevan,
Armenia
To participate in Kick-off meeting of

PSA Working Group of
WWER
Regulatory Forum.
14.
Utkarsh S. C.
16/6/2014
19/06/2014
Helsinki,
Finland
To participate in EPR severe accidents

experts subgroup (MDEP-TESG)
meeting.
15.
S. S. Bajaj
16/06/2014
18/06/2014
Helsinki, Finland To participate in 21st Annual meeting of

the state Nuclear Authorities of the
countries operating WWER type
reactor.(WWER Forum).
16.
K. J. Vakharwalla
16/06/2014
18/06/2014
Helsinki, Finland To participate in 21st Annual meeting of

the state Nuclear Authorities of the
countries operating WWER type
reactor.(WWER Forum).
17.
Shri R. K. Singh
16/6/2014
20/6/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in 28th Meeting of

Transport Safety Standards Committee
(TRANSSC).
18.
Fredric Lall
16/06/2014
20/06/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in 5th meeting of the

Nuclear Security Guidance Committee
(NSGC).
19.
R. S. Rao
17/06/2014
18/06/2014
Switzerland
To participate in ORCD/NEA meeting

on HYMRRES.
20.
P. S. Virdi
17/06/2014
20/06/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA Technical

Meeting to Develop, Review and
Revise a draft IAEA Tec Doc on the
Design Provisions for Station Blackout
at NPPs.
21.
Umesh Awasthi
23/06/2014
04/07/2014
Obninsk, Russia
To participate in IAEA International

Training Course in the Physical
Protection implements at Nuclear
Facilities.
22.
Smt. Susmita
Mukherjee Roy
24/06/2014
26/06/2014
Paris, France
To participate in 4th meeting of WG 8.1

of Working Group 8 of the activities of
IAEA International Seismic Study
Centre.
23.
Animesh Biswas
07/07/2014
09/07/2014
Paris, France
To participate in 19th meeting of Digital

Instrumentation and Control Working
Group
(DICWG) of Multinational
Design Evaluation Programe(MDEP)
24.
S. Duraisamy
08/07/2014
10/07/2014
Idaho National
To participate in Indo-US Civil Nuclear
Laboratory, USA Energy Working Group Meeting.
25.
A. J. Gaikwad
09/07/2014
11/07/2014
Vienna, Austria
142
To participate in IAEA Workshop on

release of contact boiling experimental
data for international collaborative

standards problem exercise on Heavy
Water Reactor Moderator Sub-cooling
Requirement.
26.
P. Vijayan
14/07/2014
18/07/2014
Daejon,
South Korea
To participate in IAEA Regional

Workshop on Occupational Radiation
Protection and ALARA in Waste
Management.
27.
Amit Sen
21/07/2014
23/07/2014
Tajikistan
To participate in 3rd INTERPOL

Counter
Nuclear
Smuggling
Conference for the Central Asia /
Caucasus Region.
28.
Mahendra Prasad
21/07/2014
25/07/2014
Ottawa, Canada To participate in IAEA Technical

Meeting on Canada Deuterium
Uranium
Reactor
(CANDU)
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).
29.
D. M. Rane
26/08/2014
29/08/2014
Shanghai, China To participate in IAEA Seminar to

Detect and Respond to Cross-Border
Movement of Nuclear and Other
Radioactive Material out of Regulatory
Control in South-East Asia.
30.
Mahesh M.
26/08/2014
29/08/2014
Shanghai, China To participate in IAEA Seminar to

Detect and Respond to Cross-Border
Movement of Nuclear and Other
Radioactive Material out of Regulatory
Control in South-East Asia.
31.
Rajib Lochan Sha
08/09/2014
12/09/2014
Beijing, China
To participate in IAEA Regional

Training Course on Nuclear Security
Detection Architect.
32.
L. R. Bishnoi
09/09/2014
11/09/2014
Issy-lesMoulineaux
France
To participate in 24th meeting STC of

MDEP & visit to Flamanville 3 EPR
construction site.
33.
L. R. Bishnoi
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA
To participate in AERB, USNRC

Bilateral Meeting.
34.
S. Duraisamy
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA

Bilateral Meeting.
35.
R. Bhattacharya
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA

Bilateral Meeting.
36.
P. R. Krishnamurthy
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA

Bilateral Meeting.
37.
A. J. Gaikwad
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA

Bilateral Meeting.
38.
Utkarsh S. C.
10/09/2014
12/09/2014
Maryland, USA

Bilateral Meeting.
39.
R. Bhattacharya
15/09/2014
16/09/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in Joint technical

meeting of IAEA/NEA FINAS National
Coordinators.
143
40.
Rajoo Kumar
15/09/2014
19/09/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA consultancy

meeting to initiate the development of a
Nuclear Security Series Implementing
Guide on Regaining Control over
Nuclear and other Radioactive Material
out of Regulatory Control.
41.
S. S. Bajaj
17/09/2014
19/09/2014
22/09/2014
26/09/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA Consultancy

meeting on Regulatory Licensing
Strategies for New Build Projects.
As a part of Indian Delegation
participated in the 58th Regular Session
of the IAEA General Conference.
42.
G. M. Behera
22/09/2014
26/09/2014
Trieste, Italy
To participate in Workshop on Nuclear

Reaction Datas for Nuclear Power
Applications.
43.
Dr. (Ms.) Thilagam L.
25/09/2014
26/09/2014
Moscow, Russia
To participate in Working Group on

Reactor Physics Analysis of VVER
Forum.
44.
Vaibhav Glolap
29/09/2014
02/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA consulting

meeting on Development of Computer
Security Guidance for Nuclear Security.
Recommendation
on
Radiation
Material & Associated Facilities.
45.
Rajnish Kumar
06/10/2014
09/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA 2nd Basic

Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) training course.
46.
Suheel Kumar
06/10/2014
09/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA 2nd Basic

Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) training course.
47.
R. U. Parmar
13/10/2014
17/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA technical

meeting of International Nuclear &
Radiological Events Scale (IVES)
National Officers.
48.
S. Harikumar
13/10/2014
15/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in Meeting of the

