BAUTISTA, Coleen Joyce Q.

1A- JD4
Introduction to Law: Saturday, 11:00AM to 12:00NN
WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON
5 US 137
February 21, 1803
Facts:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of
the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were
confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons inauguration. A few of the commissions,
including Marburys, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
Issue:
Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?
Ruling:
No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made,
and Marbury has a right to the commission. Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marburys commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive
actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to
direct an officer of the government to do a particular thing therein specified, mandamus is the
appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State
really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of
jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

JOSE A. ANGARA v. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

GR no. L-45081
July 15, 1936

Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
Motion of Protest against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest
filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
that the election of said position be nullified.
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
Held:
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ENRICO PALOMAR

GR no. L-19650
September 29, 1966
Facts:
In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional scheme called "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump of each Caltex Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open to all motor

vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is no required fee or consideration, and there is no need
for the contestants to purchase the products of Caltex. The forms are available upon request at each
Caltex Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited. Foreseeing
the extensive use of mails for publicizing and transmission of communication purposes, Caltex sent
representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. But
then, the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, denied the request of Caltex in view of Sections 1954
(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. The aforesaid sections prohibits the use of
mail conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme. Consequently, Caltex invoked a judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory
relief against the Postmaster General, ordering the Postmaster General to allow the petitioner to use the
mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public and that the aforesaid contest is not violative of
the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition of Caltex states a sufficient cause for declaratory relief.
Whether or not the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal Law.
Ruling:
Judgment Affirmed.
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law nor does it transgress any of its provisions. A lottery or gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration; and, there being no consideration derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving
the chance with regards to this contest means it is not one. Hence, the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for the purposes thereof and that the petition herein states a sufficient cause for
declaratory relief.

SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97973
January 27, 1992
Facts:
In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the decision made by herein
respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of
land sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free
patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex. Failed to
pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such
property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to

repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a
complaint against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the fiveyear period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on
the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied retroactively. Hence, the
issue.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the foreclosure sale by not
applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead applied retroactively the ruling in the
case Belisario v. IAC?
Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still the Monge case,
hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However, the respondent court applied
the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But
the Supreme Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by
decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: while our decisions form
part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. Moreover, the Court emphasized that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively xxx. Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should
be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding this case. Wherefore,
such decision was reversed and set aside.

LOURDES BARRERA v. LEON BARRERA and FIDELA ANDRES BARRERA

G.R. No. L-31589
July 31, 1970
Facts:
This case involved the contempt of Judge Alfredo Catolico of the Court of First Instance of Cavite for
having been issued a disciplinary action for the refusal to apply the law as interpreted by the highest
tribunal, the Supreme Court. It started when this case was pending trial in CFI Cavite, the counsel for
petitioner requested Judge Catolico to continue with the hearing, invoking Section 3, Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court. However, the case remains pending when at the time of the supposed continuance, the
new Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather. Such case was referred to the Justice
Department; the Undersecretary of the latter referred it to respondent judge who, in his comments, said
that such case cannot be continued because it has already lapsed, pursuant to the three-month limit in
the Rules of Court. Moreover, notwithstanding his awareness to a doctrine the Court rule in Barrueco v.
Abeto, the respondent judge predicated his own opinion and rather, questioned the decisions of the

Hon. Court in its ruling in Barrueco case. Hence, a disciplinary action against respondent. Hence, the
issue.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal by respondent Judge to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest
Tribunal lead him to his contempt?
Ruling: Yes.
The Court ruled that what the highest judicial organ says should be definitive and authoritative, hence,
binding to those occupying the lower ranks of judicial hierarchy. More so, reiterating an opinion by
Justice J.B.L Reyes, the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration,
has the last word on what the law isthere is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings. The Court emphasized that a Judge of a lower court may state his
opinion if he finds a doctrine of the SC against his principles, however, he cannot dispose of the case,
for he always has to render judgement whether or not it is against his conscience.

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34

G.R. No. L-54558
May 22, 1987
Facts: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-ofStaff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case
against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their
case for the tribunal should be considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation of
Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case Aquino v. Military
Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend that such
ruling must be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been
lifted.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so
far as the case at bar is concerned?
Ruling:

Yes.First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still pending,
military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already since the
law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some justices in Aquino v.
MilComm, stating that Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under general
law are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military processxxx..Judicial power
exist only in courts.Moreover, the Court emphasized that Reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a
doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after
all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.