Informal working group & consultation
with the Diplomatic Conference for
considering the Swiss proposal for
Amendment of convention on Nuclear
Safety.
49.
Pravin Patil
20/10/2014
22/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA Technical to

Develop Long term Management of
DSRS.
50.
R. U. Parmar
28/10/2014
31/10/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA TM to Exchange

Experience on recent events of NPPs.
51.
Ms. Reeta
Rani Malhotra
02/11/2014
14/11/2014
Netherland
To participate in IAEA IRRS Mission.
52.
Sunil Pagar
02/11/2014
13/11/2014
Netherland
IAEA IRRS Mission.
144
53.
R. Bhattacharya
04/11/2014
06/11/2014
Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
To participate in ASEM (3rd Asia

Europe Meeting Seminar.
54.
M. M. Kulkarni
17/11/2014
21/11/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA consulting

meeting on the Development of
Implementation Guide on Computer
Security for Nuclear Security & 2nd
programme committee meeting for N226.
55.
C. S. Varghese
17/11/2014
28/11/2014
Paris, France
To participate in France follow up of

IRRS Mission.
56.
Vivek A. Kale
18/11/2014
20/11/2014
Switzerland
To participate in 4th meeting of the

Programme Review Group of the
OECD/NEA HYMERES Project.
57.
Pramod Kumar Dixit
24/11/2014
28/11/2014
Trieste, Italy
To participate in IAEA-ICTP Joint

meeting on training in Patient Safety in
Radiotherapy.
58.
Parikshat Bansal
09/12/2014
12/12/2014
Moscow, Russia
To participate in Workshop on lesson

learned from Integrated Regulatory
Review Services (IRRS) Mission.
59.
Anup Prabhakaran
08/12/2014
12/12/2014
Vienna, Austria
To participate in Technical Meeting on

the Draft Safety Guide on operating
experience feedback for Nuclear
Installations.
60.
Jagannath Mishra
15/12/2014
18/12/2014
Paris, France
To participate in Meeting of the MDEP

VVER Technical Expert Sub Group on
the Reactor pressure vessel and primary
circuits (TESG RPV & PV).
61.
Smt. Sonal Gandhi
21/12/2014
23/12/2014
Daegeon,
South Korea
To participate in Deliver talk on

Prospects of Nuclear Energy in India at
KAIST.
62.
M. M. Kulkarni
19/01/2015
22/01/2015
Vienna, Austria
To participate in 2nd Consultancy

Meeting of IAEA on the Development
of Implementation Guide on Computer
Security for Nuclear Security(NSTO45)
63.
Dr. A. U.Sonawane
21/01/2015
22/01/2015
Vienna, Austria

meeting of Point of Contract (POC) of
Incident & Transforming Database.
64.
Rajoo Kumar
02/02/2015
06/02/2015
Vienna, Austria

meeting
for
developing
draft
technology guidance for exercising
Nuclear Security Systems & measures
for detection & response to Nuclear
other Radioactive Material.
65.
R. Bhattacharya
09/02/2015
10/02/2015
Vienna, Austria
To participate in Indian Delegation for

Diplomatic Conference for Considering
the 66 proposal from Switzerland for
amendment to Article 18 of the
convention on Nuclear Safety.
145
66.
S. Harikumar
09/02/2015
10/02/2015
Vienna, Austria
67.
Ajai Pisharady
11/02/2015
13/02/2015
Helsinki, Finland To participate in 2nd Meeting of PSA

Working Group of VVER Regulatory
Forum.
68.
SoumenKoner
10/02/2015
27/02/2015
Trieste, Italy
To participate in ICTP / IAEA Jointly

Training Course on Physics &
Technology of water Cooled Reactors
through the use of PC-based
Simulators.
69.
Fredric Lall
17/02/2015
19/02/2015
Abu Dhabi,
UAE
To participate in 25th Meeting of

Steering Technical Committee (STC) of
MDEP.
70.
Aniket Gupta
23/02/2015
26/02/2015
Trieste, Italy
To participate in 2nd Probabilistic

Technical Workshop of Code for
Evergreen
Service
Accident
Management (CESAM) EP 7 project.
71.
Rajoo Kumar
24/02/2015
27/02/2015
Vienna, Austria

meeting for developing draft Technical
Guidance for exercising Nuclear
Security System & Measures for
detection of & Response to Nuclear &
other Radiation Material.
72.
M. M. Kulkarni
09/03/2015
13/03/2015
Vienna, Austria
To participate in Expert meeting on the

lessons learned in Developing &
Establishing
Computer
Security
Programes of Nuclear Facilities & the
3rd programmed committee meeting
for CN-228.
73.
Dr. Pankaj Tandon
18/03/2015
20/03/2015
Vienna, Austria
To participate in IAEA meeting of INES

for Medical Events.
74.
Vivek Piplani
27/3/2015
27/3/2015
Paris, France
To participate in 22nd meeting of

Advisory Committee for International
Reporting System for Operating
Experience.
146
To participate in Indian Delegation for

Diplomatic Conference for Considering
the proposal from Switzerland for
amendment to Article 18 of the
convention on Nuclear Safety.
APPENDIX
PUBLICATIONS
JOURNALS
A. Mathur, S. A. Khan, V. Jagannathan,
l
L. Thilagam,
D. K. Mohapatra; Validation of VISWAM Square
Lattice Module with MOX Pin Cell Benchmark; UPB
Scientific Bulletin, Series-A, 2015.
S.
l
S. Singh and D. K. Mohapatra; Solution of the

Reactor Point Kinetics Equations by MATLAB
Computing; Nuclear Technology and Radiation
Protection, 30 (1), 2015.
testing, International Journal of Life Cycle

Reliability and Safety Engineering, Vol.3 Issue 3,
2014.
l
H.
Seshadri, Krishan Kumar, Mansi Garg, P.

Velavendan, S. Ganesh and P. K. Sinha; Synthesis,
characterization and evaluation of nanocrystallaline
anatase titania for the degradation of dibutyl
phosphate; Journal of Radio analytical and Nuclear
Chemistry, 300(1), 2014, pp 157-162.
l
V.
Seik
l
Mansoor Ali and V. Raghavan; Steady laminar

flame characteristics over methanol surface with air
co-flow; International Journal of Advances in
Engineering Sciences and Applied Mathematics, Vol.
6 (Issue 1-2), 2014, pp. 106-116.
N.
l
Agrawal, A. Prabhakar, S. K. Das; Hydrogen

distribution in nuclear reactor containment during
accidents and associated heat and mass transfer
issues - A review; Heat Transfer Engineering,
Vol.36, 2015, pp 859-879.
S. Smitha, M. Surianarayanan, H. Seshadri, J.

Samuel Varakumar and A. B. Mandal; Effects of
diluents on the reaction hazards of Tributyl
Phosphate with nitric acid; Organic Process
Research and Development, ACS Journal,
DOI:10.1021/op500180V (2014).
l
V. S.
Smitha, M. Surianarayanan, H. Seshadri, N. V.

Lakshman and A. B. Mandal; Thermal Hazard
behavior of TBP and DBP; Applied Mechanics and
Materials, 593(2014) pp 2557-2560.
l
Diptendu
C.
l
Senthil Kumar, Ajai S. Pisharady, S. Usha and

Prabir C. Basu; Seismic Fragility Analysis of structure,
systems and components of Fast Breeder Test
Reactor; International Journal of Life Cycle
Reliability and Safety Engineering, Vol.3 Issue 2,
2014.
Das, V. A. Juvekar, S. B. Roy and R.

Bhattacharya (2014) Comparative studies on Coextraction of Uranium (VI) and different mineral acid
from aqueous feed solutions using TBP, TOPO and
TOA, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear
Chemistry , 300:333-343.
l
Diptendu
Varun
l
Hassija, C. Senthil Kumar and K. Velusamy;

Markov Analysis for Time Dependent Success
Criteria of Passive Decay Heat Removal System;
Annals of Nuclear Energy (72), 2014.
P. Arun
l
Babu, C. Senthil Kumar, N. Murali and T.

Jayakumar; Towards assessment of Software
Reliability and its Characteristics in Safety Systems of
Nuclear Reactors; Vol. 39(5), ACM SIGSOFT
Software Engineering Notes, Sept 2014.
Hassija, C. Senthil Kumar, K. Velusamy;

Probabilistic safety assessment of multi-unit nuclear
power plant sites - An integrated approach; Journal
of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 32,
2014.
Das, V. A. Juvekar, V. H. Rupawate, K.

Ramprasad and R. Bhattacharya; Effect of the
nature of organo phosphorous acid moiety on coextraction of U(VI) and mineral acid from aqueous
solutions using D2EHPA, PC88A and Cyanex 272 ,
Hydrometallurgy Volume 152, February 2015, Pages
129-138.
l
Mahendra
Prasad and A. J. Gaikwad, Human error

probability estimation by coupling simulator data
and deterministic analysis, Progress in Nuclear
Energy, Vol-81, Pg. 22-29, 2015.
Varun
l
R.
l
Sujatha, M. Boopathi, C. Senthil Kumar; "Genetic

Algorithm approach based on Markov Model and
Basic Path Testing for MIMO Systems in Software
l
P.
K. Baburajan, Govind Singh Bisht, Avinash J.

Gaikwad, S. V. Prabhu, Influence of stiffness on CHF
for horizontal tubes under LPLF conditions, Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol-277, Pg. 15-27, 2014.
R.
l
Srinivasa Rao, Kannan N. Iyer, S. K. Gupta,

Avinash J. Gaikwad, CFD Code Benchmark against
the Air/Helium Tests Performed in The MISTRA
147
Facility, Journal of Annals of Nuclear Energy, Vol69,Pg. 37-43,2014.
NATIONAL CONFERENCES
H.
l
l
R.
Srinivasa Rao, Kannan N. Iyer, S. K. Gupta,

Avinash J Gaikwad, Implementation and Validation
of the Condensation Model for Containment
Hydrogen
Distribution
Studies,
Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol-270, Pg. 37-43, 2014.
l
Subrata
Bera, A. J. Gaikwad, A. Vaidya, U. Sati, D.

Datta, Uncertainty analysis on neutron diffusion
using fuzzy alpha-cut approach, International
Journal of Computer science and Applications, vol.
11, No. 2, pp 105-113, 2014.
Seshadri and V. Balasubramaniyan, Synthesis,

characterization and evaluation of nanocrystalline
anatase titania for the degradation of nitrilotriacetic
acid; Proceedings of Chemical Engineering in
Nuclear Technology, CHEMENT 2014, 6-7 March
2014, Kalpakkam, India.
Mahendra
l
Prasad, Arun kumar Shridharan, Avinash

J. Gaikwad, Analytical Mass Transfer Correlation
Using Mixing Length Theory: Applicable to Flow
Accelerated Corrosion, 5th International Conference
on Fluid Mechanics and Fluid Power 12th - 14th
December, 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
Dhanesh
l
l
J.
Mishra, M. K. M Abdul Rahim and V.

Balasubramaniyan; Methodology of coupled
thermo-mechanical analysis for lower head of
pressure vessel; Seminar on Pressure Vessel, Indian
Institute of Science, Bangalore, August 21, 2014.
l
C.
Senthil
Kumar,
Varun
Hassija,
V.
Balasubramaniyan, A. John Arul, M. Prasad, V.
Gopika, R. Nama, Rajee Guptan and P. V. Varde;
Risk Assessment of Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant
Sites; International Workshop on Multi Unit PSA,
Ottawa, Canada, Nov. 17-20, 2014.
l
V.
Smitha, M. Surianarayanan, H. Seshadri, N. V.

Laskhman and A. B. Mandal; Thermal Hazard
behavior of TBP and DBP; Proceedings of the
International Mechanical Engineering Congress,
National Institute of Technology, Trichy, 13-15 June
2014.
l
Alok
Pandey & Kun-Woo Cho: Global Action Plan

for Management of Radioactive Contamination in
Metal; Challenges and Suggestions, KAIST
Colloquium, Daejeon, South Korea, June 18, 2014.
B. Nagrale, Subrata Bera, Anuj Kumar

Deo, M. Prasad and Avinash J. Gaikwad,
Uncertainty Aspects of Fire Modeling Using CFD
Approach For Fire In Typical Room of Nuclear Power
Plants, FMFP-2014, 5th international and 41st
National Conference on Fluid Mechanics and Fluid
Power (FMFP-2014), December 12-14, 2014, IIT
Kanpur, India.
R.
l
Srinivasa Rao, Kannan N. Iyer, Aniket Gupta,

Gurav Kumar, Avinash J. Gaikwad, S. K. Gupta,
Comparison of Lumped Parameter and CFD Code
Predictions: Sump Evaporation Phenomena,
Proceedings of the 41st National and 5th International
Conference on Fluid Mechanics and Fluid Power,
December 12-14, 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
R.
l
Srinivasa Rao, Kannan N Iyer, Avinash J.

Gaikwad, S. K. Gupta, 'Comparison of Lumped
Parameter
and
CFD
Code
Predictions:
Condensation Phenomena', Proceedings of the 41st
National and 5th International Conference on Fluid
Mechanics and Fluid Power, December 12-14, 2014,
IIT Kanpur, India.
Rupak
l
l
Dhanesh
B. Nagrale, Subrata Bera, Anuj Kumar

Deo, R. S. Rao and Avinash J. Gaikwad, Review of
Important Acceptance Criteria, Considerations and
Significance for an Effective Decision Support
System for Nuclear Emergency Management 16th
International Conference on Harmonisation within
Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling for Regulatory
Purposes, September 8-11, 2014, Varna, Bulgaria.
l
Alok
Pandey, Hyung Joon Yu, Hong Suk Kim;

Assessment of Safety Parameters for Radiological
Explosion Based on Gaussian Dispersion Model,
Korean Nuclear Society Conference, Pyeongchang,
South Korea, October 29-31, 2014.
148
Raman, R. Srinivasa Rao, Avinash J.

Gaikwad 'Effect of Condensation on Distribution of
Hydrogen and Steam in a Reactor Containment',
Proceedings of the 41st National and 5th International
December 12-14, 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
Subrata
l
Bera, Surajit Mondal, Anuj Kumar Deo,

Dhanesh B. Nagrale, D. Datta and A. J. Gaikwad,
Uncertainty analysis of venturi scrubber using BEPU
methodology 5th International and 41st National
December12-14, 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
S.
l
S. Singh, D. K. Mohapatra and V.

Balasubramaniyan, Utilisation of Thorium in Fast
Breeder Reactor, National Conference on Power
from Thorium: Present Status and Future Directions,
December 22-24, 2014, BARC, Mumbai, India.
H. Seshadri, A. G. Shanmugmani, Biplob Paul and V.

l
Balasubramaniyan, Comparision of 99Tc removal
from low level liquid waste using inorganic sorbents
and anionic ion exchanger 12th National
Symposium on Nuclear and Radiochemistry
(NUCAR-2015), NPCIL Complex, Anushakthinagar,
Mumbai, India, February 9-13, 2015.
Krishan
l
Kumar, P.Suddhasattwa Ghosh, P.

Venkatesh, B. Prabhakara Reddyand K. Nagarajan;
Exchange current density of Na-bonded U-Zr and
U-Gd-Zr alloy in molten LiCl-KCl eutectic; 12th
National
Symposium
on
Nuclear
and
Radiochemistry (NUCAR-2015), NPCIL Complex,
Anushakthinagar, Mumbai, India, February 9-13,
2015.
Prashant Sharma, Amitanshu Mishra, S. K. Pradhan,

l
Obaidurrahman K., Avinash J. Gaikwad, S. B.
Chafle, Internally Coupled Multi-Point Kinetics with
Thermal-Hydraulics Analysis for Asymmetric Power
Transient of Natural Circulation BWR using RELAP
5 National conference on Power from Thorium:
Present Status and Future Directions, 22-24
December-2014, Mumbai, India.
Pranav
l
Paliwal, S. K. Dubey & A. J. Gaikwad

Adequacy of Passive Decay Heat removal systems
for a nuclear power plant 5th International and 41st
National Conference on Fluid Mechanics and Fluid
Power, 12th-14th December 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
P. K.
l
Baburajan, U. K. Paul, R. S. Rao, Avinash J.

Gaikwad, Station Black Out Analysis for CANDU 6
Plant, 5th International and 41st National Conference
on Fluid Mechanics and Fluid Power, 12th-14th

December 2014, IIT Kanpur, India.
l
Obaidurrahman
K. and Avinash J. Gaikwad, Core

Dynamic Response of Advanced Fuels in Fission
Reactors National Conference on Power from
Thorium: Present Status and Future Directions,
December 22-24, 2014, Mumbai, India.
l
Anuj
Kumar Deo, Subrata Bera and A. J. Gaikwad,

Temperature distribution of thoria pellet in thermal
reactor flux profile in comparison with other fuels,
National Conference on Power from Thorium:
Present Status and Future Directions, December 2224, 2014, Mumbai, India.
l
Suvadip
Carbon Steel Pipeline Wall Thickness

Measurement Using Pulsed Eddy Current
Technique, at the COMSOL conference held in
Bangalore from 13-14 November 2014.
l
S.
Mahalakshmi, G. Sahani, Pradip Kumar, P. K.

Dash Sharma, S. D. Sharma, R. L. Sha, Smriti
Sharma, Rajesh Kumar, S. Vandana; Revised 8
Protocol for Evaluation of Performance Test Criteria
of Telecobalt Unit, Proceedings of the 35th National
Conference of Association of Medical Physicists of
India (AMPICON 2014) held during 20-22
November, 2014 at Pravara Institute of Medical
Sciences, Deemed University (PIMS-DU) Loni,
Maharashtra.
l
S. Mahalakshmi, G. Sahani, P. K. Dash Sharma, A. U.
Sonawane : Projected Growth of Radiation

Facilities and Qualified Radiation Safety Personnel in
India; Proceedings of the 35th National Conference
of Association of Medical Physicists of India
(AMPICON 2014) held during 20-22 November,
2014 at Pravara Institute of Medical Sciences,
Deemed University (PIMS-DU) Loni, Maharashtra.
149
ANNEXURE
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAFR
: Additional Away From Reactor
BCD
: Bleed Condenser
ACOH
: Advisory Committee on Occupational

Health
BDBE
: Beyond Design Basis Event
BEXD
ACPSR
: Advisory Committee for Project

Safety Review
: Boron Enrichment Exchange

Distillation
BEP
: Boron Enrichment Plant
ACPSR-FCF
: Advisory Committee for Project

Safety Review-Fuel Cycle Facilities
BEPU
: Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty
ACRDCSE
: Advisory Committee for Regulatory

Documents on Civil and Structural
Engineering
BIS
: Bureau of Indian Standards
BITS
: Birla Institute of Technical Sciences
BOPS
: Blow Out Panels
BRIT
: Board of Radiation Isotope

Technology
BSD
: Biennial Shutdown
BSM
: Beach Sand Minerals
ACSD-FCF
: Advisory Committee on Safety

Documents related to Fuel Cycle
Facilities
ADS
: Automatic Depressurization System
AERB
: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
AGFS
: AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme
AHX
: Air Heat Exchanger
BSM-NORMSC : Beach Sand Minerals & Naturally

Occurring Radioactive Materials
Safety Committee
AIIMS
: All India Institute of Medical Sciences
CANDU
: Canada Deuterium Uranium
ALARA
: As Low As Reasonably Achievable
CANSAS
ALPAS
: Automatic Liquid Poison Addition

System
: CANDU Safety Association for

Sustainability
CCF
: Common Cause Failures
CDF
: Core Damage Frequency
CESC
: Civil Engineering Safety Committee
CESCOP
: Civil Engineering Safety Committee

For Operating Plants
AMD
: Atomic Minerals Directorate for

Exploration and Research
AMP
: Ageing Management Programs
AOO
: Anticipated Operational Occurrences
AOT
: AERB Observers Team
CFD
: Computational Fluid Dynamics
API
: American Petroleum Institute
CFTF
: Compartment Fire Test Facility
ARA
: Application for Renewal of

Authorisation
CFVS
: Containment Filtered Venting System
CHF
: Critical Heat Flux
ARL
: Application for Renewal of License
CNCAN
ARM
: Advanced Reference Material
: National Commission for Nuclear

Activities Control
ARMS
: Automatic Radiation Monitoring

System
CNRA
: Committee on Nuclear Regulatory

Activities
ASDV
: Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valve
CNS
: Convention on Nuclear Safety
ASEM
: Asia Europe Meeting
CORAL
BAR
: Burnable Absorb Rod
: Compact Reprocessing of Advanced

Fuels in Lead Cell
BARC
: Bhabha Atomic Research Center
CPS-AR
: Control Protection System-Absorber

Rod
151
CPV
: Cooling Pool Vessel
DND
: Delayed Neutron Detector
CRPD
: Communication & Reactor Physics

Division
DPPs
: Draft Document Profile
DPS
: Directorate of Purchase and Stores
CS
: Codes and Standards
DRP
: Diploma in Radiological Physics
CSNI
: Committee on Safety of Nuclear

Installations
DRS
: Directorate of Radiation Safety
CSP
: Core Sub-Assembly Plant
DSL
: Design Safety Limit
CSR
: Control and Safety Rods
DSR
: Diverse Safety Rod
CSRDM
: Control and Safety Rod Drive

Mechanism
DSRC
: Design Safety Review Committee

DSRC-DP Design Safety Review
Committee for Diversified Projects
CSRP
: Committee for Safety Research

Programmes
DSRC-UEP
: Design Safety Review Committee for

Uranium Extraction Projects
CSS
: Containment Spray System/

Committee on Safety Standards
DSS
: Decision Support System
CT
: Calandria Tubes
EALs
: Emergency Action Levels
CV
: Calandria Vault
ECCS
: Emergency Core Cooling System
CWMF
: Centralized Waste Management

Facility
ECD
: Electron Capture Detector
ECIL
: Electronics Corporation of India Ltd.
ECIL-SC
: ECIL Safety Committee
EE-PSA
: External Event Probabilistic Safety

Analysis
EFPSA
: External flooding PSA
EIA
: Environment Impact Assessment EIANRS Environmental Impact

Assessment in respect of Nuclear &
Radiological Safety
ELCB
: Earth Leakage Circuit Breaker
eLORA
: Licensing of Radiation Applications
EMCCR
: En-Mass Coolant Channel

Replacement
EMFR
: En-Mass Feeder Replacement
EMI
: Electromagnetic Interference
EMTR
: Emergency Transfer
EP
: Embedded Part
EP
: Emergency Protection
EPP
: Emergency Preparedness Plan
EPR
: Evolutionary Pressurized Water

Reactor
EPRWG
: Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor

Working Group
EQ
: Equipment/Environment Qualification
ERM
: Environmental Radiation Monitor
DAE
: Department of Atomic Energy DAEALSCDAE-Accelerator and Laser

Safety Committee
DBA
: Design Basis Accident
DBFL
: Design Basis Flood Level
DBGM
: Design Basis Ground Motion
DBR
: Design Basis Reports
DCH
: Direct Containment Heating
DCSEM
: Directorate of Construction, Services

& Estate Management
DCVs
: Double Check Valves
DFAs
: Dummy Fuel Assemblies
DFRP
: Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel

Reprocessing Plant
DG
: Diesel Generator
DGFT
: Director General of Foreign Trade
DGOP
: Director Generals Office of Policy
DHR
: Decay Heat Removal
DIC
: Digital Image Correlation/Digital

Instrumentation and Control
DICWG
: Digital Instrumentation & Control

Working Group
DILs
: Derived Intervention Levels
152
ERP
: Entity Resource Planning
HDR
: High Dose Rate
ERRC
: Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre
HDS
: Hydrogen Distribution Simulator
ESBO
: Extended Station Blackout
HDT
: High Dose Therapy
ESFs
: Engineered Safety Features
HEF
: Head End Facility
ESLs
: Environmental Survey laboratories
HEWAC
: Heavy Water Clean-Up
F.R
: Frequency Rate
HPC
FA
: Fuel Assembly
: High Pressure Containment HPECCS

High Pressure Emergency Core
Cooling System
FAAC
: Fatal Accident Assessment Committee
HPME
: High Pressure Melt Ejection
FAC
: First Approach to Criticality
HPRE
: High Purity Rare Earths
FAR
: Fatal Accident Rates
HRR
: Heat Release Rate
FAs
: Fuel Assemblies
HSEG
FBTR
: Fast Breeder Test Reactor
: Health Safety and Environment

Group
FCE
: Front-End Fuel Cycle Facilities
HWL
: High Water Line
FDS
: Fire Dynamic Simulator
HWP
: Heavy Water Plants
FEA
: Finite Element Analysis
HWP-SC
FEL
: Free Electron Laser
: Heavy Water Plants Safety

Committee
FEL-LINAC
: Free Electron Laser-Linear

Accelerator
HYMERES
: Hydrogen Mitigation Experiments for

Reactor Safety
FEM
: Finite Element Method
HZP
: Hotzero Power
FFP
: Fuel Fabrication Plant
I&CT
: Information and Communication

Technology
FMS
: Flux Mapping System
I&C
: Instrumentation and Control
FMSA
: Fuelling Machine Service Area
IAEA
: International Atomic Energy Agency
FOAK
: First of a Kind
IC
: Inner Containment
FP
: Full power
ICSA
: Instrumented Core Sub-assembly
FPC
: First Pour of Concrete
ICSD
: Ionization Chamber Smoke Detector
FPNG
: Fission Product Noble Gases
ICSP
FRFCF
: Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility
: International Collaborative Standard

Problem
FRP
: Fuel Reprocessing Plant
IDCT
: Induced Draught Cooling Tower
FSA
: Fuel Subassembly
IFL
: Initial Fuel Loading
FSAR
: Final Safety Analysis Report
IFSB
: Interim Fuel Storage Building
GHAVP
: Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut

Pariyojana
IGALL
: International Generic Ageing Lessons

Learned
GIC
: Gamma Irradiation Chamber
IGCAR
GT
: Generator Transformer
: Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic

Research
HAZOP
: Hazard and Operability
IHRGs
: In-HouseReviewGroups
HEF
: Head End Facility
IICT
: Indian Institute of Chemical

Technology
HBNI
: Homi Bhabha National Institute
IIT
: Indian Institute of Technology
HDC
: High density concrete
IL
: Investigation Levels
153
ILRT
: Integrated Leak Rate Test
IMS
: Ion Mobility Spectrometer
INAE
: Indian National Academy of

Engineering
INES
: International Nuclear and

Radiological Event Scale
LOCA
: Loss of Coolant Accident LPECCS

Low Pressure Emergency Core
Cooling System
LPLF
: Low Power Low Flow
LRP
: Large Rotating Plug
LVDT
: Linear Variable Differential

Transformer
LZC
: Liquid Zone Control
IOT
: Intermediate Oil Tank
IPSD
: Industrial Plants Safety Division
IR
: Intermediate Range / Infra Red /

Incidence Rates
MA
: Minor Actinides
MAL
: Main Airlock
IREL
: Indian Rare Earths Limited
MAPS
: Madras Atomic Power Station
IRGD
: Industrial Radiation Gauging Device
MBR
: Mass Burning rate
IRIS
: Improving the Robustness

assessments methodologies for
structures Impacted by missiles
MC
: Monte Carlo
MCL
: Minimum Controlled Power Level
MCR
: Main Control Room
MDEP
: Multi National Design Evaluation

Program
MISTRA
: Mitigation and Stratification
MLPAS
: Moderator Liquid Poison Addition

System
MMPA
: Modified Multimode Push over

Analysis
MoEF
: Ministry of Environment and Forests
MoPP
: Monazite Processing Plant
MoU
: Memorandum of Understanding
MSP
: Mineral Separation Plants
IRRS
: International Regulatory Review

Service
IRS
: Incident Reporting System
ISI
: In-Service Inspection
ISO
: International Organization for

Standardization
ISSC
: International Seismic Safety Center
IT
: Information Technology
JHA
: Job Hazard Analysis
JNPP
: Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project
KAPP
: Kakrapar Atomic Power Project
KGS
: Kaiga Nuclear Power Station
NAPS
: Narora Atomic Power Station
KKNPP
: Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project

KNSKorea Nuclear Society
NARAC
: National Atmospheric Release

Advisory Centre
KRSC
: KGS 1to4 and RAPS 3to6 Safety

Committee
NC
: Non Conformance
LBE
: Lead Bismuth Eutectic
NC
: Natural Circulation
LBLOCA
: Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident
NDMA
: National Disaster Management

Authority
LHGR
: Linear Heat Generating Rate
NEA
: Nuclear Energy Agency
LHS
: Latin Hypercube Sampling
NEI
: Nuclear Energy Institute
LLW
: Low Level Wastes
NEMIS
LMFBR
: Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder

Reactor
: Nuclear Emergency Management

Information system
NFAR
: Non-Fatal Accident Rates
LMODC
: Loss of Moderator Cooling
NFC
: Nuclear Fuel Complex
LOECC
: Loss of Emergency Core Cooling
NFME
: Neutron Flux Monitoring Equipment
154
NGADU
: Nuclear Grade Ammonium DiUranate
NISST
: National Institute of Secondary Steel

Technology
NKSC
: NAPS-KAPS Safety Committee
NMA
: Near Miss Accidents
NOC
: Normal Operating Condition
NORM
: Naturally Occurring Radioactive

Materials
NPCIL
: Nuclear Power Corporation of India

Limited
NPPs
: Nuclear Power Plants
NPSD
: Nuclear Projects Safety division
NREMC
: Nuclear and Radiological Emergency

Monitoring Cell
NRRC
: Northern Regional Regulatory Centre
NSAD
: Nuclear Safety Analysis Division
NSDF
: Near Surface Disposal Facility
NSGC
: Nuclear Security Guidance

Committee
NUSSC
: Nuclear Safety Standards Safety

Committee
OAS
: Office Automation System
OBE
: Operating basis Earthquake
OCRP
: Orientation Course for Regulatory

Processes
ODC
: Over Dimension Consignment
ODE
: Ordinary Differential equations
OECD
: Organisation for Economic

cooperation and Development
OEIC
: Over Exposure Investigation

Committee
OILs
: Operational Intervention Levels
OJT
: On the Job Training
OLBS
: On-Line Boron measurement System
OLIC
: Official Language Implementation

Committee
OPRD
: Over Pressure Rupture Device
OPSD
: Operating Plants Safety Division
OREDA
: Offshore Reliability handbook
OSART
: Operational Safety Review Team
OSCOM
: Orissa Sand Complex
OSEE
: Off-site emergency exercise
PAR
: Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners
PCPs
: Primary Coolant Pumps
PCT
: Peak Clad Temperature
PDHRS
: Passive Decay Heat Removal System
PDSC
: Project Design Safety Committee
PDU
: Potassium Di-Uranate
PEE
: Plantem ergency exercises
PET
: Positron Emission Tomography
PFBR
: Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
PG
: Policy group
PGA
: Peak Ground Acceleration
PHRS
: Passive Heat Removal System
PHT
: Primary Heat Transport
PHWRs
: Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors
PLCs
: Programmable Logics Controllers
PORV
: Pilot Operated Relief Valves
PPE
: Personal Protective Equipment
PPF
: Process Plant Facility
PS
: Power Supply
PSI
: Pre-Service Inspection
PSA
: Probabilistic Safety Assessment
PSAR
: Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
PSD
: Partial Shutdown
PSE
: Physical Startup Equipment
PSI
: Pre-Service Inspection
PSR
: Periodic Safety Review
PT
: Pressure Tube
PWR
: Pressurized Water Reactor
QA
: Quality Assurance
QMS
: Quality Management System
R&DD
: Resources & Documentation Division
R&D
: Research and Development
RAL
: Remote after loading
RAPP
: Rajasthan Atomic Power Project
RAPS
: Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
155
RASSC
: Radiation Safety Standard committee
RBCW
: Reactor Building Cooling Water
RCA
: Root cause analysis
RCF
: Rastriya Chemicals and Fertilizers
RCP
: Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS
: Reactor Coolant System
RDRC
: Radioactive Waste Disposal

Committee
RFF
: Resin Fixation facility
RIA
: Radiological Impact Assessment
RIH
: Reactor Inlet Header
RITs
: Reactivity Insertion Transients
RIs
: Regulatory Inspections
RLA
: Residual Life Assessment
RMSC
: RAPS-MAPS Safety Committee
ROpER
: Regulator Operating Experience

Review
ROH
: Reactor Outlet Header
RP&AD
: Radiation Protection and Advisory

Division
RPF
: Radiation Processing Facility
RPV
: Reactor Pressure Vessel
RRCAT
: Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced

Technology
RRS
: Reactor Regulatory System
RSA
: Radiation Safety Agency
RSD
: Radiological Safety Division
RSM
: Radiation Survey Meters
RSOs
: Radiological Safety Officers
RTC
: Regional Training Course
RTI
SARCOP
: Safety Review Committee for

Operating Plants
SARIS
: Self Assessment of Regulatory

Infrastructure for Safety
SBO
: Station black Out
SC
: Safety Codes
SCCI&CS
: Standing committee on Control for

Instrumentation & Computer Based
Systems
SC-RP
: SARCOP Standing CommitteeReactor Physics
SCR
: Supplementary Control Room
SCDF
: Site Core Damage Frequency
SDU
: Sodium Di-Uranate
SEC
: Site Evaluation Committee SECJNPPSite Evaluation Committee for

JNPP
SEE
: Site emergency exercise
SERs
: Significant Event Reports
SG
: Safety Guides
SG-DHRS
: Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal

System
SGs
: Specialist Groups
SHC
: Super Heavy Concrete
SM
: Safety Manuals
SMS
: Short Message Service
SNAS
: Secured Network Access System
SOHPM
: Safety & Occupational Health

Professionals Meet
SOP
: Standard Operating Procedure
SPECT
: Single Photon Emission Computed

Tomography
: Right to Information Act
SPND
: Self Powered Neutron Detectors
RUP
: Reprocessed Uranium Oxide Plant
SR
: Source Range
SA
: Severe Accident
SR
: Severity Rate
SACNUM
: Safety Committee for Nuclear

Medicine
SRI
: Safety Research Institute
SRP
: Small Rotating Plug
SAMG
: Severe Accident Analysis &

Management Guideline
SRRC
: Southern Regional Regulatory Centre
SAP
: System and Application Programs

SARCAR Safety Review Committee
for Application of Radiation
SRS
: Software Requirement Specification
SS
: Safety Standards
SS
: Stainless Steel
156
SSC
: Structures, Systems and Components
UASC
: UCIL & AMD Safety Comitee
SSDL
: Secondary Standard Dosimetry

Laboratory
UBDS
: Ultrasonic Ball Detection System
UCIL
SSE
: Safe Shutdown Earthquake
: Uranium Corporation of India

Limited
SSED
: Siting & Structural Engineering

Division
ULC
: Ultimate Load Capacity
URP
: Uranium Recovery Plant
SSL
: Secure Socket Layer
USC
: Unit Safety Committees
SST
: Sea Surface Temperature
USNRC
SSW
: Salt Service Water
: United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission
STC
: Steering Technical Committee
VECC
: Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
STQC
: Standardisation Testing and Quality

Certification
VIC
: Vendor Inspection Co-operation
VICWG
TAPS
: Tarapur Atomic Power Station
: Vendor Inspection Co-operation

Working Group
TBP
: Tri Butyl Phosphate
VPN
: Virtual Private Network
TD
: Technical Documents
VRSC
: VECC RRCAT Safety Committee
TDP
: Technology Demonstration Plant
VSPP
: Versatile Solvent Production Plant
TECDOC
: Technical Document
VTF
: Value Test Facility
TESGs
: Technical Expert Sub-Groups
VVER
TFs
: Task Forces
: Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky
Reactor
TG
: Turbine-Generator
WASSC
: Waste Safety Standard Committee
THRUST
: Thorium Retrieval Uranium Recovery

and Re-storage
WGs
: Working Groups
WGPC
: Working Group on Public

Communication
WMD
: Waste Management Division
WMP
: Waste Management Plant
WR
: Working Range
ZC
: Zirconium Complex
TLAA
: Time Limited Ageing Assessment
TLD
: Thermo luminescence Dosimetry
TPW
: Tsunami Protection Wall TRANSSC

Transport Safety Standard Committee
TRIKIN
: TRIangular meshes based KINetics
157
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES)

(REVISED)
Level / Descriptor
Nature of the Events
Examples
7
MAJOR
ACCIDENT
Major release: Widespread health and environmental effects Chernobyl NPP, USSR
6
SERIOUS
ACCIDENT
Significant release: Likely to require full implementation of Kyshtym Reprocessing
requiring implementation of planned and extended counter (now in Ukraine), 1986

Fukushima NPP, Japan,
measures.
2011
planned counter measures.
Plant, Russia,1957
Limited release: Likely to require partial implementation of

5
some planned counter measures
ACCIDENT WITH
Severe damage to reactor core/Several Deaths from radiation.
WIDER
CONSEQUENCES Release of large qualities of radioactive material within an
installation with a high probability of significant public exposure.
This could arise from a major criticality accident or fire
Windscale Pile, UK,

1957
Three Mile Island, NPP,
USA, 1979
Goiania, Brazil, 1987
Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in

4
implementation of planned countermeasures other than local
ACCIDENT WITH
food controls.
LOCAL
CONSEQUENCES Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1% release of
core inventory.
At least one death from radiation/Release of significant quantities
of radioactive material within an installation with a high
probability of significant public exposure.
Tokaimuro,Japan,1999
Saint-Laurent des Eaux
NPP, France, 1980
Fleurus, Belgium, 2006
Mayapuri Incident,
India, 2010
3
SERIOUS
INCIDENT
2
INCIDENT
1
ANOMALY
0
DEVIATIONS
BELOW SCALE
158
Near accident of an NPP with no safety provisions remaining.

Highly radioactive sealed source lost or stolen/misdelivered
without adequate radiation procedures in place to handle it.
Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/hr in an operating area
Severe contamination in an area not expected by design, with a
low probability of significant public exposure
Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for
workers/ Non-lethal deterministic health effect(e.g. burns)from
radiation.
Vandellos NPP, Spain,

1989
Ikitelli, Turkey, 1999.
Significant failures in safety provisions but with no actual

consequences
Exposure of member of public in excess of 10mSv/Exposure of a
worker in excess of the statutory annual limits/Radiation level in an
operating area of more than 50mSv/hr
Significant contamination within the facility into an area not
expected by design
Found highly radioactive sealed orphan source, device or
transport package with safety provisions intact./Inadequate
packaging of highly radioactive material sealed source
Forsmark. Sweden,
2006
Minor problems in safety components with significant defence in

depth remaining/ Low activity lost or stolen radioactive source,
device or transport package
Overexposure of member of public in excess of statutory limits.
No safety significance
Sellafield, UK, 2005

Yanango, Peru, 1999
Atucha, Argentina,
2005
Breach of operating
limits at a nuclear
facility/Theft of a
moisture density gauge
Edited and published by Shri S. Harikumar, Secretary,

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Niyamak Bhavan, Anushaktinagar, Mumbai - 400 094
(E-mail: harikumar@aerb.gov.in). Website: www.aerb.gov.in.
Compiled by: Hemant K. Kulkarni, C&RPD and Shobhasri Challa, R&DD, AERB
Acknowledgments: Soumen Sinha (IPSD), P. Bansal (R&DD), Smt. Anuradha V. (RSD)
Printed at Printania Offset Pvt. Ltd. Matunga, Mumbai - 400 019

NIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR
MUMBAI-400 094

Annual Report 2015

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Annual Report 2015

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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987.

Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996.

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, after an

Promote research and development efforts in the areas of safety.

SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS

REGULATION OF FACILITIES USING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN INDUSTRY,

LICENSES ISSUED UNDER THE FACTORIES ACT, 1948 / ATOMIC ENERGY

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES

NEW SAFETY DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED

SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND CONTAINMENT SAFETY STUDIES

INTERACTION WITH MEDIA

CHAPTER 10 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

IRRS MISSION TO AERB

CHAPTER 11 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AERB

QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (QMS) OF AERB

CHAPTER 12 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE

CHAPTER 13 SAFETY PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES

DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS MEET

CHAPTER 14 OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION

CHAPTER 16 TECHNICAL INTERACTION WITH EXTERNAL AGENCIES

INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

CHAPTER 17 AERB WELFARE ACTIVITIES

AERB STAFF CLUB ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 18 DEPUTATIONS ABROAD

Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Nuclear Power Projects and

Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Projects in 2014-15 with Status of resolution

Status of resolution of RI recommendations of Nuclear Projects for the Year - 2013-14

Meetings of Safety Committees

Categorization of Recommendations made during scheduled Regulatory

Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category-I, II & III) of Operating NPPs

Licensing of Operating Staff

Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Categorization of Deficiencies observed during scheduled Regulatory Inspections

Status of resolution of RI recommendations (Category-I, II & III) of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries

Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2014)

Radiation doses received by workers in Medical Industrial and Research Institutions

Radiation doses received by workers in Medical, Industrial and Research institutions

New Research Projects Approved

Research Projects Renewed

INES Events Scale

System-wise Classification of SERs in NPPs during the year 2014

Classification of Direct causes of SERs

Classification of Root causes of SERs

Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE units in 2014

Distribution of Man-days Loss in DAE Units in 2014

Injury Index in DAE Units in 2014

Frequency Rates in DAE Units in 2014

Year wise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units

Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Acts in DAE Units-2014

Distribution of Injuries due to Unsafe Conditions in DAE Units-2014

Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)

Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Gross Beta)

Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)

Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Argon-41)

Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Fission Product Noble Gas)

Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Iodine-131)